

UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL

UNVEILING THE RULES OF THE GAME IN A PLURALISTIC  
ORGANIZATION: THE STUDY OF THE ONGOING PROCESS OF RULE  
PROLIFERATION

THESIS

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JULIE RICARD

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DÉVOILER LES RÈGLES DU JEU DANS UNE ORGANISATION  
PLURALISTE : L'ÉTUDE DU PROCESSUS CONTINU DE LA PROLIFÉRATION  
DES RÈGLES

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JULIE RICARD

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## FOREWORD

I started this thesis with the hope of shedding light on the empirical phenomenon of rule proliferation. As a middle manager in a Canadian university for more than a decade, I witnessed the creation by the upper administration of several rules that did not seem to have the intended outcome. For instance, a rule or policy that aimed at reducing university spending ended up producing many unforeseen costs in managing the policy. Given the decentralized nature of universities, many inefficiencies had been generated long before the upper management had been alerted to organizational issues derived from the management of this rule. In organizations such as universities, these inefficiencies must often be compensated with additional resources, and therefore budgets increase. In good conscience, as a middle manager of a Canadian university, I perceived that we had a responsibility to manage budgets as efficiently as possible. Therefore, I pondered the appropriateness of unwillingly generating budget increases with inefficient organizational regulations.

As I questioned this systemic inadequacy in rulemaking, many questions arose. How can well-intentioned rules generate organizational inefficiencies? How should rules be designed to avoid most inefficiencies? As managers, do we resort to rulemaking too much? When is it viable and appropriate to resort to rulemaking?

Consequently, I set out to understand the phenomenon of rule proliferation to shed light on this primary issue hoping to develop practical administrative solutions for universities and pluralistic organizations.

## TABLE OF CONTENT

FOREWORD.....	vi
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xiii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xvi
GLOSSARY, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS .....	xix
RÉSUMÉ.....	xxi
ABSTRACT .....	xxiv
INTRODUCTION .....	1
PART I .....	8
CHAPTER I THE RULE PROLIFERATION PHENOMENON .....	9
1.1 Introduction .....	9
1.2 Rule as a Peripheral Object of Focus.....	11
1.2.1 Red Tape Theory .....	11
1.2.2 Complex Organizations .....	13
1.2.3 Organizational Routines.....	16
1.3 Rule as Central of Object of Focus.....	24
1.3.1 Organizational Learning .....	24
1.3.2 Bureaucracy Theory.....	28
1.3.3 The French School of the Sociology of Organizations.....	32
1.4 Critical Analysis of Literature .....	40
1.4.1 Rules .....	42
1.4.2 Rule Production.....	42
1.4.3 Rule Proliferation .....	43



1.5	Rule Proliferation as a Social Phenomenon .....	47
1.6	Conclusion.....	49
CHAPTER II SOCIAL REGULATION THEORY .....		50
2.1	Introduction .....	50
2.2	Social Regulation Theory.....	50
2.2.1	Control Regulation .....	51
2.2.2	Autonomous Regulation .....	52
2.2.3	Effective Regulation .....	53
2.2.4	Joint Regulation.....	55
2.3	Social Regulation Theory as a Heuristic Framework .....	56
2.4	From Regulation to Rule Proliferation .....	57
2.5	Adopting a Social Regulation Theory Perspective on Rule Proliferation .....	58
2.6	From a Macro-Level Framework to a Micro-Level Application .....	61
2.6.1	Define the main elements of the framework.....	62
2.6.2	Identify the attributes associated with each element of the framework..	62
2.6.3	Conduct a thorough analysis of each attribute for each regulation .....	63
2.6.4	Assess whether each attribute can be assigned to an organizational regulation.....	64
2.7	Heuristic Framework .....	66
2.7.1	Preliminary Framework on the Rule Proliferation Process .....	67
2.7.2	Strategic Actor Theory.....	69
CHAPTER III RESEARCH DESIGN.....		72
3.1	Introduction .....	72
3.1	Case Selection .....	74
3.1.1	Organizational Setting .....	76
3.1.2	Embedded Case Units' Selection .....	77
3.2	Case Protocol.....	80
3.3	Data Collection and Analysis .....	81
3.3.1	Data collection.....	81
3.3.2	Data Analysis .....	82
PART II.....		85

CHAPTER IV RESULTS: CLAUSE-RESERVE PROLIFERATION AT UQAM: HISTORY AND CONTEXT (QR1).....	86
4.1 Introduction .....	86
4.2 Methodology .....	88
4.2.1 Data Collected .....	89
4.2.2 Data Analysis Strategies .....	90
4.3 Proliferation during Time Periods .....	95
4.3.1 Period 1 – 1968 to 1979. Foundation of UQAM.....	96
4.3.2 Emergent Areas of Ambiguities.....	100
4.3.3 Period 2 – 1980 to 1989. Period of growth.....	105
4.3.4 Period 3 – 1990 to 1999. Period of institutional organization .....	108
4.3.5 Period 4 – 2000 to 2008. University Governance Policy .....	110
4.3.6 Period 5 – 2009-2019. Red Squares .....	112
4.4 Taxonomy of Control Rule Proliferation.....	113
4.4.1 Taxonomy of Control Rule changes.....	116
4.4.2 Taxonomy of Control Rule Additions .....	118
4.4.3 Taxonomy of Control Rule Complexifications.....	119
4.5 Rule Proliferation as Networked System.....	121
4.6 Understanding the Rule Proliferation Process.....	124
CHAPTER V RESULTS: LOOKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN OF DISPLAYED RULE PROLIFERATION (QR2) .....	129
5.1 Introduction .....	129
5.2 Methodology .....	132
5.2.1 Data collected.....	133
5.2.2 Data Analysis .....	134
5.3 The Nature of Autonomous Rules .....	142
5.4 Mechanisms of Rule Proliferation.....	144
5.5 Engines of Rule Proliferation.....	145
5.5.1 Organizational Rule Proliferation Stimuli .....	148
5.5.2 Context-Specific Rule Proliferation Stimuli .....	155
5.5.3 Local Variations .....	156
5.5.4 Indirect Rule Proliferation Influences .....	162
5.5.5 Organizational Influences .....	163
5.5.6 Environmental Influences .....	164

5.5.7 Individual Influences .....	166
5.6 Lifting the Curtain on Rule Proliferation Mechanics .....	171
CHAPTER VI RESULTS: THE PROCESS OF RULE PROLIFERATION .....	174
6.1 Introduction .....	174
6.2 Rule Proliferation Levels .....	175
6.3 Level Zero – Creation of the joint regulation and initiation control regulation proliferation .....	176
6.3.1 Level One – Rule Proliferation at Control Level .....	178
6.3.2 Level Two – Emergence of Conventions and Norms.....	179
6.3.3 Level Three – Emergence of Alternative Practices .....	179
6.3.4 Level Four - Emergence of Procedurals and Tools .....	180
6.3.5 Level Five – Emergence of Local Control Regulation.....	181
6.3.6 Areas of Ambiguities.....	181
6.4 Recalibration: A Rule Proliferation Process .....	182
6.5 Rule Proliferation Process.....	184
PART III.....	187
CHAPTER VII DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS .....	188
7.1 Introduction .....	188
7.2 Discussion of Results.....	189
7.2.1 Control Regulation Levels .....	190
7.2.2 Autonomous Regulation Levels .....	193
7.2.3 The Organizational Process of Rule Proliferation.....	195
7.2.4 Synthesis of Discussion .....	197
7.3 Theoretical Contributions.....	198
7.3.1 Rule Proliferation .....	199
7.3.2 Social Regulation Theory .....	205
7.3.3 Pluralistic Organizations .....	208
7.4 Synthesis of Contributions .....	210
CHAPTER VIII CONCERNS AND REFLECTIONS ON DISSERTATION RESULTS.....	212
8.1 Introduction .....	212

8.1.1	Rules as a historical artifact .....	213
8.1.2	Ethics in rule enactment.....	214
8.1.3	The roles of actors in rule enactment.....	216
8.1.4	Contradictions of academic administration.....	216
CONCLUSION .....		218
9.1	Implications of the Future of Research.....	219
9.2	Managerial Implications .....	220
APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES .....		222
10.1	Tables.....	223
10.2	Figures.....	230
APPENDIX B COMPLEMENTARY CITATION TABLES.....		237
11.1	Citation Tables.....	237
ANNEX A COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF PERIODS 2 - 5		
263		
12.1	Period 1 – 1968 to 1979. Foundation of UQAM.....	263
12.1.1	The negotiation of a joint regulation between university administration and lecturers.....	265
12.1.2	The creation of meta-rule <i>clause-reserve</i> .....	267
12.1.3	The birth of the meta-rule “ <i>clause-reserve</i> ”.....	271
12.2	Period 2 – 1980 to 1989. Period of growth.....	278
12.2.1	Evolution of the meta-rule .....	280
12.3	Period 3 – 1990 to 1999. Period of Institutional Organization .....	282
12.3.1	Evolution of the meta-rule .....	285
12.4	Period 4 – 2000 to 2008. University Governance Policy.....	286
12.4.1	Evolution of the meta-rule .....	288
12.5	Period 5 – 2009-2019. Red Squares .....	290
12.5.1	Evolution of the meta-rule .....	293
ANNEX B EMBEDDED CASES UNITS ANALYSIS (DEPARTMENT 1 TO 6)		
297		

