COLONIALISM'S CURRENCY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF FIRST NATIONS
MONEY-USE IN QUEBEC AND ONTARIO, 1820-1950

DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE DOCTORATE IN HISTORY

BY
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NOVEMBER 2011
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LE COLONIALISME MONÉTAIRE : UNE HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DE L’UTILISATION
DE L’ARGENT CHEZ LES PREMIÈRES NATIONS AU QUÉBEC ET EN ONTARIO,
1820 À 1950

THÈSE
PRÉSENTÉE
COMME EXIGENCE PARTIELLE
DU DOCTORAT EN HISTOIRE

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BRIAN GETTLER
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List of Abbreviations

ACNHW: Archives du Conseil de la Nation huronne-wendat
BANQ-Q: Bibliothèque et archives nationales du Québec – Quebec City
BPC: Board of Pension Commissioners for Canada
CEF: Canadian Expeditionary Force
CPC: Canadian Pension Commission
HBC: Hudson’s Bay Company
HBCA: Hudson’s Bay Company Archives
LAC: Library and Archives Canada
NWC: North West Company
T&NO: Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad
Résumé

Cette étude analyse l'utilisation de l'argent dans le contexte du colonialisme canadien des XIXe et XXe siècles. Elle émet l'hypothèse que l'argent, en tant qu'objet et idée économique par excellence de la société occidentale, était au cœur des interactions entre les Premières Nations, l'État et le capital. À travers une analyse de l'utilisation de l'argent, tant en ce qui concerne son aspect matériel que son côté abstrait, cette thèse conclut que le rôle joué par l'argent dans le colonialisme canadien ne fut pas monolithique, fournissant à tout acteur historique un moyen d'exercer du pouvoir, parfois de manière étonnante. Elle affirme que le rôle incontournable qu'une grande partie de l'historiographie accorde à l'État (plus particulièrement au Département des affaires indiennes) et le carcan législatif qu'il a développé en ce qui concerne l'expérience vécue des Autochtones est, du moins au sujet des affaires monétaires, au mieux surtenu et au pire caricatural. En effet, cette étude démontre qu'en dépit du discours musclé que certains bureaucrates et politiciens ont employé dans la correspondance, les rapports publiés et la législation, les conséquences de l'intervention monétaire de l'État dans des communautés amérindiennes n’a que rarement correspondu aux objectifs officiellement énoncés, allant même parfois jusqu’à contredire ces derniers. En s’appuyant sur l’analyse de l’expérience de trois Premières Nations distinctes sur les plans culturel, historique et géographique (au Québec, les Huron-Wendat de Wendake et les Innus de Mashteuiatsh et, en Ontario, les Cris de Moose Factory), cette étude affirme que les politiques nationales de l'État ont eu des effets différents selon le contexte dans lequel elles furent mises en œuvre. Ainsi, la présente thèse remet en question les interprétations de l'histoire du colonialisme de la première moitié du XXe siècle qui dresse trop facilement des parallèles entre les objectifs énoncés d'un État apparemment hostile et les difficultés socioéconomiques qu’expérimentent actuellement beaucoup de Premières Nations. Cette thèse affirme plutôt que l’interaction de la politique et de la pratique, en ce qui a trait à l’utilisation de l’argent aux XIXe et XXe siècles, a souvent produit des résultats inattendus, créant ainsi un nouvel espace permettant à la fois l’expression de l’« agency » autochtone et l’imposition de l’autorité étatique et capitaliste.

Au cours des années 1820 et 1830, certains débats entre les autorités impériales et coloniales quant à la monétisation des présents amérindiens contribuaient à la réification discursive de l’« Indien imprévoyant ». Jusqu’au milieu du XXe siècle, cette figure influençait le discours étatique de deux façons. D’abord, elle permettait aux Affaires indiennes de légitimer le statut légal des Amérindiens en tant que pupille de l’État. Ensuite, elle offrait à cette même institution un moyen efficace de repousser les prétentions d’autres agences étatiques qui tentaient de fournir aux Premières Nations des services au même titre que les autres Canadiens, et ce, en affirmant posséder l’expertise nécessaire pour protéger cette population particulièrement vulnérable. Cette façon de dépeindre les Autochtones, profondément influencée par la conviction très répandue que les pauvres des régions urbaines étaient incapables de gérer l’argent liquide de manière judicieuse, amène à concevoir ceux-ci comme une masse indifférenciée qui, dans les termes employés par le discours de la politique indienne, devait être « protégée », « civilisée » et « assimilée ».
Cependant, les actions concrètes des Affaires indiennes ont fréquemment influencé la société autochtone de manière à défier ce genre de représentations unitaires, notamment en ce qui concerne la création et l'entretien des divisions de classes, ceci révélant l'écart important entre le discours officiel et l'expérience vécue. Au même moment, les grandes corporations du commerce des fourrures (institutions qui dominaient l'activité économique dans la région subarctique jusqu'au milieu du XXe siècle) dépeignaient également les Amérindiens comme des êtres imprévoyants par nature, ce qui leur permettait de justifier à la fois leur politique de ne pas utiliser l'argent en espèces pour les paiements ainsi que leurs fréquents efforts pour diminuer les sommes qu'elles accordaient en crédit aux Amérindiens. Toutefois, en pratique, la concurrence et la place grandissante occupée dans le Nord québécois et ontarien par les Eurocanadiens qui n'étaient pas directement impliqués dans la traite de fourrures compliquaient l'utilisation de l'argent, faisant souvent en sorte que la Compagnie de la Baie d'Hudson et ses principaux rivaux, en dépit des souhaits de leurs dirigeants, étaient obligés d'employer davantage l'argent. Néanmoins, la politique corporative adoptée par ces compagnies à partir du XVIIe siècle, qui consistait à n'utiliser qu'une seule monnaie d'échange (le castor) avec les Premières Nations, facilitait l'implantation de l'argent étatique dans le subarctique aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Un symbole particulièrement visible de sa souveraineté sur un territoire grandissant est ainsi fourni à l'État-nation canadien en plein essor.

Cette thèse cherche à démontrer trois principaux points. Premièrement, elle soutient que l'argent doit être analysé à la fois sur les plans économique et politique, puisque l'espace monétaire dans le contexte colonial servait à légitimer l'autorité responsable de son maintien (quelles soit corporative ou étatique) tout en facilitant les activités du marché. Deuxièmement, elle affirme qu'en tant que phénomène fondamentalement social, l'argent fournissait un moyen par lequel certains acteurs arrivaient à imposer leur domination coloniale et d'autres réussissaient à résister à celle-ci ou à l'esquiver, ce dernier résultat étant souvent créé par l'application de la domination elle-même. Troisièmement, cette thèse affirme que l'histoire des relations entre les Premières Nations et les Eurocanadiens doit être examinée en des termes discursifs et matériels, car la juxtaposition de ces deux registres d'analyse distincts révèle des inconsistances importantes qui seraient autrement demeurées invisibles.

Mots-clés:

Abstract

This study analyzes money-use in the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Canadian colonialism. It proceeds from the hypothesis that money, as the economic object and idea _par excellence_ in Western society, was central to interactions between First Nations, the state, and capital. Through an analysis of the use of both abstract and material currency, however, the present dissertation concludes that money’s role in Canadian colonialism was anything but monolithic, providing a means for all historical actors to exert force, sometimes in surprising ways. It argues that, at least insofar as monetary issues are concerned, the historiography’s tendency to foreground the state (particularly the Department of Indian Affairs) and its legislative framework when describing the lived experience of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples is at best overwrought and at worse caricatural. Indeed, this study demonstrates that despite the muscular discourse deployed by bureaucrats and politicians in correspondence, published reports, and legislation, the consequences of the state’s monetary intervention in Amerindian communities rarely corresponded to its avowed goals and sometimes even explicitly contradicted them. Moreover, through its analysis of the experience of three culturally, historically, and geographically distinct First Nations in Quebec and Ontario (the Huron-Wendat of Wendake, the Moose Factory Cree, and the Innu of Mashteuiatsh), this study argues that the state’s nationwide policies often had entirely different outcomes depending on the context in which they were implemented. In this sense, the present dissertation challenges the validity of interpretations of the history of colonialism through the end of the Second World War that draw easy parallels between the avowed goals of an apparently hostile state and the dire socioeconomic straits in which many First Nations currently find themselves. Instead, it argues that the interaction of policy and practice with respect to money-use during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries frequently produced entirely unanticipated results, creating novel space for Aboriginal agency as often as it provided the state and capital with a vector for unilaterally imposing their authority and power.

During the early nineteenth century, debates between imperial and colonial authorities on the monetization of Indian presents contributed to the discursive reification of the “improvident Indian.” Through the mid-twentieth century, this figure informed state discourse in two ways: first, it allowed Indian Affairs to legitimate the legal definition of Amerindians as wards of the state and, second, it provided this same institution with an effective means of repelling other state agencies that attempted to provide services to First Nations alongside other Canadians by claiming that it alone possessed the expertise required to protect this particularly vulnerable population. Such discursive portrayals of Aboriginal peoples, deeply informed by the widespread nineteenth-century European and Euro-Canadian belief that the urban poor were incapable of judiciously managing cash, painted them as an undifferentiated mass, that, in the terms employed in officially proclaimed state Indian policy, needed to be protected, “civilized,” and assimilated into the wider Canadian body politic.

However, Indian Affairs’ concrete actions frequently influenced Aboriginal society in ways that defy such unitary representation, notably contributing to the creation and maintenance of class divisions that reveal official discourse on money-use to be entirely divorced from actual historical experience. At the same time, large fur trade corporations (the institutions that dominated much of the subarctic’s economic activity through the middle of the twentieth
century), similarly portrayed Amerindians as being improvident by nature in order to justify both their policy of not employing hard currency and their frequent attempts to curtail the amount of credit they extended to their Aboriginal trading partners. In practice, however, competition and the increasing presence in northern regions of Euro-Canadians who were not directly involved in the fur trade complicated money-use, often forcing the Hudson’s Bay Company and other large fur buying corporations to employ greater amounts of abstract and material currency than their management desired. Nevertheless, the corporate policy that these companies adopted from the seventeenth century of conducting their business with First Nations in terms of a single abstract money of account (beaver currency) facilitated the nineteenth- and twentieth-century adoption of state-backed currency by First Nations in the subarctic, thereby providing the developing Canadian nation-state with a particularly visible means of asserting symbolic sovereignty over its expanding territorial base.

This dissertation makes three primary claims. First, it asserts that money needs to be analyzed in both political and economic terms, as monetary space in the colonial context served to legitimate the authority responsible for its maintenance (whether corporate or state) while simultaneously facilitating diverse actors’ market activity. Second, it argues that as a fundamentally social phenomenon, money provided the means for some actors to impose colonial domination and for others to resist and escape such unbalanced power relations, the latter often as a direct result of the former. Third, it claims that the history of relations between First Nations and Euro-Canadians needs to be examined in both discursive and material terms as the juxtaposition of these two distinct registers of analysis reveals important inconsistencies in both that would otherwise remain undetected.

Keywords:
Introduction

"Sans argent, les autochtones se suffisaient à eux-mêmes."

- Anonymous Innu Woman, 1992

Today, the dollar is one of the most ordinary objects and ideas in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canada alike. Despite its mundane nature, it provides a highly visible metaphor for national unity. In addition to this symbolic charge, the Canadian dollar also functionally ties the nation together. Used daily for reckoning value and performing transactions by nearly every individual within Canada, money contributes to the maintenance of national economic, social, and political space. Even groups that are extremely critical of Canada, such as Quebec sovereigntists, have generally supported the use of Canada’s state-issued currency, whether the country remains intact or not. Other Canadians, however, have viewed the dollar as a tool of colonial domination. This dissertation seeks to address such critical appraisal of money’s historical role by asking whether the transformational power which the anonymous Innu quoted above assigned it can be witnessed in action. It does so in economic and political terms because while economists have generally monopolized the scholarly analysis of money, the assertion that Aboriginal peoples lost self-sufficiency as a result of the introduction of money is a fundamentally political claim, one that sees in the historical process of colonialism the subjugation of Amerindians. The association that this woman makes, then, portrays money in very different terms from classical economics.

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depiction of a neutral medium of market-based exchange, begging empirical investigation of money's changing role in the place of ahistorical theorization.

To accomplish this goal, the present study poses a series of questions that situates money, First Nations, and colonialism within a single analytical framework. How was money implicated in the expansion of authority of overseas empires and domestic states over lands and populations that had previously been beyond their reach? How does the theory of sovereignty find concrete expression in the object and idea of money? How does monetary space change and how do new monetary regimes replace their predecessors? In what ways does this object, which is critically first and foremost an idea, allow individuals, groups, and institutions to exert force in their relations with one another? Why do actors perceive money to be beneficial in some cases and frighteningly dangerous in others? Who is "allowed" to make use of cash and in what circumstances? How does money, when defined both as hard currency and as an abstract measure of value, structure relationships between people, communities, corporations, and the state? How do concepts, given material force by actors and institutions, contribute to the ordering of the physical world? This dissertation, then, examines Aboriginal money-use in the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Canadian colonialism, proceeding from the hypothesis that money played a central role in the extension of the unequal power relations that tied First Nations to the increasingly dominant population of European origin.

Ultimately, however, this study demonstrates that together money and colonialism created complex relations that defy this relatively simplistic hypothesis. Indeed, in testing this premise throughout the following chapters, it concludes that money, a particularly flexible social technology, shaped interaction in complicated ways, often favoring Aboriginal agency instead of the systematic subjugation generally emphasized by the historiography on colonialism. Although this monolithic vision of First Nations history is deeply flawed, it has proven to be a particularly fruitful means of structuring the present study. Indeed, it allows a demonstration of the necessity of simultaneously engaging different forms of analysis on several scales. This study, then, adopts a twin discursive and material approach in order to examine the interaction of money and colonialism at the imperial, colonial, national and local levels. This methodology highlights the contradictions between state and corporate policy,
legal theory, and everyday practice. Indeed, the present study argues that while officials frequently used money to discursively portray First Nations as being socially, politically, and economically dependent on the state, the ways in which Amerindians employed it, whether in abstract or material form, often contradicted this discourse, sometimes as a direct result of the actions of the state itself. In this way, it points to the necessity of analyzing historical experience from multiple perspectives, arguing that neither the state's discourse nor Aboriginal money-use can be understood in isolation. Although strictly discursive analysis suggests that money formed a major tool of colonialism (mostly through the power that the state theoretically wielded over First Nations money-use), purely empirical analysis implies nearly the opposite— that is, that throughout the period Aboriginal peoples enjoyed relatively unhindered access to currency, at least insofar as the state was concerned. This study, then, performs these two levels of analysis in parallel, the first through detailed readings of official policy as enunciated in legislation, correspondence, and published reports and the second through an examination of the material conditions prevailing in Amerindian communities. The resulting dialogue suggests that policy and practice were two very different things during the period. While the first aimed to legitimate the state's intervention in Aboriginal Canada, thereby justifying the existence of the Department of Indian Affairs, the second often served more basic ends, effectively seeking to prevent inordinate suffering while engaging money-use in very limited ways.

This study's analysis is based on the postulate that by its very nature money favors social inequality. Thus, it does not conceive of money along the lines of orthodox economics' "neutral veil," a theory that accords it the power to render value intelligible to all market participants while claiming that it exerts no economic influence of its own. Like the Innu quoted above, this dissertation rejects money's supposed neutrality, arguing that those who possessed currency could call on power that was unavailable to those without it. Because money arrived with colonization, the uses to which colonizers applied it exerted force in ways that, initially at least, were unavailable to Aboriginal peoples. This is particularly
evident in the manner in which individuals and groups employed money during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Then, as now, Canadian society privileged money’s role in the accumulation of capital – that is, the generation, through monetary circulation, of what Marx terms “surplus-value.”\textsuperscript{3} Those who did not use money in this way did not necessarily employ it incorrectly so much as they failed to take advantage of the full force that the dominant sectors of Canadian society ascribed to it. In this way, these individuals and groups, whether Aboriginal or otherwise, found themselves unable to reap the same rewards that money provided in part to their more successful neighbors.

This dissertation’s major research finding resides in the connection it establishes between money, First Nations, and state formation. Money, as both an idea and an object, provided one of the primary infrastructural tools of empire in Canada. Initially, it allowed capital to create new markets in which Aboriginal peoples acted as both producers and consumers. These markets, built on monetary systems controlled by private enterprise, placed ultimate economic and political authority in extra-regional capital (e.g. the Hudson’s Bay Company), responsible for the system’s creation and maintenance. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, as the colonial state grew at an unprecedented rate, ultimate monetary authority in these same networks of exchange shifted as First Nations made use of currency backed by the apparently neutral state to lessen the company’s power in their everyday lives. This practice, however, legitimized the state’s presence in the subarctic, providing the region with symbolic and material infrastructure, thereby integrating the area and its population into the political system based to the south. This form of everyday colonialism, then, was not imposed on unwilling Aboriginal peoples but was rather encouraged by them as an apparently innocuous means of contesting the power of actors who influenced their lives in immediate and sometimes unwelcome ways. However, this strategy would have unintended consequences, as the state used its uncontested monetary authority not only to legitimize its control of regions that had previously existed beyond its reach but also to increasingly

employ money as a tool in the management of its Aboriginal wards. Indeed, following a
failed attempt during the 1820s and 1830s, which, nevertheless, succeeded in branding
Amerindians as improvident by nature, the state began using money throughout Canada
during the 1850s in both treaties and laws to explicitly indicate who was and was not
"Indian." Such intervention, which continued beyond the mid-twentieth century, provided the
state with both a large quantity of data on First Nations and the means of discursively
marking Amerindians as being in need of its protection and guidance.

The present dissertation examines money-use in several distinct contexts. This is
ultimately a product of money's highly flexible and social nature. Indeed, the state, capital,
and First Nations made use of currency to do far more than simply perform market exchange.
They also used it to account for the rights and responsibilities included in their relationships,
to describe each other's character, and to exert political and economic force at the local level.
In this way, money provides insight into a wide array of activities by placing them within the
same analytical framework. Indeed, this dissertation argues that analysis of the social
relations revealed by money-use in diverse contexts such as treaties, the fur trade, band
politics, wage work, social assistance, and credit relations provides insight into the ways that
colonialism, the state, and capital functioned as systems rather than as mere compilations of
heterogeneous phenomena that more thematic approaches tend to suggest.

This dissertation integrates two levels of analysis. The first is resolutely local and
focuses on three First Nations: the Huron-Wendat of Wendake, the Mashteuiatsh Innu, and
the Moose Factory Cree. The second is based on larger entities, namely the state and capital,
and their actions throughout Canada. This twinned approach highlights how practice, policy,
and discourse at both the local and national levels fed back into each other in ways which
would not be perceptible if analysis had been restricted to one of these two levels alone or to
a combination of a single First Nation and the more global Canadian context. This approach
also underlines the ways in which the history of money and colonialism played out in
Aboriginal Canada both in terms of large structural phenomena and the smaller, intimate
experience of everyday life.
While the present study examines Huron and Innu monetary experience during both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it restricts its analysis of Cree history to the period between the 1890s and 1950. Although the HBC had monetized its business at Moose Factory long before this point, through the use of its in-house currency (the made beaver), no major changes occurred within monetary practice in the region between the beginning of the nineteenth and the turn of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the state was entirely absent from the region prior to 1905. As a result, this study describes earlier practice in the context of its analysis of the critical years at the very beginning of the twentieth century.

The conviction that both money and First Nations matter in the context of the larger sweep of North American history grounds this dissertation. Despite widespread agreement among historians that Aboriginal peoples played a central role in the development of the continent during the colonial era, no such consensus exists for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, scholars working both on synthetic histories of Canada and the United States and on specialized studies written in the broad, national context tend to neglect First Nations during later periods. The Amerindian-specific historiography, on the other hand, has often in some sense accepted its own irrelevance to larger scholarly currents, performing historical analysis in isolation from work produced in the context of national, continental, imperial, and global histories.\(^4\) The present study refutes this tendency, arguing that the historical process by which imperial and national markets expanded to include all of northern North America, integrating Native peoples into imperial and national polities, is central to the history of the continent’s present-day political formations. Through money, the British Empire, Canada, and the United States asserted territorial sovereignty in visible ways. This process did not occur despite Aboriginal peoples but because of them. Without the willingness of Amerindians to make use of this new conceptual and material technology, through both accounting currency and circulating cash, distant political authorities and capital

\(^4\) For more on this historiographical tendency see Chapter One and Nicolas G. Rosenthal, “Beyond the New Indian History: Recent Trends in the Historiography on the Native Peoples of North America,” *History Compass*, vol. 4, no. 5 (September 2006), p. 962-74.
concerns would have been unable to integrate these lands and their natural resources into the structures of governance and business over which they presided. The push of private enterprise into regions in which the population was predominantly native provided enormous benefits to the state that, as a result, was able to found its legitimacy on the semantic power of the abstract and material currency that eventually came to be used there. Although this money was imported by newcomers, Amerindians rapidly accepted its merits, often seeking to employ state-issued cash as a means of promoting their interests in regions where Euro-Canadian corporations tried to limit its circulation. In this sense, First Nations played an absolutely central role in the monetization of relatively remote regions across Canada during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in the process promoting the legitimacy of the state and strengthening its imagined grasp on national space.

In long-settled regions, Aboriginal money-use developed in different ways. There, rather than strengthening the state’s authority at the cost of capital, money contributed to changes in First Nations’ internal power structure. Among the Huron-Wendat of Wendake (and, to a lesser extent, among the Innu of Mashteuiatsh), the monetary economy encouraged the emergence of a small yet powerful group of families that controlled much of the reserve’s economic and political activity. From the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, members of these families, who held key political posts and ran successful and influential businesses, held a virtual monopoly on the provision of consumer credit and larger loans such as mortgages in Wendake. This proved particularly important during the Depression, when a small number of influential men prospered as a result of the difficulties experienced by the vast majority of their compatriots. Without the state, whose legislation discouraged Euro-Canadian businesses from providing loans to Amerindian reserve residents and whose approach to social assistance favored the reinforcement of local socioeconomic elites, this home-grown financial sector and the power relations that flourished as a result would not have been possible.

The period examined in the present study begins in the 1820s and continues through the immediate post-World War II years. The salience of these dates does not reside in the simple presence or not of money-use. Rather, they draw their force from changes in relations between First Nations, capital, and the state. Although some Amerindians made use of money
long before the 1820s, it was not until this decade that imperial and colonial officials explicitly addressed the subject of Aboriginal money-use. They did so in the context of a policy debate concerning the form of the traditional diplomatic presents that the British Empire provided its Native North American allies. Officials in the Colonial Office in London suggested replacing these presents with monetary payments as a cost-saving measure. Their counterparts in Upper and Lower Canada responded by asserting that such payments would pose a very real threat to Amerindian well-being. This debate led to ongoing reflection on the potential effects of money on First Nations and on the state's responsibility with regard to these communities. It also contributed to shaping the ideological underpinnings of Indian policy and state practice beyond the middle of the twentieth century. Immediately following the Second World War, a similar debate occupied members of parliament, missionaries, Indian Affairs' employees, and Amerindians. Although this discussion, which gave rise to the 1951 revision of the Indian Act, did not center on money, it provides a convenient point at which to stop the present study, before the major societal changes of the postwar period completely altered the terms by which the state framed the "Indian problem" as well as First Nations' relationship with both Indian Affairs and capital.

Chapter Description

The present dissertation begins with two introductory chapters that lay the groundwork for the historical analysis that follows. Chapter One reviews the relevant historiography, focusing on the wide array of scholarly work upon which this study is founded, before turning to a discussion of sources and methodology. The second chapter explores in greater depth this dissertation's two central concepts: money and colonialism. As neither of these notions is self-evident, precise definitions are necessary for the analysis that follows. The chapter then turns to a study of early modern and modern thought with reference to money and Aboriginal peoples. This brief analysis depicts the intellectual environment in which the events and debates described throughout this study took place. Chapter Two ends with a short monetary history of Canada in order to clarify a subject that, while not the heart of this dissertation, is sufficiently important to merit a concise summary that is unavailable elsewhere.
The dissertation then turns to historical analysis. Chapter Three details the relationship between money, First Nations, and the state during the nineteenth century. It demonstrates that, despite the strong anti-monetary rhetoric employed by colonial officials, money (or its absence) played only a marginal material role in relations between Amerindians and the imperial and federal states. It argues, however, that official discourse with respect to money contributed to the redefinition of Aboriginal peoples as improvident by nature, a change which would have profound consequences during the twentieth century. This delayed reaction was primarily caused by the decreased size and reach of the Department of Indian Affairs, the state agency charged with managing relations with First Nations throughout the period, along with the generally restrictive legal framework within which this institution operated.

Chapter Four analyzes the role of extra-regional capital and Aboriginal money-use in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake during the nineteenth century. It begins by describing the process through which the Canadian dollar replaced the HBC's proprietary currency (the castor) in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, thereby demonstrating the way in which money served as a marker of effective political authority over a given region. The chapter then turns to an analysis of money-use among the Huron-Wendat and the Innu which emphasizes the emergence of class in Wendake. It demonstrates that in direct contradiction to state discourse, which increasingly portrayed Amerindians as an undifferentiated, improvident mass, the Huron experienced socioeconomic stratification during the period, a process that featured the accumulation of important amounts of wealth among a small segment of the population.

Chapters Five through Seven consider money and colonialism in Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake during the first half of the twentieth century. This period witnessed continued growth in the state's theoretical monetary powers. While the HBC, by abandoning private currency in western James Bay (the made beaver), provided the space into which the state expanded, the company also altered its practices by ending the credit system upon which its business with Amerindians had long been built. This change deprived northern Natives of their primary means of avoiding dependence on the state in uncertain economic times. However, even within this tightly circumscribed space, certain Amerindians were able to employ money to increase their personal fortunes and uphold their authority, in
the process strengthening class divides within First Nations that mirrored those of Euro-Canadian society.

As a whole, then, this dissertation analyzes the process through which money-use informed developing political relations, both between Amerindians and the state and within First Nations, between the 1820s and the middle of the twentieth century. At the same time it describes the ways in which pre-existing monetary relations between capital and Aboriginal peoples changed during the same period. The character of these developing relations informed the ability of the Canadian state and enterprises other than those born of the fur trade to occupy regions from which they had previously been absent. The interface of money, colonialism, and First Nations also contributed to the portrayal of Amerindians as inherently improvident, necessitating protection by their state-appointed guardian, the Department of Indian Affairs. In this sense, money-use played an important role in the formation of one part of the Canadian state and the extension of national markets. Following the arrival of Euro-Canadian currency, then, Aboriginal peoples adopted a new way of measuring and expressing value and guaranteed its generalized use across Canada. Despite the widespread Euro-Canadian belief that Amerindians were improvident by nature, a belief erected in part on a monetary foundation, and despite the barriers that capital and the state often placed in the path of Aboriginal money-use, the Cree, Huron, and Innu continually demonstrated their ability to employ money as a means of exerting force and of, at least to a certain extent, shaping their place in Canadian society. Moreover, the analysis of money-use demonstrates the extent to which the implementation of policies and legislation formulated in response to this assumed improvidence provided Amerindians with the means of ensuring their own well-being, often in entirely unintended ways. The present dissertation, then, aims to complicate the general scholarly image of Canadian colonialism, suggesting that a combination of discursive and material analyses of money-use results in a profoundly different portrait of First Nations-Euro-Canadian relations than that which the historiography has traditionally presented.
Chapter 1

Historiography, Sources, and Methodology

This chapter seeks to address the major historiographical debates and developments that serve to frame the present dissertation while also describing the methodological approach and the sources used in the following chapters. Whereas the second chapter defines this study’s two central concepts, money and colonialism, through a discussion of more theoretical and conceptual work, the majority of the present chapter delineates how scholars have approached related questions in a historical perspective. It does this by combining several historiographies that scholars generally treat in isolation in order to make their similarities as apparent as possible and to clearly indicate those works that have inspired the research that follows. The sections devoted to methodology and sources that close the chapter describe the ways in which the present dissertation translates the questions raised by the historiography into empirical study.

Money and Colonialism

Although relatively sparse, the historiography on the development of money in Canada depicts it as being self-evidently interesting and therefore makes no effort to connect money-use to any larger social, political, or economic issues. This tendency is exemplified by the pioneering work of Adam Shortt on currency and banking in Canada. This study, published in installments in the *Journal of the Canadian Bankers’ Association* between 1896 and 1906, set the tone for the historiography through its concentration on the monetary and banking system’s legislative and institutional development and its presentation of this history.

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1 Although this section reviews the pertinent historiography on money and colonialism it leaves several issues for later analysis. For a conceptual examination of these issues in addition to a brief history of money in Canada, see Chapter Two.
in isolation from the lives of any but the most highly-placed individuals. Indeed, prior to the 1980s, Shortt's study remained essentially the only history of money in Canada. Although many of the studies that followed reflect Shortt's preference for top-down, large-scale political and economic analysis (thereby failing to consider lived experience), they do provide essential numerical data and valuable insight into the changing legal and institutional framework within which money evolved. In this sense, A.B. McCullough's work, which furnishes a wealth of information concerning money in what is now Canada including exchange rates, precious-metal content, and the volume of money in circulation, provides the archetypal history of Canadian money. James Powell, in a less quantitatively rigorous study of the Canadian dollar (he focuses primarily on institutional history, detailing official efforts at monetary regulation and policy as well as the issuance of banknotes), provides what is essentially the sequel to McCullough's text. While these studies furnish the most detailed analyses of the Canadian monetary system, a handful of other works have addressed specific issues that affected money-use. The largest number of these studies explicitly follows Shortt in concentrating on the history of banks in Canada (the institutions that historically printed and placed into circulation much of the nation's currency).

Thus, the majority of the historiography on money in Canada concentrates on legislative and institutional issues that leave both lived experience and questions of power untreated. However, a small number of studies that engage money somewhat incidentally

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manage to tie it to larger social, political, or economic issues. Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, in a chapter in their recent economic and social history of Quebec, provide the most in-depth exploration of money’s role in Canadian society. However, given that their study is a minimally updated version of an article originally published in 1984, they make virtually no use of the increasingly sophisticated historical, economic, and sociological literature on money that has appeared over the past twenty-five years, leading their analysis to be substantially less profound than it might otherwise have been. Other historians working from the perspective of social and economic history, most notably Louise Dechêne, also relate money to lived experience, although this remains peripheral to their projects. Although scholars only rarely apply this approach to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when combined with studies of credit and other forms of abstract money that are often analyzed in isolation from cash (frequently seen as the only “true” form of money), this body of work provides an important counterpoint to the institutional, legislative, and numerical observations that the more purely monetary historiography makes.


As valuable as these studies are to understanding Canada's monetary history, they often fail to account for the ways in which money affected and was affected by human relationships. A handful of studies from mostly outside the Canadian context follow Georg Simmel's "philosophy of money" to argue that money's meaning can only be rightly understood in reference to social relations. While Simmel and his immediate followers claim that monetization leads inevitably to increased rationalization among individuals and societies, replacing emotional thinking with quantitative calculation, recent work has focused on the diverse ways in which money has escaped this supposedly ineluctable march toward modernity.

Viviana Zelizer is the leading contemporary proponent of money's social character, asserting in her work on money-use in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century United States that it holds a socially fluid character which largely depends on the users' perception of sources of monetary revenue and the forms of expenditure that such sources allow. While Zelizer's work is insightful, it disposes too readily with questions related to formal political power, preferring to view money in more informal terms as a means of both class struggle between poor recipients of charity or welfare and the solidly middle-class social workers through whom such assistance passed and gender relations between male breadwinners and their wives who were responsible for maintaining the household. While also paying too little attention to formal political power, Amy Kaler adds depth to Simmel's and Zelizer's work by demonstrating that not all actors consider monetization to be positive. Kaler considers money to be more than a simple reflection of

currency, see Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008.


10 Another body of literature that complicates older economic models in a very similar way details the persistence of gift exchange—a supposedly "primitive" transactional form—in the modern world. See, for example, James G. Carrier, Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700, New York, Routledge, 1995.

pre-existing social prerogatives, claiming that it is also an agent for change in its own right. She argues that according to the “philosophy of money” expressed by elderly men and women living in present-day rural Malawi “cash is indeed heralded as a sign of modernity—but as a sign that appears in the emotion-laden terrain of individual personalities and social relationships rather than the impersonal and rational market, and which is perceived as profoundly destructive.”12 Kaler, then, reminds us that academic theory and actors’ perceptions do not necessarily align.

Although her project contradicts that of Kaler, Angela Redish provides valuable insight into the ways in which Canadians perceived money. Redish concludes that the widespread belief among late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century colonists that the economy suffered from a shortage of specie provides a perfect illustration of Gresham’s Law. This fundamental law of orthodox economics states that “bad money drives out good,” meaning that as the quantity of “low quality money” (money in which users have little faith) in circulation increases, economic actors hoard “high quality money.” According to Redish’s analysis, then, the Canadian economy lacked not currency per se but rather quality currency (i.e. coins having high precious-metal content).13 Although ultimately serving to assert the validity of an immutable law of economics, Redish’s study is useful in that it underlines the importance of perception to the functioning of the free market. Of course, First Nations’ participation in the Western market was not necessarily “free” in any sense of the word, complicating this rather deterministic and idealized model of human economic behavior. 14 Nonetheless, it helps illuminate certain phenomena such as the greater faith that Amerindians


generally placed in widely circulating, publicly issued monetary instruments when compared to more restrained, privately issued currency.

Redish’s study also underlines the complexity of British North America’s monetary system. Indeed, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Canadians made use of multiple currencies, in both their material and abstract forms. Redish views this heterogeneity as resolving itself into a qualitative hierarchy, in the process generating anxiety among the colony’s inhabitants as to the value of their money. In more general, historical terms, however, this insight points, as Emily Gilbert reminds us, to the need to spatially and temporally situate money. In contrast to studies drawing on orthodox economic theory, Gilbert argues against defining money as an ahistorical object according to a list of necessary attributes, instead asserting that it should be understood in reference to the ways in which people made use of it.¹⁵ She does so by drawing both on works emerging from the Simmelian tradition and recent scholarship asserting the primacy of currency to the nation-state as it developed during the nineteenth century. Gilbert makes this argument in more concrete terms through an analysis of the iconographic content of nineteenth-century Canadian paper money, claiming that such representations situated colonists within imperial, colonial, and later national geographies, visually enforcing the authority of the state over its population and territory.¹⁶ Eric Helleiner makes a very similar argument, although he shifts from the national to the global scale, claiming that currency provided nineteenth-century nation-states with one of the primary means of marking their territorial sovereignty.¹⁷ As Bruce Curtis demonstrates, this process proved central to the formation of the Canadian state and polity in that the region’s increasingly homogenous monetary system provided it with a single means of


measuring and expressing abstract value.\textsuperscript{18} This account accords with Geoffrey Ingham’s recent theoretical work which locates money’s nature in its origins as a measure of value, first used by priests and nobles to correlate the value of precious metals and cereals in the redistributive command economies of Near Eastern empires between the third and the middle of the first millennium BC. According to Ingham, accounting currency, when decreed by a central political power, provides as much a claim to territorial sovereignty as circulating cash.\textsuperscript{19}

Money, then, was intimately involved in the geopolitical process by which the British Empire and the Canadian federal state extended their authority over the northern portion of North America, a process anticipated to the south by the United States’ westward expansion. Despite its fundamental historical importance, colonialism has, until very recently, existed on the margins of North American historiography.\textsuperscript{20} This limited role springs from two marked historiographical tendencies. First, historians have traditionally presented both the United States and Canada as nations-in-the-making, seeking, often in teleological terms, the historical roots of apparently natural present-day political forms.\textsuperscript{21} Second, those scholars


who have analyzed colonialism in greatest detail have overwhelmingly emphasized the period of “new imperialism” in Asia and Africa – that is, roughly, between 1880 and 1910 – thereby obscuring Northern North America’s role in the colonial enterprise, both in geographical and temporal terms. Recently, however, a small number of historians, geographers, and anthropologists have begun asserting colonialism’s usefulness as an analytical tool in the North American context. This movement has contributed to a better understanding of both the “colonial period” proper (the period of French and British overseas colonies in North America) and the era following the political independence of the United States and Canada. In fact, several scholars have asserted the primacy of post-independence colonialism vis-à-vis its predecessor. This perspective portrays the process by which the United States and Canada extended their territorial limits to engulf vast regions and populations that had previously been beyond the pale of Western political control as presenting a far more invasive form of colonialism than that of earlier overseas empires in

Toronto, Oxford University Press, 2008. For one of the only classic studies that uses the term colonialism, without, however, defining it, see Stanley B. Ryerson, *The Founding of Canada: Beginnings to 1815*, Toronto, Progress Books, 1972.

22 A recent survey of colonialism excludes North America from “the core of this vast historical process,” understood as having occurred over the past 150 years, presenting the region as having hosted merely the prelude to Europe’s true colonial enterprise in Africa and Asia. Norrie MacQueen, *Colonialism*, Toronto, Pearson Longman, 2007, p. xv.

Northern North America. Somewhat surprisingly, this movement towards understanding the history of North America in terms of colonialism does not extend to the historiography on Quebec. Although Quebec nationalists, beginning at the very end of the 1950s, employed the ideas developed by the then-burgeoning literature advocating decolonization, colonialism as a heuristic concept is all but absent from the Quebec historiography.

This recent wave of studies that views Canadian and American history through the prism of colonialism has not considered money’s role in this process. However, the historiography is not entirely bereft of monetary analyses of colonialism or imperialism. The vast majority of such work concentrates on the replacement of Indigenous forms of currency by new types of money in Africa and emphasizes the power relations that colonial monetary history reveals. C.A. Gregory, for example, does so through his “subaltern quality theory of money.” Rather than explaining the collapse of shell money (cowries) in West Africa during the nineteenth century by using the widely-accepted quantity theory of money, most notably championed by Milton Friedman, Gregory distinguishes between the “money-value systems” of, on the one hand, the imperial state and, on the other, the Indigenous elite and contrasts them with the values of the subalterns who occasionally made use of both in their production and exchange of goods and services. In this way, he argues that, “there is a

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25 On the casting of Quebecker society as colonized within the context of the international decolonization movement, see Sean Mills, *The Empire Within: Postcolonial Thought and Political Activism in Sixties Montreal*, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. This observation on the absence of colonialism from the Quebec historiography also applies for the most part to the province’s “other” colonized peoples – First Nations. The most recent synthesis of Native history in Quebec does not consider this question at all. Claude Gélinas, *Les Autochtones dans le Québec post-confédéral*, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2007. For an exception to this rule, see Morantz, *The White Man’s Gonna Getcha*. For Canadiens’ historical relationship with the British Empire, see Colin M. Coates, “French Canadians’ Ambivalence to the British Empire,” in Buckner (ed.), *Canada and the British Empire*, p. 181-99.
cultural tendency for those with power to impose their standards of value on others with different standards.”

By emphasizing power’s role in the monetary system, Gregory underlines the fallibility of orthodox economic theory’s postulate that metallic standards naturally oust others. In this sense, money in colonial West Africa was defined not by some inherent material character, but by the power of authority and, as such, served the interests of those who imposed it rather than those who used it. In a study that similarly foregrounds power relations, Mahir Saul argues that cowries continued to circulate in colonial West Africa into the 1940s because, despite France’s attempts to impose the franc following its turn-of-the-century conquests, West Africa remained politically fractured, with no single authority possessing power over the whole region (since Great Britain held West African colonies in which they imposed the pound sterling, shell money effectively remained the region-wide monetary standard). Walter I. Ofonagoro reports on a similar process of slow currency replacement in Nigeria between the late nineteenth century and the 1940s. Like the French, the British proved unable to rapidly displace cowries and other Indigenous currencies with imported, imperial money. Ofonagoro remarks that this failure arose because “British coins were simply not regarded as money by the local population. To them, the coins had no monetary value; only their bullion value excited local interest.” Thus, as in Malawi and British North America, perceptions of money influenced its acceptability in Nigeria.

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29 This observation accords with anthropological studies that argue in favor of analyses of intercultural exchange that conceive of interactions between Europeans and Indigenous peoples as “grounded in local cultural and political agendas, rather than naïveté.” Nicholas Thomas, Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 88. According to this vision of exchange, ideas and objects have no inherent function, but are rather assigned one (or many) by the culture that makes use of them. For a groundbreaking
In her doctoral dissertation, Wambui Mwangi provides the historiography’s longest and most detailed study of currency in the context of colonialism. Like Gregory, Saul, and Ofonagoro, Mwangi concentrates on relatively recent African history and the power that allowed local populations to resist the imposition of foreign money. By way of a study of the East African Currency Board, the body that regulated the region’s succession of domestic money (the Indian rupee, Seyyidich currency, and East African Currency) through their exchange against the British pound sterling from 1919 to 1972, Mwangi examines “how the contested attempts to maintain control over the monetary system in the colonial period produced the coercive force that imposed and reified territorial boundaries and homogenized political spaces on insistently fluid geographies and dynamic spatial relations.”

Her study underlines currency’s inherently political nature and its contribution to the contested process of state formation in colonial East Africa. Although it does this primarily through a top-down approach, Mwangi remains sensitive to money’s role in connecting the sphere of high politics and the state to the everyday lives of “regular people,” exploring this connection through moments of conflict between bureaucrats and the British East African colonies’ inhabitants over the value and symbolism of official currency and other monetary forms. While the social and institutional milieu of twentieth-century East Africa diverges substantially from that of nineteenth and twentieth-century Canada, Mwangi’s results make a persuasive case for the need to investigate money’s role in the colonial setting explicitly in reference to the power relations that it helped express.

Although these studies provide important points of comparison, they remain somewhat inapplicable in the present case given that the character of high imperialism as exercised in Africa and Asia differed substantially from Canadian colonialism. Indeed, in place of large numbers of immigrants originating in the metropole and elsewhere in Europe, collection in the anthropology of material culture, see Arjun Appadurai (ed.), *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Indigenous peoples continued to compose the vast majority of the population of Europe’s African and Asian colonies. Thus, as a result of their demographic preponderance, Natives in these regions proved far more capable of influencing the colonial monetary system as a whole than did their counterparts in Canada. Moreover, in Africa, imperial actors attempted to impose European currency in the face of preexisting Indigenous monetary systems, creating a form of antagonism that did not exist in the Canadian context. Indeed, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries some Amerindians actively encouraged the introduction of state-issued currency as a means of displacing earlier monetary forms maintained by fur trade companies, thereby apparently increasing their own “freedom” to the detriment of their most important corporate trading partner.  

However, the acceptance of novel forms of currency on the part of First Nations did not originate in the nineteenth century, but dates to the beginnings of settler colonialism in northeastern North America, a region from which money appears to have been entirely absent prior to European arrival. Through their appetite for wampum (beads manufactured with imported metal tools from shells found on the east coast of North America), Amerindians contributed to the decision made by governments in mid-seventeenth-century New Netherland and New England to declare it legal tender.  

Although this system was inspired by First Nations’ demand for wampum, a form of currency that resembled those used by Indigenous Africans prior to European arrival, the two monetary systems were in fact quite distinct given that one predated colonialism while the other was produced by it.  

In this sense, the present study suggests that while money clearly played a role across the globe in the creation and maintenance of the power relations that were a by-product of Europe’s expanding overseas empires, the ways in which it did so need to be carefully contextualized. Whereas the African experience offers compelling evidence for the

31 On this process, which ultimately encouraged the state to take back much of this apparent “liberty,” see Chapters Four through Six.


33 For more on Wampum’s use as money, see Chapter Two.
resistance that Indigenous practice could offer European systems, this dissertation argues that the Canadian case provides equally convincing evidence of Aboriginal ability to engage such systems in order to exert force of their own, often in surprising ways.

Amerindian-Euro-Canadian Political Relations

"New Indian History," Aboriginal Agency, and Empire

Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, a new academic discipline, formulated specifically to address the methodological difficulties of analyzing the history of Native North Americans, took shape in the United States. Known as ethnohistory, this discipline grew from a combination of ethnological and historical approaches to the study of Aboriginal peoples and the relations they maintained with colonial society. Initially, ethnohistorians concentrated on North American First Nations that had themselves left no written record, combining cultural insight gleaned from anthropological fieldwork with information mined from colonial archives. This approach was based in the conviction that Aboriginal peoples possessed non-negligible historical agency, a sentiment that with a few notable exceptions had been entirely absent from the colonial and national historiographies of North America. This emphasis on agency became central both to ethnohistory and to its more formally historical offshoot that first appeared in the 1970s, the "new Indian history." This current, for a recent historiographical analysis of the development of ethnohistory, upon which this paragraph draws extensively, see Gilles Havard, "Les Indiens et l'histoire coloniale nord-américaine: les défis de l'ethnohistoire," in Cécile Vidal and François-Joseph Ruggiu (eds.), Sociétés, colonisations et esclavages dans le monde atlantique. Historiographie des sociétés américaines des XVII-XIXe siècles, Rennes, Les Perséides, 2009, p. 95-142. For other recent reviews of the Amerindian historiography, see Denys Delâge, "L'histoire des autochtones d'Amérique du Nord: acquis et tendances," Annales. Histoire, science sociales, vol. 57, no. 5 (2002), p. 1337-55 and J.R. Miller, "Bringing Native People in from the Margins: The Recent Evolution and Future Prospects of English-Canadian Historiography on Native-Newcomer Relations," in J.R. Miller, Reflections on Native-Newcomer Relations: Selected Essays, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. 13-36. Much of this historical analysis has developed in a highly juridical environment. For a recent analysis of this process's influence on the historiography, see Arthur J. Ray, "Constructing and Reconstructing Native History: A Comparative Look at the Impact of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Claims in North America and Australia," Native Studies Review, vol. 16, no 1 (2005), p. 15-39.
influenced by increasingly visible First Nations activism across North America, forcefully challenged the ethnocentrism of earlier historical works that implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) asserted Western cultural superiority. This emphasis on Aboriginal agency developed at roughly the same time as postcolonial and subaltern studies. In Canada, this movement resulted in the publication of a series of transformative studies by Bruce Trigger, Arthur Ray, Denys Delâge, and others during the 1970s and 1980s. Together with similar studies emerging from the United States, these works recast Amerindians as active participants in the political and economic history of North America on a scale that dwarfs all previous attempts to do so.

Richard White’s enormously influential 1991 study of European-Amerindian relations in the Great Lakes region between the mid-seventeenth and the early nineteenth centuries, The Middle Ground, exemplifies the new Indian history and its emphasis on
Aboriginal agency above all else. Although White's assertion that Aboriginal peoples played an active role in shaping the history of the colonial project is clearly correct, scholars have recently begun charging that, in portraying the Great Lakes as a land of protomulticulturalism, White neglects certain historical processes. Several historians have noted that although White's study effectively communicates the ambiguity of cultural exchange, thereby forcefully laying to rest Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis and the ethnocentric notions of progress that it implies, it simultaneously neglects the unequal material realities of colonialism and imperialism. However, such critical readings of *The Middle Ground* appear rooted more in the historiography that it inspired than in the study itself. Indeed, as Susan Sleeper-Smith writes, White's monograph appears to owe much of its enormous popularity to its "optimistic model of how cultures negotiated rather than collided. This model has become so appealing that many scholars are guilty of turning every time and place of cultural encounter into a middle ground, transforming the phrase into an elusive metaphor for various forms of compromise." Imprecise readings of *The Middle Ground*, then, have led the historiography to present a skewed version of the work, misrepresenting its conceptual content and simplifying its fundamental argument.

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White himself is quite explicit about the power relations and structural factors that provided the necessary preconditions for the emergence of the "middle ground" in the Great Lakes. This historical formation, which White describes as being dual in nature (a process and "a quite particular historical space that was the outcome of this process"), relied on the existence of three factors: "a rough balance of power, mutual need or a desire for what the other possesses, and an inability by either side to commandeer enough force to compel the other to change." Moreover, White argues that, "the construction of a historical space in which the process becomes the basis of relations between distinct peoples... depended on the creation of an infrastructure that could support and expand the process." According to White, the lack of appropriate infrastructure ("from missions, to posts, to a network of alliance chiefs, to a set of mutually comprehensible and oft-repeated rituals") is what confined the middle ground to the Great Lakes, preventing its exportation with the French to regions beyond the Mississippi.\(^ {42} \) The middle ground as a concept, then, becomes significantly less applicable to the historical study of Amerindian-Euro-American relations than has often been recognized. Moreover, because White's approach to power relations constitutes a presumption rather than an analysis, *The Middle Ground* proves somewhat problematic. This is perhaps best illustrated by the study's conception of the French state as being monolithic. Indeed, throughout the text, White, though analyzing internal political divisions within the ranks of the Great Lakes' Amerindian population, assumes that all French actors (constantly referred to simply as "the French") pursued the same goals, essentially rendering structural or personal rivalries within the imperial state imperceptible. Thus, while White's study consciously serves to remind us of the transformational and often unpredictable nature of intercultural interaction, its imperfections provide a forceful reminder that neither European nor Amerindian communities were ever homogenous. This dissertation employs both of these insights to insist on Aboriginal agency where some scholars have emphasized the state or

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capital while resisting the conceptualization of Euro-Canadians and their political and economic institutions as homogenous.

At the same time that Amerindian agency started making significant inroads in the North American historiography, courts in Canada began providing scholars with a new stage on which to discuss First Nations history. Following the Canadian Supreme Court's seminal 1973 Calder decision, scholars began devoting increased attention to issues of legal applicability, particularly those affecting claims to Aboriginal and treaty rights. The recent "judiciarization" of Amerindian history in Canada has led to research that places emphasis on abstract legal concepts such as sovereignty, formal agreements (i.e. treaties), and the legislation through which the state has historically shaped its relationship with First Nations. Although this approach has supplemented the historiography with an impressive

number of valuable studies, it has also contributed to distorting the effects of the legal system on the everyday lives of Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, while the articles of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Indian Act structure much of the recent historiographical production, as the present dissertation’s analysis suggests, these formal documents may have exerted less force over Amerindian-Euro-Canadian relations than this explicitly legalistic historiography claims. Moreover, a significant portion of Canada’s Aboriginal population has, until relatively recently, lived beyond daily contact with the legal system that occupies such an important place in these studies.

In the same year that The Middle Ground appeared, Ken S. Coates published Best Left as Indians, a study of Aboriginal-Euro-Canadian relations in the Yukon, one region in which First Nations led their lives without significant contact with the legal system. Covering the period from 1840 to the present, Coates’s work centers on the native population, what he terms “the principal constant in Yukon history.” While sensitive to issues of Aboriginal agency, Coates’s analysis focuses on the “points of contact between an advancing European culture and an indigenous population,” most particularly insofar as concerns the capitalist economy and the federal and territorial states. His study focuses resolutely on local conditions, analyzing northern experience in a way that separated it from earlier work on the Yukon and elsewhere in the Canadian north that most often adopted a perspective based in

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the south. Although it did not offer the sweeping vision of White’s work, *Best Left as Indians* provides a somewhat subtler picture of the ways in which heterogeneous, yet distinct groups interacted, forming and reforming the Yukon’s political and economic landscape. However, while Coates claims that this interaction has resulted in the marginalization of Aboriginal peoples, he does not systematize this argument by situating their experience in the context of the larger historical process by which European society spread across the globe, gradually extending its control over natural resources and Native peoples.

Toby Morantz, in her study of bureaucratic colonialism in eastern James Bay during the twentieth century, addresses precisely this issue through an analysis of the advance of southern political, economic, and religious institutions into a region that, with the exception of fur traders and a small number of itinerant missionaries, had previously been beyond the reach of southern actors. Morantz draws on the typology of colonialism provided by anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff in their study of South African history. The Comaroffs propose that historical forms of colonialism correspond to one of three models: state, settler, and civilizing or missionary. While Morantz finds these models stimulating, she argues that the historical experience of eastern James Bay, in which southern institutions effectively neglected the region, is best described by a variation on state colonialism that she terms “bureaucratic colonialism.” This conceptualization of colonialism, which emphasizes “the contradictions caused by the various agencies of government’s approach to social engineering,” provides a means of analyzing Amerindian-Euro-Canadian interactions in a way that takes into account both recent work asserting the fractured internal nature of the

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state and the historiography’s description of the Canadian federal state’s frequently incoherent Indian policy. 48

Although concerned with the ways in which James Bay was tied to southern Canada rather than with any larger scale of analysis, Morantz’s work reflects the recent rise of the “new imperial history.” Drawing much of its inspiration from postcolonial studies, this historiography, exemplified by Catherine Hall’s work on the Caribbean, aims to place metropole and imperial periphery in a single analytical framework. 49 Scholars working on this strain of imperial history emphasize interconnectedness in the place of earlier generations’ practice of either lauding or lamenting the imperial past.50 However, this historiography has proven somewhat contentious due to its tendency to adopt aspects of postcolonial studies’ methodology. Cole Harris, drawing on his work on the creation of reserves in British Columbia, argues that recent postcolonial scholarship places too much emphasis on discourse and culture and not enough on other, more material forms of colonial power. As a result, he argues that scholars need “to investigate the sites where colonialism was actually practiced,” rather than relying solely on metropole-centered analyses of the “imperial mind.”51 In the Canadian context, recent work has done precisely this, integrating general analysis of distantly generated discourse with detailed analyses of local experience. Adele Perry’s study of gender and race in mid-nineteenth-century British Columbia, for


example, is informed by the conviction that, “To examine colonialism from the vantage point of the periphery highlights the disjuncture between imperial ideals and practice, and reminds us that colonialism was a popular social experience as well as a political arrangement and literary discourse.” The work of Perry and Harris, then, demonstrates the necessity of supplementing close discursive readings with insight gleaned from in-depth analysis of material factors.

“Old Indian History”: Indian Policy and the State

In The Middle Ground, Richard White refers to “white policy toward Indians” as “the staple of the ‘old history,’” an approach that he explicitly contrasts to that of the “new Indian history,” which “places Indian peoples at the center of the scene and seeks to understand the reasons for their actions.” Although White makes an important point about the need to re-center Amerindian history so that it truly focuses on Aboriginal peoples, “white policy toward Indians” provides even this “new” history with absolutely essential contextualization, something which scholars in both Canada and the United States have generally recognized, perhaps explaining why in-depth studies of Indian policy emerged at precisely the same time as the first great wave of new Indian history. However, most of this work deploys relatively unsophisticated analyses of state action and discourse, often uncritically accepting the claims of those who formulated and implemented Indian policy. Recent work on the state, when combined with the central role that the new Indian history assigns agency, opens a space for reformulating “white policy toward Indians.” It does so in a way that avoids this naïve approach to state discourse while contributing to efforts to correct

52 Perry, On the Edge of Empire, p. 7.

53 For Harris’s material analysis, see Harris, Making Native Space. This point is also well made by Gilles Havard’s magisterial analysis of French-Amerindian relations in the upper Great Lakes during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Havard, Empire et métissages.

54 White, The Middle Ground, p. xi.
what Nicolas Rosenthal identifies as the tendency of First Nations history to exist in isolation “from larger currents of North American history.”

The history of Canadian Indian policy owes its origins and much of its current form to the state agency that has long been responsible for its formulation and implementation – that is, the Department of Indian Affairs. Indeed, Duncan Campbell Scott, the Department’s chief bureaucrat (the deputy superintendent general), performed the first lengthy analysis of the subject in three articles published in 1913 and 1914. The texts describe the development of imperial and later federal Indian policy through three phases. Scott claims that from the Conquest through roughly 1830 “a purely military administration prevailed, the duty of the government being restricted to maintaining the loyalty of the Indian nations to the crown, with almost the sole object of preventing their hostility and of conserving their assistance as allies.” During the second period, stretching from approximately 1830 into the 1860s, “The civilization of the Indian became the ideal; the menace of the tomahawk and the firebrand having disappeared, the apparent duty was to raise him from the debased condition into which he had fallen owing to the loose and pampering policy of former days.” Scott’s analysis of the third period, which began during the 1860s and continued to his own time, underlines the economic “advancement” made by Amerindians, particularly in eastern Canada, and points to a time in the near future “When by amendment of the Indian Act it has become possible to enfranchise Indians without unnecessary and tedious formality, numbers of those who now subsist apart from the reserves will embrace full citizenship.” Throughout

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the three texts, Scott describes the Department as having always been dedicated to First Nations' wellbeing while simultaneously making the claim that its senior officials clearly enunciated Indian Affairs' policy goals in their official discourse.

In 1946, *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* published two papers on Indian policy, both of which had been presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in May of that year and authored by high-ranking bureaucrats in the United States and Canada. The first of these, by Willard W. Beatty, the director of education for the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States, lauds in the progressive language of the Indian New Deal the American policy of assimilation, defined as "the preparation of the Indian to understand and share in the richer standards of living of our country, managing his own affairs, and making his own choice of religion and occupation."\(^{59}\) While shaped by the policies of the Roosevelt administration, recent scholarship has demonstrated that American Indian policy of the 1930s constituted a continuation of earlier, progressive-era programs. Beatty's description of culturally sensitive assimilation, then, presents nothing more than a timely discursive adaptation for promoting fundamentally unaltered policy.\(^{60}\) Although less explicit, T.R.L. MacInnes, the secretary of the Indian Affairs Branch, also voices his support for assimilation, a gradual process which he couches in the typically Canadian language of enfranchisement. MacInnes's historical analysis implicitly draws on Scott's work by adopting his periodization and structure, reinforcing his predecessor's characterization of Canada's Indian policy as clearly spelled out in official rhetoric and as benevolent above all else, while, like Beatty, failing to acknowledge discourse's role in cosmetically adapting policy to contemporary concerns.\(^{61}\)


These claims and methodological shortcomings found their way in relatively unaltered form into the prodigious number of doctoral dissertations produced on Canadian Indian policy during the 1970s and 1980s. These studies, along with the work of John Tobias and others, adopted the central points of Scott's and MacInnes's analyses, in the process modifying them slightly to fit the environment of the time. Together, this work argues that the state's historical relationship with First Nations is best understood in reference to its evolving, officially stated policy goals. These scholars claim, then, that the state's late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century Indian policy sought to conciliate and protect the crown's Native allies, while from the period following the end of the War of 1812 its successor aimed to "civilize" them, and, finally, beginning in the 1860s, the state sought to assimilate (by force, if necessary) Amerindians into the general body politic. Since the


appearance of these studies, the historiography has generally taken these policy goals for granted, employing them to structure work covering vastly different periods and geographical contexts. In the 1990s, while still approaching official political discourse on its own terms, scholars began questioning the efficacy of these policies for the first time, producing a series of studies that demonstrated the ultimate failure to achieve the policy goals that generations of departmental employees articulated. While this work added nuance to the historiography, as a whole it remained committed to the general framework proposed by Scott. During the 1990s and 2000s a handful of book-length studies appeared arguing that Indian Affairs historically pursued a fourth, unacknowledged goal: control/coercion. According to this argument, the Department sought to impose its programs on docile clients and its employees resented any efforts on the part of Amerindians to impede or alter these programs. Robin


Jarvis Brownlie asserts that during the interwar period, “Whenever the elected leaders attempted to reach beyond their extremely limited jurisdiction to matters of political importance, they ran headlong into the department’s restrictive regulations and the determined opposition of its agents.”

Despite its tendency to uncritically assume that the goals proclaimed by Scott and his fellow bureaucrats actually animated state action, the historiography on Indian policy and the Department of Indian Affairs has grown significantly over the past twenty years, coming to include detailed studies of a wide variety of state discourse, practice, and programs affecting Aboriginal peoples. Several of those scholars who first questioned the efficacy of Indian Affairs’ policies focused their analysis on state attempts to encourage agricultural “advancement” in western Canada, generally through restrictions on market access, in the process demonstrating the preponderant role of the Department in preventing First Nations from competing with their newly arrived Euro-Canadian neighbors. Recent work has also focused on the imperial and later federal states’ land policy, providing in-depth analyses of treaty negotiation and the creation of reserves. Other scholars have demonstrated the ways in which the state framed natural resource use often prejudicially to Aboriginal interests.


67 Carter, Lost Harvests and Waisberg and Holzkamm, “A Tendency to Discourage Them from Cultivating.”

largely through the passage of a series of fish and game laws, but also through the administration of on-reserve resources. Although not central to this historiography, recent work on social assistance and veterans' and dependents' benefits points to the important role that these programs have played in the ongoing relationship between the state and First Nations, contributing to widespread public perception of Aboriginal peoples as both improvident and benefitting from the public purse to a disproportionate extent. Other recent studies have emphasized the growth the state’s knowledge apparatus experienced through the creation of commissions of inquiry into Indian Affairs and the practice of census making, both of which developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The ideological underpinnings of authorities’ thought has also begun attracting interest from scholars, providing insight into the ways in which larger philosophical movements affected Indian


policy and departmental practice. This work, along with that focused on Indian Affairs' ability to know its "cliente le" dovetails well with recent scholarship that foregrounds the Department's bureaucrats and bureaucracy, underlining the ways in which individual employees and Indian Affairs' global administrative structure interacted, in the process shaping the everyday lives of First Nations. Scholars analyzing the response of Aboriginal peoples to Indian policy have also complicated this historiography, moving activism to the foreground and demonstrating the effects that it had on state practice.

While collectively these studies highlight the central role of Indian Affairs and Indian policy in the creation and maintenance of unequal power relations, they often fail to sufficiently account for the state's complicated makeup and the ways in which this has affected its practice. Some scholars, however, have given the state more serious and sustained attention in the context of Amerindian history. J.E. Hodgetts long ago published a markedly more subtle analysis of the imperial state's relationship with First Nations than much of the scholarship that draws directly or otherwise on Scott. In his 1955 administrative history of the


United Canadas, Hodgetts argues that before 1860, the year in which the colonial state gained jurisdiction over the Indian Department, a constellation of imperial and colonial institutions collaborated with Indian Affairs in order to administer the state’s relationship with Amerindians. With this shift in jurisdiction, however, the Department was reborn as a “clientele” agency, effectively monopolizing all aspects of this relationship.\(^{75}\) When read in conjunction with recent work on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hodgetts’s study suggests the necessity of reevaluating the place occupied by Indian Affairs within the overall state apparatus.\(^{76}\) Together, these studies point to internal competition within the state, whether from agencies located on the same level of government or between representatives of Canada and the provinces, challenging older scholarship’s tendency to study Indian Affairs in isolation from the rest of the state.\(^ {77}\)

Somewhat surprisingly, this older approach to writing the history of Indian Affairs has much in common with newer forms of political analysis based largely in the work of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Jean-Marie Fecteau notes that scholars working in this tradition have begun viewing the state as largely superfluous, replacing attempts to comprehend the state as a whole with analyses of the procedures and policies of fundamentally independent agents, agencies, and groups. Fecteau sees this development as symptomatic of “une crise profonde dans l’étude conceptuelle du phénomène politique dans les sciences sociales.” Indeed, he argues that the state is the dominant manifestation of the social relations at the core of politics. For Fecteau, the state comprises several socio-political

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phenomena (e.g. sovereignty, war and diplomacy, administration and bureaucracy, the legal system, democracy or other means of accessing political power, and symbolic representations of collective identity) that are deeply intertwined and that cannot be fully understood in isolation. Moreover, this association of diverse elements is critical to understanding the historical development of the liberal democratic state, which worked from the nineteenth century to deny the legitimacy of rival forms of collective identity through a discourse portraying nation-states and nationalities as the basis of politics.\textsuperscript{78} Fecteau notes that the twentieth-century development of the welfare state, which involved itself in the everyday lives of its population to an historically unprecedented extent, would only strengthen the ability of this discourse to legitimize the state.\textsuperscript{79}

In this spirit, certain scholars, among them Fecteau himself, have conducted empirical research aimed in part at understanding the state as a whole. Much of this work draws inspiration from Mary Douglas's argument that institutions, like individuals, are concerned with ensuring their own survival, making analyses of both their interactions with other institutions and their discursive legitimization of their own existence central to understanding their history.\textsuperscript{80} This conviction has led to a growing body of research on state


\textsuperscript{80} Mary Douglas, \textit{How Institutions Think}, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1986.
formation, the process by which the state changed and, for the most part, grew over time.\textsuperscript{81} This literature, which originated from attempts to study the state from below rather than from the older perspective of high politics, demonstrates, in the words of Michael Braddick, "that the study of the organisation, institutionalisation, representation and expression of political power remains an important means by which to approach an understanding of many aspects of social, economic, intellectual and cultural life."\textsuperscript{82}

Although remaining virtually absent from the First Nations historiography,\textsuperscript{83} interest in state formation in Canada has led to a wide array of studies dedicated to understanding the ways in which the state's activities intersect with the everyday existence of individuals and communities. Bruce Curtis's work on census making demonstrates the effects that seemingly neutral developments in the information at the state's disposal had on day-to-day administrative practices and the lives of individuals living within national territorial boundaries. Drawing on Foucault, Curtis argues that through the census, the Canadian state of the mid-nineteenth century actually \textit{created} its population.\textsuperscript{84} Published in 1992, \textit{Colonial Leviathan}, a collection of texts that analyze various aspects of historical state formation in Canada, provides the historiography with its programmatic statement on the subject, combining bottom-up and top-down perspectives to focus on the growth of the state primarily

\textsuperscript{81} For the prototypical historical study of state formation, see Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, \textit{The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution}, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1985.


\textsuperscript{83} Indeed, state formation has only made inroads in the sociological and anthropological literature on contemporary Aboriginal experience. Andersen and Denis, "Urban Natives and the Nation" and Paul Nadasdy, \textit{Hunters and Bureaucrats: Power, Knowledge, and Aboriginal-State Relations in the Southwest Yukon}, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2003.

during the pivotal decades following the Rebellions of 1837-8. This approach has also proven important in shaping the application of social regulation to Canadian history, most notably in Jean-Marie Fecteau’s research on poverty and crime. While refusing to neglect the analysis of “high politics,” all of this work highlights the value of focusing on the state from below, carrying forward the project of both social history (as exemplified in the work of E.P. Thompson) and the new Indian history by accepting that those who earlier generations of scholars excluded from history not only possess agency, but also have an important role to play in historical narratives that go beyond the resolutely local.

This combination of top-down and bottom-up perspectives, coupled with the claim that the state and the institutions that comprise it are far more complicated and conflicted than their unified, external façade suggests, provides this study with its primary conceptualization of public policy and the actions of state institutions and their employees. Rather than assume an easy correlation between policy and practice, the present study argues that the local political, social, and economic context complicated the implementation of legislation and discursively defined policy goals. It also claims that instead of being an undivided and homogenous whole, the nineteenth and twentieth-century Canadian state, which lies at the center of much of the analysis that follows, was in fact subject to a wide array of frequently divisive internal forces that further complicated the translation of policy to practice. This dissertation employs this conceptual framework to argue that Amerindians both exploited and


fell victim to the heterogeneous state and its imperfectly implemented policies, thereby rendering far more ambiguous the generally uncomplicated narrative of both whiggish and more critical versions of the history of colonialism.

Aboriginal Peoples, Economic Power, and the Transition to Capitalism

Until recently, the historiography on Amerindian economies in Canada has been dominated by two interconnected approaches: staple theory and ethnohistory. Staple theory, as originally developed by W.A. Mackintosh and Harold Innis, argues that the development of Canada’s economy is best understood in terms of a small number of high-volume natural resource and agricultural exports (staples).88 The early fur trade historiography presents the most important adaptation of this school of thought to Aboriginal history. Staple theory, which dominated the Canadian economic historiography through the Second World War, came under widespread attack from scholars beginning in the 1960s. At the same time, efforts to recuperate the theory by left-wing Canadian nationalists, in particular by Mel Watkins, failed to restore its earlier consensual status.89 By the 1980s and 1990s, staple theory had lost much of its analytical appeal for scholars who questioned its utility in explaining even economic activity that seemed self-evidently based in the exportation of single agricultural or natural-resource-based commodities. Marvin McInnis, for example, argues that staple theory fails to account for the internal complexity of the nineteenth and early twentieth-century Ontarian economy, regardless of its external appearance as being dominated by the


production of wheat. Despite the theory’s tendency to oversimplify historical economic activity, its underlying conviction remains useful in that it explicitly links Canada’s domestic economy to international markets, in the process emphasizing its dependence on Europe and, from the mid-nineteenth century, the United States.

The other primary historiographical domain in which Amerindians occupy a central economic role grew directly from staple theory studies, while being tempered by ethnohistorical insight into Aboriginal cultural prerogatives and historical agency. Harold Innis’s groundbreaking work on the Canadian fur trade paved the way for Aboriginal inclusion in the history of one of northern North America’s longest-standing economic sectors. Of course, Innis’s preoccupation with national and international economic history led him to neglect Amerindians’ role in the fur trade, instead foregrounding the activities of European and Euro-Canadian corporations and their employees. However, following E.E. Rich’s seminal 1960 article, which centers on the participation of Aboriginal peoples in the fur trade, First Nations slowly came to occupy center stage in the fur trade historiography, both as producers of pelts and as consumers of trade goods. Drawing on Rich’s exploratory study, a new body of scholarship emerged beginning in the 1970s that emphasized interethnic economic partnership over competition and exploitation, leading the historiography to increasingly portray the fur trade as an area in which Amerindians exerted considerable force. Studies of Amerindian consumption compellingly make this case by arguing that the

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91 Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada*.


eighteenth-century fur trade benefited all parties as those companies that proved successful in this competitive commercial environment catered to their clientele’s merchandise preferences.\textsuperscript{94} By the 1990s, though, several scholars, some of whom had been vocal proponents of partnership-based models, had begun questioning this relatively rosy historical account, arguing that, in the context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century fur trade, capitalist corporations wielded considerably more power than their Amerindian trading partners. However, these scholars remained sensitive to the ethnohistorically influenced historiography, making it clear that Aboriginal peoples were bona fide actors even in this hostile environment.\textsuperscript{95} More recently, studies focusing on eighteenth and early-to-mid nineteenth-century Quebec have reinforced this interpretation by demonstrating that in eastern Canada, too, power in the fur trade was never as balanced as the partnership-based historiography suggests.\textsuperscript{96}

This concern with power relations is not unique to fur trade history. Indeed, most analyses of First Nations economic history underline imbalances in the Aboriginal ability to


exert force in the marketplace. Although still relatively underdeveloped, the historiography on wage work has begun to analyze First Nations’ role in the development of industrial capitalism in a similar light to that which has traditionally been reserved for non-Aboriginal peoples. Of course, First Nations’ primary role in the North American economy did not originate with their labor power, as it generally did with other racialized communities (both the dominant Euro-Canadians and subaltern groups such as those of African and Asian origin). As Patrick Wolfe rightly points out, the relationship between Natives and “their colonizers – as both parties to the relationship would presumably agree – centered on land.”

In this sense, Europeans and their descendents sought control of Amerindian lands rather than Amerindian labor power. However, this observation is only valid to a point because it relies on the highly prejudicial definition of labor that colonists carried with them to the New World. According to John Lutz, “The argument was that the fishing, hunting, gathering, building, and even farming that Aboriginal Peoples did was not labour – at least not in a way that met the definition of classical economics. Such efforts did not sufficiently remove items from their ‘state of nature.’ European fishing, trapping, farming, and manufacturing, on the other hand, were considered to mix labour with nature and so were invoked as justification for making the land, waters, and resources European ‘property.”

Analyzing First Nations history in terms of labor, then, allows scholars to question some of the apparently natural foundations of the economic and political relations that characterize colonialism.

The historiography on Aboriginal participation in wage work traces its origins to Rolf Knight’s Indians at Work, an informal history of Aboriginal labor originally published in 1978 that attempted “to sketch in some of the forgotten components of working-class


history in British Columbia.” At the time, the historiography on both labor and First Nations ignored Amerindian wage work. Knight, reacting to both labor history’s negligence of Aboriginal peoples and the cultural relativism of ethnohistory and anthropology, sought to encourage revisionism in both historiographies by focusing on the sectors of the capitalist labor market traditionally analyzed in histories of work (“loggers, longshoremen, teamsters, cowboys, miners, fishermen and canning workers”). Thus, rather than expanding the definition of work to include those activities that colonial thought excluded from conceptions of labor, Knight made the case for the integration of Amerindians into the general Canadian history of wage work. And despite the slow response that his call for histories of Aboriginal work received, Knight’s focus on “traditional” forms of wage labor set the tone for the scholars whose work has appeared over the past three decades. To its credit, *Indians at Work* does suggest that this conception of labor is problematic, something that a series of recent studies attempt to address by recasting work in ways that challenge both the historiography on wage labor and that on First Nations. Patricia C. Albers, in a reflection on the conceptual underpinnings of the historiography on Aboriginal work, questions the symbolic separation of “the work that is considered a ‘real’ expression of Native American

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experience... from most other forms of labor." Several scholars, working both in the United States and Canada, have accepted this conceptual challenge, publishing empirical studies of Amerindian work that complicate the term’s meaning, setting forms of traditional economic activity alongside employment in the capitalist labor market. However, as historian Robin Jarvis Brownlie argues, these studies have all too often foregrounded Aboriginal agency at the cost of downplaying the coercive power of those who held capital. Indeed, Brownlie points to racism’s restriction of employment options to remind us that individual choice was often an unattainable luxury for Amerindians.

In addition to underlining the conceptual double standard that has often been applied to the study of labor, in recent decades the historiography has also begun focusing more intently on the structural imbalances that hinder Aboriginal access to economic success in more general terms. This historiographical current traces its origins to dependency and world system theories. Dependency theory emerged from studies written by Latin American and African scholars (most of whom were not historians) that analyzed the asymmetrical effects of capitalist production by which certain regions and groups benefited at the expense of others. World-systems theory, most notably taking shape in the work of Immanuel


Wallerstein, combined this approach with the historical analyses of Fernand Braudel and other members of the French *Annales* school. Scholars working in this tradition conceive of "worlds" on various scales, each with a center dominating to some extent one or several peripheries. Although generally employed to analyze economic activity, this approach has also been adapted to the study of political formations. Richard White first applied dependency and world-systems theory to the history of Aboriginal market exchange, using them to analyze the ways in which colonialism, and the demographic and ecological changes it wrought, led to the economic and political subjugation of the Choctaw, Pawnee, and Navajo between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Other scholars, including Denys Delâge and Brian Hosmer, demonstrated the versatility of world-systems analysis by adapting it to the study of the capitalistic market economy and Aboriginal peoples in widely divergent periods and regions. Together, these studies follow Braudel and Wallerstein in emphasizing the power of capital while questioning the lack of agency that world-systems and dependency theory accord Amerindians. Hosmer, for example, notes that, "dependency, 1978), p. 13-43 and Raymond D. Duvall, “Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes toward Precision of Concept and Argument,” *International Organization*, vol. 32 (Winter 1978), p. 51-78. Although scholars have largely turned away from dependency theory in recent years, it continues to be used in certain contexts, most notably that of development theory. Ramon Grosfoguel, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America,” *Nepantla: Views from South*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2000), p. 347-74.


107 White, *The Roots of Dependency*.

while ostensibly an effort at considering the 'other side' of the contact equation, often amounts to an analysis of white domination of Indians, not of how Indians reacted to challenging situations. These studies, then, seek to advance the project of ethnohistory by arguing that Amerindians were capable of meaningful action in the capitalistic market, insisting that culture supplied both the motivation and the means through which agency flowed. However, this approach has generated similar criticism to that directed at Richard White’s second monograph, The Middle Ground, due to its perceived tendency to minimize the effects of unbalanced power relations.

In addition to employing dependency and world-systems theory, this historiography draws upon Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, the prototypical study of the transition to capitalistic market society. Polanyi asserts that the “great transformation” of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by which industrializing nations subordinated social to economic relations through the adoption of the self-regulating market as society’s primary organizational agency, remade all social relations as monetary in nature. Beginning in the 1970s and continuing well into the 1990s, historians, drawing on Polanyi as well as Wallerstein and Braudel, fiercely debated the nature and the timing of the rural population’s

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109 Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace, p. 11.

110 Of course, these studies do not make this point to the same extent. Delâge, for example, places considerably more emphasis on the unbalanced power relations that characterized the international economy of the seventeenth century than he does on Aboriginal agency as notably developed by White in The Middle Ground.


"transition to capitalism" in the northeastern United States. The echoes of this debate in the Canadian historiography provide a useful means of grounding the interplay of money and colonialism among First Nations. Scholars such as Gérard Bouchard and Béatrice Craig convincingly demonstrate that abstract notions of motivation drawn from orthodox economic theory fail to account for the activity of geographically and economically marginalized individuals and communities. Rather than behaving as *homo œconomicus*, seeking to maximize profit without regard for all non-economic factors, the Euro-Canadian colonists studied by Bouchard and Craig combine market savvy with distinctly non-capitalistic motives such as social reproduction. Bouchard terms this strategy of using the capitalistic market place to encourage non-capitalistic social formations "co-integration," a concept that John Lutz adapts in his recent study of Aboriginal history in British Columbia. Through the "moditional economy," Lutz explains that in the context of colonialism Amerindians pursued neither purely capitalistic nor purely traditional economic activity. Instead, they continually

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114 It should be noted, however, that recent economic theory and recent contributions to the transition historiography reject the *homo œconomicus* model. As Lamoreaux notes, "Economic actors never make decisions solely on the basis of prices and quantities in the market; their choices are always shaped by their preferences and their perceptions of available options, which in turn are largely structured by the cultural systems in which they operate." Naomi R. Lamoreaux, "Rethinking the Transition to Capitalism in the Early American Northeast," *The Journal of American History*, vol. 90, no. 2 (2003), p. 440.


modified their traditional economy to meet their cultural needs while simultaneously seeking
to profit from the capitalistic colonial market.¹¹⁷

This study adopts aspects of each of these dominant approaches to the study of Aboriginal economic history. Although staple, dependency, and world systems theory have all justifiably been targets for criticism, their insistence that the capitalist marketplace is favorable to the creation and maintenance of fundamentally unbalanced power relations is an important reminder of the force that large-scale economic activity can bring to bear. Indeed, this assertion is central to the present study’s primary postulate: that by its very nature, money is a source of social, political, and economic inequality. However, this emphasis on the power of dominant capital formations has been appropriately tempered by ethnohistorical treatments of the fur trade and wage work that insist on the centrality of Aboriginal agency. While capitalist enterprise and preconceived western notions of the meaning of “labor” have certainly contributed to First Nations’ economic marginalization, Amerindians remained both individually and collectively able to affect their own destiny throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As both Bouchard and Lutz remind us, scholars have often failed to recognize this agency largely as a result of the divergence between the reasons for market participation assumed by orthodox economic theory (which, in overly simplistic terms, is best described as the individual profit motive) and those underlying the activity of many marginalized groups. While similarly highlighting the cultural underpinnings of economic activity, Craig’s work further complicates traditional economic analysis by arguing against the existence of a single, unified “market,” instead proposing that economic history should be written with an eye towards the multiple markets that exist within any economic system.¹¹⁸

These economic spaces include the family and the workplace, the local and the global, as well as the formal and the informal, each of which features its own internal power dynamic and relates to the others according to a hierarchy of force principally corresponding to scale.

¹¹⁷ Lutz, Makûk. For a similar analysis of the power of Indigenous cultural prerogatives to dictate participation in the capitalistic market, see O’Neill, Working the Navajo Way.

¹¹⁸ Craig, Backwoods Consumers and Homespun Capitalists, esp. p. 3-22.
The conviction that economic activity is best understood in terms of a multiplicity of markets underlies this study's analytical approach and provides it with the means of tying money-use's economic to its political dimensions. Rather than assuming the single, unitary market of orthodox economic theory, the present dissertation traces currency through wage work and commercial hunting and trapping funded by European and Euro-Canadian capital as well as through internal economic relations in Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake. The resulting analysis suggests that markets operating on different scales and involving different actors combined with similarly diverse political formations to influence the ways in which the Cree, Innu, and Huron wielded money in both political and economic contexts. As state-backed currency circulated more freely in both the St. Lawrence Valley and the subarctic, sometimes as the result of clear state intervention, sometimes arising from more purely economic factors, capitalist enterprise in general, and large fur trade companies in particular, slowly lost the implicitly political role they had previously played in many Aboriginal communities to the state. In this sense, then, this study argues that state formation, the spread of publicly-issued money, and the change in local markets that these first two factors contributed to creating led to the symbolic shift of authority over relations with First Nations from capital to the state. At the same time, however, it argues that Amerindians actively participated in the changing economic and political relations that money-use reveals, both encouraging changes to the monetary system and taking advantage of inconsistencies in state policy and practice in order to favor their own individual and collective well-being. This conviction that different scales of analysis elucidate both economic and political experience also explains why this study concentrates on three distinct Aboriginal communities.

Wendake, Mashteuiatsh, and Moose Factory

The present dissertation focuses on the history of three First Nations: the Moose Factory Cree, the Huron-Wendat of Wendake, and the Innu of Mashteuiatsh (Figure 1.1). Although several scholars have analyzed aspects of each of these communities' history, the historiography pertaining to them remains small. With relatively few exceptions, this scholarship only tangentially concerns itself with issues of colonialism or unbalanced power relations, generally preferring to adopt the new Indian history's agency-centric analytical
framework. Furthermore, this historiography tends to treat political and economic phenomena, as well as the history of each community, in isolation, thereby failing to foreground both comparison and the effects generated by the interaction of different sectors of human activity. Ultimately, this leads to an incomplete image of these Nations' history, particularly insofar as relations with Euro-Canadians during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are concerned.


The majority of work concerning the Huron actually relates to their immediate ancestors, the Huron of Georgian Bay. Due in large part to the important effects of the wars in which the Huron took part and the dramatic nature of the resulting “fall of Huronia,” scholars have concentrated on the first half of the seventeenth century – that is, the period
preceding their arrival in the region of Quebec City. Early work on the Huron, like that concerning other First Nations, adopted an approach that sought to determine the extent to which the Huron had “acculturated,” while trying to document as many traditional practices as possible before they disappeared. These studies generally neglected historical perspectives, preferring analyses of the Huron based in cultural anthropology.

Since the 1990s, however, the body of historical literature on the Huron of Wendake has experienced slow but steady growth. Much of this recent work originated in legal disputes over Huron ancestral rights including that leading to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1990 Sioui decision. These disputes have given rise to the publication in the form of scholarly articles and books of reports that had initially been presented to the court in addition to several lengthy commentaries on Huron history and its ties to the contemporary legal system. While still accounting for an inordinate amount of the historiography, studies explicitly framed in legal terms have recently begun making way for analyses of Huron social, economic, and cultural history. In this sense, the special issue of Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, published in 2000, on the Huron of Wendake has been particularly instrumental in expanding the horizons of this historiography. Although including one study


121 For a post-trial take on the decision, see Denis Vaugeois, La fin des alliances franco-indiennes. For four of the scholarly reports presented to the court (written by Alain Beaulieu, Denys Delâge, Cornelius Jaenen, and Marcel Trudel), see Vaugeois (ed.), Les Hurons de Lorette.

122 For a work that remains locked in a legal perspective, largely leaving aside those aspects of Huron historical experience that do not clearly serve juridical ends, see Michel Lavoie, C’est ma seigneurie que je réclame. La lutte des Hurons de Lorette pour la seigneurie de Sillery, 1650-1900, Montreal, Boréal, 2010.
that, while not juridical in nature, grew from legal disputes (Alain Beaulieu’s study of Huron-British political relations at the time of the Conquest), the issue also contained Denys Delâge’s analysis of Huron commercial practice from the eighteenth through the early twentieth century, Patrick Brunelle’s study of Huron identity during the twentieth century, and the analyses of Huron territorial occupation with reference to hunting and trapping conducted by Jocelyn Tehatarongnantase Paul and Jean Tanguay. More recently both Andrew Nurse and Véronique Rozon have focused on interactions between the Huron and Euro-Canadians in terms of identity, providing analyses of both external and internal perceptions of what it meant to be Huron during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while tying these perceptions to larger histories of political relations. At the same time, recent work by Hugh Shewell and Michel Lavoie has also pointed to the importance of intercultural political relations, highlighting Huron activism’s long history. Together, this literature depicts a community that, while highly integrated into the social and economic landscape of French Canada, struggled to assert its status as an “authentic” First Nation while also meeting with persistent difficulties in its relations with Euro-Canadian legal and political authorities.

Although Moose Factory held a critical place in the fur trade of present-day northern Ontario and Quebec from its founding in 1673 through the mid-twentieth century,


125 Shewell, “Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism...” and Lavoie, C’est ma seigneurie que je réclame.
the historiography on the post and the Aboriginal peoples that frequented it pales in comparison to that which treats eastern James Bay. The only book-length study on the history of the western James Bay Cree, *Muskekowuck Athinuwick* by Victor Lytwyn, concentrates solely on the period prior to 1821, the date at which the HBC and the North West Company merged, effectively establishing a monopoly in the subarctic fur trade. Through company records, Lytwyn analyzes the cultural, economic, political, and environmental dimensions of Cree society during an era in which they had relatively little contact with Euro-Canadians. Beginning in this early period Moose Factory formed the hub of the HBC’s activities in Hudson and James Bay and, as a result of the system of rivers that allowed relatively easy travel to and from the post, also served as the most important locale in present-day northeastern Ontario prior to the recreation of the region’s transportation network as a result of railway expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

John S. Long’s research, which focuses on both missionaries and Treaty No. 9, represents the historiography’s most sustained and nuanced treatment of both western James Bay and its Aboriginal inhabitants. This impressive body of work is of particular importance to the present dissertation as it examines in detail the interaction of extra-regional organizations (such as the Anglican Church and the provincial and federal states) and the Cree during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, describing several ways in which colonialism as a historical process unfolded in western James Bay while consistently underlining Aboriginal agency. However, Long’s explicitly historical research, primarily

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126 For examples of lengthy studies dealing with the history of the Cree of eastern James Bay, see Francis and Morantz, *Partners in Furs*, Morantz, *The White Man’s Gonna Getcha*, and Carlson, *Home is the Hunter*.


founded in archival rather than field studies, forms an exception to the literature on the region and its First Nations, dominated by anthropologists and which, in its older form, privileges ethnographical analysis, emphasizing continuity rather than change.\textsuperscript{130} Of course, several anthropological studies make use of fieldwork to focus on the effects of interethnic relations through time, adding vital perspective to purely archival research on Cree economic, social, and cultural practices.\textsuperscript{131} In the case of the Moose Factory Cree, Regina Flannery’s fascinating life history of Ellen Smallboy is the best example of this, supplementing the


historiography's general description of the Cree with an intimate portrait of one woman’s everyday life.\apn{132}

Anthropological work, particularly that published by Julius Lips during the 1930s and 1940s, also provides critical perspective on the economic, social, political, and legal practices of the Innu of Mashteuiatsh.\apn{133} The well-known anthropological debate on the fur trade's effects on the structure of Algonquian hunting territories, most notably the contributions of Frank Speck and Eleanor Leacock, also provides invaluable information on the organization of Innu society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\apn{134} While a handful of studies analyze the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fur trade in explicitly historical terms, their focus is overwhelmingly on the monopoly fur trade that predates the period covered by this dissertation.\apn{135} Two recent book-length studies examine aspects of the Innu's historical

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relationship with Euro-Canadians; Jean-Paul Lacasse analyzes the relationship between the Innu, Euro-Canadians, and land in eastern Quebec and Labrador while Joëlle Gardette examines the “dialogue of cultures” between the Innu and Euro-Canadians since the seventeenth century. Both of these studies, however, pose certain problems in the context of the present dissertation. Although Lacasse firmly anchors his analysis in the material realities of the Innu’s ongoing struggle to exert more force in their relations with Euro-Canadians and, in particular, to gain greater control over their territory, he does so through a juridical framework primarily interested in contemporary legal issues related to governance and intercultural cooperation. Gardette, for her part, engages in discursive analysis that, while of critical importance to Amerindian-Euro-Canadian relations (which she generally presents as constant through time), leads her to neglect colonialism’s physical dimension and the material conditions that made Euro-Canadian discourse possible. Moreover, although ostensibly dedicated to an analysis of intercultural “dialog,” the Innu half of the conversation is often absent. Of course, this is largely due to the relative scarcity of sources in which the Innu themselves “speak.” In this sense, two recently published life histories of band members provide critical insight into twentieth-century Mashteuiatsh Innu life. In addition to these works, a handful of other books give voice to Innu from both Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and elsewhere in eastern Quebec and Labrador, both through the life history of individual Innu and through the personal observations of members of several different bands. Alain Beaulieu’s and Stéphanie Béreau’s forthcoming article on Indian Affairs’ imposition of the band council system in Mashteuiatsh effectively counters the historiography’s tendency to


formulate analyses of Indian policy either in terms of historical discourse or as a function of contemporary legal concerns. Indeed, they demonstrate that through band councils the Innu and the state interacted in complex ways, leading the Innu to lose power in certain cases but also possibly strengthening the community’s ability for collective action, thereby providing it with an effective means of exerting force vis-à-vis the state.139

Methodology

This study combines “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to the writing of history. Rather than focusing uniquely on “on-the-ground” lived experience or the political and economic superstructures that framed such everyday existence, it seeks to delineate the connections that brought the two together, in the process marrying discursive and material analysis. This approach emphasizes the need to understand the ways in which women and men actively engaged in shaping their lives in a world over which they had little control.140 At the same time, this approach allows multiple views of the same issue that account for the divergence of power between the state and transnational capital, on the one hand, and First Nations on the other. In this sense, it attempts to avoid engaging discourse and practice naïvely by accepting the need to contextualize both in terms of the power relations characterizing Euro-Canadian and Amerindian societies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In her study of liberalism in turn-of-the-twentieth-century Quebec, Fernande Roy points to the necessity of grounding discourse in practical realities in this way. “L’analyse du discours libéral dans un contexte spécifique doit prendre en compte la situation du groupe


140 For a discussion of the twinned top-down and bottom-up approach, focusing on “the intersection and disjuncture between the public politics and daily lived realities of race,” see Jennifer M. Spear, Race, Sex, and Social Order in Early New Orleans, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, p. 2-3 and 6.
émetteur dans la structure de pouvoir et donc celle des autres groupes sociaux et idéologies avec lesquels il entre en concurrence et avec lesquels il doit aussi composer.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, a twinned top-down and bottom-up, discursive and material analysis allows a nuanced understanding of the complex and changing relationships through which social power is exerted.

The present dissertation grounds its analysis in a “bottom-up” study of the changing material conditions of three Amerindian communities: Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake. These three communities each experienced in historically distinct ways the interactions between money and colonialism. The Huron-Wendat, who first migrated to the Quebec City region in 1650-1, settled at the site of present-day Wendake in 1697.\textsuperscript{142} By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Huron had begun integrating a portion of their economic activity into the colonial market and by mid-century they maintained a material culture closely related to that of their Euro-Canadian neighbors.\textsuperscript{143} Social integration accompanied its economic counterpart as the residents of Wendake increasingly married colonists, leading during the nineteenth century to conflict among the Huron and charges from both within and without the community of the failing purity of the Huron “race.”\textsuperscript{144} Despite this process of \textit{métissage}, the Huron continued to maintain their identity as a distinct community throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean led semi-nomadic lives, spending the majority of the year hunting, trapping, and gathering in the bush and a few weeks each summer conducting business at fur trade posts. Following legislation

\textsuperscript{141} Roy, \textit{Progrès, harmonie, liberté}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{142} On the Huron migration from the Great Lakes to Quebec City and their experience there through the end of the seventeenth century, see Trigger, \textit{The Children of Aataentsic}, p. 801-20.


\textsuperscript{144} Rozon, “Un dialogue identitaire.”
passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada in 1851, the Innu received two reserves on the shore of Lac St. Jean (at the mouths of the Peribonka and Métabetchouan Rivers) in 1853.\(^{145}\) Three years later, however, they traded these reserves for another at Mashteuiatsh (Pointe Bleue), where by the following decade, in response to a request made by several Innu, the HBC had opened a post. Although the majority of community members continued to spend most of their lives in the bush, these changes inspired a gradual shift towards a sedentary existence that characterized the community by the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, while far less populous than Quebec City, the towns of Roberval and St. Félicien rapidly grew up next to Mashteuiatsh from the middle of the nineteenth century, creating close economic, social, and cultural ties between many Innu and the neighboring Euro-Canadian population. The arrival of the railroad at Roberval from Quebec City in 1888 increased this proximity, providing new opportunities for wage work to even those Innu who wished to continue spending much of their time in the bush (e.g. guiding tourists).

The Cree of Moose Factory, on the other hand, experienced no day-to-day contact with a substantial Euro-Canadian population until the middle of the twentieth century. From 1670 to 1870, authorities in Europe and the New World ascribed sovereignty over the region that drained into Hudson Bay (Rupert’s Land) to the English Crown. Despite Great Britain’s retention of formal authority, the monopoly trading rights to the region that it accorded the Hudson’s Bay Company effectively made the chartered corporation the most substantial political and economic power in Rupert’s Land. Moose Factory, a trading post founded by the company in southwestern James Bay in 1673, played an important role in the region as the hub of the HBC’s Hudson and James Bay transportation network through the early decades of the twentieth century. This encouraged the distinct geopolitical character of Rupert’s Land and James Bay into the twentieth century. As one company employee observes, at Moose Factory during the 1910s “Travellers by canoe or snowshoe taking any of the river routes

\(^{145}\) Fortin and Frenette, “L’acte de 1851...”
southward to Southern Ontario or Quebec always said they were 'going to Canada.' Indeed, this relative isolation lasted until the arrival at Moosonee (a community situated on the mainland directly adjacent to Moose Factory Island) of the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad in 1932. Even after this point, many Cree continued to lead semi-nomadic lives, hunting and trapping in the bush during the winter and trading their catch at Moose Factory or Moosonee during the summer. In this sense, the bush rather than the trading post or any neighboring Euro-Canadian settlement structured Cree life throughout the period making Aboriginal experience in western James Bay distinct from that of Wendake and Mashteuiatsh.

Thus, whereas the Huron-Wendat of Wendake lived in close proximity to a large Euro-Canadian population center (Quebec City) since the mid-seventeenth century, colonization of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean only began during the mid-nineteenth century, and Moose Factory hosted an extremely limited Euro-Canadian presence through the middle of the twentieth century. Moreover, during this period, only Wendake remained constantly within the limits of the same territorial jurisdiction (Lower Canada and later Quebec). Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the whole of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fell outside of Lower Canada's standard system of land tenure, being leased by the crown along with monopoly rights to the region's fur trade to the highest bidder and off-limits to settlement. The Cree of western James Bay remained officially beyond the reach of federal and provincial authorities until 1905, when they signed Treaty No. 9, by which they entered into formal, political relations with both Canada and Ontario. Prior to this point, the HBC was the unique Euro-Canadian political authority with which the Cree dealt, an authority that although no longer recognized by the state at the turn of the twentieth century gave it significant political power in the region well into the new century. Together, then, Wendake, Moose Factory, and Mashteuiatsh represent three distinct temporal and geographical forms of interaction with

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147 On the bush-centered lives of Cree in eastern James Bay, see Carlson, *Home is the Hunter*. 
colonialist states, each of which involved different geopolitical actors and differing levels of
everyday “contact” with colonizers. These differences provide fertile grounds for analyzing
money’s role in the colonial encounter.

These First Nations form useful case studies in other ways as well. Wendake’s
nineteenth and twentieth-century economy reflected general trends in contemporaneous,
industrializing Canada. The Moose Factory Cree, on the other hand, practiced a relatively
static fur trade economy typical of the Amerindian population of subarctic Canada throughout
the period, with major changes arising only as railway infrastructure and state bureaucracy
reached the settlement during the second quarter of the twentieth century. The Saguenay-Lac
St. Jean Innu reflect an economic experience situated in between these two extremes, shifting
from a semi-nomadic fur trade economy to one that emphasized agriculture, wage labor, and
other more “permanent” means of participating in the capitalistic marketplace. Each of these
three economic histories, like their political counterparts, then, represents larger trends in
Aboriginal history.

Of course, these cases also have limitations. Mashteuiatsh, Wendake, and Moose
Factory all remained small throughout the period, having in 1934, for example, populations
of 776, 478, and 377 respectively. Thus, none of these First Nations compare with larger
communities that have been the subject of considerably more scholarship, such as the Six
Nations of Grand River who in 1934 had a population of 4,908. As a result of the relatively
small size of these three nations, moreover, certain phenomena that were central to life
elsewhere are either absent or only appear on occasion in the historical record, the density of
which is often directly related to the size of the population that it concerns. This clearly
affects the present study in that only fragments of certain processes and practices appear in
the archives, often making their reconstruction somewhat tentative. At the same time,
focusing on communities located in distinct jurisdictional spaces (the provinces of Quebec
and Ontario from the early twentieth century and before this within either the domain of the

colonial state or the HBC) complicates the analysis somewhat and risks making extremely localized phenomena appear universal. In order to avoid this, at least to some extent, the present dissertation uses sources (both primary and secondary) that describe conditions among neighboring First Nations (such as the Fort Albany Cree and the Atikamekw of the Upper Saint Maurice). While this approach is certainly not perfect, it provides an effective means of partially filling gaps in the documentary record while simultaneously guarding against unwarranted generalizations.

