The experimenters’ regress: from skepticism to argumentation

Godin, Benoît et Gingras, Yves (2002). « The experimenters’ regress: from skepticism to argumentation ». Studies in History and Philosophy of Science(33), pp. 137-152.

Fichier(s) associé(s) à ce document :

Prévisualisation	PDF Télécharger (87kB)

Résumé

Harry Collins’ central argument about experimental practice revolves around the thesis that facts can only be generated by good instruments but good instruments can only be recognized as such if they produce facts. This is what Collins calls the experimenters’ regress. For Collins, scientific controversies cannot be closed by the ‘facts’ themselves because there are no formal criteria independent of the outcome of the experiment that scientists can apply to decide whether an experimental apparatus works properly or not. No one seems to have noticed that the debate is in fact a rehearsal of the ancient philosophical debate about skepticism. The present article suggests that the way out of radical skepticism offered by the so-called mitigated skeptics is a solution to the problem of consensus formation in science.

Type:	Article de revue scientifique
Mots-clés ou Sujets:	sociologie des sciences, philosophie des sciences, skepticisme, argumentation
Unité d'appartenance:	Faculté des sciences humaines > Département d'histoire
Déposé par:	Yves Gingras
Date de dépôt:	30 janv. 2008
Dernière modification:	01 nov. 2014 02:04
Adresse URL :	http://archipel.uqam.ca/id/eprint/488

Modifier les métadonnées (propriétaire du document)

Statistiques