13.1 Case 1: Organization Studies .....	297
13.2 Case 2: Business .....	306
13.3 Case 3: Fine Arts .....	311
13.4 Case 4: Human Sciences .....	314
13.5 Case 5: Public Policy .....	319
13.6 Case 6: Science .....	328
REFERENCES .....	333
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	345

## LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION .....	1
Figure 1. Embedded Case Study Illustration.....	5
CHAPTER I THE RULE PROLIFERATION PHENOMENON .....	9
Figure 2. Rules in the Performance of Routines.....	18
Figure 3. Depth of Rule Study.....	41
Figure 4. Organization of Literature .....	45
CHAPTER II SOCIAL REGULATION THEORY .....	50
Figure 5. Types of Regulation in Social Regulation Theory.....	56
Figure 6. Rule Proliferation Heuristic Framework .....	71
CHAPTER III RESEARCH DESIGN .....	724
Figure. 7 Embedded Case Study Illustration.....	73
CHAPTER IV RESULTS: CLAUSE-RESERVE PROLIFERATION AT UQAM: HISTORY AND CONTEXT (QR1).....	86
Figure 8. Quantification of Meta-rule Proliferation .....	93
Figure 9. Summary of Temporal Bracketing Analysis .....	96
Figure 10. Example of Slack Enabling Variability in Rule Application .....	105
Figure 11. Interconnections between Rule Changes, Additions, and Complexifications .....	127
Figure 12. Effective Regulation's Variability of Application .....	128
CHAPTER V RESULTS: LOOKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN OF DISPLAYED RULE PROLIFERATION (QR2) .....	129
Figure 13. Sankey Diagram of Pervasive Rule Proliferation Mechanisms.....	141

Figure 14. Tools, Procedurals, and Local Control Regulation as Moderator of Effective Regulation Variability.....	148
Figure 15. Examples of Rule Proliferation Paths per Size.....	160
Figure 16. Mechanics of Rule Proliferation.....	173
CHAPTER VI RESULTS: THE PROCESS OF RULE PROLIFERATION.....	174
Figure 17. Rule Proliferation Process .....	185
CHAPTER VII DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS .....	188
Figure 18. Contributions to Rule Proliferation Discussions .....	201
APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES .....	222
Figure A1. Rule Changes over Five Periods.....	230
Figure A2. Rule Additions over Five Periods .....	231
Figure A3. Rule Complexifications over Five Periods.....	232
Figure A4. Rule Proliferation per Department.....	233
Figure A5. Sankey Diagrams of Context-Specific Mechanisms.....	234
Figure A6. Sankey Diagram of Rule Proliferation Mechanics illustrating Organizational Stimuli.....	235
Figure A7. Diagram of Rule Proliferation Mechanics with Focus on Influences ....	236
ANNEX A COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF PERIODS 2 - 5	263
Figure AX1. Period 1 – Foundation of UQAM.....	264
Figure AX2. Actors involved in the creation of meta-rule <i>clause-reserve</i> .....	267
Figure AX3. Period 2 – Period of institutional growth.....	280
Figure AX5. Period 4 – University Governance Policy .....	288
Figure AX6. Period 5 – Red Square .....	292
ANNEX B EMBEDDED CASES UNITS ANALYSIS (DEPARTMENT 1 - 6) .	297
Figure AX7. Case 1 Summary.....	298
Figure AX8. Case 2 Summary.....	306
Figure AX9. Case 3 Summary.....	311

Figure AX10. Centralized Ph.D. Administration .....	312
Figure AX11. Case 4 Summary.....	314
Figure AX12. Case 5 Summary.....	320
Figure AX13. Case 6 Summary.....	329



## LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I THE RULE PROLIFERATION PHENOMENON .....	9
Table 1. Literature Review: Rules as Peripheral Topic of Research .....	20
Table 2. Literature Review: Rules as Central Topic of Research .....	37
Table 3. Objects of Rule Study.....	42
CHAPTER II SOCIAL REGULATION THEORY .....	50
Table 4. Summary of Key Distinctions between the Regulations .....	55
Table 5. Social Regulation Theory Attribute Descriptions .....	63
Table 6. Preliminary Conceptual Analysis Grid.....	71
CHAPTER IV RESULTS: CLAUSE-RESERVE PROLIFERATION AT UQAM: HISTORY AND CONTEXT (QR1).....	86
Table 7. Summary of Documents Collected .....	90
Table 8. Rule proliferation type with Associated Motive .....	115
Table 9. Rule Dependencies .....	120
CHAPTER V RESULTS: LOOKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN OF DISPLAYED RULE PROLIFERATION (QR2) .....	129
Table 10. Document Data.....	134
Table 11. <i>Clause-Réserve</i> Mentions per Department .....	135
CHAPTER VI RESULTS: THE PROCESS OF RULE PROLIFERATION .....	174
Table 12. Rule Proliferation Levels .....	177
CHAPTER VII DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS .....	188
Table 13. Rule proliferation type with Associated Motive .....	201

APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES .....	222
Table A1. Compilation of Rule Changes per Period .....	223
Table A2. Compilation of Rule Additions per Period .....	225
Table A3. Compilation of Rule Complexifications per Period .....	226
Table A4. Emergent Categories of Autonomous Rules .....	227
Table A5. Summary of Context-Specific Stimuli .....	228
APPENDIX B COMPLEMENTARY CITATION TABLES .....	237
Table A6. Organizational Slack .....	237
Table A7. Other Organizational Stimuli .....	243
Table A8. Other Influences: Organizational .....	251
Table A9. Other Influences: Environmental .....	254
Table A10. Other Influences: Individual .....	259
ANNEX A COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF PERIODS 2 - 5	
263	
Table AX1 – Administration’s and Lecturer’s Perspective at First Negotiation .....	266
Table AX2. Negotiation of the first collective agreement - Administration’s Perspective .....	268
Table AX3. Negotiation of the first collective agreement - Lecturers’ Perspective .....	269
Table AX4. Negotiation of the first collective agreement – Other stakeholders’ perspective .....	270
Table AX5. Meta-rule <i>clause-reserve</i> as pre-determined organizational slack .....	271
Table AX6 – Area of Ambiguity on Qualification of Experts .....	273
Table AX7 - Area of Ambiguity on Manipulation of the Job Posting Process .....	274
Table AX8 - Area of Ambiguity on the University-Wide Quota .....	275
Table AX9 - Area of Ambiguity on Students Registered in Advanced Studies .....	276
Table AX10. Rule proliferation during period 2 .....	281
Table AX11. Rule proliferation during period 3 .....	286
Table AX12. Rule Proliferation during period 4 .....	290
Table AX13. Rule proliferation during period 5 .....	295

ANNEX B EMBEDDED CASES UNITS ANALYSIS (DEPARTMENT 1 - 6) .	297
Table AX14. Citations illustrating the size of the department .....	300
Table AX15. Citations illustrating expertise diversity and disciplinary pluralism ..	301
Table AX16. Citations illustrating types of courses typically assigned under <i>clause-reserve</i> .....	302
Table AX17. Citations illustrating areas of ambiguity between control and autonomous regulations .....	305
Table AX18. Citations illustrating types of courses and cross-departmental collaborations .....	307
Table AX19. Citations illustrating the ability to mobilize bureaucratic rules .....	309
Table AX20. Citations illustrating lack of knowledge with meta-rule.....	313
Table AX21. Size of the department .....	316
Table AX22. Diversity of expertise .....	316
Table AX23. History of intra-department conflicts.....	317
Table AX24. Types of courses .....	318
Table AX25. Field perceived as male-dominated .....	322
Table AX26. History of frictions.....	323
Table AX27. Type of courses.....	326

## GLOSSARY, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS

### Terminology

**Lecturer – Chargé.e de cours:** In the Province of Quebec, the Lecturer title is attributed to the course conductors who teach based on experience and professional qualifications rather than based on academic qualifications only (Ph.D.). These course conductors typically earned a Master's degree in their field and possess vast professional or technical experience.