This is in some sense, then, a comparative history since it concentrates on First Nations with distinct historical experiences living in regions in which the general process of economic and political colonialism unfolded in different although related ways. At the same time, it adopts a perspective similar to that taken by recent works in histoire croisée. This relatively new approach argues in favor of the analysis of the entanglements between the history of regions and peoples that have generally been treated in isolation. Drawing inspiration from postcolonial studies and producing analytical frameworks that resemble those of the new imperial history, histoire croisée seeks not to isolate and compare but to integrate, replacing the multiple sites of comparative history with a single overarching whole in which ideas, people, and business defy the national borders that have tended to encompass historical research. Jürgen Kocka argues that elements of comparative history and histoire croisée can be fruitfully combined by conceiving of "historical phenomena as units of comparison and, at the same time, as components of a larger whole."149 Although the present dissertation does not systematically employ either of these methodologies, it does draw inspiration from them, combining into a single analytical framework both communities that are rarely studied together and higher-level institutions (i.e. the state and private corporations).

Thus, while approaching the history of money among First Nations from the bottom-up through detailed studies of Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake, carefully comparing the distinct experiences of each throughout, this study also situates these three cases within larger analytical structures. The examination of money in the context of both capital and the state provides the environment for accomplishing this top-down approach. The chapters that follow analyze the development of the imperial, colonial, federal, and provincial states and their role in changing monetary conceptions and uses from above. In addition to a similar analysis of extra-regional capital (most often the HBC), this approach allows the development of a framework that stretches beyond the purely local, tying Cree, Huron, and Innu history into larger patterns of interaction. At the same time, the comparison allowed by the study of local contexts and experiences complicates and provides texture to the larger story related through the analysis of the policy and actions of the state and capital.

This dissertation also combines discursive and material analysis. Its primary sources of inspiration in this sense are Karl Marx and Michel Foucault. Although these thinkers' followers have conflicted more often than not, the emphasis that they convincingly place on different aspects of the same historical phenomena points to the complementarity of these approaches. The present study, then, follows the attempt of Geoff Eley and Keith Nield to reconcile postmodern (including Foucauldian) and Marxian historical analysis. Eley and Nield argue that the conflict that has traditionally separated practitioners of these methodologies fosters a counterproductive and hostile atmosphere which blinds scholars to the usefulness of "opposing" forms of analysis. The academic debates to which this difference of opinion gives rise largely focus on the interplay of text and context and on the ability of historians to access real empirical events, with those scholars who subscribe to the most radical postmodern or discursive forms of analysis discounting the distinction between text and context as well as the feasibility of empirical research. Ultimately, the proponents of pure discursive analysis assert that everything is text or discourse, calling into question nearly

all of the traditional historiography. However, even if one entirely accepts the tenets of the “strong textualism” advocated by Foucault and others, it would be difficult to refute the centrality to First Nations’ history of certain material, contextual elements upon which Marxian historical analysis focuses (e.g. Aboriginal susceptibility to pathogens and sophisticated European military technology). On the other hand, discursive analysis’ insistence that words and ideas shaped “realities” in the past is borne out by the results presented in the following chapters. Thus, rather than restricting itself to a purely Foucauldian discursive analysis or to an entirely structural or material Marxian approach, this dissertation combines them, proceeding from the conviction that all historical processes contain both discursive and material elements and that neglecting either one or the other necessarily leads to a truncated understanding of history.

Sources

The present dissertation primarily bases its analysis on archival collections, two of which are of particular importance: the Department of Indian Affairs fonds (RG10) at Library and Archives Canada and the Hudson’s Bay Company Archives (HBCA) held by the Archives of Manitoba. RG10 contains much of the documentation generated by Indian Affairs since its creation by the British imperial state in 1755. The majority of this material consists of correspondence between the Department’s headquarters staff and its field agents and collaborators (e.g. the missionaries who resided on reserves in Lower Canada) as well as Amerindians themselves. This source provides detailed information on moments of crisis such as conflicts, both those among band members and those between band members and various Euro-Canadians (e.g. Indian Affairs employees, missionaries, neighbors), while offering less information on day-to-day life. RG10 also contains, from the late nineteenth

During the twentieth century, the Department engaged in a series of economic initiatives (e.g. fur preserves) and administrative collaborations with other state agencies (e.g. the Department of Pensions and National Health) that generated copious documentation also contained in RG 10. In more precise terms, prior to RG 10’s 1872 reorganization into the Red and Black Series (concerning eastern and western Canada respectively, both including files that relate to specific reserve communities), the Department of Indian Affairs fonds was organized chronologically, with documents pertaining to diverse regions intermingled. As a result, pre-Red Series RG 10 was consulted in order to locate records from this period relating to either the Huron or the Innu. In addition, this study’s documentary corpus includes copies of some documents from RG 10 which are held at the Archives de la Nation huronne-wendat (ACNHW). A wide array of Red Series files pertaining to Wendake, Mashteuiatsh, or Moose Factory between the 1870s and the middle of the twentieth century were consulted in order to determine their content, with those having the most to do with monetary issues receiving in-depth treatment. Because money, politics, and the economy interacted in distinct ways in Moose Factory, Mashteuiatsh, and Wendake, often growing from a combination of local factors and the prerogatives of Indian Affairs’ headquarters staff, the cases that this dissertation analyzes were frequently unique to one of the three contexts. As a result, this study ties these cases together through the light they cast on the political content of money-use in the context of colonialism, despite the diverse array of specific historical subjects that they imply (from Indian presents, through credit relations, to beaver preserves).

This study employs published documents in addition to these archival sources. The largest single collection of these is the Indian Affairs Annual Reports, published in 1864 and

152 It should be noted that RG 10 contains no information on the Moose Factory Cree prior to the turn of the twentieth century.
yearly from 1868. However, this source is particularly problematic in that some of the numerical data it reports (that pertaining to on-reserve economic activity) often appears to have been entirely fabricated and because sections of it repeat the same information from year to year (frequently verbatim).\textsuperscript{153} Despite such deficiencies, the reports of Indian agents and other administrators paint a qualitatively rich portrait of First Nations' daily life across Canada. Moreover, the \textit{Annual Reports} provide detailed quantitative data in the form of official governmental accounts, critical to this study's analysis of several departmental programs. The \textit{Annual Reports} also appear to provide faithful population figures into the 1930s,\textsuperscript{154} while furnishing reliable figures on the amount of relief the Department distributed either from monies it held in trust for bands or from its own funds. Analyzed together, these data permit a rough estimate of the amount of per capita on-reserve assistance furnished bands during both good and bad economic times.

The lengthy reports of several state-conducted commissions of inquiry into Indian Affairs during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also furnish a great deal of information on the structure of the Department, the legal context within which it performed its duties, and the effects of policy on First Nations. Although Amerindian "voices" only appear occasionally in the pages of these reports, the words of administrators, politicians, and other Euro-Canadian commentators provide valuable insight into colonial opinions of First Nations, often directly related to monetary issues. This dissertation also analyzes the text of laws that framed the state's relationship with Aboriginal peoples in order to better understand the extent to which Parliament participated in the extension of forms of monetary control.

\textsuperscript{153} Despite the clear invention involved in providing numerical data on Aboriginal income, John Lutz argues that the \textit{Annual Reports} provide important estimates for determining the relative importance of different forms of income. Lutz, \textit{Makik}, p. 316-7. However, given that these estimates never provide information on the form of payment, they are not analyzed to any significant extent in the following chapters.

\textsuperscript{154} However, certain cases form exceptions to this rule. See, for example, the discussion of Moose Factory's population and the signature of Treaty No. 9 in Chapter Six.
Among official published documents, treaties and land surrenders also provide a great deal of information on the power relations formed by state action in First Nations communities.

The second major archival source on which this study draws is the HBCA. Although the company did not regularly trade with the Huron during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its policies and practices deeply affected the economic wellbeing of the Cree and Innu. Indeed, during much if not all of the period prior to 1950, the HBC constituted the primary trading partner of those residents of Mashteuiatsh and Moose Factory who engaged in the fur trade. The HBCA are divided into several sections; this dissertation concentrates its analysis on two of these: the records of the Governor and Committee (the company’s official, London-based management) and those of the company’s posts. The first of these sections is of particular use because of the annual reports and accounts that the Winnipeg-based fur trade department sent to the Governor and Committee. These documents contain detailed numerical data on the amount of currency in use at the HBC’s posts in addition to analyses of the company’s activities in its different districts, frequently including information on trade at particular posts and the opinions of company inspectors as to the best course of action for improving business (which, as will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters, often included a monetary dimension). The post records provide far more detail on the company’s day-to-day operations and on the Aboriginal peoples with whom it did business. These records are divided into several series, the following of which are analyzed below: post journals, correspondence books (sent), correspondence inward (received), account books, and reports on district. Each of these series provide different types of information: reports on district offer the most synthetic account of life and business at the post, journals and accounts furnish the greatest detail on First Nations, and correspondence generally concerns company policy and structure. The present dissertation analyzes the archives left by several posts, both those that directly concern members of the Mashteuiatsh or Moose Factory First Nations (Chicoutimi, Lake St. John (Métabetchouan), Moose Factory, and Pointe Bleue (Mashteuiatsh)) as well as those that provide contextualization (Abitibi, Albany, and Mistassini). Together, these archival series provide material for analyzing both the HBC’s on-the-ground practice and its general policy with respect to Aboriginal money-use and the fur trade overall. Moreover, given the extreme paucity of sources dealing with other fur traders, the HBCA provide one of the only means of accessing information on the
company's many competitors. Although rarely addressing the First Nations at the heart of the present study, several published first-hand accounts of the fur trade, generally written by former HBC employees, serve to add the depth of personal experience to the often dry, formal accounts held in official company archives.

Although all of these series were consulted in preparing the present study, the treatment they received was not uniform largely due to their nature and content. For example, while the post journals held in the HBCA contain detailed information on daily life at the company's posts, much of this information has little directly to do with money-use. Thus, post journals were treated after denser sources (e.g. correspondence, annual reports, and reports on district). The analysis that follows also only makes sparing use of the HBC's account books. This is primarily due to this source's density. Indeed, the accounts of a single trapper during any given year often occupy several pages. Although company employees kept these accounts in a given abstract currency depending on the period, it is often (although not always) impossible to determine from the accounts alone whether transactions included cash or not. As a result, rather than exhaustively analyzing the information contained in this source, the present dissertation concentrates on account books that describe periods of transition from one monetary system to another and on those entries that explicitly mention the presence of cash. Since this study is not an attempt to perform an exhaustive examination of Aboriginal consumption patterns or the fur trade's debt system (both of which several scholars have already masterfully done), a more in-depth analysis of this source was not considered necessary.

The other major archival sources on which this dissertation is based are preserved at the Archives du Conseil de la Nation huronne-wendat in Wendake and Bibliothèque et archives nationales du Québec (BANQ). Together, these two institutions hold the small, publicly accessible portion of a much larger collection of documents which constitute the
Picard Family fonds.\textsuperscript{155} During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Picards were one of the wealthiest, best educated, and most politically influential families in Wendake. Family members held the post of Grand Chief and Indian agent while also working in a number of professions, primarily in the region of Quebec City, and employing other Huron in on-reserve manufacturing jobs. The Picards describe in detail much of this activity in their journals and correspondence, while their personal papers (including accounts, receipts, and contracts) provide a great deal of information on their business dealings and the credit and cash-based relations tying them to other Huron and to their Euro-Canadian neighbors. The portion of this collection held at the ACNHW contains three important records of daily life during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: two journals maintained by François Xavier "Paul" Picard Tahourenché and that of his grandson, Pierre Albert Picard. The first of these, kept by François Xavier Picard between 1837 and 1875, records his vision of important events in the wider world, while particularly focusing on his economic activities and political events involving community members. In addition, from 1840 to 1854, Picard maintained in a separate document (also referred to as his "journal") the Huron chiefs' accounts arising from their local management of resource-use on their Quarante Arpents reserve. These documents, then, provide a wealth of information on the economic and political life of mid-nineteenth-century Wendake. Pierre Albert Picard's journal, which he kept between 1916 and 1920, is the product of his decision to record his daily activities and observations on Huron and Euro-Canadian behavior following his election to the position Grand Chief at Wendake.\textsuperscript{156} It appears clear that Picard felt it his duty to record his time in office for posterity. This document contains valuable information on the political issues within the community with which Picard concerned himself, his notions (and by extension those of the educated Huron

\textsuperscript{155} Despite clear testamentary instructions to deliver the totality of this collection to the Huron of Wendake, many of the documents were sold to private collectors thus preventing access to the largest source of Huron archival heritage. On this fonds and its history, see Jonathan Lainey, "Le fonds Famille Picard: un patrimoine documentaire d'exception," \textit{Revue de Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec}, no. 2 (2010), p. 94-105.

\textsuperscript{156} This explains why Picard's journal ends in February 1920 when he lost his re-election bid to Ovide Sioui.
of which events and changes in broader Canadian and international society were of importance, and his opinions of proper conduct, relating both to monetary and non-monetary affairs. The ACNHW also hold important documents relating to the political history of the reserve, most notably the "Huron council book" (*Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons*) kept by Maurice Bastien and providing the greatest detail on band council meetings at Wendake between 1919 and 1949. The Marguerite Vincent fonds also contains a number of documents providing valuable insight into on-reserve economic relations and the political activities of certain Huron, particularly with respect to the federal government.

**Conclusion**

This study, through a detailed analysis of archival and published documents, seeks to analyze the political content of First Nations money-use in the context of nineteenth and twentieth-century Canadian colonialism. It does so through a twinned top-down and bottom-up, material and discursive analysis of archival and published documents relating to Indian Affairs and the HBC as well as those concerning the Huron of Wendake, the Moose Factory Cree, and the Innu of Mashteuiatsh. Through this approach, it tests the hypothesis that money—an idea and an object that contributed (and continues to contribute) to the creation and maintenance of social, economic, and political inequality throughout the world—occupied a central role in the process through which the Canadian state grew and exerted increasing control over its growing territory and the Aboriginal population within its national borders. Ultimately, however, this study concludes that the history of Amerindian money-use in Quebec and Ontario calls for a more nuanced image of change than that for which this type of strong interpretation allows. Indeed, through its adoption of an analytical framework that emphasizes Aboriginal agency while simultaneously highlighting the power of state and capital, this dissertation argues that money provided a political and economic means of both circumscribing and empowering, often unintentionally, First Nations. This nuanced interpretation calls into question many of the historiography's most categorical assertions concerning the relationship between Amerindians, the state, and capital in Canada during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Before turning to its historical analysis, this study will first consider the conceptual duo that forms its core (money and colonialism) and then
provide an analysis of money's nineteenth-century ideological and material content. In tandem with the preceding historiographical and methodological review, this approach provides critical context for the chapters that follow.
Chapter 2

Money, European Expansion, and Conjectural History in the New World

"Thus in the beginning all the World was America, and more so than it is now; for no such thing as Money was any where known."

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1690, section 49, p. 301

John Locke, like many of his contemporaries and followers, viewed the New World’s Indigenous inhabitants as the living, breathing ancestors of contemporaneous Europeans. Locke, along with many other early modern and modern thinkers, constructed a human history at the apex of which sat Europe. According to this "conjectural history," Amerindians provided access to the prehistory of numerous Western institutions and practices.¹ In this way, Western thinkers portrayed Aboriginal peoples as explicitly less developed than their European counterparts, thereby justifying the colonial project, which claimed to carry the light of civilization into the darkest recesses of the globe. Rather than constituting a moral argument in favor of imperial expansion, money provided an example of Europe’s self-evident superiority. Money, then, was not equivalent to religion: Europeans did not feel that its absence required any active intervention. Instead, they believed that the obvious superiority of precious-metal based currency of European origin would lead it, once colonial economies had overcome the infrastructural and technical difficulties of ensuring that quality coin and paper circulated in even their farthest-flung corners, to inevitably become the world’s only monetary system.

¹ On “conjectural history,” the practice by which participants in the Scottish Enlightenment sought to speculatively reconstruct the past from the observation of societies in the present, see Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in Sciences of Wealth and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998, esp. Chapter Five, “From Conjectural History to Political Economy,” p. 214-63.
This chapter addresses Locke's assertion through a consideration of the idea/object at the center of this study (money) and the environment in which it was used (colonialism), defining these heuristic and operational concepts in order to render them applicable throughout the whole of the present study. It then ties these two conceptual strands together through a reading of early modern and modern economic theory in respect to Indigenous peoples and money, thereby illustrating the theoretical baggage that Western institutions and individuals carried with them to British North America as well as modern economics' colonial and evolutionary heritage. Although economic thought was far removed from the everyday preoccupations of the majority of North Americans during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ways in which it participated in structuring colonialism and the social, economic, and political norms that arose from this historical process have proven to be anything but distant. The chapter ends with a cursory examination of Canadian monetary history prior to the mid-twentieth century. Taken as a whole, this chapter serves both to ground the analysis that follows and to provide the intellectual context within which the historical actors who appear therein lived and worked.

Colonialism

Colonialism has profoundly shaped the contemporary world. The process by which merchants, missionaries, settlers, and soldiers carried European ideas, norms, and practices to every corner of the globe has provided our world with an incalculable social, economic, political, and cultural heritage. While the historical and anthropological literature frequently invokes this process, only a relatively small number of works, even among those explicitly dedicated to its study, attempt to define colonialism in any meaningful way. This neglect decreases the term's clarity, intellectual purchase, and critical content. In order to take full

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2 For a similar observation with respect to imperialism (along with a detailed discussion of the development of the constellation of concepts surrounding it), see Patrick Wolfe, "History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism," *American Historical Review*, vol. 102, no. 2 (April 1997), p. 388-420.
advantage of colonialism's analytical potential, this section draws on several theoretical and historiographical visions of the concept in order to clearly define the term for use throughout the present dissertation.

The term “colonialism” forms one part of a larger conceptual unit that includes “colony,” “colonist,” “colonial,” “colonization,” “empire,” and “imperialism.” Each of these concepts emphasizes colonial/imperial regimes’ practice of connecting distant regions and peoples. However, colonialism, along with imperialism, makes explicit the conflict, violence, usurpation, and unequal power relations that these other terms only evoke elliptically. Moreover, because it places emphasis on the contested control of land and resources, colonialism underscores the political nature of European, and later Euro-American, expansion. In other words, colonialism extrapolates from the local character of individual or collective action implied by its cognates in order to contextualize “on-the-ground” decisions in relation to distantly defined policy goals and socio-cultural prerogatives, all the while foregrounding the unequal power relations at the core of the historical phenomenon.

In addition, colonialism explicitly highlights the a posteriori and normative nature of the “colonial project.” On the one hand, the concept offers present-day scholars and students a mental structure within which to understand the historical processes by which

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3 Although the literature on colonial and imperial studies sometimes distinguishes between “imperialism” and “colonialism,” this distinction is often purely semantic. In general, the two concepts are differentiated based on the presence (colonialism) or absence (imperialism) of settlers originating in the imperial heartland, with the concept of imperialism sometimes extended to regions in which a given power is informally active (generally through capitalist enterprise). For an influential study that differentiates between imperialism and colonialism in this way, see Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York, Vintage Books, 1993. However, given that both terms describe an extremely similar historical process featuring unequal power relations resulting from the imposition of external force, the present study makes no effort to differentiate between colonialism and imperialism. However, in the interest of clarity, colonialism rather than imperialism provides the preferred term throughout this dissertation.

"normal" social, political, economic, and cultural relations were transposed both across oceans and back through time. In this way, from both a contemporary and contemporaneous perspective, European action is rendered coherent (it formed part of a project) and natural (this is how the world is ordered). However, while European individuals and institutions certainly did not go about their business in the complete absence of any planning, the expectations that they carried to the New World—expectations rooted, for example, in European notions of gender and class—in no way represent more "natural" assumptions than those of their Amerindian counterparts. As such, the concept of colonialism underscores the inherently ethnocentric categories through which Europeans ordered their experience in the rest of the world and the ways in which those categories have come to structure both popular and academic understanding of the "colonial encounter."5

The theoretical vision of colonialism employed in this dissertation owes its greatest debt to Michel Foucault’s analysis of power relations developed in the first volume of the History of Sexuality.6 Put in the simplest terms, it defines colonialism as the continually changing field of power relations within which colonizers (Europeans and their descendents) and colonized (Indigenous peoples)7 interacted during the period frequently referred to as "post-contact." To a certain extent, this definition casts colonial relations as elastic, permitting the historian to conceive of all actors in any given situation as disposing of power,

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sometimes in unexpected ways. Thus, in the abstract, it is equally conceivable that First Nations or Euro-Canadians might dominate a given situation (or that there may exist a state of equilibrium, preventing either of the groups from exerting control). Of course, this theoretical potential was rarely realized with such equity in the real world. Thus, it is important to recognize that while according to this model each actor wields some amount of power, and is therefore never entirely helpless, this power is not necessarily distributed equally. Furthermore, following this definition, the process of colonialism is ongoing. Although some prefer to use the related concepts of internal colony or the fourth world when describing First Nations, I feel that colonialism places the process in a more richly detailed historical and historiographical context as it more explicitly connects it to similar processes which played out elsewhere in the world and during different periods.

In recent anthropological, literary, and historical scholarship (the interdisciplinary field generally referred to as post-colonial studies), the *History of Sexuality* is most often understood in terms of the discursive constitution of regimes of power—that is, in terms of power as embodied by language—as proposed by Foucault himself. This interpretation, the

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8 In addition to Foucault, this definition of colonialism draws inspiration from Jean and John Comaroff’s work on the history of missions in South Africa. They describe colonization, and therefore colonialism, “as a process of ‘challenge and riposte’ often much too complex to be captured in simple equations of dominance and resistance.” In order to cope with this challenge, without losing themselves in a postmodernist sea of unmeaning, the Comaroffs temper the Foucauldian conception of free-floating and diffuse power with the Gramscian notion of hegemony, which stresses meaning that, from the actors’ point of view, is apparently fixed, natural, or beyond human agency. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 1, *Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 5 and 13-27. See also, Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 2, p. 14-29.

9 Edward Said, who prefers the term imperialism to colonialism, makes a similar point. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, p. 9.

so-called linguistic turn, draws on linguistic and post-structuralist theory in order to privilege words and ideas over the material factors favored by generations of "positivist" scholars when charting power relations such as those found, for example, at the heart of colonialism or capitalism. While discourse and perception have undeniably shaped historical experience, evacuating the material world in this way seems naïve at best. In addition to having to cope with foreign languages and concepts, Aboriginal peoples in colonial settings also found themselves confronted by altered material realities. The present study centers on several such "real-world" changes. Colonial states, with the means at their disposal of shaping and controlling the land itself, provided one form of radical change; colonial economies, wielding similar, if less formal, powers, formed another. Fortunately, Foucault's, or, perhaps more fittingly, the Foucauldian, predilection for considering power in discursive terms in no way precludes applying his insight to such material phenomena.

11 For a scathing critique of the linguistic turn and its effects on the political potential of history, see Bryan D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990. Similar criticism is also found in the post-colonial studies literature, although, as result of the field's debt to discursive analysis, this criticism tends to be far less severe. For example, Frederick Cooper asserts the necessity of contextualizing colonialism instead of simply "plucking stories" that prove a point from any colonial situation. "Colonial power, like any other, was an object of struggle and depended on the material, social, and cultural resources of those involved. Colonizer and colonized are themselves far from immutable constructs, and such categories had to be reproduced by specific actions." Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, p. 17. Explicitly Foucauldian discursive analyses have only recently begun to appear in the Amerindian historiography. For an example of a discursive, narrative-centric analysis of Amerindian history, see Hans M. Carlson, Home is the Hunter: The James Bay Cree and their Land, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008, p. 23. He writes: "European economic activity could go on for centuries within a largely Native narrative space; the missionary narrative could be controlled and made useful within the material reality of the hunt; an outside narrative of ownership, control, and sovereignty could exist apart from James Bay even as the hunt and its narrative continued because the lands of James Bay were deemed not useful. Only when these narrative lines converged was the effect revolutionary."

12 As Patrick Wolfe astutely points out, "the fact that Michel Foucault appropriated the term 'discourse' from linguistics should not lead us to forget that, in his hands, the concept encompassed institutional configurations as solid as the prison or the asylum. (As practices go, few can be more material than architecture.) Despite this, postcolonial writing has too often excluded historical, economic, and material factors." Wolfe, "History and Imperialism," p. 405-6. For a discussion of attempts by colonial scholars to push beyond Foucault's emphasis on discourse and Foucault's
As discussed in the last chapter, this dissertation seeks to temper the historiography’s emphasis on Aboriginal agency in economic and political relations with Euro-Canadians by foregrounding the concept of colonialism. Of course, this relatively neat, theoretical vision would be useless if not applicable to the concrete historical processes under consideration.\textsuperscript{13} In order to be analytically effective, any given concept must possess some empirical basis. The sources consulted in the course of the research undertaken in connection with this study portray over-bearing state agencies and employees alongside active Amerindians. These institutions and individuals, in addition to merchants, missionaries, settlers, and others, acted according to their own aspirations and desires. However, they did so within a social, political, economic, and cultural field which was structured and restructured by powerful processes and relations that at least colored, and sometimes overrode, personal and institutional prerogatives. Colonialism, understood in these terms, allows us to simultaneously grasp individual agency and social momentum, with reference to both the colonizing and the colonized population.

One final remark should be made about what archaeologists refer to as “acculturation models.” The present study could lend itself to the implicit interpretation that one discrete cultural group, Aboriginal peoples, received from another distinct and bounded group, Europeans and their descendents living in North America, the practice of money-use as part of a process of collective movement between cultural poles. In other words, one might conceivably conclude that Euro-Canadians “donated” money to Amerindians, thus causing this second group to lose in some sense an aspect of its predefined culture, in the process becoming more like the colonizing population. However, such an essentialist interpretation is entirely unfounded in that it refers to a mythical “pure” culture, that existed prior to contact,


\textsuperscript{13} On several of the ahistorical approaches employed in post-colonial studies to historical processes, see Cooper, 	extit{Colonialism in Question}, p. 17-22.
not only with Europeans, but with all other cultures, including those of neighboring Indigenous peoples. Refashioning archaeologist Stephen W. Silliman’s questions as assertions, this study conceives of “change and continuity... as the same process.” In other words, the present dissertation argues that while money-use is one aspect of everyday life that underwent observable change as a result of colonialism, this change in no way spelled the demise of any portion of Huron-Wendat, Innu, or Cree culture. Rather, such change, perhaps as much as relative stasis in other practices, offered Aboriginal peoples “a way to remain Native in very changed and very conflicted circumstances.” Furthermore, money, although European in origin, should not itself be thought of as somehow “European.” Like any other object, its users ascribe to it meanings that are not inherent to money itself.

Money

Although money is among the contemporary world’s most mundane objects, its meaning and definition, after proving remarkably static prior to the turn of the twentieth century, have provided grounds for strident debate among scholars ever since. Present-day economic theory ascribes to money three (or sometimes four) functions: a store of value, an abstract measure of value, and a means of exchange (which is sometimes distinguished from its function as a means of payment or settlement of debt). However, this list of essential functions constitutes the only consensus in an otherwise extremely contentious field of scholarly inquiry. The present study follows most closely the recent work of Geoffrey Ingham in order to present a conceptual vision of money as being first and foremost a social relationship based in both its ability to measure value and its function as transferable debt.


Such a definition directly contradicts the dominant monetary theory of orthodox (or mainstream) economics as pioneered by nearly every nineteenth-century economist of note. Classical political economy, via the commodity theory of money, employs “money” as convenient shorthand for “commodity accepted as a generalized medium of exchange.” In this way, orthodox economics stresses money’s exchange function, which is based, at least in the sophisticated economies of early modern and modern Europe, on money’s function as a store of value, itself arising from money’s precious metal content. Orthodox economic theory continued to support this view even as fiduciary money (promises to pay specified amounts of gold or silver bullion) replaced precious-metal coins as the backbone of the international monetary system during the nineteenth century. Moreover, this vision of money’s nature lying in its relationship to precious metals remained uncontested in the popular imagination through the functional end of the international gold standard during the Great Depression and the implementation of the Bretton Woods system at the tail end of World War II.

Despite the absence of any direct relationship between metals and money, present­day economic theory remains informed to a significant extent by classical political economy’s emphasis on gold and silver. This debt is most obvious in mainstream economics’ insistence that money forms a “neutral veil” through which commodities can express their


17 It is, of course, important to note that while Say and his immediate predecessors and contemporaries (most notably Adam Smith and David Ricardo) wrote during a period in which precious metals provided the theoretical basis for money’s value, the global gold standard would not come into existence until the 1870s, when nearly every European nation as well as the post-Civil War United States adopted the system. Of course, the international gold standard, like its national and regional predecessors (the gold, silver, and bi-metallic standards of the mid-nineteenth century), did not guarantee that circulating monetary media would possess any precious metal content whatsoever. Rather, these systems guaranteed payment of gold or silver in exchange for government-backed notes and coins. Barry J. Eichengreen and Marc Flandreau, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Barry J. Eichengreen and Marc Flandreau (eds.), The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 2nd ed., New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 1-30.
value. According to this model, money acts merely as a means of rendering barter more efficient and in no way influences exchange or the economic system as a whole beyond its simple existence as the universally sought commodity. Among classical economists, John Stuart Mill provides what is perhaps the most striking example of this thesis, insisting that money only makes itself felt when malfunctioning. “There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money; except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and labour. It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it: and like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets out of order.”

By the late twentieth century Mill’s assertion had become a truism for the majority of economists who perpetuated it by according no analytical role to money in many of their most sophisticated mathematical models. At the same time, and in spite of the obvious contradiction, many of the same economists argued with increasing fervor that central banks needed to enforce a strict equilibrium between monetary supply and demand in order to prevent the possibility of serious short-term economic damage posed by inflation. However, these economists, proponents of “quantity theory” or “monetarism,” simultaneously held that money in no way influenced long-term economic prospects. In other words, although economists assigned no analytical importance to money, its control increasingly came to be seen as central to the maintenance of economic stability.


The commodity and quantity theories, however, do not provide the only means of understanding money's nature. Whereas orthodox economics emphasizes money's exchange function, while simultaneously proclaiming that it only exerts an influence on the economic system when it is out of alignment, another school of thought, which traces its lineage to Georg Simmel's *The Philosophy of Money*, considers money's nature to lie in its utility as a means of measuring and rendering intelligible abstract, socially-defined value. In other words, rather than emphasizing money's physical function as a medium of exchange or as a store of value, this theoretical perspective accentuates money's immaterial role as a unit of account. Thus, whether physical money-stuff participates in an exchange or not, the transaction is monetary if the parties to the exchange understand it in reference to an abstract measure of value. Geoffrey Ingham makes this argument in great detail, in the process reformulating several of orthodox economics' favorite examples of "proto-monetary exchange" as, in fact, instances of monetary transactions based upon money's function as an abstract measure of value. For example, Ingham writes that Adam Smith's characterization of nail-based exchange in Scotland or similar trade patterns in Newfoundland based on dried cod (both during the eighteenth century) as forms of "primitive" monetary-exchange is incorrect because neither nails nor cod functioned as abstract measures of value. In fact, Ingham argues, these cases provide examples of full-fledged monetary exchange because the commodities in question were used as a means of settling in-kind debt that had been contracted in terms of an abstract money of account (the pound), not in terms of cod or nails. In Ingham's words: "it was the unit of account that conferred the quality of 'moneyness' on the nails and cod, and not the converse. Divergences between the money of account in which

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21 Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, trans. by Tom Bottomore and David Frisby, Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1900] 1978. Recent work claims that prior to Simmel Marx had laid the groundwork for this theoretical position because he argued that, "money is the universal equivalent or independent form of value." Costas Lapavistas, “The Social Relations of Money as Universal Equivalent: A Response to Ingham,” *Economy and Society*, vol. 34, no. 3 (August 2005), p. 400. However, Lapavistas continues to situate money's true use in its value as an exchangeable good rather than in the social relations in which it participates. See also Costas Lapavistas, “The Emergence of Money in Commodity Exchange, or Money as Monopolist of the Ability to Buy,” *Review of Political Economy*, vol. 17, no. 4 (October 2005), p. 549-69.
prices are reckoned and the commodities by which debts are discharged is historically commonplace.\textsuperscript{22}

Simmel and his intellectual heirs propose a monetary model that emphasizes conceptual abstraction over the material expediency posited by orthodox economics. The ultimate consequence of this model is the reformulation of money as being a primary means of social integration in that it provides the way in which economic actors establish relationships with one another. In other words, money allows diverse and otherwise unconnected individuals to communicate using the same language of value to describe every saleable good and service.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, following the introduction of money, these relationships are capable of traversing distances – geographical, social, cultural, and economic – that would otherwise form insurmountable barriers.\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, rather than asserting that money is an entirely neutral object, of which actors make use only in the economic arena, scholars working in the Simmelian tradition argue that money is present in all areas of modern society. In place of the neutral veil of orthodox economic theory, these scholars conceive of money as a vector of economic, social, political, and cultural force.\textsuperscript{25} Michel Aglietta and André Orléan extend this argument to its logical

\textsuperscript{22} Ingham, \textit{The Nature of Money}, p. 34-5.


\textsuperscript{24} Simmel, \textit{The Philosophy of Money}, p. 78-9.

conclusion by inverting the classical economic equation that renders money meaningless in order to construct a monetary theory from which all social relations spring. Based on the work of anthropologist René Girard, they argue that through mimicry individuals and institutions struggle for prestige and power in an inherently unbalanced socio-economic system. This competition, which is characteristic of modern, capitalist nations (what Aglietta and Orléan term "economic societies"), allows for an increase in the quantity of violence present in society by channeling it away from individuals (in the form of murder) towards property (in the form of theft). Money is central to this altered form of violence: because it is quantifiable and ultimately exchangeable for any saleable good or service, money is the weapon of choice in economic societies. As violence is not directed at human beings but at their property, such societies are better able than others to effectively resist physically destructive conduct through the encouragement of market-based violence. This directed violence, then, gives economic societies an edge when competing with their non-economic counterparts.

The economic theory that attaches greater importance to money’s function as an abstract measure of value finds its empirical basis in pre-modern and non-market forms of obligation and debt. The first historical societies for which records of monetary calculation are extant, those of the ancient Near East, attest to the existence of units of account that did not correspond to any physical, circulating media. Money served to assess rents and taxes essential to the region’s command economy. Individuals paid these fees in kind, either in barley or silver, and secular and religious authorities subsequently redistributed them. In other words, money served to calculate the social obligations of landowners, laborers, clerics,


and the nobility. Furthermore, the standard unit of account, the Mesopotamian shekel, did not correspond to any media valued for its precious metal content but, rather, formed the state-established correlation between the value of silver and barley that structured the temples’ and palaces’ collection and redistribution of commodities.28

This debt-based system persisted after the creation of physical, circulating currency and remained in force in the capitalist economies of the early-modern and modern Atlantic World. In this context, monarchs and banks placed money, which the issuer promised to accept as payment (the monarch for taxes and the bank in repayment of loans), into circulation as transferable debt – that is, as a promise to pay that is exchangeable between any number of parties – in order to purchase goods and services. Thus, debt, like its counterpart credit, constitutes a social relationship by way of the claim that the holder possesses on the issuer. It also constitutes a political relationship in that the individual employing money must, even if unconsciously, accept the authority of the issuer. Money, then, is, in the words of Geoffrey Ingham, “assignable trust. In the face of real-world radical uncertainty, self-fulfilling long-term trust is rooted in a social and political legitimacy whereby potentially personally untrustworthy strangers are able to participate in complex multilateral relationships. Historically, this has been the work of states.”29 Thus, every individual who accepts money as payment subscribes to the “society” created through money’s distribution and continued circulation. Because such societies function under the aegis of the state or some other relatively powerful institution (e.g. a monopolistic trading company), money reveals itself to be both a tool and a manifestation of sovereignty.30


29 Emphasis in original. Ibid, p. 74.

This observation, once again, directly contradicts classical economic theory which considers political authority to be exogenous to the market. Following in the footsteps of Adam Smith, who postulated the existence of the market system as an entirely autonomous economic space (the "invisible hand"), practitioners of economics have long sought to banish politics from market analyses. According to orthodox economics, money exists as a "public good" created and maintained outside of the market system by an institution – the state – that lacks any meaningful economic role. From this perspective, the state's unique economic function is to guarantee money's nominal value through the judicious use of its authority, embodied by the seal or stamp it places on circulating media. In this way, prior to the advent of fiduciary money, economic actors did not need to engage in the unwieldy process of determining the purity of each and every coin involved in all transactions because they could rely on the monarch's or the state's reputation. In other words, classical political economy asserted that the state, like money, simply provides a means of increasing the efficiency of market exchange. Orthodox economics, particularly its monetarist strain, continues to make this argument regardless of the disappearance of precious metals from the money supply.

Of course, by stamping money with its sovereign authority, the state created a highly visible symbol of its authority and legitimacy. Colonial sovereignty, then, follows not only the flag, as a common legal metaphor would have it, but also the currency. As Emily Gilbert remarks in reference to both privately (i.e. bank) and publicly-issued notes, "paper money situated Canadian colonists within specific and intersecting personal, national, and imperial geographies." However, colonists were not alone in handling and interpreting these circulating symbols. Through money, Aboriginal peoples also experienced these "intersecting

32 For an example drawn from classical political economy, Say, *Traité d'économie politique*, p. 244-5.
geographies,” in the process accepting and making use of representations of the colonizer’s political and economic power.35 Thus, through the use of this symbolically charged technology of transferable debt, Amerindians actively engaged in the Foucauldian field of unequal social, political, and economic power relations characteristic of colonialism.36

"Every Prudent Man": Colonialism and the Politics of Economic Thought

The process through which Aboriginal peoples came to be wards of the state has long been one of the focal points of the historiography on Amerindians. Although this literature focuses on political changes in the nineteenth century, some scholars have sought out the beginnings of this process either in earlier periods or in economic exchange relations.37 However, the historiography often fails to consider the inherently colonial nature of both Western thought in general and the theories that informed European action in North

35 The Comaroffs propose: “To the extent that colonization effected a change in the state-of-being of ‘native’ populations, it typically depended less on the formal apparatus of colonial states... than on other agents of empire.” Although explicitly referring to individuals, this observation applies equally to objects such as money. Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 2, p. 21.

36 Ingham writes that, “money is not merely a useful technique, comparable to weights and measures; it also consists in social relations that are inherently relations of inequality and power.” Ingham, The Nature of Money, p. 37.

America more specifically.38 In an effort to complicate the historiography on First Nations’ marginalization, as well as to focus on the inherently biased bases of scholarly analysis, this section considers the ethnocentric assumptions at the core of monetary theory and their implications for “primitive peoples” the world over. In this way, it suggests that the imported theoretical vision of Aboriginal peoples and money formed the backdrop against which the process of colonialism described in the following chapters unfolded.

This section draws on the insight of Mary Poovey and Jean-Michel Servet to discuss the “historical” analysis of the origins of money proffered by a group of participants in the Scottish Enlightenment who engaged in what Dugald Stewart termed “conjectural history.” Poovey writes that the Scottish conjectural historians drew on the work of experimental natural philosophers in order to employ “the experimentalists’ assumptions that some system organizes the phenomenal world and that human nature is universal to ‘conjecture’ what they could not document. Such conjectures constitute assertions that what one has not seen resembles what one can observe.” Thus, by observing the contemporary world, conjectural historians felt themselves capable of describing processes that had gone undocumented by the historical record. In addition to producing histories of such periods and developments, this movement produced a series of abstractions conceptualized as being capable of acting in the world that were thus agents of historical change. Poovey describes one such abstraction: “as a historical agent, ‘the human mind’ could be inferred from its effects, many (though not all) of which had been documented by eyewitnesses who recorded particulars whose larger significance they did not understand.” For the purposes of the present discussion, Adam Smith’s “market system” provides the best example of a conjectural abstraction – although no historical observer had claimed to witness such a system in action, its existence and development could be inferred from the information that

38 For a study that examines the seventeenth and eighteenth-century theoretical underpinnings of European action in the New World (in this case those supporting French arbitration of Amerindian conflicts), see Maxime Gohier, Onontio le médiateur: La gestion des conflits amérindiens en Nouvelle-France, 1603-1717, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2008.
such chroniclers had provided. Smith and his followers applied this same methodological approach, using both historical texts referring to Western society and contemporary accounts of Aboriginal peoples, to the task of describing the development of money. The results of this analysis informed both the image that colonists had of Amerindians as economic agents and orthodox monetary theory as still championed by many practitioners of present-day economics.

The golden cow of monetary theory, today as in the past, is that money functions first and foremost as a medium of exchange (or payment). As a result, economic theory explains money's initial appearance and subsequent development as responding to the inefficiency of pre-monetary exchange — that is, from barter. In its simplest form, this evolutionary explanation of the rise of money (what Servet terms the "barter fable") asserts that following a period during which barter provided the only means of exchanging goods and services, humans realized that by accepting a single commodity not for its inherent value, but for its use as a medium of exchange they could greatly increase the efficiency of the marketplace. Adam Smith, one of the most influential proponents of this model, writes: "In order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in every period of society, after the first establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of their own industry." In other words, the advent of the specialized commodity known as "money," predicated on the division of labor (itself based on "the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange"), brought unequivocal technical and social progress by allowing "prudent"


40 This critique of classical economics' description of barter as being the basis for money is presented in Jean-Michel Servet, "La fable du troc," *Dix-huitième siècle*, no. 26 (1994), p. 103-15.

economic actors to meet and exchange “the different produces of their respective talents” without recourse to the ponderous system of barter.\textsuperscript{42} This vision, which asserts the primacy of exchange relations between individuals through the development of a monetary economy and the self-evident, labor-derived value of commodities, portrays the process of socialization as being inherently apolitical. In this way, the “invisible hand,” not the prince or the state of pre-classical political economy (as presented most notably by Hobbes), regulates society. Thus, interested exchange between more or less sovereign individuals forms the functional core of society while the state is relegated to consecrating and perfecting previously existing instruments of exchange. The political project of classical economics is thus revealed to be the redefinition of the social order as being uniquely economic, thereby demoting the political to a role of secondary importance.\textsuperscript{43}

However, the “barter fable” presented a more complicated evolutionary version of the development of money than this. As John Locke argued nearly a century before the publication of the \textit{Wealth of Nations}, for a commodity to be accepted as a generalized medium of exchange, it had necessarily to be durable.\textsuperscript{44} In other words, without a medium of exchange that was not also a store of value, money could not exist, thereby damning


\textsuperscript{43} Servet, “La fable du troc,” p. 109-15. This political project persists in the monetarist movement as discussed above. For an extremely influential modern study that contends that a similar process by which the economic trumped the political took place in the context of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism and the liberal state, see Karl Polanyi, \textit{The Great Transformation}, Boston, Beacon Press, [1944] 1962.

\textsuperscript{44} “And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life.” Emphasis in original. John Locke, \textit{Two Treatises of Government}, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1960 [1690], sect. 47, p. 300-1.
humanity to a state in which every individual sought only to meet her immediate needs, with no possibility of amassing material wealth. Moreover, Locke explicitly applied this logic to the Americas, arguing that isolation, due to the absence of money that it entails, breeds a lack of industry. “For I ask, What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Acres of Excellent Land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, in the middle of the in-land Parts of America, where he had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product?” Drawing upon the New World’s lack of money, then, Locke concludes that at some point in the past “all the World was America... for no such thing as Money was any where known.” Thus, according to Locke, Europe had successfully escaped the monetary prehistory in which the New World was still mired. Monetary theory, then, provided classical economics with a key exhibit proving Europe’s superior level of sophistication.

Locke’s intellectual heirs extended his analysis to argue that durability was, historically, insufficient. In addition to the use of “some one commodity or other” by “prudent men,” Smith asserted that, “In all countries, however, men seem at last to have been determined by irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals above every other commodity.” Smith argued that metals’ superiority lay in not only their imperishable, but also their infinitely divisible nature. Furthermore, although any metal could be used as money, Smith, again following Locke, noted that “all rich and commercial nations” employed gold and silver. Jean-Baptiste Say, the French political economist who

45 Emphasis in original. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, sect. 48-9, p. 301.

46 However, it should be noted that these seventeenth and eighteenth-century assertions of superior sophistication were not necessarily synonymous with the disrespect of non-European societies that characterized the high-handed evolutionary thought of the Victorian era. On Smith’s ability to balance his conviction that modern society constituted an improvement with his belief that non-European societies were neither morally nor culturally inferior, see Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 25-58.

47 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 30-1. Marx also makes the argument that “money is by nature gold and silver.” Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 183. Locke casts the monetary value of precious metals as arising from a tacit social agreement that falls beyond the scope of law and government. Locke, Two Treatises
first published his *Traité de l’économie politique* in 1803, built on Smith’s evolutionary perspective to argue that as economies developed or, in his words, became more “civilized” through greater specialization of labor, the need for commodity-money became ever more pressing. Classical economics argued that precious metals were the single commodity that could effectively take on such a monetary role. John Stuart Mill wrote, “After the immediate necessities of life were satisfied, everybody was eager to accumulate as great a store as possible of things at once costly and ornamental; which were chiefly gold, silver, and jewels. These were the things which it most pleased everybody to possess, and which there was most certainty of finding others willing to receive in exchange for any kind of produce.” In other words, classical economics held that every economic actor sought to stockpile precious metals (and jewels). This assumption led to consternation on the part of Europeans when faced with Aboriginal populations who in no way acted along these lines. In this way, Amerindians, who accumulated neither precious metals nor jewels and who possessed no pre-contact monetary form recognized by Western economic thought, found themselves, through the interactions of theory and the practice of everyday colonialism, placed beyond the pale of the economic. In some sense, this blatantly ethnocentric vision has continued to the present day, both through widely-held views on the part of the general North American population of Government, sect. 50, p. 302. Say nuances this argument by stating that precious metals had not come to serve as money because of their intrinsic value or obvious convenience for the task, but because the most industrious and commercial nations had chosen to use them as money, which, in turn, prompted other countries to do likewise. Say, *Traité d’économie politique*, p. 243. Of course, both Locke and Smith simply added their voices to longstanding discussion of precious metals’ monetary role. For an analysis of an English debate from the 1620s during which precious metals’ monetary role was discussed in the context of the elaboration of “the first theoretical model of a commercial system” (emphasis in original), see Poovey, *A History of the Modern Fact*, p. 66-88.

48 Say, *Traité d’économie politique*, p. 239.

49 Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, p. 484-5. Mill goes on to write that, “gold and silver have been generally preferred by nations which were able to obtain them, either by industry, commerce, or conquest.” While not explicit, this statement once again conveys the schema by which classical economists placed Aboriginal peoples at a lower rung on the evolutionary ladder. *Ibid*, p. 485. On classical economics ties to evolutionary thought – particularly Malthus’s role in inspiring Darwin’s theory of natural selection – see, E.G. Hundert, *The Enlightenment’s Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 394-5.
and via the historiography’s reluctance to consider certain aspects of Aboriginal economic experience.\textsuperscript{50}

Thus, through a combination of monetary theory, the “barter fable,” and precious metals, Smith and other classical economists constructed a theoretical model that placed “civilized” European economic and social institutions at the apex of human evolution.\textsuperscript{51} Through this model, Amerindians, who did not use precious metals as a means of exchange, came to be seen as economically and, by extension, socially and culturally inferior to their European colonizers. This postulate, along with its equivalents in religion, education, and so on, permitted Europeans and their descendants to claim that Western society formed the model to which all other social groups should aspire, thereby providing the same basic assumption that underlies both the historic process by which Aboriginal peoples in Canada were remade as wards of the state and the modern construct of the “developing world”.\textsuperscript{52}

\section*{Money in Canada to 1950}

Before proceeding to the core of the present dissertation’s historical analysis, it is necessary to briefly sketch the monetary history of the region now known as Canada. In this way, this section moves from a purely theoretical portrait of money to one in which emphasis


\textsuperscript{51} Smith writes: “money has become in all civilized nations the universal instrument of commerce.” Smith, \textit{Wealth of Nations}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{52} On the ethnocentricity of economics’ monetary model, see Bernard Élie, \textit{Le régime monétaire canadien: Institutions, théories et politiques}, Montreal, Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1998, p. 21. Of course, it is important to note that neither Smith nor his followers sought to subjugate Indigenous peoples through economic theory. For the same argument made in reference to the Scottish Enlightenment (of which Smith was a key thinker), see Poovey, \textit{A History of the Modern Fact}, p. 24.
New France

The early-modern conflation of "money" with precious metals greatly influenced French perception both in the metropole and the colonies. In New France, as in all North American colonies and in much of Western Europe at the time, a wide variety of coin of diverse national origins circulated. For example, a 1662 government ordinance mentions that seventeen different coins were used in the colony, if only to an extremely limited extent. In spite of this official recognition, prior to the introduction in the same year of royal government and the expenditure that this brought with it, particularly in the form of cash salaries paid to regular troops stationed in the colony, very little coin, whether of French or other origin, seems to have been in circulation. This relative scarcity and impressive heterogeneity of metallic currency would remain the rule throughout the French regime and

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well into the nineteenth century. Alongside these limited metallic monetary instruments, colonial officials sporadically issued large quantities of paper currency. While this practice sought to provide the colonial state with funds from which to make the expenditure necessary for its continued existence — expenditure threatened by the penury of cash — it had the side effect of providing the local economy with an additional form of circulating money.

In order to avoid the constant shifts in their monetary frame of reference that this heterogeneous supply of foreign and domestic gold, silver, and copper coin, in addition to paper currency, would seem to necessitate, French settlers and colonial authorities employed these multiple if limited monetary instruments by way of a single abstract measure of value: the *livre*. In other words, colonial residents employed each coin, whether French or otherwise, in terms of the official money of account. Moreover, since no single *livre* coin ever existed during the French regime, New France’s state-sanctioned money was always purely abstract.

Thus, merchants and habitants made use of this money of account both when employing physical money stuff and when engaging in credit-based exchange. In a cash-poor economy, credit/debit relations often serve to ensure the circulation of goods. The merchants of New France, through their account books, pursued monetized commerce with their clients by serving as local agents of redistribution. In idealized terms, habitants purchased goods throughout the year on credit from their local merchant, who recorded these transactions in

55 Allan Greer writes of the merchant at the center of his study of socio-economic life in rural New France and Lower Canada: "Samuel Jacobs himself was very often without currency. When he did have money, it came in a variety of forms, gold and silver, of English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Spanish-American origin." Greer, *Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, p. 160.

56 On paper currency in New France — the so-called card money — see McCullough, *Money and Exchange in Canada*, p. 35-40 and 44-52.

57 The English system also lacked a one-pound coin during the period. Like an English pound, which shares a common Carolingian (if not Roman) origin, one *livre* was divided into twenty *sous* or *sols*, each of which could be further divided into twelve *deniers*. McCullough, *Money and Exchange in Canada*, p. 29-30.
monetary notation in his ledger. Similarly, the merchant, as well as other habitants, purchased goods and services from other local residents by according them the appropriate amount of credit (and if the purchase was made by a habitant, debiting his account). The habitants then paid for their purchases with their own produce (e.g. wheat, peas, eggs, or butter) not by handing it over to the merchant himself, but by giving it to those who had purchased the produce.\textsuperscript{58} By accepting commodities in exchange for other commodities based on a system of book debt expressed in monetary terms, the merchant in New France became the central cog in the monetized economy, in the abstract if not the physical sense.\textsuperscript{59} By the end of the French régime, this model had become the rule, with the majority of habitants in at least one region possessing no cash while those who did for the most part held the seriously devalued, if not altogether worthless, card money.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, although credit restricted economic action in a way that cash in hand did not (credit not being as generally transferable as hard currency), both served the same basic monetary function.

\textsuperscript{58} This idealized description is based on the early eighteenth-century activity of Montreal merchant Alexis Monière. Outfitting of voyageurs for the Montreal-based fur trade worked in more or less identical terms (and Monière, who had himself been a voyageur, had several traders among his clients). Louise Dechêne, \textit{Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XVIIe siècle}, Montreal, Boréal, \{1974\} 1988, p. 185-90 and 195-6. The model also appears to have functioned in a similar manner during New France’s initial, “monopolized” period, with habitants trading agricultural produce and furs to the company in exchange for other goods. Adam Shortt, \textit{Adam Shortt’s History of Canadian Currency and Banking, 1600-1880}, Toronto, The Canadian Bankers’ Association, 1986, p. 110. For other examples of merchant-centered rural credit networks in New France see Greer, \textit{Peasant, Lord, and Merchant}, esp. p. 140-76 and Sylvie Dépatie, “Commerce et crédit à l’île Jésus, 1734-75: Le rôle des marchands ruraux dans l’économie des campagnes montréalaises,” \textit{Canadian Historical Review}, vol. 84, no. 2 (June 2003), p. 147-76.

\textsuperscript{59} Of course, this system did not always work in such idealized terms. However, credit, even in cases of longstanding indebtedness, served to organize economic relations in a monetized manner. In such cases, merchants, by way of notarized contracts with their clients, were legally entitled to have goods and lands seized for resale so that they could recover the amount of money owed to them. Dépatie, “Commerce et crédit à l’île Jésus,” p. 150.

\textsuperscript{60} This observation is based on thirty-nine estate inventories from three parishes in the Lower Richelieu valley for the period 1740-1769. Greer, \textit{Peasant, Lord, and Merchant}, p. 160.
In addition to paper and metallic currency and credit, the historiography has argued that several other objects functioned as money in northeastern North America during the period. However, in general these studies confuse “money” with “commodity,” asserting that those goods that traded hands in the credit networks centered on New France’s merchants were, in fact, money. Given that no record has been found of “savings” held in wheat or beaver skins, such arguments appear extremely suspect. Moreover, with the exception of seigneurial rents, debts and payments were generally calculated in terms of the universal accounting currency, the *livre*, rather than in terms of any given commodity. In the context of the fur trade, however, beaver skins provide an important exception to this rule. Although they did not serve as physical, circulating currency, pelts quickly came to provide the fur trade’s abstract measure of value.

61 For a recent example, in which beaver and moose pelts, wheat, and wampum are portrayed as money, see Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, *Un Québec moderne, 1760-1840: Essai d’histoire économique et sociale*, Montreal, Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 2007, p. 200.

62 Louise Dechêne writes: “Trois cents inventaires après décès nous ont démontré que personne n’accumule de fourrures. La thésaurisation du castor ou autres moyens d’échange, présenté par les historiens comme un trait caractéristique de cette société et qui repose sur des témoignages aussi fragiles, ne peut pas être retenue.” Dechêne, *Habitants et marchands...,* p. 135. In this way Dechêne explicitly refutes Adam Shortt who, writing in 1898, asserted that, in New France prior to royal rule, “there was one article of universal acceptance which answered all the purposes of a medium of exchange, except for small currency, and that was the beaver skin.” Shortt is correct, however, to point out that the fixed price at which the Company of One Hundred Associates purchased beaver skins made them an extremely stable commodity. Shortt, *Adam Shortt’s History...,* p. 110.

Because of the absence of circulating money in pre-contact northeastern North America and the immateriality of abstract measures of value, scholars know nothing of purely Aboriginal monetary forms. Students of Indigenous economic history tend to address this lacuna through the application of anthropological models of "primitive exchange" to pre- and immediate post-contact First Nations. Marcel Mauss's vision of gift exchange provides what is by far the most influential theoretical model in this sense. This model considers all economic interaction as occupying a discrete position along a continuum stretching from generalized reciprocity, or disinterested exchange, to negative reciprocity, or interested exchange. Although this model permits the conceptualization of exchange in Aboriginal North America by focusing on the material flow of goods in society, it remains silent insofar as money, whether abstract or material, is concerned. While Mauss and his followers argue that certain goods possess symbolic importance, those that apply this model to North America generally prove unable or unwilling to broach the means by which Amerindians judged and expressed the value of goods and services involved in such transactions. Thus, while many studies analyze the different social and cultural motivations underlying Native-newcomer exchange, none explore the conceptual means through which Aboriginal peoples evaluated goods and services prior to contact.

In spite of the lack of any analyses of pre-contact Aboriginal monetary practice, the historiography sometimes portrays wampum beads as being a form of "Indigenous money." However, Aboriginal peoples only began trading these beads following the arrival of Europeans in North America. Moreover, before the seventeenth century, wampum beads did not, as they would during their "monetary" phase, circulate in the interior of the continent.


65 For an example of this model employed in the North American context, see Denys Delâge, Le pays renversé: Amérindiens et Européens en Amérique du nord-est, 1600-1664, Montreal, Boréal Express, 1985, p. 64-5.
Beginning in the early seventeenth century, this changed as European fur traders began purchasing increasing quantities of beads from coastal nations in order to trade them at a profit for furs in the interior. Following this development, both New Netherland and New England, for a short period in the mid-seventeenth century, declared wampum to be legal tender, a policy which introduced the settler population to wampum-use to a far greater extent than in New France. French colonists, in contrast, only made use of beads, whether made of shell or glass, by Amerindians or Europeans, in the context of the fur trade. Regardless of whether wampum held special legal status or not, Amerindians accorded it extraordinary value. However, this value appears to have been one that corresponds most closely to contemporary European ideas of precious metals rather than money. Amerindians "consumed" many of the beads they received in trade through their use as adornment, their incorporation in diplomatic belts, and, ultimately, their burial alongside their owners. In these cases, beads ceased to circulate, sometimes definitively, thereby calling their use as physical money-stuff into question. These practices simultaneously suggest that Amerindians prized wampum beads more for their symbolic representation of wealth than for their monetary

66 "True" wampum – that is, white and purple cylindrical beads manufactured from shells from the east coast of North America – was a product of the European arrival in the New World both because of the metal tools necessary to manufacture it and because of the capital importance of these beads to the interior fur trade of the seventeenth century. Jonathan C. Lainey, La "Monnaie des Sauvages": Les colliers de wampum d'hier à aujourd'hui, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2004, p. 12 and 20-2.

67 Wampum was legal tender in the English colonies from 1637 to 1652 and in New Netherland between the mid-1630s and the end of the colony in 1664. Lynn Ceci, "The First Fiscal Crisis in New York," Economic Development and Culture Change, vol. 28, no. 4 (1980), p. 839-47. Ceci argues that the struggle between these imperial powers for the control of the wampum trade significantly contributed to New Netherland's demise.


69 Laurier Turgeon notes that, "almost all beads circulating in North America ended up in burial sites... The act of interment expressed the intention to withdraw beads from economic and social circulation..." Turgeon, "Material Culture and Cross-Cultural Consumption," p. 101-2.
value. In other words, Aboriginal society promoted the “conspicuous consumption” of beads over their use as a means of purchasing other commodities. Regardless, wampum as money did not outlast the seventeenth century, with the beaver skin assuming the place of abstract measure of value in the fur trade by the early eighteenth century.  

**British North America**

British North America, much like New France, played host to circulating coin minted by several foreign nations. Again, as French authorities had done, British colonial officials introduced common moneys of account in order to make sense of the various forms of circulating cash. Throughout the period, London retained the right to mint and set the precious metal content of British coins, while the colonies possessed and exercised the power to set official exchange rates. They did this by declaring the value of the principal coins in circulation in terms of the official money of account, which, in the majority of British North America for most of the period, was Halifax currency (Hfx). However, two exceptions applied to this general rule: the colonial state rendered all accounts to its imperial counterpart in pounds sterling (stg) and the military chest paid civilians and soldiers using its own accounting currency, Army Pay, that, for most of the period, was pegged to the value of the most common coin, the Spanish silver dollar, at a slightly lower rate than the Halifax system.

As in New France, authorities in British North America found it necessary, in order to pay the state’s bills, to issue paper currency. Although merchants had issued small bills for use as change (bonds) beginning in the 1760s and commercial paper (e.g. bills of exchange

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70 In addition to Ray’s and Freeman’s work on the use of the beaver as an accounting currency by the HBC, Lainey cites examples from the Catholic mission at Detroit in the 1740s where the beaver (“castor”), rather than wampum beads, serves as abstract measure of value. Lainey, La “Monnaie des Sauvages”, p. 23.

71 Paquet et Wallot, Un Québec moderne, p. 208.
and promissory notes) circulated widely in Canada in the same period and well into the
nineteenth century, the state only began issuing paper money, known as “army bills,”
during the War of 1812. In July 1812, the Executive Council of Lower Canada authorized the
printing of up to £250,000 Hfx in paper money in two denominations: $4 (or £1 Hfx) and $25
or larger. The Executive Council made these bills legal tender (Upper Canada followed suit
in 1813), insured that the larger bills bore 4% interest, and declared that the money would be
redeemable in coin at Quebec City at face value (or, in the case of larger denominations, in
bills of exchange drawn on London if the government preferred). In 1813, Lower Canada
doubled the number of bills it could issue while simultaneously introducing a greater variety
of small denominations. Although the colonial government issued the army bills, and initially
guaranteed the principal, it was only responsible for paying one-third of the interest on the
larger bills with the rest being supplied by the military chest. This financial burden led the
imperial state to terminate the system and by the end of 1817 it had withdrawn nearly all of
the bills from circulation.

However, the army bill system had proven popular among the general population,
often receiving credit in the immediate post-war period for the colony’s economic prosperity.
According to Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, such widespread acceptance of paper
money represented nothing short of a revolution in the average colonial inhabitant’s monetary
experience. While the French had employed circulating paper media successfully in
peacetime in the St. Lawrence Valley during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
card money’s catastrophic depreciation during hostilities had left many habitants and
merchants skeptical of its nominal value, thus reinforcing the common belief that quality

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72 Bons, although technically illegal, were tolerated by the state because they provided useful, although not universally loved, circulating media. Paquet et Wallot, *Un Québec moderne*, p. 203. Commercial paper circulated according to the recipient’s perception of the issuer’s creditworthiness. Curtis, “From the Moral Thermometer to Money,” p. 552.


currency must necessarily come in the form of precious-metal-based coin. Army bills, on the other hand, secured the population's confidence thereby retaining their nominal value and in the process demonstrating that properly managed paper money could function just as effectively as specie.

This atmosphere proved favorable to the foundation of a series of private, joint-stock, note-issuing banks. Drawing inspiration from the United States and Great Britain, a group of Montreal merchants established the Bank of Montreal in November 1817. By the early 1820s, banks operated or were represented in Quebec City, Kingston, and York (Toronto), in addition to Montreal. Canadians' acceptance of notes in place of metallic currency and army bills, in spite of sporadic bank failures, fueled chartered banks' rapid growth to Confederation. By the early 1820s, contemporary observers reported that individuals and the state acquitted much of their debt in paper money. The 1830s witnessed a boom in the circulation of bank notes in Upper and Lower Canada, with notes in circulation more than doubling in value in both provinces between 1829 and 1841.

As during the French regime, credit remained a vital resource for economic activity under British rule. In rural areas, merchants continued to provide loans to their customers for the purchase of real estate or the payment of laborers and seigneurial dues more as a means of encouraging habitants to purchase goods and sell wheat at their store than in the hopes of turning a profit on interest charges. Furthermore, in spite of peasants' accumulation of small sums of money, the rural economy of Lower and Upper Canada appears to have continued to be based in money of account, with debts settled through payment in agricultural produce,

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76 On banks during the period, see McCullough, *Money and Exchange in Canada*, p. 85-8.


rather than in circulating currency until at least 1840. However, with the establishment of note-issuing banks in the late 1810s, these newcomers largely supplanted “merchant-bankers,” particularly in urban areas. On the other hand, in isolated rural areas, such as the Madawaska valley, expansion depended on such so-called merchant bankers because Euro-Canadian colonists could not have hoped to clear land and to purchase stock, seed, equipment, and other necessities without a significant line of credit. Thus, in the nineteenth century’s “frontier” regions, book credit, calculated in money of account, proved to be just as vital to the local economy as it had been in the St. Lawrence Valley of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Although chartered banks rapidly came to dominate the Canadian monetary system, and although they continued to issue notes into the 1930s, the state began in the 1840s to curtail banks’ monetary role. In 1847-8, the state made an aggressive incursion into the monetary system through the issue of what amounted to paper currency in the form of interest-bearing debentures. These financial instruments, with values as low as $10 or £2 10s. Hfx, served to fund the Canadian state during the international and domestic loan drought caused by the depression of the late 1840s; they also served as currency, with over £630,000 Hfx in $10 and $20 debentures in circulation by May 1850. Despite their relative success, however, the United Canadas withdrew the debentures by the end of the year.

81 Craig, Backwoods Consumers, p. 114. On credit in the fur trade, which will be discussed at greater length in the following chapters, see Toby Morantz, “‘So Evil a Practice’: A Look at the Debt System in the James Bay Fur Trade,” in Rosemary E. Ommer (ed.), Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective, Fredericton, Acadiensis Press, 1990, p. 203-22.
Also in the 1840s, legislators and merchants began making attempts to adopt a decimal currency in the Canadas. The Currency Act of 1841 initiated this process by encouraging the circulation of United States gold and silver decimal coins. However, as a result of the imperial will that the colonies adopt currencies based on the pound, decimalization made no concrete progress until the 1850s. In 1853, the legislature of the Province of Canada passed a compromise act that adopted the pound, dollar, shilling, pence, and cent as official units of Canadian currency. In 1857, a further piece of legislation effectively ended the use of the Halifax system and sterling notation in the colony by requiring that all accounts submitted to the state, as well as those kept internally by the state itself, be in dollars and cents. This move towards decimalization again curtailed the banks’ monetary role in that colonial officials simultaneously received London’s permission to mint decimal coins for the first time. These coins became legal tender on 10 December 1858. The Provincial Notes Act of 1866 further strengthened the colonial state’s hand vis-à-vis the banks by authorizing the United Canadas to issue up to $8 million in provincial notes and to pay banks an annual sum of 5% of the value of the notes that they withdrew from circulation until 1870. However, the Dominion Notes Act of 1868 would supersede this law.

Post-Confederation Canada

The 1867 political unification of much of British North America led politicians and state officials to devise a series of standardized practices and objects in order to symbolically

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83 Curtis, “From the Moral Thermometer to Money,” p. 553.
85 Although this act allowed for accounts to contain an additional column in which amounts could be reported in sterling notation, it did not require that this column be completed. The act provided no space for noting amounts in Halifax currency. McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 110.
86 McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 110.
87 Élie, Le régime monétaire canadien, p. 146.
represent the newly created nation. Canada's increasingly unified currency occupied an important place among these symbols. In 1868, the Dominion Notes Act converted the paper currency of the Province of Canada into the new nation's monetary base by making bills redeemable for bullion in Saint John and Halifax in addition to Montreal and Toronto. In 1876, parliament extended the act to Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, and British Columbia and in 1886 did so again, this time with respect to the Northwest Territories, thereby ensuring that the national currency circulated throughout the totality of Canadian territory. The circulation of foreign coin also proved problematic to those interested in promoting Canadian unity. Canada addressed this issue in the Uniform Currency Act (1871) which effectively removed all foreign silver coins from circulation. At the same time, however, Canada rendered British gold sovereigns and United States gold eagle coins legal tender while neglecting to take action to remove foreign copper coins from circulation. Nevertheless, since very few gold coins circulated in Canada, the practical importance of making American and British coins legal tender appears to have been negligible. This act also made already-minted silver, copper, and bronze coins from the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick legal tender throughout the country while abolishing Nova Scotia's unique monetary standard. Thus, by 1871 parliament had created a coherent monetary system for the totality of the new dominion. In other words, Canada possessed a uniform abstract and physical currency for the first time.

After Confederation, the federal state followed the lead of its provincial predecessor by continuing to diminish the role of private banks in the Canadian monetary system. The Dominion Notes Act of 1868 limited the chartered banks to issuing notes denominated in multiples of $4 and $5, while reserving for the federal government the issue of small bills in

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90 Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer to Money," p. 554.
the amount of $0.25, $1, and $2.\footnote{Élie, \textit{Le régime monétaire canadien}, p. 146.} However, prior to the outbreak of World War I, privately-issued bank notes did not constitute legal tender—that is, Canadian residents were not legally obliged to accept them in payment. British, American, and Canadian gold coins as well as dominion notes served this role from the pre-Confederation period through the final, official suspension of Canada’s adherence to the international gold standard in 1933.\footnote{Between 1914 and 1926, Canada was off the gold standard. During this period, bank notes had legal tender status. On legal tender and the gold standard from the mid-nineteenth century through the Great Depression, see Powell, \textit{A History of the Canadian Dollar}, p. 14-25.} The federal state ended private banks’ role in note printing with the creation of the Bank of Canada, which began operations in 1935.\footnote{On the creation of the Bank of Canada, see Michael D. Bordo and Angela Redish, “Why Did the Bank of Canada Emerge in 1935?” \textit{The Journal of Economic History}, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1987), p. 405-17 and Powell, \textit{A History of the Canadian Dollar}, p. 27-9.}

As in earlier periods, credit continued to play a central role in the Canadian monetary system. However, in contrast to previous practice, credit increasingly came to be distributed by third parties in addition to merchants. Whereas banks had existed in British North America since the 1810s, their lending habits focused in the main on the regions’ well-to-do population, with most inhabitants of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Canada (rural and urban, Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike) relying on store credit accorded by merchants.\footnote{For a loose description of the workings of store-credit in late nineteenth-century Montreal, see Bettina Bradbury, \textit{Working Families: Age, Gender, and Daily Survival in Industrializing Montreal}, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1993, p. 106-7 and 161. On credit in the twentieth-century fur trade, see Claude Gélinas, \textit{Entre l'assommoir et le godendart: Les Atikamekw et la conquête du Moyen-Nord québécois, 1870-1940}, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2003, p. 171-3 and Morantz, \textit{The White Man's Gonna Getcha}, p. 112-7.} Beginning in the early twentieth century, a large number of organizations began appearing that specialized in providing credit to populations who had not previously had easy access to it (e.g. credit unions).\footnote{For instance, an explosion in the number of cooperative groups specializing in loaning funds to members of particular immigrant communities took place during the first half of the twentieth century.} However, prior to World War II the credit union movement...
(the caisses populaires in Quebec) drew the mass of its relatively small number of adherents from either the traditional petite bourgeoisie or the rising middle class, rather than from the ranks of the urban and rural poor to which it was explicitly designed to cater. Furthermore, with the exception of a small number of wealthy individuals, this movement remained absent from Aboriginal Canada through the middle of the twentieth century.

Conclusion

This chapter has defined the present study's two central concepts (colonialism and money) before tracing them through the economic thought of classical political economists and the "on-the-ground" use of currency in Canada prior to 1950. Through money, defined as an inherently social measure of abstract value and a form of transferable debt based on the authority of a given region's dominant political power (whether the state or a private institution such as the Hudson's Bay Company), the following chapters grapple with Euro-Canadian-Aboriginal interactions on several levels (e.g. economic, political, social) that scholars frequently treat in isolation. Moreover, money furnishes a concrete and conceptual

See, for example, Sylvie Taschereau, “Les sociétés de prêts juives à Montréal, 1911-1945,” Urban History Review/Revue d'histoire urbaine, vol. 33, no. 2 (Spring 2005), p. 3-16. It is important to note, however, that most of the loan associations described by Taschereau specialized in providing funds to merchants and small manufacturers, not to private individuals. However, organizations such as the Montreal Hebrew Free Loan Association did provide interest-free loans to "workers" as well as small businessmen, artisans, and peddlers.

means of gauging the extent to which unequal power relations characterized nineteenth and
twentieth-century Canadian colonialism in both material and discursive terms. Indeed, an
analysis of money provides insight into both First Nations’ socioeconomic status and
Western preconceived notions concerning Indigenous peoples and their ability to handle cash.
As the following chapters will demonstrate, these two distinct levels of experience fed into
each other, shaping certain aspects of Aboriginal history throughout the period. It is
important to note, however, that the Canadian monetary regime did not exist for Aboriginal
peoples alone, but served to integrate them, alongside recent immigrants and Francophone
and Anglophone North Americans, in the political, social, and economic space of the colonies
and, later, the Canadian nation-state. Thus, the extended attention devoted to the broader
history of the monetary system in Canada has served to contextualize the following chapters’
analysis while reminding readers that Amerindian money-use, like Amerindian history more
broadly, did not take place in a vacuum, but was closely intertwined with the monetary
experience of non-Aboriginal peoples.

Nevertheless, the concept of colonialism provides an ideal means of grasping the
many particularities of historical money-use among First Nations. In the Canadian context,
colonialism and money first interacted at the ideological and cultural level. Extrapolating
from Locke, Adam Smith and his followers created an intellectual framework within which
money was a uniquely Western phenomenon. These thinkers considered the absence of
precious-metal-based currency as offering proof of the superiority of Europe’s “developed”
economies. Of course, this line of argument was teleological and specious: it proceeded from
the belief that European societies were superior to their Aboriginal counterparts and thus the
evidence offered did nothing more than “prove” these thinkers’ initial premise. Regardless, it
did aid in making the appropriation of North America and other parts of the globe appear
“natural.” By way of conjectural history, orthodox economics held (and continues to hold)
that Western monetary norms provided the single model towards which all societies tend. The
economic thought of the Early Modern and Modern periods, then, was intimately bound to
colonialism as it contributed a measure of intellectual justification to the project of imperial
expansion and exploitation.
However, economic thought only accounts for a fraction of money’s colonial role. At a much more basic level, the state’s imposition of an official money of account, along with the latter-day circulation of material media explicitly embodying this abstract measure of value, served to unify economic space, thereby physically and conceptually creating coherent political space. This real-world process fed back into the ideological underpinnings of economic thought in order to reinforce and perpetuate the “natural order” of colonialism. The colonial and later federal states existed in North America because its agents proclaimed as much and because the signs of its existence (among them, money) circulated for all to see. Despite this highly visible ability to legitimate Euro-Canadian political formations, however, money’s role in more mundane contexts is less clear-cut. Indeed, although First Nations theoretically lost a great deal of power to the state and capital during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such change often failed to translate into practice as Amerindians proved capable of employing money to their advantage, both within the community and in interactions with powerful Euro-Canadian actors. The present study, then, distinguishes between the monetary power accorded First Nations at the discursive level (most often by the state) and the force they were able to exert through money-use in actual lived experience. In this way, it argues that theory (in the form of Indian or corporate policy) justified systemic inequalities while its practical implementation frequently produced results that undercut these same theoretical distinctions.
Chapter 3

Money, First Nations, and the State during the Nineteenth Century

This chapter considers the interplay of money and formal political relations between the state and First Nations from the 1820s to the turn of the twentieth century. It analyzes monetary debates as well as Indian Affairs’ policy and practice at the imperial, colonial, federal, and local levels in order to detail the power that various political actors exerted through money in Aboriginal Canada. As the nineteenth century unfolded, both the relationship between these different levels of government and the role ascribed to the state by mainstream Euro-Canadian political theory, discourse, and practice changed. Money, in both its physical and abstract forms, provides an excellent perch from which to study these changes. Indeed, this chapter argues that the development of the formal political relations and structures within which money played a role mirrored the phenomenal, although still highly limited, expansion of the state’s theoretical prerogatives and material power during the century, even as its involvement in quotidian Aboriginal money-use remained marginal.

The present chapter considers three distinct political scales. The first, analyzed primarily through the debate surrounding the proposed commutation of Indian presents, involves relations between the metropole and the colonies. Although the British Empire played a relatively minor role in the day-to-day administration of Indian affairs prior to the 1860 transfer of authority in the matter to the colonies, the Colonial Office did involve itself in major policy decisions, in the process contributing to the maintenance and extension of the fundamentally unbalanced field of power relations characteristic of colonialism. The colonial and later federal states also actively participated in this process, although somewhat impotently at first. Beginning in the immediate aftermath of the War of 1812, the Indian Department, then under imperial jurisdiction, saw its size and budget slashed. This overall retreat on the part of the institution continued through Confederation when, after the legislative and administrative reforms of the 1850s and 1860s, Indian Affairs emerged a much larger and significantly more powerful institution than it had been at any time since the early nineteenth century. The monetary content of Indian policy reflects these changes, with the Department gaining legal prerogatives that theoretically allowed it to implement
significant surveillance of the everyday lives of First Nations during the final third of the nineteenth century. However, when translated into practice at the local level these theoretical changes had limited and sometimes incongruous effects. Indeed, although Mashteuiatsh and Wendake experienced relatively little state intervention into local monetary issues prior to the administrative changes of 1870s (mostly among the Huron and then only incidentally), the legal changes of the second half of the nineteenth century from which Indian Affairs drew its significantly increased authority did not lead to any major growth in state intervention in monetary matters among either the Innu or the Huron.

This chapter, then, shifts from distant debates, through colonial and federal practice and policy, to local experience in order to demonstrate money's formal and informal political character in First Nations-state relations. In its final section, the chapter focuses solely on the Huron and Innu, not including the Moose Factory Cree due to the state's near total absence from James Bay prior to the early twentieth century. This approach, beginning in distant imperial networks of communication and continuing through local conditions, allows for an analysis of the point to which money served as a vehicle of colonialism during the period. It also demonstrates the ways in which the combination of these different analytical scales provides perspective on processes that transcend each of them individually. In this chapter, then, money serves to vertically integrate the study of Ameridian experience of nineteenth-century state formation, ultimately arguing that, insofar as monetary issues are concerned, the historiography has tended to exaggerate the state's everyday influence over First Nations.
Annual Presents, Money, and the “Improvident Indian,” 1820s-1850s

In 1827, Earl Dalhousie, governor-in-chief of British North America, asserted that the imperial policy of “making useful presents as payment” to First Nations originated in a desire “to avoid temptation.” In doing so, Dalhousie portrayed Indian presents as a form of social assistance, thereby participating in a widespread nineteenth-century debate on the relationship between poverty and the improvidence of the poor that transcended Indian policy. By the end of the Victorian era, this debate had been at least temporarily carried by the infantilizing vision promoted by Dalhousie, which refused to recognize the ability of both Amerindians and the poor more generally to manage their own financial affairs or even to handle cash. Although the historiography recognizes the existence of this “dogma of improvidence,” no study has yet to examine its development with relation to Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. In fact, the only historical study devoted to state provision of social assistance to First Nations makes virtually no mention of the period preceding Confederation. This historiographical lacuna obscures both the origins of welfare provision to Aboriginal peoples in Canada and the developing ideology that informed state action with regard to the poor during the nineteenth century.

1 For an earlier version of some of this section’s arguments, see Brian Gettler, “L’argent, l’État et les Autochtones: la tentative gouvernementale de monétisation des relations dans les années 1820 et 1830,” in Alain Beaulieu and Maxime Gohier (eds.), Les actes du colloque: les Autochtones et l’État, Montreal, Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la question territoriale, 2008, p. 3-26.

2 “Extract of a Despatch from Lord Dalhousie to Mr. Secretary Huskisson,” 22 November 1827, in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes (North America, New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land and British Guiana)..., London, 1834, p. 6.

3 On the evolution of Canadian debate on poverty during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 3rd ed., Vancouver, UBC Press, 1997. In spite of this altered understanding of the roots of poverty, the state has remained extremely reticent to distribute cash to the impoverished to the present day. For an example of a program that managed to overcome much of this reticence in the mid-twentieth century (family allowances), see Dominique Marshall, Aux origines sociales de l’État-providence. Familles québécoises, obligation scolaire et allocations familiales, 1940-1955, Montreal, Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1998.

This section argues that the state’s diverse and often conflicted discourse and practice with respect to monetary circulation contributed to an ongoing process by which all Amerindians were defined as being improvident by nature. It focuses on the distribution of presents by the British crown to its Aboriginal allies in the St. Lawrence Valley during a period of intense retrenchment in the Indian Department. The section pays particular attention to imperial and colonial policy debates with regard to Indian presents. These debates reveal much of the ideological apparatus that contributed to the formation and reformation of Canadian Indian policy over the period. Following Philip J. Deloria, this section argues that ideology, which it seeks to access via official state discourse as articulated by high-ranking imperial and colonial administrators, has played an important role in constituting and maintaining the uneven power relations typical of North American colonialism to the present day. In more concrete terms, it describes the imperfect process through which ideas are enunciated and, ultimately, contribute to the reformation of “reality.” Drawing on Clifford Geertz, this section argues that the ideology promoted by administrators during the period provided them with “the suasive images” through which the management of Aboriginal peoples and their resources could “be sensibly grasped” by contemporary Canadian public opinion. It asserts, then, that this imagery, which during the nineteenth century became hegemonic in nature, contributed to justifying the growing theoretical powers that legislators


7 Although, Geertz is describing ideology’s role in the development of an autonomous politics – that is, political systems not “firmly embedded in Edmund Burke’s golden assemblage of ‘ancient opinions and rules of life’” – this point is entirely applicable to ideology’s ability to justify and naturalize political action. Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, London, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p. 47-76. On “public opinion” and the ways in which this notion, born of the Kantian enlightenment, came to establish itself as the primary means by which the state made authoritative decisions in British North America, see Jeffrey L. McNairn, The Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000.
accorded Indian Affairs during the second half of the century and beyond. In this sense, the "improvident Indian" that emerged from these debates participated in the naturalization of the sociopolitical distinction between Aboriginal peoples and all other Canadians upon which the Department of Indian Affairs continues to base its legitimacy today.

The figure of the "improvident Indian" is closely bound to several other common nineteenth-century representations, most notably that of the improvident poor. Victorian commentators involved in debates on the nature of poverty eventually arrived at the consensus that recipients of social assistance naturally lacked foresight – that is, they were incapable of managing their money in a sensible and self-sustaining manner. In Mariana Valverde's words, "there was a lingering suspicion that what many poor people needed was moral reform and not money." This conviction that the poor were improvident combined effectively with pre-existing stereotypes of Native peoples, particularly those of the colonial period ascribing indolence and heathenry to Amerindians. James Axtell writes that European commentators were commonly struck by the lack of industry perceived in the activities of Aboriginal men. As confirmation of their suspicions, Europeans pointed to men's enjoyment of the aristocratic leisure activity of the hunt while their wives, mothers, and daughters slaved in the fields. Of course, this observation was a product of idealized Western social norms that reserved for men the hard manual labor of farming while preserving women in the "comfort"

8 Jean and John Comaroff argue that hegemony "exists in reciprocal interdependence with ideology: it is that part of a dominant worldview which has been naturalized and, having hidden itself in orthodoxy, no more appears as ideology at all." Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 1, Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 25.


of domestic work.\textsuperscript{11} At the same time, Amerindians' lack of religious enlightenment encouraged generations of Europeans to view them as "poor Indians," ignorant of the Gospel and in need of charity.\textsuperscript{12} The figure of the improvident Indian also draws heavily on the conviction, born of Victorian evolutionary thought, that Amerindians were in the process of disappearing.\textsuperscript{13} Rather than celebrating Native peoples' inherent virtue, as enlightenment thinkers had done via the "noble savage," nineteenth-century commentators tended to assume that First Nations were doomed to extinction due to the advance of industrialization and "superior" Western civilization. Thus, the Amerindian of the nineteenth century was not to be held up as a moral yardstick for a decrepit Europe, as had previously been the case, but was rather to be pitied as a being whose exploits, while glorious, were confined solely to the past and whose future was non-existent.\textsuperscript{14} In other words, this discursive Amerindian, incapable of looking to the future, was literally improvident.

This section concentrates on the fierce debate over the monetization of Indian presents that took place during the early nineteenth century. This debate, launched by a series of proposals put forward by the Colonial Office, centered on what was perhaps the state's premier role in relations with Aboriginal peoples through the middle of the nineteenth


\textsuperscript{14} On the noble savage, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present, New York, Vintage Books, 1979, p. 72-80.
century: the distribution of presents. This section concentrates on this issue because although other, more explicitly monetary proposals were made with regard to Canada’s Aboriginal population during the period, the commutation of presents offers the longest and most detailed intra-state debate concerning Amerindians’ ability to responsibly handle money. It also took place largely within the public eye as the imperial and colonial state rapidly published most of the official correspondence in which the debate took place. After having preoccupied the officials in London and the colonies who oversaw the Indian Department over a span of several decades, this debate on the wisdom of supplying cash to Amerindian communities contributed significantly to the growing Euro-Canadian tendency to represent Aboriginal peoples as incapable of participating in civil society on the same terms as their non-Native neighbors.

Thus, an analysis of this debate sheds light on the process by which the British and Canadian states took charge of Upper and Lower Canada’s Aboriginal population during the first half of the nineteenth century. Through an examination of official correspondence concerning Indian presents, this section highlights the influence of discourse and representation on policy goals. However, it does not do mean to do so naively. Thus, the section does not proceed from the widespread historiographical assumption that Indian Affairs clearly spelled out its goals, whether accomplished or not, in its discourse. However,

15 The Bagot commissioners, in their list of recommendations offer a tantalizing suggestion: “That Institutions calculated to promote economy, such as Savings Banks, be established among them. It appears probable that Building Societies, similar to those existing in England, would be of much benefit to the Tribes.” Unfortunately, this recommendation was neither implemented nor did it generate any appreciable amount of debate. “Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada,” in Canada, Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix T, Montreal, 1847.

16 Furthermore, in Britain, at least, these publications were read by those outside of government who had an interest in Indian Affairs. A committee of the Aborigines Protection Society, for example, referenced them in detail in its well-known 1839 report. Aborigines Protection Society, Report on the Indians of Upper Canada, London, William Ball, Arnold, and Co., 1839.

17 For the typically naive discourse-centric analysis, see John L. Tobias, “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada’s Indian Policy,” Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology, vol. 6, no. 2 (1976), p. 13-30. For a study of Indian Affairs’ lack of success in
official discourse did affect administrators' policy decisions in very real ways, largely as a result of its capacity to define what was and was not conceivable. This section argues that by way of the discursive redefinition of the Amerindian as being improvident by nature and thus in perpetual need of the state's guidance and protection, high-ranking colonial administrators reinforced the Indian Department's position as the "guardian" of Canada's Aboriginal peoples, thereby promoting its continued institutional existence.18

*The Nature of Indian Presents*

By the 1820s, the policy of distributing presents occupied a historically important position in European-Aboriginal relations in North America. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both the French and the British made extensive use of gifts in their diplomatic efforts aimed above all at forming and maintaining military alliances with First Nations.19 Within the specific context of British North America, the distribution of Indian...
presents had attained an effectively unassailable position in policy circles following “Pontiac’s Rebellion” – an uprising at least partially brought about by General Jeffery Amherst’s decision to abolish such presents following the end of the Seven Years’ War.\textsuperscript{20} However, as a result of the virtual disappearance from North America of armed imperial rivalry after the War of 1812, British authorities increasingly called into question the continued distribution of Indian presents.\textsuperscript{21} Of course, Canada’s Aboriginal population did not necessarily share this belief that presents had become expendable. In fact, through much of the period Amerindians continued to interpret British presents as a sign of good faith necessary for a continued relationship.\textsuperscript{22}

However, these presents were not merely symbolic; they also formed a source of revenue for Canada’s Aboriginal population during the period. A hypothetical Amerindian family of five receiving presents in Upper Canada in the early 1840s obtained roughly seven percent of the value in goods of what Douglas McCalla reported the “average” farm in that

\begin{itemize}
  \item Lainey, \textit{La "monnaie des sauvages": Les colliers de wampum d’hier à aujourd’hui}, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2004, p. 50-3.
  \item For example, during an 1829 council with a British representative on the permanent settlement of his people near Sault Ste. Marie, Shingwaukonse stated: “if the British proved faithful to their Native allies and continued to supply presents, he and his band would consider moving permanently to the Canadian shore.” Janet E. Chute, \textit{The Legacy of Shingwaukonse: A Century of Native Leadership}, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998.
\end{itemize}
province annually sold as produce during the 1830s and 1840s.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, this percentage underestimates the value of presents in certain circumstances as some Amerindians received goods of greater value than did the members of this family. For instance, pensioners, recipients of what the Indian Department termed “full equipment,” drew a greater value of goods than those who only received presents, strictly speaking (“common equipment”). Even among the latter class certain Amerindians, most notably chiefs, received presents of greater value.\textsuperscript{24} These distinctions aside, throughout the period all classes of Canada’s Aboriginal population received their presents primarily in the form of cloth and other sewing materials, blankets, and ammunition, along with various other utilitarian objects (primarily farming and fishing implements).\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} The “average” Upper Canadian farm sold produce worth £45.5.8\textsuperscript{1/2} Hfx. This figure was arrived at by averaging the mean sales per year of those farms reported by McCalla for the 1830s and 1840s with the exception of the farm that produced the greatest commercial revenue (nearly five times that of the next most profitable) and the farm that produced the least. Of course, as McCalla notes, there is little reason to believe that farmers sold much more than half of their produce during the period. Douglas McCalla, \textit{Planting the Province: The Economic History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870}, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, p. 84 and 271. The value of the hypothetical family’s presents (£3.7.6\textsuperscript{1/2} Hfx) was based on the cost of presents distributed to each class of recipient in both provinces circa 1843. The family was made up of one warrior, one woman, and three children, one from each of the Indian Department’s defined age groups (1-4 years old, 5-9, and 10-14 for girls or 10-15 for boys). Given that girls received more valuable presents than boys, I averaged the presents’ value for each age group in order to arrive at three “genderless” children. Appendix no. 59 in Canada, “Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada,” 1847. The conversion rates from sterling to Halifax currency (£1 stg = £1.1111 (£1.2.2\textsuperscript{1/2}) Hfx) are from A.B. McCullough, \textit{Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900}, Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 292.


\textsuperscript{25} For a list of the goods distributed on Drummond Island, Upper Canada in 1820s, see Appendix no. 60, in \textit{Ibid}. For the goods distributed in Lower Canada in 1830, 1834, and 1836, see Appendix no. 57 in \textit{Ibid}. For the list of goods distributed in Upper Canada beginning in the summer of 1838, see Appendix no. 58 in \textit{Ibid}. 
Debates on Commutation during the 1820s and 1830s

The first move on the part of the British imperial state in the nineteenth century to significantly alter the role of presents in its relationship with Canada’s First Nations came immediately following the end of the War of 1812. As a result of the hostilities between Great Britain and the United States, annual imperial expenditure for the Indian Department, a large portion of which was dedicated to the system of presents aimed at securing and maintaining alliances with northeastern North America’s Aboriginal peoples, had ballooned to over 200% of its pre-war level. In 1816, in an effort to return military spending to peacetime proportions, Lord Bathurst, the secretary of state for the colonies, ordered the Indian Department to reduce “the Indian Establishment to the footing upon which it stood in the Year 1811.”26 By 1823, the Department had largely surpassed this goal, cutting its annual expenditure to less than half of that made twelve years earlier.27 Although the Colonial Office and the Treasury sought further cuts in the Indian Department’s budget, particularly in the area of Indian presents, imperial administrators took no concrete action in this direction until Viscount Goderich replaced Bathurst as colonial secretary in April 1827.

In July of that year, Goderich sent a letter to the governor-in-chief of British North America, George Ramsay, the Earl of Dalhousie, requesting detailed information on “the precise expense of the Indian department, both in the salaries of officers, and in the amount of stores distributed to the Indians, with the view of effecting the reduction, and ultimately abolition of the establishment.” Goderich further asked Dalhousie to direct

the heads of the department... to confer with leaders or chiefs of the Indians, who are entitled to annual presents, either as subsidies to their tribes, being independent, or as rewards for past services as subjects, or as retaining fees in nature of half-pay to those who have been employed in arms, or lastly in payment of lands ceded to His Majesty’s Government, and to negotiate with them for the commutation of


such payments into money, such commutation to be fixed in British currency, and to be payable in the description of coin most agreeable to the chiefs.

By seeking to convert Indian presents to monetary payments, in the ultimate goal of eliminating them altogether, the Colonial Office aimed to realize a "necessary measure of public economy and improvement" — that is, it sought to reduce the expenses of the British Empire. 28

Dalhousie responded to Goderich's instructions by asserting that the Amerindians under his charge would receive "with the utmost alarm" any proposal "to convert the payment of presents, or other tribute to them, in money." Dalhousie attributed this hypothetical reaction to what he considered to be the Aboriginal penchant for spending all money that came into their possession on alcohol. In fact, he asserted that, "the system adopted in making useful presents as payment was intended expressly to avoid temptation." Dalhousie, then, rejected the notion that such an investigation was warranted, stating, "I think the proposed measure fully fraught with mischief to the Indians, no saving nor advantage possible to Government, and the future consequences of it dangerous in the extreme." 29 In spite of his opposition to the proposal, in June 1828, nearly a year after Goderich sent his instructions, the governor general ordered Major-General Darling to compose a report on the state of Upper and Lower Canada's Amerindian population. 30

Darling submitted his report at the end of July to Dalhousie who, in turn, sent it on to the new colonial secretary, Sir George Murray, the following October. While ignoring the question of commutation with regard to Lower Canada, Darling found that in Upper Canada the outright abolition of Indian presents or their commutation into money "would be received

28 "Copy of a Despatch from Lord Goderich to Earl Dalhousie," 14 July 1827, in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes..., p. 5.

29 "Extract of a Despatch from Lord Dalhousie to Mr. Secretary Huskisson," 22 November 1827, in Ibid, p. 6.

30 "Instructions to Major-General Darling...," in "No. 5: Copy Despatch and Enclosures from Lord Dalhousie to Sir George Murray," 27 October 1828, in Ibid, p. 31.
with the utmost apprehension and alarm as to the further intentions of their great father.” Moreover, he asserted that, “The Indian would receive no benefit whatever from a small sum of money put into his own hand, which he would find of little value, compared with his blanket and ammunition.” Darling did feel, however, that “a sum of money, in lieu of a portion of the presents now given, might be annually laid out for them to advantage, in the purchase of... agricultural implements and common tools.” The money used for such purchases, according to Darling’s scheme, would be drawn from each band’s land cession payments. In order to provide precedent and prove its practicality, this proposal looked to Sir Peregrine Maitland’s experiment in Amerindian “civilization,” where, according to Darling, “One hundred pounds was so laid out in the case of the Mississaquas of the Credit River, and with the best effect.”

Sir James Kempt, Dalhousie’s successor as governor general, reiterated many of Darling’s points in a letter to Murray sent in May 1829. Kempt asserted that before replacing presents with monetary payments, the government should be certain that the Amerindian population had advanced sufficiently to be able to use money wisely. “I am of the opinion, however, that the Indians, when settled, would readily agree to the substitution of implements of husbandry, and seed, &c. for many of the gaudy and useless articles which now compose their presents and which are daily falling in their estimation; but until a material improvement takes place in the habits of the Indians, it would be unwise to place at their disposal any commutation in money for those presents, of which they would in all probability make an improper use.” Thus, in complete absence of any Amerindian input or, for that matter, any recognition that such input might be desirable, Kempt claimed that Canada’s Aboriginal peoples would happily accept presents in the form of agricultural goods.

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32 “No. 8: Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Kempt to Sir George Murray,” 16 May 1829, in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes..., p. 39. Emphasis in original.
Kempt argued that the state should make every effort to avoid placing money in Amerindians’ improvident hands.

Of course, imperial and colonial administrators were not alone in commenting on the proposed commutation; Amerindians and missionaries also joined the fray. However, given the nature of the published correspondence in which commutation was discussed, it remains uncertain whether the Aboriginal point of view portrayed therein is in any way definitive. Ultimately, the documents under consideration reflect the opinions of the administrators who sent them. In other words, bureaucrats and politicians employed Amerindian “voices” in the official correspondence of the 1820s and 1830s to support their particular vision of commutation and not to provide a free forum for Native self-expression.33

This is not to suggest, however, that the opinions expressed by Amerindians in reference to the monetization of presents are somehow disingenuous. Thus, although an imperial administrator, colonial under-secretary Robert William Hay, made use of Chief John Asance’s request that a portion of the Matchedash Bay Chippewas’ presents be distributed in money in order to bolster the argument in favor of commutation, Asance’s request clearly remains his own. In 1831, Methodist minister and member of the Credit River Mississauga band, Peter Jones, wrote to Goderich to offer “a short account of the Indian people of Upper Canada, to whom I belong.”34 In his letter, Jones briefly commented on the distribution of presents generally before conveying Asance’s request. Jones wrote that Asance “wishes to have something always in his pockets and never be empty, so that when he gets hungry he may put his hands into his pockets and find something jingling to buy bread with.”35 Thus, Asance refutes the colonial contention of Amerindian improvidence by arguing that

33 This observation holds for Missionary voices as well. On the difficulties of reconstructing an Aboriginal position concerning the commutation of presents, see Gettler, “L’argent, l’État et les Autochtones.”

34 “Copy of a Letter from Mr. Peter Jones to Viscount Goderich,” 26 July 1831, in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes..., p. 135.

providing presents in monetary form would ultimately be of greater use in that they would allow their discerning recipients to purchase goods when necessary.