**Postdoctoral fellow – Post-doctorant.e:** postdoctoral researcher interning with a professor to complete a research project. In the context of this study, postdoctoral fellows have employee status at the host university.

**Ph.D. Student – Étudiant au doctorat:** Graduate student in the process of completing doctoral studies. In the context of this study, Ph.D. students can have multiple statuses: student, student-employee, and lecturer.

### Acronyms

**ACCENT :** Logiciel de gestion et d'attribution des cours aux chargés de cours – Course allocation software for lecturers

**AFPC :** Alliance de la fonction publique du Canada – Public Service Alliance of Canada

**CNESST** : Commission des normes, de l'équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail  
– Committee on Standards, Equity, Health and Safety at Work

**EQE** : Équivalences de qualification à l'enseignement – Teaching Qualification  
Equivalency

**FRQ** : Fonds de recherche du Québec – Quebec Research Funds

**ESG** École des sciences de la gestion – ESG Business School

**PEI** : Programme d'études internationales – ISP International Studies Program

**SCCUQ** : Syndicat des chargées de cours et chargés de cours de l'UQAM – UQAM's  
Lecturers' Union

**SETUE** : Syndicat des étudiants et étudiantes employé.e.s de l'UQAM – Union of  
employed students of UQAM

**SSHRC** : Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines – Social Sciences and  
Humanities Research Council

**UQAM** Université du Québec à Montréal – University of Québec in Montreal

## RÉSUMÉ

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'illustrer le phénomène de la prolifération des règles et de comprendre comment ce processus se déroule dans le temps. De plus, elle identifie si des caractéristiques spécifiques au contexte d'une organisation pluraliste peuvent accentuer la prolifération des règles.

Mobilisant la théorie de la régulation sociale de Reynaud (1989), cette thèse est une étude de cas enchâssés analysant des données qualitatives complexes et éclectiques que les études quantitatives passées n'ont pas réussi à saisir. Les recherches antérieures n'ont pas illustré la manière dont le phénomène de prolifération des règles se déroule, c'est-à-dire comment les ensembles de règles combinées de manière désordonnée émergent et s'accumulent sur différentes périodes. La recherche a exploré la croissance de la masse des règles, l'interconnexion des règles et leur évolution ainsi que les influences macro-environnementales sur la prolifération des règles. En outre, les études précédentes ont utilisé des macro-unités d'analyse. Néanmoins, il n'existe aucune recherche au niveau d'analyse de la règle unique. De nombreux chercheurs ont abordé l'idée de l'évolution des règles, de leur changement et de leur ajout, ce qui sera extrêmement utile pour ce projet. Cependant, comme les discussions sur les règles sont dispersées dans différents domaines, il n'existe pas de typologie unique pour étudier les phénomènes de croissance ou de prolifération des règles.

Par conséquent, je complète les recherches antérieures sur les règles organisationnelles en examinant comment les règles prolifèrent et les contextes qui sont plus susceptibles d'intensifier la prolifération des règles. Je constate que la prolifération des règles est un processus décisionnel dépendant du chemin suivi (*path dependency*), dans lequel la

régulation autonome est le principal moteur de la prolifération des règles. Les éléments de prolifération des règles qui influencent la liberté d'action ont le plus d'impact sur la vie organisationnelle. Les mécanismes de prolifération des règles impliquent des stimuli organisationnels ainsi que des stimuli spécifiques au contexte. Le relâchement organisationnel (*slack*) est le principal stimulus organisationnel de la prolifération des règles. Il est associé à l'asymétrie des connaissances, l'asymétrie du pouvoir, le respect inégal des règles, la distribution des ressources et l'ambiguïté. Les stimuli spécifiques au contexte comprennent l'utilisation des règles, la disponibilité des ressources, les structures administratives locales, la taille du département et la nature du pluralisme disciplinaire. Même si chaque élément de prolifération des règles a le potentiel d'augmenter la variabilité de la régulation effective, les changements de règles de type protocole semblent efficaces pour stabiliser l'application des règles avec plus d'uniformité.

Au cours de cette thèse, je décris le processus de prolifération des règles dans une université canadienne. J'ai constaté que le recalibrage continu du système réglementaire résultant de l'évolution des zones d'ambiguïté dans la régulation de contrôle et autonome déclenche un processus continu de prolifération des règles. Ce processus continu de recalibrage se produit par la négociation continue entre les régulations autonomes et de contrôle.

Par conséquent, cette thèse contribue aux recherches actuelles sur la prolifération des règles menées dans les domaines de l'apprentissage organisationnel, des routines organisationnelles, de la théorie néo-institutionnelle et de la théorie de la bureaucratie. Cette thèse fournit une taxonomie de la prolifération des règles de contrôle ainsi qu'un cadre permettant de mieux comprendre comment les règles de décisions prolifèrent au sein de l'organisation. Le choix délibéré d'un cadre pluraliste pour le travail de terrain a conduit à des contributions spécifiques à la recherche sur les organisations pluralistes. Les règles permettent non seulement la cohabitation entre des groupes d'acteurs

divergents, mais elles prolifèrent également en raison de la présence d'un important relâchement organisationnel qui est essentiel à la vie organisationnelle.

Cette thèse de doctorat est organisée en trois parties. La première partie se concentre sur la littérature actuelle. Elle présente une revue de la littérature ainsi que le cadre théorique mobilisé pour cette étude. Elle aborde également le design de recherche et le contexte organisationnel. La deuxième partie est consacrée aux résultats. Les résultats sont organisés en trois chapitres, chaque chapitre décrivant les stratégies spécifiques d'analyse de données adoptées pour chaque partie. Le premier chapitre des résultats se concentre sur la compréhension du déroulement de la prolifération des règles sur une période allant de 1969 à 2019 en utilisant une stratégie de *bracketing* temporel. Le chapitre suivant se concentre sur l'analyse des six unités de cas enchâssés au cours desquelles nous examinons les mécanismes de la prolifération des règles. Parmi ces mécanismes, il en existe qui sont spécifiques au contexte dans la mesure où ils influencent la manière dont la prolifération des règles se déroule localement. Le troisième chapitre consolide les résultats pour présenter tous les niveaux de prolifération des règles observés ainsi qu'un modèle descriptif du processus de la prolifération des règles en organisation. La troisième et dernière partie explore les contributions théoriques, comprend une discussion des résultats, et conclut avec des implications pour la pratique et la recherche future.

Mots clés : prolifération des règles, prise de décision, théorie de la régulation sociale, pouvoir, asymétrie des connaissances, université, organisations pluralistes



## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the phenomenon of rule proliferation and understand how this process takes place over time. Furthermore, it identifies if context-specific characteristics in a pluralistic organization can accentuate rule proliferation.

Mobilizing Reynaud's (1989) social regulation theory, this dissertation is an embedded case study analyzing complex and eclectic qualitative data that past quantitative studies have failed to capture. Past research has not illustrated how the phenomenon of rule proliferation unfolds; that is how the sets of oddly combined rules emerge and accumulate over different periods. Research has explored rule mass growth, the interconnection of rules and their evolution as well as macroenvironmental influences on rule proliferation. Furthermore, previous studies have used macro units of analysis. Nevertheless, there exists no research at the single rule level of analysis. Many scholars have tackled the idea of rule evolution, rule change, and rule addition, which will be tremendously helpful for this project. Still, because discussions on rules are scattered across different domains, there is no single typology to study rule growth or rule proliferation phenomena.

Hence, I complement past research on organizational rules by exploring how rules proliferate and contexts that are more likely to intensify rule proliferation. I find that rule proliferation is a path-dependent decision making process in which the autonomous regulation is the main rule proliferation engine. Rule proliferation elements influencing freedom of action have the most impact on organizational life. Mechanisms of rule proliferation involve organizational stimuli as well as context-specific stimuli. Organizational slack is the main organizational stimulus of rule

proliferation. It is associated with knowledge asymmetry, power asymmetry, uneven rule abundance, resource distribution, and ambiguity. Context-specific stimuli include rule use, resource availability, local administrative structures, the size of the department, and the nature of disciplinary pluralism. Even if each rule proliferation element conveys the potential of increasing variability of the effective regulation; protocol-type rule changes appear efficient in stabilizing rule application with more uniformity.

During this dissertation, I describe the process of rule proliferation in one Canadian university. I find that the ongoing recalibration of the regulatory system resulting from evolving areas of ambiguities in the control and autonomous regulation triggers a continuous process of rule proliferation. This ongoing process of recalibration occurs through the continuous negotiation between the autonomous and control regulations.

As a result, this dissertation contributes to current rule proliferation research conducted in the fields of organizational learning, organizational routines, neoinstitutional theory, and bureaucracy theory. This thesis provides a taxonomy of control rule proliferation as well as a framework to better understand how rules of decisions proliferate within the organization. The purposeful selection of a pluralistic setting for fieldwork led to specific contributions to pluralistic organization research. Rules not only allow cohabitation between divergent groups of actors, but they also proliferate due to the presence of important organizational slack which is key to organizational life.

This doctoral dissertation is organized into three parts. Part one focuses on current literature. It presents a literature review and the theoretical framework mobilized for this study. It also addresses the research design and the organizational setting. Part two focuses on findings. Findings are organized into three chapters, with each chapter describing specific data analysis strategies adopted for each portion. The first chapter of findings focuses on understanding the unfolding of rule proliferation over a period

ranging from 1969 to 2019 using a time bracketing strategy. The following chapter focuses on analyzing six embedded case units during which we examine mechanisms of rule proliferation. Among these mechanisms exist those that are context-specific in that they influence how rule proliferation unfolds locally. The third chapter consolidates findings to present all levels of rule proliferation observed and presents the organizational process of ongoing rule proliferation. The third and last part explores theoretical contributions, includes a discussion of results, and concludes with implications for research and practice.

Keywords: rule proliferation, decision making, social regulation theory, power, knowledge asymmetry, university, pluralistic organizations

## INTRODUCTION

The annual listing of changes and additions to legal rules for the province of Quebec has increased from six pages in 2014 to 53 pages in 2018 (*Assemblée Nationale Du Québec*, 2019). This document lists the changes that were made to the different rules, and it refers to the corresponding articles of the law for review. It is updated and uploaded on Quebec's National Assembly's website annually. For instance, the law of financial administration expanded by 12% in its number of pages from its 2002 version to its 2019 version. Modifications applied to this specific piece of legislation implied changes to other legal rules and led to the initiation of bills that would result in future rules. This phenomenon of rule content complexification, rule changes, and rule additions, was defined by Jennings, Schulz, Patient, Gravel, and Yuan (2005) as rule proliferation. This dissertation uses Jennings et al. (2005)'s definition of rule proliferation to advance our understanding of the phenomenon. Knowing that the term proliferation refers to a rapid and excessive increase; rule proliferation implies that each rule can potentially bring about the birth of multiple rules (Barber, 2004). Rules that are initially meant to ease decision making processes, multiply and complexify, hence rendering decision making intricate and challenging.

Heavy rules of control governing decision making processes play an important role in pluralistic organizations. Pluralistic organizations are characterized as settings in which power is diffused and in which actors with divergent perspectives cohabit and collaborate (Denis et al., 2001, 2011; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006). In these organizations, rules serve as a mechanism allowing various groups to coexist peacefully (Reynaud, 1995). Hence, pluralistic organizations are fertile grounds for the study of decision making and the proliferation of rules.

Rules are conventions or obligations framing behavior and limiting actors' discretionary area; this is the space within which individuals operate. In this thesis, I refer to rules as control rules or

autonomous rules based on social regulation theory (J.-D. Reynaud, 1989). Control rules are displayed rules that explicitly determine acceptable limits, behavior, and sanctions. Autonomous rules are implicit expectations of acceptable behavior or perceived limits imposed on actors and emerging from collective action.

Organization scholars have long taken an interest in rules. Starting with Max Weber's conceptualization of the bureaucratic organizational form, numerous scholars followed by developing theories such as Red Tape (Bozeman, 1993; Bozeman et al., 1992) and organizational learning (March et al., 2000). While many studies have referred to rules as a peripheral object of study to a core research problem (Hrebiniak, 1978) or, simply as an explanatory variable (Cyert & March, 1963); others have made rules and rule changes central to their research (Jennings et al., 2005). Even so, those studies that have tackled rules more directly, have done so primarily by focusing on causal links between rules and other variables (Beck, 2006; Jennings et al., 2005; March et al., 2000; Schulz, 1998; Zhou, 1993). Furthermore, they used large units of analysis such as rule boundaries and rule families which encompass entire categories of rules such as academic rules or administrative rules (Beck, 2006; Levitt & March, 1988; March et al., 2000; Schulz, 1998; Zhou, 1993).

Past research on rules has discussed rules as structures framing behavior (Giddens, 1984). Some of this research went further into examining their effectiveness (or lack thereof) in framing and guiding behavior (DeHart - Davis, 2009). Their perceived lack of effectiveness in a given context can result in overflows triggering rule revisions and tension between regulations. Regulation is defined as the compilation, and juxtaposition of a poorly combined set of rules and practices from a collective action that has emerged over time over different periods (J.-D. Reynaud, 1989). Consequently, regulation is the construct that will be of utmost interest to us as it will lead to a better understanding of the rule proliferation phenomenon. This phenomenon has not been explored and described qualitatively and therefore how this phenomenon progresses over time has not yet been fully understood. Moreover, we don't know if specific contexts are auspicious to accentuate rule proliferation. Because regulations emerge in time, studying its temporality is an

important concern in understanding this phenomenon. Furthermore, the intricate accumulation of rules and their imperfect juxtaposition calls for a qualitative exploration of proliferation.

The purpose of this thesis is to mobilize Reynaud's (1989) social regulation theory to improve our understanding of the rule proliferation phenomenon in organizations. By illustrating the phenomenon of rule proliferation in rich detail, we aim to finally understand how this process takes place in time. Furthermore, it identifies if context-specific characteristics can accentuate rule proliferation. In doing so, we will contribute to the work of Jennings et al. (2005). A qualitative study will capture complex and eclectic data that past quantitative studies have failed to capture (Fachin & Langley, 2017; Langley, 1999; Langley & Abdallah, 2011).

In light of current rule literature, I have established that past research has not illustrated how the phenomenon of rule proliferation unfolds; that is how sets of oddly combined rules emerge and accumulate over different periods. Research has explored rule mass<sup>1</sup> growth, the interconnection of rules in their evolution as well as macroenvironmental influences on rule proliferation. Furthermore, previous studies have used macro units of analysis, thus there exists no research at the rule level of analysis. Many scholars have tackled the idea of rule evolution, rule change, and rule addition (Beck, 2006; Jennings et al., 2005; Levitt & March, 1988; March et al., 2000; Zhou, 1993), which will be tremendously helpful for this project. Nevertheless, because discussions on rules are scattered across different domains, there exists no single typology to study the rule growth or the rule proliferation phenomena.

Although the phenomenon of rule proliferation is commonly known to the public as bureaucracy and has been ridiculed in countless fiction including Kafka's famous work *The Castle*, very few organization studies scholars have studied rule proliferation. Therefore, there still exists limited scientific knowledge on organizational rule proliferation. This scientific knowledge is eclectic and scattered across disciplines such as the sociology of organizations, public administration, and

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<sup>1</sup> Beck 2006 refers to rule mass as the total number of pages of written rules.


management. Consequently, practitioners mostly apply common knowledge and understanding of bureaucratic structures in daily decision making and policymaking. This common knowledge can be misguided and can result in unintentional rule proliferation. Breaking this complexification pattern by shedding light on this phenomenon and elucidating the rule proliferation process is an important step in reducing rule proliferation, enhancing rulemaking, and improving organizational decision making.

**In this doctoral dissertation, I aim to complement past research on organizational rules by exploring how rules proliferate and examining which contexts are more likely to intensify the proliferation phenomenon. How, why, and with what consequences does a formal rule come to be reinterpreted in time in a pluralistic organizational setting? As such, we will examine how actors, embedded in social and temporal contexts, interpret, and apply rules, and interact in the shaping and manipulation of organizational regulations.**

To achieve this goal, I opted for a qualitative approach that best describes a complex phenomenon over a long period (Fachin & Langley, 2017; Musca, 2006) mobilizing the social regulation theory. The social regulation theory enables the examination of clandestine regulations that have been neglected in past rule proliferation research as well as its ongoing interaction with the control regulation. Moreover, it is an adaptable framework that has been used in other organizational qualitative studies and enables one to account for both displayed and clandestine regulations. In addition, it was derived from Crozier and Friedberg's (1977) strategic actor theory which will be instrumental in understanding the role of the actors in shaping rule proliferation (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977).