Missionaries, who frequently presented themselves as spokesmen for Aboriginal peoples, took part in this debate on similar terms. For instance, in 1829 Reverend James Magrath, a Toronto missionary, sent a report concerning the state of the Mississauga village on the Credit River to Sir John Colborne, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada. This village, initially settled in the early 1820s under the aegis of Maitland's governmentally-sponsored civilization program, presented many nineteenth-century commentators with the model through which Amerindians might be “raised up” to the Euro-Canadian level. In the first part of his report, completed in March 1828, Magrath commented that the Mississauga would prefer to receive their annual presents in cash rather than in the form in which the Indian Department had traditionally distributed them. “They say that the articles they get are generally unnecessary, as they cannot use or wear out those they receive in a year; they frequently dispose of many articles at a great loss, particularly the guns. If they received one-half in cash they could procure many necessaries which (as they are now settled) they stand in need of, on more reasonable terms than they could do with the presents.” Magrath annexed to his report a short note written in January 1829 in which he, following the request of John Jones, Peter Jones’s brother and the band’s schoolmaster, reiterated the Mississauga’s desire to receive a portion of their annual presents in currency. In making this request, Magrath commented, the Mississaugas ultimately aimed to purchase agricultural and fishing supplies. By highlighting the progress this First Nation had already made, then, the missionary refuted colonial administrators’ assertion that Amerindians were incapable of managing their own financial affairs. Ultimately, this rhetorical approach explains why colonial authorities found

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36 For more on Maitland and the establishment of the Mississauga model-village on the Credit River, see Leslie, “Commissions of Inquiry...,” p. 12-7.
Magrath’s recommendation acceptable – although arguing for commutation, he also testified that the colonial “civilization” project had begun bearing fruit.37

Following a period of inaction, the imperial state once more began to pursue retrenchment in January 1836 when the British colonial secretary, Lord Glenelg, sent near-identical letters to the governor-in-chief of British North America, Archibald Acheson, the Earl of Gosford, and the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Sir Francis Bond Head. Glenelg informed the two colonial administrators of a resolution that the Committee of the House of Commons on Military Expenditure in the Colonies had recently adopted calling for the reduction of spending on the part of the Indian Department. In particular, this resolution dealt with the expense incurred by the annual distribution of Indian presents in Upper and Lower Canada. The Committee inquired “whether any Arrangement might not be made to dispense with such Distribution in the future, or to commute the Presents for Money.”38

London, as it had done a decade earlier, sought to reduce the expenses incurred by the Indian Department with a view towards the institution’s eventual dissolution. Whereas Goderich had not specified a timetable for the Department’s abolition in his directions to Dalhousie, Glenelg actively sought to reassure colonial administrators that no action would be taken immediately. Rather, he asserted that his interest lay in gaining more precise information concerning Canada’s Aboriginal population so that the imperial state might

37 In all of the published correspondence under consideration, this is the only instance in which a colonial administrator forwarded the comments of a missionary or Amerindian in favor of commutation. Jones’s request for cash, however, was mitigated by Magrath’s assertion that the Mississauga were interested in obtaining agricultural and fishing supplies in place of “[t]hose trinkets and gaudy-coloured clothes which they formerly admired so much.” This ultimately allowed Kempt to recommend a change in the goods distributed as presents while still opposing commutation. “Report of the State of the Indians on the River Credit...,” in “Enclosure No. 1,” in “No. 8: Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Kempt to Sir George Murray,” in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes... , p. 43.

38 Quoted in “No. 1: Copy of a Despatch from Lord Glenelg to the Earl of Gosford,” 14 January 1836, in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835, between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Governors of the British North American Provinces, Respecting the Indians in those Provinces, London, 1839, p. 1.
eventually institute savings in a manner that would avoid harming First Nations. “I feel bound, after much Consideration, to express my Opinion that the Time is not yet arrived at which it would be possible, consistently with good Faith, altogether to discontinue the annual Presents to the Indians.” Instead of being a right to which the colonies’ Amerindian population was entitled, Glenelg described the system of Indian presents as being a custom that continued to exist in order to keep the Amerindians docile. “[I]t is sufficient to observe, that the custom has now existed during a long Series of Years; that even in the Absence of any original Obligation a prescriptive Title has thus been created; and that this Title has been practically admitted by all who have been officially cognizant of the Matter, and that all agree in stating that its sudden Abrogation would lead to great Discontent among the Indians, and perhaps to Consequences of a very serious Nature.”

In addition to interviewing the chiefs with respect to the substitution of money for presents, Glenelg directed the two governors to inquire as to whether the Amerindians in question would “sanction the Application of at least a Portion of the Sums now expended in the Purchase of Stores and Presents to the Erection of Schoolhouses, the Purchase of elementary Books, and the Payment of resident Schoolmasters, for the benefit of the Indian Tribes.” Here again Glenelg’s primary motivation was clearly the lightening of the Treasury’s fiscal load.

The Colonial Office did not propose the conversion of presents to money merely on the strength of potential savings to the Imperial Treasury — Glenelg also countenanced the proposal in the argument that money might, in fact, be beneficial to Canada’s Aboriginal population. He remarked that if Gosford or Head should find “that the Well-being of the Indians would be promoted by substituting an Equivalent in Money in lieu of the Articles at present issued,” they should consider themselves “at liberty... to effect such a


40 Ibid, p. 3.
Corrunutation.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, the Colonial Office sought to drape the mantel of Aboriginal improvement over its actions in Canada in much the same way as it did in other parts of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{42} As a result of the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833, imperial officials found themselves capable of calling upon Britain's clear humanitarian credentials even when pursuing goals, such as retrenchment, which may have been detrimental to colonial subjects' best interests.\textsuperscript{43} Glenelg, however, could not force authorities in Canada to carry out his will because Britain, in contrast to France and Spain, did not rule her colonial periphery from the imperial core in absolute terms, but rather employed a form of government through which officials in London collaborated with those in the colonies in formulating and implementing policy. Thus, the Colonial Office's approach in this instance is symptomatic of its treatment of colonial governance in general: it requested information while giving free rein to colonial authorities who might choose to implement London's favored policy of commutation.\textsuperscript{44}

Head responded to Glenelg's instructions by initially ignoring them and by finally refusing to respect them. In August 1836, Head reported that the colonial secretary's directions had reached him too late to be acted upon that summer. Thus, instead of relaying the information sought by Glenelg, Head wrote concerning his scheme to purchase the whole

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{43} On the British Empire's abolition of slavery and the ability of authorities through official discourse to sympathize "with humanitarian goals even when disinclined or unable to promote them effectively," see Ibid, esp. p. 201-4.

\textsuperscript{44} On British imperial governance during the nineteenth century, see Peter Burroughs, "Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire," in Porter (ed.), \textit{The Oxford History of the British Empire}, vol. 3, p. 170-97.
of Manitoulin Island as a reserve for "those Indians, who are now impeding the Progress of Civilization in Upper Canada."

Three months later, Head responded to Glenelg's instructions by supplying him with a memorandum on the state of Upper Canada's Amerindian population and its Indian Department. Rather than being a detailed report, this memorandum presents Head's personal impressions and observations. Instead of submitting the question of commutation to Upper Canada's Amerindian communities, the lieutenant governor simply answered it himself. "I am not prepared to recommend that Money should at present be substituted for Presents to the resident Indians in this Province, — 1st, Because I think, unless good Arrangements were previously made, the Indians, from their improvident Habits, would in many Places be left destitute; and, 2dly, Because, without due Precaution, a Money Delivery to so many Men, Women, and Children might possibly be attended by very great Impositions." In other words, Head felt, regardless of the fact he was "quite alive to the Advantage which we should gain by the Substitution of Money, if it could be properly effected," that cash payments might ultimately cost the imperial treasury more than they were worth. In the end, he declared that he would need "Another Year's Experience and Reflection" before being able to provide a definitive response — one which he never sent.

In contrast to other administrators' refusal to adhere to the Colonial Office's instructions, Gosford complied by ordering, in October 1836, a detailed inquiry into the state of Lower Canada's Aboriginal population and into the possibility of replacing Indian presents with cash payments. He submitted the results of the inquiry to Glenelg in a series of letters beginning in November 1836 and culminating, in July 1837, in a report that he had commissioned from a committee of the Executive Council of Lower Canada detailing the


majority of the Indian Department's activities in the province and including an in-depth analysis of the proposed commutation.

In order to comply with Glenelg's instructions, the Montreal and Quebec district superintendents of the Indian Department held councils with each of Lower Canada's settled Amerindian bands on the subject of commutation during the summer of 1836. Although the records generated in connection with these meetings are by no means lengthy, they permit an invaluable glimpse of how presents were viewed in the province's Aboriginal communities. Each of the six bands interviewed by James Hughes, the superintendent for the Montreal district of the Indian Department, as well as the four bands in the Quebec district superintendency, under Louis Juchereau Duchesnay, categorically rejected the proposal. 47 This refusal to accept monetary payments from the state arose from two major claims: first, that money given in lieu of presents would deprive the communities' weaker members of basic necessities in that it would permit those receiving the cash - the heads of household - to spend it on alcohol and, second, that presents formed a venerable compact between the Crown and Canada's First Nations that could not in good faith be altered.

Each of the Amerindian bands queried asserted in more or less identical fashion the problems that the substitution of money for presents would cause. The reaction of the Nipissing, Algonquin, and Iroquois of Lake of Two Mountains (Kanesatake) is, in this sense, typical:

Tell our Father we want no Money from him; most of our young Men and many of the old ones would make bad use of it... Was our Father to give us Money instead of the Articles we now receive as our annual Presents, our Wives and Children would be naked and miserable, and we Men unable to procure a Livelihood for them. We

47 The information submitted by Juchereau Duchesnay is markedly less detailed than that given by Hughes. Whereas Hughes's reports averaged between one and two pages for each band interviewed, Duchesnay's report covers four bands in under half a page. For Hughes's reports, see Enclosures 7-10 in "No. 11: Copy of a Despatch from the Earl of Gosford to Lord Glenelg," 13 July 1837, in Ibid, p. 41-6. For Duchesnay's report, see "Enclosure 11 in No. 11," 22 August 1836, in Ibid, p. 46.
are sure our Father will find that we speak true, that he will listen to us, and continue the Issue of our Great Father's annual Bounty to us as heretofore.48

The Iroquois of Kahnawake went further than the other bands in arguing against commutation: they offered "proof" that such money would be wasted. The Iroquois’s grand chief, Tekanasonnie, depicted a scene that he had recently witnessed at the distribution of treaty annuities made by the United States at St. Regis, New York (Akwesasne). "The American Indians had upwards of 2,000 Dollars to receive. On that Day the Payment was made to us the Council-room was full of Tavern and Grog-shop Keepers, with their Account Books under their Arms, to receive our poor Brothers [sic] hard-earned Money for nothing but Rum, which they had advanced them on Credit. Upwards of 1,000 Dollars were paid to these Rum Sellers."49

While the interviewed bands unanimously asserted that commutation would threaten their most defenseless members, a series of different visions informed their claim that presents, as traditionally given, formed part of a long-standing compact between Britain and themselves. The interviewed Amerindians generally envisioned the state’s distribution of presents as being rooted in one of two historical realities. During the summer of 1836, the Akwesasne Iroquois appears to have been the only group considering itself to have an absolute and unquestionable right to the receipt of such presents. "Saro Oriwagati, the oldest Man and Chief of his Tribe (i.e. Ninety-four Years of Age)," argued this point of view on their behalf: "Father, I have outlived a great many Winters, and Three bloody Wars, in none of which did I ever find cause to doubt the good and faithful intentions of my Great Father the King towards us his Indian Children; and I cannot believe that he now thinks of breaking that Promise of his Forefathers, which was guaranteed to us when I was a young Man: 'Presents so long as we shall remain a tribe.'"50 In the eyes of the Iroquois, then, presents

48 "Enclosure 9 in No. 11," in Ibid, p. 44.
were more than mere objects furnished by the state – they symbolized a solemn and venerable pact between themselves and the British. As a result, presents could not rightly be replaced by money.\textsuperscript{51}

The Abenaki of Odanak exemplified the competing vision of Amerindian rights regarding British presents when they labeled the distribution of such gifts “a Sort of Remuneration for our past Services.”\textsuperscript{52} This describes presents not as a right pertaining to Amerindians alone but as payment for services rendered. In other words, the Abenaki’s conceptualization of presents, as well as that of the Algonquin, Nipissing, and Iroquois of Kanesatake, and the Iroquois of Kahnawake, calls these objects’ immutable nature, as asserted by the Iroquois of Akwesasne, into question. This contention indicates a fundamental difference in Amerindian strategy, if not thought, when faced with potential changes in British Indian presents. Nonetheless, every community interviewed by Hughes, while forcefully opposed to the substitution of money for presents, justified their claims to the “annual bounty” on historical grounds. The Algonquin, Nipissing, and Iroquois of Kanesatake even went so far as to cite pre-Conquest French presents as forming the basis from which the British system grew.\textsuperscript{53}

Although during the summer of 1836 these communities did not appear to consider presents an immutable right, two of them later altered their position in order to support that of the Akwesasne Iroquois. In February 1837, after the initial Indian Department interviews had

\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, the receipt of presents by individuals served to prove their standing as band members. For example, George de Lorimier, a resident of Kahnawake, claimed presents not for their economic but for their symbolic value. Duncan Napier, the Governor General’s Indian Secretary at Quebec City, wrote that it would be ridiculous to believe that de Lorimier sought to receive presents for their material worth, suggesting that he instead did so “with a view to remove the objections to his becoming a candidate for the situation of a chief of the Iroquois tribe, and eventually perhaps to his acquiring the control and management of the seigniory of the Sault St Louis.” Duncan C. Napier, “Observations on a letter from Mr. George de Lorimier,” 24 October 1837, LAC, RG10, vol. 94, p. 38701-4, reel C-11469.

\textsuperscript{52} “Enclosure 8 in No. 11,” in \textit{Ibid}, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{53} “Enclosure 9 in No. 11,” in \textit{Ibid}, p. 44.
been concluded, three bands belonging to the Seven Nations, the inhabitants of Kahnawake and Kanesatake along with the Akwesasne Iroquois, sent a petition to Gosford protesting the Indian Department's decision to cease the distribution of presents to all children born after May 1st of that year. The petition asserted not only that the French had begun the systematic distribution of presents, which the British then continued after the Conquest, but that these presents could never rightfully be terminated. "Mon père, ces présents (puisqu'on nous a appris à les nommer ainsi) ne sont pas dans le fait des présents, c'est de la part du Gouvernement une dette sacrée promisė [sic] à nos pères par les Rois de France pour les indemniser des terres qu'ils leur ont abandonnées, et confirmée par les Rois d'Angleterre depuis la cession du pays, et jusqu'à présent ponctuellement payée et acquittée." Although the chiefs who signed the petition ultimately struck a conciliatory tone – begging rather than demanding that the presents be continued to their children – the mere assertion that the French had originally given presents as a means of paying in perpetuity for Amerindian land cessions underlines the highly symbolic and historical charge that these objects carried.

The Indian Department also inquired as to whether Lower Canada's settled Amerindian communities would be willing to utilize a portion of the monies spent on the purchase of presents in order to fund their children's education. All of the bands that considered this proposal flatly rejected it for identical reasons. The Abenaki of Odanak responded to the question: "Brother, tell our Father, that... we are well aware that they [the band's children] can but reap great Benefit from receiving an Education, but at the same time tell him, that the great Majority of the Abenakois Tribe are so wretchedly poor, that they

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55 James Hughes did not make any such inquiry to the Algonquins, Nipissings, and Iroquois of the Lake of the Two Mountains because the Sulpician Seminary ran the community's school and paid for all of its expenses. "Enclosure 9 in No. 11," in Ibid, p. 44. Duchesnay rejected outright the applicability of the question to those Amerindians whose children did not already attend school. As those schools in operation already had funds, he saw no point in making inquiries. Duchesnay did, however, assert that, "they never would willingly contribute in any way towards paying Part of the Expenses of a Schoolmaster and other Expenses attending a School." "Enclosure 11 in No. 11," 22 August 1836, in Ibid, p. 46.
have not the Means of paying for the Instruction of their Children; that the Presents they annually receive from their Great Father's Bounty are barely sufficient to protect them from the Cold."

In other words, Lower Canada's settled Amerindian bands recognized education's value, but asserted that, due to their extreme poverty, they were completely incapable of paying for it. The Iroquois of Akwesasne, like Lower Canada's other Aboriginal communities, asserted that they were more than willing to accept education as long as it was publicly funded. "[W]e hope in this respect to be put on a Footing with our Brethren the White Skins, who, we are informed, have their Children educated at the public Expense. If Schools are established amongst us on such a Footing, we will cheerfully send our Children to them."

Thus, contrary to earlier responses to the "commutation question" on the part of the colonial state, the Committee of Lower Canada's Executive Council based its conclusion to some extent on clearly demonstrated, rather than presumed, Amerindian opposition to the proposal. In its final report, the committee concluded that cash payments should not be substituted for the traditional Indian presents and that the costs of Amerindian education could not justly be defrayed, in whole or in part, by the budget accorded to the presents' annual distribution. In arriving at its conclusion, the committee considered the legal nature of Indian presents evoked by all of the bands with which the Indian Department held councils in 1836. The committee's final report argued that, although custom prohibited the abolition or alteration of presents in the immediate future, the receipt of these goods in no way constituted an Aboriginal right. The committee even went so far as to claim that the system of presents then in place was in some sense responsible for creating and maintaining poverty in Amerindian communities. As a result, its members felt that Lower Canada's Aboriginal

56 “Enclosure 8 in No. 11,” in Ibid, p. 43.

57 “Enclosure 7 in No. 11,” in Ibid, p. 42.

58 “Enclosure in No. 11. To His Excellency the Earl of Gosford... Report of a Committee of the Executive Council...,” 13 June 1837, in Ibid, p. 28.
population could rightly claim the continued distribution of presents. “[T]his System, by fostering their natural Improvidence, by estranging them from the ordinary Pursuits and Industry of civilized Life, and teaching them to consider themselves as under a special Tutelage of the Crown, and in dependence upon it, has further strengthened their Claim to a Continuance of it until they shall be raised above their helpless Condition to which it has mainly contributed to depress them.”59 For his part, Gosford agreed entirely with the committee’s conclusions.60

_Commissions of Inquiry and Commutation, 1839-1858_

Following Gosford’s examination of the form of Indian presents, four other independent, state-sanctioned commissions of inquiry took up the question. The four commissions each built on the work of their predecessors – General Darling and the committee of the Executive Council of Lower Canada – and in so doing created what one historian has termed a “corporate memory” for the Indian Department upon which Indian Affairs continues to draw even today.61 Three of these four commissions rubber-stamped the findings of the committee of the Executive Council with respect to commutation62 and reinforced its vision of Amerindians as poverty-stricken wards of the imperial state.

For instance, in 1839, Justice James Buchanan Macaulay, in his report on Indian Affairs in Upper Canada, reaffirmed both the committee’s vision of Amerindians as naturally

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60 “No. 11: Copy of a Despatch from the Earl of Gosford to Lord Glenelg,” 13 July 1837, in Ibid, p. 25.


62 While concerned with the question of altering the form in which the Crown distributed Indian presents, Committee No. 4, in its January 1840 report, made no mention whatsoever of commutation.
improvident and its conclusion that commutation could only end in grief, both for First
Nations and for the state.

I concur with those who disapprove of a money commutation. It might (treating the
presents as a dry matter of debt) be more convenient to pay in cash than in goods,
but considering the motive and object, and, the well known indiscretion and folly of
the Indians no room is left for doubt on the subject. It is manifest that the money in
itself can be of no benefit to them, it can only be useful to exchange for necessaries,
and it may readily be supposed that if not enticed from the improvident holders with
liquor excessive prices would be exacted from them for necessaries, of inferior
quality, and undue advantages be taken of them in every way. Therefore as respects
both commodity and prices and the real benefit and comfort of the receivers, the
Government can best provide them with useful supplies such as clothing, implements of husbandry, fire arms, ammunition and food, in short almost anything
but money.63

In its report, submitted in 1844 and published in two parts in 1845 and 1847, the Bagot
Commission reached a very similar conclusion, soundly rejecting commutation on the basis
of the positions defended by previous colonial administrators. As Macaulay had done eight
years earlier, the commissioners recommended changing the form of the presents, although
this time, at least as far as Upper and Lower Canada’s sedentary Amerindian bands were
concerned, with a view towards “gradually extinguishing existing claims.” Ultimately, the
Bagot Commission recommended that the money spent on presents for these communities be
converted into funding for industrial schools in Upper Canada (at Alderville and Mount
Elgin) and for the purchase of agricultural equipment.64 Although colonial authorities
implemented these reforms, the Pennefather Commission, in its 1858 report, asserted that the

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effort to redirect funds previously used to purchase presents in order to support education, “in some cases against [the bands’] will,” had been a failure.  

Beyond simply recommending against commutation, each commission of inquiry also emphasized the deleterious effects that the system of presents had on First Nations, ultimately portraying the Amerindian as impoverished by definition. For instance, the Bagot Commission’s report echoes the conclusions of the 1836 committee by asserting that Indian presents maintained First Nations in a state of poverty because of the dependence on state aid that these goods created. “This reliance has doubtless had the effect of encouraging their natural indolence and improvidence; of keeping them a distinct people; of fostering their natural pride and consequent aversion to labour; and of creating an undue feeling of dependence upon the protection and bounty of the Crown.” The Commissioners concluded that, “the majority of the Indians throughout the United Provinces, are still in such a state of actual destitution, and of incapacity to hold their place among the whites, that it would be inconsistent, both with justice and humanity, at present to withdraw such assistance from them.” In its 1858 report, the Pennefather Commission similarly concluded that First Nations had become wholly dependent upon state assistance, explicitly supporting the 1836 report in this regard. “The conclusions arrived at by the Executive Council of Lower Canada in their admirable Report to the Earl of Gosford in 1836, cannot we think be controverted. They maintained that the position so taken up afforded unusual facilities for educating and improving the Aborigines, that the state of tutelage in which the latter were kept by the Crown taught them to look up to it, and to feel dependent upon it.”

65 Canada, “Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the 8th of September, 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada,” in Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix 21, Toronto, Stewart Derbishire and George Desbarats, 1858.


67 Canada, “Report of the Special Commissioners...”
The four post-1836 commissions of inquiry, like their predecessors, based their conclusions to a certain extent on the testimony of individuals familiar with the "Indian question." As a result, it is hardly surprising that these witnesses frequently expressed similar opinions to those put forward by the commissions’ reports. For instance, the Bagot Commission’s portrayal of presents as a form of relief provided to Canada’s naturally impoverished Aboriginal population clearly draws on the opinions of those who provided the commission with evidence. The Indian Department’s superintendent on Manitoulin Island, Thomas Gummersall Anderson, makes an exemplary assertion in this sense by claiming that if presents were withdrawn those bands under his charge “must consequently perish” because they “have no annuity as a resource; the game is almost entirely destroyed; they have scarcely any furs to offer the trader... and they gain only a precarious subsistence by fishing, trapping hares, and shooting a few wild fowl.”

In responding to the same commission, Samuel P. Jarvis, the chief superintendent of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, voiced this conviction even more forcefully when he proposed that the money used to purchase presents and “all [Amerindian] funds, from whatever source derived,” should be pooled in order to permit Indian Affairs to provide assistance whenever deemed necessary. In other words, Jarvis asserted that Indian Affairs’ raison d’être should be the provision of relief to its wards.

However, in opposition to the committee of the Executive Council, these latter-day commissions based their conclusions on little or no Aboriginal testimony. For instance, the Bagot Commission, while receiving submissions from most of the Indian agents and missionaries in the two Canadas, only consulted a single Amerindian, Peter Jones, and this in his capacity as Methodist minister to the Credit-River band. Although also citing Reverend Jones as well as several other Amerindians, Macaulay approached his task in an even less

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69 Samuel P. Jarvis to the Commissioners on Indian Affairs, 30 January 1843 in Appendix no. 16 in Ibid.

70 Appendix no. 38 in Ibid.
inclusive manner, neglecting to visit a single First Nation or to solicit any Aboriginal input, instead concentrating uniquely on pre-existing official papers and correspondence furnished by Sir George Arthur, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada. Committee No. 4 carried out its investigation in similar fashion, concentrating on state documents as it was unable to examine “the present condition, morally and politically, of the different Tribes” due to “the remoteness of the sources of information,” thereby effectively disallowing Aboriginal input. The Pennefather Commission proceeded in more or less identical fashion as the Bagot Commission had done a decade earlier, collecting evidence from Euro-Canadian experts on the “Indian question” while failing to consider any Amerindian opinion or commentary.

Although they employed similar methods and expressed near-identical visions of Amerindian improvidence, the four post-1836 commissions proposed different means of altering or phasing out the state’s distribution of Indian presents. Beyond supporting Jarvis’s call for the encouragement of civilization by way of the distribution of “shoes and trousers,” Committee No. 4 avoided making any concrete proposal for changing the system. Rather, it recommended that a means of minimizing expenditure from parliamentary funds be devised, particularly in reference to the high cost incurred in shipping the presents to their points of distribution. In contrast, the Bagot Commission proposed sweeping changes, ultimately promoting assimilation as the preferred means of ending the distribution of Indian presents. The Commission’s final report recommended that “a period sufficiently distant should be fixed, at which the bounty of the Crown in its present shape should cease, and the Indians now settled in the Province should be expected to fall into the ranks of the other subjects of Her Majesty.” Ultimately, the commissioners proposed a form of “proto-enfranchisement,”

73 Ibid. Although the committee’s report never mentions it, this suggests that it may have been at least partially in favor of the substitution of money for presents. Since the 1820s, the low shipping costs of cash in comparison to bulky Indian presents had been one of the chief arguments supporting commutation.
whereby Indian Affairs would grant land from the appropriate reserve to an individual who was ready to participate in colonial society on equal terms to those enjoyed by his Euro-Canadian neighbors. "[U]pon Issue of this Patent all further claims to share in the Presents [will] be relinquished; but that any title to share in an annuity or other property of the Tribe be retained." 74

This points to the centrality to both First Nations and the state of the list of presents during the period preceding the transfer of responsibility for the Department from imperial to colonial authorities. Indeed, among those bands who did not receive annuities, receipt of presents often served as the sole marker of Indian "status" during the period, particularly in Lower Canada. However, as a result of legal changes made in the 1850s, the importance of presents in terms of both administration and political identity declined rapidly. As a result, authorities implemented the Bagot Commission's recommendation that presents be abolished altogether while failing to simultaneously eliminate Amerindians' separate administrative and legal status. 75 In March 1851, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Grey, decreed that the distribution of presents would cease in 1858. In the words of the Pennefather Commission, Grey felt "that the gradual extinction of this vote would not conflict with any just claim on the part of the Indians." 76 Thus, when the distribution of Indian presents came to an end in the late 1850s, the state had never made any concrete attempt at commutation.

Conclusion

In spite of the state's refusal to ever implement commutation, an analysis of imperial and colonial discourse concerning First Nations sparked by this proposal offers insight into


75 See below for a discussion of these changes.

76 Canada, "Report of the Special Commissioners...," 1858. See also Milloy, "The Era of Civilization," p. 311.
the development of a persistent and particularly pernicious stereotype that would come to provide much of the moral and political justification for the state's paternal involvement in the lives of its Aboriginal wards. This discourse ultimately contributed to the creation of legal mechanisms that theoretically denied Amerindians the ability to manage their own affairs, financial and otherwise, while simultaneously vesting renewed authority in Indian Affairs – authority that the imperial state had called into question through its post-War of 1812 cost-cutting campaign. Thus, when Gosford and the committee of the Executive Council portrayed presents as a form of state handouts to "a Race of indigent People," they provided Indian Affairs with an argument in favor of its engagement in more invasive forms of bureaucratic control in Amerindian communities. Although this argument proved unable to perfectly preserve the Department's institutional integrity in the face of the massive imperial retrenchment of the early to mid-nineteenth century, it provided Indian Affairs with a particularly persuasive means of justifying its continued existence – a means that would eventually contribute to its mid- to late-nineteenth-century renaissance.

The historiography has placed very little emphasis on this strain of imperial-colonial intercourse concerning Indian presents. Rather, the vast majority of studies have sought to understand this debate as springing, on the one hand, from the imperial will to cut Indian Department expenditure and, on the other, from the colonial commitment to a policy of

77 On the threat that fiscal reform posed to Indian Affairs' continued existence, see Milloy, "The Era of Civilization." Of course, retrenchment of this sort was in no way limited to the Indian Department or British North America but extended throughout the empire. Peter Burroughs writes: "Throughout the century the opinion prevailed among politicians and commentators that, whatever the Empire's benefits, its administration and defence imposed unduly onerous burdens on the British Treasury which ought to be reduced. This conviction persisted even when Britain became affluent enough to afford such expenditure, so deeply was the obsession with economy embedded in the Victorian political consciousness." Burroughs, "Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire," p. 176.

78 "Enclosure in No. 11. To His Excellency the Earl of Gosford... Report of a Committee of the Executive Council...," 13 June 1837, in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835..., p. 28. For control as the unacknowledged "real first principle of Indian policy," see Robin Jarvis Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939, Don Mills, Ont., Oxford University Press, 2003, p. xiv-xv.
conciliation with regard to Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. The historiography depicts the proposed solution to the impasse — Colborne, Kempt, and later governors’ promotion of Maitland’s civilization scheme — as being motivated by the desire to avoid antagonizing the crown’s traditional Native allies while simultaneously aiding the imperial treasury in its quest for retrenchment. 79 However, the positions adopted in this debate by administrators in Canada and Great Britain might equally be understood as having arisen from the conviction that monetary payments would increase rather than diminish the state’s financial obligation to Canada’s Aboriginal population — a population that authorities of the period increasingly treated as wards of the state. In other words, cash, as asserted by Dalhousie, Kempt, Head, and the committee of the Executive Council, as well as by certain Amerindians, would be spent improvidently, thereby requiring the state to make additional expenditure in order to provide relief to the now totally destitute Aboriginal communities. Thus, colonial administrators seem to have been at least as influenced by widespread contemporary notions affirming the fundamentally improvident nature of the poor as they were by the Indian Department’s commitment to its traditional Aboriginal allies. 80

In at least one instance, these notions directly influenced Indian policy. Beginning in 1834, immediately prior to his appointment as lieutenant governor of Upper Canada in December 1835, Head occupied the position of assistant poor law commissioner for East Kent. 81 As a result, he imported to the colony, and to relations with First Nations in particular, a vision directly born of the implementation of the most recent piece of legislation concerning poverty in the imperial heartland. In expressing his skepticism concerning

79 See Milloy, op. cit., p. 84-97.


Aboriginal capacity to wisely employ money, Head echoed his own words, written on the other side of the Atlantic, charging that “little shop-keepers” and “owners... of beer-shops” profited “from that vast and hitherto unprotected mass of money, which has been collected nominally for the support of the poor.” In other words, Head, like other colonial commentators, affirmed an innate Amerindian proclivity for spending their cash income on alcohol in terms drawn directly from discussions of the improvident poor, ultimately contributing to the failure of commutation to be implemented.

Of course, the outcome of this debate was far from a foregone conclusion. One could conceivably argue that had the imperial camp taken the day, cash payments in lieu of presents might have paved the way for full-fledged Amerindian participation in Canadian civil society. Instead, however, it seems likely that the colonial insistence on Aboriginal improvidence contributed to the evolution of Amerindians’ special legal status, as eventually enshrined in the Indian Act of 1876. In other words, once the assertion that Amerindians were incapable of managing their own financial affairs had become dogma – a dogma largely elaborated in the course of imperial-colonial debates over the commutation of Indian presents – the only option left to the state was to adopt a policy assigning itself the role of the Aboriginal population’s legal guardian.

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83 In addition to being influenced by his time as assistant poor commissioner, Head’s Indian policy drew on the idealized romantic image of Upper Canada’s Amerindian population as being simultaneously superior to Euro-Canadians and fatally vulnerable to the newcomers’ vices. This vision led him to implement a policy of removal based in large part on that of the United States, a policy that was at odds with that favored in British North America which aimed to “civilize” Aboriginal peoples. Theodore Binnema and Kevin Hutchings, “The Emigrant and the Noble Savage: Sir Francis Bond Head’s Romantic Approach to Aboriginal Policy in Upper Canada, 1836-1838,” Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d’études canadiennes, vol. 39, no. 1 (Winter 2005), p. 115-38.
From Retrenchment to Expansion: The Unexpected Growth of Indian Affairs

During the nineteenth century, officials in the Indian Department developed two distinct attitudes with respect to Amerindian money-use. As physical, circulating currency became more widely available in British North America, those state officials charged with the responsibility of maintaining relations with First Nations came to portray the use of money in the context of social assistance (in which they increasingly placed Indian presents) as a threat to the Department's publicly proclaimed goal of civilizing its Aboriginal wards while coming to see currency in other contexts, most notably that of treaty payments, in the absence of any similar sense of alarm. As the debate on commutation illustrates, both imperial and colonial officials worried that cash offered Amerindians too much freedom. Because it allowed its holder the theoretical liberty of purchasing goods and services as she saw fit, money could only be entrusted to those individuals of sufficient learning and moral fiber to not expend it inappropriately. According to the Department, an organization firmly anchored in both the transatlantic debates on poverty and British North America's increasingly hegemonic "liberal order," Amerindians did not yet fit these criteria. In fact, during this period Euro-Canadian actors and institutions portrayed Aboriginal peoples in ever more formal and legalistic terms as being the "Other" against which the individual "Canadian" subject was at least partially defined. In this context, authorities felt that both First Nations as collectivities and individual Amerindians could not yet be trusted to wield their moral sanction in order to

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85 Of course, Amerindians had long provided Europeans and their New World descendents with a means of self-definition. See, for example, Gilles Havard, "Les forcer à devenir Citoyens': État, Sauvages et citoyenneté en Nouvelle-France (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)," Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, vol. 64, no. 5 (December 2009), p. 7-40.
protect against the dangers of individual freedom, thus necessitating increasingly numerous forms of individual political and economic education. In the same way, the Department and other colonial observers felt that individual Amerindians were not yet sufficiently prepared to protect their own liberties against the tyranny of the community that similarly needed state guidance in the establishment and surveillance of liberal forms of local government. In this sense, the political project of liberalism came to provide the Indian Department with a moral imperative requiring its intervention in the everyday lives of the Aboriginal peoples defined over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century as wards of the state.86

This intervention, which took the form of schools and reserves, treaty payments and bans on the consumption of alcohol, provided the state with the theoretical means of treating the “illness” it had created from the 1850s through the legal codification of the individual Amerindian as an liberal subject. In order that he (liberalism’s concern was overwhelmingly placed on men) might become the liberal subject that Euro-Canadian society increasingly lauded throughout the period, the Amerindian had to be persuaded, increasingly by Indian Affairs, to abandon his anti-liberal community of origin in favor of Canadian society. However, because First Nations provided nineteenth and twentieth-century liberalism with an effective counterpoint against which to define itself, a program seeking the dissolution of “Indians” as a distinct segment of the population seems to have been logically doomed to failure. In other words, state authorities’ constant insistence that Amerindians were not yet ready for full participation in Canada’s economic, social, and political life served as a marker that, at least under the “liberal order,” they never would be.87

86 On nineteenth-century liberalism’s use of individual and community-based freedom as a bulwark against the excesses that freedom itself made possible, thereby bringing into existence the seemingly contradictory political project allowing states to rule through freedom, see Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City, New York, Verso, 2003.

87 For liberalism’s need for liberal groups – such as women and Aboriginal people – against which to define itself in the production of liberal society, see Adele Perry, “Women, Racialized People, and the Making of the Liberal Order in Northern North America,” in Constant and Ducharme (eds.), Liberalism and Hegemony, p. 274-97.
Thus, the political climate of the second half of the nineteenth century provided the state with a seemingly infallible moral justification for its involvement in Aboriginal communities. However, the nearly half-century that preceded this period witnessed a prolonged and serious challenge on the part of both colonial and imperial officials to the very existence of the Indian Department, the institution charged with overseeing relations with First Nations. Commutation provided imperial authorities with one avenue for potentially saving the treasury large sums of money. While it ultimately failed to substitute cash payments for presents, the Colonial Office did manage to make savings elsewhere, primarily by restricting the amount of presents distributed, but also by steadily reducing the Indian Department’s workforce and the salaries of those employees that remained. Thus, while many commentators during the early to mid-nineteenth century felt it important to encourage the grand social engineering scheme through which Amerindians were to become full partners in colonial society, the Department’s ever diminishing fiscal, human, and material base prevented it from playing a truly central role in this project. However, Indian Affairs’ diminished material base would not last; by the 1870s, it had staged a dramatic return, thereafter continuing to grow in terms of manpower, reach, and ambition into the twentieth century. This renewed vigor in turn allowed the Department to engage in a series of practices undertaken in the name of many of the principles enunciated in an earlier era of shrinking budgets and relative institutional impotence. However, given Indian Affairs’ increasingly hegemonic position within the field of Aboriginal “civilization” from the second half of the nineteenth century and the legal changes made to support and encourage the agency in carrying this project forward, these principles were recast in more explicitly liberal terms. In order for an Amerindian to become “civilized,” he now had to jettison any and all formal affiliation with Aboriginal society while fulfilling preconditions for full participation in Canadian society that would be inaccessible to many (and perhaps most) of his neighbors of European descent.

However, this explicitly liberal program functioned primarily, at least insofar as money-use was concerned, on the discursive rather than the material plane. Indeed, although the Department gained wide-reaching legal powers permitting it to involve itself in the day-to-day lives of its Aboriginal wards to an unprecedented extent, it rarely employed these powers in practice. In this sense, the present section primarily provides an analysis of the
state's theoretical relationship with First Nations during the nineteenth century. The following section, which pursues Indian Affairs’ policies with respect to money to the local level, counterbalances this discursive reading, pointing to the forces that complicated the implementation of administrative and legal theory “on the ground.” This section, then, analyzes the ways in which retrenchment and later expansion affected the reach and ambition of Indian Affairs. Since the present dissertation is concerned above all with the history of Aboriginal and not governmental money-use, this analysis is undertaken to clarify the state’s role in Amerindian monetary practice generally during the period. The section then turns to an analysis of several aspects of Canadian Indian policy relative to monetary matters, whether in the region covered by this study or elsewhere. In this way, it provides a history of Indian Affairs’ and Indian policy’s relation to money-use from a relatively broad, pan-Canadian perspective, focusing on Quebec and Ontario whenever appropriate. This will then allow a more coherent investigation of the nineteenth-century experience of money-use in Mashénuatsh and Wendake in this chapter’s final section.

Institutional Change in Indian Affairs

The ongoing loss of personnel formed one of the main legacies of the wave of deep cuts in the Indian Department’s budget provoked by imperial authorities following the end of the War of 1812. In 1813, at the height of the Anglo-American conflict, the Indian Department in Lower Canada planned to employ forty individuals the following year. By 1815, in the context of peacetime, the number of actual employees stood at twenty-four. This number continued to decline steadily through the late 1830s, when it bottomed-out at

88 This number excludes the three pensions that the Department paid during the period. John Johnson, “Indian Department, Lower Canada, Proposed establishment for the year 1814,” 2 November 1813, LAC, RG10, vol. 627, p. 182948-50, reel C-13396.

eleven. A similar process took place in the Upper Canadian Indian Department, with the number of personnel dropping to low levels in the 1830s before rebounding slightly the following decade. In both colonies, the first wave of reductions came in the form of the elimination of commissioned officers who had served in the Department during the war years. Thereafter, departmental authorities dismissed most of non-administrative staff (e.g., blacksmiths, surgeons, and storekeepers). By the 1830s, the Indian Department mainly employed administrative personnel (superintendents and resident agents) and interpreters (who sometimes also performed administrative functions). In Lower Canada several schoolmasters and Catholic missionaries also drew departmental salaries during the period.

90 In 1820, the Indian Department had 21 employees in Lower Canada. In 1825, this number had dropped to 18. In 1829, it declined again to 17. In 1831, it had dropped again to 15, the level at which it would stay until 1837, when the number of employees was again reduced, this time to 13. Two years later it would drop again to 11, before rebounding to 13 during the mid-1840s. John Johnson, “Proposed Establishment Indian Department of Upper & Lower Canada, 1820,” 15 November 1819, LAC, RG 8, vol. 262, p. 349-50, reel C-2853, John Johnson, “Proposed Establishment Indian Department of Upper and Lower Canada for the Year 1825,” 1 September 1824, LAC, RG 10, vol. 16, p. 12745-6, reel C-11003, “Enclosure no. 2: Establishment of the Indian Department in Lower Canada, for the Year 1829” and “Enclosure no. 3: Establishment of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, for the Year 1829” in “No. 8: Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Kempt to Sir George Murray,” 16 May 1829, in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes..., p. 44-5, R.J. Routh, “Lower Canada, 1831, Account of Pay and Lodging Money to the Indian Department,” 10 May 1832, LAC, RG 10, vol. 84, p. 33290-1, reel C-11030, D.C. Napier, “Estimate of the Probable Expenditure of the Indian Department in Lower Canada for its Establishment and Pensions from the 1st of April 1838, to the 31st of March 1839, inclusive,” 31 March 1838, LAC, RG 10, vol. 97, p. 39975-6, reel C-11470, R.J. Routh, “Account of Pay and Lodging Money issued to the Indian Department in Lower Canada from 1st October 1838 to 31st March 1839,” 31 March 1839, LAC, RG 10, vol. 97, p. 40025-6, reel C-11470, and Canada, “Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada,” 1847.

91 While no wartime numbers have been found, in 1815 the Upper Canadian department employed 34 individuals. By 1820, this number had dropped to 31. In 1825, the department had 17 employees, which would remain the case until 1833 when the number dropped to 10. In 1835, the number of employees in Upper Canada fell to 9. The Upper Canadian department grew more quickly in the 1840s than its Lower Canadian counterpart, employing 15 individuals in 1840 and 19 in 1844. In addition to the sources cited for Lower Canada, see R.J. Routh, “Upper Canada, 1833, Account of Pay and Lodging Money to the Indian Department,” 24 March 1834, LAC, RG 10, vol. 88, p. 35175-6, reel C-11466, D.C. Napier, “Establishment of the Indian Department in Upper and Lower Canada from the 1st of April 1835 to the 31st of March 1836,” 10 January 1835, LAC, RG 10, vol. 91, p. 37065-6, reel C-11468, Canada, “Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada,” 1847, and Robert S. Jameson, J.B. Macaulay, and William Hepburn, “Report of Committee No. 4, on Indian Department,” January 1840 in Appendix no. 1 in Ibid.
While the prior personnel were charged only with ensuring the education of their pupils, the latter received state-funded salaries because they effectively functioned as Indian agents in the communities in which they served. This practice contrasted with that of Upper Canada where, as a result of the network of well-organized and privately-financed missionary groups that took root in the colony in the 1820s, the Department employed only a single missionary and a single teacher prior to 1840. However, in both colonies the Department experienced a marked reduction in manpower through the mid-1840s. Furthermore, those employees that remained frequently found themselves impotent when faced with the tasks they were intended to perform. This difficulty arose from the constellation of state agencies – whether the Department of Crown Lands (in charge of surrendered lands), the Receiver General, the Army Commissariat (responsible for the supply of presents), or the imperial treasury – that collaborated in the day-to-day management of relations with First Nations. Imperial and colonial authorities outside the Department saw its extinction as inevitable and, as such, considered that other state institutions would ultimately assume responsibility for various aspects of Indian affairs. In spite of some centralization of administrative tasks, particularly those related to finance, as a result of the commissions of inquiry from the 1820s through the 1840s, the Indian Department did not assume responsibility for nearly every aspect of relations with First Nations until its transfer from imperial to colonial jurisdiction in 1860.

92 Missionaries served as “temporary” Indian agents in Restigouche, Lorette, St. Francis, Caughnawaga, and St. Regis. D.C. Napier, “Second Enclosure in No. 9: Estimate of the Probable Expenditure of the Indian Department in Lower Canada for its Establishment and Pensions, from the 1st April 1837 to the 31st of March 1838, inclusive,” 13 February 1837, in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835..., p. 20. At the same time, the secretary for Indian Affairs in Canada, Duncan Campbell Napier, wrote: “The Appointments of Roman Catholic Missionaries and Schoolmasters to the Indian Tribes... [are] of a temporary Nature.” D.C. Napier, “First Enclosure in No. 9: Return of the Length and Nature of the Services of the Officers and Inspectors of the Indian Department of Lower Canada (computed to the 31st of March 1837 inclusive),” 13 February 1837, in Ibid.

93 From this point, Indian Affairs became a “clientele” department. Rather than focusing on a given aspect of the state’s global responsibility with regard to its population or territory, it was dedicated to monopolizing the relationship between the state and First Nations. J.E. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-1867, Toronto, University of Toronto
These cuts in personnel, however, did not arise purely as a result of the calls of imperial officials for reductions in the size and scope of the Indian Department. British humanitarians, through the Aborigines Protection Society, similarly viewed limited departmental personnel and expenditure in a positive light. This concordance of opinion arose chiefly from the Society’s belief that the Indian Department of the 1830s existed first and foremost to distribute presents – either as dictated by diplomatic tradition or as a result of land purchases – to Canada’s First Nations. Since, in its opinion, these presents, too often tied to outmoded and degrading ways of living, caused more harm than good among the Aboriginal population, the Society held that their form needed to be altered. However, given the limited lifespan of presents and of certain land payments, economy should be effected in the Indian Department’s organization. In 1839, the Aborigines Protection Society’s committee investigating Indian Affairs in Upper Canada recommended that, “The expences of the Indian department have been often noticed, past reductions may be followed up by farther diminution, and the grants themselves being in many instances limited to a specified term of years, it becomes a matter of first rate importance, that the payments whilst they are continued, should be administered with the most rigid economy.” Thus, because it considered the Indian Department’s primary function to be the distribution of presents and treaty payments to First Nations, the Society’s committee believed, as did many humanitarians in the colonies as well as in the metropole, that the institution would cease to exist once Amerindians no longer needed the support and protection of a legal guardian due to the sure success of “missionary settlements” in promoting “The introduction of civilized habits and bone fide conversion to christianity.”

In other words, the committee argued that the Indian Department, in concert with missionary groups, should be encouraged to pave the way for its

Press, 1955, p. 213-5 and 219-225. On the politics behind the financial reorganization of the Department in the mid-1840s, as well as the collaboration with other state agencies that the Indian Department necessarily undertook during the period, see David Shanahan, “Tory Bureaucrat as Victim: The Removal of Samuel Jarvis, 1842-47,” Ontario History, vol. 95, no. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 38-64.

own obsolescence. The members of the committee developed this vision in reference to the Department’s traditional role as the state’s diplomatic representative among First Nations; while supporting the project of “civilization,” its report did not place Indian Affairs in the legalistic, assimilationist, and liberal framework within which it would find itself reinvented during the second half of the nineteenth century.

Partly as a result of lost manpower during this period, but also due to generalized reductions in salary, the Indian Department significantly cut its expenditure on personnel. After the brief distraction caused by Francis Bond Head’s removal policy in Upper Canada, imperial concern with Indian Affairs turned once more toward retrenchment by 1840. In 1844 the Department spent £1,213 less on salaries in Lower Canada than it had in 1829, making for a reduction of nearly 50% of its outlay in this category. However, in Upper Canada the Indian Department paid significantly more in salaries in 1844, raising its expenditure by £681 over the same period. Although this increase was far from negligible, the Upper Canadian Department had actually cut its budget in the salaries paid for “traditional” posts, having added roughly £800 of annual expenditure in the early 1840s in the establishment of tradesmen on Manitoulin Island, where it had begun more aggressively promoting “civilization.”

In 1845, the Indian Department again shed a significant number of employees as a result of its major reorganization in line with the recommendations of the Bagot Commission. The Colonial Office placed responsibility for this reorganization in the hands of Charles Metcalfe, the governor general. In accordance with the commissioner’s recommendations, Metcalfe appointed the civil secretary head of Indian Affairs, integrated the staff of the Department’s headquarters office with that of the governor, and replaced local agents with three visiting superintendents, one for Canada East and two for Canada West. The Indian

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96 Milloy, “The Era of Civilization,” p. 244-6 and 289-90.
Department simultaneously cut several lesser positions, including at least two interpreters in Canada East. 97

The Civil Secretary retained the office of superintendent of Indian Affairs through the late 1850s. During this period, the Department continued to work in concert with several other colonial and imperial institutions in order to discharge its administrative responsibilities. However, according to the Pennefather Commission, which published its report in 1858, this system was severely flawed in that it caused First Nations to lose importance in the eyes of the Indian Department's institutional collaborators as a result of the time and energy spent dealing with their other charges. The commissioners argued that this neglect led to the failure of state programs aimed at erasing the differences between Amerindians and Euro-Canadians. Although neither explicitly denouncing this piecemeal system nor arguing in favor of a clientele Indian Department, the commission's report demonstrates its conviction that the management of Indian affairs required an overhaul while suggesting that a centralized agency might be the solution to the system's shortcomings. In the commissioners' view, the Indian Department needed to be maintained and, given continued imperial calls for economy, they therefore supported the transfer of authority over First Nations from the imperial to the colonial state. Furthermore, the commissioners noted that when this change in jurisdiction took place, it would provide the perfect opportunity for restructuring the Department once more. Although taking several years to implement, by 1862 the Indian Department had been reconstituted as a branch within the Crown Lands Department, with a permanent bureaucratic head (the deputy superintendent general of Indian Affairs) reporting to a political official (the commissioner of Crown Lands who doubled as superintendent general of Indian Affairs) and virtual autonomy in the administration of the

97 These two interpreters were Dominique Ducharme, based at Lac des Deux Montagnes, and Jacob Picard, based in Montreal. See Petition from Jacob Picard, Huron, to Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, 10 May 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 121, p. 5358-9, reel C-11480 and James Macaulay Higginson to Ducan C. Napier, 5 June 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 510, p. 347, reel C-13344.
various tasks newly subject to its centralized control. Thus, by the early 1860s, the Indian Department practically possessed a monopoly over the administration of the state's relations with First Nations. This situation created, for the first time, an administrative environment in which the state could theoretically assume the central role in the recreation of Amerindians in the Euro-Canadian mold. Moreover, Indian Affairs found itself in many ways invisible to the political mainstream as a result of Amerindians' exclusion from the franchise coupled with the agency's financial model, whereby the majority of funding for departmental programs came from revenue generated by the sale of Aboriginal lands and not from parliamentary grants. As a result, the Department long enjoyed isolation from electoral politics thereby allowing it to carry out its business far from the public eye and without any meaningful or sustained public criticism.

Although bringing about major changes in other areas, Confederation had little short-term impact on the Indian Department. Beyond officially becoming a branch of the Department of the Secretary of State for the Provinces, Indian Affairs maintained the same bureaucratic structure and relative autonomy of its immediate pre-1867 predecessor. However, certain changes occasioned by the creation of the new nation of Canada – most notably the purchase of Rupert's Land from the Hudson's Bay Company – led to the institution's rapid and unprecedented growth, both in terms of its geographical scope and its personnel. In fact, this growth had begun prior to Confederation. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that Indian Affairs' personnel dramatically increased in number from Confederation through the turn of the twentieth century. Although somewhat deceptive, because the figures for 1870 exclude the Maritimes and British Columbia, the gradual expansion of headquarters staff as well as field employees in Quebec and Ontario was complemented by much more rapid expansion in personnel in Manitoba and the North-West caused by the provisions of the numbered treaties and the push of Indian Affairs' assimilationist structure into the region. Thus, after the minor growth immediately following Confederation and the signature of the

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first seven numbered treaties, the Department rapidly expanded its presence in western Canada beginning in the 1880s. Although appearing to have radically decreased its number of employees in Ontario during the early 1870s, Indian Affairs’ personnel size actually remained essentially unchanged in the region, the apparent difference arising from the Department’s altered system of accounting for its employees (the 1870 numbers include “personnel” such as chiefs, councilors, and teachers who would later be removed from this category). The Department increased its numbers in Quebec and Ontario at a much slower rate than it did on the Prairies, during the 1880s adding “medical men” in Ontario and agents on those reserves in the two provinces from which they had been previously absent. This change in departmental personnel reflected the legal changes that Indian Affairs’ mandate had undergone between the 1850s and 1870s.

Figure 3.1: Department of Indian Affairs Employees, 1870-1905 (source: Indian Affairs Annual Reports, 1870-1905)
Monetary Aspects of Indian Policy

During the nineteenth century, officials applied two complementary frames of reference when judging the appropriateness of money-use in the context of Canadian Indian policy. The first of these characterized money in negative terms, as offering too much freedom to a naturally improvident population. The second portrayed money as fundamentally neutral and, therefore, neither encouraged nor discouraged its use. As demonstrated above, officials employed both of these frames of reference in the debate on commutation. In other words, authorities neither unanimously condemned nor supported money-use. Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, the same officials supported and opposed state payments to First Nations in monetary form on different occasions. Thus, Indian policy appears to have been shaped not by visions of money itself but by notions of what rights Aboriginal peoples possessed. This, then, reveals the centrality of the "improvident Indian": by agreeing that the imperial state distributed presents as a privilege rather than as a right, officials in both the colonies and the metropole provided themselves with a means of discussing the form taken by presents. However, in cases where imperial or colonial authorities conceived of money as providing the essential form of state payments to which First Nations were entitled by rights, these men offered little or no opposition to money-use. Treaty payments provide perhaps the best example of this second means of imagining money.

Money’s role in treaties and land surrenders, like its role elsewhere in Indian policy and First Nations-state relations, changed over the period. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 declared the imperial state to be the only actor capable of acquiring Amerindian lands in North America. Beginning at the tail end of the American Revolutionary War, British officials occasionally purchased Aboriginal lands by way of one-time cash payments without any indication of the anxiety that would later color some state discourse on Amerindian money-use.99 However, from the early 1790s through the Robinson Treaties of 1850, the

99 For example, on 12 May 1781, four Chippewa chiefs received £5,000 New York currency for the surrender Michilimackinac Island. Robert J. Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763-1862:
British Empire acquired title to lands in Upper Canada by way of in-kind payments alone. Initially, state negotiators followed the blueprint provided by the surrenders of the 1780s to purchase lands via the one-time only distribution of goods. Following the War of 1812, however, the imperial state began paying for the lands it purchased in annual installments or annuities provided to chiefs who then distributed the goods to individual band members. At the same time, the Indian Department began calculating land surrender payments in per capita terms. Authorities effected the replacement of lump-sum payments by annuities in order to promote departmental economy. Theoretically, annuities permitted the treasury to finance the acquisition of Amerindian lands from the payments made by settlers who purchased plots

The Evolution of a System,” Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Ottawa, Carleton University, 1983, p. 49 and No. 1 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, Saskatoon, Fifth House Publishers, [1891] 1992, p. 1. Three years later, on 22 May 1784, Colonel John Butler, following Governor Haldimand’s instructions, purchased nearly three million acres of land between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario from the Mississauga for £1,180.7.4 stg. This surrender was later amended to include an additional 3,450 acres that the Crown purchased for £100 Hfx. Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario,” p. 67-8. For the original agreement, see No. 3, 7 December 1792 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 5. For the amended version, see No. 3¾, 24 October 1795 in Ibid, p. 8-9.

The British only purchased lands in Upper Canada during this period. For the first purchase in the “in-kind period,” in which “the principal Village and War Chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy and Huron Indians [sic] Nations of Detroit” surrendered lands on Lake Erie for “the Sum of Twelve Hundred Pounds Currency of the Province of Quebec at Five Shillings per Spanish Dollar for Valuable Wares and Merchandise,” see No. 2, 19 May 1790 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 1.

Annuities were not an entirely novel form of treaty payment as British authorities had employed them in the Treaty of Halifax signed in 1752 with the Micmac. J.R. Miller, Lethal Legacy: Current Native Controversies in Canada, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 2004, p. 115. This form of payment had also been employed in the 1817 Selkirk Treaty in what is modern-day Manitoba. This agreement contained a clause requiring the payment of an annual, in-kind quit rent – essentially an annuity. Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000.

Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario,” p. 183-6. The first land cession completed on the basis of annuities, signed by the Mississauga and William Claus, the deputy superintendent general of Indian Affairs in Upper Canada, in November 1818, also included per capita payments. The land surrender declared that, “Every man, woman and child [was] to receive [annuities] to the amount of ten dollars in goods at the Montreal prices.” No. 20, 5 November 1818 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 49.
within the surrendered areas. Thus, London pursued this novel policy in order to shift the financial burden of securing land cessions to the colonies by way of the Crown’s territorial revenue. At roughly the same time, again most likely as a result of pressure for retrenchment, land surrenders began containing clauses that set a ceiling on annuity payments. This maximum figure corresponded to the total sum of per capita annuities required to pay the signatory band’s population at the time of the surrender. In other words, imperial negotiators included a mechanism designed to potentially lighten the treasury’s fiscal load should the band’s population decline, while being careful not to saddle the empire with promises of greater outlay should its population increase.

With the exception of two provisional agreements, both of which the imperial treasury rejected, and one instance in which cash reimbursements were paid to Amerindians having made improvements on ceded lands, no treaty provided its Amerindian signatories with monetary compensation before 1850. In this sense, the land cessions negotiated by


104 In the 1822 confirmation of a surrender initially made in 1819 by the Mississauga of the Bay of Quinte and Kingston region the £2.10.0 per capita, in-kind annuity was made contingent on the condition that “the number of persons entitled to receive the same shall in no case exceed two hundred and fifty-seven persons, that being the number of persons claiming and inhabiting the said tract at the time of concluding the provisional agreement.” No. 27½, 22 November 1822 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 65. See also Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario,” p. 186-7. Surtees mistakenly states that this confirmation was recorded on 26 April 1825, the date of a provisional cession made by the Chippewa residing near London. No. 27½, 26 April 1825 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 65-7.

105 The first provisional agreement was reached in early March 1819 with the Chippewa residing near London and stipulated that they were to receive “the yearly sum of six hundred pounds Province currency, one-half in specie and the other in goods at the Montreal price.” No. 21, 9 March 1819 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 49. The second involved the payment to the Chippewa of the Chenail Écarté and the Ausable and St. Clair Rivers of half of the £1,375 annuity in cash in exchange for the “Huron Tract.” Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario,” p. 200. Unfortunately, the letter in which the Indian Department was told to renegotiate these agreements without monetary payments does not offer a clear explanation for why the treasury rejected them. P. Maitland to Colonel Darleng, 13 August 1820, LAC, RG8, vol. 263, p. 103, reel C-2854. For the instance in which cash was used to reimburse Amerindians for improvements to their lands, see No. 47, 25 October 1836 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 115-6.
William Benjamin Robinson with the Ojibwa inhabiting the north shores of Lakes Huron and Superior in the summer of 1850 reconfigured Canadian treaty practice. Whereas during the preceding sixty years authorities had avoided making cash payments in exchange for lands, the Department sanctioned their use in 1850 in conjunction with the annuity system that it had developed in the context of the post-War of 1812 wave of retrenchment. While unclear why he offered monetary terms where earlier treaty negotiators did not, Robinson evidently acted under instructions from the superintendent general of Indian Affairs. The treaties which resulted from his efforts, signed with the Lake Superior bands on 7 September and with those of the north shore of Lake Huron on 9 September, included a total of $4,000 in gratuities ($2,000 per treaty) paid upon the agreements’ signature and an annuity of $500, in the case of the Robinson Superior Treaty, and $600, for the beneficiaries of the Robinson Huron Treaty to be paid annually thereafter. The Robinson Treaties, like earlier surrenders, allowed the state to reduce annual payments, but only if the population fell below two-thirds of its size in 1850, at which time the overall annuity payment would “be diminished in proportion to their actual numbers.” However, unlike earlier agreements, the Robinson Treaties stated that if revenue from the sale of surrendered lands permitted, annuities might

106 For the texts of the Robinson Treaties, see No. 60, 7 September 1850 (the Robinson Superior Treaty) and No. 61, 9 September 1850 (the Robinson Huron Treaty) in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 147-52.

107 After having secured Ojibwa agreement to the two 1850 treaties, Robinson reported to the superintendent general that, “The whole amount given to me in August was £5,033 6s. 8d., of this sum their remains £800.” In other words, the officials who had sent Robinson west provided him with cash prior to his departure. William B. Robinson, Report to Colonel Bruce, Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, 24 September 1850, in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories including the Negotiations on which they were based, Saskatoon, Fifth House Publishers, [1880] 1991, p. 21

108 Given the size of Amerindian populations that adhered to each of the two agreements (1,240 for Lake Superior and 1,422 for Lake Huron), in 1850 the signatories of the Lake Superior treaty received slightly more per capita in gratuities (approximately $1.12.3 Hfx or $6.45) than did those living adjacent to Lake Huron ($1.8.1½ or $5.63). However, beginning in 1851, when the normal annuities began, this order reversed itself with those Ojibwa living on the shores of Lake Superior receiving roughly $0.8.3¼ Hfx or $1.61 while their Lake Huron counterparts were given roughly $0.8.5¼ or $1.69.
be increased to a maximum "of one pound provincial currency in any one year, or such further sum as Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to order." In other words, in contrast to earlier land cessions' strict avoidance of any possible increase in annuities, the Robinson Treaties provided a means for maintaining some semblance of a correlation between annuities and revenue from the sale of surrendered lands. Although initially amounting to less than half of this possible sum of £1 per person, by the turn of the twentieth century annuities for the Robinson Treaties' signatory bands had increased to this level.\(^\text{109}\)

The Robinson Treaties also maintained the Indian Department's standard practice of paying annuities to signatory bands' chiefs, who would then redistribute the monies to individual Amerindians. However, such payments did not simply provide a means of enforcing Indian Affairs' or any other Euro-Canadian institutions' will on First Nations through the maintenance of "puppet" leaders. For example, the mechanism for making annuity payments in these treaties allowed chiefs and not the Indian Department to define and enforce who was and who was not an Indian. During the negotiations, Robinson told those Métis who were present and wished to benefit from treaty payments: "I came to treat with the chiefs who were present, that the money would be paid to them — and their receipt was sufficient for me — that when in their possession they might give as much or as little to that class of claimants [the Métis] as they pleased. To this no one, not even their advisers, could object and I heard no more on the subject."\(^\text{110}\) Furthermore, the chiefs who received payment presumably maintained the ability to distribute these monies in other ways than on a strictly

\(^{109}\) The fact that members of Robinson signatory bands only received £1 Hfx ($4) in annuities provided the federal and provincial officials who negotiated Treaty No. 9 in 1905 with justification for offering $4 in annuities rather than $5, as was paid in the western Canadian numbered treaties. For the suggestion that a new treaty be made, with identical annuities to those provided by the Robinson Treaties — that is, $4 to every individual member of the signatory First Nations — see, [?], Memorandum for Mr. Sifton, 11 August 1903, LAC, RG10, vol. 3033, file 235,225, part 1, reel C-11314.

per capita basis, thereby providing Aboriginal leaders with a potent tool for use in local politics.

The treaty securing Canada’s 1862 purchase of title to the majority of Manitoulin Island, the site of the Amerindian colony created by Francis Bond Head nearly thirty years before, adhered to the Robinson Treaties’ practice of paying annuities in cash, while deviating from the example set in these earlier agreements by directly basing annual payments on the revenue generated by the ceded lands, thereby guaranteeing that their amount would fluctuate from year to year. The treaty further deviated from earlier practice by providing annuities to individual band members, rather than making an annual lump-sum payment to Aboriginal leaders.111 State authorities would not adopt the first of these two changes in the post-Confederation numbered treaties negotiated with the First Nations of western and northern Canada, in which annuities reverted to fixed instead of fluctuating sums. However, the 1862 treaty’s second innovation (the per capita distribution of annuities) would find its way into all such agreements that Canada signed with Aboriginal peoples through the 1920s.112 This slight change in payment practice provided Indian Affairs with political power at the price of Indigenous leaders who would no longer be able to control the flow of annuity funds to the same degree. However, the double share in interest that the treaty paid to chiefs did continue the departmental practice of reinforcing Aboriginal leaders’ local political authority. Following the implementation of legislation in the late 1860s and 1870s that allowed the state to intervene more aggressively in First Nations’ internal politics, such

111 The Manitoulin Island Treaty provided each member of the signatory bands with one share of the total monies distributed annually with the exception of chiefs, who were to receive two shares. For the treaty text, see No. 94, 6 October 1862 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 235-7. For a more in-depth analysis of the treaty, see Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario,” p. 258-68.

112 It should be noted, however, that officials generally made payments resulting from later treaties to heads of household. While no indication of this practice has been found with respect to the Manitoulin Island Treaty, given that this would later become standard practice and because male heads of household had also traditionally received presents from the Indian Department for their entire family, it would appear likely that interest monies were distributed along similar lines under the 1862 agreement.
special treatment provided chiefs with material incentive for cooperating, at least to a certain extent, with Indian Affairs’ policies and projects.

In the 1870s, following Canada’s post-Confederation acquisition of Rupert’s Land, the federal government embarked on a rapid succession of land negotiations with western Aboriginal peoples by which it secured title to the majority of the lands between northwestern Ontario and eastern British Columbia. Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, Canada would extend the basic form and precepts of these agreements to First Nations living in northern regions that had yet to enter into any formal relationship with the state. During this period, federal authorities and treaty negotiators attempted to apply a single treaty model to all Amerindian land surrenders. As in earlier treaties, this model had little or nothing to do with the quantity, quality, or market value of the ceded lands. In spite of their minor differences, all eleven treaties negotiated during the period, in part because of their great similarity in annuity payments, created a population of idealized Aboriginal treaty signatories with whom the state could deal uniformly. However, the bureaucratic practicality of having what amounted to a single treaty signed at different times with different First Nations could not prevent negotiators from departing from the standard text in the interest of economy. Regardless of these minor differences, the numbered treaties, by way of annuities and other terms, coupled with Indian Affairs’ rapid growth in the decades following Confederation provided the Department with a means of increasing its involvement in the everyday lives of Aboriginal signatories.

The Robinson Treaties set the tone for all land surrenders signed in Canada through the 1920s by providing cash payments to each member of every signatory band. Therefore, monetary annuities, framed by the treaty texts as a right, constituted one of the central elements of Indian policy during the period. Negotiators appear to have conceived of these annuities as being symbolic payment provided in exchange for goods (title to Aboriginal lands). In other words, these men did not think of treaty payments as handouts. Beginning with the Robinson Treaties, Euro-Canadian negotiators constantly emphasized the state’s intention of allowing Amerindian signatories to continue pursuing their traditional means of supporting themselves in ceded regions, except where land-use on the part of new arrivals prohibited this, in the process relegating money to a symbolic rather than a material role. The
Robinson Treaties, for example, explicitly accorded the Ojibwa the right to hunt and fish, "saving and excepting only such portions of the said territory as may from time to time be sold or leased to individuals or companies of individuals, and occupied by them with the consent of the Provincial Government." More than fifty years later, federal negotiators continued to use this argument, although now explicitly underlining that the money which the Government was giving them was a gift, and did not expect them to be dependent or live upon it, as they were not depriving them of any of the means of which they have been in the habit of living upon heretofore, and added that they had the privilege of hunting and fishing as before, and that with the money and some other useful articles which the Government proposed to give them yearly, they would be in a better position to live than they were at the present time.

Treaty negotiators, then, sought to convince First Nations that annuities functioned as a symbol providing perpetual recognition of their cession and not as a means through which the state would guarantee them a living.

While negotiators, then, saw annuities as a right rather than a privilege, they were well aware of the common stereotypes portraying Amerindians as improvident by nature. While not immune to such preconceived notions themselves, officials believed that since cash annuities were insufficient to meet the needs of even the most modest of lifestyles, any "inappropriate" use of this money would merely cause discomfort and not destitution. While cash still posed potential risks to its Amerindian owners, the size of annuities mitigated such danger. After having negotiated the first two numbered treaties, commissioner Wemyss M. Simpson confidently asserted the ideal nature of these agreements' cash annuities precisely because they were insufficient to provide a living to their recipients. Simpson also hoped that

113 This clause is contained in both the Lake Superior and Lake Huron treaties. No. 60, 7 September 1850 (the Robinson Superior Treaty) and No. 61, 9 September 1850 (the Robinson Huron Treaty) in Canada, *Indian Treaties and Surrenders*, vol. 1, p. 147-52.

the small size of annuities would serve to instruct the Aboriginal population in the fundamentals of thrift.

The system of annual payment in money I regard as a good one, because the recipient is enabled to purchase just what he requires when he can get it most cheaply, and it also enables him to buy articles at second hand, from settlers and others, that are quite as useful to him as are the same things when new. The sum of three dollars does not appear to be large enough to enable an Indian to provide for himself with many of his winter necessaries; but as he receives the same amount for his wife or wives, and for each of his children, the aggregate sum is usually sufficient to procure many comforts for his family which he would otherwise be compelled to deny himself.\textsuperscript{115}

Thus, federal negotiators conceived of annuities, if employed properly, as providing Indigenous peoples with a means of obtaining goods (whether "comforts" or "winter necessaries") locally at lower prices than those available to the state. At the same time, Simpson argued that because annuities did not "enable an Indian to provide for himself," they served to reinforce his initiative rather than to create dependence. In this sense, he dismissed the possibility that annuities might be spent inappropriately, in the process legitimating the policy of making cash payments to treaty signatories.

Although some officials emphasized monetary annuities' potential benefits rather than the danger they may have posed, others inverted this critique. In May 1871, when relaying his instructions to the commissioners of what would become Treaties No. 1 and 2, secretary of state Joseph Howe wrote: "Another point to which I wish to call your attention is the policy of restricting as much as possible the amount to be paid in money. It has been represented to the Government that money is but little used by the Band with whom you will negotiate, and that provisions and clothing are much more highly prized. There is a danger too that, should money become plentiful among those people, traders will bring spirits into

\textsuperscript{115} Wemyss M. Simpson to the Secretary of State for the Provinces, 3 November 1871, in Morris, \textit{The Treaties of Canada...}, p. 43.
the settlement, and demoralize and destroy the Indians.”

The “danger” of entrusting cash to Amerindians remained on the minds of federal officials throughout the period. For instance, J.A.J. McKenna, an Indian Affairs employee and one of the Treaty No. 8 commissioners, and J.A. Macrae, the Department of Indian Affairs’ Inspector of Indian agencies, suggested that the state depart from monetary annuity payments during its 1899 treaty negotiations. McKenna noted that, “the Department’s view appears to be that the paying of annuities to Indians has not produced desirable results.” Ultimately, McKenna argued that the prospective Treaty No. 8 First Nations would “not place much value on” annuity payments and that in northern regions they would be extremely costly. Contrary to McKenna’s recommendation, Treaty No. 8 included monetary payments in line with those offered in Treaties No. 1 to 7. Thus, while well aware of the hazards and drawbacks of cash annuities, federal officials continued to employ them in the context of new treaties and adhesions to old agreements into the 1930s, underlining their centrality to these agreements.

First Nations did not view annuities in the same way as government officials, drawing mainly on the social, political, and economic practices established over the preceding centuries in the context of the fur trade in order to conceive of the relations they were creating with the Canadian state through treaty. Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough argue that as a result of the numbered treaties the federal state effectively replaced the HBC in western Canada. The authors contend that the use of annuities in these agreements should be understood in reference to the traditional fur-trade practice of winter outfitting—that is, purchasing the goods and equipment necessary to carry a family through the winter hunting season. Prior to the state’s arrival in the west, the obligation of supporting the Aboriginal population in poor years, when hunters were unable to pay off the debt that they had contracted, fell on the HBC. However, from the 1870s the state assumed this responsibility, thereby inserting Indian Affairs into a pre-existing set of social and economic


117 Quoted in Ray, Miller, and Tough, Bounty and Benevolence, p. 162.
relations. While Amerindians attempted to ensure that the state would provide sufficient income to guarantee them a living in the context of economic uncertainty and that it would come to their aid in times of need, officials preferred to consider the Department's role, at least insofar as annuities were concerned, in terms of its responsibility for symbolically recalling the transfer effected by these agreements, thereby upholding the "honor of the crown" through the annual distribution of a small amount of cash to every member of the bands having taken treaty.

Of course, Aboriginal and official conceptions of treaty relations and money-use both, at least to some extent, informed and were informed by the provisions of the agreements themselves, making their analysis as central to the present discussion as the analysis of the discourse that surrounded them. The eleven numbered treaties, and adhesions thereto, signed between 1871 and 1930 contained nearly identical monetary clauses. Treaties No. 1 and 2 began the period by paying all Amerindians within the region they covered a $3 gratuity in addition to an annual payment of $3. However, following the signature of Treaty No. 3 in 1873, and Canada's admission that certain "outside promises" had been made during the negotiations of the first two numbered treaties, the federal government moved to align these agreements with the terms guaranteed by Treaty No. 3 - that is, beginning in 1875, all Treaties No. 1 and 2 chiefs would receive $20 in annuity payments whereas all other band members would be paid $5 annually. Treaty No. 3, in addition to providing larger annual payments to band chiefs ($25), also guaranteed $15 in annuities to "each subordinate officer, not exceeding three for each band." The 1873 treaty also paid significantly more in gratuities ($12 per capita) than had the two earlier agreements. Treaty No. 4, signed in the summer of 1874, expanded on the terms contained in Treaty No. 3 by paying larger gratuities to both

118 For this argument as applied to Treaties No. 1 and 2, see Ray, Miller, and Tough, Bounty and Benevolence, p. 74. In the context of Treaty No. 6, see Ibid, p. 147.

119 For the original texts of Treaties No. 1 and 2, see Morris, The Treaties of Canada..., p. 313-20. For the revised versions, see Ibid, p. 338-42.

120 For Treaty No. 3, see Ibid, p. 320-9.
headmen, “not exceeding four in each band,” ($15) and chiefs ($25), while providing identical annuity payments to those accorded the year before. With the exception of Treaty No. 9, which paid less per capita both in annuities and gratuities than did all other post-Confederation treaties, Treaties No. 5 to 11 paid identical annuities to those afforded by Treaties No. 3 and 4. The gratuities of these treaties, however, varied. Treaty No. 5 paid a $5 gratuity to all band members regardless of rank, Treaties No. 6 and 7 paid identical gratuities to Treaties No. 3 and 4 ($12 per capita), and Treaties No. 8, 10, and 11 adopted a graduated gratuity pay-scale whereby chiefs received $25, headman $22, and everyone else $12.

In specifying the form and manner in which payments were to be made, the numbered treaties created a more or less homogenous system of annual monetary distribution among the signatory bands of western and northern Canada. Nearly half of these treaties (No. 4, 7, 8, 9, and 11) specified that annual payments, “unless there be some exceptional reason, [are] to be paid to the heads of families for those belonging thereto.” However, Morris’s comments during Treaty No. 6 negotiations suggest that the heads of household most likely received payment for their family members even under those treaties that make no mention of how annuities or gratuities were to be paid. Morris told the assembled Plains Cree at Fort Carlton: “When the treaty is closed, if it be closed, we will make a present to every man, 

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121 For Treaty No. 4, see Ibid, p. 330-8.

122 Treaty No. 9 paid $8 gratuities and $4 annuities to all members of the signatory bands, regardless of their political status within the community. For a more in-depth analysis of Treaty No. 9, see Chapters Five and Six.

123 For the treaty texts, see Ibid, p. 342-50 (Treaty No. 5); Ibid, p. 351-67 (Treaty No. 6); Ibid, p. 368-75 (Treaty No. 7); Canada, Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, etc., Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, [1899] 1966; Canada, The James Bay Treaty, Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) and Adhesions Made in 1929 and 1930, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, [1931] 1964; Canada, Treaty No. 10 and Reports of Commissioners, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, [1907] 1966; and Canada, Treaty No. 11 (June 27, 1921) and Adhesion (July 17, 1922) with Reports, etc., Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, [1926] 1957.

124 This particular clause is from Treaty No. 7 in Morris, The Treaties of Canada..., p. 370.
woman, and child, of twelve dollars, the money being paid to the head of a family for his wife, and children not married.”125 With the exception of Treaties No. 1 and 2, all of the post-Confederation treaties guaranteed annuity and gratuity payment in monetary form. Although it eventually paid them in cash, Canada reserved for itself in the text of the first two numbered treaties the right to decide the form in which treaty payments would be made: “such payment to be made in such articles as the Indians shall require of blankets, clothing, prints (assorted colors), twine or traps, at the current cost price in Montreal, or otherwise, if Her Majesty shall deem the same desirable in the interests of her Indian people, in cash.”

The numbered treaties, following the example set by the individual interest payments made under the Manitoulin Island Treaty and to a lesser extent by the coarse population surveys performed by state agents in the build-up to the Robinson Treaties, provided the state with a wealth of annually-updated information on the treaties’ Amerindian signatories – information that it had not previously possessed.126 This drive by the state towards the constitution of more detailed information concerning the situation “on the ground” within its national boundaries was not exclusive to Indian Affairs, with the uniformization of population information throughout Canada as a whole taking place at the same time. This process, through which officials created a centralized and standardized knowledge-based apparatus, constitutes one of the pillars of mid-to-late nineteenth-century state formation in Canada as in the United States and Western Europe.127 In the case of First

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122 A.G. Jackes, “Narrative of the proceedings connected with the effecting of the treaties at Forts Carlton and Pitt.,” in Ibid, p. 207.

126 On the 1849 exploratory trip that generated preliminary information on the location and size of the Lake Superior and Lake Huron bands with whom the 1850 treaties were concluded, see Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario,” p. 242-7. Robinson combined this information with that gleaned in the course of his 1850 negotiations in order to construct a more complete portrait of the treaties’ signatory population in order to enforce the agreements’ clause concerning the bands’ necessity of maintaining two-thirds of their numbers.

Nations, Canada’s mid-to-late nineteenth-century treaties, the monetary payments that they guaranteed, and the detailed, individualized, and standardized annual record-keeping that they required provided the means through which the imperial and later federal state came to know (and to create) its Amerindian population. Furthermore, in contrast to both the Robinson and Manitoulin Island agreements, the numbered treaties determined who was and was not a band member. Thus, in spite of occasional requests on the part of Amerindians, those individuals that the state formally recognized as Métis were deemed ineligible to benefit from the treaties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – that is, they could not draw annuities and, as a result, were excluded from Canada’s state-defined Amerindian population.128

The existence of this process of population creation is perhaps best illustrated by the flagrant lack of numerical information that the state possessed with regard to First Nations when undertaking treaty negotiations. After the signature of Treaty No. 4 at Qu’Appelle, the commissioners, because of faulty estimates of Amerindian numbers, twice requested additional funds from Winnipeg to complete treaty payment.129 However, after this initial difficulty, treaty payments proceeded smoothly in following years as a result of the band lists that authorities drew up at the first year’s payment table. Furthermore, officials clearly sought to increase their knowledge of the Aboriginal population beyond this point in that some of the treaty texts themselves specified that, “as soon as possible after the execution of this treaty,


128 On Amerindian attempts to include the Métis in the terms of Treaties No. 3 and 4, see J.R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2009, p. 168 and 172.

129 W.J. Christie and M.G. Dickieson to [the Secretary of State of Canada], 7 October 1875 in Morris, The Treaties of Canada..., p. 85-7.
[authorities should] cause to be taken an accurate census of all the Indians inhabiting the
district above described." These censuses served to "create" the treaties' Amerindian
population so that the state might "cause to be paid [the annuities] in cash at some suitable
season to be duly notified to the Indians, and at a place or places to be appointed for that
purpose, within the territory ceded." Similarly, the payment of annuities also served to
encourage Amerindian bands to settle on their reserves, thereby anchoring nomadic peoples
to fixed geographic locales and thus further aiding the state in performing its administrative
duties. During the Treaty No. 6 negotiations, "The Lieutenant-Governor [Morris] then met
the few Chippewas who came forward, and told them that they must be paid at the place
where they belonged, that they could not be paid at Fort Pitt." Thus, through the practice of
annuity payments, the numbered treaties allowed the state to clearly define western and
northern Amerindian bands while attaching them to specific points on the map. In this way,
federal bureaucrats could theoretically manage the state's day-to-day relations with First
Nations in a manner that corresponded to contemporary ideals of scientific rationality.

In the case of the numbered treaties, annuity payments again provided Indian
Affairs with a means of maintaining a political structure that federal officials had largely
defined during treaty negotiations. Although negotiators clearly adopted this approach to
facilitate the Departments' dealings with the numerous bands that had taken treaty by
unilaterally imposing upon them a single form of governance, in at least one case, this is
precisely what Amerindian treaty negotiators sought. During discussions preceding the
signature of Treaty No. 6, the Plains Cree told Reverend George McDougall, "We would
further ask that our chiefships be established by the Government. Of late years almost every
trader sets up his own Chief and the result is we are broken up into little parties, and our best

130 This clause is taken from Treaty No. 1 in Ibid, p. 315.
131 This clause is from Treaty No. 4 in Ibid, p. 332.
132 A.G. Jackes, "Narrative of the proceedings connected with the effecting of the treaties at Forts
Carlton and Pitt...," in Ibid, p. 223.
men are no longer respected.”

Thus, these Cree appear to have considered the federal state’s external enforcement of Amerindian political structure as a means of preventing their community’s dissolution at the hands of Euro-Canadian merchants. Thus, the supplementary payments that treaty chiefs and headmen received from the federal state each year served, in theory at least, to shore-up these individuals’ authority thereby maintaining a cohesive “traditional” political unit while simultaneously serving Indian Affairs’ interests through its ability to remove uncooperative leaders, who thereby lost the significant supplementary revenue from annuities they earned as chiefs or headmen.

Despite the monetary annuities that characterized Canadian treaty policy after 1850, authorities continued to express, through laws, discourse, policy, and practice a profound unease with respect to Amerindian money-use. In 1851, the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada constituted the Lower Canada Indian Fund, in which it agreed to deposit up to £1,000 Hfx annually, in order to pay for necessary expenditure on behalf of the Amerindians of Canada East. However, it rapidly became clear that the state would not expend the entirety of these monies. Beginning during the period of retrenchment following the War of 1812, the Department had adopted a parsimonious stance in relation to the use of state and band funds for the benefit of First Nations. This fiscal approach characterized Indian Affairs’ financial policy well into the twentieth century and explains why the Lower Canada fund remained underused. In 1852, for example, the Department spent less than £400 from this source. By 30 June 1864, as a result of the continuation of the annual parliamentary grant at the same rate at which it had been established ($4,000 or £1,000 Hfx), interest on the fund’s accumulated capital, and limited outlay, its balance had grown to

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133 George McDougall to Lieutenant-Governor Morris, 23 October 1875 in Ibid., p. 175.


$35,350.01 (£8,837.10.6 Hfx). By the end of the decade the fund had grown to approximately $42,000 before leaping to $120,841.93 in 1870.

However, in spite of this annual excess of funds, Indian Affairs rapidly discounted the possibility of any cash distribution to individual Amerindians and does not appear to have ever reconsidered the issue. This points to a fundamental difference in departmental perception of parliamentary funds from those provided in connection with treaties. Whereas authorities viewed the latter as an indisputable right, they considered the former to be a privilege, arising from the state’s “benevolence” rather than from any legal obligation. In 1852, the superintendent general of Indian Affairs, Robert Bruce, opposed using the Lower Canada fund to make any generalized payment to individuals, employing a similar line of reasoning to that used by colonial officials who had argued against the commutation of Indian presents in the 1820s and 1830s. Bruce estimated that the Aboriginal population of Canada East was somewhat superior to 5,000. As a result, he claimed that an annual payment to every Amerindian in the colony from these funds would be entirely useless since the $4,000 parliamentary grant could not provide even $1 per person, per year. In commenting on Bruce’s report, a committee of the Executive Council argued that the Indian Department should be encouraged to use the Lower Canada Indian Fund judiciously on a case-by-case basis in order to help “better” each of the colony’s Aboriginal communities according to its particular needs. It added, following Bruce’s suggestion, that Indian Affairs should be permitted to preserve any unexpended balance for future use. Thus, as in the case of Indian


138 Although I have been unable to locate Bruce’s report of 21 December 1852, the committee of the Executive Council provides a brief summary in its report written at the end of the same month. Extract from a Report of Executive Council, 29 December 1852, in Canada, Journaux du Conseil législatif de la province du Canada, vol. 16, Toronto, Le Leader, 1858, Appendix No. 13, n.p.
presents, colonial officials felt that the funds set aside by the legislature should not be expended in small cash payments to individual Amerindians. Instead, they argued, the state should maintain control over the Lower Canada Indian Fund, expenditure from which was to be made solely at the superintendent general’s discretion. In this way, the parliamentary grant came to be employed in accordance with departmental prerogatives and not Amerindian rights.

Official insistence on the “judicious” use of funds remained in force through the end of the century. Whenever possible, the Department appears to have consciously supplied Amerindians with agricultural goods that were less easily exchangeable than cash. Policy-makers clearly intended to “civilize” First Nations through this use of the funds that it held in trust either for individual bands or for a large segment of the Aboriginal population (as in the case of the Lower Canada Indian Fund). In 1886, John A. Macdonald, who doubled as Prime Minister and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, wrote of the Department’s responsibility in expending funds provided by Parliament:

The grant made by Parliament at its last session of $4,000 for the purchase of cattle and agricultural implements, to assist, in their farming operations, industrious and deserving members of Indian bands in the older Provinces who have no trust funds at their credit in the hands of the Government, was to some extent drawn on for the purpose intended; but it requires great caution to be exercised in the gift of such articles to prevent the same from being handed over to any but trustworthy Indians who would make a good use of and not sell them. This the Department has endeavored to do; and with each gift the recipient was duly notified that he was not to dispose of the articles given without the consent of the Department having been previously obtained. 139

Macdonald’s emphasis on trustworthiness points to authorities’ belief that assistance ought to be rendered in kind. Officials argued in favor of close supervision of expenditure from public funds, something that would be impossible if the state supplied Aboriginal peoples with cash. Thus, the alarm generated by the prospect that Amerindians might sell these goods underlines

139 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1886, p. xii-xiii.
the state's use of monetary power (even in the absence of cash) to restrict Aboriginal options and to reinforce the distinction between funds whose form was left entirely to the discretion of officials and those guaranteed to be provided in currency by the formal legal apparatus of land cessions.

This departmental mistrust of money did not only concern cash; it also extended to credit relations. In 1891, Edgar Dewdney, the superintendent general of Indian Affairs, argued that, "there should be legislation prohibiting, under severe penalty, the giving of credit to Indians, except under special permission." Dewdney felt that indebtedness was inherent to Amerindians due to their general inability, and sometimes unwillingness, to repay those who supplied them with goods on credit. Furthermore, the superintendent general claimed that the dangers of debt increased with proximity to Euro-Canadian population centers. As a result, he wrote: "the prohibition would appear to be more necessary in the case of Indians of the older Provinces... than it is in that of Indians residing in the more recently acquired sections of the Dominion." 140 This emphasis on the necessity of preventing Amerindians from having easy access to credit was not novel in the 1890s. In fact, the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857 also placed a great deal of stress on debt. For an Indian to be enfranchised under this law, he had to be over twenty-one, able to "speak, read and write either the english or french language readily and well," and "of good moral character and free from debt." 141 Of course, the majority of Euro-Canadian colonists may have been unable to meet this particular constellation of requirements for full British North American citizenship had it been required of them. 142 Moreover, this proviso, like Dewdney's proposal, appears to lack an understanding, either willfully or otherwise, of the building blocks of capitalism (the creation of capital frequently requiring borrowed capital). From the middle of the nineteenth century,

140 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1891, p. xvii- xviii.

141 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this Province, and to Amend the Laws Respecting Indians," 10 June 1857, 20 Victoria, c. 26. Furthermore, this act only provided for the enfranchisement of men.

then, Amerindians found the road to economic success theoretically barred by their supposed guardian – the Canadian state – as it frequently refused, through both general discourse and legislation, to afford them any but the most minor role in the monetary economy.143

Indian Affairs had not always possessed the legal and political mandate that it did in the late nineteenth century allowing it such wide theoretical latitude when interfering in the everyday lives of Amerindians. Upon its creation in 1755, the Indian Department was expected to manage diplomatic and military relations with First Nations. In short order, it was also assigned the task of overseeing Aboriginal land surrenders declared by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to be the exclusive domain of the imperial state. Following the end of the War of 1812, the Department could no longer effectively justify its existence using the first of these two elements, even if it did continue to distribute the presents that had originated in the period Amerindian military importance. As a result, in addition to the provision of presents, Indian Affairs occupied itself with the operation of the treaty system that had developed under the aegis of the Royal Proclamation while, from the 1820s, funding and playing a relatively minor role in the public-private partnership that sought to “civilize” Amerindians. In the 1850s, colonial legislators began to displace the Royal Proclamation and the “civilization” project from their central role in the legal and political framework underlying Aboriginal-state relations through new laws that defined the Department’s raison d’être no longer in terms of the provision of presents and annuities but in terms of a clearly defined distinction between Amerindians and non-Aboriginal Canadians.

At roughly the same time that colonial officials reconstituted the Indian Department as an essentially autonomous branch of the Crown Lands Department, the colonial government began erecting the legislative framework that would serve to provide Indian

Affairs with legal authority over the lives of Aboriginal peoples far surpassing that of the preceding period. In 1850 and 1851, the Legislative Assembly of the Province Canada passed legislation meant to protect Aboriginal lands in both Canada East and Canada West, defining in the process who was "Indian" for the first time. In 1857, the Assembly increased the Canadas' ability to directly intervene in the affairs of First Nations with the passage of the Gradual Civilization Act. This law aimed to erase the distinction between "Indians" and Euro-Canadians by enfranchising sufficiently "advanced" male Amerindians while providing them with title to land from the reserve on which they lived and a portion of their band's funds along with any annual payments they would have otherwise received. As John Milloy has pointed out, this law abandoned the tradition of pursuing "civilization" through the private-public partnership that had been established by missionaries and state officials in concert with Amerindians who favored Western education in the 1820s and 1830s for a state-centric approach. In other words, at the same time as the colonial state was preparing to

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145 Under this system, women's legal status accorded with that of their husband. Thus, if a man was enfranchised, his wife and children, both male and female, would also lose their Indian status. However, if any such female "lineal descendant" married an Indian, she would become an Indian under this law. Canada, "An Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes..." According to the tenets of liberalism and nineteenth-century common law, women's status was subordinate to that of their husband, father, or other male guardian. On marriage laws in Canada and other British colonial contexts, see Bettina Bradbury, "Colonial Comparisons: Rethinking Marriage, Civilization and Nation in Nineteenth-Century White Settler Societies," in Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the British World, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 2005, p. 135-57.

146 John S. Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change," in J.R. Miller (ed.), Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, p. 148. It is important to note that while in 1857 the state took upon itself a much more central role in the "civilization" (now, because of the new legal definitions, more rightly termed "assimilation") project, private groups such as missionary societies continued to play an active role alongside the Indian Department.
take charge of the Indian Department, soon to be reconstituted as the sole governmental agency responsible for relations with First Nations, legislators provided the Department with the legal tools necessary for transforming its mandate from being the state’s representative in the heterogeneous field of Aboriginal civilization to being the primary author of Amerindian assimilation into the Canadian body politic.

The Enfranchisement Act of 1869 provided the Indian Department with dramatically expanded power over what could now rightly be termed its wards while explicitly tying Indian status to the receipt of state funds. The passage of the act was to serve as the beginning of a new era in the definition of who was and was not an “Indian.” Along with access to First Nations’ reserves, “the division among the members of any tribe, band, or body of Indians, of any annuity money, interest money or rents” would now depend upon an individual’s status in the eyes of the Department of Indian Affairs. The act declared that, “no person of less than one fourth Indian blood, born after the passing of this Act, shall be deemed entitled to share in any annuity, interest or rents, after a certificate to that effect is given by the Chief or Chiefs of the band or tribe in Council, and sanctioned by the Superintendent General of Indian affairs.” Furthermore, the act provided coercive measures designed to promote morally acceptable behavior. For example, it declared that any imprisoned individual would not receive such funds during the period of imprisonment and that Indian Affairs had the authority to use “any annuity or interests coming to such Indian” to defray “the legal costs incurred in procuring such conviction.” The act also provided the Department with the power to withhold annuity or interest payments from “any person of Indian blood who may be proved to the satisfaction of the Superintendent General of Indian affairs to have been guilty of deserting his wife or child” in order to provide for the wellbeing of the deserted family members as well as from any Amerindian not performing maintenance work on “roads, bridges, ditches and fences” for which he was responsible. The act, however, did not employ repressive monetary measures alone. For example, in addition to title to lands extracted from his band’s reserve, an enfranchised male Amerindian, along with his wife or
widow and children, would continue to receive “the annuities and interest money and rents, of the tribe, band, or body of Indians to which they belonged.” In this way, Parliament equipped the Department with even more extensive legal means than it had gained in 1857 for promoting the assimilation of Amerindians into Canada’s imagined, morally upstanding body politic.

While the Enfranchisement Act, following the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857, set the stage for late nineteenth-century Indian policy, the Indian Act of 1876 consolidated the basic theoretical structure of Amerindian-Euro-Canadian relations that these earlier pieces of legislation set out while once more expanding state power. As its predecessors, the 1876 act was preoccupied with the relation between individual Amerindians, First Nations as distinct groups, and the general Canadian population into which the law’s framers hoped the first two categories would shortly disappear. Money, again in the form of annuities or interest payments, played a prominent role alongside land in the legal definition of the distinct Aboriginal societies to which the law applied. Thus, the act defined “band” (its preferred term for officially recognized Amerindian collectivities) as: “any tribe, band or body of Indians who own or are interested in a reserve or in Indian lands in common, of which the legal title is vested in the Crown, or who share alike in the distribution of any annuities or interest moneys for which the Government of Canada is responsible.” Furthermore, the act declared that through the state’s monetary payments, the band could expand its ranks to include individuals, such as illegitimate children, who would otherwise be excluded from Indian status. As had been the case in the 1869 law, the framers of the Indian Act sought to

147 Canada, Statutes, “An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better Management of Indian Affairs, and to Extend the Provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42,” 22 June 1869, 32 & 33 Victoria, c. 6, s. 4, 5, 7, 11, and 16.

148 Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians,” 12 April 1876, 39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 3, ss. 1.

149 “[A]ny illegitimate child, unless having shared with the consent of the band in the distribution moneys of such band for a period exceeding two years, may, at any time, be excluded from the membership thereof by the band, if such proceeding be sanctioned by the Superintendent-General.” Ibid, s. 3, ss. 3.
avoid dissuading Amerindians from becoming enfranchised for financial reasons. As a result, “any Indian woman marrying any other than an Indian or a non-treaty Indian” would lose her status in the eyes of the law while continuing to receive “the annual or semi-annual distribution of [her] annuities, interest moneys and rents.” The 1876 act once again used the threat of non-payment of annuities as a means of guaranteeing Amerindian cooperation in certain instances such as the performance of roadwork and as a form of punishment for crimes committed or for deserting his or her family. The Indian Act also employed the promise of cash payments to those individuals – Aboriginal or otherwise – who provided information concerning the sale of liquor to any Amerindian (which it made illegal). As the Enfranchisement Act had done, the 1876 law aimed to encourage the renunciation of Indian status by permitting the enfranchised individual to continue drawing the annuities, interest monies, and rents paid to their former band. Furthermore, it moved beyond its predecessor by permitting the payment of the enfranchised Indian’s “share of the capital funds at the credit of the band, or his or her share of the principal of the annuities of the band” if “his or her exemplary good conduct and management of property, proves that he or she is qualified to receive his or her share of such moneys.” Thus, while land remained the chief material concern of legislation concerning Amerindians, the Indian Act employed money as a means of defining those to whom it applied, encouraging them to willingly surrender their special legal status, and providing punitive measures against those who refused to cooperate with the

150 *Ibid.* However, such women could, with the consent of her former band, opt out of this system by accepting a one-time payment of ten years’ worth of such payments.


152 Under the Indian Act of 1876, half of the fines imposed upon conviction were to be paid to the informant of prosecutor and the other half were to be placed in “the fund for the benefit of that body of Indians or non-treaty Indians, with respect to one or more members of which the offence was committed.” *Ibid.*, s. 79.


general goals of Indian policy or the specific instructions of the Indian Department or its employees.

Depending upon the context, then, officials conceived of money in a variety of ways during the nineteenth century. Whereas from 1850, they portrayed monetary payments as a right when stemming from land cessions, authorities framed both presents and various forms of assistance as privileges throughout the period and, as such, refused to monetize them, preferring to either send goods themselves or to provide funds to Indian agents or missionaries who would then purchase and distribute the necessary provisions. This is hardly surprising. Throughout the nineteenth century, the majority of Europeans and their descendants across the globe subscribed to the belief that money, when supplied as assistance, encouraged the natural improvidence of those who had the greatest need of it (whether this be the urban poor or Aboriginal peoples). This idea would not be overthrown, in Canada at least, until the Second World War, when the state, now far larger than it had been at any point in the nineteenth century, began providing cash welfare en masse.\(^\text{155}\) Thus, officials' insistence that departmental aid be distributed in kind owed more to structural and cultural forces than it did to any conscious decision.

This division of acceptable forms of monetary payment had important consequences for the force the state could conceivably bring to bear on First Nations. Although treaties provided their Amerindian signatories with a steady, if limited flow of money, thereby furnishing them with a flexible means of exerting force, money's absence from every other aspect their relationship with the state subjected First Nations to a clear power imbalance. The state determined the form taken by the goods and services it supplied Amerindians, rather than providing them with money which would have allowed them to make such decisions themselves. At the same time, the Assembly of the Province of Canada began a process by which colonial and later federal lawmakers would pass legislation defining who was and was not an "Indian" in terms of individualized access to the resources

\(^{155}\) On wartime changes to welfare, see Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, p. 103-33.
held in trust by the state. Thus, bands came to be identified with trust funds and enfranchised Amerindians became “true” liberal subjects through the unrestricted access that these laws granted them to their portion of band funds and reserve lands. Those who chose to reject assimilation into larger Canadian society, however, might potentially find themselves subject to ever-greater punitive measures linked to these same monetary sources. Concomitantly to the changes made between the 1850s and 1870s to the legal framework within which Indian Affairs operated came the dramatic expansion of the agency’s personnel and its corresponding ability to influence everyday life in Aboriginal communities. A redesigned Department replaced the extremely limited Indian Affairs infrastructure of the first half of the nineteenth century, in the process creating the “Indian” as a distinct and well-defined category of Canadian society.

Beginning in the 1870s, then, the Department of Indian Affairs, now a true “clientele” agency, gained a previously inconceivable level of legal control over Amerindians as well as the responsibility for remaking them as ideal liberal subjects. Although it introduced a slew of new programs and services (such as boarding schools and model farms) in the late nineteenth century, the Department set about achieving assimilation in a surprisingly nonchalant manner. However, because of the confluence of this novel mandate and the changed politico-legal structure within which it operated, Indian Affairs came to occupy a “natural” place in Canadian society. As such, the Department’s discourse proclaiming its socially desirable and apparently humane goal of integrating Canada’s Aboriginal peoples into the national body politic provided it with a powerful argument in favor of its own legitimacy, regardless of its lack of results.156 The changed legal and administrative environment of the late nineteenth century, then, did not necessarily translate into similarly altered material conditions on the ground. In order to determine the extent to which Indian Affairs proved capable of exerting actual monetary force during the period, the

156 On legitimacy, see Douglas, How Institutions Think. On Indian Affairs’ lack of success in implementing its publicly stated policy goals, see Miller, “Owen Glendower…”
following section descends from this high-level analysis to concentrate on conditions in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake.

**Indian Affairs, Money, and Politics in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake**

This section focuses on the monetary interaction of Amerindians and the Department in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh during the nineteenth century. During the period of retrenchment and stabilization that lasted from the 1810s through Confederation, Indian Affairs played a relatively minor role in money-use in these two communities, due primarily to its near total absence in the case of Mashteuiatsh and its limited regulatory capacity in Wendake. However, even after the Department had assigned permanent agents to both reserves and had undertaken the administration of a wide array of their day-to-day affairs extending well beyond anything it had previously done, money only occasionally provided cause for local intervention. While the Huron and Innu also only rarely sought to exert force through money-use, the monetary power relations in which they were involved proved extremely contentious on a handful of occasions. The 1840s in Wendake and the 1890s in both communities were periods during which monetary issues played a significant role in local politics. At other times, state officials and band authorities engaged money in a far less contentious manner, integrating it into the routine management of on-reserve affairs. In this sense, the analysis of money's political dimension (both in terms of the encouragement of money-use and the constraints placed thereon) reveals one aspect of the changing relationship between the state and local elected authorities during the period while simultaneously providing insight into the reasons for which certain aspects of intra-community politics proved contentious while others did not. It also reveals the extent to which money played a critical role in maintaining or undercutting political authority in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. Indeed, the Department, band councils, and individual band members made use of money (both in its abstract and material form) in attempts to challenge rivals’ claims to legitimacy and to assert their own authority.
Indian Affairs’ Administrative Presence in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh

In order to contextualize this section’s analysis of Indian Affairs’ actions with respect to Huron and Innu money-use, it is important to describe the agency’s presence in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake. The Indian Department’s profile in these two communities during the nineteenth century paralleled its general pattern of development across Canada. In the decades following the War of 1812, the Department decreased its presence in Wendake, at mid-century it entered the still remote Saguenay-Lac St. Jean region, and during the 1870s and 1880s it finally established a permanent agent in both communities. In this way, Indian Affairs’ institutional reach first diminished and later increased alongside the role assigned it by succeeding imperial and federal governments. In other words, beginning in the 1820s and extending through mid-century Indian Affairs progressively lost some of its earlier potential to affect money-use “on the ground” (had it wanted to do so). By the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the Department, benefiting from greater legal power, increased funding, and more numerous personnel, had begun exerting its influence over monetary matters in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh in novel ways, even if it remained absent from most of the local day-to-day relations founded upon money-use.

Although having interacted with Europeans and their descendents in the St. Lawrence Valley since at least 1650, the Huron’s official relationship with the Indian Department began with the 1760 signature of the “Murray Treaty” which, among other things, guaranteed them safe conduct across British lines to La Jeune Lorette (Wendake). However, this relationship did not translate into the posting of a permanent, departmental agent in the village until the 1880s. Prior to this point, Indian Affairs relied on a mixture of officials charged with the supervision of several communities and Catholic missionaries in order to manage relations with the Huron. During the 1820s, Louis de Salaberry served as deputy superintendent at Quebec, giving him responsibility for administering relations with Wendake. Upon Salaberry’s 1828 death, Louis Juchereau Duchesnay succeeded him and

remained in the post through his own death in 1838. In that year, Indian Affairs altered its administrative structure, abolishing the deputy superintendent position at Quebec and making Duncan Campbell Napier the de facto head of the Indian Department in Lower Canada as secretary of Indian Affairs to the governor general. By the late 1830s, therefore, the Indian Department had ceased to maintain even the semblance of dedicated representation at Wendake that it had done since Salaberry’s tenure in office. In spite of this lack of fulltime representation, throughout the nineteenth century the village’s resident Catholic missionary provided both the Huron and the Department with the services offered elsewhere by state officials. In exchange for partial funding of his salary by Indian Affairs, the missionary kept authorities apprized of the state of the community and acted as an advocate for Huron interests in dealings with departmental and other state authorities.

In contrast to the longstanding relationship between the state and the Huron, the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and the North Shore of the St. Lawrence effectively existed beyond the purview of the Indian Department until the mid-1840s. However, the region’s rapid colonization led to the Innu “settling” the reserve at Pointe-Bleue (Mashteuiatsh) beginning in the 1850s. As the Indian Department gained greater powers over its wards, the reserve slowly became home to a small sedentary group of Innu and other Amerindians (mainly Abenaki in origin). During this period, as Euro-Canadian colonization displaced Saguenay-Lac St. Jean’s Aboriginal population, Mashteuiatsh also gained importance as the

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159 In 1845, following receipt of “a Petition from the Tribe of Indians known as Mountaineers (Montagnais) of Tadousac and places thence downwards along the North Shore of the River and Gulf of St Lawrence commonly called the ‘Kings Posts,’” the Secretary of Indian Affairs wrote that he “could not discover among the records of the Indian Office, any notice or description of the Petitioners, and that they had not at any period been under the protection of the Indian Department.” Duncan C. Napier to James Macauley Higginson, 30 June 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 149, p. 86383-4, reel C-11494.

160 For a report on the state of the reserve and its population in the early 1870s, see L. Vankoughnet to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 30 June 1873, LAC, RG10, vol. 1906, file 2295, reel C-11108.
region's primary fur trade center. These changes created a permanent base, featuring the presence of state and HBC agents, to which Innu hunter-trappers returned annually and where a small number of band members, particularly towards the turn of the twentieth century, established year-round residency in order to earn their living by farming, commerce, and a mixture of other activities. Through the application of legislation to Mashteuiatsh, the Indian Department and the Innu themselves reorganized the community's political structure, implementing an elected band council active in the management of the reserve's day-to-day affairs. In these ways, the Innu's economic activity and political structure underwent major change that, in turn, significantly altered patterns of money-use.

In 1844, the Innu of the North Shore petitioned the governor-general for the establishment of a reserve in the region of Pessamit.\textsuperscript{161} This action led to authorization for the creation of the first reserve in the region the following year.\textsuperscript{162} In 1847, the governor-general again received a petition, this time from the Innu living in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and on the North Shore. The petition clearly references established treaty policy and sets forth the case for compensation for Innu lands in line with that provided to Upper Canadian First Nations, based on the state's longstanding receipt of revenue from the region in the form of the lease to the King's Posts (the lessee held monopoly rights over the fur trade in the region). Concretely, the Innu requested that "des endroits de territoire fertiles soient tracés et réservés pour eux sur les bords des grandes eaux dans les postes du pays où ils s'assemblent d'ordinaire" and that a portion of the funds generated by land sales and the King's Posts be provided them in order to assist in the development of agriculture. Both the commissioner of Crown lands and the member of the Legislative Assembly of Province of Canada from the county of Saguenay recommended that the state pursue this policy by setting aside reserves

\textsuperscript{161} Petition from the Montagnais of the North Shore to Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, 9 August 1844, LAC, RG10, vol. 599, p. 47446-50, reel C-13380.

\textsuperscript{162} E. Parent, Copy of a Rapport of a Committee of the Executive Council, 1 October 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 163, p. 95189, reel C-11501.
and providing annuity payments, whether in kind or in currency.\textsuperscript{163} The following year, the Innu renewed their requests in a hand-delivered petition to the governor general. Once again, they appealed for reserves and the funds generated by the lease to the King’s Posts as well as those resulting from the sale of lands and timber.\textsuperscript{164} These efforts, along with those made by timber merchants and Catholic missionaries, led to the passage of the 1851 law that constituted the Lower Canada Indian Fund and provided the legal mechanism for the creation of the several reserves throughout the province that would take place in 1853, including two for the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean.\textsuperscript{165} However, the act did not accord any fixed annual payment from the funds generated by leasing the King’s Posts and the sale of lands therein in fee-simple to colonists along the lines requested by Innu petitions and recommended by the reports of the 1840s.

In addition to contributing to the creation of reserves, Innu petitions played an important role in defining the sociopolitical entities that the Indian Department would later

\textsuperscript{163} Although he does not explicitly argue for either monetary or in-kind payments, the representative for Saguenay writes on established treaty practice in Canada West in terms that do not advocate one mode of payment over the other. “Depuis 1763, le Gouvernement adhérant à la Proclamation royal de la même année, n’a pas cru devoir déposséder les Sauvages de leurs terres sans entrer en arrangement avec eux et leur donner quelque indemnité. Cette indemnité était quelque fois donnée sous la forme de présens, mais plus fréquemment sous la forme de rentes annuelles fixes et permanentes payables à la tribu et aux descendants de la tribu à perpétuité soit en marchandises ou en argent à raison de dix piastres pour chaque membre de la Tribu.” For a copy of the petition as well as a report, in which the commissioner of Crown lands is quoted, on the petition, see M. de Sales Laterrière, Report on a Petition from the Innu of Saguenay to Charles Murray Cathcart, n.d. [26 June 1847], LAC, RG10, vol. 122, p. 5789-6, reel C-11481. For another copy of the report, see M. de Sales Laterrière, Report on a Petition from the Innu of Saguenay to Charles Murray Cathcart, 26 June 1847, LAC, RG10, vol. 606, p. 51060-3, reel C-13383.


\textsuperscript{165} Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Authorize the Setting Apart of Lands...” On the reserves created by the act (one on the shores of the Peribonka River and the other on Lac St. Jean at Métabetchouan) and the role of timber company employees and missionaries, see Gérard L. Fortin and Jacques Frenette, “L’acte de 1851 et la création de nouvelles réserves indiennes au Bas-Canada en 1853,” Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 19, no. 1 (1989), p. 31-7.
administer as separate bands, thereby challenging the Innu’s relatively fluid sense of community. Thus, when the state set aside reserves in 1853, it participated in the reification of the two “branches” of the Innu: those residing in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and those making their home on the North Shore of the St. Lawrence. Innu petitions also participated in the creation of formal relations with the state and, more particularly, the Indian Department. Unlike the First Nations of the upper St. Lawrence Valley and the Great Lakes, the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean had no financial relationship with the Department in the 1840s. Prior to the creation of reserves, the state set aside funds only in order to respond to occasional requests for relief and not to maintain any formal administrative infrastructure in the region. Furthermore, the agents involved in requesting and receiving these early payments were neither Innu nor state officials. For example, in 1848 timber merchant Peter McLeod secured a one-time payment of £450 in order to provide relief to Saguenay-Lac St. Jean’s Amerindian population. Oblate missionaries apparently aided in the distribution of these funds as well as supporting McLeod when he again requested state assistance for destitute Innu in 1851. In the same year, Duncan Campbell Napier, the superintendent of Indian Affairs in Canada East, wrote: “the Indians of the Saguenay District have never been acknowledged as the recipients of Her Majesty’s Annual Bounty, or as having any claim to assistance from the funds of the Indian Department of Canada East.” By the early 1850s, this had changed, with Indian Affairs providing occasional funds first to Father C.F. Cazeau and, from 1854, to David E. Price, the eldest son of timber magnate William Price, who in turn provided relief to the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean in the state’s name. However, disagreement among Euro-


Canadians over the state’s division of funds for relief expenditure among the Innu fueled conflict between Indian Affairs’ informal agents in the region. Following the Department’s decision to accord Price a portion of the funds originally earmarked for distribution by the Oblate missionary Flavien Durocher to the Innu of the North Shore alone, Durocher charged Price with being motivated purely by self-interest. In order to counter the altered division of funds, Durocher planned to conduct a census of the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, thereby hoping to demonstrate the numerical superiority of the North Shore’s Amerindian population. However, in spite of Durocher’s attempts to discredit him, Price continued to perform as voluntary and unpaid Indian agent to the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean Innu through 1872.

By this time, the Department had begun looking to appoint a full-time Indian agent to the reserve at Pointe Bleue. In that year, the federal government offered the position to a Huron, Paul Picard Tsawenhohi. Picard, however, declined the offer, suggesting that his Euro-Canadian brother-in-law, Zéphirin Duhamel, be named in his place. In a somewhat striking example of the Huron’s tendency to see themselves in a different light from other Amerindians, Picard claimed that Duhamel “pourra devenir un des plus fermes pionniers de la Colonisation sur le lac St. Jean.” However, two years later the Department named the

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169 Durocher’s complaints and plan for correcting the situation are laid out in a letter to the HBC’s chief clerk at Métabetchouan, George Munro Skene. F. Durocher to Mr. Skene, 6 February 1857, HBCA, B.111/c/1, reel 1M272.

170 Furthermore, Price continued to distribute aid on a voluntary basis to Innu living in the vicinity of Chicoutimi through the mid-1870s. David E. Price, Account Current with the Indian Department for Montagnais Indians, Upper Saguenay, 15 November 1875 LAC, RG10, vol. 1973, file 5615, reel C-11125. Following the receipt of this bill, the Department authorized Price to continue to spend up to $30 annually on relief for the Innu at Chicoutimi. Lawrence Vankoughnet, Note on David E. Price’s Letter of 18 November 1875, 29 November 1875, and [Lawrence Vankoughnet?] to David E. Price, 30 November 1875 LAC, RG10, vol. 1973, file 5615, reel C-11125.

171 Paul Picard to Joseph Howe, 23 August 1870, LAC, RG10, vol. 380, p. 11-4, reel C-9603.
man recommended by David Price, L.E. Otis, instead of Duhamel as Indian agent at Mashteuiatsh.¹⁷²

Although the Indian Department initially approached a Huron to act as agent at Pointe Bleue in 1870, it would not appoint an agent in Wendake until the early 1880s. However, from this point through the middle of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs’ local representative at Wendake was always a band member. This is in marked contrast to Indian Affairs’ practice nearly everywhere else in Canada, underlining the Huron’s unique status in the eyes of both the Department and Euro-Canadian society more generally.¹⁷³

Honoré Sioui first filled the Indian agent’s office at Wendake, although he left little trace in the archival record and drew no salary from the Department. Following his death in 1881, the village’s Catholic missionary, Guillaume Giroux, argued that, “It is very desirable that the Department should pay or allow a fixed salary to the agent, as he is sometimes obliged to lose time in the exercise of his charge, and as he has not always the means to submit to this loss.” Sioui had been aided in conducting the business of the agency by an assistant, François Grosouis Sasccnio, who Giroux recommended be appointed agent.¹⁷⁴ However, the Department did not follow his advice, neither in terms of the candidate nor the pay, eventually according the post on an unpaid basis to Antoine Oscar Bastien.¹⁷⁵


¹⁷³ Elsewhere, including for example Kahnawake, Indian agents “were English Canadian, French Canadian, Black, Scottish, Irish... but seemingly never Indian.” Cori Simpson, “‘In the Eyes of the State’: Memories of Indian Agents, Agency and Resistance in Kahnawake,” M.A. Thesis (Canadian Studies and Indigenous Studies), Peterborough, Trent University, 2008, p. 22.


¹⁷⁵ Although the Department initially named Bastien temporary and unpaid agent, it changed his status to permanent Indian agent when it accorded him a $150 salary in 1886. For Bastien’s employment
Money, Presents, and Power in Wendake, 1840s-1860s

Money played an important role in the central struggle of Wendake's political life in the 1840s. During the decade preceding the Legislative Assembly's definition of who was "Indian," community membership proved to be a contentious issue at Wendake. The conflict over who was and was not "Huron" turned on control of communal resources and residency rights on the band's three reserves. Although not the heart of the issue itself, money provided the band council with a means of promoting its authority and members of the relatively small faction that the chiefs labeled the "village rebels" with the ability to resist the council's will. Indeed, money furnished these individuals with both the means and the motivation to do so as the cash revenue generated by the activities the chiefs forbade rendered the penalties that they imposed ineffectual. The council attempted to bypass this resistance through a locally administered fund serving to finance community events and Huron claims. Given that the chiefs managed this fund, the claims that the account underwrote were those supported by the council and their allies, serving to marginalize the political power of those who opposed the chiefs. Moreover, the manner in which the chiefs constituted this fund appears to have contributed to the conflict as throughout the period, the majority of money paid into the account for timber came from Euro-Canadians and not band members. This conflict, then,

history, see [?], "Memorandum concerning Antoine O. Bastien," n.d. [1900/02], LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

176 During the early to mid-nineteenth century, the band council at Wendake was made up of six Huron chiefs. The titles the chiefs used changed somewhat during the period, but the general structure of the council remained unaltered. For example, in 1832, the council consisted of one principal chief (grand chef), one second chief (deuxième chef), two council chiefs (chefs de conseil), and two warrior chiefs (chefs des guerriers), in 1842 the council consisted of one principal chief, two council chiefs, and three warrior chiefs, and in 1855 the council consisted of one principal chief, three council chiefs, and two warrior chiefs. See Petition from Nicolas Vincent et al. to Lord Aylmer, 1 July 1832, LAC, RG10, vol. 85, p. 33355, reel C-11031, Nicolas Vincent et al. to [Duncan C. Napier], 20 October 1842, LAC, RG10, vol. 597, p. 46474-5, reel C-13379, and Petition from the Hurons of Lorette to Sir Edmund Walker Head, Governor General of British North America, 31 March 1855, Archives de l'Archevêché de Québec, 62 CD, Village Huron, I: 6 (ACNHWH H-2-44).
illustrates both the force that groups and individuals could exert through money and the shortcomings associated with this technology when strategically deployed on the local level.

The conflict also demonstrates the political preponderance of the Indian Department in Wendake. Before the Legislative Assembly provided a clear definition of who was and was not “Indian,” the Department signified band membership throughout the St. Lawrence Valley through restrictions on reserve residency and the receipt of presents. Those individuals who did not satisfy Indian Affairs’ criteria qualified for neither Indian presents nor on-reserve residency. While the British had banned Euro-Canadians from living in Amerindian villages since the late eighteenth century, the second means of indicating band membership in Wendake appears to have been a product of the 1840s and continued to inform local understandings of band membership through the mid-1850s. However, other community members did not necessarily consider individuals who had lost their presents as outsiders. Thus, while the forfeiture of presents may have served as a deterrent in some cases, in others their economic value alone failed to compare to the money that individuals stood to earn by disregarding the council’s decrees. In this context, both the chiefs’ and Indian Affairs’ power was limited. This section, then, complicates the earlier analysis of presents, demonstrating that while the Huron preferred to receive them when possible, presents never overrode all other considerations.

The Huron collectively held three reserves during the nineteenth century: the village of La Jeune Lorette (Wendake), Quarante Arpents in the neighboring seigneury of St.

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177 For the order banning Euro-Canadian residence in Amerindian villages, see Guy Carleton, “Order to Prevent the Selling of Strong Liquors to the Indians in the Province Of Quebec...,” 29 March 1777, Great Britain, Privy Council, Judicial Committee, In the matter of the boundary between the Dominion of Canada and the Colony of Newfoundland in the Labrador Peninsula, between the Dominion of Canada of the one part and the Colony of Newfoundland of the other part, London, W. Clowes and Sons Ltd., 1927, vol. 6, no. 1101. The civil secretary reissued this order in 1839. Thomas L. Goldie, Order, 17 June 1839, LAC, RG10, vol. 99, p. 41327, reel C-11471.
Gabriel, and Rocmont in relatively distant Portneuf County. During the period, Wendake was essentially an urban community and Rocmont was completely uninhabited. In comparison, the Huron cultivated part of Quarante Arpents while also using the reserve as a source of firewood for their own consumption. In the early 1840s a handful of families decided to move to this reserve in order to be closer to their fields. This contributed to the strained relations between certain individuals, both Huron and Euro-Canadian, and the band council that characterized the decade. By 1842, this tension had developed into an open struggle, primarily between the Huron chiefs and members of the Bastien family, over the ability of local political authorities to dictate policy with regard to both land and resource-use and the presence of Euro-Canadians within the community. The chiefs had decided that no Huron should settle on Quarante Arpents and that no Euro-Canadian should reside on any of the band’s reserves. In this way, the council moved along gendered and racial lines in an attempt to consolidate its own political power through a local system of “customary” law, which very well may have been of the chiefs’ devising, regulating marriages between band members and non-Huron. This system, essentially identical to that which Canada would adopt in 1869 while being radically different from traditional Iroquoian practice, permitted any non-Aboriginal woman who married a Huron to become a band member while expelling

178 While the state only granted the Rocmont reserve in 1853, the Huron held the other two reserves during the whole of the nineteenth century.


180 In 1845, for example, only two families resided there. Canada, “Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada,” in Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix BEE, Montreal, 1844-1845.

181 While some documents refer to the Sébastiens or Basquins, the family adopted Bastien as the preferred spelling.

182 For a detailed study of this struggle, see Rozon, “Un dialogue identitaire,” p. 133-46.
any Huron woman who married a non-Amerindian. In theory, this system presented the chiefs with a means of limiting access to Huron resources by preventing any pretence of band membership on the part of male newcomers who might otherwise potentially become political rivals. In addition to barring Euro-Canadian men from enjoying band membership, the chiefs also restricted reserve residency to Huron. By the 1840s, several Huron had begun renting homes in Wendake to Euro-Canadians in order to supplement their revenue from other activities.

The chiefs, however, possessed only limited coercive power and were forced to rely on the state to enforce their decrees. The Indian Department did so by removing the names of Huron women who married Euro-Canadian men from the list of those entitled to receive annual presents and by suspending “the issue of Presents to Indians who resist the lawful commands of their particular Leaders or Grand Chiefs.” Although this practice allowed the council to define who was and was not Huron and to punish band members who refused to

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183 In 1842, the Huron chiefs asserted that the custom of denying band membership to women who married Canadians had been encouraged by Louis de Salaberry, a former Indian Department superintendent who had died in 1828. The Huron Chiefs to Duncan C. Napier, 20 October 1842, LAC, RG10, vol. 597, p. 46474-46475, reel C-13379 and Louis Juchereau Duchensay to the Huron Chiefs, 25 March 1828, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1. On the 1869 act (“An Act for the graduaI enfranchisement of Indians...”) declaring that Indian women married to non-Indian men forfeited their special status, see Milloy, “The Early Indian Acts...” According to the Pennefather report, this practice was already in use in Canada West by the late 1850s. Canada, “Report of the Special Commissioners...”


185 In 1845, the so-called “rebelles du village” claimed that due to losses in hunting and fishing income, they rented their property to earn a “faible revenu qui nous aide à bien vivre et nous sauver de la misère.” Petition from Vincent Ferrier, et al., to Charles Theophilus Metcalf, 18 October 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 122, p. 5677-83, reel C-11480.

186 On the removal of women’s names from the list of those entitled to presents, see Duncan C. Napier to the Chief Secretary, 13 December 1842, LAC, RG10, vol. 593, no. 51, reel C-13378 and I. Royan, “Department Order,” 15 July 1843, LAC, RG10, vol. 141, p. 45528, reel C-11490. On those refusing to respect the council’s decrees, see Duncan C. Napier to the Chief Secretary, 10 January 1844, LAC, RG10, vol. 593, no. 52, reel C-13378. For the official order sanctioning this policy, see James M. Higginson to Duncan C. Napier, 3 February 1844, LAC, RG10, vol. 599, p. 47169, reel C-13379.
respect its decrees, the chiefs required Indian Affairs to intervene on an annual basis in order to reaffirm their authority.

Withholding presents, however, proved to be less effective than the chiefs and the Indian Department had hoped. This lack of political success was primarily attributable to the economic value of presents relative to that of the sources of income at the root of the conflict. For example, Isaac Bastien, who by 1843 had moved to Quarante Arpents to be close to his fields, continued to reside there through the mid-1850s despite having lost his presents. 187 Similarly, those who rented to Euro-Canadians, Baptiste and Marie Bastien and Marie’s son Moyse Picard, also proved indifferent to their loss of presents as a result of the monetary income that renting furnished. Beginning in 1843, the Department withheld Marie Bastien’s presents for refusing to adhere to the council’s regulations. 188 Two years later, the chiefs asserted that she planned to continue her resistance: “elle va louer sa maison à une personne qui veut y tenir ‘grocery’; elle dit que ce n’est pas pour une couverte et un peut [sic] de drap qu’elle refusera de belle argent [sic].” At the same time, the chiefs claimed that Baptiste Bastien managed to both receive presents and make money renting a house in Wendake. Bastien “a fait entré [sic] dans le Village le lendemain de la distribution des équipement [sic] un Canadien avec sa famille, dans la maison d’un de ses gendre [sic], qui est absent, et

187 In 1843, the missionary at Lorette wrote that the families of Isaac and Stanislas Bastien “paroissent avoir laissé le village des Huron pour s’établir sur et auprès des terres qu’ils cultivent depuis longtemps” on Quarant Arpents. Louis Thomas Fortier, “Certificat pour Isaac et Stanislas Bastien,” 14 November 1843, LAC, RG10, vol. 598, p. 47030, reel C-13379. Bastien lived on Quarante Arpents at least through late 1847. François Boucher to Duncan C. Napier, 13 November 1847, LAC, RG10, vol. 603, p. 49236-7, reel C-13381. The chiefs continued to deprive Bastien’s wife, Josephine Zacharie, of presents through 1851, suggesting that the family still resided on the reserve. Duncan C. Napier to James Bruce, 18 January 1851, LAC, RG10, vol. 186, pt. 1, p. 108184-5, reel C-11511. By 1854, the chiefs and Bastien had resolved their differences and jointly petitioned the governor general to restore Bastien and several others to the list of those community members at Wendake who had the right to Indian presents. However, this petition contains no indication of how the parties reached a settlement or whether Bastien continued to reside on Quarante Arpents. Petition from Isaac Sébastien et al. to James Bruce Elgin, n.d. [September 1854?], LAC, RG10, vol. 212, p. 125676, reel C-11524.

188 François Boucher to Duncan C. Napier, 10 November 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 601, p. 48492-8, reel C-13381.
ensuite est descendu avec sa famille au Saguenay, nous laissant dans le trouble, avec ce Canadien." Thus, members of the Bastien family defied the council’s authority because the power accorded it by Indian Affairs could not rival the money that the “rebels” might make by renting real estate. While François Boucher, the Catholic missionary in Wendake, reported to the Department in 1846 that Marie Bastien and Moyse Picard “se sont soumis aux Chefs et ont promis de se conformer à l’ordre établi dans le village,” three years later he wrote that the “rebels” continued to rent to Euro-Canadians. Presents, then, provided insufficient force to guarantee local respect for the resolutions and the authority of the band council.

The Huron chiefs, however, did not rely solely on the Indian Department to support their authority. Prior to the state’s decision to withhold presents from those who transgressed local regulations, the council had created a system by which it would receive direct monetary payments from those who removed timber or other natural resources from Quarante Arpents or who made use of public lands in Wendake. Although this mechanism failed to generate massive receipts due to the refusal of the council’s opponents to cooperate and the modest size of payments provided by its allies, the money it generated furnished the chiefs with an effective means of administering local affairs with greater liberty than they would later enjoy when the Indian Department held all of the band’s funds in trust.

Under this system, which was in operation from 1840 to 1854, the band council sold wood from Quarante Arpents to band members and Euro-Canadians and used the proceeds to constitute a special fund from which the chiefs made a wide variety of

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During the funds' lifetime, the sale of timber accounted for 60% of its total revenue of £1196.9 Hfx, the majority of which was paid by non-Huron. Euro-Canadians provided 91% of the fund's timber revenue in 1840, 89% in 1846, and 76% in 1853. Even in those years such as 1841 and 1848 when the Huron supplied all or most of this revenue, they may have only acted as intermediaries, passing on the profits from sales they themselves conducted. In 1850, for example, Elie Sioui and Zacharie Vincent (both of whom were band members) provided money for wood sales ("vente de bois"), while Mr. Couture (a non-Huron) paid for wood ("bois") alone. This commercial practice seems even more likely given complaints made at the end of the decade. In 1858, Elie Sioui, by then a member of the Huron council, charged Laurent Picard Atehratak, who had previously been a chief and who had paid for the vast majority of wood harvested from Quarante Arpents during the fund's lifetime, with selling timber from the reserve despite repeated instructions to stop. The chiefs, then, appear to have sold the vast majority of the timber harvested from the Quarante

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191 This section relies heavily on François Xavier (Paul) Picard Tahourenché, *Journal (1840-1854)*, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1.

192 The purpose of several of the entries in the account book is not clearly indicated. Thus, only 45% of the funds' revenues arose explicitly from timber sales. However, given the individuals and the amounts involved in the 15% of unidentified transactions, it seems likely these payments were made for wood. Picard, *Journal (1840-1854)*, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1.


194 In 1841, the Huron paid 94% (£7.19.4) of the total paid for wood (£8.9.1). In 1848, Laurent Picard paid 100% of the £2.12.9 that the fund received for wood. Picard, *Journal (1840-1854)*, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1.

195 Picard, *Journal (1840-1854)*, 12 and 26 October and 1 November 1850, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1.

Arpents reserve during the period to non-band members, in the process generating the largest part of its locally controlled funds.

In addition to timber sales, the account received money from several other sources, most importantly the rental of communal lands. Between 1840 and 1853, the fund earned a total of £21.13.2, or 18% of its total revenue, from the rental of the garden and enclosed yard adjoining Wendake's presbytery. The band account's other major source of revenue was the one-time payment of £12.15.0, or nearly 11% of all monies received by the fund during the period, made in February 1848 by the road inspector of the parish of St. Ambroise for the right to open a road through Quarante Arpents.

Although the amount of money held by the fund remained quite small over the period — its balance at the end of the calendar year never exceeded £10, and even dipped below zero in four of the five years from 1843 through 1847 — its existence permitted the band council to exert influence when promoting its agenda in ways that might not have otherwise been possible. The chiefs employed these funds for various public purposes, including the management of communal lands, maintenance of public buildings (e.g. the presbytery), support for community events, and the band's political activities with regard to the state and other First Nations. For example, in 1847, the band spent a total of £7.18.4 on expenses including fence and road maintenance, trips made by the chiefs for political purposes to Quebec and Montreal, mass and religious art, and land surveying. During its

197 Following François Boucher's arrival in Lorette, he rented the garden. Prior to Boucher's arrival, Philippe Vincent, a future Chief, had rented the garden for one year. During the period, Thomas Plamondon, the Euro-Canadian husband of Adelaide Picard, and Philippe Vincent both rented the enclosed yard. Picard, Journal (1840-1854), ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1.

198 Picard, Journal (1840-1854), 14 February 1848, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1. The municipal council of St. Ambroise petitioned the Indian Department to open a road at lesser expense than that demanded by the Huron — "la jolie petite somme de quatre vingts livres courant" — in 1847. The issue was clearly settled at far less cost to St. Ambroise than this. Dominique Lefrançois to D. Campbell Napier, 13 March 1847, LAC, RGIO, vol. 604, p. 49632-3, reel C-13381.

lifetime, the account also served to pay band members' legal expenses, to hire notaries to draw up petitions and "protests" on behalf of the council, to fund the transportation of mediators to negotiate internal disputes in the community, to purchase provisions for band members presumably in need of assistance, and to finance a substantial number of politically motivated trips made by chiefs.

Thus, the chiefs had a vested interest in maintaining the productive capacity of the forest on Quarante Arpents. According to a former departmental employee, writing to explain the lack of wide-scale agricultural activity among the Huron, the band took this responsibility very seriously: "As fire-wood is a primary consideration with the Indians, the Hurons wish to save the little they possess for their descendants, [they] consequently do not clear much

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202 In 1843, the council paid to transport Robert Symes, the deputy chief of police in Quebec City, to Wendake so that he could attempt to mediate the conflict between the chiefs and Stanislas Bastien who, along with Isaac Bastien, had moved to Quarante Arpents to be close to his fields by 1843. Picard, *Journal (1840-1854)*, 8 October 1843, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1 and Louis Thomas Fortier, "Certificat pour Isaac et Stanislas Bastien," 14 November 1843, LAC, RG10, vol. 598, p. 47030, reel C-13379. Given that Stanislas Bastien did not sign the October 1845 petition protesting against the council's allegedly despotic rule, this negotiation would appear to have been successful. Isaac Bastien, however, did sign the petition. Petition from Vincent Ferrier, *et al.*, to Charles Theophilus Metcalf, 18 October 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 122, p. 5677-83, reel C-11480.


204 For example, the fund paid £6 in 1843 "Pour le voyage des Chefs André Romain et Michel Sioui, a Kingston," £2.3.2½ in 1845 "pour un voyage à Montréal, de trois chefs, et une femme," and £5.7.5½ "pour aller au Sault St. Louis, au grand Conseil (Du Colonel Napier et Mr Vardon) du 13 Juillet 1846." Picard, *Journal (1840-1854)*, 27 October 1843, 26 July 1845, and 25 May 1846, ACNHW P2-S1-A1, box B-1-1.
land." However, even with such careful management, the fund always operated under the shadow of poaching – that is, the removal of timber or other resources without the approval of the band council. In 1843, the chiefs wrote that Euro-Canadians married to Huron women claimed to have the right to “prendre couper et enlever tous les bois qui leur sont nécessaires.” The council requested that governor general Metcalfe declare this right inexistent, revealing its inability to control resource-use solely through locally levied and controlled fees. However, given the council’s sale of wood to other non-Huron, this request also points to the chiefs’ attempts to monopolize the control of on-reserve resources and the money that might potentially result.

Following the disappearance of the locally-held band fund, the situation on the Quarante Arpents reserve appears to have deteriorated appreciably. In 1856, Louis Panet, a member of the Legislative Council, informed the Department that the Huron chiefs were experiencing a “great deal of trouble in preserving the Wood and Timber upon the 40 Arpents from being plundered by the Whites, and even by some Indians of the Village, who sell wood to the Whites to the great damage of the Community. Dilapidations of the Kind are going now at such rate that unless promptly checked, the whole wood must soon go.” By 1858, the situation had not improved, prompting the chiefs to write to the commissioner of Indian lands, Narcisse de Lorimier, complaining of at least four individuals who removed wood illegally from Quarante Arpents without any fear of reprisal. The chiefs asked de Lorimier to reopen legal proceedings against the widow of Jean Baptiste Bastien and her brother for


206 Petition from Nicolas Vincent, et al. to Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, 26 August 1843, LAC, RG10, vol. 598, p. 46916-8, reel C-13379

207 Louis Panet to Duncan C. Napier, 4 March 1856, LAC, RG10, vol. 603, p. 49420, reel C-13381.
illegal cutting timber on the reserve and to order the former chief Laurent Picard Atehratak to stop cutting wood for sale.208

This process resulted in an 1864 provincial law giving the Huron chiefs, under Indian Department supervision, the right to regulate timber harvesting on the Quarante Arpents reserve through a system of licenses. This law decreed that justices of the peace had the right to fine and jail both Huron and Euro-Canadians who cut, sell, or bought unlicensed wood and could also force them to forfeit the value of the wood taken. It stipulated that, “the said fine and forfeiture shall belong one half to the informer and the other to the Indian Fund, such fund to be specially applied to the maintenance of the said tribe.”209 Thus, by the early 1860s, a formal legal mechanism overseen by the Department had replaced the council’s informal, locally maintained means of managing their timber. However, although this law nominally guaranteed the authority of the band council and the financial wellbeing of the community, while replacing the locally administered system that had proven unable to halt the decline of Quarante Arpents’ timber supply, it also affirmed the chiefs’ reliance on the Indian Department, which might intercede at any moment to promote or counteract the council’s agenda. Furthermore, the monies generated through the exploitation of the band’s timber no longer flowed directly into Wendake, instead fueling the Huron fund held in trust by the Indian Department. Thus, when it lost control of the money generated by the band’s natural resources, the Huron council simultaneously lost real decisional power. Rather than providing the chiefs with increased responsibility, Indian Affairs undercut their ability to affect local politics by reserving ultimate authority for itself. Armed with a new raison d’être and novel legal prerogatives which, among other things, affirmed the Wendake council’s

208 The case had been dismissed because it was improperly filed. Elie Sciou to Narcisse de Lorimier, 15 December 1858, LAC, RG10, vol. 246, p. 146494-5, reel C-12639. The chiefs made similar complaints a year later against three Euro-Canadian farmers, each of whom they charged with timber poaching. [?], “Complaint of Simon Romain,” 17 December 1859, LAC, RG10, vol. 252, pt. 2, p. 150540-1, reel C-12642.

policy of striking Huron women married to outsiders from the band list, the Department pushed well beyond its earlier use of presents in managing the affairs of the Huron, taking control of the band’s funds, imposing fines on poachers, and extending monetary rewards to informants. In this way, then, Indian Affairs counteracted its officially proclaimed goal of ensuring its own disappearance in order to claim a central role in the regulation of Huron resource-use and internal politics.

Money, the State, and Political Authority, 1870s-1900s

Although Indian Affairs’ legal and administrative power grew during the final third of the nineteenth century, money played a relatively minor role in the electoral politics of Mashteuiatsh and Wendake and the relationship of these communities with the state. This was due in part to the selective interest that the Department generally held in these two communities. Indeed, Indian Affairs concentrated on infrastructure and land management and sales during the period, areas of interaction that, while certainly not free from cash, required neither the use nor any significant discussion of money in the context of state-First Nations relations. Furthermore, as the next section will show, departmental officials in Ottawa proved woefully uniformed of the conduct of even their Indian agents, something which suggests an inability to involve itself in the sorts of quotidian relationships founded upon money. The lack of regular and sustained action on the part the Huron and Innu band councils before the 1890s also provides a reason for money’s relatively minor role on the local political scene. Although both Huron and Innu representatives regarded money as a potentially powerful political tool, the two bands’ chiefs neither met often enough nor possessed sufficient authority under the Indian Act to employ money in ways that allowed them to deeply influence everyday life on the reserves. As a result, this section demonstrates

210 Of course, the Department used the funds it received for the purchase of Huron and Innu lands to finance medical and educational services and infrastructural projects such as road and wharf construction. However, in nearly every such case, Indian Affairs managed this financial system without involving Amerindian money-use in any way.
that the relative disinterest exhibited by Indian policy as articulated at the highest levels mirrored on-the-ground practice in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. It also highlights the mixed results of attempts on the part of local officials to make use of money as a means of reinforcing their authority.

Although it had long been an active player in local politics, following its involvement with money-use in the 1840s and 1850s, the Huron band council did not again explicitly involve itself in monetary issues until 1891 when it passed a series of strict regulations concerning disorderly conduct, whether committed by Amerindians or Euro-Canadians. These rules drew their force from the Indian Act, which provided band councils with the power to enact rules concerning "The repression of intemperance and profligacy." The council declared that any inebriated individual blaspheming, swearing, brawling, or causing public disorder in any other way would be brought before a justice of the peace for summary judgment. The regulations stated that anyone convicted would be subject to a $5 fine or eight days in jail for a first offence, a $10 fine or 15 days in jail for a second offence, or a $15 fine or twenty days in jail (or a combination of a $3 fine and five days in jail) for every subsequent offence. Similar penalties applied to anyone found to have caused disorder in or around Wendake's church during services. Under these rules, a chief could appoint any band member temporary constable for the purpose of making an arrest. This individual would receive $2 in payment, however, should he refuse to serve as constable, he would be subject to a $5 fine. The chiefs could also require any band member to clean his or her yard on penalty of a $3 to $5 fine or 8 days in jail and they could enforce the performance of roadwork with a $5 fine or eight days in jail. The rules also imposed a $5 fine or fifteen days in jail for anyone keeping pigs in the village between 15 May and 15 October. Indian Affairs welcomed these rules as being in accord with the Indian Act, which in no way

\[211\] Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians," 12 April 1876, 39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 63, ss. 3.

\[212\] "Règles et règlements passés par les chefs du village Huron de la Jeune Lorette réunis en conseil tenu le 29 juillet," 21 September 1891, ACNHW.
prohibited the use of cash in maintaining the peace. Moreover, according to the Indian agent, these regulations greatly aided in repressing disorder in the village.\(^{213}\) Thus, the band council made effective use of money to impose its authority and to police the reserve.

While Indian Affairs accepted the levying of fines by Wendake’s band council for the maintenance of public order, it objected to Innu attempts to tax band members and merchants conducting business on the reserve. In 1895 the Mashteuiatsh band council passed a resolution declaring

\[\text{qu’une taxe de } \$5.00 \text{ soit imposée à tout chartier vivant en dehors de leur réserve et venant exercer leur métier sur la dite réserve et qu’une taxe [de] } \$1.00 \text{ soit aussi imposée aux autres chartiers Indiens résidant sur la dite réserve et que les dits chartiers dans l’un ou l’autre cas soient obligés de porter un numéro accordé par le Conseil. De plus que tout colporteur vendant des marchandises sèches, bijouteries, soient tenus de prendre une licence annuelle au conseil, au prix de } \$2.00, \text{ s’ils veulent commerçer sur la dite réserve.}\]

At the same time, the council resolved to impose a twenty-cent tax on every family residing on the reserve in order to constitute a fund on which the band council might draw to administer its policies.\(^{214}\) Although these resolutions clearly demonstrate the council’s intention to take responsibility for the internal affairs of the reserve, and in spite of the Indian agent’s support for them, the Department refused to sanction the rules because the council had overstepped its authority under the Indian Act.\(^{215}\) The Department noted the second of

\(^{213}\) "The regulations, framed by the chiefs, in regard to cleanliness, and sanctioned by His Excellency the Governor General in Council on the 21st September, 1891, have also been well observed. Temperance is improving and the many disorders which existed formerly have been considerably repressed." Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 24 August 1892, in Indian Affairs Annual Report.

\(^{214}\) Copy of the Pointe Bleue Band Council Minutes, 4 July 1895, LAC, RG10, vol. 7151, file 377/3-10, part 1, reel C-9685.

\(^{215}\) L.E. Otis to Hayter Reed, 4 July 1895 and The Acting Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to L.E. Otis, 7 August 1895, LAC, RG10, vol. 7151, file 377/3-10, part 1, reel C-9685. For the list of issues on which band councils could pass resolutions, see Canada, Statutes, “The Indian Act,” 1886, 49 Victoria, c. 43, s. 76.
these two resolutions would be lawful only if the Innu were to accept the provisions of the Indian Advancement Act of 1884.216

Legislators had designed this act to alter the powers of those bands selected by Indian Affairs in order to provide them with training that would serve to facilitate their transition to municipal-style government. The “advanced” council’s power to tax the real property of band members constituted one of the key provisions of the act. The law also provided the superintendent general and Indian agents with far greater powers to intervene in internal political affairs, including the power to depose elected officials and to call and supervise band meetings and elections. In this way, as John Tobias has noted, “the agent directed the political affairs of the band.” Through amendments to the Indian Act in the 1880s and 1890s, the Department ultimately secured the greater powers originally provided by the 1884 legislation without affording this act’s extended authority to band councils.217

While the band’s councilors were “décontenancés” by Indian Affairs’ refusal to sanction their resolutions on taxation and licensing fees for traders, they acknowledged their willingness to accept the application of the Indian Advancement Act “pourvu qu’elle leur accorde des pouvoirs plus étendus en leur donnant les moyens d’avoir des revenus pour faire figure avec les dépenses car sans cela, leur Conseil leur servira à peu de chose et paralysera ainsi les efforts qu’ils font pour entrer dans une voie de civilisation et d’ordre.”218 In other words, the band council recognized that without access to funds, which could only be guaranteed by obligatory monetary contributions of band members and others active on the reserve, it was doomed to ineffectual regulation of local conditions. Despite the Indian agent’s support for the application of the Indian Advancement Act, the Department never

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216 Canada, Statutes, “The Indian Advancement Act,” 19 April 1884, 47 Victoria, c. 28.
218 L.E. Otis to Hayter Reed, 15 August 1895, LAC, RG10, vol. 7151, file 377/3-10, part 1, reel C-9685.
implemented it at Mashteuiatsh. The Innu council, then, failed to gain access to this source of funding, and as a result was confined to an essentially advisory role in the management of reserve affairs.

However, even in this advisory role, the Innu and Huron councils proved adroit at altering practice to favor local monetary prerogatives. At approximately the same time that representatives of the federal government enshrined monetary annuity payments at the heart of Canadian treaty policy through the agreements negotiated with First Nations from northwestern Ontario through eastern British Columbia, Indian Affairs began providing annual distributions from the interest on band funds to Aboriginal communities in Quebec that had not previously received any such payments. Although Ottawa may have initiated this practice as early as the late 1860s, no clear evidence of interest payments exists for the Innu of Mashteuiatsh or the Huron of Wendake prior to the fiscal year ending 30 June 1874.

Between 1 July 1873 and 30 June 1880, the Department made at least $349.95 in cash interest payments to the Innu. The Huron also received monetary interest payments from their band fund, although during a shorter period (between 1876 and 1880) and for a lesser amount ($135.09). However, such payments formed only a minor source of revenue for both the Huron and the Innu: on average each Innu received $0.25 in interest annually, while every

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219 This was due to a combination of factors, including a failure to hold council elections and the replacement of the Indian agent. Alain Beaulieu and Stéphanie Béreau, "Voir par eux-mêmes à l'Administration de leurs propres affaires": Les Innus de Mashteuiatsh et l'implantation du Conseil de bande, 1881-1952," Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française (forthcoming, personal communication).

220 Beginning in 1870-1871, the Department expended a portion of the interest on the funds it held in trust for the Innu of Mashteuiatsh. However, prior to 1873, its annual reports did not clearly identify the nature of such expenditure, thereby making it impossible to determine whether any interest payments were made.

221 Indian Affairs Annual Reports, 1874-1879. The annual report for 1876 offers no detailed information concerning band accounts' expenditure and receipts. However, since the Department made interest payments in every other year in this period, it is likely that it did so in 1875-6 as well.

222 Again, the Department's annual report for 1876 contains no detailed account information, making it possible that the Huron, too, received interest payments.
Huron received $0.16. On the other hand, this practice suggests that during the 1870s Indian Affairs viewed the funds it held in trust for First Nations in a distinct light from public monies provided by Parliament for the agency's operating expenses or for occasional relief. Officials appear to have conceived of band funds, at least in the case of these two First Nations, as being just that—monies that the band might spend as it saw fit. This included the provision of small amounts of cash to all band members which, as we have already seen in the case of treaties, did not afford the state the same level of control as in-kind distributions.

Although no information has been found on the manner in which the Indian Department initiated interest payments from band funds in the 1870s, the origins of a similar distribution at Wendake during the 1890s suggest that the chiefs most likely played a part. In 1896, the council elicited a payment to all band members of a small sum of money from the interest on the band's capital fund. In February of that year, the chiefs unanimously passed a resolution declaring "That in future no money shall be paid out of the interest on the funds of the tribe to anyone whomsoever of the Hurons for any cause whatsoever; and that the interest on the said funds shall be distributed each year to all the members in accordance with their right in the beginning of November in order to assist them in buying their wood for winter fuel." Later in 1896, the Huron received payment from their band fund which, despite the resolution's wording, would be the only such payment they received before the 1910s. As it had in the 1870s, the Department distributed a minuscule amount of money: the Indian agent provided $113.52 to 284 Huron, with the vast majority (256) receiving $0.40 each, although a small number (17) received $0.41, $0.42, or $0.42½ and the agent paid each of the eleven members of Guillaume Siou’s family $0.36 4/11 (or $4 for the entire family). In order to

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223 These amounts are based on the average population for both communities calculated from the figures reported in the same annual reports as those which provide the data on the sums paid.

224 Copy of a resolution of the Huron Band Council, 10 February 1896, LAC, RG10, vol. 2738, file 144,620-6, reel C-12790.

ensure accountability, the Indian agent, after having notified the band members by letter, distributed these funds to the heads household in the presence of two non-Huron witnesses. In acceptance of the money, the agent required each recipient “to sign three times, in three different books.” However, this payment conflicted with Indian policy as developed under deputy superintendent general Hayter Reed. In December 1896, shortly after Clifford Sifton was appointed minister of the interior and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, Reed informed him of the Department’s practice with regard to interest payments: “the money distributed as interest is a positive deterrent to individual improvement amongst the Indians; they learn to depend too largely upon these payments, and frequently they squander them.”

This shift in official thinking that portrayed band funds as more akin to money voted by Parliament than to annuities is instructive and explains why Indian Affairs did not implement the council’s recommendation that such payments be made annually. Nonetheless, in 1896, at least, the Department proved amenable to providing the Huron with the individual monetary payments called for by local elected officials. This supported the council’s authority in Wendake while supplying the state with a wealth of population information on the Huron.

The 1896 request that Indian Affairs distribute the interest on Huron funds provided dissidents with a platform from which to protest the actions of the council and the band’s Indian agent. Although most Huron drew a portion of these monies, twenty-nine individuals, members of six households belonging to the Sioui family, refused to accept payment.

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228 Although not noted in the documentation generated by the distribution, the 1896 pay-list would become Indian Affairs’ standard reference for establishing Huron band membership into the 1910s.

229 Those who “Refused accepting his share” were Joseph Sioui, Thomas Sioui, Elisé Sioui, Sr., Stanislas Sioui, Jr., Stanislas Sioui, Sr., and Elisé Sioui, fils. Pay-List of Interest Distribution for the
Siouis, most of whom resided on the Quarante Arpents reserve, clashed with the band council, the Indian agent, and Indian Affairs, claiming to be the only remaining “true Huron” and demanding control over the band’s resources as well as the expulsion of a host of band members whom they asserted were Canadiens and not Huron. Joseph Sioui’s attempts to gain a pension from the band council provide a telling illustration both of these ongoing tensions and of the interconnectedness of money-use and politics.

In 1895, the band council passed a resolution requesting the provision of $25 in assistance to Sioui on account of a physical disability that prevented him from earning a living (he had lost an arm and two fingers in two separate accidents while working for the Quebec and Lac St. Jean Railroad in 1889).²³⁰ Although Indian Affairs granted these funds, the following year the band council refused to recommend Sioui’s request that payments be continued on a monthly basis because “they consider that Joseph Sioui, although infirm, is far from being destitute. He is comfortably settled, keeps a horse and cows, cultivates a lot which produces enough to support himself and family.”²³¹ Following this rejection, Stanislas Sioui began repeatedly petitioning authorities in Ottawa to grant the pension regardless of the council’s objections. In a March 1896 letter to the governor general, he openly challenged the legitimacy of the band council:

We do not see why the Department of Indian Affairs refers this question to the chiefs and to the general council of the band, seeing that two-thirds of the people of this tribe are French Canadians... It is absolutely necessary that we should know by what authority the chiefs of this tribe interfere with Mr. Joseph Sioui’s receiving a pension to be paid by the Department of Indian Affairs. If they are Huron Indians, let them prove the fact by their registers of genealogy and we shall be satisfied; but

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²³⁰ Resolution of the Huron Band Council, 25 May 1895 and Antoine O. Bastien to Hayter Reed, 27 May 1895, LAC, RG10, vol. 2738, file 144,620-6, reel C-12790.

if on the contrary they cannot prove anything, let them be deposed from the position of chief to make room for those who sent a copy of the register of their ancestors.\footnote{232}

In order to appease the Siouis, the agent, Antoine O. Bastien, suggested that Joseph Sioui send a petition to Indian Affairs headquarters by which his supporters might request to "give up their share of interest on capital" in order to fund his pension. Bastien informed the deputy superintendent general: "I prepared this petition for him, and sent it to him to get it signed. I have not seen either Sioui or his petition since. I therefore supposed that he had dropped his request and I have learned that those who signed his first petition for a monthly allowance have formally declined to relinquish their share of interest."\footnote{233}

Stanislas Sioui claimed that he and his "compatriots who refuse to recognize A.O. Bastien as agent for this tribe" did not accept the interest payment other band members received because they did not believe Bastien to be sincere when he invited Sioui "to go to his house and personally see the share of interest due me out of the funds of the Huron tribe." Thus, Sioui and his allies used the Huron's interest payments as yet another means of calling into question the authority of the band's officially recognized leaders. Before accepting any funds, Sioui asked the superintendent general to "be so kind as to tell us whether the Indian Department has really sent him this money to be distributed amongst the tribe."\footnote{234} Elizabeth Sioui described the Sioui's position even more explicitly. The family refused to recognize Bastien and they had "dispensed with his services as Agent on the 8th April the petition respecting which you received. The Siouis are not disposed to accept their rents except from someone else than from the Agent or from the Government."\footnote{235} As described below, this

\footnote{232 Stanislas Sioui to Lord Aberdeen, Governor General of Canada, March 1896, LAC, RG10, vol. 2837, file 171,530, reel C-11284.}

\footnote{233 Antoine O. Bastien to Hayter Reed, 23 May 1896, LAC, RG10, vol. 2837, file 171,530, reel C-11284.}

\footnote{234 Stanislas Sioui to Clifford Sifton, May 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.}

\footnote{235 Elizabeth Sioui to [Clifford] Sifton, 24 May 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.}
conflict would again rear its head in the context of Indian Affairs’ regulation of on-reserve consumption.

In 1879, at roughly the same time that the state stopped making annual interest payments to the Innu and Huron, the Department began a relatively long-lasting work-for-welfare program at Mashteuiatsh that broke with established practice by providing cash wages to participating band members. In that year, Ernest Cimon, the Conservative MP for Chicoutimi-Saguenay, wrote to John A. Macdonald, then serving as prime minister, minister of the interior, and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, in order to call his attention to the distress which now prevails amongst the Indians of Lake St John. Those poor men have no more hunting grounds, on account of the rapid development of the colonisation in that part of the country, so that they are obliged to remain all the year on the Reserve. Hence, the allowance of the Government is now insufficient. I would humbly suggest that an additional sum of $500. be allowed them. This sum may be employed in inducing those Indians, during the summer, to work upon the opening of a road on the Indian Reserve, & so, in the meantime, while assisting them, this money would be utilised in facilitating the colonisation on the Indians’ lands & giving value to them.236

On the recommendation of Lawrence Vankoughnet, the deputy superintendent general and the effective head of Indian Affairs, the Department instructed the Indian agent, L.E. Otis, to carry Cimon’s plan into action. Following the completion of roadwork, Otis was to return to the Department copies of its standard pay list for the Innu employed on the project, each of whom would then be paid by departmental check.237 The agent implemented the project, spending the entire $500 budget allotted him.238 The Department expended similar sums for

236 Ernest Cimon to the Minister of the Interior, 1 May 1879, LAC, RG10, vol. 2085, file 13,059, reel C-11153.


238 Vankoughnet wrote that, “the sum of $500 was expended on a road through said reserve [Pointe Bleue], Indian labor being employed in the construction thereof. The work done by them has been favorably reported of by their agent.” L. Vankoughnet, Report of the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 31 December 1879, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1879, p. 8.
roadwork from the Innu's band fund during the next several years, totaling $2,812.68 between 1879 and 1886.\footnote{In the fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1879, the Department spent $535.79 on roadwork, in 1880 it spent $499.94, and it spent $497.76 in 1881. \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1880}, part II, p. 66, and \textit{1881}, part II, p. 71. After spending nothing in 1882, the Department expended $896.81 on roadwork the following year, $364.83 in 1884, and $17.55 in 1885. \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1884}, part II, p. 74, \textit{1885}, part II, p. 72, and \textit{1886}, part II, p. 76.} Beginning in the late 1880s, the Department scaled back its efforts, expending far more modest sums on road maintenance on the reserve.\footnote{During the fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1888, Indian Affairs spent $59.17 on road repairs. \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1889}, part II, p. 213.} Thus, Indian Affairs created a relatively long-lasting work-for-welfare project, supplying the Innu with substantial cash payments from band funds. Although never in any sense dominating their economy, such roadwork projects provided the residents of Mashteuiatsh with supplementary monetary income.\footnote{For example, Otis wrote about the situation in 1881: “The work on the road made by the Government, in the Township of [p. 16] Ouitchouan, has sustained a good number of them who had not gone to the hunt. This kind of works has the double advantage of supplying them with bread and keeping them from idleness, which is demoralizing them and takes away all their energy.” L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 24 September 1881, in \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1881}, p. 15. However roadwork did not always receive the Department’s blessing. In 1898 the council, with the agent’s support, proposed that $200 be set aside from its funds to pay for roadwork on the reserve. Judging from the lack of any corresponding entry in Indian Affairs’ accounts for 1898 and 1899, it seems unlikely that this request was accorded. For payments made from the Pointe Bleue, see \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1898}, p. G-93-4 and \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1899}, p. G-95.} This suggests that when the Department felt that such projects warranted expenditure and when the band had sufficient funds to cover costs, officials in Ottawa did not necessarily oppose welfare programs that provided monetary payments as long as they required some effort on the part of beneficiaries.

However, the monetary payments made for roadwork in Mashteuiatsh (a project which was explicitly framed as a relief initiative) clashed with the established departmental practice of providing assistance in kind.\footnote{For example, in 1880, the Indian agent at Mashteuiatsh wrote that, “The money received during the current year, has been disposed of for the assistance of the sick, widows, infirm and orphans, and for the purchase of seed grain.” L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 13 September 1880, in \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1880}, p. 32.} Although generally implied, Indian Affairs...
sometimes made this opposition explicit. In an 1895 letter to the Indian agent in Wendake, the deputy superintendent general stated the Department’s unequivocal opposition to the provision of cash relief to a destitute widow, in the process invoking the specter of the improvident Indian: “if supplies to this amount were furnished the accounts for the purchase of the same should be forwarded but if the cash was given to her (which I may here state is a method of furnishing relief not approved by the Department, for obvious reasons) receipts for the amounts are required.” Thus, in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh at least, Indian Affairs distinguished between work framed as welfare and relief that carried no labor requirements when deciding whether to provide cash or provisions during the late nineteenth century.

_The Politics of Consumption at the turn of the Twentieth Century_

During the late 1890s, issues pertaining to consumption informed the political scene in both Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. While Indian Affairs concentrated its action in this area on suppressing the sale of alcohol, the Huron and Innu band councils proved far more interested in the regulation of credit relations. Whereas much of this chapter has focused on cash’s role in politics, this section, then, concentrates on abstract currency’s role as credit and the importance of this monetary form in the context of on-reserve consumption. Although the retailers who sold goods and services to the Huron and Innu at the turn of the century certainly accepted cash, they also often extended credit. However, merchants did not universally follow this practice, necessitating in the case of Mashteuiatsh the intervention of the band council. In Wendake, on the other hand, credit proved to be an important front of the ongoing struggle between the Indian agent (himself a band member) and several Huron who contested his and the band council’s authority. Thus, money became a central issue in both

243 [Bayter Reed], Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to A.O. Bastien, 4 April 1895, LAC, RG10, vol. 2738, file 144,620-6, reel C-12790.

communities as the chiefs, band members, and Indian agents all sought to exert influence on the local political scene.

In the summer of 1897, the Innu band council passed a resolution requesting that the Department permit Charles Siméon, an Innu originally from Pessamit but living in Ste. Anne de Chicoutimi, to open a store on the reserve at Mashteuiatsh. It requested that Indian Affairs allow the establishment of this store “seeing that that which already exists (Hudson Bay Co’s) refuses under many circumstances to outfit with necessaries Indians when starting out on their land.”245 Thus, the band council explicitly sought to encourage the new store in order to fill a need for credit that the HBC refused to meet. The Department undertook a rapid inquiry into the council’s request primarily to avoid antagonizing the HBC who, in the words of Indian Affairs’ secretary, had “protested against some parties elsewhere being allowed to trade with Indians for whose support in time of distress the Company has contributed largely and to whom many of the Indians are indebted for food, etc.”246 P.L. Marcotte, the Indian agent, replied to his superior that Siméon should be allowed to operate his store because the HBC’s trading practices were highly damaging to the Innu’s economic wellbeing. “Their margin being so large and their selection of Customers so restrained that more than half of the Indians had to provide for the Winter supplies, last fall, with the Neighbouring towns, Roberval, St Prime and St Félicien. In my opinion, there is room here for two good stores without any conflict of interest. The Hudson’s Bay Co might reduce her large profits in order to keep her good Customers and let the other to fight his way through the best he can.” Moreover, Marcotte expanded on the council’s argument by charging the HBC with price manipulation with a view towards preventing the Innu from reimbursing the debt they had

245 Minutes of the Pointe Bleue Band Council Meeting of 9 August 1897, 10 August 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299.

246 J.D. McLean to P.L. Marcotte, 3 September 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299.
taken on prior to leaving the reserve in the fall.\textsuperscript{247} As a result of Marcotte’s support, the Department followed the council’s recommendation and allowed Siméon to open his store on the reserve.\textsuperscript{248} This decision immediately added an important, although seasonal (Siméon closed his store during the winter when hunters were off-reserve), source of credit to the local economy. Indeed, in 1897 Siméon marketed a total of $3,000 to $4,000 in goods to the Innu, being roughly half of what the HBC would sell during the 1901-2 fiscal year.\textsuperscript{249} While it is unclear how much of this merchandise Siméon sold on credit, it seems likely that the amount was fairly substantial given that he himself had a financial backer and because he had managed to recover the credit he had extended the previous year when visiting the reserve as a travelling salesman.\textsuperscript{250}

Credit also played a central role in a major political dispute that took place in Wendake at the same time. This conflict had its roots in the long-lasting assertions on the part of members of the Sioui family that they were the only “true Huron” remaining. This clash crystallized most dramatically around the question of whether the Department would allow Antoine Oscar Bastien to maintain a store on the reserve. When Indian Affairs appointed him permanent Indian agent in 1886, it provided Bastien with an annual salary of $150, which, it increased to $200 the following year. In spite of this increase, his salary remained well below the $500 to $1,200 that an internal report claimed Indian Affairs paid most of its agents. By 1894, Bastien, “being married and with family,” felt that his salary provided insufficient

\textsuperscript{247} P.L. Marcotte to [J.D. McLean], Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 8 September 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299.

\textsuperscript{248} J.D. McLean to P.L. Marcotte, 14 September 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299.

\textsuperscript{249} P.L. Marcotte to [J.D. McLean], Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 8 September 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299. From June 1901 through May 1902, the HBC sold $8,664.01 in merchandise to the Innu. HBCA, A.76/15, f. 109, bob. 973.

\textsuperscript{250} Siméon’s financial backing came from Father Roussel, the priest at Ste. Anne de Chicoutimi. P.L. Marcotte to [J.D. McLean], Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 8 September 1897, LAC, RG10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299.
support and to increase his income he opened "a grocery and sold goods on credit to Indians of Lorette." Although he received a second increase in salary to $300 in 1899, the agent continued to conduct his business in the village. The following year, when his activities came to the attention of Indian Affairs' headquarters in Ottawa, Bastien justified his actions by both referring to his family's needs and to those of Wendake's population in general. Bastien claimed to have opened his store because the Huron "often were in distress being without work and could not hunt on account of the prohibitive law of the Province of Quebec." By 1900, members of the band owed Bastien nearly $1,500 for goods purchased on credit. The agent had expected "to be well paid at the return of the Indians to their works." However, rather than leading to the windfall for which he had hoped, his retailing activities led him to court. Bastien sued Abraham Sioui and Felix Groslois in the Circuit Court of Quebec for non-payment of debt so that he might, in turn, repay his own creditors who had taken legal action against him, also for unpaid debts. However, the Indian Act explicitly barred an Indian agent from conducting business with his wards unless Indian Affairs had first granted him a license, which it had not done. In order to overcome his own legal problems, Bastien asked the Department to provide him with payment of the amount owed him by band members "from their annuity money."

Indian Affairs refused to grant Bastien's request. Furthermore, although it had received evidence of the agent's commercial activities since early 1896 in the form of receipts of state-funded relief provided by Bastien's store, Ottawa only took concrete steps to

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251 Memorandum concerning Antoine O. Bastien, n.d. [1900/02], LAC, RG 10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

252 Even though a departmental memorandum estimated this amount at nearly $1,000, the Huron band council eventually asked that the Department reimburse Bastien $1,429.25. [?], Memorandum concerning Antoine O. Bastien, n.d. [1900/02] and J.D. McLean, Memorandum to the Solicitor General, 8 June 1900, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

253 [?], Memorandum concerning Antoine O. Bastien, n.d. [1900/02], LAC, RG 10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. Sioui later mentions that Bastien filed his suit against him and Groslois in the Circuit Court of Quebec on 12 March 1900. Abraham Sioui to Lord Minto, Governor General of Canada, June 1900, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.
close the operation when it became a matter of public comment.\textsuperscript{254} In February 1900, J.D. McLean, the secretary and primary day-to-day administrator of Indian Affairs, informed Bastien that the Indian Act forbade “officials or employees of the Department from trading with any Indian, or from selling him directly or indirectly, any goods or supplies.”\textsuperscript{255} Bastien attempted to gain a permit, retroactive to 1894, allowing him both to escape the penalties imposed by the Indian Act and to continue his suit against Sioui and Gros Louis.\textsuperscript{256} In a memorandum on the subject to the deputy minister, McLean wrote that, “although the law authorizing the granting of permits to enable them to do so, contemplates exceptional cases, the undersigned is certainly not of opinion that this case is one which should be made an exception.” While McLean professed incomprehension as to “why the Agent who is an Indian of the Band should not be able to live as such on a Reserve, on $300. a year,” he recommended increasing Bastien’s salary rather than permitting him to trade with his fellow Huron. McLean also rejected Bastien’s request for a permit dating from 1894 on the grounds that there was no technical means of emitting a retroactive license. The secretary did note that reimbursement of individual debt from band funds was possible. “The Department when an account is properly presented and the Indian acknowledges the debt and consents to such being done not infrequently pays it, deducting some 25% from the Indian’s share of distribution of annuities, until recouped.” However, McLean fully admitted the naïveté of this statement given that payment could not legally be made from the band fund’s capital and that the fund generated extremely limited interest: “the capital of the Band is so trifling that they cannot pay their doctor’s salary and only one distribution of interest has been made in the

\textsuperscript{254} For an example of $10 worth of relief provided by Bastien, in exchange for a check from Indian Affairs for the same amount, see Relief Account of François Groilouis, 20 January 1896, LAC, RG10, vol. 2738, file 144,620-6, reel C-12790.

\textsuperscript{255} J.D. McLean to A.O. Bastien, 7 February 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

\textsuperscript{256} [Antoine O. Bastien] to Charles Fitzpatrick, 12 February 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.
past 15 years or so."\(^{257}\) Furthermore, Felix Grosouis and Abraham Sioui appear to have constructed their defense around the Indian Act’s prohibition of trade between agents and Amerindians in order to avoid having to repay their debt only after their lawyer had informed them of the clause’s existence.\(^{258}\) Thus, the probability that either of them would have agreed to transfer any part of their interest payments – even if there had been any – to the agent would appear to have been nonexistent.

Bastien protested his innocence based on the fact that the Department had never sent him a copy of the Indian Act. Furthermore, he claimed to have advanced credit for necessities alone. Bastien asserted: “I ought to receive the assistance of the Department, as I was altogether ignorant of this law, and as I acted charitably in the best faith in the world in making advances of provisions to both these families... I am myself harassed by my creditors, some of whom have prosecuted and have obtained judgment against me, and others are still prosecuting me and I am obliged by these circumstances to give up trade and to think about leaving my country.”\(^{259}\) Both the Indian agent and rank-and-file band members, then, may have been ignorant of the Indian Act’s provisions, calling into question to a certain extent the influence that this law exerted over the everyday lives of Amerindians (at least in the particular context of Wendake).

In March 1900, the Department, employing the arguments that McLean had developed in his memorandum of the preceding month, rejected Bastien’s requests.\(^{260}\) In

\(^{257}\) J.D. McLean, Memorandum for the information of the Deputy Minister, 16 February 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

\(^{258}\) McLean later wrote: “It is probable that neither the Agent nor the Indians were aware that the store was on the Reserve in contravention of the law until this fact was pointed out by the lawyers when Mr. Bastien endeavoured to collect the money due him through the courts.” J.D. McLean to C.J. Jones, Governor General’s Secretary, 22 June 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

\(^{259}\) Antoine O. Bastien to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 19 February 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

\(^{260}\) J.D. McLean to A.O. Bastien, 20 March 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. For the deputy superintendent general’s opinion that, “Mr. Bastien’s request with regard to trading
May, Abraham Sioui, continuing his family's campaign against the agent, informed the governor general that, "the Agent A.O. Bastien is going to take steps, if he has not already taken them, to get the Indian Dept. to see that he is paid for groceries sold by him to the Indians of this place. Now, according to Section 134 of the Indian Act, Agent A.O. Bastien has no right to trade with the Indians being an employee of the Indian Department. Moreover the payments that the Indians have made him since he has been trading with them have well repaid the losses that he has suffered."261 However, by this point Indian Affairs, which considered the matter closed, had lost patience with the Siouis' attempts to have Bastien recalled. As such, McLean replied to Sioui that, "the Department has no sympathy whatever with those who would first take groceries from the Agent on credit and then attempt to evade paying for what they got, by pleading the provisions of the section quoted."262 This violent reaction and the Department's refusal to take any action against Bastien other than to dismiss his requests for a license and repayment of the debt owed him by certain Huron from band funds were predicated both on the continued complaints of the Siouis that Indian Affairs had determined were unfounded and on the fact that "None of the Indians made any complaint regarding the store on the Reserve, although it was in operation for over five years, until the Agent began to take action for the recovery of moneys due him by certain of the Indians."263

In June 1900, the Department rejected a "petition of the Lorette Indians, supported by their Missionary, Rev. Guil. Giroux, and Mr. Prosper Marlet, asking that their indebtedness, amounting to $1429.25, to Agent Bastien, be paid from their funds.” McLean wrote to the solicitor general that, “this band has to their credit at present $4680.50 capital

with the Indians can be permitted,” see James A. Smart, Memorandum for Mr. McLean, 20 February 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

261 Abraham Sioui to Lord Minto, Governor General of Canada, May 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

262 J.D. McLean to Abraham Sioui, 5 June 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.

263 J.D. McLean to C.J. Jones, Governor General's Secretary, 22 June 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291.
and $30.34 interest. Under the law as it stands now the capital funds of the band cannot be used for any such purpose and their interest fund is so small that it does not suffice to pay the ordinary running expenses of the band, such as medical attendance, fuel, material for schools, &c., &c. However, Bastien kept his post and, rather than being fined or punished in any way by the Department, received a $125 raise on 1 July 1900.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed money's role in relations between First Nations and the state during the nineteenth century through an examination of its theoretical content and practical use at three distinct political levels. In this context, money provides a window onto First Nations' experience of state formation while simultaneously offering a vantage point from which to consider the state's developing vision of Aboriginal peoples. From the theoretical construct of the "improvident Indian" partially developed by imperial and colonial commentators, through the logic of pan-Canadian Indian policy, to the ways in which Amerindians lived the implementation of this policy, money informed how the state imagined and interacted with First Nations and, thus, the form and extent to which colonialism influenced the everyday lives of Aboriginal peoples. At the same time, money furnished chiefs and rank-and-file band members with an effective tool for exerting force in local politics and in their unbalanced relationship with imperial, colonial, and federal officials. In this sense, money, whether abstract or material, contributed to colonialism, a process that

264 J.D. McLean, Memorandum to the Solicitor General, 8 June 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-V1291.

265 Beginning at this point, he made $425 per year. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1901, part I, p. 169.
both empowered and subjugated Amerindians in much the same way as other seemingly mundane technologies.  

During the nineteenth century, money first played a major political role in the context of the commutation debates. Colonial officials, drawing on a series of Western stereotypes tied to both Aboriginal peoples and the urban poor, defined Amerindians as being naturally improvident, an assertion that would continue to echo through state Indian policy and practice well into the next century. However, this claim did not banish money once and for all from state-First Nations relations. Indeed, from mid-century, imperial and later colonial and federal officials founded one of the central pillars of Indian policy, treaties providing the crown with title to Aboriginal lands, on the payment of cash annuities. This was largely due to the distinction made between payment as right and payment as privilege, a division which drew on the same basic assumptions about the responsibility of the collective to the individual as charity and public assistance. Thus, whereas state officials came to perceive treaty money as providing payment in a way that paralleled any other market transaction (thereby sanctioning cash’s use), they considered funds held by the government, either in trust for individual bands or provided by Parliament, as necessitating greater oversight on the part of Indian Affairs, something which prohibited the distribution of currency from these sources in most cases. Moreover, authorities did not make this distinction at the policy level alone; they also implemented it in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake through interest payments and the in-kind provision of welfare. At the local level, money also served to support Indian Affairs’ and band councils’ political authority. Indeed, prior to the Department’s late nineteenth-century expansion, money (in the form of the locally managed band fund) may even have provided the Huron chiefs with a more effective means of exerting political influence than their attempts to secure local cooperation through the state’s imposition of coercive measures. By the final third of the century, and particularly during the

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266 For example, writing also played an important role in colonial power relations. Sean Hawkins, *Writing and Colonialism in Northern Ghana: The Encounter between the LoDagaa and “The world on paper,” 1892-1991*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002.
the limited monetary powers that the Indian Act provided band councils also furnished these bodies with a means, however circumscribed, of proclaiming their political authority. However, even during this period of greatly expanded legal power, the state never controlled all aspects of local political affairs, something which the substantial consumer credit that its agent at Wendake provided the Huron makes abundantly clear.

Although the state’s monetary policy and practice with regard to First Nations remained relatively weak at the end of the nineteenth century, then, the process by which Indian Affairs came to monopolize the management of the state’s relations with Aboriginal peoples during the period set the stage for the much more active approach that the institution would adopt beginning in the 1930s. Thus, this chapter has served to establish the basic parameters of the state’s vision of money-use and monetary regulation that would continue to inform its interactions with Aboriginal Canadians during the twentieth century. This chapter has also provided an essential complement to the next, which seeks to delineate the less formal, although no less political, power relations characteristic of the market society in which money played a significant role during the nineteenth century. Indeed, while money-use in the context of private networks of labor and industry perhaps appear spontaneously less political, its effects would prove to be no less important for the ability of the Huron and Innu to exert force in their local relations and in those they maintained with extra-regional capital and the state.
Chapter 4

Capital and Community in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake during the Nineteenth Century

Although the developing legislative framework that governed the state’s relationship with First Nations during the nineteenth century theoretically structured several aspects of Aboriginal money-use, Indian Affairs only rarely wielded material power in either Mashteuiatsh or Wendake. Moreover, when it did involve itself in concrete monetary issues, the state did not always do so in clear reference to its high-level discourse. However, Indian Affairs was never the sole external actor that engaged with money-use among Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, capital, whether multinational or local in scope, also participated in creating the monetary environment in which First Nations interacted among themselves and with their non-Indigenous neighbors. In addition to the state, then, this dissertation considers the role that capital played in Canadian colonialism. This chapter begins its analysis through a description of the transformation of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean’s monetary space. During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the region’s rapid colonization initiated the process through which colonial and later federal currency replaced the monetary form developed by merchants and Amerindians in the fur trade over the preceding centuries. This contributed to a fundamental change in the region’s power relations by which externally controlled fur trade companies, Saguenay-Lac St. Jean’s predominant political and economic force through the 1830s (and much later in some areas), were forced to conduct business using abstract and physical money that they did not fully control. However, the HBC, the main fur purchaser in the region from the 1830s, continued to pursue its policy of using book debt to restrict the Innu’s influence over fur trade relations. The remaining sections deal with monetary sources and forms of expenditure that escaped the highly circumscribed environment of the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fur trade. They analyze the ways in which Huron and Innu earned and borrowed money along with one particular way in which they spent it. This demonstrates one of the ways in which money was employed locally in both communities (charity, most often tied to the Catholic Church) while underlining the modest access to money that the majority of residents of both Wendake and Mashteuiatsh had during the century. Although these two
communities shared both of these traits with most of their Euro-Canadian neighbors, certain structural factors to which only First Nations were subjected demonstrate the particular importance of colonialism in Aboriginal Canada, while also demanding that these factors be analyzed on the practical as well as the theoretical levels. This chapter, then, serves to add nuance to the historiography's characterization of First Nations history by both acknowledging the economic and political process by which capital and the state contributed to rendering Amerindians peripheral to Canadian society and insisting that much of this marginalization was in large part discursive.

**Colonization and the End of Castor Currency in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean**

During the nineteenth century, the region composed of present-day Quebec and Ontario consisted of two distinct monetary spaces. The first — the steadily growing area inhabited by colonists of European origin — was home to official state currency of first British and later Canadian origin. The second — the region in which fur traders and missionaries provided the primary permanent or semi-permanent Western presence — boasted a privately defined and maintained commercial currency based on the beaver pelt. The boundary separating these two monetary spaces shifted during the period, with beaver currency having disappeared from much of the region by the early years of the twentieth century. While this change may at first appear inconsequential, the differing historical trajectories of these two "territorial currencies" point to a much larger process: the extension of state authority over regions that had previously remained beyond its reach. Through monetary circulation, then, it becomes possible to determine the period at which the state replaced private enterprise as the primary institution serving to justify the control of remote regions. In this sense, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a process by which the colonial and later federal state assumed the pretension of territorial sovereignty that had previously been

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asserted by the French and British Crowns through chartered companies such as the HBC. This section ties these political changes to alterations in the structure of the monetary system brought on by the advance of state-centered colonialism in subarctic Quebec while paying particular attention to the ways in which monetary space influenced the options to which actors had access. In order to do so, this section considers this process in relation to the Aboriginal population of a particular geographical space (the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean), which experienced the substitution of the state for the HBC as the pillar of its monetary system during the mid-to-late nineteenth century. In conjunction with the analysis of a similar process in turn-of-the-twentieth-century western James Bay provided in the following chapters, this section argues that currency replacement formed one of the visible ways through which the political community centered on the St. Lawrence Valley and the lower Great Lakes expanded to engulf the vast majority of the territory of which present-day Canada is comprised.

During the mid-nineteenth century, the state in British North America, as in the United States and much of Western Europe, came to occupy an increasingly central role in political and economic life. In addition to its growing involvement in sectors such as education, policing, and transportation, the state also pursued monetary standardization, symbolically and functionally integrating colonial and later national markets and polities in the process. However, rather than addressing regions, like the Canadian subarctic, already dominated by a single, centrally-enforced currency, the historiography on the state's role in

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the development and spread of an exclusive monetary standard during the nineteenth century focuses on the phenomena in areas of relatively heavy colonization. Although the historiography emphasizes physical media, colonists in these regions had long made use of unitary abstract money (first the French \textit{livre}, later Halifax currency, and finally the Canadian dollar) to evaluate the heterogeneous supply of coin in circulation.\textsuperscript{4} Indeed, under both the French and English regimes, authorities dictated the abstract terms in which colonial residents expressed value, symbolically uniting the colonies both economically and politically.\textsuperscript{5} Despite this abstract unification, colonists in the region continued to employ multiple forms of foreign and domestic cash (both coins and bank notes) through 1871, when Parliament passed the Uniform Currency Act, thereby effectively creating a single, consolidated system of abstract and physical currency in southern Canada for the first time.\textsuperscript{6}

Although this constituted a major change in those regions that hosted a relatively large population of European origin, this was not the case in the Canadian subarctic in which a single abstract (and sometimes physical) currency had been widely used in the context of


\textsuperscript{5} On the French \textit{livre} in Canada, see A.B. McCullough, \textit{Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900}, Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 29-30. On the implementation of Halifax currency following the Conquest, see Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, \textit{Un Québec moderne, 1760-1840: Essai d'histoire économique et sociale}, Montreal, Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 2007, p. 208. In 1853, the legislature of the Province of Canada adopted the pound, dollar, shilling, pence, and cent as official units of currency. In 1857, it effectively ended the use of the Halifax system and sterling notation in the colony by requiring that all accounts submitted to the state, as well as those kept internally by the state itself, be in dollars and cents. McCullough, \textit{Money and Exchange in Canada}, p. 106-10.

\textsuperscript{6} Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer to Money," p. 554. However, this law did make some foreign coin, notably British gold sovereigns and United States gold eagle coins, legal tender. Nevertheless, since very few gold coins circulated in Canada, the practical importance of making American and British coins legal tender appears to have been negligible. A variety of foreign copper coins of small denomination also circulated well into the twentieth century. Helleiner, \textit{The Making of National Money}, p. 32, 39, and 116.
the fur trade since at least the late seventeenth century. This commercial activity grew from the collaboration of vastly diverse actors including Amerindian hunter-trappers and European elites (commercial as well as aristocratic) and their employees. Shortly after European merchants had arrived on the shores of Hudson and James Bay during the late seventeenth century, transactions in the region came to be structured through the use of the beaver pelt as the standard of trade. The English, who, from 1670, traded in the subarctic under the auspices of the Hudson’s Bay Company, referred to this standard, which expressed the theoretical value of a single prime beaver pelt, as the “made beaver.” However, the beaver’s abstract monetary role was not confined to the HBC’s business; as a result of the generalized trade in beaver skins, the French in the Great Lakes also made use of such easily understood currency (the “castor”) during the mid-eighteenth century. Moreover, the castor survived the Conquest and was carried far inland by voyageurs operating on behalf of the North West Company (NWC). By the early nineteenth century, then, the beaver had become the fur trade’s abstract currency throughout northern North America.

Given that individuals neither saved skins nor employed them when purchasing goods as they did with metallic and paper money, the beaver formed an abstract rather than a physical currency. Furthermore, according to Gordon Charles Davidson, the value of a beaver skin when used as money “differed considerably from the existing worth of the

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7 Rich writes that as early as 1684, traders and hunter-trappers “made” all goods and furs into beaver in order to express their value, thereby providing the name for the Hudson’s Bay Company’s abstract accounting currency: the made beaver. E.E. Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1837, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1967, p. 59.


articles it represented.\textsuperscript{10} In other words, the value of the made beaver or \textit{castor} was entirely independent of any actual skin, being situated in the relationship it expressed between furs, commodities, and people — a relationship that could span long periods of time. Although several scholars have remarked the existence of this monetary system, none has underlined its fundamental role in the creation and maintenance of the debt-based fur trade, an institution which has received far more attention.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, without an abstract measure of value, the fur trade could only function through “straight barter.” Following the appearance of beaver currency, and the simultaneous construction of permanent trading posts, Amerindians and merchants could begin to exchange goods against future promises to pay, recorded in the traders’ ledgers and, in principle, agreed upon by all parties to the transaction. Thus, this particular form of money, like forts, provided the fur trade with the infrastructure necessary to develop into an ongoing economic relationship between First Nations and international capital.

This relationship, however, was never entirely economic; it was also eminently political. Indeed, from the late seventeenth century, commercial ventures such as the HBC, the \textit{Compagnie du Nord}, the \textit{Compagnie de la Colonie}, and the NWC struggled for the control of the fur trade throughout much of the Canadian subarctic. Most of these companies (with the notable exception of the NWC) did so on the basis of government-furnished monopolies theoretically allowing them to purchase pelts in the absence of competition. The

\textsuperscript{10} In discussing John Franklin’s account of the “trade around Cumberland House in 1819-1820,” Davidson does not use the term “money,” preferring to refer to beaver skins as “the standard of exchange.” Gordon Charles Davidson, \textit{The North West Company}, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1918, p. 241-2.

HBC, notably, owed its existence to a 1670 royal charter that provided it with such monopoly rights over the entire Hudson Bay watershed. Thus, while its capital originated primarily in London, the HBC’s political base also lay in the heart of the British Empire. However, rather than importing the British Empire’s standard money of account (the pound sterling) along with its trade goods, from its beginnings the company traded with First Nations using the made beaver. In some regions, HBC employees and Amerindians continued to make use of this form of money in their dealings instead of either imperial or national currencies well into the twentieth century. In this sense, the made beaver was as much a territorial currency as those developed by colonies and nation-states across the globe through the late nineteenth century as it allowed the HBC to mark the regions it controlled through a unique and locally-intelligible means of expressing value. The process, then, by which beaver currency gave way before the Canadian monetary system represents more than the disappearance of a pre-modern curiosity. Rather, it signals the way in which, over the course of the nineteenth century the liberal democratic state came to occupy an increasingly unassailable position as the only legitimate institutional expression of national political communities. It also suggests the centrality of the HBC and other chartered companies in the assertion of sovereignty by European Crowns over much of the early modern and modern world.

During the whole of the nineteenth century, the fur trade throughout much of subarctic Canada was predicated on two interlocking institutions: the annual cycle and the debt system. In idealized terms, the Amerindian hunter-trapper arrived at the post of the HBC

12 On the HBC’s political character throughout North America, see John S. Galbraith, The Hudson’s Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957.

13 For a compelling argument asserting the need to study the state precisely because of this process and because of the inseparability of the various socio-political phenomena (e.g. sovereignty, war and diplomacy, administration and bureaucracy, the legal system, democracy or other means of accessing political power, and symbolic representations of collective identity) embodied by the state, see Jean-Marie Fecteau, “Écrire l’histoire de l’État?” Bulletin d’histoire politique, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 2007), p. 109-15. For an important recent contribution to the history of the liberal democratic state in Canada, see Jean-François Constant and Michel Ducharme (eds.), Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2009.
or one of its competitors in late summer and purchased, on credit, the goods necessary to carry out his family’s winter hunt. At the beginning of the following summer, if not before, the individual who had received credit returned to the same post, selling his winter fur collection to the company in order to settle his debt. Ideally, each hunter-trapper would repay the entire amount owed at the beginning of the summer, thus allowing the fur trade company to turn a profit while maintaining the hunter-trapper’s access to credit. In practice, however, Amerindian hunter-trappers were rarely debt-free.

The HBC sold goods to Amerindians and purchased furs using the made beaver while keeping its accounts with employees in pound sterling. Although above all abstract in nature, the fur trade companies’ beaver currencies did occasionally circulate in physical form. However, given their status as private proprietary currency this monetary form functioned first and foremost as a direct marker of the economic and political relationship between the fur trade company and its Aboriginal trading partners. Because such money, even if minted, was not necessarily acceptable anywhere beyond the posts of the company

14 This “ideal” system did not necessarily function precisely in this manner. For example, the HBC post at Métabetchouan occasionally collected debts in the fall rather than at the beginning of the summer. In 1852, the post manager wrote: “Traded the hunts of Joseph Sr. & Joseph Junr. this forenoon the former paid his debt the latter nearly so... Simeonish[?] arrived in the evening and traded his hunt he paid his debt.” Monday, 11 and Wednesday, 13 October 1852, HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 18v, reel 1M70.

15 For instance, during the 1899 Outfit – that is, the fiscal year running from June 1899 through May 1900 – the HBC post at Moose Factory recorded $3,673.73 in unpaid Indian Debt. Appendix 7: Statement of Indian Debts, Outfit 1900, (Amended Copy), Moose Post, Inspection Report on Moose Factory, 4-11 July and 12-18 August 1901, HBCA, B.135/e/34, p. 24, reel 1M1257.

16 During the eighteenth century the company kept “men’s accounts” (those of their employees in North America) in pounds sterling while it accounted for trade with Amerindians in made beavers. Ray and Freeman, “Give Us Good Measure”, p. 88 and 92.

that issued it, within regions from which Euro-Canadian settlement was largely absent, it possessed a distinctly political character. Like the Canadian Dollar, then, the made beaver and the *castor* were territorial currencies in that their use constituted a geographical space from which other monetary forms were for the most part excluded. In this way, beaver currency participated in the organization of colonial space and relations in regions from which state-issued money was absent.

Prior to the 1830s, the Lower Canadian state, as its French predecessor had done, restricted access to Saguenay-Lac St. Jean to merchants who had purchased the monopoly trading rights to the King’s Posts. In the mid-seventeenth century, New France set aside the King’s Posts or the King’s Domain — the region corresponding roughly to modern Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and including a portion of Charlevoix and the North Shore of the St. Lawrence — as a reserve in which settlement not directly tied to the fur trade or missionary work was prohibited. Over the nearly two hundred years which followed, the state in both New France and British North America leased the exclusive right to trade in this region to a single individual or group at a time. However, by the 1820s and 1830s, Lower Canada’s colonization movement began looking to the region as a source of fertile and unclaimed lands, thereby providing a means of preventing the emigration of at least some of the province’s booming French-speaking population. As a result, the first wave of colonialism in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, which centered on the exploitation of the region’s fur-bearing species by its Aboriginal population for sale to Euro-Canadian merchants, gave way to a second wave, characterized above all by settler colonization. Beginning in the late 1830s, French Canadians, primarily from the neighboring Charlevoix region, rapidly began colonizing the shores of the Saguenay River before continuing on to the lands surrounding Lac St. Jean beginning in the 1850s. Beyond settlement, this second period of colonialism was also characterized by a focus on forestry, largely directed by extra-regional capital, coupled with

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locally-controlled subsistence agriculture. Thus, from the late 1830s, colonialism in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean led to the arrival and continued presence of a stationary Euro-Canadian population and to the creation of local markets in which agricultural produce, as well as furs and manufactured goods, exchanged hands.¹⁹

Although settler colonialism would come to dominate nineteenth-century Euro-Canadian activity in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, at the beginning of the 1820s this was anything but a foregone conclusion. In comparison to other regions of importance to the fur trade in subarctic Canada, Saguenay-Lac St. Jean continued to play host to intense competition even after the 1821 fusion of the HBC and the NWC. At the time of the merger, the state continued both to forbid settlement in the region and to lease monopoly rights to its fur trade. Although the NWC held the lease to the King’s Domain through 1822, the HBC proved uninterested in renewing its rights following the merger of the two companies. As a result, a new rival (the King’s Posts Company) was born with John Goudie’s 1822 purchase of a twenty-year lease to the region’s fur resources. HBC management, however, quickly decided that the company had been mistaken in failing to pursue the lease with greater conviction and therefore, working from the margins of the King’s Posts, it engaged its new competitor in a struggle for control of the region’s fur supply throughout the 1820s. This conflict ended in 1831, with the purchase by the HBC of the King’s Posts Company’s lease.²⁰

Following its acquisition of the lease, the HBC enjoyed a decade during which it held monopoly rights to the region’s fur trade. However, by the end of the 1830s, the Société de Vingt-et-Un had begun the formal colonization of the Saguenay River region. This group aimed to support itself through lumbering (farming being strictly forbidden by the HBC). In


1842, William Priee purchased all of the sawmills that the colonists of the Vingt-et-Un had built on the Saguenay, thereby creating for himself a virtual monopoly on forestry operations in the region.\(^{21}\) Also in 1842, the HBC's exclusive rights to the King's Posts expired. Although the company renewed its lease, Lower Canadian authorities insisted on several important changes: while the HBC maintained exclusive rights to the region's fur trade, the government officially opened Saguenay-Lac St. Jean to colonization by providing the legal means for settlers to acquire title to lands that they had "improved."\(^{22}\) Thus, by the early 1840s the King's Posts ceased to be off-limits to Euro-Canadian colonization. This change, in turn, led to a radical reworking of the political and economic climate of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean.

In the face of large-scale Euro-Canadian immigration, the HBC lost its predominance in the region, although, initially, to another capitalist enterprise rather than to the state. Beginning in the early 1840s, William Price and Company had joined the HBC as one of the two primary capitalist enterprises operating in the Saguenay region. By 1851, the approximately 4,000 Euro-Canadians living along the banks of the river depended to various degrees on William Price, whether for their income or their tools and provisions. In a manner reminiscent of the HBC's proprietary monetary system, William Price and Company issued bills, to a maximum value of £1, for use in paying wages and purchasing goods from the company's stores.\(^{23}\) At mid-century, the region's lumber companies also, like the HBC, advanced credit to their employees, later deducted from their wages, so that they might buy provisions. In other words, Euro-Canadian wage-earners, like Aboriginal hunter-trappers,

\(^{21}\) Due to the important role played by one of William Price's associates, Alexis Tremblay, in the formation and management of the Société de Vingt-et-Un, Dechène speculates that Price may have in fact underwritten the group's activities precisely in the hopes of creating for himself such a monopoly. Louise Dechène, "Les entreprises de William Price (1810-1850): scieries et chantiers," Saguenevien, vol. 12, no. 4 (July-August 1970), p. 82-5. See also Camil Girard and Normand Perron, Histoire du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, Quebec, Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1995, p. 120-1.

\(^{22}\) Girard and Perron, Histoire du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, p. 119.

found themselves locked into a cycle of non-transferable debt which diminished their access to more universally acceptable forms of cash. William Price and Company reinforced this system by extending mortgages on their employees' lots in exchange for credit at the company store. Despite not owning their lands outright, as a result of either having failed to pay the full purchase price or illegally occupying lands, forestry workers were thus doubly beholden to the region's large timber merchants, chief among them William Price. A state-commissioned report on the Saguenay region, written in 1850, asserted that timber companies were able to exercise this stranglehold on the local economy precisely because of a lack of public economic infrastructure (including state-issued currency). "Le colon du Saguenay est dans une situation exceptionnelle. À une distance considérable de tous les marchés, il ne trouve dans le territoire qu'il habite aucun moyen de se procurer, par la vente de ses modiques produits s'il en a, l'argent dont il a besoin." Thus, by the middle years of the nineteenth century, the monetary system of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean was dominated by private currency, both physical and abstract, issued by two major commercial entities.

Despite the increasing centrality of Price and Company to the region's money supply, the HBC continued to control the majority of the currency used by the Aboriginal population. Between the seventeenth century and the 1840s, Innu hunter-trappers employed this money at the handful of trading posts scattered throughout the region. From its


25 Ibid.
acquisition of the lease to the King’s Posts through the end of the nineteenth century, the HBC operated a total of four posts in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean: Ashuapmouchouan, Chicoutimi, Métabetchouan (or Lake St. John), and Pointe Bleue (Mashteuiatsh). As a result of internal competition within the HBC and, in the case of Chicoutimi, the massive influx of Euro-Canadians, the first two posts rapidly lost importance to the Innu economy.26 Although Métabetchouan remained open until 1879, Mashteuiatsh quickly became the center of the HBC’s operations in the region following its establishment in 1866.27 This final post owed its longevity (it would continue to operate through the middle of the twentieth century) to the fact that it was situated on the reserve at Pointe Bleue, making it convenient for the HBC’s Innu trading partners.28

As elsewhere in the Canadian subarctic, the fur trade in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean relied on a beaver-based currency of account at the beginning of the period. Due to the

26 Métabetchouan provided competition to Chicoutimi while the company’s post at Mistassini did the same for Ashuapmouchouan. The HBC closed this second post, approximately 90 miles up the Ashuapmouchouan River from Lac St. Jean, in 1850 due to its small clientele (it served no more than eight families). For the post’s history, see J. Allan Burgess, “The Unwanted Post,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1947), p. 401-10. As early as 1831, a company employee described Chicoutimi as “a very pleasant and comfortable place, but trifling in the fur trade.” Richard Rae to James Bargrave, 18 October 1831, in G.P. de T. Glazebrook (ed.), The Hargrave Correspondence, 1821-1843, Toronto, Champlain Society, 1938, p. 78-9. By 1851, the post had become primarily dedicated to the transshipment of merchandise to and from interior posts and in 1856 the HBC abandoned the post. Although it reopened Chicoutimi in 1863, the post had by that time long since lost the major role that it had previously played in the Innu economy. Bouchard, Le Saguenay des fourrures, p. 229-30.

27 On Métabetchouan, see Michelle Guitard, Des fourrures pour le Roi au poste de Métabetouchan, Lac Saint-Jean, Quebec, Ministère des Affaires culturelles, 1984.