I chose a longitudinal embedded case study (Musca, 2006; Yin, 2009). An embedded case study involves one general case along with multiple sub-units of analysis that are selected for comparison as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Embedded Case Study Illustration



Source: Yin, 2003: p. 40

In an embedded case study, investigations are conducted both at the general case level and at the sub-unit level (Eisenhardt, 1989; Musca, 2006; Yin, 2003, 2009). In this project, the general case consists of one meta-rule at the university level, whereas the sub-units refer to the meta-rule's enactment in six departmental settings. This approach will enable us to compare this rule across different departmental settings to observe the effect of pluralism on rule proliferation and evolution in those different sub-units contingent upon local departmental conditions. The general case study selected is the life of one bureaucratic rule in a university setting, namely, the *clause-reserve* rule indicating how teaching load reserves are to be distributed between visiting professors and Ph.D. students<sup>2</sup> before they are allocated to lecturers<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> **Ph.D. Student – Étudiant au doctorat:** Graduate student in the process of completing doctoral studies. In the context of this study, Ph.D. students can have multiple statuses: student, student-employee, lecturer. Note: the rule can apply to master students, but because of the rare occurrences, respondents refer mostly to Ph.D. students.

<sup>3</sup> **Lecturer – Chargé.e de cours:** In the Province of Quebec, the Lecturer title is attributed the course conductors who teach on basis of experience and professional qualifications rather than on the basis of academic qualifications only (Ph.D.). These course conductors typically earned a Master degree in their field and possess a vast professional or technical experience.



Professional bureaucracies such as universities are documented as pluralistic (Hardy, 1991; Hardy et al., 1983; Mintzberg et al., 1976); contexts in which disparate goals and interests need to coexist (Denis et al., 2007). Rules and conventions are one of the mechanisms accommodating this cohabitation (Denis et al., 2011). As such, they are a prolific ground for studying rules. Nevertheless, heavy rules of control governing committee decision making processes and governing the various groups are some of the mechanisms in place to allow the somewhat peaceful coexistence of these groups. Hence, pluralistic organizations are fertile grounds for the study of decision making and the proliferation of rules. To this end, it is plausible that some contexts are more conducive to a greater intensity of proliferation.

This embedded case study traces and explores the journey of a rule's life from birth. Using a micro-unit of analysis allows us to isolate elements that influenced the rule's evolution throughout its life. By limiting our fieldwork to one rule, we collect rich data on the process of rule evolution. Hence, we access information on drivers influencing its proliferation and complexification, as well as what rule additions resulted from its creation and existence over an extensive period. Moreover, by using an embedded case study, we examine whether certain sub-units are more likely to experience a higher rule proliferation intensity, along with consequences on the organization, decision making, actors as well as on the rule itself.

This doctoral dissertation is organized into three parts. Part one focuses on current literature. It presents a literature review as well as the theoretical framework mobilized for this study. I classified previous literature on rules and rule proliferation into two categories. One of the categories encompasses research that tackles rules as a peripheral object of study. The other category includes work that has made rules a central object of research that comprises rule dynamics and rule families. Past research has not explored how a rule evolves— i.e., the process of rule evolution – and more scholarly work is needed to define the concept of rule proliferation. Based on a deeper analysis of the literature, I propose a heuristic framework that guided this investigation. It also presents the research design to grasp this phenomenon, as well as the organizational setting in which the study takes place.

Part two focuses on empirical findings. Findings are organized into three chapters, with each chapter describing specific data analysis strategies adopted for each portion. The first empirical chapter focuses on understanding the unfolding of rule proliferation over a period ranging from 1968 to 2019 using a time bracketing strategy. The following chapter focuses on analyzing six embedded case units during which we examine mechanisms of rule proliferation. Among these mechanisms exist those that are context-specific meaning that they influence how rule proliferation unfolds locally. The third empirical chapter consolidates findings to present all levels of rule proliferation observed and present the ongoing process of organizational rule proliferation.

The third and last part explores theoretical contributions, includes a discussion of results, and concludes with implications for practice and research. Rich theoretical contributions are made in the fields of bureaucracy theory, organizational learning, neoinstitutional theory, and organizational routines.

In the next section (Part I), I start by examining the literature on rules and rule proliferation. It will continue with the presentation of the social regulation theory as a theoretical framework which is mobilized for this dissertation. Part I will conclude with a review of the research design.

## PART I

## CHAPTER I

### THE RULE PROLIFERATION PHENOMENON

#### 1.1 Introduction

The focus of this study is to provide a deeper understanding of how rule proliferation unfolds, that is the process by which a rule leads to the addition of more rules as well as the complexification and expansion of these rules. Consequently, in this chapter, I discuss literature on rules, regulation, and rule proliferation. This literature will assist in shaping our knowledge of how rules proliferate and provide structure for this doctoral thesis.

The growth of bureaucracy taking the shape of a global increase in rule mass<sup>4</sup> (Beck, 2006) and escalation of administrative formalities<sup>5</sup> (Bozeman, 1993) has been widely addressed in the literature. For instance, as soon as the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Max Weber was investigating bureaucratic structures including rules, procedures, hierarchical structures, and their ongoing growth within the context of the bureaucratic organization. His research paved the way for many lines of research to progress, both in management studies and in the sociology of organizations. It is therefore surprising that rule proliferation, being the addition and complexification of rules (Jennings et al., 2005) emerging from one single rule has not yet been studied. Scholars have

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<sup>4</sup> Beck 2006 refers to rule mass as the total number of pages of written rules

<sup>5</sup> Administrative formalities known as Red Tape include rules, administrative processes, protocols

defined rules in many ways; rules have been described as a rational effort to organize (Cyert & March, 1963; Giddens, 1984; Gouldner, 1954; Hrebiniak, 1978; Perrow, 1986), as social structures shaping the reality we interact with, meaning that they result from and enable social practices (Giddens, 1984), and as encodings of history, which refers to the encapsulation of organizational knowledge for future reference (Zhou, 1993; Schulz, 1998; March, Schulz & Zhou 2000). In this thesis, I use Reynaud's social regulation theory in reference to rules. Therefore, I describe rules as control rules or autonomous rules based on their explicitness and legitimacy. Control rules are displayed rules that explicitly determine acceptable limits, behavior, and sanctions. Their legitimacy is external and more formal because this regulation is applied and sanctioned by the institution. For instance, a control rule could take the shape of an academic article stipulating that:

departments must make available, prior to the start of classes, draft course outlines or master course outlines for the courses for which they are responsible; (excerpt from Rule 5 article 1.4.5) (*Université Du Québec à Montréal*, 2016)

Autonomous rules are implicit expectations of acceptable behavior or perceived limits imposed on actors and emerging from collective action. Its legitimacy is internal as it emerges from work and is perceived as necessary for daily activities. For instance, departments can develop protocols and conventions in how they expect their teaching staff to prepare and communicate their course outlines.

To position this thesis within the landscape of current and past rule research, I explore the main fields of study that have contributed to developing several rule-related constructs and that promise to bring significant insight into shaping the construct of rule proliferation. Each of the fields that will be presented has studied rules, but each one has examined rules differently and at varying levels. For instance, some have contributed by investigating rule production dynamics, or others through the construct of rule proliferation. During this review, it is important to distinguish which field has contributed the most to rule proliferation as it will shape the project further.

Many streams of research have considered rules within the greater scope of their research. Still, only a few of them have made rules the central focus of their investigation. As a result, I have organized this review into two categories: scholarly research with rules as a *peripheral object of focus* and scholarly research with rules as a *central object of focus*. Considering our keen interest in developing a rule proliferation construct, the main emphasis will be placed on the latter. I have discarded from our review high-reliability organizations (Weick et al., 1999) and safety rules (Weichbrodt, 2015), in which the application of rules and protocols are highly calculated and rehearsed to minimize errors and overflow. Overflows in the current study represent the failure of rules to contain or plan for every single possibility, therefore, causing unplanned consequences. Since rule addition and complexification emerge in part due to overflow (D’Adderio, 2008, 2011) and those high-reliability settings are competent at containing them; they are not ideal contexts for our study.

## 1.2 Rule as a Peripheral Object of Focus

Pillar streams of research that discuss rules and are frequently referred to in organizational studies, include red tape theory (Bozeman, 1993), complex organizations (Gouldner, 1954), and organizational routines (Feldman et al., 2016). These studies have referred to rules as a peripheral object of study within the frame of their core inquiry, or as an explanatory variable for the main phenomenon that they study. For instance, red tape theory scholars addressed rules as causes and consequences of organizational pathologies (Bozeman, 1993; Bozeman et al., 1992); while complex organizations researchers described rules as one of the primary characteristics of their object of study (Crozier, 1964; Hrebiniak, 1978; Perrow, 1986). These fields are summarized in Table 1.