28 In fact, the company established the post in direct response to a petition it received from eight Innu men asking the HBC to open a post on their new reserve because “the present Post at Metebatchouan is too far from the Rivers, on the north side of the Lake, that many of us are accustomed to hunt in and especially during winter; when the navigation is closed the present Post is very difficult to access and for many of us who leave our families in the woods to come down for a supply of provisions it takes us a long time to reach Metebatchouan.” Luke Simeon, et al., to Edward Hopkins, 12 October 1866, LAC, RG10, vol. 10263, file 377/32-2-5-7, reel T-7555. The Department of Indian Affairs accorded the HBC permission to open a post on 6 December 1866. Newton Flanagan to James Bisset, 20 March 1876, ibid.
historic and contemporaneous French presence in the region, upon its merger with the Northwest Company the HBC referred to this money as the castor rather than as the made beaver.\(^{29}\) Although the company’s records are unclear, it would appear that at mid-century the Innu and the HBC traded at Métabetchouan based on a system of book debits and credits from which circulating media of exchange were absent. In spite of transactions that appear to be “pure barter,” the exchange of furs for provisions alongside the sale of furs towards the repayment of book debt suggests that the Innu and the HBC evaluated all exchange, regardless of its specific form, in monetary terms.\(^{30}\) Writing in 1857, David E. Price, the eldest son and a partner of William Price in addition to being the self-appointed Indian agent for the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, noted that the HBC continued to use the castor currency at its Métabetchouan post. Through its accounting practices and this purely abstract monetary form, the company established creditor-debtor relations with its clientele, thereby encouraging the sale of furs and the purchase of merchandise.\(^{31}\) Price asserted that this system

\(^{29}\) At the time of the merger, the HBC drew up a series of lists using the castor currency to express the amount of debt owed the company by Innu hunters at the King’s Posts. For examples from posts in the Lac St. Jean region, see K.K. Murchison(?), “List of debts due by Indians who frequent Ashwambmouson to the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1822,” 3 October 1822, HBCA, E.20/1, f. 213-4, reel 4M127 and Charles Jordan, “List of the debts due by the Indians at the Post on Lake Saint Johns,” 7 October 1822, in \textit{Ibid}, f. 215.

\(^{30}\) For example, the Métabetchouan post journal contains the following entries pertaining to “barter”: "A canoe arrived in the afternoon from Ashwn. they left immediately with 3 Bags of Flour & \(\frac{1}{2}\) Cuvt.[?] Shot[?]." Monday, 8 October 1849, HBCA, B.111/a/2, f. 23v, reel 1M70 and “Pierre Chemish traded a Beaver & Lynx Skin for Flour and left.” Thursday, 5 February 1852, HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 9v, reel 1M70. However, the journals also note debt-based exchange: “Traded the hunts of Joseph Sr. & Joseph Junr. this forenoon the former paid his debt the latter nearly so.” Monday 11 October 1852, HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 18v, reel 1M70, “Simeonish[?] arrived in the evening and traded his hunt he paid his debt.” Wednesday 13 October 1852, HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 18v, reel 1M70, and “Agapie & Son Laurent arrived last evening they traded their hunts this morning, both paid their debts, they left immediately afterwards.” Thursday, 19 May 1853, HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 27v, reel 1M70.

\(^{31}\) “Many owe large amounts to the Company, others less, and some of the best hunters have large amounts at their credits.” David E. Price to [?], 14 November 1857, Appendix No. 11 in Canada, “Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the 8th of September, 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada,” in \textit{Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers}, Appendix 21, Toronto, Stewart Derbishire and George Desbarats, 1858.
of carrying on its business allowed the HBC to fleece its Innu trading partners through the conscious manipulation of the value of its in-house currency.

The Company here trade by 'castors' which they change in value to suit their own purposes, from six pence to 2s. 6d., so that no one but the Clerk knows what he values them at; as for instance, one day a 'castor' represents ¼ lb. of powder and next day 1 lb. The Indian sells his furs for so many castors, and more he gets the more value he fancies he has obtained for his furs, but as the value of the castor is changed to suit the Company's purpose the poor Indian is 'taken-in' without his being aware of it.

Apparently because of the castor's proprietary nature and the power that this provided HBC employees when selling merchandise and purchasing furs, Price asserted that this technique for encouraging monopolistic over free market exchange prevented the Innu from learning to appreciate "real" money: "They do not know the value of money but in few instances."32

Although the HBC proved resilient in its use of the made beaver in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, settlement challenged its dominance in the region and, therefore, its ability to maintain a proprietary system of money. In contrast to earlier periods, competition in the mid-nineteenth century did not come from rival fur companies but from independent colonists, who either themselves trapped furs or acted as middlemen, and the region's large timber interests, particularly William Price and Company.33 Unlike the situation in Rupert's Land, the HBC did not possess a monopoly on exporting furs from Canada, which made their operations in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean vulnerable to both small and large competitors who could sell to either the merchant-furriers of Quebec City and Montreal or to the HBC itself.34

This competition, however, most frequently operated as a sideline to other economic

32 Ibid.

33 For example, an 1849 government report notes that the HBC "complain that the Lumberers, as well as the settlers carry on an extensive trade with the Indians to the great prejudice of the Compy & the demoralization of the Indians." T.B., "Hudson's Bay Compy at the King's Posts," 5 September 1849, BANQ-Q, Ministère des Terres et forêts, E 21/5, 2608-1401A, Report Book, no. 1, C.E., September 1847 to May 1851, #294, p. 263-4.

34 Guitard, Des fourrures pour le Roi..., p. 155-7 and 191.
activities practiced by individuals or companies, providing them with benefits at virtually no additional cost.\textsuperscript{35}

Such pressure, whether from colonists or timber companies, altered the form of the HBC’s monetary regime. Unsurprisingly, this system first underwent complete transformation at Chicoutimi. By 1849, if not before, the post at Chicoutimi began keeping its books in Halifax (provincial) currency suggesting that state-backed money had replaced its private counterpart in the trade along the Saguenay.\textsuperscript{36} By the late 1850s, in accord with the general movement towards the use of decimal currency in the Canadas, the HBC had switched monetary notation once again at the post, this time in favor of the dollar system.\textsuperscript{37} The company’s post at Métabetchouan began accepting cash on a limited basis, apparently from Euro-Canadians alone, beginning in the mid-1840s.\textsuperscript{38} However, the post records clearly

\textsuperscript{35} However, in at least one instance, William Price and Company dedicated resources in order to directly challenge the HBC’s trade with the Innu. In 1853, the company sent an Abenaki named Pierre Antoine to open a trading post on the shores of Lac St. Jean at the mouth of the Ashuapmushuagan River. “Pierre[?] Antoine an Abenakie Indian who is empl. by I believe Mr. Price to trade with the Indians arrived this forenoon at Mr. Price’s Establishment upon opposite side of the River, with a Barge belonging to that Establishment full of Goods, Provs. &c.” Tuesday, 1 November 1853, HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 33r, reel 1M70. “Pierre Antoine started his [?] for the entrance of the River Ashuapmushuagan [Ashuapmushuagan] where I understand he is to winter and to cheat the Ashun. Indians as much as he possibly can.” Saturday, 5 November 1853 in ibid. Unfortunately, no detailed records concerning this foray into the fur trade have been found and therefore it is impossible to determine its monetary impact. Regardless, the competition offered by Price and Company proved to be short-lived and by 1863 it had become one of the HBC’s main clients at Métabetchouan. Guitard, \textit{Des fourrures pour le Roi...}, p. 191-2.

\textsuperscript{36} Halifax currency employed pound notation. “Day Book,” HBCA, B.36/b/1, f. 7-26, reel 1M175. Although primarily dedicated to the Euro-Canadian trade by this period, some Innu hunter-trappers (e.g. Bazil Jr., Patapish, and François Lake St. Johns) traded at Chicoutimi. Thus, the changed monetary system affected the Innu.

\textsuperscript{37} Because of the document’s informal nature – it appears to have been used as a means of keeping daily accounts before transferring the numbers to formal account books and thus generally only lists the day and the month (without the year) – the Chicoutimi “Day Book” does not make entirely clear when this change took place. However, by 1859, the post had changed to dollar notation. “Day Book,” HBCA, B.36/b/1, f. 20v-26, reel 1M175.

\textsuperscript{38} The post’s Day Book lists a handful of cash sales made during August 1845. However, given the post’s standard practice of listing the name of Innu hunter-trappers for all transactions in which they
state neither the quantity nor the specific use the HBC made of money. While the HBC had begun occasionally making small cash payments at Métabetchouan by the second half of the 1850s, this money went to Euro-Canadians alone prior to the early 1860s.

While the HBC, recognizing non-proprietary money as a threat to its standing in the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fur trade, attempted to restrict the use of abstract and physical currency that it did not itself control for as long as possible, the Innu, also aware of money’s potential power, sought to increase their access to cash. Despite the HBC’s preeminent role in the region from the 1830s, Amerindians actively contributed to the downfall of the castor monetary system. This is particularly obvious in the use of abstract accounting currency. Beginning in the mid-1840s, the HBC post at Métabetchouan kept Innu accounts either in castor or in Halifax currency. The hunter-trappers appear to have decided themselves which money of account was used as each individual’s sales and purchases were always recorded in the same units. Through the 1850s, the number of Innu trading in provincial currency were involved, these sales were most likely made to non-Natives. 2, 3, 6, and 15 August 1845, HBCA, B.111/d/1, reel 1M506, f. 37v-38v and 40r-41r. Furthermore, the post’s ledger for Outfits 1846 and 1847, giving individualized accounts for all hunter-trappers (whether Aboriginal or Euro-Canadian) trading at Métabetchouan, makes no mention of Innu cash purchases. HBCA, B.111/d/2, reel 1M506. By 1849, among its regular compliment of hunter-trappers, the HBC made cash sales to Euro-Canadians alone. See for example, the purchases made by Joseph Verreaux, 6 June 1849, HBCA, B.111/d/3, reel 1M506, f. 20r.

39 In 1854, the post manager wrote: “I started this morning for Chicoutimi, to bring up the Cash left there by Mr. Stewart.” Thursday, 6 April 1854, HBCA, B.111/a/4, f. 39v, reel 1M70.

40 The HBC paid cash to Moyse Beaulieu, a French Canadian, in 1856 and 1857. 27 October 1856 and 15 August 1857, HBCA, B.111/d/11a, f. 4r and 5r reel 1M506.

41 For example, during Outfits 1846 and 1847, the transactions made by Agapie Sr. and Laurent Agapie were always recorded in pound notation whereas the transactions of nearly every other Innu were kept in Made Beaver. HBCA, B.111/d/2, reel 1M506. However, one account book, which contains lists of “Indian balances” and “Freemen’s balances” at the beginning of Outfits 1847 through 1849 at Métabetchouan, lists Agapie Sr.’s and Laurent Agapie’s balances in dollar notation, suggesting that these Innu may have traded in either Halifax currency, dollars, or both. HBCA, B.111/d/5, reel 1M506, f. 10r, 20r, and 30r. All of the “freemen” – that is, Euro-Canadians – traded in provincial currency rather than either the castor or dollars. Ibid, f. 10v, 20v, and 30v.
slowly grew, until, by the beginning of the following decade, the HBC accounted for all of its business in the region in dollars.\(^{42}\)

Beginning at this point the HBC provided the Innu economy with a significant amount of cash. In 1862, only two years after what was apparently the first monetary payment made to an Innu at Métabetchouan, Étienne Jourdain received $30 from the HBC, or one-quarter of what the average Innu hunter-trapper earned annually from the company whether in goods or in currency.\(^{43}\) From the middle of the 1860s through at least the middle of the 1870s, the amount of money that an “average” Innu hunter-trapper might make annually from the HBC varied wildly, but in general remained relatively small, ranging from slightly more than $2 to $13. However, once the outliers are removed from the data set,\(^{44}\) this “average” individual earned roughly $8 in cash annually, although this sum might double in a good year.\(^{45}\) However, this method of analysis obscures as much as it illuminates. For example, the higher average cash payments that the HBC made in 1872 when compared to other outfits during the early 1870s was primarily due to several individuals receiving greater

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\(^{42}\) The first accounting entries in dollars from the Métabetchouan post “Day Book” date to 1856. HBCA, B.III/d11a, reel 1M506. However, systematic accounting in decimal currency alone at the post did not begin until 1860. HBCA, B.III/d12a, reel 1M506.

\(^{43}\) 30 December 1862, HBCA, B.III/d15b, f.25r reel 1M507. The annual average income, $120, is that of the Innu trading at Pointe Bleue during the HBC’s 1866 and 1867 outfits. HBCA, B.329/d/1, reel 1M575. The first trace found of an Innu having been paid in cash by the HBC at Métabetchouan is from December 1860, when the company paid Bazil Junior $1 for furs. 28 December 1860, HBCA, B.III/d/12b, reel 1M507, f. 15r. The following year François Jourdain received $2 for furs and, in 1863, the HBC paid Luke $1 in cash. 7 July 1861, HBCA, B.III/d/12a, f. 93v, reel 1M507 and 1 November 1863, HBCA, B.III/d/14b, f. 105v, reel 1M507.

\(^{44}\) For example, in Outfit 1866, the HBC paid Étienne a total of $97.03 in cash for his furs. Although he also earned a relatively substantial amount of currency during the following year ($30), the size of the payment he received in 1866 was certainly anomalous. HBCA, B.329/d/1, reel 1M575. In order to diminish the standard deviation, thereby augmenting the reliability of resulting average, the highest and lowest sums of currency earned by any Innu during the outfits in question (1866, 1867, and 1870 through 1873) were not used when calculating the average.

\(^{45}\) The "standard" years for which data has been analyzed include 1867, 1870, 1871, and 1873. The average significantly increased to approximately $11 in 1872 and rose to roughly $15 in 1866. HBCA, B.329/d/1, reel 1M575 and B.329/d/5, 1M575.
amounts in currency than in other years. The highest earner in 1872, Prospère Cleary, earned nearly twice as much in monetary payments as he did for Outfits 1870, 1871, and 1873 combined. In addition to Cleary, three other Innu hunter-trappers (François Jourdain, Peter of Ashuapmouchouan, and Charles Carrot) made significantly more in cash payments in 1872 than in any other year. However, by the late 1880s, one journalist visiting the region (admittedly without having actually seen any Innu trade at the HBC post) claimed that, “the amount of good hard cash each Indian handles in the course of a year would hardly be enough to set up a safe-deposit company in business.” This suggests that despite the relatively good years that certain hunter-trappers experienced in the 1870s, most Innu drew only minor amounts of cash from their fur catch through the end of the 1880s.

Even after the importation of the Canadian currency system, however, Saguenay-Lac St. Jean’s population continued to make use of local, informal debt — whether transferable or not. In addition to its official, state-issued physical form (notes and coins), the Canadian dollar circulated as drafts and “bons” — that is, handwritten and signed notes acknowledging a monetary obligation on the part of the issuer to the holder. The HBC used this method of payment as it had traditionally used book debt to earn profit from both the purchase of furs and the sale goods. However, the frequency with which the HBC issued circulating credit in the form of bons appears to have diminished during the period. At the same time, the company occasionally collaborated with William Price and Company, by then

46 In 1872, the HBC paid Cleary $135.65, whereas he made a total of $83.80 in the other three years. HBCA, B.329/d/5, IM575.


48 For the HBC, drafts provided a simple means of providing payment for individuals elsewhere than at a local post. For example, the post manager at Métabetchouan ordered payment of a surveyor at Chicoutimi. Simon Ross, Draft for $30.00 for P. Dumais, 5 January 1876, HBCA, B.36/z/2, f. 4, reel IM1657. For other examples of drafts and “bons” from the mid-1870s, see HBCA, B.36/z/2, reel IM1657. For a list of drafts drawn at Métabetchouan on Chicoutimi, some payable to Innu, see HBCA, B.111/d/4, reel IM506, f. 44v-45v.

49 For a rare example of this form of payment, made for $34.16 to Charles Robertson in 1861 see, 29 May 1861, HBCA, B.111/d/12a, f. 63v, reel IM507.
one of the HBC’s chief clients in the region, perhaps in order to prevent its Innu trading partners from paying cash to the company’s rivals.\(^{50}\) Thus, at least during the 1860s and 1870s, private forms of transferable debt continued to provide the HBC with an effective means of limiting the Innu’s ability to conduct business elsewhere than at its posts.

Of course, the HBC also continued to employ purely abstract, book-based money in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean. This preference for crediting Innu accounts rather than purchasing furs with cash arose, as it did throughout the subarctic, from two overlapping factors. First, through the use of a pure system of book credits and debits, the HBC stood to make a profit both on its fur purchases and its sale of goods and provisions. Second, the HBC recognized that the use of freely circulating and universally accepted monetary instruments threatened its position in that Amerindian hunter-trappers armed with cash might take their consumer business elsewhere.\(^{51}\) However, because of the uncertain nature of hunts from one year to the next, the HBC was never capable of imposing a pure credit-for-furs system. If the company wished to prevent Amerindians from turning to the competition while keeping them hunting for saleable furs rather than for survival, especially following poor years when a hunter’s returns alone would not permit him to outfit for the following season, it was often forced to sell goods on credit. In spite of its dual desire to conduct trade using only abstract monetary means and to retain its clientele, the HBC frequently felt that the dangers of allowing its Aboriginal clients to purchase merchandise on credit (unpaid debt and the corresponding

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\(^{50}\) In 1868, the company paid Price & Co. $10, subtracting the amount from that the HBC owed Thomas Bacon. 11 November 1868, HBCA, B.329/d/17, f. 9r, reel 1M575. By 1863, Price and Company had become one of the HBC’s main clients at Mtiabetchouan. Guitard, Des fourrures pour le Roi..., p. 191-2.

\(^{51}\) This practice aimed at the maximization of “overplus” – that is, the difference between the HBC’s official valuation of furs, on the one hand, and provisions and goods, on the other. By selling merchandise at higher rates than those given in official HBC instructions, along with the purchase of furs at lower prices, managers could add to their post’s profits. With the advent of cash payments, Amerindian hunter-trappers were no longer captive consumers. As a result, the HBC lost, at least to some extent, one of its traditional forms of profit. On overplus, see Ray and Freeman, “Give Us Good Measure”, p. 52, 66-7, 93-5, and 203-17.
drain on profitability) outweighed the benefits (increased profits due to a captive clientele). Even though the Innu were, in the words of their Indian agent, “honorable in paying their debts,” the company had stopped extending credit at its Lac St. Jean posts by the late 1870s. James Bissett, the HBC’s chief factor at Montreal, asserted that because the company no longer needed to underwrite unpaid advances, it could “afford to sell goods cheaper than when giving them out on credit.” Although this change in policy proved untenable and had been definitively abandoned by the end of the following decade, the HBC’s practice of refusing credit most likely played a part in the decision of certain Innu to employ cash when paying for a portion of the merchandise they purchased at Mashteuiatsh. However, such cash expenditure remained marginal, most likely because the Innu sought hard currency in order to make purchases from retailers who, unlike the HBC, did not deal in book credits/debits.

By the 1880s, the company’s managers realized that currency had become a permanent part of its business with the Innu. From this point, the question changed from

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52 Although the HBC had always viewed credit as “a necessary evil,” they were rarely able to discontinue it completely. For a brief discussion of credit in a region bordering Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, see Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, *Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 1600-1870*, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983, p. 51-3 and 123-4.

53 L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 26 October 1878, in *Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1878*, p. 35. This comment echoes another, made over twenty years earlier, by David Price: “they [the Innu] are generally strictly honest that they return with their furs to the trading posts, where they received advances.” David E. Price to [?], 14 November 1857, Appendix No. 11 in Canada, *Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers*, Appendix 21, “Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the 8th of September, 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada,” Toronto, Stewart Derbishire and George Desbarats, 1858.

54 James Bissett to Newton Flanagan, 22 September 1879, HBCA, B.111/c/2, reel 1MB72.

55 The earliest cash sales found at Pointe Bleu date from 1883. For examples, see the sales made in June 1883 to Old Philip, David Philip, Charles Jourdain, Charles Robertson, George Metabeg, and Bazil Ousinithlon HBCA, B.329/a/2, reel 1M1018, f. 21r-26r.
whether to use money to how best to control it. By the end of that decade, the HBC had once more begun extending credit to Innu hunter-trappers at Mashteuiatsh. Moreover, the company provided a portion of this credit in cash, something that it had not previously done. In 1890, the inspector for the HBC’s Saguenay District described the potentially hazardous outcome of this system. He asserted that cash advances to the Innu constituted a very real risk to the company’s bottom-line, “especially in this District where such inducements are held out [by competitors] to Indians to be dishonest.” However, he agreed with the post manager at Mashteuiatsh who felt that, “the effect of abolishing all cash advances to Indians would be disastrous, and I have no doubt that to a certain extent he is right, as they are bound to have cash, and if not supplied will keep back furs to obtain it from others.”

This policy was clearly directed at securing Innu trade in what was proving to be a particularly challenging environment for the company. By the 1890s, colonization on the shores of Lac St. Jean had significantly increased the size of the region’s Euro-Canadian population. The growth of towns in the immediate vicinity of Mashteuiatsh created new outlets for sale of furs, apparently raising prices and injecting large amounts of money into the Innu economy. At the same time, retailers in these towns proved eager to sell merchandise to Amerindians in exchange for cash. In 1898, J.B. Ross, an HBC employee in the Saguenay district, informed the company’s Pointe Bleue manager that, “the Indians on their way to this Post dispose of a great many furs for cash to the storekeepers.” The HBC responded to its local cash-paying competition by dramatically increasing the amount of

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56 For a discussion of how to make the company’s prices at Mashteuiatsh more competitive, thereby theoretically diminishing the amount of cash necessary in order to purchase furs, see J.A. Wilson, “Post Report – Pointe Bleue,” 18 October 1889, HBCA, B.329/e/2, reel 1M1258.


58 Unfortunately, none of these new fur traders left records of their activities. As a result, it is necessary to rely on statements made by HBC employees which rarely contain any quantitative information.

59 Sunday, 29 May 1898, HBCA, B.325/a/4, reel 1M1019, f. 9v.
currency it employed when purchasing furs from the Innu. On 31 May 1901 alone, the HBC post at Pointe Bleue paid Innu hunter-trappers at least $255.32 in cash (and perhaps as much as $389.14).60

Thus, wide-scale colonization in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean altered the region’s monetary landscape by introducing new trading partners and currencies, while simultaneously pushing the HBC to retreat in the face of a booming settler population. As a result, the Innu integrated their economic activity into the networks imported and created by their new Euro-Canadian neighbors, in the process diminishing the economic and political power of the HBC. The slow creation of infrastructure – the markets and roads that were still largely lacking at mid-century – brought about changes in the region’s monetary system. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Innu had free access to the Canadian dollar, both in its physical and abstract forms, making use of it with both the HBC and its competitors. In this way, the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean Innu were no longer beholden to the company in the same way as they had previously been, thereby gaining at least a measure of economic and political independence. However, during the same period that the HBC’s hold on the region and its Aboriginal population slipped, the state, primarily through the Department of Indian Affairs, became increasingly involved in the everyday lives of the Innu.61 Thus, the shift from one monetary regime to another underscores the changing ways in which the British Empire and the young nation of Canada managed the territory to which they laid claim along with its inhabitants.

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60 The lower number represents the total number of cash payments made by the HBC where the recipient is clearly identified. The additional $133.82 included in the higher figure is the sum of cash payments made on the same day where the recipient is not identified. The HBC records identify six Innu as having shared the $255.32. 31 May 1901, HBCA, B.329/a/4, reel 1M1019, f. 25r-27r.

61 For a study of the state’s increasingly important role in Innu life, see Alain Beaulieu and Stéphanie Béreau, “‘Voir par eux-mêmes à l’Administration de leurs propres affaires’: Les Innus de Mashteuiatsh et l’implantation du Conseil de bande, 1881-1952,” Revue d'histoire de l’Amérique française (forthcoming, personal communication).
Money-Use and Socioeconomic Stratification: The "Moditional Economy" and Class Formation in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh

This section examines the process through which the socioeconomic landscape and money-use developed in tandem in nineteenth-century Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. Whereas the historiography, influenced to a greater extent by anthropology than sociology, emphasizes social cohesion while downplaying stratification in Aboriginal Canada, this section argues that, particularly in the case of the Huron, the nineteenth century was a transformative period for Amerindian communities as they underwent socioeconomic change that approximated those concurrently taking place among urban Euro-Canadians. It also claims that the local implementation of state policy directly contributed to some of these changes, particularly as a result of the legislative regulation of credit relations. However, the state did not dictate all economic aspects of reserve life and, in fact, often proved oblivious to the ways in which market activity truly affected local money-use. While departmental officials maintained the stereotype of Amerindian improvidence, nineteenth-century Innu and Huron, like their Euro-Canadian neighbors, actively sought to improve their lives through economic activity. Again like their neighbors, Amerindians modified traditional activities in a variety of unique ways to participate in what John Lutz terms the "moditional economy." Lutz argues that Aboriginal economies in the post-contact era were neither purely capitalist or traditional nor were they a random assembly of elements that corresponded to one of these two logics alone. Rather, Amerindians engaged in activities that scholars have tended to label "Aboriginal" or "Western" by adhering to changing cultural prerogatives that favored social reproduction.

This section, then, claims that the state's discourse with regard to the unitary "improvident Indian" was largely divorced from the historical experience of the Huron and Innu during the

62 For a well-known study that both influenced Lutz and treats the Saguenay region during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Gérard Bouchard, Quelques arpents d'Amérique: population, économie, famille au Saguenay, 1838-1971, Montreal, Boréal, 1996.

nineteenth century. Indeed, rather than being dependent on state assistance, the vast majority of the population of these two First Nations procured their living through market activity.

“A love of work appears to be fully developed”: The Mixed Economy of Money Making

This section addresses the various ways in which the Huron and Innu earned income during the nineteenth century in order to situate state discourse with respect to actual money-use. It concentrates on the local level, arguing that while high-level debates, policy, and legislation partially structured money-use, the analysis of day-to-day income acquisition provides an effective means of comparing this discourse to material experience. Ultimately, this section argues that the official depiction of Aboriginal peoples as inherently improvident fails to account for the wide array of economic activities in which community members participated while earning revenue for themselves and their families. Furthermore, it underlines the incommensurability of authorities’ discourse through its analysis of official sources that document the hard work in which Amerindians engaged. In 1893, for example, the Indian agent at Mashteuiatsh described for his superiors in Ottawa the variety of market activities in which the Innu participated: “Some of them till the land, while others manufacture canoes, which are in great demand at the fishing places. Some are also employed in the saw-mills of Roberval, but they generally prefer to engage as guides with the sportsmen whenever they have the chance.”64 While such mixed means of earning income did not necessarily favor capital accumulation, they did allow the Innu (and those Huron who similarly combined diverse sources of revenue) to maintain their sense of community while supporting themselves materially. At the same time, this description also clearly demonstrates the energy Amerindians employed while participating in the market economy, underlining the extent to which the Department’s discourse diverged from its wards’ experience.

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While, as discussed in the preceding section, the Innu earned the vast majority of their revenue, monetary or otherwise, during the nineteenth century from the fur trade, the Huron economy grew increasingly dependent on proto-industrial production during the period. This burgeoning sector of the economy, dominated by the manufacture and sale of "souvenir art" and utilitarian goods based on traditional Aboriginal design, lay at the heart of Wendake’s socioeconomic stratification. Although the Huron, like other First Nations, had long produced such objects for their own use, by the end of the nineteenth century commercialization had propelled this activity to the forefront of Wendake’s economy, in the process creating important class divisions between a small economic elite and a much larger working class. Members of two Huron families, the Picards/Vincents and the Bastiens, operated this industry, earning impressive amounts of money while elevating their social standing among community members and the well-to-do residents of Quebec City alike. At the same time, these families provided a major source of employment to other band members. However, this sector of employment, whose health depended on regional, national, and international markets, proved volatile, and the increasing frequency of massive layoffs as the century advanced contributed to periodic hardship among workers and their families.

In the 1820s, this sector of the Huron economy produced a large quantity of goods which a guidebook published at the beginning of the following decade described as “bows and arrows, and moccasins very neatly finished by the Squaws.” In 1836, the commissary general reported to the governor general of British North America that the Huron’s “chief Employment consists in the Manufacture of Mocassins, Snow Shoes, &c. for the Quebec

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Market, and in hunting and fishing.” By the 1840s, if not before, Marguerite Vincent LaSinonkié and her husband Paul Picard Hondaonhont, along with their nephew Philippe Vincent Ténonouathasta and son François Xavier “Paul” Picard Tahourenché, had begun the first large-scale manufacturing business in the community. During the 1840s, the Picards conducted a profitable business with the British military and civilians alike. Among their customers, the Picards counted members of the colony’s ruling elite, including Lord and Lady Elgin, the governor’s brother and military secretary, Robert Bruce, and the British army’s commander of Canada’s eastern district, General Charles Stephen Gore. This patronage was made possible by Wendake’s proximity to Quebec City, the Picards’ high social standing, and their ability to receive these individuals in a style fitting their rank. During the 1850s, the Picards promoted and sold their goods at industrial exhibitions in

67 R.J. Routh to the Earl of Gosford, 28 April 1836, in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835 ..., p. 39. Louis Juchereau Duchesnay echoed this comment later the same year when he wrote: “At Lorette, their principal means are in making & embroidering with camel hair and porcupine quills, shoes, mitts, [?] and many other articles; in making snow-shoes, hunting to a small extent and some in cultivating vegetable gardens & small tracts of land.” Louis Juchereau Duchesnay, “Answers to Queries,” 19 November 1836, LAC, RG 10, vol. 92, p. 37645-51, reel C-11468.

68 Delâge, “La tradition de commerce...,” p. 46.

69 The Picards sold the army snowshoes manufactured by their employees. “Payé pour les raquettes du Gouvernement le 28 avril 1842 par le Commissaire Millikin.” François Xavier (Paul) Picard Tahourenché, Journal (1837-1875), 28 April 1842, ACNHW. A later entry in the same journal refers to “Mr. Millikin Commissaire Général.” 17 July 1845 in Ibid. For an example of sales made by François Xavier Picard, see François-Xavier Picard, Vente de l’été 1846, 1 November 1846[?], BANQ-Q, P883, S2, File 7.


71 Among Quebec City’s elite, François Xavier Picard was known for his hospitality. As a result, he frequently received prestigious residents of the city in his home. “Reçu la visite du Lord, et Lady Elgin Colonel Bruce, sa dame, Capt Hamilton[, ] un autre Monsieur[, ] Lord & Lady Warncliff[,] Lady Hamilton, et Lady Bruce, en ma demeure, le 24 Juin 1852, jour de la St. Jean Baptiste.” François Xavier (Paul) Picard Tahourenché, Journal (1837-1875), 24 June 1852, ACNHW.
Quebec City and Montreal and at the Exposition Universelle in Paris.\footnote{The industrial exhibitions held in Quebec City and Montreal were held 1850 and the Paris exhibition took place in 1855. François Xavier (Paul) Picard Tahourenché, Journal (1837-1875), n.d. [September 1851], ACNHW and Thomas Sterry Hunt, Le Canada et l'Exposition universelle de 1855, Toronto, n.p., 1856, p. 204-6.} By the early 1870s, the period during which Philippe Vincent's son (also named Philippe) assumed responsibility for operations,\footnote{Philippe Vincent Téonouathasta died in 1870. Delâge, “La tradition de commerce...,” p. 46. However, by the mid-1880s, if not before, Vincent's son ran the business. Guillaume Giroux, Annual Report on the Agency at Lorette, n.d., in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1884, p. 35.} the family proved able to ship 1,700 pairs of moccasins to a single customer. While such sales did not involve astronomical sums of money (in this case, each pair of women's moccasins sold for $0.10 whereas men's moccasins cost the buyer $0.13 per pair) the volume of this particular transaction and the acknowledgment that another item (men's overcoats) cost the same as the previous year suggest that the size of this exchange was not unusual.\footnote{François Xavier Picard to [?], 15 February 1872, BANQ-Q, P883, S2, File 7.}

Like the Picards, the Bastien family also successfully managed the manufacture of moccasins, snowshoes, and other "traditional" Amerindian goods. The firm that, by the 1920s, would be known as Bastien Brothers began operations in Wendake under Maurice Bastien in 1876.\footnote{The brochure contains an error when it states that Maurice Bastien was "the Only Manufacturer in Indian Lorette in 1826." It should instead read "1926," the year in which it was printed. Bastien Brothers, Brochure: "The Call of Indian Lorette," n.d. [1926], ACNHW, E-4-66.} At this early date, Bastien manufactured snowshoes alone. According to sociologist Léon Gérin, Bastien's son, Maurice Bastien Ahgnionlen "the second," had taken over the prospering business by the time of Gérin's visit to the Huron village in the 1890s. "Le petit atelier de fabrication de raquettes que lui avait transmis son père s'est singulièrement développé et diversifié entre ses mains." In addition to snowshoes, the Bastiens manufactured moccasins and tanned hides.\footnote{Gérin, “Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage,” p. 34-5.} Although the family's business would...
later develop to sell its products through international wholesalers, during the late nineteenth century, Caroline Bastien, Maurice Bastien Ahgnionlen’s daughter, traveled to the United States herself to sell the company’s wares in the 1880s.\textsuperscript{77}

By the middle of the decade, the Picard (now headed by Philippe Vincent) and Bastien families had been joined by François Grosouis Sasceinio in the manufacture of moccasins and snowshoes.\textsuperscript{78} During these years, Wendake’s missionary claimed that, “The trade in moccasins and snow shoes has made great advances, and has contributed to the prosperity of the village.\textsuperscript{79} However, by the end of the decade, Euro-Canadian competition in “Indian industries” had begun to adversely affect manufacturing in Wendake.\textsuperscript{80} By the middle of the 1890s, the Huron Indian agent, Antoine O. Bastien, reported that the industry’s continued struggles, the result of a 50% drop in prices caused by a “depression in trade” and intense competition,

forced some families to try a venture in the American republic. Fortunately, however, the demands of Ontario and the west have raised the state of affairs a little; the village was threatened with a regular emigration. This disaster was prevented through the efforts of some courageous men of the tribe, notably Mr.

\textsuperscript{77} Maurice Bastien to L.W. Vankoughnet, 11 July 1880, LAC, RG10, vol. 2116, file 22,010, reel C-11161. Until the very end of the nineteenth century, this practice had the added benefit of allowing the Bastiens to avoid paying import duties as a result of Caroline’s Indian status.


\textsuperscript{80} In his 1888 annual report, the Indian agent wrote: “Trade, which until lately was prosperous, has now considerably decreased, and the Indians are consequently not in such good circumstances. The competition entered into by the whites in Indian industries has been the cause, to a certain extent, of this state of things.” Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 August 1888, in \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report}, 1888, p. 28. Thomas Sioui, an inveterate political opponent of Bastien, echoed this sentiment: “depuis quelques années[es] les blancs se sont adonnés à la fabrication de tous ces articles et enlevé complètement cette industrie aux Sauvages qui ont perdu ainsi ce moyen de gagner leur vie.” Petition from Thomas Tsioiu, \textit{et al.} to Lord Stanley de Preston, Governor General of Canada, 26 August 1889, LAC, RG10, vol. 6825, file 495-8-1, pt. 1, reel C-8545.
Maurice Bastien, jr., who, to the detriment of his own business, with the sole object of assisting his compatriots, continued to give work to families in the village and to prevent their leaving the country. 81

The Indian agent considered the prospects of a lasting revival in the industry grim because “half of it has now passed into the hands of speculators, who trade on the margin of abatement on these articles which, however, do not lose any of their quality or actual value.” 82 During this period the most serious threat to the Huron industry appears to have come from Euro-Canadian tanneries that, along with Bastien, dominated the supply of raw materials for moccasin and snowshoe production. By the turn of the century, Cloutier, a Canadien who had married a widow from the Sioui family, and Henry Ross, a merchant of Scottish origin who had recently acquired Philippe Vincent’s business, constituted the Huron’s primary competition in tanning, as well as snowshoe and moccasin manufacturing. However, Bastien owned by far the largest such operation in Wendake. 83

At the very end of the 1890s, the industry experienced a dramatic rebirth as a result of the demand for snowshoes and moccasins brought about by the Klondike gold rush. In 1898, the Indian agent at Wendake claimed that, “there are manufactured in the Huron village, no less than seven thousand pairs of snowshoes, and at least twelve thousand dozen pairs of moccasins, representing a general business of from $70,000 to $75,000.” 84 Léon Gérin agreed, estimating that in the late nineteenth century the industry in Wendake used 10,000 to 15,000 hides each year in the production of approximately 140,000 pairs of

81 Of course, this report may have been overly flattering with regard to Maurice Bastien Ahgnionlen, given that he was the agent’s brother. Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 August 1895, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1895, p. 31-2.


83 During the 1890s, three tanneries operated either within Wendake or in its immediate vicinity. Two of them were owned by Euro-Canadians (Ross and Cloutier) and the third was owned by Maurice Bastien Ahgnionlen. Gérin, “Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage,” p. 33-5.

moccasins and 7,000 pairs of snowshoes.\textsuperscript{85} In comparison, one of the largest shoe manufacturers in the province, Ames-Holden of Montreal, produced two million pairs of shoes annually in 1921.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, the roughly 150,000 pairs of moccasins that the agent claimed Wendake produced during the Klondike boom years would appear to have placed Huron manufacturers in the company of the province's largest footwear firms during the late nineteenth century. Bastien produced the largest quantity of snowshoes and moccasins (over half of the total value according to the Indian agent) while Philippe Vincent's company (the former Picard operation, purchased by Henry Ross following Vincent's December 1897 death) also manufactured a large amount.

While Huron entrepreneurs apparently made large profits from their products, their employees earned significantly less income. Despite this unsurprising discrepancy, wageworkers in Wendake appear to have earned more than at least some of their Euro-Canadian neighbors. During the 1890s, the women who produced moccasins for any one of the companies in Wendake earned between $0.25 and $0.30 for every dozen pairs they completed. Thus, according to Gérin, they were able to make between $0.30 and $0.50 per day when working entirely by hand or twice as much when employing a sewing machine. As a result of this difference in income, many Huron women had invested in this technology by the turn of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{87} However, while the Klondike boom in moccasin and snowshoe production provided jobs and insured the continued existence of "the mother industry of our village of Lorette," the Indian agent wrote that this upturn increased neither the workers' wages nor the owners' profits to any meaningful extent.\textsuperscript{88} Regardless, the wages

\textsuperscript{85} Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 36-7.


\textsuperscript{87} Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 34.

\textsuperscript{88} Bastien explains this by pointing out "the considerable rise in the value of leather and raw skins; for example, the raw skins which formerly were worth from $4 to $5 per 100 lbs. have risen to from $9 to $10." Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 22 July 1898, in \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1898}, p. 45.
earned by the companies’ employees proved significant enough to entice French Canadians from neighboring St. Ambroise Parish to join the Huron in producing moccasins, although only two had acquired the skills needed to manufacture snowshoes. Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, Gérin felt that a new factory system had supplanted the older putting-out model in the production of Huron “artisanal” goods, in the process significantly altering the village’s work environment. “À l’ancien petit atelier familial s’est substitué l’atelier collectif sous la direction de patrons étrangers à la famille ouvrière.” In other words, a new, class-based hierarchy had replaced the older, informal system of production.

In strictly monetary terms, the Indian agent claimed that this newfound growth greatly benefited the Huron. At the height of the Klondike boom, Bastien reported that,

During the past year, thanks to the improvement in the local industry, the Huron tribe has enjoyed a condition superior to that of the last few years. Money has circulated more than usual, but the lack of work during the last few years placed a good many in distress, and forced them to run into debt for maintenance and provisions which they have not yet liquidated. I have observed that generally they have acted with strict economy in order to retrieve the past, and to be ready to face the possibilities of the future. A love of work appears to be fully developed, and assures the advancement both intellectually and materially of the Huron tribe.

Of course, at least some of those Huron who were “forced... to run into debt” borrowed from Bastien as a result of his illicit on-reserve retailing activity. Regardless, this manufacturing gold rush proved short-lived, with the agent writing the following year that, “The enthusiasm of last year, which made these Indians imagine that their success would continue, particularly blinded their foresight, and this year, compared with last year, the making of snowshoes and moccasins was nearly nil.” This underlines the increasing centrality of moccasin and


snowshoe manufacturing to the reserve economy and the very real damage to general Huron wellbeing that any downturn in this industry could inflict.

In addition to moccasins and snowshoes, the Huron also manufactured, on a markedly smaller scale and with less economic impact, “fancy wares” for sale in Wendake, to wholesalers in urban areas, and to tourists in the northeastern United States and at the “watering holes” along the lower St. Lawrence (e.g. Malbaie, Cacouna, and Rivière du Loup).\(^{92}\) Although its recovery lagged behind that of Wendake’s production and sale of moccasins and snowshoes, the souvenir art industry also rebounded by the end of the nineteenth century. In the same year that the more industrial production reaped the rewards of the Klondike, the Indian agent at Wendake wrote that souvenir art manufacturing “was not so remunerative, and the opinion at the end of the season was that it will be still less so this year. The squaws, who work in ash wood and sweet hay, not having had time during the winter to prepare as large a supply as usual, went to the watering places without much stock in hand.” While hard economic times negatively affected this industry, it also suffered as a result of the United States’ decision to revoke Canadian Amerindians’ immunity from customs fees, in the process imposing a “ruinous duty on these articles.”\(^{93}\) In spite of these obstacles, the Huron labor that had been eliminated by the massive post-Yukon decrease in snowshoe and moccasin production contributed to the following year’s threefold increase in revenue from the sale of “fancy wares.” According to the Indian agent, this happy coincidence, along with the newly introduced production of canvas canoes, saved Wendake’s economy from what would have otherwise been a devastating loss of revenue. “Had it not been for the introduction into the village of a new work, the making of canvas canoes, many families would have found themselves in discouraging want.”\(^{94}\) Regardless, throughout the period this

\(^{92}\) Gérin, “Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage,” p. 32.


industry supplied markedly less income to the Huron than the production of moccasins and snowshoes.

While manufacturing of “traditional” goods provided the majority of Wendake’s residents with monetary income during the nineteenth century, not all community members benefitted from this development to the same extent. As a result, this industry contributed to significant socioeconomic stratification. For example, the money generated by manufacturing provided the members of the Bastien and Picard/Vincent families with the means of elevating their social status through access to education and white-collar jobs. For example, Prosper Vincent, one of Philippe Vincent Téonouathasta’s sons, became a Catholic priest in 1870 and had become a vicar by the turn of the twentieth century. In 1876, the provincial Department of Colonization and Mines hired Paul Picard, the son of François Xavier Picard Tahourenché, as a draughtsman and surveyor, a position that he held through at least 1888. At the same time, Picard exercised the office of notary public. Also during the 1880s, Picard occasionally worked as a consultant for the federal Department of Justice. In 1885, he received $3 per day for the time he provided information (“renseignements”), $4 per day when called upon testify in court, and $10 for a detailed map of the former seigneuries in the region of Quebec City. This form of upward social mobility appears to have been restricted to members of those families that dominated Wendake’s manufacturing sector.

96 According to his application for life insurance, Picard had been employed by Quebec as “Government Employee Draughtsman” since 1876. Paul Picard, Application for a Policy, Union Mutual Life Insurance Company, 26 April 1888, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 7.
97 Madame Veuve P. Picard to J. Prévost, 12 September 1905, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, File 5. Picard’s profession is listed as “Notaire” in Copie d’une convention de vente remérée de Paul Picard à Cyrille Tessier, 6 June 1888, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, file 3.
98 In total, the Department of Justice paid Picard $79.50 for his consulting work and services as an expert witness. H. Cyria Pelletier, Moneys Owed to Paul Picard by the Department of Justice, n.d. [20 July 1886] and George W. Burbidge to Paul Picard, 27 July 1886, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 14.
Although manufacturing dominated Wendake’s economy during the nineteenth century, the Huron were always able to earn revenue from other activities as well. For example, community members continued to hunt and trap through the turn of the twentieth century even if their work in this sector generated much less revenue and occupied far fewer community members than among the Innu. Between the 1820s and the end of the century, nearly every male band member participated in at least one of the two seasonal hunts (autumn or spring) and many fished during the summer, although not necessarily in the hopes of selling their catch. However, as time went by the number of Huron who earned the majority of their income from hunting or trapping decreased. Between 1871 and 1891, the percentage of adult male community members who declared hunting to be their primary occupation fell from 37.5% to 14%, largely as a result of slumping fur prices. Wendake’s primary industry, the production of moccasins and snowshoes, appears to have absorbed the majority of these men into its workforce. By this point, Huron hunter-trappers sold their skins, almost certainly for cash alone, directly to the furriers of Quebec City, including Laliberté, Renfrew, Pâquet, and Vermette. Several Huron also engaged in the moose hunt in order to supply artisans in Wendake with their valuable hides, again most likely receiving payment in hard currency.

99 Jocelyn Téhatarongnate Paul, “Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de Lorette,” *Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2000), p. 8. This percentage actually grew between 1871 and 1881, when it stood at 42%. However, the fur market dropped substantially during the 1880s. In 1888, the Indian agent wrote: “They have had very little success this year in hunting and fishing; beaver has been very scarce and it is the most profitable fur. Marten and mink, however, have been plentiful, but the price at which the fur of those animals is sold is very low.” Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 August 1888, in *Indian Affairs Annual Report*, 1888, p. 28. Beginning in 1889 and continuing through the mid-1890s, fur prices rebounded and those Huron engaged in hunting and trapping had a series of successful years. Regardless, this did not lead to the reconversion of the Huron economy to hunting and trapping. Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 August 1889, in *Indian Affairs Annual Report*, 1889, part 1, p. 36, Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 29 August 1891, in *Indian Affairs Annual Report*, 1891, p. 31, Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 24 August 1892, in *Indian Affairs Annual Report*, 1892, p. 32, Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 6 September 1893, in *Indian Affairs Annual Report*, 1893, p. 34, and Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 31 August 1894, in *Indian Affairs Annual Report*, 1894, p. 30.

100 However, because of the animal’s virtual disappearance from the regions adjacent to the village, hunters were forced to travel to New Brunswick and Maine in their pursuit. Léon Gérin, “Le Huron de
Nevertheless, even during years of relative abundance, the Huron were, in the words of their agent, "unable by these occupations to provide the necessaries of life for their families."\(^{101}\)

In addition to unfavorable market conditions for the sale of furs, the 1880s and 1890s proved to be a difficult period for those Huron who sought to earn a living from the bush as a result of the construction of the Quebec and Lake St. John Railway, the creation of numerous game clubs with exclusive hunting and fishing rights in the region between Wendake and Mashteuiatsh, and the establishment of the provincial Parc des Laurentides. In 1896, agent Bastien reported to his superiors in Ottawa that, "Nearly all the lakes where they were accustomed to fish freely have been put under license by the provincial government. The establishment of the National Park has deprived them of the liberty of hunting as they please, and if one should attempt to break the law he would render himself liable to be severely punished and to lose his ammunition and hunting outfit."\(^{102}\) By 1900, several Huron had been brought before "Dame Justice" for their hunting and trapping activities in the Parc des Laurentides and the lands reserved for game clubs in the region. Although the courts declined to impose the monetary fines and imprisonment within its power, they did so only on the condition that the Huron "not return."\(^{103}\) Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, low prices, the loss of easy access to game in proximity to Wendake, and an increasingly menacing regulatory regime had combined to dramatically reduce the importance of hunting and trapping to the Huron economy. Despite these challenges, certain individuals continued

\(^{101}\) Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 August 1895, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1895, p. 31.


to practice this occupation in conjunction with other activities well into the twentieth century. ¹⁰⁴

Both before and after the turn of the twentieth century, these Huron did so by combining their own personal and relatively small-scale hunting and trapping operations with paid employment guiding tourists on hunting and fishing excursions in the region north of Quebec City.¹⁰⁵ According to Jocelyn Tehatarongnantase Paul, guiding Euro-Canadian sport hunters and fishermen first provided the community with a source of monetary income at the beginning of the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁶ By the late 1880s, the Indian agent claimed that those Huron who served as guides to sportsmen obtained a higher standard of living than those who continued to support themselves primarily by hunting.¹⁰⁷ By the middle of the following decade, a majority of Huron men found employment as guides, making good wages in the process. “At certain seasons of the year, especially during winter, it is nothing unusual to see three-quarters of our men accompanying gentlemen. They then earn on an average $1.25 a

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.


¹⁰⁶ Paul, citing Gérin, writes: “les officiers de la garnison britannique de même que des bourgeois de Québec et certains riches ‘sportsmen’ étrangers utilisaient abondamment les Hurons à titre de guides tant pour la pêche que pour la chasse au gros gibier [...] Cette activité lucrative rapportait au début du XIXᵉ siècle plusieurs milliers de dollars de revenus.” Paul, “Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de Lorette,” p. 9. However, Paul mistakenly attributes the “plusieurs milliers de dollars de revenus” made by Huron guides to the early nineteenth century, suggesting that he overestimated the profitability of guiding during this early period. Gérin referred to the Huron of the late nineteenth century when he wrote that guiding sportsmen assured them of “plusieurs mille dollars de revenu chaque année.” Gérin, “Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage,” p. 31. For an example of Huron guiding during the early 1870s, see “Les causes célèbres. Le coup de fusil sans témoin. Comment le guide indien Gros-Louis fut assassiné et dévalisé en revenant à travers bois à Lorette,” in La Patrie, Montréal, vol. 46, no. 47, n.d. [1871], p. 26.

¹⁰⁷ “Some of our best hunters were hired to serve as guides to American sportsmen, and their condition was materially improved thereby.” Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 August 1889, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1889, part 1, p. 36.
day, clear of all expenses." The profitability of this sector, particularly in comparison to hunting and trapping, continued through the turn of the twentieth century.

The construction of the Quebec and Lake St. John Railway also greatly influenced Innu economic fortunes. The railroad provided easy access to Lac St. Jean, where the Innu occupied a privileged position when seeking employment guiding Euro-American sportsmen in the region. In 1889, an American journalist heartily recommended Lac St. Jean to his readers: "The water is full of fish, the woods are full of game, and 100 miles around it, in any direction, you can go and stand where no white man ever stood before." Here the visiting sportsmen could hire Innu "guides, [for] $1.50 a day; [and] foreman guides, capable of heading a party and taking full charge, [for] $2.50 a day." Following the construction of the railway, then, the Innu made wages guiding tourists comparable to those earned by their Huron counterparts.

While the opening of the railway certainly offered Amerindians opportunities for earning cash, state authorities feared that the increased presence of Euro-Canadian and Euro-American sportsmen in the region would distract the Innu from farming, the Department of Indian Affairs' preferred method of promoting "civilization." In 1890, Edgar Dewdney, the minister of the interior and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, wrote that,

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109 Gérin writes: "Directement, la pêche et la chasse procurent aux Hurons des recettes à peine supérieures à celles que fournit la culture; mais indirectement, par l'exercice du métier de guide, elles leur assurent plusieurs mille dollars de revenu chaque année. Le guide indien accompagne les partis de 'sportmen' aux lieux de chasse et de pêche, ou encore les arpenteurs officiels dans leurs voyages d'exploration. Il reçoit pour ses services 1.25 dollar (à peu près 6 fr. 50) par jour, sans compter les vivres, le tabac et le whisky pendant toute la durée du voyage. C'est l'occupation favorite de Daniel Gros-Louis, de son frère Xavier et de nombre d'autres Hurons." Ibid.

The Montagnais of Lac St. Jean have been brought more into contact with the world outside of their reserve since the construction of the Quebec and Lake St. John Railway; but it is questionable whether they will be benefited thereby either morally or materially. The advent to the locality of so many strangers attracted by the lovely scenery of Lac St. Jean is calculated to divert their minds from giving their attention to cultivating the soil, which would be ultimately of more permanent value to them than the few dollars picked up by them from transient tourists, who employ them as guides and boatmen.\textsuperscript{111}

In this way, Dewdney, as generations of officials had done before him, portrayed the Innu as improvident by nature and thus as being particularly susceptible to the exchangeability of currency, especially if it could be had through employment that he considered to be easy for Amerindians. According to such reasoning, if Aboriginal peoples did not need to toil for their income, they would not put it to appropriately “sober” ends — that is, they would expend such literally “easy money” on alcohol and other useless or harmful goods, preventing themselves from benefiting “either morally or materially” from their income. Dewdney implicitly drew this connection by claiming that, presumably because of the arrival by train of so many newcomers in the region, “Their intemperance in the use of intoxicants has already become of more frequent occurrence, and it is feared that this vice, with all its attendant misery, will increase among them rather than decrease.”\textsuperscript{112} Despite their clearly exhibited work ethic,

\textsuperscript{111} Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1890, p. xxiii. It is important to note that Dewdney drew on the annual report of L.E. Otis, the Indian agent at Pointe Bleue in making this claim. However, Dewdney went much further in asserting the deleterious effects of the arrival of so many Euro-Canadians in the region. Otis, while also emphasizing the railway’s negative effects, also claimed that the Innu were still making progress in terms of agriculture. “The employment of the Indians as guides by the strangers who visit our watering and fishing places, retards to a certain extent their advancement in agriculture. Their progress in this particular branch is slow. Nevertheless, some improvement is noticeable.” L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John and Chicoutimi Agency, 23 August 1890, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1890, p. 101.

\textsuperscript{112} Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1890, p. xxiii. Dewdney once more based his claim on Otis’s report. However, in this instance, Otis was also quite clear that the arrival of so many Euro-Canadians influenced the Innu negatively. “The great facility for travelling which we now have is causing a change in the habits of our once peaceful Indians. Intemperance, the great evil of our day, has made its appearance on the reserve, and the disturbances resulting therefrom are at times very difficult to subdue.” L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John and Chicoutimi Agency, 23 August 1890, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1890, p. 101.
then, officials in Ottawa continued to assert that the Department’s guidance and protection were necessary in order to prevent the Innu from indulging their improvident predisposition.

Regardless of official rhetoric, farming proved marginal to both the Huron and Innu economies during the nineteenth century. In 1889, a journalist visiting Mashteuiatsh wrote that, “The Government has given them a reservation of several hundred acres of land at Pointe Bleue, but they do not cultivate much of it, so they told me, and I could not see any evidence of cultivation at all.”113 In the place of farming, many Innu preferred to rent their lands in order to supplement their hunting, trapping, and guiding income. According to an 1896 newspaper article, “Their farms are usually tented upon shares to some white or half-breed habitant, while the owner devotes his time to hunting or guiding. They do not take naturally to farming, and rarely follow it, taking the farms only as a source of a small income.”114 During the first-half of the nineteenth century, some Huron gained a portion of their revenue from farming, although none pursued agriculture on a full-time basis.115 However, like the Innu, several Huron employed Euro-Canadian laborers in their fields, thus making it clear that they sought to employ all the resources at their disposal in order to earn a living.116 Of course, most contemporaneous Euro-Canadian commentators viewed this most basic form of capitalist accumulation (the use of capital and alienated labor power in order to increase one’s own capital) when exhibited by Amerindians as symptomatic of the


115 In 1836, Napier reported that, “none of them [the Huron] derive the whole of their Support from Agriculture.” D.C. Napier, “Return of Indians under the Protection of the Indian Department of Lower Canada,” 12 December 1836, in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835..., London, 1839, p. 54.

characteristic Aboriginal trait of laziness. Thus, Dewdney’s comments on the dangers of “easy money” applied to all Amerindians who pursued income without following the model of peasant farming so dear to Indian Affairs and other Euro-Canadian commentators.

During the nineteenth century, then, the Huron and Innu actively pursued cash through a variety of economic activities. They did so in ways that corresponded with local prerogatives and conditions instead of subscribing to Indian Affairs’ moral and theoretical framework. In fact, this willingness to participate in a variety of economic sectors underlines the significant gap separating the Department’s “improvident Indian” and actual Innu and Huron, an observation which is clearly supported by the agency’s own data. Despite the mixed nature of their economy, members of both communities relied on a single industry above all others: the fur trade and allied activities in the case of Mashteuiatsh and the manufacture of moccasins, snowshoes, and tourist art in Wendake. This ensured that both individuals and their communities were particularly vulnerable to any changes that these sectors of activity might undergo and to any decisions on the part of major capital interests.

117 For an excellent analysis of the historical construction of the stereotype of the “lazy Indian,” see Lutz, *Makûk*, p. 31-47.


119 In addition to the cases presented above, this gap is also reflected by the Department’s relief expenditure. In 1884-5, it spent $75 ($0.26 per capita) providing “seed, grain, and relief” to the Huron and $400 ($1 per capita) on the Innu. *Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1900*, part II, p. 99-100. However, given the general disinterest both bands exhibited in agriculture, the purchase of seed inflates these figures in the absence of any real advantage to either community. In 1894-5, it spent a total of $88 from Huron band funds in order to provide social assistance ($63 in “relief grants” to Cyprien Vincent and $25 ($0.06 per capita) on “relief for sundry destitute Indians”) while spending nothing from the Mashteuiatsh band fund. *Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1895*, part II, p. 65 and 68. By the 1899-1900 fiscal year, these numbers had grown slightly, with the Department supplying $148.57 ($0.33 per capita) in “supplies to destitute” in Wendake and $113($0.25 per capita) in such relief in Mashteuiatsh. *Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1900*, part J, p. 6.

120 Although the Innu economy actually diversified substantially during the century, the fur trade remained Mashteuiatsh’s single greatest source of revenue in 1900.
affecting the form in which they made payment or the size of their workforce. When crises arrived, the Huron and Innu continued their developing strategy of seeking income elsewhere. While this mixed approach to earning income meant that only a few individuals managed to gain substantial monetary power in either community, those who did enjoyed a relatively high level of security and wielded significant power by the turn of the twentieth century. This emerging class structure proved to be the legacy of on-the-ground money-use in Wendake.\textsuperscript{121}

Indeed, while external capital continued to significantly influence Mashteuiatsh's economy, ensuring that the majority of Innu found themselves economically beholden in one way or another to Euro-Canadians, the Huron economy developed to favor the emergence of a local entrepreneurial elite. An analysis of the reserve's credit market makes apparent the monetary force that a handful of families exerted at Wendake by the end of the nineteenth century, thereby revealing a central aspect of class formation.

\textit{Credit Relations at Wendake}

As the nineteenth century advanced, the state's legal regime increasingly limited First Nations' theoretical ability to participate in certain market activities. In addition to the well-known bans that it imposed on the purchase of alcohol, Parliament restrained Aboriginal access to credit. This development emerged at a time when Amerindians were experiencing increasing difficulties in obtaining advances from Euro-Canadian capital. Indeed, with the exception of those individuals who secured extremely limited credit from major fur trade companies, only the most well-heeled band members could count on receiving monetary loans from Euro-Canadians. This section analyzes the changes that Wendake's credit market underwent during the nineteenth century, demonstrating the importance of wealth as a precondition to securing loans of any meaningful size. During the period, then, money attracted money in Wendake, thereby contributing to the process of class formation already described in the context of manufacturing while also underlining contradictions in the state's

\textsuperscript{121} For an analysis of a similar process in Mashteuiatsh, see Chapter Seven.
discourse and practice in Aboriginal Canada. Indeed, while Indian Affairs continued to portray Amerindians as improvident by nature, it furnished a legal environment conducive to the management of increasing sums of money by a small segment of the Huron population.

The Indian Act, passed in 1876, formally banned the seizure of the “real or personal property of any Indian or non-treaty Indian within Canada, except on real or personal property subject to taxation.” Despite this restriction, the law did permit merchants to recover the specific merchandise sold to Amerindians in the case of failure to pay debt. This restriction, when combined with reserve lands’ status as Crown property, meant that Amerindians could not make use of their lands or other on-reserve property as collateral in order to secure loans, effectively preventing most of them from borrowing any substantial amount of money. The Huron were well aware of the very real structural limitations that this placed on their economic activity. In 1895, Antoine O. Bastien described the difficulties faced by the band members who attempted to make a living from farming:

On the Quarante Arpents Reserve there are only about a hundred acres under cultivation this year, and these were worked by six Huron families. These families are in a difficult position. Although the land is suitable for cultivation, these farmers, not being able to make the improvements required for careful and profitable cultivation, not being able either to borrow or mortgage, get very little return from their land and are obliged to turn to expedients and work at day labour to support their families.

Even before the passage of the Indian Act, however, many Amerindians enjoyed only limited access to credit, with those who did benefit from loans generally doing so through informal agreements that often only provided small amounts of currency. Both before and after the institution of formal restrictions, the Huron managed to develop and maintain such informal credit networks, both among themselves and with their Euro-

122 Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians,” 12 April 1876, 39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 66.

Canadian neighbors. Although very few personal records belonging to individual Huron persist, those of the Picard family suggest that, at least within the wealthy circles of Indigenous society, informal creditor-debtor relations provided an effective means by which individuals could secure loans while simultaneously guaranteeing the circulation of a certain quantity of goods and services in the relatively cash-poor local economy. These relationships, such as that lasting from 1866 to 1875 which involved François Xavier Picard Tahourenché and Noël Otesse Zacharie, two Huron heads of household, could be quite longstanding. Although up to $104.84 of the total value of exchange between the two men of $135.94 consisted in some form of cash payment, Picard and Zacharie themselves almost never exchanged currency, doing so only to a maximum sum of $42.50. The majority of the items included in the account consist of payments destined for one of the two men but made to the other, purchases made by one on behalf of the other, rent from, or monetary transfers to members of their respective families ($85.94). Payment for goods represented only a small proportion of the total exchange, both in terms of their number and size (two payments, one for wood and the other for flour, for a total of $7.50). The remaining sum ($42.50) consisted of direct payments between the two men. Thus, although the account demonstrates widespread use of cash among the Huron, it also verifies the importance of local and informal credit relations in the monetary economy. Without such relations, because of the absence of large-scale lenders such as banks or credit unions from Wendake during the nineteenth century, a large proportion of the exchange that took place within and without the community would not have been possible. In this way, relationships such as that formed by Picard and Zacharie allowed the circulation of goods and services even if those looking to purchase them did not have the cash to do so.

124 The name “Noël Otesse” is taken from François Xavier Picard’s account which serves as the basis for this paragraph’s analysis. François Xavier Picard, Account with Noël Otesse, n.d. [after 1875/05/21], BANQ-Q, P883, S2, File 4. However, the 1879 census of the Huron of Jeune Lorette lists the individual as “Noel Hotesse (Zacharie).” For the census, see “Recensement des Hurons de la Jeune Lorette,” 19 February 1879, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-01.

125 Both of these cash totals may have been significantly smaller if the $36 that the account lists Zacharie owing Picard on 5 December 1871 consisted of pre-existing debt rather a cash payment.
François Xavier Picard and his son, Paul, also benefitted from abstract currency as credit when establishing and maintaining relations with local Euro-Canadian merchants and tradesmen. Between 1862 and 1880, François Xavier maintained this sort of debtor-creditor relationship with Léon Racine, a French Canadian blacksmith. Picard paid for a great deal of work with a combination of cash and hay for Racine's livestock. In addition to the production of his forge, Racine occasionally provided Picard with cash. Similarly, Henry Ross, the owner of general stores in St. Ambroise and Wendake, sold Paul Picard food, clothing, household items, and firewood on credit. In November 1885, Picard carried a balance at Ross's store of $26.27. By September 1888, Picard's outstanding debt had grown to $107.42. However, Picard dealt with Ross as his father had with Zacharie and Racine—that is, by keeping clear accounts of his transactions without exchanging large amounts of currency. In this instance, Paul Picard paid $85 of his debt to Ross through the five-year rental of a field ($80) and the sale of pipes ($5). Thus, in November 1888, Picard's outstanding balance only amounted to $22.42. Over the next several years, Picard and Ross continued to conduct their business in this manner: Ross occasionally rendered an account of the goods Picard had purchased and credited him $16 every year for the rental of his field. Picard and Ross appear to have brought this credit-based relationship to an end in 1894 when


127 This amount represents the sum of Picard's two accounts with Ross, this first which concerns primarily foodstuffs and household and the second which includes wood alone. Although one of the two accounts is dated 9 May 1888, its final entry is clearly given as 14 September 1888. Paul Picard's Account with Henry Ross, General Store, 9 May 1888 and Paul Picard's Account with Henry Ross, 18 October 1888, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 2.


Eva Ross, presumably Henry's daughter, paid Picard the balance due to him on account of the rental of his field. As demonstrated by Antoine O. Bastien's provision of goods on credit to band members of relatively modest means such as the Siouis, this form of merchant-provided consumer credit was widespread in late nineteenth-century Wendake.

Beyond consumer credit, Paul Picard also sought and secured loans that were not directly tied to merchants or tradesmen. However, his residence on the reserve at Wendake complicated this means of accessing money since he could not use his home or the lot that he occupied as collateral. Given his socioeconomic status, though, Picard held several objects of significant market value which he could pawn (using the legal mechanism of a contract of vente à faculté de réméré) to raise funds. In June 1888, Picard, in exchange for $50 in cash provided by Cyrielle Tessier, agreed to repurchase within the following six months at 8% interest a manuscript French-Huron dictionary, a silver medal minted in 1840 bearing the image of Queen Victoria, another silver medal bearing the image of George III, three other medals respectively stamped “Dublin (1565 ou 1865) New York, 1853, [and] Prince Albert 1851,” and two wampum belts. In May 1900, Picard again pawned a silver medal for $15 to Tessier, which he agreed to repurchase at 6% interest within the following twelve months. However, with the exception of the dictionary, which he again sold in 1896 (this time to the Séminaire de Québec), Picard does not appear to have repurchased any of these items. In 1923, Picard's son Pierre Albert requested information from Indian Affairs concerning the legality of the first of these two transactions “with the faculty of redemption” along with another that took place in 1890, given that they involved the sale of “presents.” He


131 Copie d'une convention de vente reméré de Paul Picard à Cyrille Tessier, 6 June 1888, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, file 3.

132 Copie d'une convention de vente reméré de Paul Picard à Cyrille Tessier, 1 May 1900, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, file 3.

133 Picard exchanged the dictionary in 1896 in order to pay his debt of $217.83 to the Séminaire for the tuition of his son Pierre Albert. Lainey, La "Monnaie des Sauvages," p. 125.
asked: “Are there any precedents to the knowledge of the Department, when such sales were annulled and such presents recovered according to law?” The secretary of Indian Affairs responded that, “the prohibition against selling ‘presents’ as referred to in Section 105 (1) of the Indian Act to any persons or Indian other than an Indian of such band, is apparently confined to the Provinces of Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan or Alberta or the Territories, so that there would be no legal objection to an Indian of the Lorette Band in the Province of Quebec disposing of presents which were his own.”

Jonathan Lainey suggests that Picard’s practice of pawning these goods might be understood as a consequence of the financial straits in which he found himself following the death of his father, François Xavier. The principal cause of Picard’s monetary troubles would appear to have been the court case Picard v. Picard, which turned on a dispute between himself and his two sisters (and their Euro-Canadian husbands) concerning the inheritance from their father of lands situated beyond the bounds of the reserve at Wendake and the rights of the three children to sell them. This litigation occupied the family and the courts for a decade during the 1880s and 1890s and proved extremely costly to Picard, who eventually lost his house in the village to Henry O’Sullivan, the husband of his sister Claire. Paul Picard’s financial difficulties, however, were not the result of the trial alone because, as his son later admitted, he “indulged greatly in alcoholic liquors.” Moreover, Picard, like other members of the Huron elite, needed money in order to ensure an acceptable level of education for his children. His sons Louis Ormond and Pierre Albert attended Christian Brothers’ Commercial Academy whereas his daughter Clémentine received an education at

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134 Pierre Albert Picard to J.D. McLean, 2 April 1923, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 8.
135 J.D. McLean to P.A. Picard, 9 April 1923, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 8.
137 Pierre Albert Picard to J.D. McLean, 2 April 1923, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 8.
the Ursuline convent in Quebec City. Picard’s health also failed during the 1890s, causing him to request an increase in his $25 per-month pension from the Province of Quebec’s commissioner of colonization and mines. His difficulty in maintaining sufficient income also caused him to fall behind on his dues to the Chamber of Notaries, the organization that regulated his profession in Quebec.

Thus, Picard’s case is clearly exceptional in terms of its scale and his own desire to maintain a certain socioeconomic standing. However, it remains instructive in that it demonstrates the difficulties faced by Amerindians who sought access to borrowed capital. Indeed, since Picard could not use his on-reserve real property to secure loans from outside financial institutions, his only option was to pawn the valuable objects in his possession, hoping that he might be able to repay their sale price along with interest charges in the relatively short periods specified in the contracts he signed. Obviously, only certain band members held such valuable objects, placing the ability to borrow any significant sum beyond the reach of most Huron. In this sense, the Indian Act created a situation in which only those who possessed valuable moveable property might secure off-reserve loans, property which local elites tended to accumulate. Thus, the importance of the consumer credit which agent Bastien offered becomes apparent: it provided one of the sole ways by which lower class Huron might secure access to greater amounts of money than that generated by their work-related income alone. Despite its illegality, then, the credit that Bastien provided other band members appears in many ways to have been a direct result of the articles in the Indian Act that guaranteed the “protection” of on-reserve property.

138 Receipt from Christian Brothers’ Commercial Academy to O. Picard, 4 April 1899, ACNHW, P2-S3-A15, File B-2-17 and Bill from the Religieuses Ursulines de Québec for Monsieur Picard, 8 June 1899, ACNHW, P2-S2-A2, File B-1-5.

139 Lainey, *La “Monnaie des Sauvages”*, p. 126.
Huron and Innu Charitable Donations

Although the documentary record only contains occasional traces of charitable donations made by the Huron and Innu, members of both communities appear to have expended a great deal of currency in support of charitable causes, most importantly those tied to the Catholic Church, suggesting that the investment of even their relatively small income in charity provided members of both bands with important returns (in the form of either increased social capital or the satisfaction of supporting their faith's local infrastructure). In 1858, shortly after having begun to make use of cash with the HBC, the Innu provided the visiting Oblate missionary with £127 with which he was to renovate the small chapel at Métabetchouan.\(^\text{140}\) Five years later, Flavien Durocher, the Oblate missionary most active among the Lac St. Jean Innu during the nineteenth century, reported on a hunter-trapper who turned to the Catholic faith and sought literally to pay for his sins. "Ce bon Antoine, le meilleur des chasseurs du lac, le bénoni\(^\text{141}\) des traiteurs, voulut racheter son péché par l'aumône; à la collecte que je fis à la fin de la Mission pour la chapelle, il me donna, en billets de banque, la somme de 30 piastres."\(^\text{142}\) Moreover, Antoine was not alone; between 1860 and 1863, the "quarante ou cinquante familles du lac" contributed more than $1,200 to the renovation of their chapel at Métabetchouan.\(^\text{143}\) In other words, each year from 1860 through 1863 the Innu provided the church with roughly the equivalent of what they earned in cash from the HBC.\(^\text{144}\)

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\(^\text{141}\) "Benoni" is a Hebrew word meaning "son of my sorrow" or "son of my pain."


\(^\text{143}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{144}\) This annual average ($297.50) is based on the total cash the HBC paid the Innu at Pointe Bleue during Outfits 1866, 1867, and 1870 through 1873. HBCA, B.329/d/1, reel 1M575 and B.329/d/5, 1M575.
During the 1820s and 1830s, as well as the 1860s, the Huron also actively funded the Catholic Church. In their case, band members coordinated the collection of funds needed, in the first instance, to renovate the village’s chapel and, during the 1860s, to reconstruct it following a fire. During both episodes, the Huron combined private and public funds in order to achieve their goal. While the first effort relied overwhelmingly on funds provided by the state (the only non-state monies expended, £8.10.11 of a total of £230.15.4 Hfx, originated from a single, private, non-Huron donation), community members in the 1860s either paid or raised in the form of charitable contributions a much larger portion of the necessary funds ($804 of the $1004 total), with the rest being provided by the Department of Indian Affairs.  

The Huron socioeconomic elite also engaged in a series of charitable activities. In June and July 1880, for example, a number of local women, “Under the Distinguished Patronage of His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor, of Madame Robitaille and of the Reverend Messire F. Boucher, Curé of St. Ambroise,” organized bazaars on two consecutive Sundays in Wendake in order to raise money for the village’s chapel and school. The *Quebec Daily Telegraph* encouraged the city’s residents to attend because “Perhaps no class of our mixed population deserves more encouragement than does that which keeps watch and ward over the Falls of Lorette.” It noted that, “the visitor to Lorette is ever agreeably surprised to find among the daughters of the Red Children of the Forest, ladies of cultivated tastes and habits. These latter now appeal and with confidence to all their friends in and about Quebec to assist them in the yet greater improvement and development of their race.”

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in July 1880, the Huron staged a concert including musicians from Quebec City and Ottawa as well as “Several Tableaux-Vivants” and an “Indian war dance,” again in order to aid Wendake’s chapel and school. In the 1890s, the Huron banded together by subscription to purchase the “brass instruments required for the formation of a choir. The seventeen instruments purchased, which constitute a fairly complete choir, cost more than $200, on account of which they have already paid by subscription a fairly large amount. They naturally count on new subscriptions to pay the balance and to provide for repairs.” Wendake’s socioeconomic elite, then, organized events and charity drives in order to collect cash for the support of community-based initiatives in ways befitting their standing in the village.

Members of the Huron economic and political elite also engaged in charitable activities aimed at the alleviation of economic hardship among other First Nations. In 1895, the Huron provided an Innu family from Tadoussac, who had arrived in Wendake “destitute and despairing, without provisions or clothes,” with “$20 in cash, clothing for a year and provisions for himself and family for several months.” The Huron band council met with their agent and voted relief expenditure for the family from band funds. Maurice Bastien, the grand chief and the main manufacturer in Wendake, even managed to secure free “passage for the family on the Quebec & Lake St. John Railway.” Thus, while the council dispensed the funds used, Wendake’s “upper class” piloted this charitable project to fruition.

This practice highlights several important socioeconomic factors in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake. First, the Catholic Church exerted great influence in both communities during the period, drawing for its support a large portion of Innu and Huron monetary revenue. Second, as in the case of the financial sector, class played an important role in charitable activity in Wendake. Bourgeois women and wealthy manufacturers took charge of these


150 “Indian Family Made Happy,” Quebec Standard Budget, 31 August 1895, n.p.
efforts, whether designed to aid the Church or families in need. This, of course, is hardly surprising — those who had money occupied a privileged position from which to donate and raise more.\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, money reinforced the social standing of those who employed it charitably. In the particular cases examined above, then, social and monetary capital overlapped, contributing to the process of socioeconomic stratification that would continue, especially in Wendake, during the twentieth century.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the ways in which money participated in structuring the economies of Wendake and Mashteuiatsh during the nineteenth century. Cash and credit-based relationships tied community members to extra-regional capital while also linking them amongst themselves. These relationships distributed power unequally between all involved, with money literally lending greater force to certain individuals and organizations than to others. However, this power was never unassailable, as the turn towards public currency in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean demonstrates. This process of social and economic recreation in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake transformed the communities’ internal and external relations and contributed to similar changes that would take place during the twentieth century.

The momentous change that the monetary regime of the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean underwent constituted one of the period’s most important transformations. In the early nineteenth century, fur trade companies dominated both the region’s economic and political landscape. As a result, they were able to maintain a relatively closed, abstract monetary system, thereby structuring their exchange relations with Amerindians. The economics of monopoly coupled with a private, abstract monetary system allowed the fur trade companies

\textsuperscript{151} Similar phenomena existed among contemporaneous Euro-Canadians. See, for example, the description of Olivier Berthelet’s charitable contributions in Huguette Lapointe-Roy, \textit{Charité bien ordonnée: Le premier réseau de lutte contre la pauvreté à Montréal au 19\textsuperscript{e} siècle}, Montreal, Boréal, 1987, p. 112-23.
to alter prices in an effort to maximize profits on both the purchase of furs and the sale of goods. While the fur trade companies remained able to dictate many of the conditions under which exchange took place, the advent of public, state-backed forms of transferable debt (e.g. the Canadian dollar) altered this situation by enabling the Innu to take their business elsewhere. Indeed, as the gradual adoption between the mid-1840s and the early 1860s of state-backed accounting currency on the part of all Amerindians trading with the HBC in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean demonstrates, the Innu understood the power that the control of the monetary system afforded the company. Through their active promotion of state currency in the region, however, First Nations unwittingly encouraged the definition of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean as Canadian rather than Aboriginal space. This change in monetary regime, then, should not be conceived of as being entirely liberating because, while national currency provided Amerindians with a modicum of economic leverage, it neither prevented the HBC from continuing its traditional attempts to lock its Aboriginal trading partners into creditor-debtor relations based on abstract money of account nor did it free the region from the influence of frequently overbearing external political authority.

In Wendake, the interplay of money, politics, and the economy likewise produced ambiguous results during the period. Here, the process of class formation began remaking internal relations along similar lines to those of contemporaneous Euro-Canadian society, particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century. The economic and social fortunes of two families in particular, the Picards/Vincents and the Bastiens, improved markedly during the period and money provided members of both with access to financial services, education, jobs, and social clout that were unavailable to the “average” Huron. At the same time, however, these families’ economic success contributed to the success of the community as a whole, providing employment (and cash wages) to a large number of reserve residents, thereby maintaining Huron families in Wendake who may have otherwise sought employment elsewhere. Nevertheless, the community’s internal structure changed over the period, as the state altered local forms of governance and as the economy propelled the Bastiens and the Picards to the forefront of Huron society. These dual processes, one typically political and the other typically economic, wrought important changes in local government, the financial sector, and the labor market that would continue to influence day-to-day experience in Wendake through the middle of the twentieth century.
Currency, then, in no way guaranteed Aboriginal “freedom,” either in the face of the state or capitalist enterprise. However, it did not necessarily enslave Amerindians either. In both its abstract and physical forms, money theoretically served to tie the Huron and Innu into the contractual and legalistic relational forms typical of Western society, contributing to their apparent marginalization. Despite the legislative restrictions placed on the seizure of on-reserve property (precluding its use as collateral when borrowing funds), throughout the period members of both bands had access to modest amounts of unsecured consumer credit, from either fellow reserve residents or off-reserve capital or entrepreneurs. Furthermore, at least among Wendake’s socioeconomic elite, certain individuals made use of movable property in order to circumvent such restrictions. During the first half of the twentieth century local credit markets would continue to grow in both size and complexity, demonstrating, in a similar vein to that explored by the previous chapter’s analysis of agent Bastien’s store, the extent to which the state’s legislative regime, when implemented in practice, created local conditions that diverged markedly from what a strictly discursive analysis would suggest. This divergence between theory and practice, then, is central to the political history of Aboriginal money-use.
Chapter 5

Private Capital and National Currency: Monetary Policy and Money-Use in the Fur Trade, 1900-1940s

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Canadian fur trade boomed as Canadian, American, and European capital, taking advantage of developments in technology and infrastructure, financed the activities of new actors who entered the Canadian north in search of pelts to meet growing demand for luxury furs in northwestern Europe and North America.1 In James Bay and Lac St. Jean this process led to the arrival of Revillon Frères, the French fur company whose business practices closely resembled those of the HBC, along with a host of independent fur buyers. The fierce competition which resulted drove up prices paid to Amerindian trappers while favoring the widespread use of cash. HBC executives responded through policies which attempted to dictate the terms by which cash, credit, and barter would be employed by their subordinates. With the company's market share under threat from small cash buyers, the HBC's upper management, perceiving in unpaid debt a major drain on profitability, attempted to force as much of the company's business as possible into ready/barter (where goods and furs were traded directly without the use of credit/debit). However, this policy proved unsuccessful and the HBC, having abandoned its attempts to control the fur trade through abstract money, found itself increasingly unable to restrict the use of the Canadian dollar, whether as a medium of exchange (cash) or a measure of value (credit/debit). In this way, the company's sway over money-use declined as the fur trade increasingly escaped its control.

This chapter traces the changes that both corporate monetary policy and money-use underwent in the fur trade during the first half of the twentieth century. While focusing on the HBC, it also analyzes Revillon Frères' relationship to money as well as that of small

independent traders, all the while paying particular attention to the northern Quebec and Ontario fur trade. It begins with a general summary of the HBC’s monetary practice and policy prior to its major competitor’s decision to purchase furs directly from Aboriginal trappers before turning to the changes in the subarctic fur trade caused by Revillon Frères. The chapter then analyzes the downfall of the HBC’s private monetary system (the made beaver) in western James Bay, a result of increased competition and state intervention in the form of Treaty No. 9. This change fundamentally altered James Bay’s political and economic landscape as it symbolically and materially undid the ties that bound the Cree to the HBC and replaced them with connections to the region’s newly dominant power: the Canadian state.

The rest of the chapter focuses on the evolving relationship between cash and credit. It argues that this conceptual tandem provided the grounds for the high-level internal debate that reshaped the HBC’s commercial policy with regard to Amerindian trappers during the transitional period in the fur trade that, according to Arthur J. Ray, witnessed the end of company paternalism.

Ultimately, the present chapter argues that the changes that James Bay’s monetary system underwent at the turn of the century form a key chapter in Canada’s assertion of sovereignty over the subarctic. Although the federal and provincial states only gradually expanded their involvement in the lives of First Nations in far northern Ontario beyond the annual payment of treaty annuities, the currency that they introduced to the region in this way marked it as part of the political space centered on Ottawa, thereby symbolically removing it from the authority of a single private enterprise. This development, then, had its roots in the 1870 transfer of Rupert’s Land from the HBC to Canada and continued beyond the mid-twentieth century through the exceedingly deliberate process by which civil servants and state services arrived in far northern Ontario. The disappearance of the made beaver and the HBC’s ultimate surrender of responsibility for relief provision, then, serve to demonstrate the retreat of private enterprise’s political power in western James Bay. At the same time, the company continued to suffer losses to its ability to exert economic force in other regions of the subarctic as a result of significantly increased competition (much of which succeeded precisely because of money-use). This chapter’s description of fur trade capital’s decline in political dominance in western James Bay and Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, then, paves the way
for the following chapter's analysis of the state's changing role in money-use during the first half of the twentieth century.

The End of the Made Beaver at Moose Factory

At the turn of the twentieth century, the HBC operated an extensive and heterogeneous network of posts that stretched from relatively large centers of Euro-Canadian population in the south to the remote corners of the high arctic. This diverse and fur-flung trading empire required the maintenance of two distinct systems of exchange: the first, illustrated by relatively remote posts such as Moose Factory, continued to function primarily along traditional lines through book credits and debits and the second, of which Mashteuiatsh provides an example, was influenced by "line" conditions, including generalized use of cash, relatively large numbers of white trappers, and extremely active competition. These distinct conditions point to money's centrality in the fur trade. Indeed, the clear preference on the part of HBC management for the pursuit of trade in the absence of both the material and abstract Canadian dollar demonstrates the importance that these men ascribed to the control of the money supply. Although the company had already abandoned beaver currency in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, it had no intention of doing so farther north. However, developments during the first years of the twentieth century gave the HBC little choice in the matter and by 1905 their private monetary system had entirely collapsed in western James Bay. This section traces this monetary sea change by concentrating on the historical experience of the Moose Factory Cree.

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Credit and the Centrality of Money to the Fur Trade

In 1900, the debt system and the annual cycle lay at the core of the fur trade in western James Bay. In this context, the HBC and Amerindian hunter-trappers continued to express value in terms of beaver currency, as they had done in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean during the first half of the nineteenth century. In western James Bay, then, the control that the company exercised over the money-supply, which consisted primarily of its private abstract and physical currency (the made beaver), allowed it to exert significant force in dealings with its Cree trading partners, tying their economic well-being to this unequivocal symbol of the HBC's sovereignty and political power.3

Although made beaver coins and notes circulated in HBC-controlled territory into the twentieth century, post employees and Amerindian hunter-trappers most often used this currency in its abstract form. The made beaver allowed fur trade participants to set prices for furs and merchandise. Because this function supplied traders and trappers alike with the ability to quantify the credit/debit that defined their relationships, it formed the precondition for the provision of advances and their repayment. HBC management, however, constantly questioned the wisdom of extending credit to Amerindians, a segment of the population that it, like many bureaucrats in Indian Affairs, considered inherently improvident. While this vision was widespread in the company's ranks, the conclusion that credit should be abolished never constituted consensus. Indeed, a large number of the HBC's post managers viewed the provision of goods on credit as the only means of preventing the advent of a purely cash-based business that would cripple the company's control over the fur trade. This proved to be a major issue because while the HBC could not guarantee the repayment of debt by trappers, the provision of cash promised to reduce profits generated by a combination of the low prices the company paid for furs and the high prices it charged for merchandise. In other words, the HBC treated the goods it supplied Amerindians as loans, with the difference in market and company prices being equivalent to interest. Post and district managers felt that credit alone

3 For a more detailed examination of these issues in the context of nineteenth-century Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, see Chapter Four.
allowed the company to structure its operations in this way. Although the HBC’s corporate leaders agreed that such profit margins were worth protecting, they generally argued in favor of a return to a barter-based system and the elimination of credit. However, post managers and those executives who had held positions at the company’s trading posts believed that the on-the-ground implementation of this policy, which sought to retain the company’s sizeable profit on the sale of goods while limiting its capital outlay in the form of what were effectively unsecured loans to employees (trappers), would decimate the company’s returns as, in their view, Amerindians would abandon the HBC if it offered neither credit nor competitive prices. However, under the monopoly conditions that the company enjoyed in western James Bay at the turn of the century, credit generated the vast majority of its sales at Moose Factory.4

Company Money at Moose Factory at the turn of the Twentieth Century

While the made beaver formed the monetary backbone of the James Bay region at the end of the nineteenth century, the HBC only employed this currency in dealings with the Cree.5 When conducting business with individuals of European descent, the HBC used both the Canadian dollar and the pound sterling by way of one of three instruments of exchange: cash, letters of credit, and personal checks drawn on European or southern Canadian banks. Travelers visiting James Bay and Euro-Canadians stationed there (other than those employed by the HBC) generally made use of the latter two in place of cash. Although denominated in national currency, the HBC treated these methods of payment as book credit, supplying goods to a maximum of the amount for which the letter or check was made while apparently

4 In 1901, for example, the post made $7,676.20, or nearly 85% of its total sales, on credit. The remaining sales were split between cash ($807.47) and barter ($576.86). Trading Account, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfit 1901, HBCA, A.76/15, f. 92, reel 973.

5 For examples of the Made beaver's use at Moose Factory, see George McKenzie to An. [Allan] Nicolson, 18 August 1901, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 5r-11r, reel 1M1122 and Monday 17 March 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/189, f. 29r, reel 1M1012.
refusing to provide cash for any unspent amount. On occasion, the HBC allowed Euro-

Canadian visitors to the region to purchase merchandise on credit, only later seeking
repayment. This method of purchasing goods, however, contravened standard practice and
seems to have been restricted to those individuals affiliated with trusted, most probably state
or religious organizations. Thus, while individuals of European descent calculated their
purchases in the region in Canadian or British currency, they generally did so within the
closed circuit of HBC posts. Of course, at the turn of the twentieth century, the company’s
stores held a monopoly in both theory and practice in western James Bay, thereby permitting
it to dictate restrictive trading terms even to those who had ready access to hard currency.

Some cash, however, did circulate in western James Bay and provided the final
method of payment accepted at Moose Factory. Nevertheless, the HBC tightly controlled its
use in the region, only accepting it from the company’s employees in its sales shops at Fort
Albany and Moose Factory, preferring to conduct its local business uniquely in terms of the

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6 For an example of the use of letters of credit, see W.K. Broughton to the Commissioner, 20 July
1901, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file 1, document 243, reel 1M1120. Sister A. Felix wrote a check for $20,
drawn on the Old Lowell National Bank, to the HBC on 30 April 1904. Remittance to Winnipeg on
account of James Bay District Outfit 1904, 20 July 1904, HBCA, B.135/b/57 vol. 2, reel 1M122, f.
341 Br. No record of any unspent funds from letters of credit being paid to the holder in cash has been
found.

7 For example, in 1901 the census enumerator, who was also a Catholic priest, made a total of $39.53
in purchases at Albany, Moose Factory, and New Post. The officer in charge of the Southern
Department forwarded the bill to Winnipeg for collection. W.K. Broughton to the Commissioner, 20
July 1901, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file 1, document 244, reel 1M1120. The Anglican Mission at Moose
Factory as well as the Canadian Geological Survey also purchased supplies or services on credit. W.K.
Broughton to the Commissioner, 14 August 1901, in ibid, document 247 and W.K. Broughton to the
Commissioner, 14 August 1901, in ibid, document 248. A letter written several months earlier, most
likely by Broughton, states that, “No travellers have thus far been supplied beyond the amounts of their
Credit Letters in the Department.” [W.K. Broughton?] to the Commissioner, 29 January 1901, in ibid,
document 168. The following year, the new head of the James Bay District sent a letter to Winnipeg
after the refusal of bank draft stating: “I shall [be] careful in future that nothing is supplied without the
draft or letter of credit.” George McKenzie to [the Commissioner], 28 January 1902, HBCA,
B.135/b/56, file 2, document 293, reel 1M1120.
made beaver. In fact, the HBC tended to distribute cash only to those individuals who were leaving the region. For instance, in June 1902, the HBC eliminated twelve Moose Factory servants from its payroll in order to lower the post's expenses. However, the HBC's James Bay district manager, George McKenzie, predicted that because these men were "deeply in debt to the Company... on arrival at the front [the railway, they] will find themselves totally destitute." As a solution, McKenzie had suggested several months earlier "to give each party say a ten Dollar Bill as a bonus. Even this would be a saving in order to get rid of them." Thus, the HBC had no difficulty placing state-issued currency into circulation as long as its ultimate use took place beyond the bounds of James Bay, thereby preserving its political and economic dominance of the region.

In spite of this will to power on the part of the HBC, the Cree did have access to a certain amount of cash. This currency originated primarily from two sources: small independent traders active on the edge of the James Bay region (generally along the railway) and HBC posts in these same peripheral areas that, given the much larger Euro-Canadian population, were unable to control the money supply. By the early years of the twentieth century, the railroad offered the Cree a relatively accessible alternative to trading their furs at the company's posts in western James Bay. At the time, HBC management was well aware

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8 "The business at all Posts in the Southern Department, with the exception of Albany and Moose Factory where there are Sales Shops for the Company's employees, is confined entirely to the Fur Trade which is conducted throughout on the MB system." Moose Factory Post Report, 31 December 1895, HBCA, B.135/e/32, p. 1, reel 1M1257.

9 [George McKenzie?] to the Commissioner, District Affairs, 31 January 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file 2, document [307B], reel 1M1120. For the names of the dismissed servants, see Thursday, 5 June 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/189, f. 35v, reel 1M1012.

10 In 1906, Alex Milne, the manager of the HBC's James Bay district, noted with some wonder that the trip from "the line," in this case from Missanabie, to Moose Factory took a mere nine days by canoe. Alex Milne to Mr. Ware, 30 September 1906, HBCA, A.11/48, p. 225, reel 725. By 1910, J.W. Anderson reports that the railway had become even more accessible, even if "Cochrane was still some two hundred miles upstream from Moose Factory, an eight-to-ten-day arduous journey by canoe, though the five-day downstream trip was somewhat easier." J.W. Anderson, Fur Trader's Story, Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1961, p. 17.
of the threat that the railway’s proximity posed to Moose Factory’s business and generally attempted to combat the problem by making the price of furs and merchandise at Moose Factory “approximate that at the line.” The company also resorted to subterfuge in an attempt to obtain more furs for itself, in the process providing the Cree with a small amount of cash. In 1901, Alex Milne, the HBC’s inspector for the Southern Department, wrote: “Three trusted Servants of the Company have been of recent years under instructions to, quietly as if for themselves, buy up odd furs held by the Indians with the purpose of sending or taking them inland. Last Outfit 25 Otters at $8.00, 1 Fisher $5.00 and 1 Bear $5.00 were secured in this way.” Although not explicitly noted in this description, the HBC most likely purchased these furs using cash, given that the amounts listed are in dollars – as opposed to the still current made beaver – and that the success of this approach to purchasing furs depended on it maintaining an illicit appearance. However, because of the relatively insignificant amount paid in this manner, the clandestine purchase of furs by the HBC would appear to have had an extremely limited impact on both the Cree’s access to money and their general economic condition.

In spite of itself, the HBC did in at least one instance encourage the use of cash among the Cree of Moose Factory on a larger scale. Rather than being a result of external competition or any company policy aimed at buying furs on the “black market,” such encouragement came from a neighboring post’s practice of purchasing furs with currency from Aboriginal hunter-trappers. Although initially reluctant to do so, the HBC had been using money to purchase furs at its Montreal Department post on Lake Abitibi since at least

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13 In the same year, the HBC post at Moose Factory paid the Cree a total of $2,572.76 (4,677 ¾ MB) for furs and labor. Thus the $18 spent purchasing furs on the “black market” represents a mere 0.7% of the total spent by the company. Ibid, p. 24.
the late 1880s. As a result of this intra-company competition, Milne wrote in 1901 that, "It may then be advisable to start a cash tariff here [at Moose Factory], the profit to be sought on the goods rather than on the furs. One of the two best hunters appears to have gone to Abitibi Post last year, attracted by the cash tariff there, and the other, it is feared, may follow his example this winter." Despite this recommendation, the HBC maintained the use of the made beaver in James Bay. Regardless, within the following five years beaver currency would collapse under the dual weight of intense competition in the region's fur trade and the state's annual payment of treaty money to every Cree resident of Moose Factory.

The Monetary Weight of Competition: Revillon Frères' Arrival at Moose Factory

The first major challenge to the made beaver's continued existence in western James Bay came from Revillon Frères, the HBC's major competitor in the region from the beginning of the twentieth century through the 1930s. In the hopes of lowering its costs in the acquisition of pelts, the French furrier decided to expand its operations by opening a string of posts throughout the Canadian north during the early years of the twentieth century.

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14 HBCA, B.1/e/10, p. 5, reel 1M1254. The HBC divided its fur trade business during the period into several distinct, regionally-defined departments. Because each department was somewhat autonomous, their particular policies sometimes led them to clash in "frontier regions" such as that separating Moose Factory from Lake Abitibi.


16 Ray describes the HBC's failed effort to introduce a similar company-centric monetary system in 1918 elsewhere in Ontario. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 108. I have found no evidence that similar measures were taken at Moose Factory.

17 While Revillon Frères remained active in the region through its final sale to the HBC in 1936, the English company had actually purchased a controlling stake in Revillon's fur business in 1926. On the HBC's acquisition of Revillon Frères Trading Co. Ltd., see Lynda Harris, "Revillon Frères Trading Company Limited: Fur Traders of the North, 1901-1936," n.p., Ministry of Culture and Recreation for the Ministry of Natural Resources, Northern Region, Ontario, 1976, p. 65-82.
century. Revillon Frères’ operations at Moose Factory contributed to the rapid downfall of the HBC’s monetary hegemony in western James Bay. The first of the French company’s employees in the region established themselves, apparently without formally requesting state permission to do so, adjacent to the HBC post at the mouth of the Moose River in the summer of 1902. Here they set up a temporary trading post while awaiting the delivery of building materials, supplies, and staff that were to arrive during the following summer. However, as a result of Revillon’s supply ship running aground near Fort George, only its crew arrived, without provisions, and were forced to travel inland via the Moose and Abitibi Rivers in a bid to leave what had become, due to their presence, an undersupplied James Bay.

Thus, although competition arrived in James Bay in 1902, because of the disastrous attempt to supply its well-financed and ambitious operations, Revillon Frères required several years before being able to trade with the Cree in a similar manner to that practiced by the HBC. This state of affairs directly affected the region’s monetary system. The HBC’s post records clearly demonstrate that while prior to the arrival of competition in the region in 1902 the company continued to use the made beaver, by early 1904 it accounted for furs in terms of the dollar. This rapid change appears to be attributable primarily to Revillon Frères’ use of


19 Following “vague rumors that opposition is sending in,” “the Trader party – long expected, come in from their camp about the breach.” George McKenzie to [?], 7 July 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file 2, f. 156v, reel 1M1120 and Saturday, 16 August 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/189, f. 41r, reel 1M1012. Although several Revillon Frères subsidiaries held Canadian letters of patent permitting them to operate within the country’s borders, none appear to have requested permission to establish posts at any specific locale. Harris, “Revillon Frères Trading Company Limited,” p. 53-4.

20 On the sinking of Revillon Frères steamer, the El Dorado, 1 September 1903, see “Wreck of the Lady Head on the Gasket Shoal,” n.d., HBCA, B.135/a/7, f. 10r, reel 1M1666. For a global description of this expedition, see Harris, “Revillon Frères Trading Company Limited,” p. 12-21.

21 The Moose Factory post journal’s last entry describing a transaction in terms of Made beaver was recorded 17 March 1902: “Cephas[?] came in today with 104 Made beaver of a hunt.” Monday, 17 March 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/189, f. 29r, reel 1M1012. The next entry in which a monetary value is...
of the currency, both in its material and abstract forms, rather than any equivalent of the made beaver. Indeed, the new company appears never to have employed the beaver as a monetary unit, thereby building its commercial relations with the Cree on the Canadian dollar, a currency with which many were already familiar from their trading trips to the railroad.

The increased circulation of cash caused by Revillon Frères’ failure to adequately supply its posts in James Bay, although perhaps not decisive, also appears to have been important in changing James Bay’s basic monetary unit. The wreck of its supply ship forced the French company to rely on canoes as the unique means of conveying people and provisions to the region. As a result, from its arrival at Moose Factory in August 1902 through the summer of 1904, Revillon Frères did not have enough goods to even support its own employees. In the hopes of forcing the French traders from the region, the HBC’s district manager, George McKenzie, instructed the company’s manager at Moose Factory to refuse cash payments from the competition. In 1902, he wrote: “If any of the opposing party should appear near or at your Post you will not give them any assistance whatever either by selling them provisions or selling to their men for cash. Provisions are not to be supplied at any figure.” The following year, McKenzie even went so far as to assert that the HBC could not be held responsible if Revillon Frères employees were to starve for want of food.24

mentioned was recorded nearly two years later: “John Narager in on Wednesday with a good hunt (355.00).” Friday, 5 February 1904, Ibid, f. 87r.