### 1.2.1 Red Tape Theory

Initiated by Kaufman in 1977, with Red Tape, public administration’s red tape theory scholars take interest in learning about organizational pathologies to which rule growth contributes. Yet, Kaufman subtly argued for the superiority of the bureaucratic organization which is an

organizational structure characterized by its hierarchical decision making system, its diffuse decision making power, and heavy rules of control. Red tape in common language is defined as the pointless hoops one goes through to complete an activity within the structure of a bureaucratic organization. One argument is that pointlessness is relative; this means that pointless for some means necessary for others. As such, he describes public workers as the scapegoats for red tape criticism (Kaufman, 2015).

Vicious circles, organizational pathology, and organizational complexity associated with red tape theory have been covered extensively in conceptual papers and academic books (Bozeman, 1993; Bozeman et al., 1992). Excessive rule growth is perceived as an organizational pathology complexifying the environment and rendering customer service and management taxing.

Interestingly, a recent upsurge in interest led the field to converge toward a unified definition of red tape as being a combination of rules, regulations, and procedures that demand compliance regardless of the functional goals of those rules (Bozeman, 2000; Bozeman & Feeney, 2014). Consequently, it primarily focuses on duplications and overlaps in organizational activities (Bozeman & Feeney, 2014). In their 2014 work, Bozeman and Feeney extensively review learnings and develop a research agenda about red tape theory. They argue that there is still scarce formal (scientific) knowledge provided that only a few scholars work on the subject; this means that judgment on red tape is mainly informed based on ordinary (common) knowledge, which can prove to be biased or even misguided at times. They develop a research agenda for those few scholars working in the field and connect with other public administration researchers (Bozeman & Feeney, 2014).

Despite their extensive referral to rules within the scope of their work, rules are not clearly defined within this framework. This model examines bureaucratic growth which encompasses all sorts of administrative formalities rather than rule growth. In fact, “red tape” refers to administrative formalities, rules being one possible type of formality. Hence this model does not isolate rules and regulations as a subject of study. In the context of the red tape theory, rules are primarily referred

to as formal and informal. Within this framework, it is intended that formal rules are, for the most part, written.

### 1.2.2 Complex Organizations

According to Gouldner (1954), bureaucratic rule proliferation is the result of managerial distrust, disturbances in the informal ruling system, and tensions within formal authority relationships (Gouldner, 1954). Therefore, the lone entrepreneur would not require explicit bureaucratic rules (Coase, 1937). Gouldner claims that bureaucratic rules could be preferable substitutes to close supervision. They are less ambiguous than direct orders, sensibly designed, and understood as more definite than direct orders. Because of their definitive and official nature, punishment is another characteristic associated with rules. In the case of non-abidance, punishment is legitimized and understood. Managers can use this legitimization as a tool to influence behavior by withholding punishment if performance is satisfactory. It gives them a certain “leeway” in exercising punishment (Gouldner, 1954: 187). However, some managers may see punishment as the end goal of negative behavior rather than seeing rule enforcement as the objective (Gouldner, 1954).

Nevertheless, mere compliance as a measure of success for rule application could be misleading. For instance, enforcement of rules that are resented by workers or enforcement of rules that may be misunderstood can be achieved to a certain level, but performance cannot be enforced. Therefore, workers will deliver minimal performance so as to not receive punishment. As a result, the organization could achieve compliance at sub-optimal performance levels (Gouldner, 1954; Hrebiniak, 1978).

Around the same period, Merton (1957) studied the effects of bureaucratic proliferation and excessive rule growth on organizational learning (Hrebiniak, 1978). He was interested in the notion of goal displacement. This means that over time, original organizational goals or goals associated with activity might be transformed to accommodate the system’s needs or only because the original goals have been achieved. Merton stressed the importance of consistency for the bureaucratic



organization. This consistency is achieved through the narrowing of the discretionary area, based on the depersonalization of positions and tasks, and focuses on the categorization of decision making. This creates an extremely rigid organization in which stepping outside of the routinized and standardized behavior is perceived as unacceptable.

Conversely, in his 1986 work on complex organizations, Perrow sees bureaucracy as a form of progress in order to avoid fraud, nepotism, collusion, and other managerial biases (Perrow, 1986). The bureaucratic structure centralizes control of the majority by a minority of people (Perrow, 1986). Perrow portrays rules as a form of structure; a mechanism by which to provide guidance, to ensure that workers channel efforts towards the right objectives and that regulation abundance are achieved (Hrebiniak, 1978; Perrow, 1986). Although Perrow admits to the proliferation of rules in complex organizations, in his view, they ensure protection, coordination, canalization of efforts, limitation of efforts, universalism, a sanctuary for the inept, stability, change impediment, and proper diversity.

Perrow gives examples of how rules become scapegoats for bad organizational performance. Rules are often designed in isolation by departmentalized units; the impact and interconnectedness of these rules are rarely seen until there is a capacity strain on the system due to a sudden change in the environment. Hence, organizations with high rule proliferation do not perform as well in shifting environments (Perrow, 1986). Yet, Perrow claims that by reducing the number of rules, an organization would become more Impersonal, more Inflexible, and more standardized (Perrow, 1986). Again, reducing the mass of rules may be a daunting task provided that most complex organizations' rules are interconnected; hence the removal of one would require the re-design of many (Perrow, 1986).

In terms of effectiveness, Perrow examines how rules influence agents' decision making. He believes that bounded rationality hinders organizational effectiveness (Perrow, 1986). This means, that the size of the set of alternatives for each decision can be prohibitive and not humanly possible to generate, the assignment of credit is a challenge and more importantly, the exploration, evaluation, and operationalization of alternatives are uncertain (Laville, 1998; Perrow, 1986). As

such, he infers that cognitive limitations do not allow agents to use an optimal process, but rather a process that is deemed satisfactory at best to generate acceptable alternatives (Perrow, 1986). He adds that the utility maximization of agents comes from the anticipated value of the next alternative. If the anticipated cost of searching for a new alternative outweighs the costs of the current best solution, the agent will be deemed to have found a satisfactory outcome (Perrow, 1986).

Therefore, by decreasing managers' discretion with rules, the organization is increasing agents' decision making freedom and autonomy by clearly setting the frame by which they are allowed to make decisions without reprimand (Perrow, 1986). Moreover, the legitimization of rules also serves as protection against blame and punishment by simply knowing where the boundaries lie (Perrow, 1986).

In the context of these works on complex organizations, scholars connect rule growth to rational decision making. In their perspective, rules reduce the size of the discretion area; therefore, limiting the number of alternatives possible. Hence, rules make decision making easier; explaining a phenomenon by which rules mass grows excessively (Hrebiniak, 1978; Perrow, 1986).

Complex organization studies detail the characteristics of rules and their impacts on organizations. By the same token, they observe rule production and to some extent, rule proliferation in complex organizations. As a result, they bring interesting insights into managerial implications of rule proliferation on decision making although they do not study rule proliferation directly. These insights however can help us understand the motives behind actions undertaken by managers as well as some of their consequences. Nevertheless, these studies are limited to the effectiveness of rules and their impact on decision making due to their overbearing presence. Their focus on the organization, its performance, and decision making does not provide insight into the process of rulemaking and rule proliferation.

### 1.2.3 Organizational Routines

The initial concept of organizational routines can be traced back to the Carnegie School (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947). According to Simon, organizational routines give rise to decisional processes that reinforce search issues, conflict resolution, and environment adaptation (Simon, 1947).

There exist many perspectives on organizational routines (Lazaric, 2011). For instance, Nelson and Winter addressed the intentionality of routines. As such, rules are perceived as adaptive through selection (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Nonetheless, I will focus on the practice perspective because I will be examining rules as structures guiding and shaping behavior, and behavior shaping rules.

Inspired by Giddens's (1984) structuration theory, the practice perspective on routines calls upon Bourdieu's (1977) theory of practice (Giddens, 1984). The practice view defines routines as structures (Koumakhov & Daoud, 2016). These scholars are interested in the study of behavioral phenomena, that is repetitive and recognizable patterns of actions enacted by multiple actors (Pentland & Feldman, 2005). They instill stability in common goals through a shared control system (Cyert & March, 1963). Feldman and Pentland joined the organizational routine conversation contending that routines require individuals' selection of an action from a list of actions where the performance outcome is effortful. The practice perspective gave rise to the Ostensive-Performative view of routines. In the Ostensive-Performative view, routines focus on the interconnection between the ostensive and the performative dimensions; the connection between the individual and their environment. The ostensive is the abstract portion of the construct (intrinsic), whereas the performative (extrinsic) portion of the construct, is the enactment of the routine.

The Ostensive-Performative view of routines assumes that individuals are acting within a sociomaterial ensemble in which humans and nonhumans, such as rules and objects (or as might be referred to as artifacts) interact collaboratively and in which the actant is connected through the

action taking place. In this perspective, the environment in which individuals perform is described as a sociomaterial ensemble because it is assumed that all humans and nonhumans – whether tangible or intangible – are part of the environment and are in continuous interaction.


Within the scope of organizational routines, rules are regarded as artifacts structuring and constraining actors' behavior (Feldman et al., 2016; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland et al., 2012; Pentland & Feldman, 2005). Martha Feldman in a 2015 keynote address at the Academy of Management, however, warned against the common mistake to confuse rules with routines. While rules are involved in the guidance of behavior, they are not routines. For instance, a procedure might be a rule; yet only the enactment of the procedure is the routine. For instance, a rule can indicate a pattern of action that is acceptable for evaluating the performance of employees. The enactment of this rule is routine while the rule remains an artifact guiding the actor during the enactment.

This field engaged organizational theory scholars in a debate on definitions between rules, protocols, and routines (Faraj & Xiao, 2006), and therefore contributed to shaping these constructs. For instance, protocols are very rigid routines that enable enactment with the most stability and precision in environments requiring to act fast such as hospitals. Rules can be embedded in protocols to define areas of allowance and reprimand. Although those constructs have been more clearly defined in recent literature, according to current academic conferences dialogues, and discourses, they are far from unanimous.

Within the last decade, D'Adderio engaged the field of organization routines in a more direct study of rules. Prior to 2008, behaviorists and routine scholars identified rules as artifacts guiding behavior in the context of their study of actors (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Feldman, Pentland, Adderio, & Lazaric, 2016; Pentland & Feldman, 2005; Pentland, Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012). D'Adderio (2008)'s study looks at artifacts such as rules and technology, as pivotal elements of routine enactment. Her study, however, did not strictly focus on rules but more broadly, on the necessity of artifacts in routine enactment. She distinguishes representational artifacts which include standard operating procedures and formal rules from other types of artifacts such as clocks,

documents, and calendars (D’Adderio, 2011). These representational artifacts also referred to as “cognitive” artifacts or “artifactual representations” of routines, symbolize “routines-as-theories”; that describe prescriptive behavior (D’Adderio, 2011; D’Adderio, 2008); whereas routines-as-practice is the actual performance, as depicted in Figure 2. Due to human agency and interpretation, the performance of routines does not automatically match theoretical representations of routines. Therefore, to increase control and match between routine-in-theory and routine-as-practice, routine performance can be delegated to other artifacts such as computers or algorithms (D’Adderio, 2011).

Figure 2. Rules in the Performance of Routines



Source: D’Adderio, 2008

Moreover, Geiger and Shroder (2014) suggest that rules are routines’ building blocks. Yet they claim that maintaining the difference between rules and routines is important given their contra-factual stable<sup>6</sup> nature. They define rules as a normative behavioral expectation that results from collective construct and that maintains organizational boundaries. Rules, therefore, sanction power and allow for reprimand. Nevertheless, their general and abstract nature does not allow for direct

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<sup>6</sup> Contra-factual stability refers to the stability of the formal rule despite rule violation; even if violated it might remain unchanged.

execution; they require local interpretation. Hence, they posit that routines remain the enactment rule interpretation (Geiger & Shroder, 2014).

Notwithstanding this marked advancement in the importance of artifacts, rule proliferation is not a concern of organizational routines. The field of organizational routines considers rules as guiding and constraining artifacts shaping actions. Therefore, this body of work does not investigate the production of rules except in the event where the creation of an organizational rule becomes a routine itself by its repetitive and recognizable patterns of actions involving multiple actors.

Table 1. Literature Review: Rules as Peripheral Topic of Research

Theory	Authors	Methodology	Unit of analysis	Object of study	Level of rule study	Description
<b>Organizational Routines</b>	Cyert and March, 1963	Grounded theorizing	Organization	Rule-based decision making, the logic of appropriateness, routines, standard operating procedures (SOP)	SOP as an organizational rule  Rule-based decision making	The behavioral theory of organizing redefined organization theory following the economic paradigm. The limited computational capability of actors, evolving preferences, and behavior (is routine) is driven by rules and routines rather than consequences. This represents a move in the rational ideology. It discusses the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness. If one is a true believer in the logic of consequences, using the logic of appropriateness will allow one to get the best outcome. As rules have evolved to be functionally best, one can predict the rules from the consequences. The logic of appropriateness claims that one has learned that the appropriate thing to do is using the logic of consequence, that is, calculate the expected value and choose the highest value; it's an appropriate rule.
	Nelson and Winter, 1982	Theoretical	Routines	Evolution of routines	Rules as a routine-based	Routines' evolutionary theory emerged from the fact that rules are routine-based behavior. There exists very little disagreement between Nelson, Winters, and March. They are quite complementary theories. The major difference lies in the emphasis placed on different concepts. Evolutionary theory claims that the best rules arise and stay, whereas prior March's view doesn't make that claim.
	Feldman, 2000	Qualitative (grounded theorizing)	Organizational routines	Organizational routines	Rules as artifacts enabling organizational routine	Organizational routines are defined as repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by actors. They have been characterized as effortful accomplishments and even as potential sources for change. This paper offers a performative model of routines. It postulates that routines

						change according to past performances. It integrates agency into the construct of routines and allows for routines to evolve and change following the agents' reflections and experiences.
	Feldman and Pentland, 2003		Internal dynamics of routines (ostensive-performative)	Organizational routines	Rules as artifacts enabling organizational routine	This paper builds upon Feldman (2000)'s performativity of routines and revives Latour's ostensive and performative dimensions in order to challenge the traditional belief that routines create inertia in organizations; rather it postulates that as a result of the agency integration into the construct of routine, organizational routines can bring change as well as stability.
	Pentland and Feldman, 2005	Conceptual	N.A.	Organizational routines	Rules as artifacts enabling organizational routine	This paper offers an in-depth analysis of units of analysis for the study of organizational routines under the ostensive-performative perspective. It opens up the routine construct to look at analysis possibilities such as artifacts, relations between artifacts and routines, the relationship between ostensive and performative, the relationship between performative and artifact, and the relationship between ostensive and artifact.
	D'Adderio, 2008	Qualitative	Artefact-performativity of routines	Artifacts as enablers of organizational routines	Rules as enablers of organizational routines	Routines differ from rules provided that they represent artifacts enabling enactment thereof. Scholars have even researched the relationship between rules and routines. D'Adderio examines rules and other artifacts in the enactment of routines and finds that technology integration can result in more efficient routine performance.
	Feldman, Pentland, D'Adderio & Lazaric, 2016	Qualitative	Routines, routine interaction	Routines internal dynamics, routines as enablers of change, stability, and innovation	Rules as artifacts enabling organizational routine	Routines are repetitive recognizable patterns of actions carried out by multiple actors. However, they also possess a temporal dimension. This means that routines cannot take place instantaneously or persist continuously, implying that they can change from one iteration to the next. This paper examines the work of others on routine interaction, emergence, or change. It also explores how routine promotes innovation. They look at importing routines from other organizations as well as reshaping them in order to promote novelty.



Complex organizations	Gouldner, 1954	Grounded theorizing	Coordination relationships	Coordination problems, close supervision	Rules as a substitute to close supervision Rule production	Bureaucratic rules can be preferable substitutes to close supervision. They are less ambiguous than direct orders, sensibly designed, and understood as more definite than direct orders. Because of their definitive and official nature, punishment is another characteristic associated with rules.
	Hrebreniak, 1978	Conceptual	N.A.	Complex organizations	Rules as a component of the complex organization Rule production	Examines rule growth as a characteristic of the complex organization and as they relate to rational decision making. Rules make decision making easier; explaining a phenomenon by which rules mass grows excessively Yet, rules created in different logics might come into conflict with customer needs.
	Perrow, 1986	Theoretical	Complex organizations	Power, actors, and decision making in complex organizations.	Rules as a component of the complex organization Rule production	Reduced arbitrary decision making caused by amplified bureaucratic complexity and increased rule structure.
Red Tape Theory	Kaufman 1977 (v. 2015)	Conceptual			Rule as a characteristic of red tape Rule production	Kaufman's work attempts at understanding why a phenomenon like bureaucracy that is despised by a great majority seems to endure through time and flourish. One of the aspects of understanding comes from the relativity of red tape; what appears superfluous to one, can appear necessary to others. Kaufman also looks into the origins of red tape in our governments, and it appears to emerge from the diversity of values to which people in society adhere, from the varied demands expressed to governments, and from the responsiveness to these demands.
	Bozeman, Reed & Scott, 1992	Quantitative case study	Time (delay) to achieve an activity	Red tape	Rules as a component of red tape	This study undertakes the examination of delays to undertake and complete activities within an R & D organization. They found that red tape might be intensified in personnel-related areas.