22 Beginning in the summer of 1902, Revillon Frères’ employees were unable to feed themselves from their own stores and hoped to purchase goods from the HBC. On the difficulties experienced by the company’s employees in obtaining food, see, for example, Friday, 29 August 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/189, f. 42r, reel 1M1012 and Donald Gillies to Mr. Ware, 2 February 1903, HBCA, A.11/48, f. 202, reel 725.

23 George McKenzie to the Officer in Charge, Hudson’s Bay Company, Moose River Post, 22 September 1903, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 333r, reel 1M1122. McKenzie probably wrote this in order to encourage Revillon Frères’ shipwrecked crew and employees to leave Moose Factory and to continue down the Moose River to the railroad.

24 George McKenzie to the Officer in Charge, Hudson’s Bay Company, Moose River Post, 10 September 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 207v, reel 1M1122.
However, this official stance appears to have been anything but rigid in practice. In Outfit 1901, the HBC sold goods for a total of $807.47 in cash at Moose Factory, most probably in the sales shop it maintained for its Euro-Canadian clientele.25 During the next two years, precisely the period in which Revillon Frères proved unable to supply its post on the Moose River, thereby forcing it to conduct its trade through the use of hard currency alone, the HBC’s Moose Factory cash sales shot up to $2,426.97 in Outfit 1902 and then to $3,241.03 the following year. During Outfit 1904, the first year that Revillon Frères managed to supply its post’s needs in provisions and trade goods, Moose Factory’s cash sales returned to their 1901 level ($819.05).26 In other words, the HBC’s increased cash sales appear to have been caused by its new competitor’s inability to trade the Cree anything but currency for basic necessities and pelts alike. This in turn suggests that the English company was fully willing to accept cash when unable to control money-use in a monopolized environment. That cash sales decreased once more in 1904-5 further suggests that Revillon Frères, like the HBC, preferred to use book credits and debits when large supplies of trade goods made such a policy feasible.

While the HBC discounted the newcomers’ chances of capturing any part of the fur market due to their lack of merchandise, the Cree do not appear to have shunned the purely cash-based trade that Revillon Frères could offer. In December 1902, McKenzie wrote to the HBC manager at Rupert’s House that, “The Opposition is still here [at Moose Factory] but do not seem to be doing much. I hear one of them is going out after Christmas, they are not likely to do much as they only have cash and we are not trading cash in our stores.”27 Despite claims to the contrary sent by the HBC’s district manager to his superiors in Winnipeg, this

25 At the same time, the HBC only purchased $13.95 of furs in cash at Moose Factory (compared to $576.86 of furs “Bartered for Goods” and $3602.52 in furs credited to Cree accounts). Trading Account, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfit 1901, HBCA, A.76/15, f. 92, reel 973.

26 Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1902-4, HBCA, A.76/16, f. 92, A.76/17, f. 86, A.76/18, f. 86, reel 974.

27 George McKenzie to A. G[?]. Nicholson, 19 December 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 223r-224r, reel 1M1122.
state of affairs does not appear to have kept the Cree from exchanging their pelts for currency with Revillon Frères. Moreover, the Cree even appear to have profited handsomely from the situation. According to Robert Renison, an Anglican missionary based at Moose Factory during this period, the Cree took advantage of Revillon Frères' supply difficulties in order to charge them "Parisian prices for fish and game." This suggests that, despite HBC claims to the contrary, the Cree perceived trading pelts and country provisions for money as advantageous. Thus, like the company, Cree hunter-trappers understood cash's potential power and sought to acquire it in order to transform their relationship with the region's dominant economic and political actor – the HBC.

Money in the James Bay Fur Trade after Treaty No. 9

Fur trade competition, then, contributed to the rapid disappearance of the made beaver from James Bay. However, while competition did not force the HBC, still the most powerful Euro-Canadian economic and political presence in the region, to accept cash at its posts, it did render the debt system significantly more fragile than it had been under monopoly conditions, even if it remained at the core of the fur trade in the region into the 1930s. Despite the continued relevance of debt, the HBC abruptly began accepting large quantities of cash at its posts after the state's introduction of annual monetary payments in western James Bay during the summer of 1905. On 9 August, representatives of the Cree, the

28 For an example of the HBC claiming that the Cree did not trade with Revillon Frères, see G. McKenzie to the Commissioner, 24 September 1903, HBCA, A.11/48, p. 210-3, reel 725. According to Moose Factory's post journal, "Most of the Indians have gone to work for the Traders." Tuesday, 26 August 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/189, f. 41v, reel 1M1012. In January 1903, George McKenzie wrote to the HBC manager at Abitibi warning him that "I understand that Mr. Loudin our opponent is going down your way on his way out you better pick up all furs as soon as you can as he is paying all sorts of outrageous prices and of course would get the furs if there are any to get." George McKenzie to Robert Skene, 10 January 1903, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 234r, reel 1M1122.


30 For a more detailed analysis of Amerindian perceptions of money, see Chapter Seven.
Canadian and Ontario governments, and the HBC signed Treaty No. 9 at Moose Factory.\textsuperscript{31} The following day, the Treaty Commissioners began and “rapidly completed” the payment of a one-time $4 gratuity and a $4 annuity (for a total of $8) to each “Indian” who presented himself at the payment table.\textsuperscript{32} Regardless of the money Revillon Frères and other, smaller fur-traders paid for furs, Treaty No. 9 payments represented the first substantial and regular influx of cash into western James Bay. Between 1906, the first year in which every band member received $4, and 1932, the Treaty Commissioner paid an annual average of $1,445.69 at Moose Factory.\textsuperscript{33} In comparison, during outfit 1900, the HBC gave $3,877.91 in credit to the Cree at Moose Factory.\textsuperscript{34} The state’s annual treaty payments, then, equaled roughly 37% of the Cree’s revenue arising from trade with the HBC a mere five years before. Even if the HBC had greatly increased the amount of goods sold on credit to Cree by 1905 (an amount, furthermore, that would skyrocket over the following twenty years), treaty

\textsuperscript{31} For the text of the treaty, see Canada, The James Bay Treaty, Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) and Adhesions Made in 1929 and 1930, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, [1931] 1964.


\textsuperscript{33} This average is based on annuity and arrears payments made from 1906 through 1932, excepting 1931 for which no data is available. LAC, RG10, vol. 3034, file 235,225, part 4, reel C-9666.

\textsuperscript{34} The HBC’s accounting year stretched from 1 June of the “outfit” year through 31 May of the following year. This sum equals 7050 ¼ made beaver. In 1901, the HBC valued 1 MB at $0.55. “Appendix 7: Statement of Indian Debts, Outfit 1900, (Amended Copy), Moose Post,” in Alex Milne, “Inspection Report on Moose Factory,” 4-11 July and 12-18 August 1901, HBCA, B.135/e/34, p. 24, reel 1M1257. The $3,877.91 that the HBC extended to the Cree in credit is significantly greater than $2,572.76 that the Cree paid the HBC during the outfit.
annuities significantly increased the amount of cash in circulation in a region which had for the most part previously only made use of abstract money.\textsuperscript{35}

Once the state began making annual cash payments to Moose Factory’s Aboriginal population, the HBC could no longer refuse to accept money at its trading posts. From its 1904 level of $819.05, Moose Factory’s cash sales of goods rose to $1,973.69 in Outfit 1905. Through the end of the decade, this number fluctuated, from a low of $1,589.67 in 1906 to a high of $3,129.80 in 1910, but always remained well above its pre-treaty level.\textsuperscript{36} This experience extended throughout western James Bay where Treaty No. 9 served to definitively open the region’s fur trade to the use of cash. For example, on 3 August 1905, nearly a week before their arrival at Moose Factory, the Commissioners signed Treaty No. 9 with the Cree of Fort Albany, a comparable HBC post located several hundred miles north of Moose Factory. That same day, the post at Fort Albany made cash sales totaling $1,072.\textsuperscript{37} For the whole of August 1905, the post sold $2,103.14 worth of goods in cash while making a total of $2,303.24 in cash sales for the entire outfit.\textsuperscript{38} By comparison, in August 1903, the HBC post at Fort Albany had made cash sales for a total of only $1.50.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, in two years, cash sales at the post had increased by a factor of 2,000. Moreover, given that the Fort Albany Cree received a total of $776 in gratuities and annuities on 3 August 1905, more than 60% of

\textsuperscript{35} In 1905, the HBC sold $16,001.09 worth of goods on credit at Moose Factory. By 1925, this amount had climbed to $58,943.66. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1905 and 1925, HBCA, A.76/19, f. 88, reel 1359 and A.76/42-8, f. 135r, reel 1367.

\textsuperscript{36} Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1905-10, HBCA, A.76/19, f. 88, A.76/20, f. 96, A.76/21, f. 96, A.76/22, f. 101, reel 1359, A.76/23, f. 102, A.76/24, f. 107, reel 1360.

\textsuperscript{37} Thursday, 3 August 1905, HBCA, B.3/a/205, f. 84r-84v, reel 1M995.


\textsuperscript{39} “List of transactions, Fort Albany,” August 1903, HBCA B.3/b/101, p. 789, reel 1M1032. Unfortunately, no data is available for August 1904.
the money made by the HBC that month came from elsewhere than treaty payments. Furthermore, as at Moose Factory, Revillon Frères maintained a trading post at Fort Albany in 1905 – a post which was fully stocked following the uneventful arrival of their supply ship in 1904 and perhaps in 1905. Thus, the Cree most likely expended a certain quantity of treaty annuities elsewhere than at the HBC’s store, making the amount of money in circulation at Fort Albany greater than the company’s figures alone would indicate. As a result, it would appear that the annuities and gratuities provided by Treaty No. 9 forced both the HBC and Revillon Frères to accept money indiscriminately. This in turn suggests that the Cree had been saving cash from their trips to the “line” and that following the state’s arrival, they used this money to purchase goods that they would not otherwise have been able to afford.

A similar analysis is more complicated in the context of Moose Factory. This is due to the presence at the treaty signing of a substantial number of “Moose Factory” Cree living to the south at Chapleau and Missanabie. While these individuals appear to have received annuities in 1905 as members of the Moose Factory band, they received their gratuities the following year in payments distinguishing them from those Cree who traded at the mouth of the Moose River. Thus, the $3,696 distributed at Moose Factory in 1905 would appear to have formed gratuity and annuity payments for the roughly 325 members of the Moose band “proper” as well as $4 each in annuities to the roughly 250 band members based at Chapleau or Missanabie. Furthermore, because of the substantial cash business already carried on in

40 Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to A.J. Mathason, Ontario Provincial Treasurer, 9 April 1906, LAC, RG10, vol. 3034, file 235,225, part 4, reel C-9666. The Cree at Albany also had access to the railway by way of the Albany River.

41 No information is available on Revillon Frères’ ship’s arrival in 1905. However, given that in the early years of the twentieth century, the HBC’s ship generally arrived at Charlton island from mid to late August, Revillon Frères’ supply ship may not have reached Fort Albany by 3 August 1905. HBCA, B.135/z/7, f. 8v-9r, reel 1M1666.

42 For the payment of $3,696, see Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to A.J. Mathason, Ontario Provincial Treasurer, 9 April 1906, LAC, RG10, vol. 3034, file 235,225, part 4, reel C-9666. The approximate population numbers were calculated from payments made in 1906 and 1907. Frank
the Moose Factory sales shop, it would appear that approximately $1,150 of that spent on goods at the post in 1905 came from the Cree. This suggests behavior in contradiction to that of the Fort Albany Cree. Rather than spending their cash reserves, the Cree spent less than half of what they had been paid by the treaty commissioners at Moose Factory. However, given the presence of Revillon Frères at Moose Factory as well as the relative proximity of the HBC’s Lake Abitibi post—a post which had used Canadian currency for well over a decade by 1905—it is entirely possible that the Moose Factory Cree simply spent their treaty money at a larger number of locations than did their neighbors to the north.

Despite this difference, the annual treaty payments made by the state beginning in 1905 clearly forced the western James Bay fur trade to accept the Canadian dollar as a form of payment. However, as in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, the HBC continued to use book credit wherever possible when purchasing furs from the Cree. In the twenty-one-year period stretching from Outfit 1901 through Outfit 1921, the HBC paid for the vast majority of furs with credit at Moose Factory, with cash payments only amounting to 1% of its total expenditure. Furthermore, cash payments never exceeded 6% of all fur purchases in any given year and frequently equaled less than 1% of total purchases. Simultaneously, the HBC paid nearly 94% of its funds used in the purchase of furs from the Cree during the period in

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Pedley to A.J. Matheson, 16 January 1907, in Ibid and Frank Pedley to A.J. Matheson, 15 October 1907, in Ibid.

43 In 1904, the HBC made $819.05 in cash sales at Moose Factory. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1904, HBCA, A.76/18, f. 86, reel 974. A year later, it made $1973.69 in cash sales. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfit 1905, HBCA, A.76/19, f. 88, reel 1359. The difference between the two amounts suggests that the Cree spent roughly $1,150 at the post.

44 If those based at Chapleau and Missanabie are excluded, the Moose Factory Cree were paid approximately $2,600 in gratuities and annuities in 1905.

45 In 1905, Abitibi sold $2,865.66 of merchandise for cash. Trading Accounts, Abitibi Post, Lake Huron District, Outfit 1905, HBCA, A.76/19, f. 81, reel 1359.
the form of book credit.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, although the HBC now accepted cash in exchange for goods at Moose Factory, it continued to pay for the vast majority of furs it purchased from the Cree with abstract accounting currency.

\textbf{Pre-War Controls: Money and the Fur Trade Status Quo}

The fur trade's altered environment in the context of industrialization and the state's and colonists' push into the subarctic led HBC management to question many of the company's longstanding practices in an attempt to stave off competition and revitalize its market share. By the late nineteenth century, the HBC employed a two-tiered purchasing tariff by which it paid less for furs in cash than it did in credit- or barter-based transactions. In 1888, two company inspectors, Edward K. Beeston and Richard Hardisty, recommended both increasing the cash tariff and forming two categories from the single barter category then in existence, one for credit/barter and the other for ready/barter. Beeston and Hardisty felt that the first change would staunch the flow of furs to rivals who paid cash while the second would discourage Amerindians from taking their "prompt trade" – that is, those furs not needed for the repayment of debt – to the opposition by increasing the tariff for ready/barter furs.\textsuperscript{47} By the beginning of the twentieth century, a modified version of this tariff was in use by the HBC in its St. Maurice and Saguenay Districts. Under the new model, the company paid the lowest amount for pelts in cash and the highest for pelts exchanged by those having existing accounts with the company, while providing an intermediate amount for furs given in straight barter or as a means of opening a new account. The maximum prices that the HBC permitted its employees to pay varied widely and for some furs, such as mink and ermine, the tariff

\textsuperscript{46} During the period, the HBC made a total of $2,633.80 of cash payments for furs. In contrast, it expended $14,691.66 in "barter" – that is, where neither cash nor credit was provided – and $256,647.49 in credit to the Cree. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1901-21, HBCA, A.76/15-38, reels 973-4 and 1359-65.

\textsuperscript{47} Ray, \textit{The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age}, p. 77.
allowed for twice the amount to be paid in credit on an existing account as in cash.\textsuperscript{48} Furthermore, as the chief factor of the Montreal Agency, P. McKenzie, instructed the HBC's post employees, the amount paid for longstanding debt might be significantly greater than that stipulated by the tariff. "For old debts you can give prices according to circumstances — in fact almost any price to wipe off old balances."\textsuperscript{49} However by 1908, the HBC had ceased using this tariff at Mashteuiatsh, instead offering a single price-list regardless of the method of payment.\textsuperscript{50} Four years later, the company's St. Maurice and Saguenay District manager encouraged the HBC's post manager at Pointe Bleue to aggressively pursue the local cash trade, effectively ending the policy of favoring credit and barter over cash when selling merchandise. "The day is gone for this District to be entirely independent of the white man's trade, or the Indian's Cash so I trust you will join with the others in the District and \textit{BOOST every PART OF THE BUSINESS THAT WILL BRING IN REVENUE.}\textsuperscript{51} Given that the HBC began accepting cash payments in western James Bay following the signature of Treaty No. 9, it would appear that the company had already adopted a similar policy at Moose Factory.

While HBC management formulated an explicit policy on the sale of merchandise for cash, prior to the beginning of World War I it never appears to have barred the company's employees from purchasing furs with currency and even explicitly supported the practice on occasion. In 1909, the company's commissioner, C.C. Chipman, argued that, when post managers exercised extreme caution, limited cash purchases would provide an effective


\textsuperscript{49} P. McKenzie, "Purchasing Tariff for Furs, St. Maurice and Saguenay Districts," 3 April 1905, HBCA, B.329/c/2, f. 375, reel 1MB89.

\textsuperscript{50} [M.R. Grahame], "Fur Purchasing Tariff, 'Canada' Furs," 11 December 1908, HBCA, B.329/c/2, f. 845, reel 1MB89.

\textsuperscript{51} C.G. Wilson to W.R. Hamilton, 30 November 1912, HBCA, B.329/c/3, f. 518-9, reel 1MB90. Emphasis in original.
means of remaining competitive. However, in keeping with the company's basic business model, senior executives universally preferred strengthening the HBC's standing through the maintenance of a large stock of quality merchandise, an area in which they had traditionally held an advantage over their competitors. In early twentieth-century James Bay, for example, the HBC engaged Revillon Frères by reserving such trade goods for those Cree who remained "faithful" rather than through any major policy of cash purchasing. In this way, senior executives hoped to force the Cree to do business with the company. However, by the end of the decade, the Cree had the option of purchasing supplies from the Revillon Frères post at Moosonee which by now was as well-stocked as the HBC store across the river. Furthermore, as a result of more intense competition elsewhere, the commercial situation proved at least as favorable, if not more so, for Amerindians throughout Canada. Thus, the company's merchandise-based credit policy proved unworkable in the context of competition and the HBC found itself forced to define most Amerindians as "reliable" and to sell them goods on credit or lose a significant portion of the trade.

This pragmatic acceptance of credit did not, however, erase the widespread conviction among senior executives that "improvident" and "unfaithful" trappers would fail to reimburse their debt, thereby creating substantial losses for the company. However, up until the outbreak of the First World War the Winnipeg-based Fur Trade Department employed precisely this figure (the "improvident Indian") in attempting to overcome


53 The HBC's commissioner wrote in his 1905-6 annual report that: "The increase in Capital employed of approximately $13,000 it is believed is fully justified to meet the increasing requirements of the trade and to gradually build up the advance Outfit, upon which heavy encroachments have been made." C.C. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May, 1906," 26 February 1907, HBCA, A.74/15, p. 30, reel 1349. The James Bay District manager increased his stock of merchandise to an even greater extent during the following outfit. C.C. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May, 1907," 10 February 1908, HBCA, A.74/16, p. 32, reel 1349.

London’s resistance to the provision of credit to Amerindian trappers. In 1908, for example, Chipman wrote that, “On account of the improvident disposition of the natives many of them take no thought for the provision of future requirements, and it is absolutely impossible for them to reach the hunting grounds without necessary supplies.”55 Despite Chipman’s rhetoric, the company’s upper management (including Chipman himself) considered debt to be the primary impediment to success in the fur trade. In many ways, this belief was an artifact of the counterproductive system that the HBC employed to supply its posts. The company required both its depots in Montreal, Winnipeg, and Edmonton along with individual posts to register a profit. As a result, when supplying posts with their inventory, warehouses applied a surcharge to the goods delivered which the posts then had to overcome in order to generate positive net revenue. In this way, the HBC eliminated the advantage that bulk purchasing should have provided. Furthermore, this policy called for post managers to impose an average percentage price increase on all goods, which had the effect of preventing the company from responding to local market conditions through competitive pricing of selected merchandise. Although HBC executives had been aware of this policy’s unfavorable consequences for trade since at least 1870, they did not make any effort to address the issue prior to the late 1930s when they eliminated the requirement that supply depots make a profit.56

Instead, during the first decade of the twentieth century the HBC used its trade goods in an effort to diminish the effects of bad debt through the application of substantial markups to the price charged for every item sold at its posts throughout Canada. Chipman relied on this practice to minimize the importance of the losses suffered by the company on unpaid debt during the 1906-7 season: “Though these amounts seem large, and particularly so the unpaid advances for the Outfit under review, it will no doubt be understood that the advances are charged at trade prices, and the amounts written off as above are therefore 75 to


100 per cent greater than the actual cost of the goods to the Company." Chipman reiterated this same argument two years later, although this time noting that the lower limit of the markup had actually increased from 75% to 83.3%. By the early 1910s, the HBC's fur trade commissioner reported that the margin between cost to the company and the price charged consumers had increased at most posts in James Bay, where "the profit exceeds 100%, so that the actual losses by Indian debts are less than half the face value." However, both the HBC and Revillon Frères continued to provide unprecedented amounts of credit to the region's Cree. Thus, the large profit margin that the company earned on its merchandise appears to have been supported by its willingness to provide substantial advances to its Aboriginal customers. That Amerindians accepted these conditions in lieu of cash payments further suggests that they had a need for supplies and provisions at the beginning of the hunting and trapping season that monetary payments made upon receipt of their production could not meet.

Thus, the HBC's policy with respect to cash sought to make money superfluous from an Aboriginal perspective while earning profit for the company through inflated prices charged on merchandise sold on credit. From management's perspective, monetary payments in exchange for furs promised to decrease the company's profitability by allowing Amerindians to spend their revenue, now provided in the form of a generalized medium of exchange rather than in kind or in credit, elsewhere than at the company's stores. Thus, in turn, would cut into profits, provided in large part by the sale of goods and provisions. By the

57 C.C. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May, 1907," 10 February 1908, HBCA, A.74/16, p. 54, reel 1349.

58 "It is hardly necessary to mention here that the losses from Indian Debts as shown above are based on the trade prices of supplies at the several Posts, and that the actual loss to the Company on the basis of Cost Landed prices represents but from 50 to 60 per cent of the amounts as set out in the comparisons." C.C. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May, 1909," 12 January 1910, HBCA, A.74/18, p. 61, reel 1349.

early 1910s, the HBC’s fur trade commissioner, R.H. Hall, noted that the company’s profits primarily came from precisely this sector, whether it sold merchandise on credit or in exchange for furs or cash, and not from the sale of furs. The widespread competition that the HBC faced, along with technological changes that allowed the rapid dissemination of fur prices being paid in London, Leipzig, and New York, forced the company “to pay for furs very nearly their full market value.” Thus, the spector of a purely cash-based fur trade promised to lessen the company’s control over its trading partners and the profits such control generated while also appearing to pose a threat to the HBC’s very existence, based, as it was in large part, on the revenue generated by its sale of merchandise.

Furthermore, from management’s perspective, the company’s debt system appeared to place it in an even more precarious position with respect to cash than would have otherwise been the case. Although Amerindians’ continued willingness to subscribe to this system provided the company with limited protection against the fur trade’s full monetization, the absence of a highly developed legal system in the subarctic forced the HBC to rely on what its executives considered to be Amerindian trappers’ inconstant “faithfulness” rather than judicial coercion in order to guarantee repayment of credit. Upper management does not appear to have called upon the legal system even in those regions where it was well established, such as Saguenay-Lac St. Jean. Thus, the company’s management feared that cash would place its Aboriginal trading partners in a secure economic position from which they could refuse to honor their debt. Although no such mass default on the part of cash-rich trappers ever materialized, the HBC’s senior managers unceasingly demanded the reduction of sales on credit to Amerindian trappers, with a view to their ultimate abolition. Moreover,


61 Furthermore, corporate management was well aware that it might attempt to secure payment through the courts. W.R. Hamilton, the HBC’s Pointe Bleue post manager, proposed a blueprint for corporate policy with regard to debt and the judicial system in his annual report for Outfit 1900. His superiors do not appear to have ever attempted to implement this plan. W.R. Hamilton, “Report upon District, Outfit 1900,” n.d., HBCA, B.329/e/9, p. 2.
HBC executives were not alone in seeking the end of credit, being joined in the effort by Revillon Frères’ management. In the diary he kept during his 1920 inspection trip of Revillon Frères posts in Hudson and James Bay, Thierry Mallet succinctly described the message he had relayed to his subordinates at Moosonee: “More fur – less general expenses, and more paid debts.” However, Arthur J. Ray points out that, given the massive markups on merchandise and the HBC’s practice of accounting for debt based on the price the customer paid for goods rather than their cost to the company, bad debt never posed as serious an issue as generations of senior HBC officials believed. Rather, bad debt represented a relatively small operating cost, totaling less than 6% of the value of returns during the last decade of the nineteenth century.

Wartime Changes

The First World War brought radical change to the Canadian fur trade. In reaction to the close of the English market, the HBC slashed the amount of furs that it authorized its employees to purchase while also making deep cuts in credit and eliminating the use of cash as a means of purchasing pelts. In August 1914, C.G. Wilson, the manager of the company’s St. Lawrence District, wrote a rapid succession of letters to W.R. Hamilton, its post manager at Mashteuiatsh, providing a clear outline of the HBC’s monetary policy in view of the outbreak of hostilities. After first instructing Hamilton to drastically cut back on fur purchases, Wilson quickly directed him to halt cash purchasing altogether and to decrease the total amount of credit made available to the Innu by 83%. Although management required

the company's post managers to stop providing Amerindians with cash, it simultaneously sought to boost cash sales, thereby increasing the flow of currency to the HBC's offices in Montreal and Winnipeg while also maintaining profits on merchandise.\textsuperscript{65} During the winter of 1914-5, the HBC, increasingly under pressure from independent traders, issued a new fur-purchasing tariff to its post managers throughout Canada, setting prices at 83\% below those earned at the company's March 1914 sale.\textsuperscript{66}

After having initially required the company's post managers to apply the same 83\% reduction in credit to all Amerindian trappers, N.H. Bacon, the HBC's fur trade commissioner, changed tack during the 1915-6 season, instituting a new debt policy based on trappers' records.

The amount of advances to be given an Indian for Outfit 1915 was to be in proportion to his past record of hunting, conservatively based at the reduced tariff on the number of skins he is likely to produce, so that each will be able to pay up his account in the Spring of 1916 for Outfit 1915 advances. Any Indians not living up to this arrangement are to be refused further debt.

By these instructions it is hoped to eliminate eventually all those Indians who do not fulfill their obligations and minimize the loss from Indian Debts in future.\textsuperscript{67}

Although the start of the War and the closing of the English and German markets devastated the fur trade, the situation rapidly reversed course, with the majority of Canadian furs being routed away from European auctions and to sales in New York, St. Louis, and Montreal. This change came at the expense of the HBC, which awaited the reopening of the auction in London in order to sell its furs. Although the company's board permitted limited fur sales in the United States for a short period between June 1916 and the winter of 1917, it quickly

\textsuperscript{65} C.G. Wilson to the Manager, Pointe Bleue, 110 October 1914, HBCA, B.329/c/4, f. 167, reel IMB90.


overturned this decision to act more from patriotic fervor (the HBC's head office was located in London) than capitalistic reason. In his annual report on Outfit 1914 (submitted in January 1916), Bacon claimed that, "at many of the Posts it is absolutely necessary in order to hold our trade, to pay the Indians for their Furs partly in cash, which is subsequently turned over to the store for goods. Many Indians like to handle actual cash and cannot be persuaded to do business on a straight barter basis." The HBC's London board responded shortly thereafter by authorizing limited cash fur purchasing in an effort to stem the tide of furs flowing to its competitors. However, this new policy only permitted cash to be employed under the strict supervision of district managers "at those centres in Canada which would not interfere with the Post trade." In other words, employees would only be allowed to exchange cash for furs at the company's "line" posts. Whereas this policy did not lift the ban on cash purchases at Moose Factory, it did have an immediate effect on purchasing at Mashteuiatsh, where cash purchases jumped from $3.60 during the 1915-6 season to $1,689.63 the following year (Figure 5.1). Despite this dramatic increase, the overall sum spent in 1916-7 was low when compared to the volume of money spent in this way by the post during the pre-War period (for example, during the 1913-4 season, the HBC spent $9,687.65 in cash on furs). Moreover, total cash fur purchases at Mashteuiatsh would remain small through the cessation of hostilities.

Figure 5.1: Furs Purchased for Cash by the Hudson’s Bay Company at Moose Factory and Pointe Bleue, 1901-1924 (Source: HBCA, A.74/34 and 40, reels 1351 and 1353 and A.76/15-42, reels 973-4 and 1360-7)

These policies immediately altered prevailing market conditions in Lac St. Jean and western James Bay. At the same time that the HBC drastically curtailed its accumulation of furs and its extension of credit, small traders continued acquiring pelts for cash from the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean on account of the furriers of Quebec City. These traders paid much higher prices than the company and appear to have absorbed many of the furs that the Innu would have otherwise sold to the HBC.\(^7\) In contrast, the significant reduction in credit provided at Moose Factory by the HBC and Revillon Frères following the outbreak of the war did not lead the Cree to increase their cash trade with independent buyers. Instead, the two companies’ drastically lowered fur-purchasing tariffs meant that, “a large proportion of them took up their traps and quit hunting fur and devoted all of their time to hunting country

food." This reaction proved disastrous for the HBC because, as the James Bay District Manager writes, "although the amount of Indian Advances given out in July and August was very much smaller than in previous years, the amount of unpaid debts was increased by $9,024." In other words, since "news of the War and the slump in the Fur market" only reached Moose Factory after most of the Cree had already been outfitted for the season, the generally small catch among trappers meant that very few proved able to reimburse the HBC.72

However, the fur trade commissioner realized that the company could not realistically hope to erase all losses due to unpaid debt without entirely ceasing to provide credit to the Cree, which, given the conditions of the James Bay trade, would have meant abandoning the region entirely. In spite of the changed credit policy that the company had adopted during Outfit 1915, by the beginning of the following outfit in June 1916 the situation had not improved materially from the HBC's perspective. Bacon, however, decided to continue providing credit along the lines established during the previous season regardless of the losses that would surely result. "Advances have been authorized for Outfit 1916 by the District Manager based on the average hunts of the past four years in value at current purchasing prices. In any case, however, advances to the extent of the total estimated hunt are too much and wherever there is opposition, must result in loss."73 Despite concurrent efforts to centralize the extension of credit in district headquarters through the submission by post managers of detailed accounts, providing the amount of credit they proposed to advance to each Amerindian trapper, the HBC continued to record large losses on unrecovered debt through the end of the War.74 Moreover, the company actually increased the value of goods


sold on credit at Moose Factory (and at Mashteuiatsh, although to a much lesser extent) during the War (Figure 5.2). Despite ongoing fears that Amerindians would prove unable to reimburse their debt (fears that the unsure economic context of wartime only amplified), the HBC's senior managers effectively used credit to limit the amount of currency in circulation wherever possible. Thus even at Mashteuiatsh, where "line" conditions rendered cashless trade suicidal from the company's perspective, HBC executives sought to control demand for money, and thus the custom of their Amerindian clients, through recourse to the other _bête noire_ of the subarctic fur trade: unsecured credit.

Following the end of the War, the HBC continued working to combat cash's influence in the fur trade. However, at this point senior officials realized that the HBC's bookkeeping system prevented them from determining whether goods had been sold to Amerindians on credit or in payment of furs previously "deposited" on their account at a post. James Thomson, the HBC's fur trade commissioner, described the confusion resulting from this system with reference to the St. Lawrence District (in which Mashteuiatsh was situated):

![Figure 5.2: Net Cost of Goods Sold by the Hudson's Bay Company on Credit at Moose Factory and Pointe Bleue, 1901-1925 (Source: HBCA, A.74/34 and 40, reels 1351 and 1353 and A.76/15-42, reels 973-4 and 1360-7)](image-url)
"While the accounts for this District would show the total advances to Indians for the Outfit to be $33,611.00, it should be understood that the natives frequently turn their furs over to the Post for the credit of their accounts, drawing against such credit, supplies as required from time to time, in this manner while the records would show such supplies to be 'credit' sales or 'advances', the goods are often actually paid for in advance.” Thomson continued to observe that this confusion permeated the whole of the HBC’s fur trade operations except for those in British Columbia, “where furs, that are not in liquidation of advances made on credit, are paid for, either by ‘trade tokens’ (due bills) or cash, the supplies then furnished to the Indian are paid for by him in trade tokens or by cash and thus appear in the accounts as ‘cash’ sales.” The company had, in fact, been employing such private money in British Columbia since the early years of the War. In 1916, Bacon had described the system, which recalled the made beaver in both spirit and form: “at the Interior Posts the Indians are paid by orders on the stores, which can be exchanged at any time for goods. The transaction is then treated in the books as a cash sale. This system is of great advantage to the Company, as it practically gives the Indians cash without cash being paid out by the Company’s Posts.” By the 1910s, then, the HBC had renewed a practice that was common during the nineteenth century by employing tokens and store orders to provide its Amerindian trading partners with the “feel” of cash while restricting their use and the value they represented to the company’s posts.

In his account of the fur trade during the first three decades of the twentieth century, Philip Godsell wrote that the increased severity of the HBC’s monetary policy was a direct result of Winnipeg’s unwillingness to heed the opinions of its field staff. Godsell felt that this tendency was best embodied by the decision of Norman H. Bacon, who had been appointed

fur trade commissioner in 1913 after having been employed by the HBC in London but never in Canada, to discontinue advances following the outbreak of World War I, in the process disregarding the recommendations of N.W.M.J. MacKenzie, a veteran fur trader and Bacon’s board-appointed advisor. After having pointed to Winnipeg’s arrogance at dismissing its employees’ on-the-ground experience, Godsell ridiculed Thomson’s decision to bar cash because it refused to accept the economic reality of the post-War fur trade, which he felt had been in part created by Bacon’s abrogation of credit in 1914. “The traveling buyers had accustomed the Indians by this time to using cash and they liked to handle a little of it after having paid off their debts. They did foolish things with it undoubtedly. If a couple of Indians wanted to spend their money traveling backwards and forwards on a passenger train, eating in the diner for the novelty of the thing, that was their affair!” In addition to Amerindians’ opposition to this policy, he asserted that post managers bitterly resented this order and “all of them put up a fight to obtain the cash from the Company... [as a] means for preventing a serious loss of trade.” According to Godsell, the average HBC manager was aware of the danger that refusing all cash purchasing posed the company. “Realizing that the Indians would sell to the opposition for cash he rightly considered that it would be much better to have the dealings take place in the store so that he could obtain a share of the money across the counter rather than have the fur bought surreptitiously around the Indian camps.” In spite of its employees’ opposition to banning cash purchasing, the HBC adopted the pan-Canadian policy of using tokens to increase “cash” sales while decreasing the amount of goods theoretically sold on credit. However, by the mid-1920s northern Ontario Amerindians, looking to purchase goods that the HBC either did not carry or priced too highly, had


successfully forced the company to retire its private coins and begin once more paying for a portion of their catch in Canadian currency.80

Cash and Credit in the Context of Fur Trade Boom and Bust, 1920s-1940s

In 1925, the HBC’s James Bay district manager, George R. Ray, described the debt system as “most inimical to the Company’s Interests. The supremely difficult problem is to conduct an extensive business comprised almost solely of unsecured credit accounts with a modicum of loss.” Ray asserted that the Amerindian trapper “may any day succumb to the blandishments of the free traders and leave a large unpaid balance in our books, yet we can do nothing to protect ourselves. We must take our chance.”81 Thus, although debt fell well within the bounds of the Western legal regime theoretically in place in the totality of Canadian territory during the twentieth century, the fur trade of the relatively remote James Bay district fell beyond its scope. In spite of the HBC’s inability to force repayment of debt through legal means, Ray championed the continued use of credit. In 1926, he expanded on his earlier statements, providing a theoretical argument in favor of the continuation of the system, despite its clear drawbacks.

The influence of credit is in stimulating enterprise. This applies to us as with outside firms. Every Indian who takes debt is really an agent of the Post in executing duties which the Manager would himself be unable to perform. The stock at the Post would be comparatively useless without a union of skill and industry: without the aid of credit the talent of the native is comparatively ineffectual: credit[,] by advancing supplies among the natives, promotes the most essential of all divisions of labor – that which uses and makes effective the ingenuity of the native in those pursuits for which he is adapted. And if credit is granted beyond the natural requirements of the native, improvidence and waste are encouraged. The

80 Although Ray refers to the demands for state-issued currency by Amerindians living in “northern Ontario,” no reference has been found to the use of tokens at Moose Factory and Mashteuiatsh. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 108.

peculiar character and effects of the credit system upon an Indian is that deferred payments offer a strong temptation to purchase. They are always eager to possess and the cost of possessing appears small in remote prospective [sic]. Indian receipts are irregular, their consumption constant.\(^{82}\)

In spite of Ray's defense of credit along capitalistic lines, fur trade commissioner Charles French ordered significant cuts to be made in advances to both Amerindian and Euro-Canadian customers in June 1927. According to this policy, no trapper, regardless of ethnicity, was to receive credit for a sum exceeding 50% of the value of his average fall or spring hunt, a sum for which he would again become eligible only after having repaid the totality of his debt.\(^{83}\)

This decision marked the end of the credit boom of the 1920s, during which both the HBC and Revillon Frères advanced substantially increased amounts of provisions and trade goods to the James Bay Cree and Lac St. Jean Innu (Figure 5.2). Toby Morantz cites one oral account claiming that during the decade's boom years, a good hunter might receive up to $1,500 in credit.\(^{84}\) This willingness on the part of the two competing companies to provide significant advances to the Cree arose from the companies' recognition that although western James Bay remained beyond the reach of most small traders due to its remoteness, Amerindians felt no need to restrict their business to the region. Instead, they frequently traveled to more southerly HBC and Revillon Frères posts (e.g. Abitibi) or to towns such as Cochrane that had grown up along the railway. Morantz argues that this abundance of credit, when coupled with dramatically decreased shipping costs of relatively low-value provisions such as flour, led the Cree to focus more of their energy than they had previously done on commercial trapping rather than subsistence hunting, in the process becoming dependent on


\(^{83}\) Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 213.

store-bought food. However, as the value of furs on the world market declined during the late 1920s and into the 1930s, the HBC and Revillon Frères slashed not only the prices they paid for furs but also the amount of goods they sold to Amerindians on credit, thus locking the Cree in a downward spiral of indebtedness. Furthermore, the period witnessed a significant drop in the numbers of animals upon which the Cree had previously relied for food making any attempt to leave the fur trade by “taking up their traps” and turning to subsistence hunting as they had done at the beginning of World War I impossible. Thus, the late 1920s and 1930s were years of considerable hardship for James Bay First Nations which caused their earning power to dive and led to the death by starvation of many Cree. 85

During the 1930s, the fur trade, like the rest of the Canadian economy, struggled to overcome the effects of the Depression. As Ray has noted, deflation during the early 1930s practically returned the purchasing power of treaty annuities to their 1870s level. 86 However, fur prices on the world market, already in decline during the late 1920s, fell to historic lows during the first half of the 1930s, before briefly rebounding at the end of the decade and falling once more during the early years of the Second World War. 87 At the same time as fur prices sagged, Indian Affairs reduced relief payments, negatively affecting both Amerindians and the HBC whose profits depended to a certain extent on relief payments. 88 Moreover, Ray demonstrates that Amerindians did not benefit from the increasing value of the fur trade during the 1920s, instead seeing the value of their trapping income decline during the period. 89 This meant that Aboriginal trappers across Canada entered the Depression in an already fragile economic condition, which was only worsened by reductions in relief payments.

88 In late winter 1934, the Mashteuiatsh post journal reports that, “the Department of Indian Affairs has cut down the relief to Sick and Destitute Indians, which has occasioned a heavy reduction in our business.” Saturday, 10 March 1934, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 53, reel lMA53.
expenditure during the early 1930s. In addition to these factors, the loss of employment in southern cities and towns drove substantial numbers of Euro-Canadians into the forests of subarctic Quebec and Ontario in search of revenue from trapping. This phenomenon greatly affected both the Innu of Lac St. Jean and the James Bay Cree, in many cases simultaneously lowering their short-term income and decimating the long-term productivity of their trapping grounds. 90 Although Indian Affairs, the government of Quebec, and the HBC had begun addressing this issue through the creation of beaver sanctuaries in eastern James Bay by the early 1930s, the Cree of Ontario and the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean would not gain access to similar programs until the 1940s. 91

In this context, the large fur trade corporations continued to prefer purchasing furs with store credit, causing them to react negatively to trappers who dealt only in currency. Julius E. Lips reports that in order to secure cash during the 1930s some Lac St. Jean Innu traded their catch fur-by-fur, rather than as a single lot, which was the preferred method of the HBC. This meant that the company risked losing the funds paid for furs that, if provided as credit or payment in abstract accounting form, would otherwise necessarily return to the company through the sale of merchandise. As a result, the HBC sought to discourage small fur sales. "This type of Indian does not enjoy the benefits of a winter supply which the more conservative Indian gets on credit from the Company. With him, only cash deals are closed. He receives no credit." 92 In the context of the fur trade, then, the pure cash economy ruptured the ties that bound company and hunter together through ongoing credit relations, providing Amerindians with opportunities for profit during good economic times while depriving them

91 For more on beaver sanctuaries, see Chapter Six.
of the safety net provided by credit that was central to survival during difficult periods. It also threatened the large trading companies’ profit model.

Following the end of the First World War, the HBC and Revillon Frères continued to split the lion’s share of the fur trade in James Bay. Although a fierce rival, HBC management considered the French company to be “straight and honourable” because it pursued the fur trade in the traditional manner through the debt system and the annual cycle, while employing as little cash as practicable. From the HBC’s perspective, this approach preserved the region from the independent cash buyers who were proving so destructive to the company’s trade elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, the mutual respect in which the senior managers of the HBC and Revillon Frères held each other was encouraged by the resemblance of the two companies’ quasi-imperial corporate structure, within which their far-flung networks of posts necessarily adapted the policy formulated by central, Canadian-based management, itself subject to the supervision of boards of directors in London or Paris. However, due to massive losses during the first half of the 1920s, Revillon Frères proved incapable of continuing to pursue the fur trade as it had since the turn of the century and sold a controlling stake in the company to the HBC in 1926. The HBC initially planned to keep the merger secret in order to give both the Canadian government and its Amerindian partners the impression that the two corporations continued to compete. Through the collusion of the two apparently antagonistic companies, the HBC hoped to limit debt, eliminate the trapping of “unprime furs” (those pelts of inferior quality taken in the late summer and early fall), control fur prices, reduce post operating costs, eliminate unnecessary outposts and “tripping” (the relatively expensive practice of sending goods to trappers’ camps), provide the


95 On the HBC’s corporate and administrative structure during the first half of the twentieth century, see Ibid, p. 171-2. On Revillon Frères, see Sexé, Two Centuries of Fur-Trading..., p. 117-20.
impression that competition was already fierce in order to discourage third parties from entering the trade, and reduce transportation costs. However, from the beginning fur trade publications reported the deal to their readers and rumors of the merger circulated widely among Amerindians. Moreover, many HBC and Revillon Frères employees refused to forget the nearly quarter-century of competition in which the two companies had engaged and ignored their superiors’ demands for tacit cooperation, thereby preventing the realization of the HBC’s plans (with the notable exception of decreased transportation costs). The mounting indebtedness of the French company brought on by the Depression along with continued tensions with its parent corporation led to its outright purchase by the HBC in 1936.96

During the first half of the twentieth century, in addition to large companies such as Revillon Frères, the HBC competed against small itinerant traders and local storekeepers who generally only purchased pelts for cash. While the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad (T&NO) did not arrive at Moosonee until 1932, southwestern James Bay had already proved to be well within the reach of small, cash-paying traders. By the late 1920s, the HBC’s James Bay District manager, V.W. West, noted the “growing tendency on the part of the Moose Factory and Albany Indians to trade at the ‘line’.” West reported that trade goods continued to furnish one of the company’s primary means of resisting this extra-regional, cash-based competition. However, by this point, the HBC had also begun trying to “keep the Indians as satisfied as possible by the adjustment of selling prices of goods and purchasing prices of furs.” At the same time, West felt that by the time the T&NO reached Clay Falls (only 100 miles upstream from Moose Factory and “an easy run both summer and winter”) during the 1929-30 season, the post would be within easy striking distance for a “number of Jewish and Syrian traders” based in Cochrane.97 The following year, West reported that the Cree had increased their trips to the railway while also receiving the visit of “a Syrian trader from Cochrane, one Shamus, [who] came down with four canoe loads of

fancy dry goods and fresh fruits. He established on an island opposite our Post on Moose Factory Island, and for a few days did quite a trade in Musquash and cash.” The HBC’s manager, however, noted that, “as we met his prices for furs, and had taken the lead by raising them before his arrival, his trade slackened off once the Indians had gratified their curiosity by looking over his goods and buying what attracted them most.” In order to combat these traders, the Fur Trade Department gave company employees permission to pay “line prices” at Moose Factory.98 Although little information is available, following the railroad’s completion to Moosonee, at least one general store, owned and operated by a former HBC employee, purchased furs from the Cree by 1940 (W.R. Cargill & Son). Moreover, by the end of the 1940s, in the context of the state-run Kesagami beaver sanctuary, Indian Affairs also purchased furs for cash from the Cree.

The HBC faced a different situation in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean. There, the company competed for furs against a much larger number of independent fur buyers who were generally better financed and thus better equipped to challenge the HBC’s dominance than the relatively minor and distant opposition of southwestern James Bay. In 1933, for example, George Fowle, the HBC post manager at Mashteuiatsh, reported that in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean “There are seven buyers in opposition to us. In addition to the local buyers - Meridy Robertson, Brousseau the Revillons agent and Brassard of Roberval, there are Clement Dufour from Chicoutimi, René Vasin who buys for the Paris market, Harry Brahms of Montreal and Mr. Harvey from Kenogami.”99 As independent fur buyers elsewhere in Canada, those who operated in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean sought above all to make a profit uniquely on furs and not, like Revillon Frères and the HBC, on merchandise. Thus, these traders dealt primarily in cash. However, some merchants, who also ran general stores in the region, followed their larger rivals’ example and provided advances to Amerindian trappers. Both Alfred Drolet and Clément Dufour, for example, sold goods on credit to Innu trappers


99 Tuesday, 1 June 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 1, reel IMA53.
beginning in the 1920s and, in the case of Dufour, continued to do so through mid-century from their stores in St. Félicien and Chicoutimi. Méridé Robertson, a band member who operated an on-reserve store at Mashteuiatsh, also provided several Innu with credit through the 1940s.

Regardless of whether they combined credit with cash or not, all of these traders purchased furs in the hopes of selling them at a profit either to the HBC or Revillon Frères or to fur dealers in Quebec City and Montreal. Their strategy consisted of taking advantage of the centralized fur-purchasing tariffs of the HBC and Revillon Frères in order to buy at prices between those paid by the larger fur concerns. In this way, they set themselves up as middlemen, capable of both outbidding some of the competition and selling the purchased furs to the rest. They were able to do so because of the practice that most of the Innu had adopted by the mid-1920s of selling their furs at informal auction at which each of the traders present would tender a bid, the highest of which would secure the furs. Since no trader or company could be present at each such sale, the small traders often proved capable of playing the HBC off against Revillon Frères. For example, in March 1932, George Fowlie, the HBC post manager at Mashteuiatsh, observed the workings of this commercial strategy: “Meridy Robertson can pay more than me and make a profit selling them to Revillon’s.” In addition to profiting from differences in price between the French and English companies, small traders also earned their living by purchasing directly for Montreal and Quebec City furriers. In such cases, they were generally authorized to pay higher prices than the HBC and Revillon Frères on select pelts. In November 1931, Fowlie reported that John Murdock, “a millionaire

100 While Drolet appears to have been active primarily during the 1920s, Dufour, who operated two stores (his initial store in Sainte Anne de Chicoutimi and in 1927 added that of his deceased brother in St. Félicien), was an active fur-buyer through mid-century. Carl Beaulieu, Les entrepreneurs Martel, Chicoutimi, Les Éditions du Patrimoine, 2008, p. 248. Drolet’s activities are recorded in the HBC Pointe Bleue post journal. For example, “Two Indians arrived this P.M. but got their advances at Drolet St. Felicien.” Wednesday, 7 May 1924, HBCA, B.329/a/8, p. 36, reel IMA53.

101 For more on Robertson’s activities, see Chapter Seven.

102 Friday, 4 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/14, p. 100, reel IMA53.
contractor of Chicoutimi," financed Clément Dufour's fur operations. While in Chicoutimi, Fowlie observed that, "Dufour had a phone call from the Bank saying that Murdock had deposited $500.00 to his credit."

As a result of the relatively high prices and the fierce competition in the Lac St. Jean fur trade during the 1920s, the Innu of Mashteuiatsh were able to innovate through the adoption of a powerful new tool through which to sell their furs to Euro-Canadian merchants. In 1925, an HBC employee noted that the system "works like an auction sale – the buyers writing down their prices; and the highest bid gets the Furs." This mechanism, which continued to function through at least the mid-1930s, allowed Innu hunter-trappers, whether they "belonged" to one of the competing commercial interests in the region or not, to sell their catch on the open market, using the cash proceeds to reimburse whatever debt they may have had. The Innu generally held these auctions either on the reserve or in the neighboring towns of Roberval and St. Félicien and invited all interested parties to attend in order to place bids. The HBC's Pointe Bleue post journal describes a June 1935 auction: "Baptiste Philippe's fur was worth about $525.00. Brassard of Roberval bid $475.00 Clement Dufour bid $535.00 so [HBC employees] G. Fowlie & L.G. Tassé bid $550.00. Then the fun started and Dufour began bidding up the furs as he did on the Boivin deal. The Company's men were determined to purchase, on account of the moral affect on the Indians, and kept raising their prices until they got the lot at $620.00." Thus, auctions served to secure cash for the Innu

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103 Monday, 23 November 1931, HBCA, B.329/a/14, p. 72, reel 1MA53.

104 Tuesday, 26 May 1925, HBCA, B.329/a/9, p. 46, reel 1MA53.

105 This use of the auction to make money from the highest bidder in spite of having been accorded credit by one of the competing fur interests is illustrated by the Clearys’ 1925 sale. The HBC’s post journal records the incident: “Two of our Hunters arrived today, Wm. & Chs. Clarey. They will sell tomorrow, by auction... We got the lots of Wm. & Charles Clarey this morning, Dufour’s bid being lower than our’s. 75 Beavers in that lot.” Sunday 7 and Monday 8 June 1925, HBCA, B.329/a/10, p. 1, reel 1MA53. Of course, the Innu also continued to reimburse their debt in the “traditional” manner, through the use of furs not cash. “Eustache Robertson was in this morning with enough Furs to pay for his account.” Wednesday, 5 January 1927, HBCA, B.329/a/11, f. 21r, reel 1MA53.

106 Friday, 14 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 5, reel 1MA53.
at rates well above those that they would have earned from isolated buyers. Even if generally unwilling to pay such inflated prices, company employees considered that ensuring this "moral affect" was absolutely central to their business because Innu trappers were attuned to the amount they could expect from each trader. If the HBC revealed itself to be unprepared to meet the competition often enough, Amerindians would begin taking their furs elsewhere without verifying different buyers' prices.

However, not all Innu participated in the auctions, some preferring to sell their catch as they had traditionally done directly at the HBC post. Such preference for the HBC was anything but a rule and, when it occurred was cause for comment. In June 1925, the Pointe Bleue post journal records that, "Old Malek Begin, arrived during the afternoon, and brought his hunt right to the door – a rarity round here, by the way." Others preferred to sell their catch elsewhere, without necessarily auctioning it, and then reimbursing whatever credit they may have received from fur companies. In 1928, the HBC's manager at Mashteuiatsh wrote: "Francois Germain was in with two fine dark Otters as it was for paying his account. I offered him eighty dollars for both ten dollars more than allowed according to my Tariff but he said that he could get $150.00 for these skins so I had to let him go. He said that he would bring me cash for his debt."

By the mid-1920s, in an effort to increase its Innu patronage and presumably to decrease the amount of fur sold at auction, the HBC had reopened its post on the

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107 Although the archives rarely explicit on the method of payment, occasional references make it clear that the HBC paid for furs purchased at auction in cash. For example, the Pointe Bleue post journal from 1933-4 notes: "Mr. Tassé and G. Fowlie made four or five trips to see fur of Baptiste Philippe. All the other buyers made bids and we finally secured it for $780.00. [...] Mr. Fowlie went to Bank for cash to pay for furs." Tuesday, 6 June 1933, HBCA, B.329/a16, p. 1, reel 1MA53.

108 For example, in 1924 the post manager at Mashteuiatsh wrote: "We went to St. Felicien to see some Furs, but could not buy. There is some more Indian In & bought some Furs." Sunday, 25 May 1924, HBCA, B.329/a8, p. 37, reel 1MA53.

109 Friday, 5 June 1925, HBCA, B.329/a10, p. 1, reel 1MA53.

110 Thursday, 2 February 1928, HBCA, B.329/a12, f. 19r, reel 1MA53.
Ashuapmouchouan River. Now known as “Moar’s Post,” after its manager, Tom Moar, the outpost, open exclusively in the winter, conducted its business in the heart of Innu hunting and trapping grounds as a means of increasing its market share. Rather than the formal environment of the company’s stores, Moar’s “post” was essentially a well-stocked winter camp, from which Moar and his family based their own hunting and trapping activities. The HBC’s employment of Moar, a member of the Mashteuiatsh band (although originally from Mistassini) of mixed Aboriginal and European ancestry, reflected its interwar practice of hiring precisely such men to manage its outposts throughout Canada. In this case, as elsewhere throughout the subarctic, the HBC outfitted such “independent” traders at advantageous price in the hope that they would be able to protect the company’s credit through the collection of those furs caught in the vicinity of their outpost. However, while Moar’s Post was primarily dedicated to recovering furs in repayment of credit and, to a lesser extent, the provision of supplies, the company could not neglect the appeal of currency even at this relatively remote outpost. In the fall of 1925, for example, cash accounted for over 30% of the value of Tom Moar’s trade stock. Thus, the outpost trade, initially devised as a means of protecting the HBC’s merchandise-based profit margin, ultimately allowed the Innu to partially escape the company’s control through the cash it provided. Although impossible to verify, the company’s opposition to cash fur-buying whenever practical suggests that the

111 The first reference to the outpost in the Pointe Bleue journals dates to the fall of 1924. Thursday, 9 October and Friday, 10 October 1924, HBCA, B.329/a/9, p. 16, reel 1MA53. Between the early 1890s and 1903, the HBC had also operated this outpost, but it abandoned it and burnt the buildings when its manager, the Innu Charles Robertson, resigned. S.K. Parson, “Report: Rupert’s River District, Mistassini Post,” 9 September 1891, HBCA, B.133/e/17, p. 12-3, reel 1M1257 and P. McKenzie to W.R. Hamilton, 14 March 1903, HBCA, B.329/c/2, f. 208, reel 1MB89.

112 Ray writes: “by 1919 ‘native’ (mixed-blood) men managed a high proportion of its outposts.” Although these men worked hard, their employment proved problematic from the HBC’s perspective. “Most native men were illiterate and they had been given no training in simple bookkeeping. Even more troublesome, they extended credit too liberally to their kinfolk, and often they paid too much for their furs.” Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 110.

113 Ibid, p. 76.

114 The HBC’s Pointe Bleue post journal records that, “Mr. Moor left this AM at 10, with about 700.00 Dollars of merchandise and 325.00 in Cash.” 13 October 1925, HBCA, B.329/a/10, p. 15, reel 1MA53.
Innu themselves most likely forced this concession, presumably threatening to take their business elsewhere if Moar could not provide cash.

Beyond purchasing furs with cash in the bush, Moar contributed to the region’s rapidly changing fur trade by placing his personal interests above those of the HBC. Although outfitted by the company and provided with trade goods at preferential prices, Moar followed the example of other Amerindians and sold his personal catch to the highest bidder in order to repay the HBC in cash. In 1931, for example, the company’s Masteuiatsh post journal records that, “Tom Moar... had about $250.00 in furs which he left on his account and $130.00 his personal hunt which I paid in cash. There were four buyers there to see him besides me Meridy Robertson, Mr. Brousseau, A. Drolet, and Eugene Simard. Meridy Robertson bought a small lot from him.”

Although the archives provide the greatest amount of information on Tom Moar’s operations, at least one other Innu conducted outpost trade on behalf of the company. From the late 1920s, Napoléon Bégin worked to secure furs on behalf of the HBC at his winter camp, most likely located near Chibougamau. Like Moar, Bégin sold his personal fur catch for cash to the highest bidder after having purchased “his goods for cost” from the HBC. According to J. Allan Burgesse, an employee of the HBC’s Pointe Bleue post during the period, both Moar’s and Bégin’s posts declined during the 1930s and “disappeared quietly around 1937.” Thus, like other Innu, Moar and Bégin preferred selling a portion of their

115 Wednesday, 1 April 1931, HBCA, B.329/a/14, p. 24, reel 1MA53.

116 In 1926, the Pointe Bleue post journal notes that, “Napoleon Begin left today, leaving Tom Moar the only one of our men to go now.” Wednesday, 28 July 1926, HBCA, B.329/a/11, p. 5, reel 1MA53. Although he fails to mention the individual who ran the outpost, Burgesse, in his article on the history of the HBC’s Ashuapmouchouan posts, refers to “a second establishment [that] was located at Chibougamau, a little further north” during the 1930s. J. Allan Burgesse, “The Unwanted Post,” Canadian Historical Review, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1947), p. 410.

117 Saturday, 8 June 1931, B.329/a/14, p. 39, reel 1MA53.

furs on the open market, thereby increasing their revenue and contributing to the process that would eventually end in the fur trade’s full monetization.

In this context, the HBC increased the harshness of its credit and cash policy even as its market share appears to have begun declining during the late 1920s. However, given the intense competition of the period’s fur trade, the company’s Mashteuiatsh post manager tempered this policy with practice aimed at retaining his customers while not antagonizing his superiors. In the spring of 1932, HBC management had apparently decided to eliminate nearly all credit at Mashteuiatsh. George Fowlie opposed this policy, noting that it would certainly negatively affect the company’s business because “The people have no money and the other merchants are giving supplies on credit as the guiding season is about to commence.” Fowlie felt that the company cut credit at its peril as the Innu, who contended “that they require small credits from time to time to tide over periods of unemployment,” preferred trading with merchants who proved willing to “accommodate them.” As generations of post managers before him, Fowlie defended the sale of goods on credit because he believed that, “by giving small credits to those who pay fairly well that it would help our trade considerably.”119 By the late summer of the same year, Fowlie had begun outfitting a large number of Innu trappers on credit. However, he provided significantly smaller advances than those of the preceding decade, confirming management’s determination to reduce credit sales.120 Moreover, the Innu were not alone in feeling the credit crunch; during the 1933-4 season, the HBC reduced advances to Euro-Canadians at the post “to practically nothing.”121 Even in the depths of the Depression, however, the HBC

119 Monday, 16 May 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 17, reel 1MA53.

120 For example, in December 1932, George Fowlie purchased $243.65 in furs from Charles and William Cleary which was sufficient to reimburse their combined debt. Saturday, 24 December 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 45, reel 1MA53.

121 Saturday, 10 March 1934, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 53, reel 1MA53.
continued paying for a portion of the furs it purchased at Mashteuiatsh in cash.\textsuperscript{122} Moreover, according to the company’s post manager, the market remained competitive enough that the Innu could decide whether to sell their catch to the company for store credit or cash.\textsuperscript{123} By this point, many Innu who had been advanced by the HBC repaid their debt in cash earned by selling their furs to the highest bidder. George Fowlie decried this practice, in the process calling into question yet again the utility of extending credit to trappers. “This is gratitude as understood and practised by the Indian. He prefers to sell his furs to an outsider rather than to the Company, which advances him. Boivin paid his debt in cash and this raises the question whether it is worthwhile advancing the Indians. We have to wait almost a year before being paid and have to take cash or pay far more than his fur is worth in order to collect the account.”\textsuperscript{124} In other words, during the mid-1930s, the HBC’s profits in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean remained dependent on the sale of merchandise. In this context, Innu use of cash when reimbursing their debt continued to pose serious problems for the company’s bottom line. However, by this point, even the most recalcitrant of HBC employees had come to accept that cash had become a permanent fixture of the fur trade. As a result, Fowlie, like his superiors, increasingly argued in favor the total elimination of credit.

Arthur J. Ray describes this moment, also characterized by the increasing importance in the subarctic of Euro-Canadian trappers along with religious and state organizations, as that at which “company paternalism” ceased to suffice in justifying corporate policy.\textsuperscript{125} Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, the state charged the HBC

\textsuperscript{122} The Mashteuiatsh post journal contains the following entry: “Several Indians came down to-day so we had a very busy day. I bought furs... [for] a total of $1244.80... I bought these furs partly for cash and partly on account of debt.” Monday, 9 January 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 48, reel 1MA53.

\textsuperscript{123} In January 1933, Fowlie wrote: “I managed to buy from Joseph McNicol for $67.35 and Benoît Jourdain for $59.85. They took most of it in trade so we had a good day in the store.” Friday, 20 January 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 50, reel 1MA53.

\textsuperscript{124} Saturday, 8 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 3, reel 1MA53.

\textsuperscript{125} Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 220-1.
and Revillon Frères with delivering relief to Amerindians in remote areas such as James Bay. Although the state rather than the fur trade companies funded the majority of such aid, its role was kept secret due to fears among Indian Affairs officials that knowledge of the state's involvement would instill a sense of entitlement in Amerindians that, according to the prevailing wisdom of the Canadian socioeconomic elite, would only serve to remove the motivation to work, thereby permanently pauperizing First Nations. Thus, the HBC and Revillon Frères provided relief to the Moose Factory Cree and their neighbors in terms that accorded with the traditions of the fur trade and in the hopes of gaining an advantage over the competition. The HBC's annual report for the 1916-7 season admitted as much: "The Government themselves are greatly to blame for the abuses which had arisen due to the fact that both the Hudson's Bay Company and Messrs. Revillon Freres were authorized to make advances. The natural consequence had been that this authority has been used as a lever to obtain the goodwill of the Indians." This method of distribution required Amerindians to hunt and trap if they hoped to receive succor from one of the companies in lean years. However, once Indian Affairs, succumbing to popular opinion that increasingly cast assistance as a right rather than a privilege while advancing its own legitimacy through what Toby Morantz has termed "bureaucratic colonialism," began distributing aid in its own name during the 1940s, all such obligation to trap disappeared. In this sense, the reorganization of relief led to the loss of a central element of the HBC's control over Aboriginal peoples. By the 1940s, then, the HBC had become, even in remote regions, simply one fur purchaser among many, with little claim to special status in the minds of Aboriginal trappers. At the same time, due to the overhunting of fur-bearing animals during the 1920s and 1930s, the

126 On the HBC's role in securing the right to distribute state-funded assistance to Amerindians, see Hugh Shewell, "Enough to Keep Them Alive": Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. 77-87.


state supplanted the company as the primary actor in Quebec and Ontario’s subarctic fur trade. During the 1940s, then, the state’s policies with respect to money influenced Cree and Innu economic fortunes more profoundly than those of private capital.

Conclusion

During the first half of the twentieth century, large corporations and small buyers each employed money in distinct ways while competing for control of the subarctic fur trade. While independent traders, who made their profit on the sale of furs and not on merchandise, preferred to employ cash in their transactions with Amerindians, both the HBC and Revillon Frères attempted to use their size and capital reserves to lock the Cree and Innu into long-term commercial relationships based on the provision of goods on credit in the late summer and the repayment of debt, including what effectively amounted to interest, nearly a year later in the form of furs. At the same time, these large capital concerns attempted whenever possible to prevent the circulation of cash within fur trade networks as money, especially when used to purchase furs, afforded Amerindians a degree of independence from the companies that threatened their business model and, in the minds of top executives, even their continued existence. Despite their massive investment in the project, neither Revillon Frères nor the HBC proved capable of resisting the monetization of the fur trade that had largely come to pass by the 1940s. This failure was in many ways foreshadowed by the HBC’s inability to force commercial relations to assume a purely barter-based form in western James Bay and elsewhere following the end that the French company put to the HBC’s monopoly at the beginning of the century. In fact, the arguments that eventually paved the way for the cash-based trade were strikingly similar to those that post managers employed when arguing in favor of credit: if the HBC failed to provide Amerindians credit or cash, they would inevitably take their business elsewhere. However, this change was never purely economic. The increased circulation of cash in the fur trade resulted as much from political intervention as from market activity. Indeed, after the western James Bay market reverted to an essentially cashless state following the provision of Revillon Frères’ posts with merchandise in 1904, Treaty No. 9 forced it to permanently accept Canadian dollars the very next year. During the First World War, the HBC, acting from patriotic fervor, halted fur exports (despite substantial
growth in demand for furs in the United States), thereby ceding a large portion of its market share to cash buyers. The final step towards full monetization, moreover, arose not from any decision on the part of the company, but from Indian Affairs’ decision to occupy the field of social assistance in the north to an unprecedented extent in the 1940s, in the process even going so far as to involve itself in the purchase of pelts from Amerindians. Thus, money’s integration into the subarctic fur trade arose from a combination of economic and political factors that included the rise of “bureaucratic colonialism” and the decline of “company paternalism.”

In more explicitly political terms, the dollar’s replacement of beaver currency in western James Bay effectively marked the region as belonging to the Canadian nation-state, thereby continuing the process of state formation that had begun in mid-nineteenth-century Saguenay Lac St. Jean. As a result of its active use by First Nations throughout the north and its introduction through treaty by the federal and provincial states, this symbol of national sovereignty definitively escaped the strict controls that the HBC had previously placed on its use. Thus, Amerindians, who had embraced the Canadian dollar above all as a means of restructuring the commercial relations they maintained with large fur trade corporations, inadvertently provided southern authorities with a particularly effective means of symbolically integrating the region into national political space. This development ultimately led the Cree and other subarctic First Nations from one relationship of dependence on external institutional actors to another, as the state theoretically assumed the HBC’s predominant economic and political role throughout the region. The following chapter analyzes the state’s nationwide policy and its local practice in Moose Factory, Mashteuiatsh, and Wendake with respect to money-use during the first half of the twentieth century, demonstrating that despite its theoretically straightforward role, the state’s discourse and material actions proved once more to be anything but identical.
Chapter 6

Discourse and Practice from Above: The State and Money, 1900-1951

During the first half of the twentieth century, the distance separating the state’s discourse from its practice with respect to Aboriginal money-use remained great. While high-level bureaucrats and elected officials proclaimed through legislation and public statements a policy aimed at assimilating Amerindians into the Canadian body politic, a discourse which turned on the rhetorical figure of the “improvident Indian” who, it was asserted, could not competently participate in market society without state supervision, the state’s concrete engagement of First Nations money-use proved far less clear-cut. Indeed, officials often proved less interested in the concrete implementation of policy than they were in defending its theoretical bases. This chapter analyzes state discourse and action with respect to money from the top-down. It pays particular attention to Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake while also considering the pan-Canadian context in order to demonstrate that the state, like capital, continued to employ money as means of discursively portraying Aboriginal peoples as requiring close supervision throughout the period. However, unlike the HBC and Revillon Frères, the state rarely made use of money as a material means of exerting force over Amerindians, either individually or collectively. Instead, this chapter argues that Indian Affairs primarily employed money during the period in order to protect its administrative prerogatives vis-à-vis other state agencies, at both the federal and provincial levels, that had in several cases begun providing services to Amerindians without regard for their particular legal status.

Between the turn of the century and the post-World War II era, the state underwent important changes, altering its relationship to Canadian and First Nations societies. These changes had the effect of introducing new institutional actors in Amerindian communities, born of participation in society-wide organizations and programs such as the military and family allowances. Although the Canadian legal regime theoretically allowed Amerindians to act in these spaces on equal terms to those enjoyed by all participants, Indian Affairs considered the multiplication of institutional actors in Aboriginal communities to be a direct threat to the existence of the clientele model under which it had functioned since the 1860s.
This competitive context accounts for much of the Department's discourse and action with respect to money-use through the mid-twentieth century. Although the state's involvement in real-world money-use did affect aspects of day-to-day life among the Cree, Huron, and Innu, the Department's discursive intervention into monetary affairs ultimately proved to be of greater consequence, favoring the continued existence of colonialism's infantilizing vision of Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, this chapter argues that Indian Affairs' use of the "improvident Indian" in establishing its institutional raison d'être ultimately had the effect of perpetuating widespread stereotypes with respect to Aboriginal peoples and reinforcing the notion that they were not yet ready to fully participate in Canadian civil society despite the very real socioeconomic success that many Amerindians had achieved.

The State's Limited Monetary Control, 1900-1929

During the first three decades of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs only engaged money-use in practice on rare occasions, primarily in the context of treaty payments. However, even during this period of limited monetary control, official discourse continued to portray Amerindians through the accepted stereotype of inherent improvidence. Frank Pedley, the deputy superintendent general during much of the first decade of the twentieth century, claimed that the legislative framework within which the state had placed Amerindians was partly to blame for their poverty. Pedley asserted that this "peculiar constitutional tendency of the Indian [leads him] to prefer employment which gives quick returns and allows of intermittent application relieved by periodical indulgence in recreation to the comparatively plodding and monotonous occupation of farming." Pedley argued that the state had failed in "helping the Indians to help themselves," because "The Indians have never manifested any slowness in grasping the fact that irrespective of their own exertions, they would not be left to starve, nor could the withholding of rations as a disciplinary

1 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1907, p. xxiii.
measure be freely employed in the early days, consistently with the safety of settlers and their property. The result was that the industrious found themselves little, if at all, better off than their brethren who opposed vis inertiae to efforts to arouse them."2 Thus, the Department’s chief bureaucrat echoed the conclusion to which the Committee of Lower Canada’s Executive Council had come seventy years before by claiming that the protective structure within which Canada had placed its wards was at least partially responsible for their pauperization. While this discourse of inherent improvidence continued through mid-century, it initially receded somewhat until thrust into the spotlight once more by the economic hardships and increased relief expenditure of the Great Depression. As a result, prior to the 1930s, the Department’s provision of limited amounts of cash to Amerindians proved less problematic than it would later become.

Treaty No. 9 Payments as the “Eyes of Politics” in Western James Bay

Whereas state-backed money imposed itself in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean through its use by colonists, it arrived in western James Bay as a result of direct action on the part of authorities. This difference in origin is critical in understanding the divergent manner in which the state exerted monetary force in the two regions. Although the state did play a role in Innu money-use following the transition to the Canadian dollar, it influenced money-use among the Moose Factory Cree in far more direct ways, literally placing cash in their hands. Toby Morantz argues that the advance of southern political, economic, and religious institutions into eastern James Bay during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries is best understood in terms of what she calls “bureaucratic colonialism” because of both “the contradictions caused by the various agencies of government’s approach to social engineering” and the general neglect with which bureaucrats and elected officials treated the

2 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1906, p. xxiv.
relatively remote region. While both of these observations also hold in western James Bay, the present section is most concerned with the ways in which the state, although asserting official claims to sovereignty, long refrained from governing the region in any way whatsoever. Indeed, even after 1905, Indian Affairs and other state institutions proved reticent to occupy any but the most minor of roles in western James Bay, with annual treaty payments constituting practically the only interaction between the Cree and the state prior to the late 1920s.

While the Cree had only limited contact with the federal and provincial state during the first-half of the twentieth century, previously they had had practically none. Beginning in its 1872 Annual Report, the Department of Indian Affairs claimed each year that 420 Cree traded at Moose Factory. By 1883, however, this number, whose origin is unclear and which had not changed in a decade, disappeared from the Department’s official lists. In 1902, as part of the preparations for Treaty No. 9, the Indian Agent at Fort William polled an HBC employee and an Anglican missionary who had both been active in the area and reported to Ottawa that 500 Amerindians were based at Moose Factory. Although the HBC had ceded its claims to the region to Canada in 1870 through the sale of Rupert’s Land, it remained the primary Euro-Canadian entity in western James Bay well into the twentieth century. Thus, when federal and provincial officials decided to “negotiate” a treaty with the region’s

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4 Indian Affairs reported this number annually from 1872 through 1882. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1872, p. 62 and Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1882, p. 257.

5 This estimate, provided by the Indian Agent at Fort William, was based on information obtained from “Mr Alex Matheson of Hudson’s Bay Co, and Archdeacon Thomas Vincent late of Moose Factory.” J.F. Hodder, to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 6 December 1902, LAC, RG10, vol. 3033, File 235,225, Part 1, reel C-11314.

6 As John S. Long demonstrates, state officials did not so much negotiate Treaty No. 9 with First Nations as they imposed its terms on them. Long, “How the Commissioners Explained.”
Aboriginal peoples, they turned to the company. The HBC facilitated the state’s assertion of sovereignty over far northern Ontario through treaty by furnishing both information in the years immediately preceding 1905 and material support to the commissioners who set out in that year.

However, the HBC’s role extended beyond the provision of assistance to public officials as its trading posts hosted the treaty “negotiations” and subsequent annuity payments to the Cree and Ojibway. Thus, Moose Factory and other posts in the region became the loci at which the state interacted with First Nations. Although many Cree continued to lead a semi-nomadic lifestyle through mid-century, the annual treaty payments helped reinforce Moose Factory’s role as the center of gravity around which the Cree’s annual cycle turned. Prior to the state’s assertion of sovereignty over northern Ontario through Treaty No. 9, Aboriginal peoples living there possessed greater control over their movements in that if their economic well-being favored it, they could change the post at which they conducted their business or they might remain in the bush for several years without returning to the post. Annuity payments, however, changed this. As John S. Long points out, “[a]long with the cash, each male household head received a card or ‘ticket numbered for future use and identification.’” In order to receive payment, then, every beneficiary needed to return to the same post each year. In this way, the money provided by the treaty commissioners tightened the relationship between the Cree and the trading post, making it the point at which the state and Amerindians interacted and providing the HBC with a critical means of ensuring its continued profitability in the region.

Treaty payments also had the effect of “creating” far northern Ontario’s Aboriginal population. They did so through the compilation and maintenance of series of statistical data

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Indeed, through the middle of the twentieth century, the Department of Indian Affairs considered that treaty payments provided an excellent means of keeping First Nations under close surveillance.\footnote{See, for example, the testimony that Indian Affairs' secretary, T.R.L. MacInnes, gave to the special joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons considering changes to the Indian Act. "Minutes of Evidence, No. 3, Brooke Claxton, K.C., Minister of National Health and Welfare, and T.R.L. MacInnes, Secretary, Indian Affairs Branch," 6 June 1946, in Canada, *Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 80-1.}

Despite the seemingly objective nature of official population statistics, the treaty commissioners determined the most fundamental parameter (which individuals belonged to each band) in seemingly arbitrary ways. Prior to the signature of Treaty No. 9, the Cree and the other inhabitants of western James Bay (primarily Scottish traders and their mixed-blood descendents) did not necessarily think in Euro-Canadian sociological terms. Although labor and ethnic divisions, one often serving as shorthand for the other, existed and were recognized within trading post communities in the region, only in 1905 and 1906 did they become fixed in the federal government's insistence that all local residents be classified as "Indians," thereby benefiting from the new treaty, or not. The payment of annuities visibly reinforced this differentiation, remaking the society of far northern Ontario in terms of the pan-Canadian distinction between the federal state's Amerindian wards ("status Indians") and all other Canadians. However, the decision to include or exclude certain individuals from annuity payments was in no way "scientific." Although the commissioners admitted large numbers of "halfbreeds" to treaty in certain communities, such as Fort Albany, elsewhere (e.g. Moose Factory) only
those recognized by local community members as “Indians” signed the agreement.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, through the monetization of Moose Factory’s Cree “population,” Indian Affairs was able to clearly delineate the object upon which it exerted its force and to simultaneously fix that object to a well-defined geographical location. Through this double maneuver, the Canadian state integrated the Cree of Moose Factory into its administrative framework and handed responsibility for this “new” population to the Department of Indian Affairs. The significance of treaty payments, then, was anything but purely economic.

It is important to note that the state always paid the Treaty No. 9 annuities in cash. One of the 1905 Treaty Commissioners, Duncan Campbell Scott, wrote that the treaty party transported by canoe “the treasure-chest which was heavy with thirty thousand dollars in small notes.”\textsuperscript{12} This policy of paying cash even resisted one of the period’s, and Indian Affairs’, strongest prejudices: the belief that Amerindians, like the poor, were naturally improvident, and thus could not be trusted with money. In 1928, when G.A. Brown, the Provincial Auditor of Ontario, inquired whether Indian Affairs, which had itself previously voiced concern about the wisdom of paying arrears worth $212 in cash to James Luke of the Moose Factory Band, J.D. McLean, the Secretary of Indian Affairs, responded dryly that, “This man was paid $212.00 arrears by the Department per cheque No. 8238.”\textsuperscript{13} The Department, then, viewed the payment of monetary treaty annuities as an inalienable right. This position placed such money beyond its power to alter or control, meaning that it was conceptually distinct from other forms of money that the state might conceivably provide in


the execution of its duties. This explains departmental employees' divergent discourse and practice with respect to treaty payments and, among other things, monetary social assistance.

Although the Department officially began its relationship with the Cree on the signature of Treaty No. 9 in 1905, it did not station its first agent, Dr. B.H. Hamilton, in the region until August 1929. Hamilton, whose office was located at Moose Factory, was responsible for all of the Amerindian communities on both the Quebec and Ontario sides of James and Hudson Bay. In addition to the administrative tasks that Indian Affairs required of all its agents, Hamilton was also charged with providing medical services to the region's First Nations, each of which he visited by boat or airplane at least once a year. However, given his residence at Moose Factory, Hamilton maintained a relatively high profile among the Cree of southwestern James Bay. Prior to his appointment, the Department had contact with the First Nations of the Ontario portion of the region only once a year at treaty time. In 1931, Dr. W.L. Tyrer succeeded Hamilton and held the post until his death in December 1940, at which point Dr. T.J. Orford was named agent. In September 1947, Indian Affairs named J.S. Allan agent in James Bay while retaining Orford's services as the region's medical officer.

During the summers of 1929 and 1930, the same time that Hamilton took up residence at Moose Factory, the federal and provincial states extended Treaty No. 9 to include those First Nations north of Fort Albany, including Winisk, Fort Severn, and Attawapiskat. In 1936, Indian Affairs reported that, "On the Treaty Nine trip $17,000 in crisp new bills is provided by the Government. New bills are taken because they pack easier and also because they will constitute a large proportion of the money in circulation in the territory for the next year." Given that the federal government had assumed sole responsibility for issuing paper currency for the first time in 1935, this observation points to the importance of treaty payments in modifying the image that Canada sought to project of itself throughout the

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whole of its territory. Indeed, prior to 1935, banks had the right to print a portion of the Canadian dollars in circulation, although the federal government had exercised a monopoly on the issue of $0.25, $1, and $2 notes since Confederation, thereby making it highly unlikely that Amerindian treaty signatories ever received private notes in payment. While the iconography of private notes referred to their bank of origin as the authority in which their value originated, publicly-printed notes also served a different master in the pre-1935 period when they bore the words “Dominion of Canada” rather than “Bank of Canada,” as they would after the founding of that institution. The unification of national space under a single currency, printed solely by the newly created Bank of Canada, then, clearly struck the author of the Annual Report as a process that was in perfect harmony with the state’s payment of treaty annuities in “New Ontario.” Thus, treaty officials sought to fulfill their role not only by supplying the Cree and Ojibwa of northern Ontario with the $4 in annuities that the federal and provincial treasuries owed them but also by injecting newly printed currency into the region, thereby marking it more effectively, in the eyes of both inhabitants and visitors, as part of the nation of Canada.

Since the signature of the original seven numbered treaties during the 1870s, a debate of relatively low intensity had been ongoing among politicians, bureaucrats, Amerindians, and the public concerning the nature and purpose of treaty payments. While First Nations generally held that annuities and other treaty benefits had been designed to provide material security in the face of changing economic conditions, representatives of the crown tended to argue in favor of the symbolic nature of benefits. During the 1940s,

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17 Ray, Miller, and Tough write that, in the case of Treaty No. 6, "the Cree and their allies sought a partnership with Canada... that provided for their basic socioeconomic security under the new economic realities of the dawning industrial age." Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000, p. 147.
Indian Affairs’ senior officials continued to make this claim, flatly rejecting the “mistaken idea abroad, that the treaty Indians were supposed to have a kind of subsistence allowance,” and instead confidently asserting that, “treaty money is only a token of good faith.” However, while economically inconsequential, treaty payments continued to furnish the state with a wealth of information on their beneficiaries – a fact of which Indian Affairs was acutely aware. In 1946, the Branch’s secretary, T.R.L. MacInnes, explicitly called attention to annuities’ use in surveillance:

we know where they are, we know where our treaty Indians are, because they have treaty tickets. They have to have that ticket in order to get their payments, so they always keep it and never lose it. Also, the head of a family in a treaty has to report in to get his payments, for each member of his family, the deaths and births that have occurred in that family; so we know all about our treaty Indians, and we have a very accurate census and individual information about them, because people will give information for a consideration which they will not give otherwise; so, if for no other reason, I believe it to be worth while having that annual treaty payment to enable us to keep such good track of our Indians.

Of course, the secretary went on, officials were aware “that the actual money, in large part, may be frittered away because of folly, for if an Indian be given $5, he will probably spend it for a few little knick knacks or odds and ends, the same day that he gets it; and that is what has given rise to the criticism that we were wasting money by that payment. Nevertheless, it is an obligation which must be fulfilled unless it be extinguished by commutation of some kind to pay it off and discontinue the practice.” Branch employees, then, dismissed treaty money’s economic importance, calling it a symbol and claiming that its distribution depended solely on legal obligation. Thus, by mid-century, annuities had become, at least according to MacInnes, a tool useful only for the collection of information concerning its wards and for the supervision of their movements.

The Depression and State Control of Money

During the first half of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs continued to deny any role to money in relief provision. As had been the case since the commutation debates of the 1820s and 1830s, state officials asserted that money offered their naturally improvident wards too much freedom. As a result, they preferred to exercise strict supervision of the ways in which Amerindians benefited from state-funded social assistance. At the same time, authorities in Ottawa continued seeking to minimize departmental expenditure. These two goals combined with the institution’s need to justify its existence in order to shape Indian Affairs’ discourse and practice during the Great Depression.

Vouchers and the Control of Consumption

The Depression led to a substantial increase in departmental relief. An analysis of the assistance provided by Indian Affairs in eight of the nineteen agencies in Quebec, representing both southern, “settled” First Nations and northern, “hunting and trapping Indians,” reveals that total relief expenditure in 1933 was 8.5 times greater than it had been in 1929. Although relief outlay declined somewhat thereafter, it remained well above its pre-Depression level at least through 1938.19 Of these eight First Nations, Odanak, Listuguj, Kahnesatake, and Wendake, each located in proximity to the Euro-Canadian population, received amounts of per capita aid during the period that dwarfed those provided to more remote agencies such as Pessamit, Mashteuiatsh, and Temiskaming.20 In 1931, the

19 In 1938, relief expenditure was roughly seven times as great as in 1929. The sample used includes: Bersimis (Pessamit), Caughnawaga (Kahnawake), Lorette (Wendake), Oka (Kahnesatake), Pierreville (Odanak), Pointe-Bleue (Mashteuiatsh), Restigouche (Listuguj) and Temiskaming. The data analyzed is from the Indian Affairs Annual Reports for 1929 to 1938 (excluding 1937 when the Report included no relief statistics).

20 For example, in 1935, the year in which the Department provided them the greatest amount of relief, the Abenaki of Odanak received $56.16 per capita. In contrast, in 1938 Indian Affairs provided the
Department reported that, “In the long settled parts of the country, such as the Maritime Provinces and older Ontario and Quebec, the Indians on the reserves are in close contact with the community at large, many of them earning their living as mechanics, labourers, industrial employees, and so on. Lack of employment has affected this class of Indian severely, and the department is obliged to provide for many of them by direct relief.”21 Of course, as John Lutz has demonstrated in the context of British Columbia, such marked disparity in the provision of assistance was also due to Indian Affairs’ assumption that subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering would meet the majority of remote Amerindians’ nutritional needs, thereby sanctioning the distribution of meager relief rations in these communities.22 The Department also applied this system to central and eastern Canada where it provided relief to “the hunting and fishing Indians dwelling in more remote districts, particularly in northern Ontario and northern Quebec... This ration is given to the Indians with the understanding that they must go back into the bush and hunt and not loiter about the posts and railway lines looking for charity.”23 Whatever the real needs of these different First Nations, the Department’s solution to their difficulties consisted of a mixture of straight relief and work-for-welfare programs by which residents carried out “road repairs, ditch digging, building operations and other necessary activities on reserves.”24

The state did not provide such assistance to Amerindians in cash, but in the form of non-transferable vouchers good only at the store for which the Indian agent had issued them. In exchange for these vouchers and the funds they guaranteed, stores provided Indian Affairs with detailed accounts of the goods Amerindians had purchased. Developed during World

Innu of Pessamit with $5.99 in per capita relief – the most assistance that they received during the 1930s.

21 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 7.


23 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 8.

War I by the Department’s top officials, this system allowed Indian Affairs’ headquarters staff to supervise the whole process from application for relief through the issue of supplies to the repayment of merchants, in the process individualizing each recipient as a separate case that required specific attention. In this sense, relief vouchers bore more than a passing resemblance to the abstract form of the fur trade’s private currency – instead of being generally acceptable while representing value independent of their holder’s identity, vouchers were personalized and only good at a single location. However, in contrast to beaver currency, vouchers only allowed their holders access to an extremely limited range of goods.

According to Mashteuiatsh resident Harry Kurtness, “Nos vieux n’avaient que six ou sept piasses par mois. Ils appelaient ça le prêt. À un moment donné, ils appelaient ça les pitons. Mais c’était accordé seulement aux vieillards. Avec les pitons, ils n’avaient pas le droit d’acheter n’importe quoi. C’était du lard, de la farine, du thé. Ils n’avaient pas le droit au luxe, pas de tabac, pas d’autres choses.” In order to change the store for which the Department had issued a voucher, its recipient needed to convince the Indian agent that such a change was warranted. Certain agents, such as Antoine O. Bastien in Wendake, appear to have considered it their duty to decide whether such requests were warranted. Thus, in 1917, he refused to transfer Mrs. Georges Gros-Louis’s $6 monthly voucher from Albert Rochette’s store to that of Pierre Pageau. Other agents, such as Maurice E. Bastien also of Wendake, claimed to have left the decision entirely to relief recipients, even if in Bastien’s case the

25 Duncan Campbell Scott, the deputy superintendent general of Indian Affairs, and J.D. McLean, the agency’s secretary, both played central roles in the system’s development. Hugh Shewell, “Enough to Keep Them Alive”: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. 99-104.

26 Although Kurtness’s life history, from which this quote is taken, does not permit the precise dating of the system he describes, given that he began working off-reserve in 1936 at the age of 13 and that he continued to earn his living off-reserve through mid-century, it would appear that he is referring to the 1930s. Harry Kurtness et Camil Girard, La prise en charge: Témoignage d’un Montagnais, Chicoutimi, Les éditions JCL, 1997, p. 19 and 36-7.

27 21 May 1917, Pierre-Albert Picard, Journal personnel, 1916-1920, p. 44, ACNHW, F-1-79. The Huron grand Chief, Pierre Albert Picard Tschiekt8an, claims that Agent Antoine O. Bastien refused Gros-Louis’s request because he felt that she would receive better value for her voucher from Rochette. 17 June 1917, in Ibid, p. 50.
assertion seems somewhat oversimplified.\textsuperscript{28} Regardless of how Indian agents acceded vouchers, Ottawa sought to hold their value to a strict minimum while also decreeing that, "only the aged and destitute or those utterly unable to provide for themselves should receive assistance."\textsuperscript{29} In this way, the Department limited the relief it distributed to a level far below that which non-Aboriginal Canadians received during most of the Depression.\textsuperscript{30}

While vouchers kept currency out of beneficiaries' hands, they did provide significant amounts of money to the merchants who accepted them in exchange for the goods.\textsuperscript{31} Despite Indian Affairs' parsimonious approach to relief provision, two Huron merchants, Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui, asserted in 1933 that at Wendake departmental vouchers constituted "la presque totalité du pouvoir d'achat d'épicerie de la réserve entière." The control of these vouchers and the money they guaranteed the stores that received them in payment constituted a major political issue among the Huron, setting the less well-heeled members of the band against its political and economic elite. In an open letter published in the Quebec City daily, \textit{Le Soleil}, Gros-Louis and Sioui accused Ludger and Maurice E. Bastien, the owners of the third on-reserve store ("Au Bon Marché"), of using their political influence to conspire with the conservative MP of Quebec-Montmorency, Charles-Napoléon Dorion, to gain control of the vast majority of vouchers. Sioui and Gros-Louis claimed that together they only received $108 per month in relief vouchers, or roughly

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{28} Bastien made this claim in M. E. Bastien, Agent des Hurons de Lorette, to M. le Rédacteur, 6 February 1933, in "Lettres que nous recevons," \textit{Le Soleil}, 10 February 1933, p. 4. See below for more on Maurice E. Bastien's involvement with vouchers.

\footnote{29} The Department's secretary sent these instructions to the agent at Wendake near the beginning of the Depression in response to increasing requests for relief. T.R.L. MacInnes to P.A. Picard, 5 November 1930, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 8.

\footnote{30} In 1931, Indian Affairs provided more per capita relief than that received by non-Aboriginal Canadians. However, in 1932, Amerindians began receiving less expenditure per capita than other Canadians. Shewell, "Enough to Keep Them Alive", p. 115.

\footnote{31} For a more detailed analysis of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Brian Gettler, "La consommation sous réserve: les agents indiens, la politique locale et les épiceries à Wendake aux XIX\textsuperscript{e} et XX\textsuperscript{e} siècles," in \textit{Bulletin d'histoire politique} (forthcoming).
\end{footnotes}
11.5% of the total, with the remainder being spent at the Bastiens’ store. Although impossible to verify, their accusations are at least plausible in that, in addition to having been the conservative member of the Legislative Assembly from Quebec County between 1924 and 1927, Ludger Bastien was the grand chief of the Huron from 1929 to 1935. His brother, Maurice E. Bastien, was the Indian agent at Wendake from 1931 through the late 1940s, thereby wielding significant political influence within the reserve as well. Moreover, the brothers had inherited their father’s and grandfather’s industrial fortune, created through the manufacture of snowshoes and moccasins, and continued to operate several businesses in Wendake that employed numerous Huron. Although the accusation generated two responses from Maurice E. Bastien along with a second letter from Sioui and Gros-Louis, all of which were published in the widely read *Le Soleil*, the Department apparently never entered the struggle. As a result, the situation did not change and “Au Bon Marché” continued to dominate the provision of relief through at least the late 1930s.

Although this episode did not lead to the change for which Gros-Louis and Sioui hoped, it does underline the centrality of this highly controlled purchasing instrument to both Indian Affairs’ welfare policy and the economic fortunes of local merchants. Indeed, as they provided at least some Amerindians with one of their primary sources of revenue during the Depression, vouchers contributed both to the survival of the poor through in-kind relief and the economic well-being of relatively privileged members of local society through cash.

32 Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui to J.F. Pouliot, M.P., 2 January 1933, in “Lettres que nous recevons,” *Le Soleil*, 2 février 1933, p. 4. In the same year, the Department provided a total of $11,285.59 in relief to the Huron, or roughly $940 per month. *Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1933*, part 1, p. 6.


payments. While it seems inappropriate to imagine that this system benefitted the Bastiens and other Huron to the same extent, departmental assistance did, at least in this specific instance, provide both succor to the economically disadvantaged and currency to the well-off. Vouchers’ ability to supply Indian Affairs with a significant amount of information concerning relief recipients’ consumption habits, while shaping those habits through Indian agents’ supervision of the goods for which vouchers were exchanged, was also central to their development and continued use.\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{Indian Affairs and the Conversion of Cash Pensions to In-Kind Relief}

During the Depression, then, Indian Affairs continued to subscribe to and promote the stereotype of Amerindians as inherently improvident. Although rhetorical in nature, this figure served to justify the state’s practice of withholding cash payments despite growing acceptance among Canadians that relief recipients deserved monetary benefits. At the height of the Depression, Indian Affairs employees collaborated with their counterparts in the Department of Pensions and National Health in order to first extend the coverage to Amerindians of a program from which they had previously been excluded – the supplementary payments made by the latter to veterans it characterized as “low pensioners” – before ultimately converting the program’s benefits to in-kind relief. This nationwide policy change was prefigured by more tentative efforts on the part of the Indian Affairs Branch to replace monetary pensions with in-kind payments to at least a portion of veterans’ dependents who received monthly payments from the Board of Pension Commissioners for Canada (BPC) and its institutional successor, the Canadian Pension Commission (CPC). Indian Affairs officials’ stated goal in pursuing these changes was to ensure that its wards remained under the benevolent guidance of the Branch while guaranteeing that they did not succumb to the temptation inherent in more cash than was necessary for survival, in the process

\textsuperscript{35} Shewell, “\textit{Enough to Keep Them Alive}”, p. 99-104. See Chapter Seven for more on vouchers in Wendake.
transforming payments that were universally considered a right given their recipients' wartime service into a privilege akin to charity. However, this substitution also served to continue both the Branch's predilection for reducing its expenditure (wherever possible it used pension payments as a means of replacing its own relief provision) and its unstated and necessary policy of founding "its rightness in reason and in nature." Indeed, since the early 1860s, Indian Affairs had exercised a virtual monopoly among state actors over its clientele. During the interwar period, however, a series of novel programs and state agencies that offered services to the entire population, Amerindians included, appeared to threaten the Branch's role as the federal state's sole representative among Canada's First Nations. In this way, Indian Affairs' efforts to lay claim to the new administrative ground created by veterans' and dependents' pensions allowed it to reaffirm its *raison d'être* at the expense of both its stated objective of Amerindian assimilation and the relative autonomy afforded Aboriginal veterans and their dependents by monthly pension checks.

Following the Pension Act of 1919, the BPC awarded benefits to those members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) whose disabilities arose from or were aggravated by military service. Because this act created the BPC as "an independent, quasi-judicial tribunal," Indian Affairs held no direct authority over the application of its programs to Aboriginal veterans and their dependents. However, for much of the interwar period, the process by which individuals applied for and ultimately received veterans' benefits was daunting in its complexity. Moreover, the BPC frequently proved reticent to award meaningful benefits, when it chose to award any at all. In the case of northern Aboriginal


38 On the BPC's complicated administrative apparatus and its frequent unwillingness to award pensions, see Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, *Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and*
peoples unaccustomed to the logic and workings of a centralized bureaucracy, these challenges may very well have seemed insurmountable. However, given their “privileged” relationship with the federal state, First Nations veterans and their dependents were often able to draw on the bureaucratic expertise of Indian Affairs and its agents in obtaining and defending their military pensions. In the case of Moose Factory, this expertise permitted Indian Affairs to “recover” its wards from a rival institution.

Indian Affairs pursued disability pensions for the dependents of at least three Cree veterans residing at Moose Factory, ultimately securing them in two cases. The first of these, that of James Quachegan’s dependents, arose following the veteran’s death on 24 October 1927. The next day, the manager of the HBC post at Moose Factory wrote to the Department on behalf of Rachel Quachegan to determine whether she and her children, given their status as James Quachegan’s dependents, might continue to receive a pension from the BPC. Although the process required nearly a year to complete, the Department’s intervention on her behalf led to the BPC awarding Quachegan and her three children a pension of $97 per month. Dinah Tapes, the daughter of Cree veteran Obeiah Tapes, also

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39 Brownlie briefly mentions a similar case in which the Indian agent in charge of the Parry Sound Agency from 1922 to 1939, John Daly, assisted Francis Pegahmagabow, one of his wards, in receiving a pension for his service during the First World War. Robin Jarvis Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939, Don Mills, ON, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 69.

40 The spelling used throughout this dissertation accords with the variant used in present-day Moose Factory. Many alternative orthographies appear in Indian Affairs’ files.

41 Although Rachel Quachegan remarried in 1933, for the purpose of clarity I use her original married name (Quachegan) in place of her maiden name (Chum) and the name of her second husband (Cheena).


43 [?]. Simpson to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 27 July 1928, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 1, reel C-8525.
received a pension through Indian Affairs’ efforts. Unlike the case of Rachel Quachegan, Indian Affairs initially failed to act in order to secure benefits for Obeiah Tapes’ widow Emily and daughter Dinah following his death on 10 June 1929. The CPC claims that BPC officers had attempted to contact both the James Bay Indian agent and the HBC’s manager at Moose Factory in 1929 and 1930 without ever having received a reply. On 24 September 1936, Tapes’s widow, who had since married Andrew Cheena, revived the case by visiting the Indian agent at Moose Factory in order to determine whether her fourteen year-old daughter, Dinah, was eligible for pension benefits. Following Mrs. Cheena’s visit, Indian Affairs worked rapidly, making a written application for pension to the CPC on 3 October. By February 1937, the Commission had ruled in favor of granting a pension to Dinah Tapes “at ordinary rates [$15 per month], with effect from the date of application, namely October 3rd, 1936.” Although Indian Affairs attempted to secure pension benefits for the dependents of a third Moose Factory Cree, Oliver Mark, it ultimately failed in doing so because the BPC and later the pension tribunal held that Mark had contracted the disease that ended his life (tuberculosis) prior to his enlistment.

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44 As in the case of James Quachegan, Indian Affairs’ files contain a plethora of different orthographies for both Tapes (frequently “Tapas”) and Obeiah (Obediah/Obadiah/Obiab). “Dinah” is also occasionally rendered as “Diane” or “Dianah.” I have again privileged the spelling found in military documents.


46 W.L. Tyrer to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 24 September 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C-8527.


48 For the BPC’s initial rejection letter, see N.M. Halkett to A.F. MacKenzie, 16 October 1930, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-493, reel C-8525. The Indian Agent later reported that he had “appealed this case twice with the same result, it seems useless [sic] for me to do so again.” W.L. Tyrer to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 7 October 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-493, reel C-8525.
In aiding its wards with the pension application process, Indian Affairs sought to secure control over the resulting funds. A.F. MacKenzie, Secretary of Indian Affairs, wrote in the letter that accompanied Rachel Quachegan’s application to the BPC that she “appears to be an Indian woman above the average type, and yet, notwithstanding this, I would ask that, if any pension be granted to her, and I trust it will, the same be forwarded to this Department to be placed to her credit in a Savings Account. The Department will then authorize the Hudson’s Bay Company at Moose Factory to supply her with provisions and clothing to a reasonable amount each month.”49 In Dinah Tapes’ case, the CPC did not wait until Indian Affairs had made a similar request, preferring to suggest that the Branch administer the funds itself. In a letter addressed to Indian Affairs’ secretary, a CPC employee wrote: “When returning the application form will you kindly forward a recommendation as to what disposal should be made of payments if an award is authorized. Presumably your Department would desire to act as administrator.”50 The Indian Affairs Branch agreed and it began receiving monthly payments following the CPC’s decision to award the pension.51 In these two cases, then, Indian Affairs proved able to return its relationship with Amerindians to the clientele basis on which the institution had been based since the 1860s.

However, this renewed control over the lives of Indian Affairs’ wards and the justification that it provided formed only one aspect of pensions’ utility from the institution’s point of view. These payments also permitted Indian Affairs to reduce the cost of the relief it supplied. In some cases this method of reducing departmental outlay seems to have motivated Indian Affairs’ initial decision to pursue dependents’ pensions. In 1930, when first writing to the Department on behalf of Kathleen Mark, Indian agent B.H. Hamilton revealed his vision

49 A.F. MacKenzie to the Secretary, Board of Pension Commissioners for Canada, 18 July 1928, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 1, reel C-8525.


of the use of veterans' benefits at Moose Factory – that is, as a means of assisting destitute Amerindians while simultaneously shifting the financial burden of their relief from Indian Affairs to the Department of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment. “This woman at the present time has absolutely nothing, in fact she has been requisitioned by the Department for years. All things considered I feel that she has possibly some claims to a pension. In writing for her, I feel that the responsibility for her maintenance should be placed where it properly belongs.”

A year later, while renewing his push for a pension on behalf of Mark, Hamilton again noted his ward’s destitution while subtly suggesting that a successful application would eliminate at least a portion of Indian Affairs’ financial responsibilities towards this ward and her family.

Thus, potential reduction of relief expenditure in part motivated Indian Affairs’ attempts to secure pensions. Once BPC/CPC funds had been secured, Indian Affairs issued vouchers for a value below that provided by the pension payments and invested the remaining funds in order to increase their lifetime. Beginning in July 1928, for example, the BPC paid $97 per month to the Department on behalf of Rachel Quachegan and her children. Indian Affairs issued Quachegan credit at the HBC’s post at Moose Factory for the purchase of “provisions and clothing to the approximate amount of $60.00 per month.” In other words, through its policy of depositing a portion of the beneficiary’s funds in a bank account under its supervision, Indian Affairs deprived the widow of nearly 40% of her monthly revenue from this source. Similarly, in February 1937, Indian Affairs’ Ottawa office requested that


53 “The Case of Mrs. Oliver Mark, has been in slings for some time. The facts have been before the Board on several occasions. This woman is destitute, and has been on the rations list of the Department of Indian Affairs, off and on for several years.” B.H. Hamilton to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 16 March 1931, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-493, reel C-8525.

54 B. Simpson to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 27 July 1928, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 1, reel C-8525.

55 A.F. MacKenzie to James Adams, 30 July 1928, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 1, reel C-8525. When Quachegan’s pension was later reduced to $87 per month, Indian Affairs’ central office
its agent at Moose Factory, W.L. Tyrer, propose a scheme for managing Dinah Tapes’s
pension payments in the absence of any information regarding the amount that she was to
receive from the CPC. Tyrer responded: “I think if we allowed her to get $5.00 per month in
supplies at the H.B.C. here and $10. both in spring and fall for clothing, the rest could be put
to her credit at the Department and only be used in case of need.” Indian Affairs’ central
office accepted this plan, effectively removing from Tapes’s control over 55% of her annual
pension income.

Furthermore, once the BPC/CPC had awarded a pension, Indian Affairs and its
employees clearly looked upon the resulting funds as falling within the realm of relief. When
writing in January 1940 to inform his superiors in Ottawa that according to his records the
account held in trust by Indian Affairs for Allan Quachegan had been depleted, the Indian
agent for James Bay, W.L. Tyrer, clearly enunciates his understanding of the purpose of
pension accounts: “If there is still a small balance please inform me and I will issue relief to

suggested to the HBC manager at Moose Factory, who was then responsible for supervising
Quachegan’s pension expenditure, that “[i]t will, therefore, be in order for you to issue relief to this
widow as usual but it is thought that she should not require provisions and clothing each month to this
full amount, but that a small portion of it should be left to her credit here to be used in case of
1, reel C-8525. This practice led to widely varying monthly expenditure. Once Indian Affairs had a
permanent agent residing at Moose Factory, Quachegan’s monthly expenditure immediately stabilized
at $50. Hudson’s Bay Company, Receipt for goods issued to Widow Quatchiquan, 3 September 1930,

T.R.L. MacInnes to W.L. Tyrer, 16 February 1937, LAC, RG10, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C-
8527.

W.L. Tyrer to the Secretary, Indian Affairs, 26 February [1937], LAC, RG10, vol. 6796, file 452-
584, reel C-8527.

$5 per month plus $10 every six months provided Dinah Tapes with $80 of goods annually from the
HBC. By comparison, Tapes received $15 monthly from the CPC, amounting to an annual total of
$180. For the details of Tapes’s pension, see Canadian Pension Commission, Award Declaration for
that amount so that the account may be closed.” 59 Indian Affairs applied this vision in which pension funds provided a means of cutting welfare expenditure in more extraordinary circumstances as well. For instance, when James and Rachel Quachegan’s son Peter fell ill while in the bush in March 1936, the Department charged the expenses incurred in transporting him to Moose Factory for medical attention to his pension account. 60

However, Cree veterans’ dependents did not experience this re-establishment of Indian Affairs’ control over their lives in entirely negative terms. For instance, the simple fact that the Department maintained a permanent address greatly facilitated nomadic families’ access to pension funds. 61 Moreover, although Indian Affairs did impose a limit on the credit that beneficiaries could receive at the HBC each month that was inferior to the monthly pension that the BPC/CPC had awarded them, Indian Affairs placed this money in an interest-bearing account, thus allowing the pension funds to grow and, in the case of the Quachegans, to ultimately reach three generations of the family. 62 Prior to the arrival of the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway (T&NO) at Moosonee in 1932, neither Moose Factory nor Moosonee (nor any other town within the immediate vicinity) could boast the presence of a bank. Thus, Rachel Quachegan, like every other Cree inhabitant of the region, would have been unable on her own to open and maintain such an account. In other words,

59 W.L. Tyrer to Mr. Patrick, 12 January 1940, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 2, reel C-8525. Emphasis added. From Indian Affairs’ records, it is impossible to determine Allan Quachegan’s relationship to James and Rachel. I would surmise that he was their nephew.

60 W.L. Tyrer to Doctor Stone, 6 April 1936 and W.L. Tyrer to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 12 April 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 1, reel C-8525.


62 For instance, following the successive deaths of Peter Quachegan on 27 November 1937 and his widow on 8 March 1938, the pension funds remaining in trust at Indian Affairs passed back to Rachel Quachegan to be spent in favor of Peter’s three year-old child. W.L. Tyrer to C.C. Parker, 24 December 1937, W.L. Tyrer to The Secretary, Indian Affairs, 14 March 1938, and G.A. Conley, Chief, Trusts & Annuities, to W.L. Tyrer, 23 March 1938, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 2, reel C-8525.
through its penny-pinching policy of substituting veterans' benefits for relief, Indian Affairs' institutional interests led it to effectively increase the lifespan of its wards' pension payments.

Of course, this analysis only pertains to a portion of Aboriginal beneficiaries of military pensions. As a result of the pension system's structure, Indian Affairs could only intercede on behalf of those Amerindians who changed status. Thus, just as James Quachegan drew a pension from his discharge until his death, those veterans who had been awarded benefits by military authorities at the end of their service remained beyond the reach of Indian Affairs. Furthermore, certain First Nations veterans and their dependents proved capable of negotiating the application or modification process without Ottawa's help. In the three communities under consideration, several veterans and dependents managed to draw pensions in this way. For example, Albert and Caroline Gustin began receiving pension payments as a result of their son Joseph's wartime service in 1937. In contrast to other Moose Factory Cree, Indian Affairs appears to have only become involved the following year when pension authorities sought its aid in having the couple's endorsement of their benefit checks witnessed as neither could write. The Indian agent for James Bay arranged for the HBC's post manager to witness the Gustins' signatures, thereby ending Indian Affairs' involvement in the case. William Frenchman, a Cree veteran from Moose Factory, also drew a military pension without Indian Affairs interference. By 1922, if not before, Frenchman received monthly checks for $7.50. Two years later, a BPC employee informed Indian Affairs that, "Mr. Frenchman requested pension to be paid semi-annually on March 31st and 30th September of each year." Frenchman continued to manage his pension without state

63 J. Franklin to W.L. Tyrer, 28 October 1938, LAC, RG10, vol. 6796, file 452-599, reel C-8527.

64 W.L. Tyrer to Mr. Patrick, 3 February [1939], LAC, RG10, vol. 6796, file 452-599, reel C-8527.

65 'Indian Affairs' archives contain no reference to the initial pension – neither in terms of the amount, nor in terms of the date at which the BPC awarded it. J.L. Biggar to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 7 January 1922, LAC, RG10, vol. 6786, File 452-432, reel C-8524.

supervision through the mid-1940s. By this point, Reverend Gilbert Thompson of Moose Factory administered Frenchman's pension benefits on his behalf. When Thompson informed the CPC that he was leaving the area, Indian Affairs attempted to gain control of the pension as its James Bay agent considered Frenchman “quite incapable of handling his own affairs.” However, it is unclear from the documentary record if it succeeded in doing so.

Of course, the Cree were not the only Amerindians to receive pensions as a result of their wartime service, even if numerically their military participation dwarfed that of the Huron and Innu. In contrast to the Moose Factory Cree, every resident of Wendake or Mashteuiatsh who drew a pension appears to have done so without Indian Affairs interference. The Huron Captain Louis Philippe Ormond Picard, for example, received a small pension of $5.42 per month, paid by check by the BPC, until his death in 1930. Perhaps as a result of Picard’s high rank, Indian Affairs never appears to have taken a hand in the administration or payment of his pension. Joseph Kurtness, an Innu from Mashteuiatsh, also received a small monthly payment ($7.25) from the BPC following his discharge. Indian Affairs only became involved in the case when, after a relatively long exchange of letters, pension authorities realized that Kurtness was an Amerindian. They then turned to the Department, requesting that it act in its official role as intermediary between Kurtness and the BPC. However, since the BPC did not grant Kurtness’s requests for increased benefits, Indian Affairs had no means of receiving payment on behalf of the veteran. All of these cases, those involving Cree veterans and dependents as well as their Innu and Huron

67 A.G. Leslie to Doctor T.J. Orford, 7 July 1945 and Dr. T.J. Orford to Indian Affairs Branch, 21 September 1945, LAC, RG10, vol. 6786, File 452-432, reel C-8524.


69 This is the sum of Kurtness’s personal pension ($6.50) and the amount accorded for the support of his elderly mother ($0.75). Joseph Kurtness to T.G. Murphy, 27 May 1931, LAC, RG10, vol. 6790, file 452-511, reel C-8525.

70 [?], Private Secretary, Memorandum to Dr. Scott, 12 June 1931, LAC, RG10, vol. 6790, file 452-511, reel C-8525.
counterparts, demonstrate that Indian Affairs depended upon pension authorities at the time of changes in pension status when working to claim control over such funds. In the absence of such changes and the toehold that they offered, Indian Affairs did not possess a means for interposing itself between the BPC/CPC and disabled Aboriginal veterans or their dependents. Moreover, this means of gaining access to funds proved extremely burdensome, as authorities had to intercede on behalf of Amerindians one case at a time. By the height of the Depression, however, Indian Affairs had discovered a far more administratively effective means of using veterans’ benefits to reduce its own relief expenditure.

In 1936, the Department of Pensions and National Health decided to extend veterans’ benefits to “low pensioners” residing on-reserve – that is “to Indian Returned Soldiers who are receiving a military pension... too small to enable them to provide for themselves and families.”71 Although Pensions and National Health provided such assistance to Amerindians living off-reserve, it had refrained from applying the program to the whole of the Aboriginal population because its employees were convinced that Indian Affairs “would not wish to have on the Reserves any inequality of treatment.” However, correspondence with Branch officials in April of that year convinced pension authorities that Indian Affairs had “no objection to this inequality” and they therefore proposed that the two agencies “decide upon how much additional unemployment assistance will be required to be granted to the Indians on your Reserves over and above that afforded by your Department, in order to bring the total monthly amount of assistance up to that granted to Indians living just outside of the same Reserves.”72 Although the method of payment that the two agencies decided to adopt did not initially provide Indian Affairs with absolute control of the funds (as in the case of some dependents’ pensions), it did allow the Indian agent to exercise a significant degree of supervision. In late spring 1936, the Department of Pensions and National Health and Indian Affairs held a conference to work out the details of the plan and decided that,

“cheques would be issued by your Department and sent to the Indians through the office of the Indian Agent in order that he may see that the money is properly used.”

However, by December of the same year, the director of Indian Affairs, Harold W. McGill, wrote to the deputy minister of Pensions and National Health in an attempt to change this system. Branch officials now believed that, “there might be difficulty if cheques were issued to the Indians direct by your Committee as the Indians might object to the allowance being small compared with white pensioners in the neighbourhood. Complaints would, in all probability, be made to your Committee who would not be in a position to deal satisfactorily with the objections raised.” McGill proposed that a “better plan of handling the allowances would be for Indian Affairs Branch to advise the various Indian Agents of the monthly relief grant to each low pensioner in his Agency. Payment would be made by this Branch and each month an itemized statement would be forwarded to you and you could reimburse us for the month’s outlay on behalf of Indian low pensioners.” The deputy minister promptly accepted McGill’s proposal. When forwarding the details of the new system to Indian agents across Canada, McGill pointed out that the relief was not to be issued, as per the initial plan, by check but in kind, instructing the agents “to furnish supplies to the amount of the monthly grant.” Thus, Branch officials gained access to relief funds and the ability to forcefully align their expenditure with Indian Affairs’ general relief policy. Yet again, the agency removed cash from the hands of a portion of its Amerindian wards who, according to established military pension practice, were entitled to it. In order to forego the possibility of injudicious expenditure of unrestricted funds, the agent was to supervise pension monies in the same way.

74 Harold W. McGill to R.E. Wodehouse, 7 December 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515.
that he oversaw the use of relief vouchers, permitting Amerindian veterans and their dependents to purchase approved commodities alone. Moreover, Indian Affairs used these additional funds not to improve the living conditions of veterans and their dependents but to reduce its own expenditure. A.F. MacKenzie, the Branch secretary, clearly demonstrated this when describing to his counterpart in the Department of Pensions and National Health the rate of payment that he felt on-reserve low pensioners should receive. "In arriving at what is considered a reasonable allowance, an endeavour is made to put the total monthly receipts of a pensioner on a par or it may be slightly higher than that enjoyed by the other members of the Indian tribe."\(^77\) In other words, Indian Affairs would substitute low pensioner payments for those who qualified for the Branch's existing outlay on social assistance. Pension officials failed to register any objection to MacKenzie's proposal, thereby effectively condoning it.

This scheme affected, although only to a limited degree, Indian Affairs' relief policy in the three communities under consideration. A. de la Boissière, the Indian Agent at Mashteuiatsh, informed his superiors in Ottawa that Joseph Kurtness, an Innu veteran living on-reserve, received a monthly pension of $40 for his wartime service in addition to $40 per month in Branch-supplied relief. This money, furthermore, provided Kurtness, his wife, and their fourteen year-old son with their sole income.\(^78\) Similarly, Euséric Picard, a resident of Wendake, subsisted solely on the $40 monthly pension that she received for the service of her son Joseph who had been killed in action. Picard was not in receipt of any Indian Affairs-provided relief and the Indian agent did not recommend providing her with any additional funds.\(^79\) Thus, Picard did not benefit from any additional outlay for low pensioners because the agent at Wendake felt that $40 provided sufficient income to guarantee her survival. Likewise, although the burden of providing relief to Kurtness appears to have passed from


\(^{78}\) A. de la Boissière to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 27 May 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515.

\(^{79}\) M.E. Bastien to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 19 May 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515.
Indian Affairs to Pensions and National Health, his income did not increase. In fact, of all the members of the three First Nations under consideration, only Thomas Nicoshee of Moose Factory received assistance in addition to that provided by the combination of his original pension and Indian Affairs' relief.\(^8^0\) From January through May 1937 (at which point he disappears from the relief rolls), Nicoshee received, in addition to the monthly check for $3.75 he drew from the CPC, $10 in monthly supplies from Indian Affairs, an apparent increase over the "very little" the James Bay Indian agent reported having previously supplied him.\(^8^1\)

More often than not, the Department repaid the wartime effort of First Nations veterans and their dependents not by recognizing their sacrifices, but by seeking control over their pension accounts in a bid to decrease relief expenditure and to assert its institutional \textit{raison d'être} in the face of "competing" state agencies. In contrast to the sense of entitlement that fuelled Euro-Canadian Great War veterans' political action, which ultimately contributed to the expansion of the Canadian welfare state and to changing perspectives on relief among the population in general, Indian Affairs officials do not appear to have viewed First Nations military pensions as imbuing veterans or their dependents with any particular rights.\(^8^2\) Rather, throughout the period, the Branch only deigned to admit Amerindian veterans' contribution

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\(^8^0\) For the Indian agent's recommendation that Nicoshee be granted additional funds, see W.L. Tyrer to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 28 May [1936], LAC, RG10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515.

\(^8^1\) See the monthly accounts of relief allowances paid to Indian disability pensioners in LAC, RG10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515. Although these accounts do not mention Nicoshee by name, he was the only member of the Moose Factory band whom the Indian agent had reported as being eligible for such relief.

to the war effort when the agency perceived this recognition as advantageous (either in fiscal terms or as a means of justifying its own existence). 83

Via the control of pensions, the Department sought to reinforce its position as the "guardian" of Canada's Aboriginal peoples. This policy had the side effect of promoting Indian Affairs' continued institutional existence. Within the particular context of disability pensions, the Department actively negated its loudly proclaimed goal of assimilating Canada's Indigenous population. If Indian Affairs had first and foremost truly aimed at the assimilation of its wards, all Amerindian beneficiaries would have collected their pensions directly from the BPC/CPC as veterans or dependents, rather than as Indians. 84 However, pension funds presented Indian Affairs with more than a means of reaffirming its institutional legitimacy. These monies simultaneously permitted the agency to fund the provision of relief to a certain segment of the Amerindian population, without incurring any expenditure whatsoever. Moreover, when pension beneficiaries and relief recipients overlapped, the administration of pension funds allowed Indian Affairs to reduce its outlay on welfare. Thus, the control of disability pensions arising from military service permitted Indian Affairs to consolidate its institutional standing while simultaneously curtailing its expenditure, thereby combining several of its institutional goals into a single, neatly packaged maneuver.

83 In addition to the disability pensions forming the basis of the present study, Indian Affairs adopted a similar position with respect to the Last Post Fund, an organization dedicated to offering decent burials to indigent veterans. In early 1928, following initial correspondence concerning Indian Affairs' on-reserve burial practices for indigent Amerindians, Indian Affairs' secretary explained that his agency made no provision for the purchase of headstones. He continued: "If you are willing to make a grant from the Last Post Fund of $25.00 to suitably mark the graves of Indian soldiers this Department will be very pleased to accept the grant." A.F. MacKenzie to Arthur H.D. Hair, 21 January 1928, LAC, RG10, vol. 6771, file 452-37, reel C-8515.

84 This observation is also applicable to later programs that included Amerindians even though they were run by state agencies other than Indian Affairs. For example, following World War II, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians alike qualified for the benefits provided by the Veterans Land Act, although Amerindians were to receive reserve rather than unoccupied Crown lands. As a journalist pointed out in 1946, "Indian veterans are covered under this plan too and so far 260 out of a total enlistment of 2,500 have taken grants on the Indian Reserves. The $2,320 in each case is handed over to the Indian Agent who supervises the development." Monty Berger, "Veteran Pioneers are Said to Get Opportunities in Quebec Province," Montreal Gazette, 14 August 1946, p. 6.
The State and Amerindian Money-Use during the 1940s

Although First Nations began the 1940s in the marginal position they had long occupied in respect to the Canadian body politic, by the end of the decade many of their concerns and their relationship to the Canadian state and society as a whole had come under national scrutiny. At the same time, Amerindians found themselves increasingly able to benefit from state programs run, at least in part, by agencies other than Indian Affairs. Although the state applied many of these programs to First Nations in ways that diverged from those used in the case of non-Aboriginal Canadians, the mere involvement of new agencies promised to provide Amerindians with novel ways of escaping Indian Affairs' bureaucratic control. However, more often than not, such promise remained illusory as the Indian Affairs Branch continued its practice of gaining total administrative authority over programs that theoretically fell at least partially beyond its purview. In this context, monetary payments (or, more frequently, their absence) provided the Branch with an effective means of both justifying its existence and applying force in order to ensure its continued control of First Nations. This section explores three state programs in effect during the 1940s, each of which had an important monetary component, before turning to the general parliamentary review that Indian Affairs underwent between 1946 and 1948 and the revised Indian Act that would result in 1951. While the political atmosphere of the decade, especially following the end of the Second World War, favored greater inclusion of Amerindians in civil society, the Indian Affairs Branch discursively employed money in order to reinforce its own standing, sometimes to the distinct disadvantage of First Nations.

Band Loans and Savings Accounts: Finance According to Indian Affairs

At the very end of the 1930s, the Indian Affairs Branch launched an ambitious program through which it hoped to supply individual Amerindians with developmental loans
from band funds. Despite earlier, informal loan programs, this system had its roots in legislation passed in the 1920s.\footnote{For example, the Six Nations Iroquois had provided interest-bearing advances on the distribution of band funds to individual members between the 1890s and 1910s. LAC, RG10, vol. 2796, file 158,908-2, reel C-12793 and vol. 2828, file 169,189-1, reel C-9660.} In 1924, Parliament accorded Indian Affairs the power to provide loans to band members backed by the value of the reserve lands held by the loan’s recipient. In that year, Parliament amended the Indian Act to stipulate that, “The Governor in Council may, with the consent of a band, authorize and direct the expenditure of any capital moneys standing at the credit of such band... in the making of loans to members of the band to promote progress, no such loan, however, to exceed in amount one-half of the appraised value of the interest of the borrower in the lands held by him.”\footnote{Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend the Indian Act,” 1924, c. 47, s. 5.} A 1938 amendment to the Indian Act extended this power further by permitting the superintendent general of Indian Affairs to provide loans to “Indian Bands, group or groups of Indians, or individual Indians” from Canada’s consolidated revenue fund in addition to band funds. Lawmakers intended such loans, the outstanding portion of which was never to exceed $350,000, to be extended “for the purchase of farm implements, machinery, live stock, fishing and other equipment, seed grain and materials to be used in native handicrafts.”\footnote{Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend the Indian Act,” 1938, c. 31, s. 2.} Thus, although the Indian Act permitted the provision of loans to First Nations and their members, it placed tight restrictions on the purpose to which such funds might be applied.

Beginning in August 1939, Indian Affairs’ “Band Loans” program provided money primarily to individual Amerindians from the funds of the band to which they belonged. The Branch launched this initiative “to encourage the Indians to make greater use of their capital funds to promote the welfare and progress of band members and to enable individuals to improve their locations by the erection and repair of buildings and fences, the sinking of wells, and the purchase of live stock and farming equipment, and to enable them to enjoy
more fully the productive value of their lands." Although the interest charges and application process imposed by the system are unclear from the documents consulted, their form probably approximated that of Indian Affairs' revolving fund, a similar program (that accorded significantly fewer loans) begun at the same time by which the Branch employed its own funds to provide funds to both bands and individual Amerindians. "Loans were repayable over a five year period and were to bear interest at 5 per cent per annum until repaid. Applications for loans were to be recommended by the Indian agent, approved by the inspector, the branch and the minister before being granted." Unlike commercial loans, which because of the Indian Act's provisions could not be backed by on-reserve collateral, Indian Affairs made use of its role as First Nations' state-appointed guardian to ensure that these loans were "adequately secured by real property and chattel mortgages and by assignment of interest distributions." According to Indian Affairs, the loans' beneficiaries were afforded every opportunity to repay what they had borrowed, even if they proved unable to abide by the terms of the original agreement. "There is a procedure established and he gets a notice that he must either pay the money or make some re-arrangement. If he indicates that he proposes to do something in repayment that is accepted and no action is taken; but if he is perfectly indifferent as to repayment, then a notice of foreclosure is sent to him by registered mail and, upon the expiration of thirty days, foreclosure proceedings are instituted and the property is taken possession of by the band." 


90 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1940, p. 193-4. However, prior to the beginning of the loan program, several bands had provided "a large volume of unsecured debts,[o] individuals." Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1945, p. 177.

91 "Minutes of Evidence, No. 11, A.G. Leslie, of Reserves and Trusts Service, Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Mines and Resources," 9 July 1946, in Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate
This liberality, however, did not extend to the control of the loaned funds themselves. Contrary to loans sought by contemporary Euro-Canadians, those provided through Indian Affairs did not place cash directly in the hands of the beneficiaries, giving the money instead to the Indian agent to be spent along the lines spelled out in the loan application. In the words of William Scottie Bryce, MP for Selkirk, Manitoba, “if he [the Indian] is borrowing money, then he never touches the money himself.” However, because the program drew on band funds, only members of those bands that had accepted that their capital accounts be used for this purpose had access to loans. Furthermore, because the bands set limits on the funds made available to its members, not all those who applied for loans could expect to receive equal treatment. In 1946, for example, only forty-three bands in Canada had decided to participate in the program, each making available between $1,000 and $15,000 for loans to band members. By 1950, seventy-seven bands participated in the program, offering from $500 to $25,000 from their capital funds for loans. However, by mid-century, none of the three First Nations under consideration appear to have made their funds available for the provision of loans to band members.

In addition to loans from band funds, Indian Affairs supervised another large-scale financial program. During World War I, Indian Affairs began holding funds in trust for its wards who received payments due to military service. “Early in the war the department undertook to administer the estates of Indians who enlisted for active service overseas and to take charge of pensions, assigned pay and separation allowance, when called upon to do so. At one time the department had over 400 active accounts, but this number has gradually decreased as the soldiers returned from overseas and took up their civil occupations.”

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Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 218. Unfortunately, the records consulted do not contain any information as to which bands participated in the program.

1921, $43,209, or slightly less than half of the total amount of such funds held by the Department, was destined for minors who "received pensions, owing to the death of the bread-winner." Indian Affairs planned to make use of this money "to start the children in life when their education has been completed."95

By 1940, the Branch had expanded this program, apparently in an effort to provide banking services to Amerindians who lacked access to financial institutions. In that year, the state administered "1,063 individual savings accounts, representing a total of $240,517.46."96 During World War II, the number of accounts and their total value grew substantially (to "1,610 individual savings accounts representing a total of $285,626.15") "due to Indians increasing their incomes by taking advantage of the demand for labour at good wages, and also to the fact that many dependents of enlisted men, saving part of their allowances, have used the facilities offered by Indian Savings Accounts as a means of accumulating a fund to assist in the rehabilitation of enlisted Indians." Indian Affairs determined that it was necessary to give "assistance and advice" to the "dependents whose allowances are administered by this Division... because the individuals, having no experience in handling money surplus to their essential needs, require supervision in the situations of increased income in which they now find themselves."97 By the end of the war, individual savings had again risen, this time to a total of $383,893.88 divided between 2,300 accounts.98 Although impossible to determine prior to this point, in the immediate postwar period these accounts bore 5% annual interest.99 By mid-century, this movement had grown further with Indian

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95 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1921, p. 17.
96 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1940, p. 194.
99 The interest rate was calculated using the $19,194.69 the federal government paid in interest on the total balance of $383,803.88 held on 1 April 1946. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1947, p. 222.
Affairs holding 2,679 individual savings accounts for a total value of $636,433.14 in 1951.\textsuperscript{100} While several Cree and Huron appear to have possessed such accounts, no specific information is available on their extent and nature.\textsuperscript{101}

In her study of state policy with regard to World War II dependents’ allowances and Aboriginal families, Emily Arrowsmith convincingly demonstrates the centrality of control to Indian Affairs’ management of these accounts. She notes that, “Indian Agents had the authority to supervise any expenditures” from accounts held by the Branch in the name of the wives of Amerindian soldiers, “advising the recipient against the withdrawal from the savings account, if he believed it ‘unwise’.” Furthermore, Arrowsmith notes that Indian Affairs promoted its savings accounts as being preferable to the purchase of War Savings Certificates by individual Amerindians because the latter investment option placed its wards’ money beyond the Branch’s control.\textsuperscript{102} Of course, as in the case of dependents’ benefits stemming from the First World War, Indian Affairs’ promotion of its in-house savings accounts over a rival program that escaped its control had at least one positive outcome: money held in the Indian Trust Fund bore a higher rate of interest than that placed in War Savings Certificates.\textsuperscript{103} Arrowsmith notes, however, that ultimately only 268 of the 754 Aboriginal wives who drew dependents’ allowances saved money through either of these two programs (with the vast majority of these – 220 of 268 – preferring War Savings Certificates). In other words, nearly 65% of the women who benefitted from these payments preferred to manage

\textsuperscript{100}\textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1951}, p. 16.


\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid}, p. 318.
their money without any state involvement. This indicates that the Branch’s offer of banking services inspired little interest among Amerindians who were visibly more comfortable controlling their money themselves than providing Indian Affairs with an additional means of exerting force over them.

Fur Preservation: The Example of the Kesagami Beaver Sanctuary

According to Peter George and Richard Preston, in western James Bay “The 1920s and 1930s were a time of destitution for the Indians, since the fur market had crashed and most of the fur and food animals had been hunted out.” By 1930, Indian Affairs hoped that the imminent arrival of the T&NO Railway at Moosonee would “provide opportunities, to such of the Indians as are willing and industrious, of earning their livelihood and of gaining an independence.” The Department’s 1930 annual report continued to confidently predict that, “By becoming virtually an inland seaport Moose Factory, with its prospective tourist and summer trade and the contemplated extensive construction work covered by the expanding program of the Ontario Government, will afford openings for the dexterous canoe man, the ready guide and the tourist’s handy man.” However, by the following year things had not improved and even the 1932 completion of the railway to Moosonee failed to revive the Cree economy as the Department had hoped. The general comments on northern Quebec and Ontario contained in Indian Affairs’ 1931 annual report effectively illustrate the situation faced by the Moose Factory Cree during the entire decade: “The problem of the hunting and fishing Indians dwelling in more remote districts, particularly in northern Ontario and northern Quebec, is one of the most serious which confronts the department. Lack of


employment in other fields has driven the white man in increasing numbers into Indian territory... Add to this that fur is scarce and prices are low, and that there is less employment guiding sportsmen than in former seasons, and it will be seen that the position of these Indians is precarious.\textsuperscript{107} By 1940, R.A. Hoey, Indian Affairs' superintendent of welfare and training, reported that the James Bay and Sioux Lookout agencies received "approximately fifty per cent of the total relief expenditures in the province of Ontario. The Indian population of the two agencies is approximately 8,000, compared with a total Indian population in the province of Ontario of 31,000." In this context, Hoey felt that, "about the only way to reduce relief costs and establish the Indian population on a self-supporting basis would be to replenish the region with meat-producing and fur-producing animals.\textsuperscript{108}

During the twentieth century, the provincial states of Quebec and Ontario involved themselves in the regulation of Aboriginal peoples' resource harvesting to a much greater extent than they had previously done.\textsuperscript{109} This generally involved a system by which provincial game wardens stamped legally taken furs and seized those that had been trapped illegally, sometimes bringing charges against those who had taken them. Initially, such regulation disadvantaged Amerindians, who, in accordance with established Aboriginal practice, generally preferred to steward the fauna on lands that they intended to continue occupying so that they might ensure themselves of a long-term source of food and revenue. By the end of the 1930s, however, increasing pressure from Euro-Canadians who sought to "trap out" a territory before moving on to the next (thereby earning revenue while depleting

\textsuperscript{107} Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{108} R.A. Hoey to Ralph Parsons, 16 January 1940, LAC, RG10, vol. 6748, file 420-8-2, part 2, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{109} On the developing regulatory regime in Ontario, see David Calverley, "Who Controls the Hunt? Ontario's Game Act, the Canadian Government and the Ojibwa, 1800-1940," Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Ottawa, University of Ottawa, 1999. For Quebec, see Toby Morantz, "Provincial Game Laws at the Turn of the Century: Protective or Punitive Measures for the Native Peoples of Quebec?" in David H. Pentland (ed.), Papers of the Twenty-Sixth Algonquian Conference, Winnipeg, University of Manitoba, 1995, p. 275-90.
whole areas of fur-bearing animals) inspired Indian Affairs employees to look to techniques of wildlife conservation developed in eastern James Bay that sought self-sustainability through an appeal to longstanding Cree interest in the fur trade. In 1941, Indian Affairs, the Ontario provincial government, and the Cree launched the Kesagami beaver sanctuary in the hopes of accomplishing such economic revitalization. The preserve, which covered 7,000 square miles between Moose Factory and the Quebec border, contained roughly twenty-seven sections, each providing trapping grounds to up to eleven heads of household (although this number was generally between one and three), which the Cree and state authorities restocked with live beaver. From 1946, the point at which the sanctuary was put into "production," through mid-century, Kesagami revived Cree fortunes in the fur trade, in the process furnishing them with a critical source of revenue. However, this money did not arrive without strings attached. As a result of a slumping fur market, the inexorable state drive for reduced expenditure, and Indian Affairs' marked tendency towards controlling its wards' lives, by 1950 the Cree who trapped on the Kesagami found the project to be less productive than it had initially seemed.

In order to ensure that the sanctuary operated according to plan, Indian Affairs, the state agency that ran day-to-day operations in the preserve, charged employees based in both Ottawa and Moose Factory with managing finances and distributing live-trapped beavers throughout the sanctuary. Several Cree actually accomplished this second duty, traveling into the bush in order to place beavers in pre-selected locations, in addition to tracking population changes within the preserve. In 1942, the year that Indian Affairs first appointed Moose Factory Cree to supervise the placement of beaver and to track population changes in


Kesagarni, the Branch hired twenty-nine such tallymen. Indian Affairs paid the preserve’s thirty-five Cree tallymen $50 each and by 1946 it employed thirty-nine Cree at the same annual salary. The Branch viewed these wages as a “small annual stipend,” designed “to help them conserve their beaver by the purchase of supplies and to compensate them in part for the decrease in revenue due to the closing of the season.” As a supplement to their cash wages, Cree tallymen received rations when traveling inland from Moose Factory to place beaver couples within the sanctuary. In addition to their work in the preserve, in 1943 several Moose Factory Cree began making annual trips to Algonquin Park under the supervision of an Indian Affairs employee experienced in live trapping in order to capture and transplant beaver to Kesagami. Each Cree employed in this way earned $88 in wages while also being provided with food and provisions during the trip. Indian Affairs reduced their wages to $68.75 per trapper the following year. Although in no way a formal rule, these jobs generally went to members of the band council, with Chief John Fletcher occupying one of the positions in every year that the Cree visited the park.

112 T.A. Crerar to Herman O. Ripel, Ontario Minister of Game and Fisheries, 16 December 1942, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 1, reel C-8105.


Once brought into production during the 1946-7 season, the Kesagami beaver preserve, following established practice in other sanctuaries in Quebec and Ontario, functioned through strict limits placed on the harvest of pelts. Authorities permitted each head of household to trap an annual number of beaver. The size of this quota generally depended on the size of the Cree family engaged in trapping activities, with larger families receiving larger quotas. During the first two years of production, 1946-8, Indian Affairs and the Ontario Department of Game and Fisheries kept quotas relatively small, with most Cree being permitted to trap between ten and twenty beaver.\textsuperscript{118} By the 1948-9 season, many Cree had been assigned larger quotas, tending to be between fifteen and thirty pelts per family, although Caleb Cheena, Joseph Dick, David Loon, and John Oustan were all allowed to trap a maximum of thirty-five beaver.\textsuperscript{119}

When Indian Affairs and the Ontario Fish and Wildlife Division first opened the Kesagami preserve to partial trapping operations during the winter of 1946-7, the law had yet to be changed to legally put it into production under Ontario regulations. As a result, all trapping of beaver during the 1946-7 season would be technically illegal, and therefore the two agencies “arranged that either the Police Constable, or Indian Agent acting in his capacity as Deputy Game Overseer, would accept the voluntary surrender of furs which would be sold in Toronto along with other furs illegally taken and seized by the provincial authorities.”\textsuperscript{120} However, the HBC protested this decision because it felt that it deprived it of deserved revenue following its active encouragement of the preserve and, as a result, Indian Affairs and the Fish and Wildlife Division of Ontario’s Department of Lands and Forests


\textsuperscript{119} J.S. Allan?, Recapitulation of Kesagami Funds, 31 March 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{120} R.A. Hoey to R.H. Chesshire, 4 October 1946, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105.
agreed to hold auctions at Moose Factory instead.\textsuperscript{121} Indian Affairs provided its agent in James Bay with funds from which to make a $10 advance on each beaver skin, regardless of size, type, or quality, surrendered to him prior to the auction. Branch officials decided on this course because the Fish and Wildlife Division did “not wish to make the marketing through our auspices obligatory on the Indians.” In order to encourage high prices, the agent was to hold sales every Thursday during the winter “so that if any buyers from Cochrane are desirous of bidding on the pelts they may do so without a long lay-over at Moose Factory.” The furs themselves were to be sold to the highest bidder (each offering a price by sealed tender) as lots corresponding to the catch of each individual trapper. In essence, then, Indian Affairs assigned its agent the role of fur buyer, a role generally performed elsewhere by small merchants or the HBC.\textsuperscript{122} Once the agent had accepted a bid for a given lot, he would credit the trapper’s account minus the sum of advances paid him upon surrender of the furs.\textsuperscript{123}

Although this system was not entirely to the HBC’s liking, Indian Affairs guaranteed that proceeds from fur sales would be funneled to the company in repayment of Cree debt. In January 1947, just after federal and provincial authorities had opened the Kesagami sanctuary to production, Conn responded to the HBC’s concerns by informing T.J. Orford, the James Bay Indian agent, by telegram that he had the authority to “accept orders from Indians for payment from beaver proceeds.”\textsuperscript{124} At the same time, Conn informed the HBC’s manager, Ronald Duncan, that the Branch would “accept assignment from Indians for

\textsuperscript{121} For the HBC’s continued protest, see R.H. Chesshire to C.W. Jackson, Secretary and Executive Assistant, Department of Mines and Resources, 15 November 1946 and R.H. Chesshire to C.W. Jackson, 2 January 1947, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{122} It had, however, hired Hugo Watt, the son of James Watt, to help the agent in performing his new role. H.R. Conn to T.J. Orford, 16 December 1946, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{123} H.R. Conn to P.H. Watt, 16 December 1946, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105.

current advances against beaver pelts.”

Thus, Indian Affairs once again took a hand in managing Cree monies by guaranteeing the repayment of credit provided by the HBC.

At the same time, Indian Affairs employees set about controlling Cree money through the payment of proceeds from the sale of beaver pelts by installment, implementing the plan that Indian Affairs’ had first framed at the outset of the Kesagami project. Under this system, the Cree head of household would receive the proceeds of his furs “in three instalments, the first of which would be paid in a lump sum to enable the Indian to pay off his indebtedness with the merchants, the second part to be divided into three equal instalments in June, July and August, and the balance paid in a lump sum in September to outfit him for the fall.” Hugh Conn asserted that this plan had been adopted primarily in the interest of preventing trappers from receiving too large a sum of money at any one time, which would only serve to encourage them to go on “a little spree in Cochrane.” In addition to the $10 advance, Indian Affairs planned to subtract $4 (termed an “impost”) to fund the tallymen’s wages. Therefore, each skin sold in the first lot of furs taken from the sanctuary was on average only worth $10 in new money, although in one instance, this sum dropped as low as $3.60. As a result of low fur prices, by the summer of 1947, the Branch had reduced the

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125 Telegram from H.R. Conn to Manager, HBC, Moose Factory, 13 January 1947, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105.

126 For the original plan, see D.J. Allan to T.J. Orford, 15 December 1941, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 1, reel C-8105.


129 For more on the first sale, see below. The average skin sold for $24, $10 of which had already been paid to the trapper at the time of surrender. Orford mentions a Cree whose ten furs sold for a total of $176. Considering that he had been advanced $100 on surrender of the furs and was subject to a $40 impost, Indian Affairs only owed him $36. T.J. Orford to H.R. Conn, 25 February 1947, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105.
impost from $4 to $1, raising to $2 during the 1947-8 trapping season, the last during which
the preserve functioned as a stand-alone project.130

Unfortunately for both the Cree and Indian Affairs, “the local fine fur catch” during
the Kesagmi’s inaugural 1946-7 season was, in the Indian agent’s words, “a total failure.”
Orford informed Conn that, “This condition is general throughout the Bay area and living is
pretty grim for those bands not depending upon Sanctuary or Township beaver.”131 Orford
held the first auction at Moose Factory on 9 January 1947. The HBC failed to purchase the
lot, making a bid of more than $1,000 less than that tendered by W.R. Cargill and Son of
Moosonee ($5,584), the only other bidder. As a result, the 231 pelts sold for the relatively
low average price of $24.17 per skin.132 The second auction, at which C. Paulson of Moose
River Crossing purchased 239 pelts for $6,354, only slightly raised the average value of furs
from the preserve to $26.58.133 Furthermore, the HBC’s Winnipeg headquarters instructed its
post manager not to bid on the furs offered in this second auction. As a result of these
disappointing results, Indian Affairs purchased a store license for $25 from the Ontario
government and altered its fur marketing strategy in the hopes of receiving better prices for
the furs.134 While Hugo Watt, the Branch’s fur supervisor based at Moose Factory, continued

130 T.J. Orford to H.R. Conn, 25 February 1947 and H.R. Conn to T.J. Orford, 3 March 1947, LAC,
RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105 and T.J. Orford to H.R. Conn, 14 June 1947,
6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.
C-8105.
132 Thomas J. Orford to H.R. Conn, 9 January 1947, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2,
reel C-8105.
133 P.H. Watt to H.R. Conn, 15 March 1947, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-
8105.
134 Conn asserted that, “Our Abitibi (Quebec) furs realized an average of $35.93 on the first sale and
$42.94 on the second sale... Since writing the above we have disposed of another lot of 173 pelts from
the Abitibi Preserve in Quebec at an average price of $49.10.” H.R. Conn to W.J.K. Harkness, 18 April
to hold local auctions, the sales were contingent on bids being “twenty to twenty-five percent below going market levels in Montreal.” If local fur buyers did not meet such minimal conditions, Indian Affairs would ship the furs directly to the Canadian Fur Auction Sales Company in Montreal for sale.  

During the 1948-9 season, the Kesagami beaver sanctuary officially ceased to exist as a separate entity, having been merged with Ontario’s registered trapline program, although the preserve’s changed status did not make itself felt on the ground prior to the summer of 1949. Ontario’s Department of Lands and Forests signaled its decision to change Kesagami’s status when, in the fall of 1948, it began requiring those Cree trapping in the area to purchase standard Provincial Township trapping licenses, for which Indian Affairs paid during the first year that they were required. This move altered the dynamic of trapping in the region yet again, in that, with the exception of those who had received advances from the Branch, the Cree were no longer required to sell their catch to the Indian agent. However, in the short term this did not prevent Indian Affairs from continuing to control a large portion of the furs from the Kesagami. From the Cree perspective, the other major consequence of the sanctuary’s transfer to the registered trapline program was the elimination of the tallymen positions and the $50-salary this work brought.

By the time the Kesagami sanctuary ceased to exist as an independent entity, seventy-three trappers worked the area, from which, during the 1947-8 season, they harvested 1,336 beaver worth $43,968 ($32.91 per pelt). This represented a one-third price increase when compared to the preceding season, during which the Kesagami trappers sold 772 beaver

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136 H.R. Conn to J.S. Allan, 8 August 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.

137 J.S. Allan to H.R. Conn, 29 November 1948, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, reel C-8105.

for $18,625 ($24.13 per pelt).\textsuperscript{139} This change seems to be primarily attributable to Indian Affairs' threat to send furs to Montreal as the agent managed to sell all of the season's catch at Moose Factory, where auction bids corresponded to the Branch's new price requirements. During the 1948-9 season, Indian Affairs decided to forego local sales altogether, instead shipping all Kesagami furs to the Canadian Fur Auction.\textsuperscript{140} However, the Branch failed to secure prices in Montreal that equaled those of the previous season's sales at Moose Factory. Of the $30,138.28 earned by Kesagami pelts during the fiscal year 1948-9, the Canadian Fur Auction only sold $13,121.28 worth of fur as the rest had been auctioned at Moose Factory during the summer. However, the 610 furs that Indian Affairs shipped to Montreal earned an average per pelt price of only $21.51, a sum that was significantly lower than that of the preceding year. Moreover, this average price was also far below that earned by auction at Moose Factory in June 1949 ($35.39 per pelt).\textsuperscript{141} This decline continued into the next fiscal year when the three sales for which figures are available for both proceeds and skins sold generated an average per pelt revenue of only $17.56.\textsuperscript{142} Thus, it would appear from the available data that at the same time as Indian Affairs decided to sell all Kesagami pelts that it had purchased in Montreal the bottom fell out of the fur market. Those Cree who traded with the Branch noticed this correlation and, as a result, some of them sought to take their business elsewhere.


\textsuperscript{140} H.R. Conn to J.S. Allan, 13 October 1948, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{141} For the amounts made by auctions in Montreal during the year, see [J.S. Allan], James Bay Agency, Beaver Funds, 8 October 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105. For the number of pelts sold, see J.S. Allan to Canadian Fur Auction Sales Co., 5 March 1949 and J.S. Allan to Canadian Fur Auction Sales Co., 14 April 1949 in Ibid.

\textsuperscript{142} These sales took place in July and September 1949 and February. The Branch also sold furs in Montreal in April and May 1949. J.S. Allan to Canadian Fur Auction Sales Co., 30 May 1949, H.R. Conn to J.S. Allan, 19 September 1949, and [J.S. Allan], James Bay Agency, Beaver Funds, 8 October 1949, J.S. Allan to Indian Affairs Branch, 16 January 1950, and H.R. Conn to J.S. Allan, 17 February 1950, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.
By the 1948-9 season, Indian Affairs had also begun outfitting Cree trapping in the sanctuary on credit in addition to paying the usual $10 fee on the surrender of each beaver pelt taken from Kesagami.\textsuperscript{143} Under this system, the Indian agent guaranteed repayment by a Cree head of household of credit extended to him by the HBC or other traders, generally because local merchants had already refused to outfit him on unsecured credit.\textsuperscript{144} However, this innovation contradicted Ottawa's intentions – namely, to provide a maximum of $10 per pelt in every trapper's quota, distributed either as an advance or on surrender, at the agent's discretion – and, as such, was abandoned when it came to headquarters' attention in March 1949.\textsuperscript{145} Indian Affairs considered the credit that it provided Kesagami Cree entitled it to receive all of the furs that they trapped. In order to guarantee that the trappers surrendered their pelts to the Branch, the Indian agent required them to sign a statement to this effect when providing them with credit. Such contractual obligations had their origins in the Kesagami sanctuary's initial phase of production when federal and provincial officials agreed that furs would be marketed exclusively through Indian Affairs. As a result of this practice, the HBC and other fur trade interests in the region ceased giving credit to the Cree trapping within the limits of the sanctuary, or reduced the credit they did extend to avoid underwriting the time spent trapping there, thereby leading to the state's assumption of this necessary charge.\textsuperscript{146} However, once Ontario had integrated the Kesagami into its registered trapline program in the 1948-9 season, the requirement that the Cree trade exclusively with the Indian agent disappeared. In spite of this changed legal environment, several Cree remained unable

\textsuperscript{143} J.S. Allan to H.R. Conn, 28 February 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{144} J.S. Allan to [H.R. Conn], 8 December 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{145} H.R. Conn to J.S. Allan, 7 March 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.

\textsuperscript{146} In December 1949, for example, Allan informed Ottawa that, "Up to the moment I have assisted Indians to the amount of about $2500.00 as most of them have been refused any assistance whatever from either Company or traders locally." J.S. Allan to [H.R. Conn], 8 December 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105. Although he couched his report in terms of relief, the "assistance" he provided was credit and he and his superiors expected it to be repaid.
to secure advances from the HBC. As a result, Indian Affairs retained a provincial fur buyer’s license and, to insure itself against unpaid debts, began requiring the signature of marketing agreements with each Cree head of household to whom it provided credit.147

As fur prices plummeted, the Branch’s insistence that those who owed it money surrender their catch to the Indian agent created tension at Moose Factory. By late winter 1949, J.S. Allan reported that he had been informed by the HBC that several Kesagami trappers had attempted to sell their catch to the company. Allan, reacting simultaneously as a fur trader and cost-obsessed bureaucrat, informed Ottawa that, “The Kesagami Indians have had considerable amounts advanced to them for the purpose of trapping this beaver and if the selling of their catches should be thrown open you may be prepared to accept a considerable loss.”148 Price appears to have been the main factor motivating Cree trappers who sought to sell their furs elsewhere. The sale of furs at auction in Montreal imposed new financial burdens on trappers; in addition to slumping fur prices, Indian Affairs now had to pay a 5% auction fee on all pelts sold while also levying 10% in impost and the $2 per pelt Ontario royalty. Thus, a fur that sold for $36 in Montreal would only be worth $28.78 to the Cree who had trapped it.149 Moreover, because the Canadian Fur Auction only held sales regularly during the winter and spring, Indian Affairs’ practice of sending furs to Montreal, in conjunction with its insistence on selling the pelts prior to distributing the proceeds, increased the time that the Cree were forced to wait before receiving payment for their catch.150

147 Furthermore, McKay states that a similar policy of advancing Amerindians had been adopted in British Columbia’s Stikine agency in the late 1940s. [D.M. MacKay] to R.H. Chesshire, 25 May 1950, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.


149 H.R. Conn to J.S. Allan, 23 March 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.

150 In July 1949, Hugh Conn wrote to a representative of the Canadian Fur Auction Company: “Since your next regular sale does not take place until September 6th and since we are anxious to return the proceeds of these pelts to the natives concerned at the first opportunity, I am writing to enquire whether the prospects of a private treaty sale are favourable at the present time and if in your opinion substantially the same prices would be received now instead of waiting until the September sale.” H.R.
Ontario's game warden at Moosonee, Thomas Tyrer, greatly assisted the Branch in its attempts to recover debt by forcing the sale of Kesagami pelts to the Indian agent. Some Cree, however, challenged the authority of the game warden and Indian Affairs to deny them the right to trade with other merchants. In the late winter of 1950, Tyrer refused to stamp the beaver furs of Erland Vincent and his son, Bobby, both of whom trapped on the Kesagami preserve and both of whom felt that they would receive more money for their furs elsewhere. The Vincents filed a complaint with the local RCMP detachment, apparently believing that they had the right to reimburse the Branch in cash from the proceeds of their sale. The RCMP officer in charge found the Vincents' complaint unfounded, because both father and son had signed an agreement to market all of their furs through the Indian agent when receiving their fall advance. However, this appears to have been an isolated case, perhaps owing to Indian Affairs' surrender of the Moose Factory fur trade to the HBC and other commercial interests when the agency closed its files on the Kesagami sanctuary after the 1949-50 season.

Although Indian Affairs and the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests successfully revived the nearly extinct beaver population of southwestern James Bay through the Kesagami sanctuary, they did so through a novel form of state surveillance and control, what Toby Morantz terms “bureaucratic colonialism,” which was in the process of recasting Native-state relations. As Hans M. Carlson has written of the Cree of eastern James Bay,

Beaver reserves had changed the environment, and this had aided Cree hunters in their attempt to live on the lands; at the same time, however, Cree culture had

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151 Allan reports that Tyrer had changed his opinion within a month of his original letter to Conn on the subject. J.S. Allan to H.R. Conn, 11 April 1949, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105.


adapted to the new system of regulation. Because whites had to rely on the Cree for the success of these programs, the Cree were able to influence the character of bureaucratic action for their own cultural ends and to continue the history of negotiated change with the outside world. They had also developed the ability—an ability that they would continue to need—to work with white bureaucrats within a Western legal structure.154

However, such exchange was far from purely positive. Indian Affairs’ monetary controls, whether in the form of installment payments from the proceeds of its statutory monopoly or the contractual and coercive relations it created with its indebted trading partners, restricted the ability of the Moose Factory Cree to manage their production and revenue as they saw fit. Of course, the Amerindian trading partners of the HBC and other commercial fur concerns were never free in any sense of the word. But the state’s attempts to enforce compliance through contract and monopoly went far beyond the practice of the period’s fur trade companies. For example, although many companies would cease to extend credit to Amerindians who had proven incapable of repaying their debt over a series of years, by the middle of the twentieth century they had universally come to accept payment of debt in cash earned from the sale of pelts to other traders who offered better prices. Indian Affairs refused to accept such conditions, in the process creating resentment among the Cree who found their purchasing power diminished because an otherwise legal form of exchange had been declared illicit. Furthermore, as the market deteriorated, Indian Affairs’ insistence that the Cree bear the financial load required for the sale of their furs led to diminishing returns for both the trappers and the Branch (by the end of the 1940s, its fur trading budget was provided by the 10% fees it imposed on fur sales). This counterproductive behavior suggests the point to which the “improvident Indian” had become ingrained in Indian Affairs institutional imagination. That by 1950 some Cree had come to view the HBC as a preferable trading partner to Indian Affairs, in spite of their refusal to outfit these same individuals, demonstrates the extent to which the state agency had antagonized its wards.

154 Carlson, *Home is the Hunter*, p. 200-1.
Family Allowances

Family allowances, like fur preserves and veterans pensions, allowed Indian Affairs to bolster its institutional raison d'être through the administration of benefits. While most Amerindian mothers received payment of family allowances in identical form to that of their non-Aboriginal neighbors, the Indian Affairs Branch administered in one way or another the benefits of a significant minority. However, the Branch retained considerable authority over even those mothers who received checks directly from family allowance officials as Indian agents and their superiors in Ottawa held the power to declare individuals unfit for cash benefits. Furthermore, Indian agents also often applied for family allowances on behalf of the Branch's wards. In this way, even in those cases when it did not insist on the distribution of in-kind benefits, Indian Affairs co-opted monetary payments that might otherwise have undercut its legitimacy. The Branch, then, made the case for its necessary involvement in the supervision of the payments provided by this program that was specifically designed to avoid much of the paternalistic control and social stigma that had traditionally been associated with charity and relief.

The Family Allowances Act of 1944 permitted the payment of benefits (which, by May 1946, averaged $14.18 per family and $5.94 per child) to "Indians and Eskimos... to a person authorized by the Governor in Council to receive and apply the same." In early

155 In 1945, the Branch administered 6,110 of the 16,215 family allowances accorded to Amerindians across Canada (37.68%). By 1950, the Branch continued to administer 25.38% of these allowances (5,080 of 20,014). These pan-Canadian numbers reflect the experience of Ontario First Nations, where the number of administered allowances fell from 42.30% (1,572 of 3,716) in 1945 to 26.30% (1,183 of 4,498) in 1950. In Quebec, however, the percentage of administered allowances was significantly higher, falling from 58.48% (769 of 1,315) in 1945 to 50.82% (959 of 1,887) in 1950. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 211 and Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1951, p. 21.


157 Quoted in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 210. Family allowance payments were made on a graduated scale according to the age of the child for which they were made. Children below the age of 5 received $5 per month, 6 to 9 year-olds $6, 10 to 12-year-olds $7, and 13 to 15 year-olds $8. However, families received $1 less for a fifth child, $2 less for the sixth and seventh, and $3 less per
1945, the Department of Mines and Resources and the Department of National Health and Welfare reached an agreement by which Indian Affairs would administer family allowance payments in cases it deemed necessary. In contrast to standard procedure among women of non-Aboriginal descent, the Indian agent generally applied for family allowances on behalf of his wards. Although the system theoretically required the agent to consult the families in his agency, in practice it allowed him to apply for benefits without their knowledge, even going so far as to sign the application form on their behalf. In addition, the Indian agent possessed significant discretionary powers with respect to the manner in which the Department of National Health and Welfare would provide Amerindian women their benefits. According to H.M. Jones, an employee of Indian Affairs' family allowances division, “In forwarding the registration to the regional director of family allowances the agent specifies the method of payment based on his knowledge of the Indian, local conditions, geographic location, etc.” Jones claimed that, “Indian affairs branch policy as regards method of payment is to have the Indians receive their allowances by cheque wherever possible. Where the Indian lives close to civilization and can use the shopping facilities of nearby towns and cities, there is no problem as far as family allowances payments are concerned. Payment is made to the Indian mother by cheque direct, just as with the whites. The Indian mother then cashes her cheque and spends the money as she deems best in the interest of her children.” Jones claimed that isolation from market infrastructure was the real reason for which the Branch insisted on providing benefits to northern Aboriginal mothers in kind because checks would presumably be useless in such an environment. Indian Affairs


felt that special arrangements would have to be made to take care of the Indian who 
traps and is away from civilization for months at a time.
These Indians get exactly the same rate of allowances as anyone else but they 
receive a monthly credit and the money representing this credit is paid to the Indian 
Affairs Branch.
We buy specially selected foods and clothing for the Indian children and pay for 
same out of credits mentioned above... Credits, similar to bank accounts, are set up 
for each individual family and are maintained separately. These purchases are made 
through 144 independent trading posts and 105 Hudson's Bay Company trading 
posts.\footnote{160}

This agreement, which allowed Indian Affairs to issue credit and sometimes 
specific goods at local stores in place of the monetary payments made to non-Aboriginal 
mothers, implicitly cast family allowances as relief, something which the framers of the law 
had explicitly sought to avoid by providing checks to every Canadian mother regardless of 
socioeconomic status. In its annual report for 1946, Indian Affairs underlined its skepticism 
as to the advisability of providing such benefits to its Amerindian wards by highlighting "two 
phases of the Family Allowances Act which are not possible to assess in their true light at the 
present time. (a) Whether Family Allowances will tend to make the Indian lean too much on 
the monthly payment and not pursue his regular occupation to the fullest extent... [and] (b) 
Whether it is a good practice to attempt to spend a year's accumulated credits in the three or 
four summer months without causing waste and being of questionable benefit to the Indian 
families." In this way, Indian Affairs underlined its continued reliance on the discursive 
"Improvident Indian," which permitted it to justify its existence and its interference in 
Aboriginal Canada. Its 1946 Annual Report declared that, "The Branch is endeavouring to 
carry out the spirit and letter of the Family Allowances Act to improve the economic status of 
the Indians, but at the same time trying to keep undisturbed the Indian means of 
livelihood."\footnote{161} As a result, although the majority of Amerindian families who benefited from 
allowances in 1945 (10,105) received direct payment by check, the remaining households

\footnote{160} Ibid, p. 269-70.
\footnote{161} Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 212-3.
(6,110) were all subject to some form of departmental surveillance. Thus, 1,959 mothers received payment by checks that first passed through the hands of the Indian agent, Indian Affairs administered the benefits of 602 families through trust funds, and 3,549 mothers received their benefits in kind at local stores.\footnote{Ibid, p. 211. Robert Hoey, director of the Indian Affairs Branch, repeated this information verbatim in the testimony he provided to the joint committee of the Senate and the House Commons charged with considering modifications to the Indian Act. “Minutes of Evidence, No. 1, Robert A. Hoey, Director of Indian Affairs,” 28-30 May 1946, in Canada, \textit{Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act}, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 21-2.}

While the form in which the state paid family allowances at Mashteuiatsh and Wendake is unclear, it appears almost certain that Cree mothers received their benefits in kind at local stores. Although no information directly concerning payment at Moose Factory has been found, John J. Honigmann notes that the federal government did not provide family allowances by check directly to the Cree of Attawapiskat in northwestern James Bay until 1955.\footnote{John J. Honigmann, “Attawapiskat – Blend of Traditions,” \textit{Anthropologica}, no. 6 (1958), p. 67 [57-67].} Toby Morantz, in her study of bureaucratic colonialism in eastern James Bay, demonstrates the deep flaws in this centrally-controlled system through which field and headquarters staff replaced currency with credit. Morantz notes that the HBC wielded far more power in northern Quebec than Indian Affairs acknowledged in its public discourse. For example, post managers often required that the Cree spend all of the credit accumulated during the winter from family allowances when they returned to the post in the spring. This practice, which primarily served the company’s bottom-line, forced Cree beneficiaries to purchase provisions from the posts’ dwindling stock, providing mothers with a severely limited selection and often leaving them with items of little value to themselves and their family.\footnote{Morantz, \textit{The White Man’s Gonna Getcha}, p. 208-9.} In the cases considered by the present dissertation, however, it appears unlikely that the HBC was able to employ family allowances with such disregard for their clients’
wellbeing as even at Moose Factory, the least commercially developed of the three communities analyzed, the Indian agent dealt with at least one local store in addition to the company’s post (W.R. Cargill & Son in Moosonee). Regardless, family allowances affected Moose Factory and Mashteuiatsh profoundly as the state made their payment dependent upon the attendance of school by all children (Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal alike). In other words, these transfer payments required important changes on the part of hunting and trapping families who, if they chose to accept the substantial additional revenue that family allowances provided, could no longer benefit from the presence and assistance of children in the bush.

Yet again the provision of cash by the state to First Nations proved to be anything but straightforward. Indian Affairs made use of family allowances to publicly promote its role as guardian of Amerindians, portrayed by both the law and the Branch as irresponsible minors. Even in those cases where its field and headquarters staff saw fit to provide checks directly to mothers, Indian Affairs maintained the ability to alter these arrangements in the absence of any external review. Thus, public and Branch mistrust of the ability to handle cash of a sector the population that had traditionally been perceived as inherently improvident along with the somewhat specious argument that relatively remote First Nations could only spend their family allowances at a single store provided Indian Affairs with ample justification for interjecting itself between the family allowance authorities and Aboriginal mothers. The HBC fully cooperated in the scheme, in the process securing access to increased sales and, in some instances at least, gaining a means of eliminating its stock of unsold merchandise. Although restrictions on the archival record do not permit an in-depth analysis of how mothers employed family allowances in Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake, it seems reasonable to assume that they appreciated this novel source of revenue and used it

Although primarily involved in bidding on lots of furs produced by the Kesagami fur preserve, W.R. Cargill & Son also occasionally outfitted tallymen working on the preserve. See, for example, Indian Affairs Branch, “Merchandise Order Slip for W.R. Cargill & Son, Moosonee,” 30 September 1943, LAC, RG10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-1, part1, reel C-8105.
in much the same way as women across Canada. Ultimately, however, instead of serving first and foremost to encourage the financial independence and economic well-being of Amerindian families, the implementation of this federal program in First Nations communities functioned primarily to generate profit for fur trade companies and to justify the Department’s institutional existence. In this sense, family allowances seem to have reinforced the inequality of Canadian society as similarly universal social assistance programs did elsewhere.\textsuperscript{166}

\textit{The Limited Effect of Parliamentary Scrutiny on Indian Affairs’ Monetary Powers: The Indian Act of 1951}

In 1946, Parliament created a special joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons to scrutinize First Nations-state relations and to make recommendations for modifying the Indian Act. Specifically, the committee was charged with investigating:

1. Treaty rights and obligations.
2. Band membership.
3. Liability of Indians to pay taxes.
4. Enfranchisement of Indians both voluntary and involuntary.
5. Eligibility of Indians to vote at dominion elections.
6. The encroachment of white persons on Indian Reserves.
7. The operation of Indian Day and Residential Schools.
8. And any other matter or thing pertaining to the social and economic status of Indians and their advancement, which, in the opinion of such a committee, should be incorporated into the revised Act.\textsuperscript{167}


\textsuperscript{167} Canada, \textit{Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act}, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. iii.
However, as Ian V.B. Johnson points out, "many important issues were not addressed, particularly political questions such as the power and authority of chiefs and councils on reserves, funding mechanisms and trust accounts, jurisdictional disputes with the provinces and Indian self-government."\textsuperscript{168}

During the committee's hearings, officials in the Indian Affairs Branch, in concert with lawmakers, continued to perpetuate the image of Amerindians as being improvident by nature. The following exchange between committee members C.T. Richard, Liberal MP for Gloucester, New Brunswick, W.S. Bryce, CCF MP for Selkirk, Manitoba, and W.S. Arneil, the Department's inspector of Indian agencies in Ontario, strikingly illustrates this tendency:

Mr. Richard: We were talking about the Indian and his easy way with money, I wanted to ask if that was a trait peculiar to the Indian, and if that could be considered as being due to his lack of education.
Mr. Bryce: You get a lot of white men who do that, who have nothing left two days after they are paid.
The Witness: It is a combination of both.
Mr. Richard: So that while he might be more inclined to spend than a white man, he could be taught to save more?
The Witness: Yes, very definitely.\textsuperscript{169}

During the same hearings, another departmental official, the principal clerk in charge of the administrative work of the Indian Branch's Trusts Division, reiterated the conviction of the agency's headquarters staff that individual Amerindians were, as a rule, incapable of wisely employing cash when he described the uses to which band funds should and should not be put. "[T]he poorest use to which they could be put is to let the fund lie there accumulating interest, and not to use it at all. The next poorest use of band funds is to distribute them in

\textsuperscript{168} Ian V.B. Johnson, "Helping Indians to Help Themselves – A Committee to Investigate Itself: The 1951 Indian Act Consultation Process," Ottawa, Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1984, p. 16.

cash. The aim of the department has been to persuade the Indians to use their band funds to promote the welfare and progress of the band generally, as well as to promote the welfare and progress of the individual."\(^{170}\) In other words, Indian Affairs' publicly-stated goal was to ensure the "welfare and progress" of First Nations through strict controls on the use of the funds that it held in trust for them, controls that precluded their distribution in cash.

The Indian Act of 1951, although often considered a departure from earlier legislation, contains many of the monetary clauses of the law as originally passed in 1876. Thus, while the parliamentary hearings of the late 1940s concerning Indian Affairs and the Indian Act's revision appeared to promise significant changes to the state's approach to the "Indian problem," the resulting legislation proved to be a continuation of, rather than a break with, earlier policy. The revised act continued to define "band" in terms of lands and funds held in trust by the government, although adding a clause stating that the Governor in Council held the power to declare any "body of Indians" a band.\(^{171}\) The act stipulated that those Amerindians who gained access to the franchise, and thus ceased being "Indians" according to the legal definition, were entitled to "one per capita share of the capital and revenue moneys held by His Majesty on behalf of the band" in addition to "an amount equal to the amount that in the opinion of the Minister [of Citizenship and Immigration] he would have received during the next succeeding twenty years under any treaty then in existence between the band and His Majesty if he had continued to be a member of the band."\(^{172}\) Indian Affairs maintained the right under the 1951 revised act to compel bands to maintain "the roads, bridges, ditches and fences within the reserve occupied by that band," with refusal allowing the Branch to carry out the work itself from monies payable to the band or its members held


\(^{171}\) Canada, Statutes, "An Act Respecting Indians," 1951, 15 George VI, c. 29, s. 2, ss. 1.

\(^{172}\) Ibid, s. 15.
The Indian Advancement Act (1884) continued to exert its influence over the revised Indian Act in that the councils of bands declared by the Governor in Council to have "reached an advanced state of development" were accorded the power, "subject to the approval of the Minister," of raising funds through "the assessment and taxation of interests in land in the reserve or persons lawfully in possession thereof" and "the licencing of businesses, callings, trades and occupations." Under the 1951 Indian Act, such band councils could also decree "a penalty for non-payment of taxes imposed... recoverable on summary conviction." The 1951 act also continued some of the innovations of the preceding half-century, such as the loan program initially created in 1924 and given greater scope in 1938, although it expanded the legitimate expenditure of such loans to cover "gasoline and petroleum products," "the making of repairs," and "the payment of wages." Under the revised act, band councils continued to have the power to regulate "the conduct and activities" of visitors to the reserve who "buy, sell or otherwise deal in wares or merchandise."

The 1951 act, however, did not maintain one of the more infamous amendments that Parliament had made to the Indian Act during the twentieth century. In 1927, it added a clause (Section 141) barring the contribution of Amerindian funds, whether held individually or in common, for the prosecution of legal claims. According to the amendment,

Every person who, without the consent of the Superintendent General expressed in writing, receives, obtains, solicits or requests from any Indian any payment or contribution or promise of any payment or contribution for the purpose of raising a fund or providing money for the prosecution of any claim which the tribe or band of Indians to which such Indians belong, or of which he is a member, has or is

173 Ibid, s. 34.
174 Ibid, s. 82, ss. 1.
175 Ibid, s. 69, ss. 1. The following year, an amendment added "the clearing and breaking of land within reserves." Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the Indian Act," 1952-3, c. 41, s. 1, ss. 1.
176 Canada, "An Act Respecting Indians," s. 80, ss. n.
represented to have for the recovery of any claim or money for the benefit of the said tribe or band, shall be guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction for each such offence to a penalty not exceeding two hundred dollars and not less than fifty dollars or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two months. 177

D.C. Scott, the deputy superintendent general, had initially drafted this amendment in 1924 to prevent claims being brought against the government without Indian Affairs' approval. When presenting the proposed legislation before the House of Commons in 1927, Charles Stewart, the Minister of the Interior and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, claimed that, "We think it is to the advantage of the Indians that these contracts should be scrutinized by the department in order to protect them from exploitation." 178 Although the discourse of protection allowed Indian Affairs to justify the amendment, its true objective appears to have been the disruption of the increasing number of political and territorial claims pressed by First Nations activists across Canada, claims that officials viewed as disturbing the otherwise smooth administration of Indian affairs. 179 However, it should be noted that the mere existence of this section did not guarantee its enforcement, as demonstrated by the fact that residents of Wendake hired lawyers on several occasions between 1927 and 1951 to pursue claims on their behalf. 180

177 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the Indian Act," 1926-7, c. 32, s. 6.


180 The most notable case is that in which J. Arthur Vincent and several other Huron used their own funds to hire Paul Lesage, a lawyer based in Quebec City, to press the band’s claims on the O’Sullivan property in the parish of Saint Ambroise de la Jeune Lorette which bordered Wendake. See Paul Lesage to J. Arthur Vincent, 31 March 1936, J. Arthur Vincent to Paul Lesage, 2 April 1936, and Paul Lesage to J.A. Vincent, 15 October 1936, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05. This same lawyer also intervened on behalf of Daniel Gros-Louis in order to press his claim for old age assistance with Indian Affairs once again failing to invoke Section 141. [Lesage and Lesage] to the Department of Indian Affairs, 8 March 1938 and R.A. Hoey to Messrs. Lesage and Lesage, 18 March 1938, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05
Thus, the legal powers conferred upon the Indian Affairs Branch by Parliament at mid-century were strikingly similar to those originally afforded it in 1876. Although having come under intense public scrutiny during the 1940s, the Indian Act, at least in terms of its monetary content, emerged relatively unscathed. When combined with the overt and also highly publicized challenges posed to Indian Affairs’ *modus operandi* by Aboriginal activists earlier in the decade, this constancy is all the more impressive.\textsuperscript{181} When called to testify before the special joint committee, Branch officials adopted the same paternalistic tone employed by their predecessors. In the absence of any meaningful, public Amerindian participation in the hearings, this discourse inspired Parliament to adopt language in keeping with the progressive tenor of the immediate post-war years while not altering the spirit or intent of the law beyond the removal of the most invasive powers accorded Indian Affairs during the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{182} The redefinition, then, of “the Indian ‘problem’ as one of citizenship and inclusion” during the first half of the twentieth century, brought about according to Hugh Shewell by pressure from “respectable groups like the Canadian Welfare Council” and Amerindian activist organizations, appears to have been above all cosmetic, being a discursive rather than a practical or legal change.\textsuperscript{183} Thus, in 1951 as in 1876, the Indian Act defined “Indians” in reference to monies and lands that the state held in trust for them while conferring authority upon Indian Affairs to intervene in its clientele’s life far surpassing that wielded by other institutions.\textsuperscript{184} In this sense, then, monetary control

\textsuperscript{181} For an example of highly publicized Amerindian contestation of Indian Affairs during the decade, see Hugh Shewell, “Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-1944,” *Journal of Canadian Studies*, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 211-42.


\textsuperscript{183} Shewell, “*Enough to Keep Them Alive*”, p. 169-70. Dickinson also describes the change in state discourse as largely cosmetic: “the goal continued to be assimilation, or as it was worded, transformation from the status of wards to that of full citizenship.” Dickinson, *Canada’s First Nations*, p. 310.

\textsuperscript{184} It should be noted that this definition did not remain purely theoretical. In 1922, Indian Affairs used, among others, the criteria that certain Innu had “participated in the distribution of money
continued to provide a central means of justifying the Branch's existence while theoretically providing it with sweeping powers in its everyday supervision of the "improvident Indian."

Conclusion

During the first half of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs continued to exercise tight controls on Amerindian money-use. In western James Bay, the Department pursued a policy of treaty-making patterned on that of the immediate post-Confederation era. This policy allowed the state to officially gain title to all of the unceded lands in northern Ontario while simultaneously "creating" the region's Amerindian population. Indian Affairs explicitly claimed that monetary annuities served to provide authorities with information that would not have otherwise been available, thereby permitting the Department to manage the Cree and their resources in keeping with established practice elsewhere in Canada.

Although such payments provided valuable cash to Amerindians while simultaneously generating detailed population statistics for bureaucrats in Ottawa, the heart of Indian Affairs' monetary policy lay neither here nor in the relatively minor expansion of its legal prerogatives. Rather, Indian Affairs' complicated approach to money is most clearly observed in its agreements with "competing" institutions concerning the control and supervision of Aboriginal participation in all state programs. Since the 1860s, Indian Affairs had operated as a clientele agency, theoretically serving all of the needs of First Nations. However, during the first half of the twentieth century, a succession of both federal and provincial agencies instituted programs from which all Canadians, Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike, could benefit. In several instances, these programs promised to place cash directly in Amerindian hands. In the cases examined above, Indian Affairs managed to secure supervision of these programs when applied to its "clients." In addition to clearly staking out

pertaining to the Band" to affirm these individuals' Indian status. J.D. McLean to A. Tessier, 12 October 1922, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.
its administrative terrain, this practice frequently allowed the Department to cut its relief expenditure while increasing its influence in the everyday lives of its wards. However, not all of the state programs over which Indian Affairs gained control correspond to this model. Thus, the Branch and not Ontario fish and wildlife authorities took the lead in creating the Kesagami beaver sanctuary. However, this program had been explicitly designed to reduce Indian Affairs' relief expenditure and ultimately served to replace the HBC in many ways with the Branch, a public institution that sought to control monetary circulation in the fur trade through even more coercive means than those employed by its private predecessors. Thus, the control of money, whether actually implemented or not, coincided neatly with Indian Affairs' need to found its existence in nature while simultaneously defending itself from institutions that appeared intent upon "stealing" its clientele.

Indian Affairs' discourse and action, then, cast money in several distinct lights. It was, accordingly, indispensable in the constitution of the "eyes of politics," a serious danger to the "improvident Indian" (who could not be trusted with such a high level of freedom to consume), an exceedingly useful tool in justifying the institution's existence, a means of reclaiming lost administrative ground, and an effective method, once converted into provisions, of reducing relief expenditure. Although failing to form either a coherent policy or practice, these diverse conceptions were not contradictory either. Thus, Indian Affairs' discourse and practice with respect to money is perhaps best described as an approach that placed the needs of the institution above those of its clientele. Indeed, the single trait that characterizes the state's relation to Aboriginal money-use during the period is the unerring conviction that authorities in Ottawa and their agents on reserves were the only ones fit to decide whether money was beneficial or detrimental. In this sense, the "freedom" that cash appeared to promise, held both positive and negative connotations, forcing First Nations' legal guardian to judge on a case-by-case basis because, in the eyes of bureaucrats and lawmakers, such a critical issue could not be left solely in the hands of "minors."
Chapter 7

Money from Below: Cash, Credit, and Community, 1900-1950

Il y a actuellement certains individus de la tribu, qui sont des fouteurs de discordes, qui poussent les membres à toutes sortes d'actes déraisonnables; ces individus, ignorants dans la force du mot, quoi qu'ils se croient d'un savoir extraordinaire et d'une intelligence supérieure, possèdent pour toute "qualité" qu'un cœur rempli de fiel de la jalousie et de l'envie: pour eux l'argent est tout; ils peuvent faire quoi que ce soit et toutes les choses les plus basses et les plus viles quand il s'agit de recueillir un peu d'argent: ils saluent jusqu'à terre le "signe de piastre" et rampent comme des serpents à travers honnêtes gens: "rongeurs de balustrades" l'on croirait avoir affaires à des saints; mais le vol et les injustices leur sont familiers. Leur fourberie est sans borne, car ils frappent de leur langue sale lorsqu’ils viennent de vous faire leurs compliments. Ces individus iront chez le diable à la fin de leur jour, car le tort commis par eux est incommensurable et ne peut être réparé à temps. Quelle triste mentalité!

Pierre Albert Picard Tsichiek8an, the grand chief of the Huron between 1916 and 1920, recorded this impassioned tirade against money’s corrosive nature and the individuals who succumbed to it in his diary in 1917. Picard’s description of the destructive misuse of money by certain unnamed band members and the threat that he felt such use posed to the bonds of community that held Wendake together indicates an awareness among Amerindians of the force that could be brought to bear through currency at the local level. This chapter applies this insight in order to demonstrate that the state and capital did not enjoy a monopoly of monetary power among First Nations during the first half of the twentieth century. In Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake, residents used money to earn revenue, to access and to provide small amounts of credit, and to purchase consumer goods as they saw fit. At

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the same time, currency allowed band members and their elected leaders to exert a certain amount of coercive force through strict legislative penalties and contractual clauses. This, in turn, elevated certain residents to positions of power from which they could fortify their standing, frequently at the expense of Picard's "honest people."

An image of money as a relationship, with all the flexibility that this term suggests, emerges from this chapter's analysis. When studied at the local level, from the perspective of its use among community members, money's social character reveals itself through the way it favored certain individuals and groups over others, in the process contributing to the ongoing formation of local class society. Inequalities in money's availability helped structure relationships between residents of Wendake, Moose Factory, and Mashteuiatsh, with some in a position to exploit others. However, such internal disparity existed in parallel to external discourse that cast First Nations as separate and inferior to "mainstream" Euro-Canadian society. As in earlier periods, the ways in which money was marked through restrictions on individual credit and expenditure of communal funds both justified and were justified by the political discourse through which the state rendered Amerindians theoretically distinct from other groups and individuals in Canadian society. However, the legal regime which both was inspired by and inspired this discourse contributed not only to maintaining Amerindians' separate status, but also to the reproduction within First Nations of the unequal economic and political power relations from which the state claimed to protect them. Through its analysis of local money-use, then, this chapter argues that during the first half of the twentieth century money continued to provide Amerindians with a means of pursuing their livelihoods while it simultaneously favored socioeconomic stratification. In this sense, this chapter claims that state discourse representing Amerindians as inherently improvident belies the ways in which Huron, Innu, and Cree led their everyday lives during the period and hides each of these First Nations' increasing internal socioeconomic complexity.

**Money's Role in the "Moditional Economy" and Class Formation**

In conjunction with the fur trade, wage work provided the Cree, Huron, and Innu the largest part of their monetary income during the period. As they had during the preceding
century, Aboriginal peoples again proved able to satisfy most of their wants themselves, thereby directly contradicting the state’s continued assertion of their improvident nature. This section analyzes the development of each community’s labor market during the period, emphasizing how the ways in which individuals earned income points to the continued relevance of class formation in Wendake and the phenomenon’s emergence at Mashteuiatsh. Although this process seems to have been absent from Moose Factory during the first half of the twentieth century, money from wage work functioned to favor certain, less developed forms of socioeconomic inequality in western James Bay as well. Ultimately, this section argues that the ways in which Huron, Innu, and Cree earned money continued to inform local power relations while simultaneously defying stereotypes of Aboriginal economic incapacity.

During the first half of the twentieth century, Euro-Canadian observers divided the Innu of Mashteuiatsh into two categories depending on economic practice, either “half-breed” or “Indian.” In doing so, they used racial classification as shorthand for economic activity in a similar manner to that employed elsewhere in North America. In 1922, the Indian agent, Armand Tessier, reported to his superiors that, “We call here ‘half-breeds’ those who farm, work in the shanty, float logs, guide sportsmen, while those whom we call ‘Indians’ (Sauvages) are those who go into the bush during eight or ten months in the year and depend solely on their hunt to live.” While Euro-Canadian commentators clearly remarked on the

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3 A. Tessier to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 11 August 1922, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680. Ten years later, the HBC post manager, George Fowlie, adopted the same categorization when describing the economic difficulties of the two segments of Mashteuiatsh’s population. “The halfbreeds exist by selling wood to Roberval Merchants and getting provisions in exchange. Nobody at Pointe Bleue has been able to get employment with the lumber companies this year which is affecting our trade. Very few Indians are coming down to Pointe Bleue, most of them come down to the nearest settlement and sell their furs and buy a few provisions & return to their hunting grounds.” Thursday, 10 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 1, reel 1MA53.
wide array of economic activities in which the Innu engaged, they did so through a hierarchy of activities, seeing “half-breeds” as progressive and “Indians” as beholden to the past. In spite of this external assessment, at mid-century most Innu continued to seek revenue in the “traditional” economy, while making increasing use of its “modern” counterpart.4

However, the ways in which the Innu made use of money make clear that this image of two, mutually exclusive subpopulations is misleading. For example, Tom Moar and Napoléon Bégin, who HBC employees considered “half-breeds,” earned cash from both trapping and trading on behalf of the company.5 Several other Innu who spent the major part of the year in the bush also adopted hybrid economic relations extending beyond the simple acceptance of market exchange entailed by the fur trade. They did so through a system of apprenticeship in which an older or more successful hunter-trapper “hired” another band member, either outfitting him himself or guaranteeing repayment to a merchant on his behalf. This system expanded the availability of credit while placing senior hunters in positions of power vis-à-vis their younger or less prosperous counterparts. According to J. Allen Burgesse, a former HBC employee at Mashteuiatsh,

All furs caught during the winter belong to the Indian who makes the advances. In most cases it is the latter who makes the arrangements for trading the furs in the spring, and he allows the subject hunter a certain fixed sum – or a proportion of the catch – in lieu of wages. Often enough, however, the hired hunter works entirely for the account of his master who undertakes to feed and clothe him and provide certain little luxuries such as tobacco and the occasional bottle of beer.

Burgesse, writing in 1945, asserted that this “is an important aspect of the Montagnais economic structure, and is of immense value to certain Indians who, either from sickness, a poor fur crop, or other such causes, are unable to obtain any advances from the traders. It

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4 According to the HBC’s post manager, during the Depression hunting and trapping accounted “for the greater part of the revenues of the village.” Thursday, 26 October 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 25, reel 1MA53.

5 For more on this case, see Chapter Five.
enables them to make an effort to re-establish themselves financially. It also provided these relationship’s senior hunting and trapping partners opportunities to profit to a greater extent in years of abundance by taking upon themselves the financial risk associated with poor catches. If the partnership proved successful, the “apprentice” and his family would earn a living while the “master” would reap greater returns than he would have been able to alone. However, if the hunt was a failure, the senior partner risked finding himself unable to secure credit due to the substantial debt that advances for two households generated.

During the first half of the twentieth century, hunter-trappers also stood to earn money from Euro-Canadian and Euro-American scholars by sharing their knowledge and experience of “traditional” Aboriginal practices. During the 1930s, Regina Flannery paid cash to the Cree informants she consulted while doing anthropological fieldwork at Moose Factory. The region’s relative dearth of cash provided Flannery with an effective means of convincing the Cree to participate in her research. “Currency, a scarce commodity in the community, was most welcome, since it offered the possibility of ordering items from the T. Eaton Co. department store catalogue more cheaply than purchasing them from the HBC store at Moose Factory.” Given that Flannery’s advisor at the Catholic University of America, John M. Cooper, also did fieldwork in the region, it seems likely that he too provided monetary income to the Cree, allowing them to circumvent to some degree the company’s attempts at maintaining a captive clientele while contributing, in a very small way, to the maintenance of “traditional” economic activity.

The Lac St. Jean Innu most likely received cash payments from scholars as well. During the 1920s, Frank G. Speck, a professor in the Anthropology Department at the University of Pennsylvania, spent time with the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, in the process


laying the foundation for anthropological understandings of eastern subarctic Aboriginal society. Julius E. Lips, a German anthropologist based at Columbia University, also worked with the Innu of Mashteuiatsh. In 1935, he visited "Pointe Bleue to record the tribal Law of the Montagnais." While there, he worked with Burgesse, who possessed a "collection of ethnological specimens," and several members of the band who were active participants in the fur trade. Joseph Kurtness worked with both of these men. During the 1990s, Harry Kurtness described his grandfather's work: "Il est allé avec des linguistes, un nommé monsieur Speck. D'ailleurs, c'était facile pour lui, il possédait les trois langues: l'anglais, le français et le montagnais. C'était facile d'échanger avec eux autres. Ils ont fait une étude itou sur la chasse et la trappe. Il y en avait un autre qui est venu, je ne me souviens plus de son nom. Je pense que c'est un monsieur Lips. Ils ont fait ça une couple d'années, si c'est pas deux ou trois ans." Both Speck and Lips also worked with several other community members. While neither scholar provides information concerning compensation, in light of

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8 Speck first appears in the Pointe Bleue post journals in February 1925 when he stayed at the post for three days. Sunday 1 through Tuesday 3 February 1925, HBCA, B.329/a/9, p. 33, reel 1MA53. The post journals refer to Speck somewhat condescendingly as "a collector of Indian curios."

9 Sunday, 4 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 18, reel 1MA53.


11 Harry Kurtness et Camil Girard, *La prise en charge: Témoignage d'un Montagnais*, Chicoutimi, Les éditions JCL, 1997, p. 50-1. It should be noted that according to both economic practice and apparent public opinion, Joseph Kurtness belonged entirely to the "Métis" portion of the band's population. Petition from David Philippe to [the Department of Indian Affairs], 21 July 1922, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.

Flannery’s description of the payment she afforded Cree informants at Moose Factory it seems likely that this form of work generated cash revenue for those who undertook it.

Those Innu who spent the majority of the year in the bush earned revenue in other ways as well, perhaps most importantly through the sale of moccasins and other handmade goods to the two primary off-reserve retailers: the HBC and Meridy Robertson. Lips reports that during the period Maggy Moar was universally perceived as being the most skilled moccasin manufacturer in Mashteuiatsh, particularly due to the complexity of her beadwork and embroidery. “Her needlework was of such daintiness and neatness in the most minute details that white experts later refused to acknowledge it as handmade.” While the documentary record provides information on the prices at which the HBC and Robertson sold such work, it fails to furnish the amount of money that Moar and other Innu women received for each sale. In 1935, for example, the HBC sold Moar’s moccasins for $2.50 per pair while Robertson charged $1.75 for her competitors’ work. While both stores certainly charged her a percentage on the final sale, these prices suggest that Moar and the other Innu women who manufactured such goods most likely earned good wages for their work, whether in cash or in store credit.

While hunter-trappers (“Indians”) could earn money from a variety of activities, so too could those Innu who remained in Mashteuiatsh on a more permanent basis (the “half-breeds”). In 1911, the Indian agent described the nature of this portion of the Innu economy:

> When the work of the farm permits them, if an opportunity of earning money in any other way offers, they do not fail to make use of it. They become in turn teamsters, guides or wood-cutters. Thus in winter they go to the shanties and cut timber.


14 Of course, the HBC’s employees agreed with Lips that Moar’s work was superior to that sold by Robertson. “Had visits of a few American tourists today and sold a pair of sealskin gloves. One man found our slippers (Mrs. Moor’s work) very expensive at $2.50. Meridy Robertson is selling slippers at $1.75. The Yank admitted that Robertson’s goods were not so well embroidered, nor was the hide so well tanned but they were trimmed with mink and he see [sic] why he should pay more than this amount.” Thursday, 20 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 6, reel 1MA53.
engaging in the floating of the logs in spring; then when the season for fishing and hunting arrives, they are all appreciated as guides by the sportsmen who come each year to the different clubs having quarters along the Lake St. John railway.  

Later in the decade, several Innu worked on the construction of the James Bay and Eastern Railway, while during the 1930s and 1940s, community members continued to earn wages in the forestry industry, generally passing much of the year away from Mashteuiatsh. While band members employed in the lumber camps were often paid in cash, Innu who worked for certain timber corporations received payment in vouchers for Roberval stores as did those families who cut wood and sold it independently to area merchants. Although difficult to estimate, the average unskilled forestry worker in the Lac St. Jean region appears to have made roughly $20 per month (approximately $0.80 per day) during the early 1930s. Forestry work, of course, was principally available in the winter. During the summer and fall months, many Innu earned significantly higher wages guiding sportsmen. George Fowlie, the HBC post manager at Mashteuiatsh, commented in 1936 on the difficulties the company experienced hiring temporary laborers for work at the post “for 20¢ per hour when people are

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17 In 1935, the HBC post journal records: “Cash sales gradually showing improvement. Most of the lumber company men are out of the woods with their earnings by which we benefit to some extent.” Wednesday, 27 March 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/17, p. 61, reel 1MA53. This report was echoed in the same source at the end of the decade: “Business improving with the influx of the odd trapper and cheques from lumber camps.” Monday, 27 November 1939, HBCA, B.329/a/22, p. 34, reel 1MA54. The HBC reported in 1934 that, “The little trade at Pointe Bleue which is slipping through our fingers is that of the farmers who are selling wood to the Roberval merchants or of families who have men working in the Gagnon Freres lumber camps. These people are paid with orders on the Roberval stores.” Saturday, 10 March 1934, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 54, reel 1MA53.

18 In an interview conducted during the 1980s, Roger Jourdain, a retired Domtar employee, claims to have earned $19 per month in 1932. Another former forestry worker, Pierre Péton, placed the salary at $0.77 per day or roughly $20 per month (men worked six-day weeks during the period). Quoted in Isabelle Trottier and Huguette Labrecque, Un siècle d'histoire: les chantiers au nord du Lac-Saint-Jean, 1850 à 1950, vol. 1, Dolbeau-Mistassini, Société d'histoire et de généalogie Maria-Chapdelaine, 2003, p. 164-5.
By the late 1940s, large numbers of Innu held employment “in the pulpwood and lumbering industries and in farming,” thereby keeping departmental relief expenditure in Mashteuiatsh relatively small. Thus, even the “half-breed” portion of the band spent a large part of its time off-reserve practicing the “co-integrated” or the “moditional” economy alongside Euro-Canadian neighbors. Furthermore, as much of this information was freely available in Indian Affairs’ Annual Reports, both its headquarters and field staff were well aware of the lengths to which the Innu would go to secure paid employment, suggesting once more the resistance of the discourse of Aboriginal improvidence to accounts of First Nations’ material success.

Somewhat paradoxically, at the height of the Depression, Mashteuiatsh’s tourist industry boomed. Although never large enough to support a majority of Innu households, tourism provided solid income to both those engaged in the manufacture of artisanal goods and those who sought employment guiding sportsmen. Mashteuiatsh owed this economic renaissance to Meridy Robertson, the community’s principal socioeconomic figure. Indeed, the owner of Robertson & Son, one of the two main on-reserve stores and fur buyers (along with the HBC), diversified his target clientele in an effort to overcome the Innu’s declining purchasing power. In 1934, Robertson began advertising Mashteuiatsh as an ideal destination for American sportsmen through the publication of “a beautiful, little, twelve-page booklet, well illustrated, which describes the country admirably,” with which he planned “to flood the Northern United States.” Robertson sent copies of this brochure to the several thousand sportsmen who had frequented one “of the defunct clubs in the district.” By 1936, Robertson did “a roaring tourist business,” claiming in late September to have made $6,000

19 Wednesday, 23 September 1936, HBCA, B.329/a/19, p. 23, reel 1MA54.

20 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1947, p. 212. This quantitative remark also applies to the period prior to the Depression. Between 1909 and 1929, Indian Affairs provided per capita average annual relief in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake of only $0.30 and $0.70 respectively. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1909-1929. As noted above, this amounted to less than a single day’s salary for an unskilled forestry worker in Lac St. Jean in the 1930s and far less than a guide might earn during the same period.

21 Friday, 9 March 1934, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 51-2, reel 1MA53.
on the year.\textsuperscript{22} As a result of this flow of visitors, which continued through the end of the decade, Robertson became the lynchpin of the reserve’s guiding economy.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, without the business that he brought to Mashteuiatsh, many Innu who made their living escorting sportsmen would have most likely found themselves in dire economic straits, something of which they seem to have been aware. In order to repay Robertson, several Innu appear to have encouraged tourists to shop at his store, even going so far as to tell “a few tales about the Company” to ensure that they did not give their patronage to the HBC.\textsuperscript{24}

Like the Innu, the Huron, too, benefited from the demand for hunting and fishing guides, integrating this activity into their own form of the “moditional economy” which was also based to a large extent on seasonal changes in work and address. Writing in 1902, Agent Bastien noted that, “the tourists who visit the lakes in the region of Lake St. John are each year becoming more numerous, and always encourage our Indians, whose skill they admire. They employ the latter for most of the summer season.”\textsuperscript{25} This sector of the economy continued to supply work to a limited number of band members through the mid-1930s, by which point, Huron guides secured $3 a day both while working at the game clubs and when independently guiding hunting and fishing parties.\textsuperscript{26} These men generally left the village for

\textsuperscript{22} Tuesday, 22 September 1936, HBCA, B.329/a/19, p. 22, reel 1MA54.

\textsuperscript{23} In 1938, George Fowlie, the HBC post manager, reported that “Meridy Robertson is doing a big tourist business putting out 6 parties to-day. Altogether he has 22 parties in the bush at present. He gets all his tourists through the various Sportsmen’s shows in the U.S... he will probably clear several thousand dollars this year.” Thursday, 15 September 1938, HBCA, B.329/a/21, p. 22, reel 1MA54.

\textsuperscript{24} In this instance, the HBC’s manager blamed David Philippe, who had served as guide to “Dr. Hull & family,” for diverting tourists away from the company. Tuesday, 6 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 19, reel 1MA53.


the sportsmen's clubs in the spring or early summer to erect camps, staying to work there through the fall when they returned to Wendake and, at least during the difficult years of the early 1930s, a grim labor market.\textsuperscript{31}

This pattern of seasonal movement resembles the less regular migrations that many Huron undertook in order to cushion their households from difficult economic times. In 1909, the Indian agent, Antoine Oscar Bastien, reported that, "The heads of families on the reserve are obliged in order to maintain their families to go off at a distance in order to earn money in the neighbouring towns."\textsuperscript{28} However, once "the special industry of the Hurons, that is to say, the making of moccasins and snow-shoes" returned to relative health, the majority of these migrant families made their way back to Wendake.\textsuperscript{29} By 1920, this sector of the economy had returned to relative prosperity as Huron footwear sold well throughout Canada and in parts of the United States. According to the journalist Victoria Hayward, in Wendake "One hears of half a million pairs [of moccasins] spoken of with equanimity."\textsuperscript{30}

The Bastien family continued to dominate this industry and the profits it generated. Such control was in part due to the diversified business of the family's members and was reinforced by the court-ordered payment to Bastien Brothers of considerable funds in the 1920s. In 1909, Ludger and his brother Ernest Bastien purchased a lot on the St. Charles River in Wendake on which they erected a tannery operated by their company, Bastien

\textsuperscript{27} In June 1919, Pierre Albert Picard wrote: "Telesphore Picard, sous Chef, part pour les clubs bâtir des camps." 16 June 1919, Pierre-Albert Picard, Journal personnel, 1916-1920, p. 117, ACNHW, F-I-79. According to Agent Picard, Moise Gros Louis, a band member who had requested departmental relief, "is a game warden and spent all last summer at his work up to the late fall. He is going back in the early spring." [Pierre Albert Picard] to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 3 January 1931, BANQ-Q, P583, S5, File 13.

\textsuperscript{28} Antoine O. Bastien, "Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency," 14 June 1909, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1909, p. 47

\textsuperscript{29} A.O. Bastien, "Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency," 10 May 1913, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1913, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{30} Victoria Hayward, "Indian Lorette," The Quebec Daily Telegraph, 13 April 1920, n.p.
Brothers. In 1895, Quebec City had begun diverting water from Lac St. Charles (where the river had its source) into its municipal water system. However, at that time it failed to make any compensation to the landowners whose access to water would be affected. In 1914, Ludger and Ernest Bastien sued the City of Quebec and in 1923 the Privy Council awarded them $175,000 in damages in addition to free water in perpetuity for the washing and soaking of hides. 31 This massive payment provided the company with needed capital reserves while also providing a tidy personal profit to the Bastiens who invested this money in a series of commercial ventures over the subsequent decades. Within a few years of the court-ordered settlement, Ludger Bastien was vice president of two family-owned companies (Alexandre Bastien, Limited and Bastien Silver Fox Breeders) and president of two others (Bastien Brothers and Bastien, Gagnon et Cloutier). Presumably because Wendake did not hold sufficient space for Ludger Bastien to live according to his standing, he lived off-reserve in Loretteville. As a result, he was able to actively participate in both political and federal politics. 32 By the late 1940s, Ernest Bastien had revived Bastien Silver Fox Breeders (this time without Ludger), raising fur-bearing animals in the village of Chateau d’Eau with considerable success. 33

While the family also made tidy profits through its state-supported retailing activities in the 1930s, the workers it employed in its manufacturing operations failed to share in this relative prosperity. 34 Indeed, during the Depression, Bastien Brothers significantly


32 During this period, federal and provincial laws based the eligibility to vote on the payment of taxes, something which, given the federal regime of Aboriginal “protection,” was impossible for those who only held on-reserve property. Raphaël Ouimet, “Ludger Bastien,” extract from Biographies canadiennes-françaises, Montreal, n.p., 1926, p. 98, ACNHW, C-4-36.


34 On the state’s role in the Bastien’s Depression-era retailing profits, see Chapter Six.
reduced its workforce, leading to increasing requests for state relief on the part of the Huron.\(^{35}\) According to a reserve resident, “a girl working periodically in a slippers factory” in Wendake in the mid-1930s could expect to earn “just a few dollars a week” while “remaining without work at frequent intervals.”\(^{36}\) Indian Affairs recognized this difficult state of affairs. In 1937, the secretary of the Department of Mines and Resources, W.J.F. Pratt, claimed that Wendake held no job prospects.\(^{37}\) Thus, during the twentieth century, class formation accelerated among the Huron as the Bastien family grew increasingly wealthy and its workers were unable to keep pace.

As the Depression wore on and on-reserve employment remained limited, the band council attempted to improve Wendake’s economic outlook on several occasions by soliciting work through political channels for reserve residents. In 1937, for example, the council asked Indian Affairs to allow a Canadian corporation (the Quebec Glove Co.) to open a factory in Wendake and, on different occasions in 1938 and 1940, it requested that the Branch intervene on the band’s behalf with other state agencies.\(^{38}\) The band council also directly petitioned the Quebec Department of Mines and Fisheries, asking that it provide

\(^{35}\) In 1930, the Indian agent recommended the relief application of “Miss Elize Gros-Louis... [who] Generally works al shoes; no work at present.” [Pierre Albert Picard] to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 26 December 1930, BANQ-Q, P883, S5, File 13. In this sense, Indian Affairs’ provision of vouchers to the Bastiens’ store (“Au bon marché”), effectively subsidized the family even as they laid off many of their workers.

\(^{36}\) Gaspard Picard to T.G. Murphy, 1 September 1934, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-01.

\(^{37}\) However, he made this claim in order to reject an appeal for assistance. Pratt made his assertion in response to Ovila Gros Louis’s request for an Indian Affairs pension so that she could return to Wendake from Quebec City, where she lived with her daughter. Pratt felt that her daughter’s $50 monthly salary (earned from the solidly white-collar Metropolitan Life Insurance Company) should be sufficient for Gros Louis’s support, especially since “il n’existe aucune chance d’être employée” in Wendake. W.J.F. Pratt to Mr. Sharpe, 17 April 1937, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-01.

\(^{38}\) Minutes du conseil, 2 November 1937, 25 February 1938, and 26 July 1940, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919-1949, p. 50-2 and 90-1, ACNHW.
work to unemployed Huron in the Parc des Laurentides. However, given that the council repeated these requests on several occasions, it seems likely that they failed to bear fruit and that the community’s economic situation only began to improve after the outbreak of World War II.

While the Depression caused great harm to moccasin manufacturing in Wendake, by the middle of the 1940s the industry had rebounded substantially. However, by this time it employed a much smaller portion of the reserve’s population than it had earlier in the century. Gaston Blanchet observed in 1945 that snowshoe-making, the sole “industrie essentiellement huronne” that remained in Wendake at the turn of the twentieth century, had disappeared and that the only local industry that remained, the manufacturing of shoes and slippers, employed no more than a handful of Huron. Despite the industry’s relatively small Aboriginal workforce, Maurice E. Bastien took advantage of his role as Indian agent to enlist the help of the Branch’s Handicraft Section in procuring scarce materials (imported, Italian or Czechoslovakian beads) during the war years. Following the war, the Branch reported that, “The Indians engaged in handicraft work were able to sell their wares, which are in great demand, at high prices.”

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39 Minutes du conseil, 16 May 1938, Ibid, p. 52-3. The council later requested that Indian Affairs take up the with provincial authorities on their behalf. Minutes du conseil, 3 March 1939, Ibid, p. 81-2.

40 He writes: “l’unique manufacture de la réserve, qui emploie une centaine de personnes dont très peu d’Indiens, fabrique des souliers, des pantoufles.” Gaston Blanchet, “Étude de la communauté de Lorette,” Bachelor’s (Licence) Thesis (Sociology), Quebec, Université Laval, 1945, p. 6-7.

41 M.E. Bastien to Indian Affairs Branch, 25 March 1944 and Kathleen Moodie to M.E. Bastien, 17 April 1944, LAC, RG10, vol. 7552, file 41,014-1, reel C-14817. Indian Affairs launched the handicraft program as a means of diminishing relief expenditure. Despite the maturity of Wendake’s manufacturing sector, a segment of the village’s population benefited from state funds when engaging in such work during wartime. Thus, between 1 April and 30 April 1940, the Branch invested $450.29 in Wendake while selling the community’s production at a loss (for $439.83). Unfortunately, from the archival record it is unclear whether Bastien or other Huron benefited from these funds. Statement of Handicraft Trust Account #470, 1 April – 30 November 1940, n.d. [11 December 1940], LAC, RG10, vol. 7551, file 41,001-1, reel C-14817.

continued to be the primary manufacturer of moccasins, shoes, slippers, and other "articles-souvenirs indiens pour les touristes" through mid-century. As during the Depression, then, the Bastiens appear to have continued to prosper while affording relatively little benefit to the majority of Huron families.

While the unequal distribution of manufacturing benefits partly resulted from the industry shedding significant numbers of Huron-held production-line jobs, it also arose from Wendake’s growing middle class. Indeed, during the first half of the twentieth century increasing numbers of Huron worked in white collar or other prestigious and economically advantageous jobs. Although the archival record most frequently refers to members of the Picard family occupying such positions, a handful of other cases suggest that the phenomenon was relatively widespread. Among those Huron concerning whom little information has been found, several held government jobs while others found employment in industries such as insurance. Meanwhile, members of the Picard and Bastien families continued to occupy socially prestigious, white collar work through mid-century. Pierre Albert Picard Tsiecheikan, who served as both grand chief and Indian agent during the period, was certainly the most visible and well-paid Huron civil servant. Beginning in 1921, he occupied a position working for the cadastre service of Quebec’s Ministry of Colonization,


44 This is due to the Picard family’s importance in the documentary record. Indeed, members of the Picard family produced the majority of non-governmental sources consulted for the twentieth century, something which allows for only rare glimpses of much of Wendake’s population during the period.

45 In 1930, for example, one of Elzéar Picard’s three sons worked for Quebec’s Treasury Department. [Pierre Albert Picard] to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 26 December 1930, BANQ-Q, P883, S5, File 13. Paul Launière also worked for the provincial government, although his post is unknown. M.E. Bastien to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 18 June 1938, LAC, RG10, vol. 7552, file 41,014-1, reel C-14817. Ovila Gros Louis’s daughter worked for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. W.J.F. Pratt to Mr. Sharpe, 17 April 1937, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-01.
Mines, and Fisheries. Picard’s annual salary for this post increased from $1,200 in 1921-2 to $1,800 in 1928-9, the level at which it stayed through his retirement in 1942. In addition, during his brief stint as Indian agent between 1929 and 1931, Picard drew a supplementary annual salary of $400 from the federal government. One of the Bastien brothers (Joseph) held a high-level commercial post as the manager of the fur department at Holt & Renfrew, a department store in Quebec City. Louis Philippe Ormond Picard Arôsen’s military career underlines the prestige which certain Huron were able to acquire in the labor market. In September 1914, Picard, an “Explorer & Draughtsman,” re-enlisted in the military, this time at the rank of Captain, serving in France with the 12th battalion. This made Picard one of only eight commissioned Amerindian officers serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1916. Wendake also produced a handful of professionals during the period, with Léon Gros Louis crowning Huron professional progress by becoming Wendake’s first medical doctor in

46 Pierre-Albert Picard to J.E. Perrault, Ministre de la Colonisation, des Mines & des Pêcheries, 23 March 1921, ACNHW, P2-S3-A13, File B-2-16.

47 He received raises in 1922, 1923, 1925, and 1928. Copy of a letter from Pierre-Albert Picard to Hector La Ferté, Ministre de la colonisation, la chasse et les pêcheries, 28 May 1931 and [List of annual revenue of Pierre-Albert Picard from the Ministère de la colonisation, la chasse et les pêcheries, 1921-1941], n.d. [19417], ACNHW, P2-S3-A13, File B-2-16.


1952 following his graduation from Université Laval in Quebec City.\footnote{Before taking the post with the Quebec government, Pierre Albert Picard Tsichek8an worked as an engineer on several large construction projects in Quebec City. For example, between summer and autumn 1917, Picard was employed by Quinlan and Robertson in Limoilou. 3 September and 4 November 1917, Picard, \textit{Journal personnel}, 1916-1920, p. 65 and 7, ACNHW, F-I-79. Speech by J. Arthur Vincent for Léon Gros-Louis, 15 June 1952 and Souscription en faveur de M. Léon Gros-Louis, n.d. [15 June 1952], ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-02.} Thus, during the first half of the twentieth century certain Huron found skilled, white-collar employment, pointing to the importance of local socioeconomic diversification and to the ability of residents to earn substantial income despite official discourse asserting otherwise.

While the state provided significantly higher per capita relief to the Moose Factory Cree during the twentieth century than to either the Innu or Huron, this situation arose mainly from western James Bay’s dependence on the fur trade, a sector of the economy that experienced difficult times during the first half of the twentieth century.\footnote{Whereas Indian Affairs provided per capita average annual relief in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake of only $0.30 and $0.71 respectively between 1910 and 1929, it provided the Cree of Moose Factory with $7.89 in annual per capita assistance during the same period. \textit{Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1910-1929}. For more on the fur trade in the region during the period, see Chapter Five, and for more on the state’s attempts to reduce relief through beaver preserves in western James Bay, see Chapter Six.} Throughout the period, the Cree proved eager to engage in various forms of employment in order to earn income. Wage work for fur trade companies provided the Cree with their most important economic activities other than hunting and trapping prior to the 1931 arrival of the railroad at Moosonee. Given its centrality to the HBC’s transportation network in nineteenth and early twentieth-century James Bay, Moose Factory furnished the Cree with significant revenue generated through dock and transportation work. In the summer of 1900, the HBC spent a total $7,873.58 on shipping at Moose Factory, most of which was expended in the form of wages.\footnote{“Report on Transport: James Bay District,” n.d. [1900], HBCA, B.135/e/33, p. 4, 1M1257. These figures were well above what the company’s upper management wanted to see.} Of this amount, the Cree earned $3,854.13 – $2,993.93 for labor paid to 102 Cree and $860.20 for freight transportation to inland posts provided to 36 Cree (all of whom also earned pay working on the docks). In comparison, it only provided $1,878.80 to 74 Moose
Factory Cree in exchange for furs. While most Cree continued to pursue traditional activities in the bush, for a brief moment summer wage work, which accounted for nearly 70% of the Cree's income in 1900-1, replaced winter trapping as the core of Moose Factory's economy. However, the shallow waters around the post, the transshipment system's high operational cost, and its counterproductive nature (the fur trade could not generate profits through transportation alone) led the company to move its main James Bay port to Charlton Island, in the process slashing the number of Cree employed as dockworkers to "ten or twelve in all" by 1910. According to longtime HBC employee J.W. Anderson, "To handle the cargoes, Indian stevedores would be hired at Moose Factory and brought out to Charlton Island for the transportation season. These men would be trappers during the winter and casual labourers during the summer." Charlton Island remained the hub of the HBC's James Bay transshipment network until the 1931 arrival of the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railroad (T&NO) ended the practice of supplying the region by sea. The Cree also secured positions on company steamers that transported goods and furs between the various posts in James Bay, although this sector never employed more than a handful of band members. At the turn of the century, the HBC's James Bay management felt that, "Indians make the best [steamer] Pilots." However, by 1910 the HBC no longer appears to have employed Cree on its boats in James Bay, having replaced them by "natives" – that is, men of mixed ancestry born in the region but not considered to be Cree. Amerindian labor also provided domestic services at Moose Factory, thereby ensuring that a very small number of band members

55 The report provides figures in Made beaver (MB), one of which it evaluates at $0.55. Thus, the company provided 5,443.5 MB for labor, 1,564 MB for freight transportation, and 3,416 MB for furs. Alex Milne, "Inspection Report on Moose Factory," 4-11 July and 12-18 August 1901, HBCA, B.135/e/34, p. 19-21 and 24, reel 1M1257.


58 Anderson reports that in 1910 "The mate, the assistant engineer, the stoker and the crew were natives of Moose Factory." Anderson, Fur Trader's Story, p. 15.
earned a steady, year-round income. This sector of the economy also provided Cree women with their only opportunity to work for wages.59

Of course, all of these workers received payment from the HBC in store credit rather than currency. Indeed, the company used labor expenditure in the same way it used the credit it extended in anticipation of furs. In both contexts, abstract money served to guarantee the sale of merchandise priced above standard market value. Despite this strategy, the competition between the HBC and Revillon Frères that characterized the western James Bay fur trade fueled a general increase in the wages paid by the two companies, at least prior to World War I.60

The 1931 arrival of the T&NO changed employment opportunities in Moose Factory, eliminating some while adding others. From the turn of the century, the HBC and Revillon Frères conjointly paid two Cree to carry the winter mail “packet” south to the line at Cochrane once each year, returning with whatever correspondence was held there for Moose Factory. Beginning in the mid-1920s, mail delivery at Moose Factory greatly increased in frequency, when “a government subsidy gave a monthly mail service excepting for the spring and fall break-up and freeze-up periods.”61 Cree such as James Quachegan and James

59 “The cooking [for the district and post officers at Moose Factory] was usually done by an Indian man or woman trained for the purpose. Very often the larger household establishments, such as the district manager’s residence, would be operated by an Indian man and wife team. The wife would be the cook and the husband would be the chore-man who would attend to the supply of wood and water, light fires in the morning and maintain them during the day, and in general help his wife in the running of the household.” *Ibid.*, p. 20.

60 In 1911, the James Bay District manager reported to his superiors that, “Expenses have increased owing to higher wages having now to be paid to Servants on re-engaging.” Although “servants” refers to non-Aboriginal employees, this wage increase most likely extended to the district’s Cree who would have been just as capable of exploiting fur trade competition as others. A.C. McNab, “Report on Trade James Bay District Outfit 1910,” 18 September 1911, HBCA, A.11/48, p. 283, reel 725.

61 Anderson, *Fur Trader’s Story*, p. 17.
Sutherland could expect to earn $60 in addition to rations for carrying the mail.\footnote{Thierry Mallet, “Mr. Mallet’s Diary, James Bay and Hudson’s Bay Trip – Summer 1920,” LAC, MG28-W97, p. 65, reel F-1615 and Tuesday, 17 July 1926, in Edward Alexander McGregor, Journal of E.A. McGregor, 1922-1927, n.p., LAC, MG30-A125.} However, once the T&NO had arrived at Moosonee, this source of revenue disappeared. A similar situation developed with respect to the HBC’s method of supplying inland posts. At the turn of the century, the HBC employed Moose Factory Cree to carry supplies inland to its post at Abitibi.\footnote{W.K. Broughton to the Commissioner, Hudson’s Bay Company, 6 February 1901, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file 1, doc. no. 206, reel 1M1120.} However, due to the arrival of the National Transcontinental Railway in Cochrane during the first decade of the twentieth century, the company began supplying Abitibi from the “line” instead. With the exception of 1900-1, no information on either the number of men working this route or the amount of wages they received has been found. Regardless, the HBC’s shipping rates rose significantly during the period, from $4 per 100 lbs in 1895-6 to $9.25 per 100 lbs in 1914-5, suggesting that Cree wages similarly increased.\footnote{W.K. Broughton to C.C. Chipman, 31 December 1895, HBCA, B.135/e/32, p. 2, reel 1M1257 and N.H. Bacon, “Fur Trade Annual Report, Outfit 1914,” 31 January 1916, HBCA, A.74/23b, p. 55, reel 1350.} In 1915-6, the HBC decided to extend its transportation route from Cochrane to Abitibi through to New Post, thereby reducing Cree employment in this sector.\footnote{F.D. Wilson, “Annual Report: James Bay District, Outfit 1915,” 6 December 1916, HBCA, A.74/45, p. 92, reel 1354.} Despite the savings effected in this way between 1915 and 1917, the HBC returned to its earlier Moose Factory-based system in 1918 due to the losses that it suffered in sales. Indeed, “as all the payments were made in cash,” those who worked the route apparently spent their wages elsewhere, depriving the HBC of its profit on the inflated prices it charged for merchandise.\footnote{F.D. Wilson, “Annual Report: James Bay District, Outfit 1916,” 20 January 1918, HBCA, A.74/46, p. 110, reel 1355.} In this sense, wage work provided by the HBC served yet again to guarantee the company’s profits while severely
limiting Cree purchasing power. In 1931, as a result of the T&NO's completion, this source of Cree wage work also disappeared.

While the railroad's arrival at Moosonee adversely affected certain sectors of the Cree economy, it also brought new forms of wage work to the region. Anderson notes that from 1931 "Moose Factory with its ancient buildings, mission station, Indian village and R.C.M.P. detachment naturally became quite an attraction for tourists." Although the post had been receiving occasional parties of visitors since at least the mid-1920s, the T&NO recast this sector of economic activity in important ways. First, earlier tourists required guides in order to access the region. However, prior to the railroad's completion, these men were most likely Amerindians who lived further to the south for whom it would be more convenient to meet those arriving in Cochrane. Once sportsmen and other visitors began arriving directly at Moosonee, the Cree could more readily secure income as hunting and fishing guides and through work ferrying visitors by canoe or boat to the tourist attractions on Moose Factory Island.

During the late 1930s and 1940s, wage labor again took on a new hue through large privately and publicly financed building projects. These initiatives attracted Cree from around James Bay to Moose Factory, in the process turning the settlement into the region's "metropolis." However, many jobs, such as those in railway construction, were reserved for union members, making them inaccessible to the Cree, many of whom "moved further up the track" as a result. At the end of the 1930s, the Anglican Church launched the first

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construction project of the period by funding a new structure to house the organization’s residential school in Moose Factory. According to Reverend Gilbert Thompson, the principal of the school, this building, which was opened in 1938, “was practically put up by local Indian labour.” During the 1940s, the state also funded several construction projects in Moose Factory. However, because it did not apply a unitary model or pay scale to the management of these sites, it inadvertently created competition among them for workers. Those Cree who were able took advantage of the higher wages offered by one of the projects (the hospital) even though the competing program (aimed at providing free homes to Cree families) may have served their needs more effectively. In an article published in 1949, John J. Honigman describes the problems created by this intra-state rivalry: “Administrators there are trying to secure Indian labor to work with a model community which will be turned over to the population without charge. Wage rates, however, are lower than on the large new Government hospital going up under the direction of a private contracting firm. The bulk of available labor is employed on the latter undertaking while the more incompetent men find work on the housing project whose progress is crawling.” Thus, in this one instance, Cree men earned different wages for essentially the same work as money, in this case provided by the state, encouraged inequality in western James Bay as it did elsewhere.

During the first half of the twentieth century, then, wage work became increasingly central to the economies of Mashteuiatsh and Moose Factory while remaining absolutely critical in Wendake. Money continued to favor the stratification of Huron society that had begun during the nineteenth century; the Picards and others sought their income in prestigious, off-reserve work, the Bastiens dominated the reserve’s labor market, and other band members found themselves wholly dependent on relatively low-paying wage labor. Indeed, this last segment of the population bore the brunt of the Depression as they found


themselves under- or unemployed and increasingly dependent on state-funded welfare that effectively subsidized those local elites who had previously employed them (the Bastien family). While some Innu and Cree remained able to earn their livelihood from the bush, the increasing presence of Euro-Canadian trappers and the declining fur market of the late 1920s and 1930s pushed many to supplement or wholly replace their income through wage labor whenever possible. While in economic terms the Moose Factory Cree remained a relatively homogenous community, the Innu began undergoing a more marked process of income-based stratification, with Meridy Robertson notably coming to occupy an important economic role at Mashteuiatsh. These changes both influenced and are visible in the financial relations and consumption practices that members of these communities pursued during the period.

The Local Financial Sector in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh

During the twentieth century, credit/debit relations between community members continued to provide one of the primary monetary resources in the economies of Mashteuiatsh and Wendake. The Indian Act's prohibition on the seizure of on-reserve property for the repayment of personal debt remained in force beyond mid-century and as a result, the Huron and Innu were for the most part forced to either generate loans locally or to go without. Although a handful of exceptions to this general rule existed, most notably in the form of credit supplied by fur traders at Mashteuiatsh, most projects that required considerable capital investment, such as the purchase of a home, could only be financed through the aid of other community members. In both First Nations, such assistance came overwhelmingly from the socio-economic elite. These individuals, in contrast to other community members, employed the full battery of tools allowed by the law in guaranteeing

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72 For more on welfare in Wendake during the Depression, see Chapter Six.

73 While the Moose Factory Cree certainly shared their monetary resources, the documentary record attests to a marked lack of what might be termed financial relations during the period. As a result, this section focuses on Wendake and Mashteuiatsh alone.
repayment. Unlike Euro-Canadian financial or commercial institutions, by 1930 band members had the right to seize collateral in the case that a debtor failed to respect the conditions of a loan. By this time, those who offered loans did so as a business transaction, charging interest and seizing collateral when payment was not forthcoming. In this way, loans reinforced the power of those band members who had access to significant capital reserves by placing a novel form of authority in their hands – that to decide who should have access to money and under which conditions. In this sense, the Indian Act, explicitly designed to protect Amerindians from outside exploitation until such time as they were ready to assume the responsibilities of full Canadian citizenship, encouraged inequality and exploitation within Aboriginal communities. At the same time, however, this practice also permitted Huron and Innu of relatively modest means access to capital that would otherwise have been unavailable. Thus, the local financial sector in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh served both to promise greater equality and to exacerbate existing inequality.

The second part of this section focuses on Huron and Innu patronage of Euro-Canadian financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. While the Indian Act certainly limited their interaction with the formal financial sector, at least some band members held savings accounts and insurance policies, indicating that they were just as savvy and concerned with their own and their family’s economic well-being as their non-Aboriginal neighbors. Furthermore, such investment, with the exception of that made overseas, was widespread, indicating that most Innu and Huron sought to increase their monetary holdings while reserving a portion of this resource to ensure their welfare in times of hardship.

*Loans and the Local Economy*

From 1876 to 1930, the Indian Act declared that, “No person shall take any security or otherwise obtain any lien or charge, whether by mortgage, judgment or otherwise, upon real or personal property of any Indian or non-treaty Indian within Canada, except on real or personal property subject to taxation.” As this clause applied to all “persons,” it formally excluded Amerindians from making use of lien in contracts among themselves. However, the law did permit those who sold goods to Amerindians to “take security on such article for any
part of the price thereof which may be unpaid.  

Thus, traders might recover merchandise sold on credit should the buyer fail to pay full price, but could not seize other property on the reserve (which was exempt from taxation). Indeed, in at least one instance, the HBC secured a ruling requiring that four Innu repay the company for debts they had incurred at Mashteuiatsh. Its lawyers may have invoked this section of the Indian Act. Alternately, the company may have attempted to secure the repayment of debt through off-reserve property (such as savings held in Euro-Canadian financial institutions) which, because it was taxable, was liable to seizure. In 1930, Parliament altered the wording of the section to permit band members to make use of lien in agreements between themselves.

Given the protection afforded Aboriginal debtors by the Indian Act, it is not surprising that Euro-Canadians rarely provided loans to Amerindian reserve residents. In fact, only two such loans have been found in the documentary record. While the first of these demonstrates the dangers associated with lending to Amerindians during the period, the second provides an example of a loan that satisfied all parties, affording necessary capital in exchange for deferred payment. This suggests, then, that while such inter-ethnic loans never constituted a major method of borrowing among First Nations they occasionally supplemented money from other sources.

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74 Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians,” 12 April 1876, 39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 66.

75 No information on the court that ruled in these cases has been found. The individuals the court found guilty, along with the amount each was ordered to pay, were: A. Petecolagan ($59.80), N. Petecolagan ($46.85), H. Connelly ($39.50), and D. Alexis ($39.50). Gustave Perrault to W.R. Hamilton, 12 August 1902, HBCA, B.329/2, f. 176, reel 1MB89.

76 As noted below, several Innu held savings accounts in Roberval during the period.

77 Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend the Indian Act,” 1930, c. 25, s. 10.

78 This excludes the standard fur trade practice of “advancing” hunter-trappers, which is covered in Chapter Five.
In July 1906, Charles Siméon transferred the title of two houses that he owned at Mashteuiatsh to L.N. Tremblay, a French Canadian merchant from Sainte Anne de Chicoutimi, “as security for advances already made and to be made to Simeon by Tremblay.” Although Siméon made this transfer with the help of a notary public in Chicoutimi, he did so without the knowledge of the Indian agent. In 1910, Tremblay’s creditors, who had had his assets seized, sold the houses at public auction. Following the Indian agent’s protests of the sale’s illegality under the Indian Act, the Superior Court of Chicoutimi declared it void and Siméon therefore retained the title to the houses.79 This case, then, illustrates both the potential short-term benefits and long-term handicaps faced by Aboriginal borrowers. Although Siméon kept his houses and the credit he had received based on their “security,” Tremblay’s business associates learned the painful lesson that on-reserve collateral could not be legally seized. Given the absence of any comparable case either in Wendake or Mashteuiatsh, it would appear that as this knowledge became more widespread, the Innu and other Amerindians found themselves unable to attract capital in this way.

However, at least one other case suggests that the local economy continued to support at least some informal and unsecured loans between Euro-Canadians and Amerindians. During the 1930s or 1940s, Anne-Marie Siméon secured $300 in credit from the owner of the sawmill in Roberval in order to construct a house in Mashteuiatsh. Siméon herself provided $300 that her husband, William Valin, had given her prior to leaving for the autumn hunt. Only a verbal contract appears to have been made in this instance and both parties fulfilled their part of the bargain, the owner of the sawmill having the house built and Siméon and her husband repaying the borrowed funds from their revenue generated by hunting, trapping, and forestry work.80 Although this loan concerns real estate, its form

79 A. Tessier to J.D. McLean, 31 May 1910 and A. Tessier to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 11 July 1910, LAC, RG 10, vol. 3161, file 365,577, reel C-11332.

80 Anne-Marie Siméon et Camil Girard, Un monde autour de moi: Témoignage d’une Montagnaise, Chicoutimi, Les éditions JCL, 1997, p. 33-7. While Siméon’s reminiscences do not allow precise dating, the context suggests that she received her loan either during the 1930s or the 1940s.
recalls the unsecured credit that merchants advanced to Amerindian hunter-trappers rather than the secured mortgages furnished by band members. In this sense, the amount of the loan appears to have been of greater importance than the ends to which its recipient put it.

While loans that crossed ethnic divides were extremely rare, both the Innu and the Huron extended monetary credit within their respective communities with greater frequency through mid-century. Although no trace of a specifically Huron credit system has been found, Julius E. Lips claims that, during the 1930s, the Innu of Lac St. Jean and the Cree of Mistassini conceived of credit and debt in culturally specific ways. Both of these groups had a legal system that recognized the use of an item as security for a promise to pay. In the same manner as a mortgage provided by a bank or other financial institutions, the Innu based their liens not on monetary value but on a specific good or chattel (but not a hunting territory). “If, during the period of gaging, the gaged object decreases in value, thereby lowering its sales value, and if the sale therefore covers only part of the debt, the creditor has no claim to additional payment. He can satisfy himself only with the gaged object itself and loses money if its sale brings less money than expected.”81 Thus, by the early twentieth century Innu law functioned in much the same way as its colonial counterpart, requiring that security for monetary loans be provided not by some specific amount of cash reserves but by a tangible object that, should the debtor fail to repay his or her loan, the creditor had the right to seize.82 However, most loans between band members were contracted without reference to money, although not in the absence of interest. According to Lips, “the loan of a canoe for a trip of some length is not gratuitous, such a loan falling rather under the classification of rent. It is paid for with goods agreed upon at the time of the loan rather than with money.” Such loans,
whether involving goods or money, were “always bound to a definitely fixed time.”

Innu custom again closely approximated Euro-Canadian practice when a loan consisted of money rather than a particular object. Lips notes that the Innu frequently lent each other money, “as a rule free of charge,” although sometimes “It may be agreed that someone who lends money to a man will get it back with a small percentage of interest.” Following the death of a debtor, his or her creditors possessed neither the power to seize property nor to require reimbursement on the part of the debtor’s heirs. Although the Innu occasionally offered to pay a portion of such debts when incurred towards other band members, commercial partners from outside of the community could expect no such favors. “‘La Compagnie est riche’ is the motto of the Indian and the inheritor therefore does not dream of paying to the Company voluntarily the debts of their deceased debtor.” Thus, “traditional” Innu credit law, as described by Lips, bore more than a passing resemblance to its Euro-Canadian counterpart.

In practice, mortgages represent the majority of actual loans concluded between the Huron or Innu for which the documentary record provides details. Initially at least, Indian Affairs opposed contracts involving reserve residents that permitted payment for real estate over a period of time while securing repayment with the property itself. In 1894, Duncan Campbell Scott, the acting deputy superintendent general and Indian Affairs’ chief clerk and accountant, instructed Antoine O. Bastien, the Indian agent at Wendake, that, “Transfers of this nature should be discouraged by you, as they are conditional in their terms.” Scott described the Department’s position to Bastien by stating that, “Of course, there can be no valid objection to exchanges made by Indians of their lands, when paid for in full.”


84 Ibid.

85 Ibid, p. 438. Although the Indian Act provided the superintendent of Indian Affairs with authority over the estates of Amerindians, it only addressed issues relating to the division of property and not the responsibility for the repayment of outstanding debt (which, presumably, was covered by the clauses relating to loans). Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians,” 12 April 1876, 39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 9 and 66.

Indian Affairs, which was under Scott’s leadership from the 1910 into the 1930s, opposed not only the use of lien but also that of interest-free loans in the transfer of on-reserve real estate. Of course, if this policy had been implemented, it would have essentially removed the majority of Huron and Innu homes and lands from the bands’ internal market as very few community members would have been able to raise sufficient funds to purchase by way of a single payment.

Although Indian Affairs may have objected to the adoption of the fixed-term mortgage, it tended to follow the recommendation of the band council when considering whether to validate or annul real estate sales. This explains the use, from the 1890s, of mortgages in both Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. Whenever a sale took place within the limits of a reserve, the band council would read the contract aloud at a meeting and decide whether to recommend that the sale be recorded or cancelled. In 1919, for example, the Huron council considered several contracts, including one by which Armand and Alex Bastien sold a store and the occupation rights to the lot on which it was situated to Alphonse Picard. Although they could recommend against accepting sales, neither the Mashteuiatsh nor Wendake band council ever appears to have exercised this power.

In both communities, notaries initially adopted the fixed-term, interest-free mortgage as the preferred means of effecting land sales. In 1893, Maurice Bastien Ahgniolen sold a house in Wendake to Maxime Sioui for $125. Sioui made a down payment of $75 and agreed to provide the remaining $50, without interest, to Bastien within a year. The contract of sale stipulated that if Sioui failed to make payment within the allotted time, “the vendor shall have the right to keep his house without any expense and the money paid shall be for rent of the said house.” Also in 1893, Michel René sold a house, along with the lot on which it was situated, to Narcisse Picard for $225, $100 as a down payment with the remaining

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88 Cyrille Renaud, Deed of Sale from Maurice Bastien, Junior to Maxime Sioui, 8 September 1893, LAC, RG10, vol. 2773, file 154,998, reel C-11276.
$125 to be paid within a year of the contract’s signature. In order to insure payment, the contract reserved for Réné “the privilege of bailleur de fonds (money lender) for the amount remaining due.” Given that Agent Bastien attempted to register the contracts a year after their signature, both would appear to have been honored.

The seller’s provision to the buyer of an interest-free loan, payable in predefined installments over a short period of time, remained the primary method of land transfer in Wendake into the 1910s. In April 1912, Ebrahim Picard sold a lot in the village, containing a barn and a store, to Gaspard Picard for $200, $70 of which Gaspard Picard provided upon the contract’s signature, while undertaking to repay the remaining sum in two installments: $30 in May 1912 and $100 the following May. The contract stipulated that the seller provide what was essentially an interest-free mortgage to the purchaser. As security for this loan, Ebrahim Picard retained “son privilège de bailleur de fonds jusqu’au paiement final” which presumably allowed him to recover the property in the case that Gaspard Picard failed to make timely payments. However, in this particular instance, he never invoked the clause as he received full payment for the sale.

Certain Innu also completed real estate transactions based on similar loans. In July 1901, James Robertson sold a portion of his lot at Mashteuiatsh to Ned Robertson. “The said sale is made for the sum of Seven Hundred Dollars payable as follows, Three hundred Dollars first of July 1901 and the balance, one hundred dollars a year, without interest, also payable on the first of July every year until the account of Seven hundred dollars has been

89 Cyrille Renaud, Deed of Sale from Michel Réné to Narcisse Picard, 9 September 1893, LAC, RG10, vol. 2773, file 154,998, reel C-11276. Emphasis in original.

90 Antoine O. Bastien to Hayter Reed, 15 October 1894, LAC, RG10, vol. 2773, file 154,998, reel C-11276.

91 Copy of Deed of Sale from Ebrahim Picard to Gaspard Picard, 16 April 1912, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-02.

92 Ebrahim Picard, Sworn Statement, 4 October 1924, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-02.
In accordance with the terms of the contract, the Robertsons completed this sale in July 1905. In 1925, Ned Robertson sold a portion of this lot to Thommy Robertson for $2,000. Again, the deed of sale contains a clause specifying the manner in which the sale price was to be paid. Following a down payment of $200, Thommy Robertson “promised to pay to the vendor accepting, at the latter’s domicile, as follows: fifty dollars the 1st day of each of the months of January, May and September of each of the following years, until full payment, without interest.”

Reserved unto himself the right to ask for the cancellation of this sale, should the purchaser fail to pay in the month when they fall due, each and every one of the term payments of the aforesaid balance of the sale price, without him being required to observe any judicial formality whatsoever, without putting in default, without indemnity for the improvements which the purchaser may have made to the said immovable during his possession, and without refund of what may have been paid up to then in respect of the sale price, the whole will be kept by the said vendor by way of rental and pecuniary compensation liquidated, and the said purchaser will proceed against, as by virtue of a lease pure and simple.

Ned Robertson made an inter vivos donation of the payments he was to receive for the sale to Mary Victoria Robertson the following month, payments that she had received in full by 1937.

By the late 1920s, mortgages in Wendake had begun charging interest. Although unclear who provided the funds, Philippe Sioui had secured an interest-bearing mortgage by the late 1920s. In 1929, Sioui held a $500 mortgage on the workshop where, prior to losing

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93 Deed of Sale from James Robertson to Ned Robertson, n.d. [1 July 1901], LAC, RG10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555.

94 Modification to a Deed of Sale from James Robertson to Ned Robertson, 7 July 1905 and Sworn Statement of James Robertson, 7 July 1905, LAC, RG10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555.

95 Deed of Sale from Ned Robertson to Thommy Robertson, 17 July 1925, LAC, RG10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555.

his eyesight, he had produced canoes. The Indian agent, Pierre Albert Picard, valued this workshop at approximately $1,000 and stated that with interest, Sioui owed his creditor $701.15.97 Despite the continued illegality of interest-bearing mortgages between reserve residents, Indian Affairs requested that Picard determine “whether it will be possible to dispose of the said work-shop to advantage in order that Sioui may pay off his mortgage and still have some funds in hand.”98 In addition to Sioui’s blindness, both his wife and son suffered from tuberculosis, prompting Indian Affairs to issue the family monthly assistance. However, the Department did not expect to pay for either the family’s relief or Sioui’s debts. J.D. McLean, the secretary of Indian Affairs, wrote to Picard:

With regard to the property owned by Sioui, and which it is advisable to sell, as he can no longer carry on business as a builder of canoes, I have to point out that you should persuade him to accept the first reasonable offer he receives. He should not hold out for too high a price, as probably there will be but few persons prepared to make purchase, and the mortgage on the building will have to be paid off from the proceeds of the sale. Assistance in the way of relief will also be chargeable against money realized from the sale of property.99

In a move reminiscent of its relations with other state agencies, Indian Affairs, then, sought to persuade Sioui to sell his home in order to subsidize his own welfare payments.

Although unclear who loaned Sioui funds against his workshop, Ludger Bastien is the most likely candidate. During the late 1920s and 1930s, Bastien dominated Wendake’s mortgage market. In 1928, for example, Moïse Gros Louis mortgaged his home to Bastien for $550 by way of a contract of vente à faculté de réméré (roughly equivalent to pawning).100 The agreement that the two men signed required Gros Louis to repurchase the house over five

97 [Pierre Albert Picard] to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 15 October 1929, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 18.

98 J.D. McLean to P.A. Picard, 17 October 1929, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 18.

99 J.D. McLean to P.A. Picard, 12 November 1929, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 18.

100 However, instead of terming the transaction a mortgage (hypothèque), the notarized contract made use of a legal mechanism (vente à faculté de réméré) that is roughly equivalent pawning.
years by repaying the full $550 in installments of no less than $100 per year along with 6% interest, twice annually over the lifetime of the loan. In other words, Gros Louis agreed to pay Bastien $166 per year ($100 in principal and $33 in interest, twice yearly). The contract also stipulated that Gros Louis was to insure the house against fire to the value of the mortgage ($550), the policy for which was to be in Ludger Bastien’s name. During the period covered by the contract, Gros Louis was to continue to occupy the house. 101 However, given that the average annual household income in Wendake entered freefall during the mortgage’s lifetime (from nearly $500 in 1929 it dropped to roughly $150 in 1933 before rebounding slightly to $200 in 1934), it seems likely that Gros Louis lost his home. 102 In fact, Bastien may have resold this same house to Elzéar Sioui in the early 1930s. In 1930 or 1931, Sioui purchased a house on the reserve from Bastien. Although the price is unknown, Sioui, apparently succumbing to economic difficulties, 103 rapidly proved unable to pay the installments required by the contract of sale and, at the end of the decade, a Quebec City newspaper reported that the little money paid did not even amount to the interest stipulated in the contract. Because the home was located on the reserve, jurisdiction fell to Indian Affairs

101 Adélard L’Heureux, Contract of Sale from Moise Gros Louis to Ludger Bastien, 27 October 1928, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-12.

102 Although the Indian agent’s income figures should be regarded skeptically, this picture of a generalized drop in income corresponds to the massive increase in state welfare distributed in Wendake during the period. The household incomes are based on the census returns of 1929 and 1934 which respectively reported 270 and 235 Huron men and women between the ages of 21 and 65. Each household is assumed to be made up of one male and one female earner. For the census figures, see Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1929, p. 64 and Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1934, p. 48. For the Indian agent’s estimate of reserve income, see Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1929, p. 90, Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1930, p. 74, Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 46, Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1932, p. 44, Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1933, p. 41, and Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1934, p. 64.

103 Sioui clearly struggled to maintain solvency during the Depression. In 1939, for example, he pleaded guilty to having abandoned two children, the first in 1936 and the second in 1938, at La Crèche, an orphanage in Quebec City. “Abandoned 2 Infants: Huron Reserve Indian Admits Separate Offences,” Montreal Gazette, 16 March 1939, p. 21.
who, although working more slowly than the superior court (the standard legal channel providing for the seizure of property) allowed Bastien to recover the house in 1938.104

Like Moïse Gros Louis, some Innu used their homes, land, and other property to secure funds from wealthy band members. In both cases that have been found at Mashteuiatsh, loan recipients sought this money in order to outfit themselves for their winter hunt. In 1931, the HBC post manager at Pointe Bleue reported that, “Chas Boivin arrived last night so I went to see him. I spent all forenoon there grading his fur he had a good hunt nearly $3000.00. Chas Boivin explained to me that he owed Meridy Robertson about that amount and that Robertson had a guarantee on his house & land and that he would require all his fur to pay it but when his son Renée [sic] came down that he would be sure to pay what he owed us.”105 The next day, the post manager described a similar deal: “went to see Michel Dominique to try and collect part of his old Debt. He said he had only for about three hundred and Meridy Robertson & Chas Buckell had guarantees on his house & property so he would not have enough to pay me.”106 All parties to these deals were band members, with Robertson and Buckell both being relatively wealthy traders. Thus, as at Wendake, local elites took advantage of their Indian status to supply credit to other band members using the recipients’ “house & property” as collateral, a mechanism for securing repayment that was not available to Euro-Canadian merchants conducting business on the reserve and that contributed to the creation of distinct socioeconomic classes in both communities.


105 Tuesday, 9 June 1931, HBCA, B.329/a/14, p. 39-40, reel 1MA53.

106 Wednesday, 10 June 1931, HBCA, B.329/a/14, p. 40, reel 1MA53.
External Financial Institutions: Banks and Insurance

While the majority of Huron and Innu lending and financial needs were serviced within the community itself, the inhabitants of Wendake and Mashteuiatsh also conducted an impressive amount of business with external financial institutions. Chief among these were savings banks and life insurance companies, although members of both communities dealt with other types of financial institutions as well. In this sense, the Huron and the Innu resembled their Euro-Canadian neighbors who increasingly employed their revenue to generate interest and to ensure monetary security in the case of an accident.\(^\text{107}\)

At Wendake, both Ormond Picard and Alfred Sioui held life insurance policies. Although the benefits provided by Picard’s policy are unknown, Alfred Sioui’s widow received $1,000 from his insurer upon her husband’s death in 1910.\(^\text{108}\) While only these two instances of Huron life insurance policies have been found during the period, this number appears to significantly underestimate the number of community members who purchased coverage. This is primarily due to the socioeconomic gap that separated Picard from Sioui. While the former was well educated and earned a significant income, the latter appears to have led a relatively modest life. Thus, it seems likely that several other Huron, both among the economic elite (e.g. the Bastien family) and the “people,” also purchased life insurance. In addition to life insurance, at least a portion of the residents of Wendake also insured their homes against fire.\(^\text{109}\)


\(^{108}\) On Sioui’s policy, see Antoine O. Bastien to J.D. McLean, 20 January 1911, LAC, RG10, vol. 2567, file 115,520-1A, reel C-11240. For information on Picard’s life insurance, see Adélard L’Heureux to Mrs. L.P.O. Picard, 19 May 1931, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, File 7.

\(^{109}\) As noted above, Ludger Bastien required Moïse Gros Louis to insure his home to the value of the mortgage ($550) supplied by Bastien.
According to the Indian agent at Mashteuiatsh, several Innu purchased life insurance in addition to other forms of coverage, while also belonging to fraternal mutual aid societies. In 1911, he reported to his superiors in Ottawa that, “Fourteen houses are under fire insurance to the extent of from $500 to $2,000. Five Indians have their lives insured for amounts of from $1,000 to $3,600, and pay their premiums faithfully. Others belong to mutual benefit societies; some of them have even received the benefit this year of assistance in case of illness.”

This belief in insurance remained in effect throughout the period, with the Innu continuing to pay premiums even at the height of the Depression. In 1935, the HBC’s post manager wrote in his post journal that, “J.B. Leveillé of Metropolitan Life in afternoon to collect on some of his Indian policies.” Both the Innu and the Huron, then, used money to prepare themselves for the risks of the future, once again demonstrating the incommensurability of the discourse of improvidence and actual Aboriginal practice.

The residents of Mashteuiatsh and Wendake also conducted business with banks, all of which were located off-reserve. Among the Huron, for example, Pierre Albert Picard held an account at the Bank of Montreal and Harry Gros Louis, Sr. had money deposited at the Loretteville branch of the Banque provinciale du Canada. Once again, the bank accounts reported by the documentary record certainly only represent a fraction of those who placed their money in these institutions. In Mashteuiatsh, the Indian agent wrote in 1904: “I know two or three Indians who have fairly considerable amounts deposited in the savings branch of the Banque Nationale at Roberval. Last Easter an Indian took advantage of a trip to Roberval, where he sold a lot of skins and deposited in the savings bank the sum of one hundred dollars,”

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111 Friday, 8 March 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/17, p. 56, reel IMA53.

112 Copy of Check from Harry Gros-Louis, Sr. to Paul Lesage, 31 December 1936, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05 and Antonio Falardeau to [Pierre] Albert Picard, 24 May 1932, ACNHW, P2-S3-A13, File B-2-16. Picard used this account to pay for his brother Ormond’s funeral expenses. In the margin of this letter requesting payment, Picard wrote: “Ce 6 juin 1932 Compte d’Antonio Falardeau payé par moi cheque sur la Banque de Montréal.”
which he will apply during the course of the summer to the building of a house.\textsuperscript{113} Over the following several years, the Indian agent would make similar observations indicating that banking at Roberval had become a permanent fixture of Innu life.\textsuperscript{114}

At least one Huron involved himself with financial institutions to a greater extent by investing in foreign bonds. In 1927, Pierre Albert Picard purchased from the National Bank of Canada 550 German Reichsmark securities.\textsuperscript{115} Again, given that their familial fortune dwarfed that of the Picards during the period, the Bastiens almost certainly held similar investments. As a result, although impossible to truly gauge the depth of Huron interaction with the financial sector based solely on these scattered archival traces, it seems likely that Wendake’s bourgeoisie spent at least a portion of their money on securities and other investments during the period.

First Nations Consumption during the 1930s and 1940s: Cash, Credit, and Vouchers

During the first half of the twentieth century, retailing in Wendake, Mashteuiatsh, and Moose Factory underwent major changes. While the Cree had access to multiple merchants in the immediate vicinity of the HBC posts in western James Bay for the first time, the Innu and Huron were exposed to an effervescent retail sector that provided consumers with increasing options. Although the documentary record rarely makes explicit reference to money, it clearly played a central role in consumption. Indeed, as the years passed, cash


\textsuperscript{114} For example, in 1911 he wrote: “Some have deposits in the bank, others do business by notes, just like white people.” Armand Tessier, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 23 May 1911, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1911, part I, p. 52. See also, Armand Tessier, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 11 June 1910, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1910, part I, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{115} [?], Banque Canadienne Nationale, to P. A. Picard, 7 October 1927 and [?], Exchange Agent, Banque Canadienne Nationale, to Pierre Albert Picard, 8 October 1927, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 6.
became increasingly ubiquitous among Amerindians. This process opened new horizons to the members of all three First Nations, allowing them to spend their money in novel ways on an array of consumer goods that had previously been unavailable. It also had the effect of reinforcing the power of many of those individuals already identified as economically central in the context of employment and the financial sector. However, the absence of currency also sometimes provided Amerindians with power in the retail sector. Indeed, Mashteuiatsh’s and Moose Factory’s consumers wielded the most economic clout precisely when they possessed the least amount of cash as a result of the ferocious retail competition that this limited resource inspired. This chapter focuses on the 1930s and 1940s because these decades witnessed important changes in retailing in all three communities and because the documentary record provides greater detail concerning consumption during this period than any other prior to mid-century. It describes the ways in which Cree, Huron, and Innu ably employed their purchasing power during the period to shape the communities in which they lived, clearly demonstrating yet again their talent for effectively disposing of their income, whether it came in the form of cash, credit, or state-backed vouchers, even in the extremely challenging context of the Great Depression.

The first half of the twentieth century witnessed stiff competition among retailers in Mashteuiatsh. During this period, a total of seven stores operated at different times on the reserve, with at least three always simultaneously active. The most important of these were those of the HBC, Meridy Robertson, and Revillon Frères.116 At the same time, itinerant

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116 Meridy Robertson had opened his store by March 1900. J.A. Macrae, Report to J.D. McLean, 7 April 1902, LAC, RG10, vol. 3048, file 237,660, part 6, reel C-11316. By 1939, Tommy Robertson had taken over this business and continued to run it through at least the late 1940s. Tuesday, 21 November 1939, HBCA, B.329/a/22, p. 33, reel IMA54 and Bill from Robertson & Son to Achille de la Boissière, 24 August 1948, LAC, RG10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555. Revillon Frères opened an on-reserve post during the first decade of the twentieth century which, by autumn 1933, it had relocated to Roberval. Friday, 20 October and Thursday, 16 November 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 24 and 29, reel IMA53. The other stores (three of which were run by Inn) were those of Charles Simeon (active at the turn of the century), the Indian agent, W.T.A. Donohue (1900-1902), William Connolly (ca. 1911), and Joseph Kurtness (ca. 1924-?).
merchants frequently visited Mashteuiatsh, both from stores in Roberval and elsewhere.117 Prior to the late 1920s, the retail environment appears to have been relatively stable, with the Innu spending the money they earned generally as they saw fit. However, the massive decrease in revenue caused by the failing fur market of the late 1920s and the widespread economic difficulties of the 1930s prompted an unprecedented struggle among stores and travelling salesmen. The shrinking money supply that resulted proved central to a struggle between retailers as they scrambled to collect what little cash circulated while continuing to sell on credit and also accepting payment in kind. Thus, although the period was certainly difficult, Amerindian consumers found themselves with options they had not previously had.

In March 1932, the HBC entered the increasingly lucrative door-to-door sales market in an effort to compete with storekeepers from Roberval who conducted business in this manner on the reserve several times a week.118 The program started slowly and after nearly two months the HBC still struggled to gain meaningful access to the market. George Fowlie, the company’s post manager at Mashteuiatsh, claimed that, “Boutet a Roberval merchant used to come only twice a week and now he is coming four times a week to try and cut us out. Leclerc is also passing three times a week and selling very cheap, so these two merchants are getting the most of what little cash there is.”119 In addition to selling goods at lower prices than those offered by the HBC, these traveling salesmen also employed a preferred customer program. Fowlie reported that, “the Roberval merchants have again lowered their prices on several lines, and besides are giving a present for each purchase of 25.00. They are issuing cards and they punch the value of each purchase and when the total amounts to 25.00 the customer gets a present of 6 cups & saucers or the choice of several

117 Traveling salesmen had been present in Mashteuiatsh since the beginning of the century and maintained a presence there throughout the period. See, for example, W.T.A. Donohue to the Secretary of Indian Affairs, 12 June 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 3021, file 223,390, reel C-11312 and Monday, 25 June 1928, HBCA, B.329/a/13, f. 3r, reel 1MA53.

118 Tuesday, 8 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 1, reel 1MA53.

119 Wednesday, 27 April 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 13, reel 1MA53.
other pieces of crockery."\textsuperscript{120} The HBC responded the following autumn by instituting a rewards program of its own. "In order to encourage the local inhabitants to trade with us instead of the Roberval merchants we are offering attractive premiums to all customers (credit or cash) who purchase to the extent of $100.00. Housewives are especially interested in this scheme."\textsuperscript{121} However, this approach failed to turn the tide in the HBC's favor and by late 1933, the company had added circulars advertising special sales to its retailing arsenal.\textsuperscript{122} Although the company's first sale did not generate as much cash revenue as Fowlie had hoped, the post manager planned "to make these special sales a weekly event."

The use of these modern marketing techniques, however, did not address the primary problem facing retailers during the period: the marked lack of hard currency caused by widespread unemployment.\textsuperscript{124} In this context, some Innu chose to remain in the bush rather than come to Mashteuiatsh where they would be unable to make purchases for want of cash while others dealt with merchants who accepted non-monetary payment. In 1932, Fowlie wrote that, "Conditions are very bad here, the people have no money. The halfbreeds exist by selling wood to Roberval Merchants and getting provisions in exchange. Nobody at Pointe Bleue has been able to get employment with the lumber companies this year which is affecting our trade. Very few Indians are coming down to Pointe Bleue, most of them come down to the nearest settlement and sell their furs and buy a few provisions & return to their

\textsuperscript{120} Tuesday, 15 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 3, reel 1MA53.

\textsuperscript{121} Friday, 7 October 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 38, reel 1MA53.

\textsuperscript{122} In November 1933, the HBC's post journal records that, "Staff preparing circulars for special sale which we hope to make on Saturday." Wednesday, 8 November 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 27, reel 1MA53.

\textsuperscript{123} Saturday, 11 November 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 28, reel 1MA53.

\textsuperscript{124} For an analysis of similar marketing strategies employed by retailers in the United States in their efforts to overcome the dearth of cash during the Depression, see Sarah Elvins, \textit{Sales & Celebrations: Retailing and Regional Identity in Western New York State, 1920-1940}, Athens, Ohio University Press, 2004, p. 106-38.
hunting grounds. The HBC dealt with this situation by using its size and financial reserves to eliminate competitors that could not weather a prolonged price war. In April 1934, Fowlie reported that, “Our system of passing round houses is serving a useful purpose. We have had to cut our prices very low and our Roberval Competitors are becoming discouraged. One has abandoned and the two who remain do not appear to be making anything. We have the greater part of what little trade there is to be had in the village.” The HBC pressed ahead with this policy, allowing it to slowly squeeze its competitors from the reserve’s retail sector. Despite such dominance, the HBC appears to have been unable to turn a profit on Innu consumption through the end of the decade as a result of the slumping fur market and the continued lack of hard currency in the village. In August 1935, after all of the returned hunter-trappers had sold their winter catch, Fowlie reported that an employee “went round the village interviewing the people with outstanding accounts. Everybody was very polite and promised to do their best, but all the money he collected was five dollars from Phylomène Paul.” At the same time, the increasing ease and rapidity of travel to Roberval provided the Innu with access to stores in neighboring Euro-Canadian towns, providing them with less expensive goods and additional lines of credit.

125 Thursday, 10 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 2, reel 1MA53.

126 Saturday, 21 April, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 66, reel 1MA53.

127 In 1935, Fowlie again claimed that this policy was a success. “Compared with previous years, business is very quiet. The Indians have practically no money & cannot spend freely. Purchases are confined to the strict necessities and living is from hand to mouth. Roberval merchants who sell on the Reserve must also be feeling the lack of ready money for we do not see their wagons in the village as often as formerly.” Monday, 17 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 6, reel 1MA53.

128 Saturday, 31 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 26, reel 1MA53. The currency shortage at Mashteuiatsh continued for several more years. In 1937, for example, H.R. Cummings, an HBC employee, claimed that there was “No cash in the village at all this season.” Monday, 14 June 1937, HBCA, B.329/a/20, p. 3, reel 1MA54.

129 In 1935, Fowlie reported that “Louis Paul... has been getting his supplies from Grenier at Roberval because we sell to [sic] dear.” Friday, 30 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 26, reel 1MA53.
By the summer of 1936, state work-for-welfare programs began injecting a modest amount of cash into Mashteuiatsh’s economy. In August, Fowlie wrote: “Business fairly brisk due to money circulating in village from the few days work which have taken place on roads.”\textsuperscript{130} Despite the healthy tourist trade in “Moccasins and Indian Handicrafts” carried on by the HBC, the post’s sales figures remained well below those of the early 1920s, suggesting that the Innu continued buying only essentials while doing business at several different stores.\textsuperscript{131} By the end of the decade, the HBC’s retail business at Pointe Bleue appears to have improved both with respect to tourists and the Innu. The outbreak of World War II caused prices to skyrocket and led to brief provision shortages in Mashteuiatsh.\textsuperscript{132} However, the situation rapidly righted itself and although prices undoubtedly remained high, the HBC post journal makes no mention of difficulties after the early fall. Moreover, the general economic situation on the reserve had improved markedly by 1940, with the HBC’s manager, H.B. Frankland, noting in June that, with only a handful of exception, trappers were “paying 100% as they arrive.”\textsuperscript{133}

Thus the HBC, Roberval merchants, and presumably Meridy Robertson\textsuperscript{134} pursued Innu dollars through the use of increasingly sophisticated marketing techniques. This struggle reached its height during the 1930s, when the reserve’s money supply was nearly depleted. This meant that the Innu’s relative power as consumers actually reached its climax as their

\textsuperscript{130} Monday, 17 August 1936, HBCA, B.329/a/19, p. 15, reel 1MA54.

\textsuperscript{131} Throughout the summer and autumn of 1936, the post effected large sales to tourists. See, for example, Saturday, 19 and Monday, 21 September 1936, HBCA, B.329/a/19, p. 21-2, reel 1MA54.

\textsuperscript{132} Just after the the outbreak of hostilities the post manager reported that it had become “practically impossible to obtain flour and other staple groceries.” Wednesday, 6 September 1939, HBCA, B.329/a/22, p. 20, reel 1MA54. Although the HBC continued to outfit Innu trappers, in the short term the provision shortage forced some to significantly delay their departure. “Francois Germain left for his hunting grounds after waiting a week or two for his flour.” Thursday, 14 September 1939, HBCA, B.329/a/22, p. 21, reel 1MA54.

\textsuperscript{133} Tuesday, 11 June 1940, HBCA, B.329/a/23, p. 1, reel 1MA54.

\textsuperscript{134} Unfortunately, the sources consulted make little mention of Robertson’s retail practices.
access to currency approached its nadir. As prices fell and credit and in-kind payment replaced cash, retailers competed for decreasing supplies of money while hoping to weather the economic downturn and be repaid thereafter by a clientele grateful for having been supported through hard times. In this sense, the resumption from 1940 of full payment by the Innu of the credit they had received and the persistence of Robertson’s store throughout the period suggests that this gamble ultimately proved successful for retailers. At the same time, the Innu demonstrated an ability to take advantage of market conditions in order to stretch their extremely modest income to the limit, relying on small amounts of both state assistance and private credit to make ends meet.135

The Huron received far higher levels of per capita assistance during the 1930s than the Innu. However, the form in which Indian Affairs supplied this relief along with the absence of a competitive retailing environment similar to that of Mashteuiatsh meant that the residents of Wendake had less room to maneuver. By the 1930s, the Huron could choose between Euro-Canadian stores neighboring the reserve and three establishments in Wendake itself. Gustave Gros Louis, Paul Sioui, and Maurice E. and Ludger Bastien owned the stores situated in Wendake while Albert Rochette owned a competing establishment in Loretteville. However, these retailers did not possess identical economic power. Although little is known about Rochette’s store, the Bastiens enjoyed access to their family’s capital reserves and political weight, allowing them to dominate sales to on-reserve consumers. In the context of the Depression, they did so largely through control of relief vouchers provided by Indian Affairs which, according to Sioui and Gros Louis, had become more important than cash in the local economy because they formed “la presque totalité du pouvoir d’achat d’épicerie de

135 As mentioned in Chapter Six, the Innu of Mashteuiatsh received extremely limited relief funds during the Depression as a result of Indian Affairs’ claim, made in complete ignorance of environmental and market conditions, that subarctic populations had easy access to subsistence resources in the bush.
Through early 1930, Indian Affairs had provided relief vouchers to destitute Huron through Albert Rochette’s store. However, shortly thereafter, the state began issuing vouchers to Huron-owned stores alone (and primarily that run by the Bastiens), in the process turning them into a major subject of political debate. Maurice E. Bastien explained that the dominance of state-funded relief enjoyed by his store, “Au Bon Marché,” provided a simple demonstration of the law of supply and demand, given that Huron beneficiaries were free to choose the establishment for which their vouchers were issued. He argued that, “la plupart choisirent le ‘Bon Marché, [sic] parce que il y avait un plus grand assortiment et à des meilleurs prix, cette épicerie étant affiliée aux ‘Epiciers Unis’ de Québec.” However, an analysis of the prices charged by the three stores for common consumer goods calls Bastien’s assertion into question.

On 15 September 1929, Pierre Albert Picard compiled a comparative price list for the three on-reserve stores. This document, which contains ten different products, allows for two observations: first, the Bastiens carried a wider array of merchandise and, second, the prices charged by Sioui and Gros Louis for the items they carried were always inferior to those of “Au Bon Marché.” In this case, Indian Affairs’ policy of issuing a single voucher for a single store to all households that received relief appears to have imposed a decision on

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136 Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui to J.F. Pouliot, M.P., 2 January 1933, in “Lettres que nous recevons,” Le Soleil, 2 février 1933, p. 4. For more on the store owners’ political struggle over Indian Affairs vouchers, see Chapter Six.

137 For example, Bill for purchases made by Madame George Gros-Louis from Albert Rochette, 15 October 1929 and Bill for purchases made Joseph Sioui from Albert Rochette, 15 February 1930, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 12.

138 M. E. Bastien, Agent des Hurons de Lorette, to M. le Rédacteur, 6 February 1933, in “Lettres que nous recevons,” Le Soleil, 10 February 1933, ACNHW, P2-S3-B2, File B-2-19.

139 Picard’s list gives an average price of $0.32 for goods at Gros-Louis’s store and an average of $0.34 for those sold by Sioui with a price differential with “Au Bon Marché” of $0.06 for the first store and $0.03 for the second. In other words, Gros Louis’s clients saved almost one-fifth and those of Sioui slightly less than one-tenth of the price charged by the Bastiens. Price List for Au Bon Marché, Gustave [Gros Louis], and Paul [Sioui], 7 October 1929, BANQ-Q, P882, S1, SS2, File 12.
beneficiaries between lower prices and better selection. The vast majority of Huron chose the latter, in the process providing the Bastien brothers with control of much of the Huron’s purchasing power. Of course, given that the Bastiens also controlled the majority of the limited number of on-reserve jobs, unemployed Huron may also have chosen to use their vouchers at “Au Bon Marché” in the hopes of earning some much-needed monetary income.

Relief vouchers continued to displace money in Wendake’s economy through the end of the 1930s. By the middle of the decade, Harry Gros Louis, Sr. also operated a store on the reserve. In 1936, with his business in dire straits, Gros Louis contacted the MPPs for Quebec-Montmorency and Quebec County to request their assistance “en obtenant du Département des Affaires Indiennes quelquels pensions que celui-ci accorde aux Indiens-Hurons, de Lorette comme RELIEF, ceci me permettrait de faire des affaires avec mon magasin.” Although the result of Gros Louis’s efforts is unknown, his letters underline the importance of vouchers to both Huron businessmen and consumers.

By 1941, a French Canadian had begun operating a store on Gros Louis’s property. This raised the political issue of whether non-Huron should be allowed to compete in Wendake’s retail market. In May, Georges Picard, himself a storekeeper in Wendake, asked the band council to ensure that, “le nouveau locataire de la Maison d’Harry Gros Louis, Mr. Guay soit assermenté ainsi que Mr. Harry Gros Louis Sr. afin d’établir si le commerce qu’il exploite est ou sa propriété ou celle de Mr. Harry Gros Louis. Au cas ou il serait la propriété de Mr. Guay, le dit Mr. Picard demande qu’il soit discontinué, vu qu’il n’est pas Indien et

140 “Au Bon Marché” controlled approximately 90% of Wendake’s relief budget. According to Sioui and Gros Louis, their stores received $46 and $62 per month in vouchers at the beginning of 1933. Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui to J.F. Pouliot, M.P., 2 January 1933, in “Lettres que nous recevons,” Le Soleil, 2 février 1933, p. 4. Indian Affairs distributed a total of $11,285.59 in relief in the village during 1932-3. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1933, partie I, p. 6. In other words, the Bastiens received $832 in monthly vouchers from a total of $940.

141 Emphasis in original. Harry Gros-Louis, Sr. to Wilfrid Lacroix, 27 March 1936 and Harry Gros-Louis, Sr. to Frank Byrne, 28 March 1936, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-01.
Although the outcome of Picard’s request is unknown, he was not alone in promoting this form of economic nationalism in the village. In his 1945 sociological study of the parish of Loretteville (which included Wendake), Gaston Blanchet claims that Jules Sioui, an “épicier-barbier, dans son ardeur, refusa pendant un certain temps de vendre aux Canadiens-français, sous prétexte qu’il ne vendait pas aux blancs. (Il a le mérite d’avoir établi la ‘vente chez nous’).” Although Sioui eventually dropped this policy for economic reasons (“il fait son profit avec les blancs”), its brief existence highlights the political importance that some Huron attached to money spent on consumer goods. This form of political action continued to be prevalent through the end of the decade. In 1946, the Huron band council passed a resolution barring from the village all traveling salesmen with the exception of those from Loretteville. This proposal, which Indian Affairs most likely accepted because it corresponded to the powers spelled out in the Indian Act, clearly demonstrates the political importance of supporting the local economy. Three years later, the council again considered charges brought by a band member, Harry Gros Louis, Sr., that an on-reserve place of business (a pool hall) was owned and operated by a Euro-Canadian instead of its apparent Huron proprietor, Claude Sioui. The council, however, found that Sioui was “le seul propriétaire,” and that the Euro-Canadian in

142 Minutes du conseil, 9 May 1941, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919-1949, p. 102, ACNHW.


144 Minutes du conseil, 27 November 1946, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919-1949, p. 156, ACNHW.

145 In 1932-3, Parliament amended the Indian Act in order to provide band councils with the power of “Regulating the operations of hawkers, peddlers or others coming on the reserve to sell, or take orders for, wares or merchandise.” Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend the Indian Act,” 1932-3, c. 42, s. 6. At the same time, this same power was provided to band councils who benefited from the Indian Advancement Act. Canada, Statutes, “An Act to Amend the Indian Act,” 1932-3, c. 42, s. 11.
question was “son employé seulement.”

Thus, during the 1940s, a form of economic nationalism became relatively widespread in Wendake, inspiring both the band council and individual band members to promote local business through a political agenda that might best be described as “buy and sell Huron.” Although the effects of this politico-economic campaign remain unclear, the renewed vigor during the 1930s and 1940s of certain band members’ political activity, most notably Jules Sioui’s pan-Indian activism and J. Arthur Vincent’s pursuit of specifically Huron land claims, clearly contributed to inspiring the movement’s political philosophy.

Thus, an analysis of consumption, like that performed in relation to finance and wage work, underlines the political and economic force exerted by the Bastien family in Wendake. Money, whether in the highly restricted form of relief vouchers or in the more widely accepted form of currency, provided the means by which this power was brought to bear. However, even though they dominated its deployment, the Bastiens never enjoyed a monopoly over such power and other Huron made use of money for their own ends. Thus, Jules Sioui and the band council sought to use money as a means of excluding certain forms of Euro-Canadian participation in on-reserve consumption.

In comparison to Wendake and Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory remained a relative backwater in terms of retailing throughout the first half of the twentieth century. As a result, consumption formed a much less significant issue in monetary terms. The 1920s proved to be a turbulent period for Moose Factory’s fur trade and, therefore, for Cree consumption.

146 Minutes du conseil, 24 January 1949, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919-1949, p. 182, ACNHW.

147 On Sioui’s political activity during the 1940s, see Shewell, “Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism...” On Vincent’s land claims, see, for example, Paul Lesage to J. Arthur Vincent, 31 March 1936, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05. On the history of economic nationalism in the United States, which helps to situate Huron politico-economic activity in the larger North American context, see Dana Frank, Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism, Boston, Beacon Press, 1999.

148 For a more in-depth analysis of changes in the region’s market during the period, see Chapter Five.
1925, the manager of the HBC’s James Bay District, George R. Ray, described the constancy of his Cree clientele: “Indian receipts are irregular, their consumption constant.” However, the rapidly declining value of furs on the world market during the second half of the decade led the Cree, like the Innu, to begin looking to retailers other than the HBC and Revillon Frères. By the end of the 1920s, the Cree traveled south more frequently to the railroad in search of both a greater selection of goods and lower prices. Simultaneously, independent traders visited Moose Factory more regularly, providing items that neither the HBC nor Revillon Frères sold (e.g. “fancy dry goods and fresh fruits”). In this sense, the Cree of Moose Factory benefited from increased competition between Euro-Canadian retailers for diminishing monetary resources. This process only accelerated following the completion of the railroad.

The T&NO arrived at Moosonee in 1931, bringing with it novel sources of goods while significantly lowering their price for Cree consumers. J.W. Anderson, manager of the HBC’s James Bay District from 1931 to 1937, later wrote that following the stock market crash and the opening of the railway, “Business was so poor that Moose Factory was practically the only post where we were selling merchandise in any considerable quantity, and there we had to dispose of it at fire sale prices!” In addition to lower prices, the railroad brought two independent stores to the area, bringing the total number of competing retailers to four and shifting consumer focus away from Moose Factory and to Moosonee.


152 Anderson, Fur Trader’s Story, p. 170.
(where both Revillon Frères and the new businesses were located). Revillon Frères ceased operations at Moosonee in 1936 and, by 1940, had been replaced by W.R. Cargill & Son, a general store and fur buyer owned and operated by a former HBC employee. During the same period, mail order also began making inroads at Moose Factory for the first time. According to Arthur J. Ray, Eaton's had been engaged in servicing those First Nations that lived in the vicinity of the railroad since the early 1920s. "By 1922 many line post managers complained that the T. Eaton Company was taking away the most lucrative aspects of the dry-goods trade." However, the Moose Factory market only became accessible to mail order after 1931, when trains permitted the regular shipment of bulky goods to the post. As we have already seen, those Cree who worked with anthropologist Regina Flannery during the 1930s appreciated being compensated for their time in cash because this allowed them to purchase goods by mail order from the T. Eaton Company at lower prices than those charged by the HBC. Cree consumers, then, like their Huron and Innu counterparts, made reasoned use of the retailing options open to them, supporting their families to the best of their ability, in the process forcefully countering the discourse of Aboriginal improvidence.

Money and Local Politics

While this chapter has occasionally evoked formal politics, it has yet to analyze money's political role in Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake in depth. Although

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156 Flannery, Ellen Smallboy, p. 4.
band councils and individual Amerindians wielded power through loans and consumption, money informed action that fell beyond the scope of the more traditionally economic. In this sense, currency relations also recast the political realm as traditionally defined. This section focuses on the local level in order to analyze the repercussions of certain state policies as well as the genesis of novel Indigenous approaches to politics as expressed through money-use. Once more it demonstrates that, despite the much greater force that the state and capital could bring to bear, First Nations, both collectively and individually, possessed definite monetary agency, allowing them to both explicitly contest external authority and implicitly reinforce local authority, the latter often as result of the former.

When the treaty negotiators sent by the federal and provincial states arrived in western James Bay in the summer of 1905, Cree notions of community were radically different from what they have since become. Although they had long frequented fur trade posts for a few weeks each summer, the Cree spent the vast majority of the year in small hunting groups made up of several related families that generally restricted their activities to a specific territory within a given river basin. 157 This meant that political organization at the national level remained relatively undeveloped. Nonetheless, the Cree did recognize leaders within the community. Robert John Renison, the Anglican missionary at Fort Albany in 1905 and later the Bishop of Moosonee, notes that while the concept of leadership was not foreign to the Cree, democracy was. Thus, the requirement that the Albany Cree elect a chief to negotiate Treaty No. 9 struck them as bizarre. “As long as a man is able to be a leader he is Chief to the Indian. The same is true of his dogs. There is always a Leader, who rules the pack, gets the best bones and the pick of everything.” 158 Despite the foreign nature of electoral politics, Renison writes that the Cree understood that the spoils would go to the victor. “It was said among the wigwams that the Chief of every band would wear a red coat,


that he would never work, that he would eat at the table of the Hudson's Bay Factor, that his credit would be good for any amount and that his wife would wear a hat. The fact that none of these things was true did not matter; they added zest to the election that was to take place.” 159 The Cree proceeded to vote as instructed, electing chiefs everywhere that the treaty party visited. At Moose Factory, Frederick Mark won the election and was joined on the band council by James Job, Simon Quachegan, and Simon Cheena. 160 Despite their mistaken ideas about the benefits of being chief, Renison writes that the Albany Cree were perfectly aware that the winner would reap significant material and symbolic capital. “The Chief was to be paid twenty dollars a year, and he was to be given a flag. Every six years he was to be given a new blue suit. Obviously he would be the most important person in his district.” 161 Thus, money played a central role in the introduction of an entirely new political system to western James Bay while reinforcing the authority of local leaders.

Elsewhere, money also served to endow elected officials with authority. Indeed, band councils’ continued deployment of monetary penalties to enforce their will during the first half of the twentieth century provided band members with evidence that these elected bodies possessed genuine power. Of course, given the extremely narrow legislative scope provided them by the Indian Act, band councils were only rarely capable of instituting monetary bylaws. In 1902, the Mashteuiatsh council passed a resolution naming Joseph Launière and Thommy Cleary road inspectors. The resolution charged these men with ensuring that the road crossing the reserve remained in good repair. Wherever Launière and Cleary deemed it necessary, the owners of lots adjacent to the road were required to perform maintenance work themselves. In order to provide the inspectors with a means of enforcing their decisions, the band council authorized them to fine residents who refused to cooperate.

159 Ibid, p. 63.

160 Although the treaty commissioners’ diary refers to Simon “Quatchequan,” the spelling used above is the variant used in present-day Moose Factory. Canada, The James Bay Treaty, Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) and Adhesions Made in 1929 and 1930, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, [1931] 1964, n.p.

161 Renison, One Day at a Time, p. 65.
"Inasmuch as it was difficult to get the roads repaired on the reserve voluntarily by those who are obliged to do so, the council... decided to impose a fine not exceeding $5 upon those, who having been warned on two consecutive occasions by the inspectors to repair their portion of the road will not act."162 At the end of the 1920s, the council renewed its use of potential fines or jail time in order to guarantee that band members effected the "upkeep of ditches, [and] roads... on their lands."163 Thus, money provided the council with coercive powers vis-à-vis intransigent band members, thereby reinforcing its political authority.

The Huron band council also employed monetary penalties to impose its policies and reinforce its authority. In 1936, the council passed four resolutions regarding the maintenance of public order and the suppression of blasphemy, each of which applied a cash fine to anyone contravening their articles. The first and the fourth resolutions imposed a $10 to $30 penalty or a prison sentence ranging from eight days to three months, depending on the place in which the convicted individual had contravened the bylaw. The second and third resolutions, on the other hand, dealt primarily with individuals impersonating or insulting the members of the band council. These resolutions again imposed a monetary penalty of $10 or from one to thirty days in jail.164 Through recourse to fines and imprisonment, then, the council sought to enforce a particular moral code within the limits of the reserve while simultaneously bolstering its authority with respect to rank and file band members.

In theory, money could also confer authority through its positive use as a reward. In 1946, the Mashteuiatsh band council attempted to employ money in precisely this way when it requested that Indian Affairs permit each councilor a $50 monthly salary. The resolution

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163 Resolution of the Pointe Bleue Band Council, 4 February 1929, LAC, RG10, vol. 7151, file 377/3-10, part 1, reel C-9685.

164 The third resolution also dealt with "vagabondage où toute sorte de scandaless en troublant la paix." Minutes du conseil, 13 July 1936, Bastien, *Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919-1949*, p. 42, ACNHW.
stated that the council made this request so that its members, being relieved of the need to secure a living through activities other than managing the band’s affairs, might remain on the reserve on a more permanent basis.\(^{165}\) The Indian agent contemptuously described the council’s request as a “ridiculous proposition.”\(^{166}\) Although this attempt certainly failed, the council’s intentions were clear: it sought to augment its clout among the Innu while providing the chief and councilors with a relatively comfortable living.

Indian Affairs supplied the vast majority of money employed on the local level for both administration and public works. Although the federal government held funds in trust for the majority of First Nations during the period, the ability of band councils to spend such money was circumscribed by Ottawa’s often invasive administrative practices and its general opposition to all but the most limited expenditure. In order to overcome this obstacle, band members occasionally raised money for political projects themselves. In 1903, a general meeting of the Mashteuiatsh Innu decided to build a new Roman Catholic cemetery on the reserve. It appointed a committee, composed of the chief Charles Jourdain, councilor Matthew Jourdain, and Joseph Kurtness, to collect the money needed from reserve residents for the purchase of the cemetery site from Luc Siméon and for the payment of fencing and other necessities.\(^{167}\) After having been informed of the council’s resolution by the Indian agent, the deputy superintendent general approved the project which was apparently completed as proposed.\(^{168}\) Although the band council would again work to enlarge the reserve’s Catholic cemetery in the 1930s and its Anglican counterpart in the 1940s, it did not

\(^{165}\) Resolution of the Pointe Bleue Band Council, 27 December 1946, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.

\(^{166}\) A. de la Boissière to the Secretary of Indian Affairs, 28 December 1946, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.

\(^{167}\) Minutes of a General Meeting of the Pointe Bleue Montagnais Band, 6 July 1903, LAC, RG10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555.

\(^{168}\) Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to A. Marcoux, 22 July 1903, LAC, RG10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555.
attempt to finance the projects through voluntary contributions of band members, preferring to request that Indian Affairs grant it access to band funds.\textsuperscript{169}

This practice of sidestepping the state through fundraising for political purposes affected the authority of both local politicians and Indian Affairs. While the Department had not opposed the application of donated money in the creation of a cemetery, it did object to its use in supporting Aboriginal activism. During the mid-1920s, Joseph Kurtness, a World War I veteran and the chief of the Innu of Mashteuiatsh, had begun aggressively promoting his own interests and those of the reserve community through trips to Ottawa paid for by local fundraisers. In July 1923 and 1924, the chief held dances on the reserve in order to raise money for his activities.\textsuperscript{170} In 1924, the Indian agent, Armand Tessier, informed the Department that Kurtness had organized a fundraising dance on the reserve “to draw a fairly good amount of money from the dancers to allow him to go to Ottawa.” The agent clearly perceived this activity as a threat to his own authority, reporting that, “I am told that he made the Indians believe that by going to Ottawa, with his authority as chief, he would force the Department to grant him immediately a lot of things.” According to Tessier, the chief had been contaminated by the radical politics of another Quebec reserve and had begun attempting to infect the other Innu. “[H]e went some time ago to Caughnawaga to inspire himself returning with barbarian ideas with which our Indians were not familiar. He considers himself now as the highest authority on the reserve and the agent does not count.” The agent continued to charge Kurtness with corruption:

I learned from creditable sources that lately he granted a permit to a man named Larouche to show moving pictures on the Reserve on the condition that Larouche pay him a certain sum of money which he pocketed. The same thing happened in


\textsuperscript{170} While the reference to the dance’s purpose in 1923 is vague, the repetition of the event in 1924 suggests that both dances’ goal was identical. In July 1923, the HBC’s post manager wrote: “The Indian Chief is having a Dance this Evening.” Wednesday, 18 July 1923, HBCA, B.329/a/8, p. 5, reel 1MA53.
connection with another man named De Lamarre who came here to give an exhibition of strength. The Chief made him pay the sum of $5.00 for permission to give an exhibition of two hours in a barn. He told these people that he was the grand chief and the only man who could grant them permission to come on the reserve and that he would give such permissions only for money.\footnote{A. Tessier to J.D. McLean, 23 July 1924, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.}

Tessier, then, portrayed Kurtness as undermining his authority and that of the Department. Indian Affairs responded by reprimanding the chief in writing, threatening his dismissal, and reminding Kurtness that his political power was wholly dependent on the Indian agent. "You will take no action whatever in the management of the affairs of your band without consulting the Indian Agent, who, you must not forget, is the official representative of the Department on the Reserve."\footnote{A.F. MacKenzie to Joseph Kurtness, 30 August 1924, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.} Kurtness rejected all of Tessier's charges, claiming that they were the product of "ceux qui font métier de collectionner des bagatelles pour monter des histoires."\footnote{Joseph Kurtness to A.F. MacKenzie, 25 October 1924, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.} Indian Affairs took no further action against Kurtness who remained chief until defeated by Xavier Gill in 1927.\footnote{Report of Constable Delvallet, Mounted Police, Pointe-Bleue, 17 July 1927, LAC, RG10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680.}

**Conclusion**

This chapter has analyzed the ways in which the Huron, Innu, and Cree made actual use of currency during the first half of the twentieth century. It demonstrates that during this period residents of all three communities employed money judiciously, whether in the form of wages, credit, insurance, or expenditure on consumer goods, in order to ensure their economic well being, both in the present and the future. However, in doing so, Amerindians
participated in the redistribution of power at the local level, most notably through the process of internal socioeconomic stratification that reshaped Wendake and, to a lesser extent, Mashteuiatsh. First Nations, though, were not the sole actors that contributed to these changes. Both capital, through the jobs it provided and the goods it sold, and especially the state, through the legislation it passed concerning Aboriginal peoples, were active participants in this process. Indeed, while the state sought to “protect” its wards, who it discursively defined as being inherently improvident, from those who wielded greater political and economic power, the legal framework that bureaucrats and legislators erected to do so contributed to reproducing these same inequalities within Native communities during the period. In this sense, the state’s essentialized Amerindian, a figure that while allegedly exhibiting improvidence also applied (according to official discourse) to all Aboriginal peoples, contributed, at least in socioeconomic terms, to increasing diversity within Wendake and Mashteuiatsh, thereby contradicting itself on the level of both form and content. In this sense, Huron, Cree, and Innu monetary practice, using material and abstract currency alike, demonstrates the fallacy of official discourse and the oversimplification involved in claims that Amerindians form or formed an undifferentiated whole.
Conclusion

This dissertation has traced the political dimensions of First Nations money-use in the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Canadian colonialism. Ultimately, it argues that money's role in the process through which Amerindians found themselves increasingly marginalized by Europeans and their descendants in economic, political, geographical, and social terms was never singular, as actors made use of it in a variety of contexts to effect a variety of outcomes. Indeed, this study demonstrates that between the 1820s and 1950 First Nations frequently exerted force through currency both individually and collectively. They did this in spite of Euro-Canadians' growing control of much of the northern half of North America's land, resources, and labor power, in the process shaping in part both their internal and external relations. Moreover, this study demonstrates that the state's implementation of policy based on the conviction that Amerindians, as a general rule, formed an improvident mass contributed to providing certain band members with monetary power that, in turn, played an important role in the socioeconomic stratification of Aboriginal communities. Throughout the period, however, the "improvident Indian" existed first and foremost in state discourse and not in Aboriginal reality, as both authorities in Ottawa and Indian agents in the field asserted Amerindians' incapacity to manage monetary affairs. This discursive refrain contributed to both the justification of the state's relationship with First Nations and, at least in the case of Wendake, the economic advancement of Aboriginal elites. This second observation points to the importance of class formation among First Nations while suggesting that Indian Affairs' role in this transformation may help to explain the absence of any criticism of state policy on the part of Aboriginal socioeconomic elites who materially benefitted from assertions of generalized improvidence.1

1 Although beyond the scope of this study, the increasing traction attained by Aboriginal critiques of Indian Affairs' policies during the second half of the twentieth century appears to be linked to the growing role in mainstream Canadian society of Amerindians who were not members of their band's socioeconomic or political elite. For the emergence of this phenomenon in Wendake just prior to mid-century, see Hugh Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-1944," Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 211-42.
The present study has examined these issues from a dual bottom-up and top-down perspective, integrating the study of local experience with that of large-scale political and economic factors. At the same time, it has engaged in both discursive and material analysis. Together, these approaches provide a general portrait of Canadian colonialism's monetary dimension while remaining sensitive to local and regional phenomena that may or may not have been generalized throughout the country, demonstrating the ways in which a global process can encompass diverse and sometimes contradictory elements. As a result, both the shared experiences of the Huron of Wendake, the Moose Factory Cree, and the Innu of Mashteuiatsh and those that set them apart from each other serve to complicate the narrative of capital and state expansion as seen from "on high." Rather than assuming colonialism's efficacy by relating its monetary history solely in terms of either the actions or the discourse of extra-regional institutions, this approach requires the comparison of global and local experience and discourse. Ultimately, it underlines colonialism's discursive force which, in the present case, allowed it to theoretically integrate diverse realities into overarching political, economic, and legal structures, while suggesting that such global factors may have influenced everyday life among First Nations in very different ways from those often claimed by both historical actors and the historiography.

Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, European political economists solidly situated North America's native inhabitants at the bottom of the evolutionary ladder with respect to money-use. Beginning with Locke and continuing through Marx and John Stuart Mill, thinkers considered money to have spontaneously developed as a means of overcoming the inherent inefficiency of pre-monetary exchange. The "barter fable," classical economics' speculative explanation of the development of money, combined with widespread belief in the inherent superiority of precious metal-based currencies to portray those societies that lacked such monetary media as necessarily inferior to the more "developed" economies of Europe. In this sense, the intellectual environment in which colonists, the state, capital, and First Nations interacted during the period represented Amerindians as monetarily primitive and emphasized the self-evidently "superior" nature of systems of exchange based on European currency.
While thinkers formulated monetary theory, thereby reinforcing the common conception of Aboriginal peoples as being "prehistoric," imperial bureaucrats, European colonists, and their descendents adapted this vision born of conjectural history to their relations with British North America's First Nations. Indeed, the debates concerning the proposed monetization of Indian presents during the 1820s and 1830s provide a striking illustration of how preconceived notions combined to shape novel state discourse. In the context of these debates, colonial authorities cast monetary payments in lieu of in-kind presents as being dangerous to the interests of both the imperial treasury and Amerindians themselves due to the widely accepted assertion that Aboriginal peoples tended to spend all of their money on alcohol. Officials reinforced this vision by drawing a parallel between the urban poor, commonly depicted as improvident and therefore singularly incapable of handling cash, and Natives whom they claimed exhibited many of the same deficiencies. This argument owed much of its purchase to older stereotypes of the "poor Indian" while also benefiting from the general intellectual climate created by Adam Smith's assertion that "every prudent man" realized the worth of precious-metal-based currency. Rather than possessing an economy that occupied a level comparable to that of Europe or its overseas colonies, First Nations remained in the eyes of colonial commentators beholden to the cumbersome system of barter from which, according to contemporaneous specialists, money had developed. In this sense, colonial authorities and their superiors in London believed that they could not reasonably expect the "improvident Indian" to manage his own monetary affairs, laying the ideological groundwork for a significantly expanded state presence in everyday Aboriginal life.

While this debate unfolded, however, the Indian Department, the agency charged with managing the imperial state's relations with First Nations, was in the process of undergoing deep budget cuts that severely handicapped its ability to implement a program corresponding to this newfound ideological orientation. However, during the 1850s, following an extended period of retrenchment in which the state found itself forced to rely on private efforts to encourage Aboriginal "civilization," colonial legislators began altering the legal framework within which the Department functioned, providing it with new powers, a new mandate, and a new means of justifying its own existence, all of which were partially based on the "improvident Indian." After the transfer of authority over Indian Affairs from
London to the Province of Canada in 1860, this legitimacy formed the foundation for the massive growth in personnel and geographic reach that the Department experienced following the purchase of Rupert's Land and the signature of the first seven Numbered Treaties. From 1869, Parliament accorded increasing authority to the Department of Indian Affairs, providing the agency with a series of theoretical powers through which it could, first, protect and guide First Nations, groups it held suffered from a marked lack of foresight, and, second, simultaneously prepare them for assimilation into the Canadian body politic. In this sense, the assertion of Aboriginal peoples' improvident nature, articulated in the context of high-level debates on the monetization of Indian presents and maintained both through the powers that Parliament afforded Indian Affairs and this institution's apparently humane goal of assimilation, underlay (and continue to underlie) departmental claims to legitimacy.

At the same time, the state greatly increased the overall amount of cash in circulation among First Nations through its monetization of treaty payments. However, this rare case of state provision of hard currency to Amerindians arose from obligation rather than discretion, explaining the gap between treaty practice and the state's rhetorical emphasis on Aboriginal improvidence. Whereas from 1850 treaties signed by authorities and First Nations required the use of cash, the funds the Department held in trust either from Parliament or for individual bands carried no such requirement. Thus, officials rarely used the monies on which they could draw to supply Amerindians with cash, arguing that Aboriginal improvidence necessitated strict supervision on their part (a claim which reinforced Indian Affairs' raison d'être), while internally and externally portraying treaty payments in terms that corresponded to any other market transaction (since the state had purchased lands from First Nations, it provided them with cash in return).

Despite the discursive refrain of Aboriginal improvidence and the marked growth in legal authority, geographic reach, and personnel that the Department underwent during the final third of the nineteenth century, the state's monetary practice in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake remained extremely discreet throughout the century. Although by the 1860s the Huron had lost the limited autonomous control over natural resources they had enjoyed since 1840 along with the funding that this system provided for independent political action, Indian Affairs only rarely used the newfound powers it gained in this instance or as a result of
legislative intervention to directly affect money-use on the ground in either Mashteuiatsh or Wendake during the century. Instead, elected members of both the Huron and Innu band councils made sustained political use of money through the end of the century in order to support their political authority, with respect to both local rivals and the state. At the same time, authorities often proved incapable of intervening in even the most obvious cases of local political money-use, suggesting that money primarily formed a rhetorical rather than a material tool for the state during the period. In Wendake, for example, the agent’s clear contravention of regulations through the maintenance of a general store and the sale of goods on credit to the reserve’s residents underlines the limits of the Department’s monetary control and the need to situate policy and practice in the same analytical framework.

The power that commerce and politics together afforded the Huron agent reflects the development of money-use in both Mashteuiatsh and Wendake during the nineteenth century. Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, a region in which the state leased monopoly rights in the fur trade to a succession of capital interests through the middle of the century, effectively illustrates this phenomenon. These companies combined their political and economic power to control the monetary system throughout the region into the 1840s. Although the HBC ultimately succumbed to the pressure of colonization and the massive increase in the circulation of publicly-issued currency that accompanied it, it continued whenever possible to force the Innu to accept payment for their fur catch in abstract accounting currency well into the twentieth century. Such political power exerted through money applied to Wendake as well, although there band members rather than external capital interests used currency to strengthen their position. Among the Huron, two families benefitted from manufacturing-based capital accumulation, allowing their members to occupy particularly influential political posts while continuing to carry enormous economic weight in the community. These processes inscribed both the Huron and the Innu to an ever-greater degree in the regional and extra-regional economy, both allowing them to profit from and increasing their vulnerability to economic and political factors beyond their control. At the same time, they also highlight the incommensurability of official discourse, which held that Amerindian improvidence was universal, and the increasing stratification of Innu and Huron society, stratification which owed some of its existence to the local implementation of the national Indian policy from which this discourse emanated.
The process by which the state replaced private enterprise at the center of the monetary system began once more at Moose Factory at the turn of the twentieth century following the arrival of Revillon Frères and the signature of Treaty No. 9. Although the HBC, along with its French rival, would seek to undermine the free circulation of the Canadian dollar through the 1930s, such attempts would ultimately fail as the state entered the fur trade and the field of social assistance in the region *en force* during the 1940s. This action relieved the HBC of its more explicit political power (without necessarily decreasing its profits) while contributing, through fur purchases and family allowances, to a significant increase in monetary circulation among the Cree. These programs, along with veterans’ and dependents’ benefits, are indicative of Indian Affairs’ will to be its wards’ sole interlocutor within the state during the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, this attempt to justify its own existence by eliminating its state-based “competition” represents, along with its attempts to justify Amerindian ward status in general, the primary thrust of departmental involvement with Aboriginal money-use through the middle of the twentieth century. For the state, then, money formed first and foremost a discursive tool serving to found its actions with respect to First Nations in reason and nature.

When implemented, however, Indian Affairs’ official goals with respect to money-use frequently contributed to local conditions that deviated in important ways from both the state’s official objectives and its description of real-life Amerindians. For example, the state’s reticence to provide cash to welfare beneficiaries during the Depression allowed the Bastien family to reinforce its dominance in Wendake’s retail sector. Although impossible to determine the validity of contemporaneous charges of corruption, it is clear that the most economically and politically powerful Huron family benefitted enormously from the funds Indian Affairs provided in the form of vouchers to the community’s poorest members. State policy, then, materially encouraged socioeconomic stratification in Wendake despite ongoing adherence to a legal regime based on the claimed incapacity of Amerindians to manage their own affairs. Through the Indian Act, which effectively banned the seizure of on-reserve property for the repayment of Amerindian debt to non-Indians, state policy also created the preconditions for the emergence of local financial markets among First Nations, thereby favoring class formation. The Bastiens made use of this sector to strengthen their socioeconomic position in Wendake while Meridy Robertson did likewise in Mashteuiatsh.
Although classical and neo-classical economists often characterize money as the “neutral veil,” describing it as an object that allows individuals and groups to verbalize the value inherent in goods and services while not exerting any influence of its own, the present dissertation’s analysis suggests that this conception disposes too readily with questions of power. Rather than being neutral, money, like any other conduit through which people articulate social relations, permits some individuals, groups, and institutions to exert more force than others. This is made clear by the HBC’s maintenance of the subarctic’s monetary system during much of the period. Beaver currency, especially when restricted to account books, allowed the company to lock its Amerindian trading partners into a relationship built on credit/debit. This system served to guarantee repayment of debts in the absence of the courts which took on this charge among Euro-Canadians to the south. In this sense, money quantified relations between trading partners in a way that would not otherwise have been possible. Of course, this quantification primarily served the company’s interests rather than those of Amerindians, as price manipulation and the massive markup imposed on consumer goods make clear. Money’s power, though, remained in no way the exclusive preserve of capitalist enterprise; the state also exerted force through both abstract and material money. From its refusal to provide cash in lieu of presents through its use of treaty payments as a means of conducting censuses of populations that would have otherwise escaped its surveillance, the state employed money to create First Nations as objects of governance and to justify Indian Affairs’ institutional raison d’être on ideological grounds that were acceptable to Euro-Canadian society. Together, money’s use in these ways contributed to rendering Amerindians’ ward status apparently natural while reinforcing the claims of the British Empire and Canada to the territory they occupied.

Despite the apparent preponderance of the state in the monetary system, Huron, Cree, and Innu alike made daily use of money throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the absence of Indian Affairs’ involvement. Indeed, while officials employed harsh words when describing their wards’ ability to manage their own monetary affairs, Amerindians spent and received currency in similar ways to the Euro-Canadian population. Like their neighbors, Cree, Huron, and Innu earned wages, sold manufactured goods and agricultural produce, ran businesses, purchased provisions and other merchandise (both with cash and on credit), made charitable donations, and invested funds for the future. Although
the state theoretically oversaw many of these transactions through the powers afforded by the
Indian Act, in practice it rarely intervened. In this sense, Amerindians’ material experience of
money-use calls into question the historiography’s emphasis on the centrality of the legal
framework governing First Nations-state relations, suggesting that while the law certainly
influenced aspects of everyday life, its effects may have been more limited than generally
believed.

Although this study comes to a close in the immediate post-World War II period, the story of Aboriginal peoples, money, and colonialism does not end there. Indeed, as North America’s consumer society surged in the succeeding decades, First Nations found themselves subject to new state policies, now aimed at encouraging their “development” rather than their assimilation. As in earlier periods, the state instead of First Nations drove this policy and the discourse that surrounded it while controlling the financial and human resources used in its implementation, although it now employed university-trained social workers rather than the missionaries and bureaucrats of earlier generations to implement its policies and to ground their raison d’être in contemporary mores. While certain First Nations made windfalls from operating casinos and others did likewise through the sale of land and natural resources, the money generated in this way often failed to create the wealth and comfort that development discourse predicted. In this context, Indian Affairs continued to project an image of Amerindians as being improvident by nature, necessitating the agency’s existence and justifying its burgeoning version of the welfare state upon which First Nations were becoming increasingly dependent.\(^2\) At the same time, new corporate actors, such as hydroelectric, mining, and forestry companies, replaced the older fur trade enterprises as the primary capital interests with whom First Nations dealt. The market relations that developed from this change were not identical to those of preceding periods, as corporate actors, still

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dedicated to the generation of profit for extra-regional interests, now often failed to provide even the modest income their counterparts had previously supplied Amerindians. Thus, from 1950, First Nations became increasingly vulnerable to monetary force exerted by the state and capital. This context allowed Indian Affairs and others to continue asserting Amerindian improvidence even as increasingly vocal activisists challenged the marginal place generally accorded First Nations in Canadian society, indicating the ongoing discursive and material interaction of money and colonialism.
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