					Rule production	
	Bozeman, 1993;	Conceptual	N.A.	Red tape	Rules as a component of red tape  Rule production	<p>This paper looks at the understudied phenomenon of government red tape to formulate a theory and to understand why governments tend to have more red tape than other types of organizations.</p> <p>The term rule density is introduced to indicate the extent of rules and regulations pertaining to an organization in relation to total resources. Red tape theory distinguishes between dysfunctional-from-the-start rules (rule-inception red tape) and rules that were perceived to have a purpose in the beginning and that changed over time (rule-evolved red tape).</p>
	Bozeman & Feeney, 2014	Collective work (collection of articles)	N.A.	Red tape	Rules as a component of red tape  Rule production	<p>This book is a collection of papers that extensively reviews learnings and develops a research agenda with regard to red tape theory. They argue that there is still scarce formal (scientific) knowledge provided that only a few scholars work on the subject; this means that judgment on red tape is mainly informed based on ordinary (common) knowledge, which can prove to be biased or even misguided at times. They aim to develop a research agenda for those few scholars working in the field and connect with other public administration researchers.</p>

### 1.3 Rule as Central of Object of Focus

Other streams of research in organization theory made rules and rule dynamics their central object of focus; they are summarized in Table 2. I have selected organizational learning and bureaucracy theory due to their significant contribution to the development of a rule proliferation construct. These two bodies of work have mainly explored causal effects between rule growth and various organizational factors, using rule families as units of analysis (Beck, 2006; Levitt & March, 1988; March et al., 2000; Schulz, 1998; Zhou, 1993). Furthermore, I have complemented this review of organization studies literature with a review of the French School of the Sociology of Organizations for its contribution to the bureaucracy theory and to our understanding of the bureaucratic phenomenon, rule accumulation, and regulations (Crozier, 1964; Crozier & Friedberg, 1977; De Terssac, 2003; Friedberg, 1997; J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989, 1995; Terssac, 2012).

#### 1.3.1 Organizational Learning

The organizational learning view explains that rulemaking is a response to the flow of problems (Levitt & March, 1988). Organizational learning scholars see rules as an encapsulation of organizational knowledge upon problem resolution. The organization faces a problem, and actors resolve it and therefore encode the resolution into a rule for future reference (Levitt & March, 1988; Schulz, 1998; Zhou, 1993). As rule mass increases in response to problems, problem opportunities decrease. Moreover, as administrators acquire experience working with rules, they might be able to absorb more problems with them. This process is called absorption (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000). Hence, rule growth is a consequence of problem resolution.

Whether it is by trial and error, contagion, imitation, or adaptation, this aggregation and stratification phenomenon is rarely the result of individual actions. Sometimes, however, rules are offered new interpretations rather than revised (March, Schulz, Zhou, 2000). Even if rule adaptation is local and some rule boundaries exist (Schulz, 1998); the ecology of rules still connects them. Any rule change has the potential of impacting other rules.

March, Schulz, and Zhou were the first scholars to discuss the construct of rule proliferation. First, Zhou (1993) looked at the temporality of rules by observing their path dependency. He looked at factors enticing rule change such as attention allocation and government intervention. Nevertheless, the variable utilized to measure attention allocation (i.e., meeting agendas) remains a questionable proxy since it only accounts for documented attention to the rule and is not necessarily representative of the attention allocation that is unofficial. Schulz (1998) then studied the birth rate of rules within the ecology of rules to understand the dynamics of rule creation.

From an organizational learning perspective, rules are social since they are derived from social problems. They are a reality of social life and regulate behavior. They consist of explicit and implicit norms that become artifacts of collective life and symbols of order (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000; Pentland & Feldman, 2005). A rule is a structure portraying a social reality (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000). It contributes to coordinating efforts toward shared goals and hence, making decisions that enhance performance (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000). Rules have social and systemic features that translate into what March, Schulz, and Zhou (2000) call the ecology of rules. This system of rules is bounded, yet they share barriers. This means that the ecologies of written rules and rulemaking are intertwined. When a rule is changed or created, it has a ripple effect on other written rules (March, Schulz, Zhou, 2000). Yet, the quantitative method adopted for this study does not support this theory in full. Some of their hypotheses remained unsupported. They found some factors that could influence rule proliferation such as changing preferences, new knowledge and learning, and problems that are not addressed by current rules. Nevertheless, because of the nature of their quantitative methodology, they could not track the complexity of the ripple effect created by rule proliferation.

Rules are part of an ecology in which one change can affect other parts of the system. Whether they are technical or political problem encodings, rule content records information about the

company's past problems or anticipated matters. Their evolving nature makes them temporary stable structures, creating path dependencies, and making the interpretation sometimes reliant on the context during which the rule was established. Furthermore, rules are generated through the contribution of a wide array of internal and external sources (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000). As such, rules resolve tensions or conflicts and can be a sign of victory or power (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000).

Organizational learning offers considerable insights into rule dynamics. Nonetheless, most of this field's findings were derived from quantitative studies; hence processual insights into rule growth could further contribute to understanding the rule growth and rule proliferation phenomena. Furthermore, some of the hypotheses remain unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, the single-case study conducted by March, Schulz, and Zhou presented a few methodological flaws which could explain why some theories were left unsupported. For instance, this quantitative single-case faced many challenges in variable selection, proxies, and measurements. Measuring attention paid to rules is very difficult; in this particular case, authors measured attention paid by agents via their mentions in past documents. In addition, March, Schulz and Zhou (2000) worked with the assumption that rule change is decoupled from other changes in the ecology. However, rules are also born from internal dynamics within the ecology of rules, by usage and application (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988; March et al., 2000; Scott R. & Levinthal, 1985). As a result, empirical evidence does not fully support the ecology of rules interconnectedness.

Organizational learning scholars have long studied rules and rule proliferation. They have classified rules as written versus unwritten to evaluate their degree of formality. As such, written rules are perceived as more formal and hold a higher level of legitimacy. Organizational learning scholars were also amongst the first to refer to rule proliferation as a construct. In this view rule proliferation is a result of problem resolution. As more rules are created, more problems can be

handled, and the rate of rule creation diminishes as a result. Written rules are created through the process of formalizing unwritten rules. This is a very interesting framework that will help us understand rule proliferation. Nevertheless, organizational learning is primarily studied at the organizational level and does not study the flow of problems that leads to rule proliferation.

Moreover, past research has shown to be strictly quantitative to measure changes in rule family composition. The quantitative nature of these studies allowed observing large amounts of data, however, did not permit to clearly define the process of rule proliferation. They did formulate hypotheses about rule proliferation that were not always supported by their data. This study invites further research on rule proliferation that would be more focused on the descriptive process by which rules increase in number. Learning from these works, I will also use a university setting to conduct an embedded case study. Their learning experience of their fieldwork is useful for this project.

Further, they classified the families of rules studied in terms of institutional logic. I postulate that pluralism is an important aspect of rule proliferation; therefore, defining the institutional logic to which rules belong throughout the project will be essential in understanding rule proliferation in relation to pluralism. Yet, given that I want to learn in fine detail the process of proliferation, I selected one rule instead of families of rules. Notwithstanding, early theorizing generated through preliminary data collection demonstrates some shortcomings of the organizational learning theory. For instance, although rulemaking appears to be broadly part of an organizational problem-solving process, it turns out that the rule resulting from this type of process could be one of the outcomes and not the solution itself. For instance, in a context where there might be tension between individuals, the creation of the rule can become a way to appease the situation without addressing the problem head-on. Hence the problem still exists, yet administrators give the appearance of solving the tension.

### 1.3.2 Bureaucracy Theory

Stemming from sociology, the bureaucracy theory has for over a century mainly examined rules and the addition of rules as an attribute of the bureaucratic organization in its rational form (Adler, 2012; Beck Jørgensen, 2012; Weber, 1968). Over the last two decades, scholars revived this theory with multiple contributions (Adler, 2012).

Based on Weber's teachings stating that bureaucratic control results in more efficient solutions, the bureaucracy theory postulates that there will be a growth of rules in organizations (Beck, 2006; Weber, 1968). This increase limits the ability of individuals to exercise decision making and reduces their discretion area. According to Weber, rules are one of the main characteristics of a bureaucratic organization (Hodson et al., 2013; Weber, 1968). He described the bureaucratic organization as having the following characteristics: it makes use of comprehensive written rules; it divides its structures into specialized departments; it possesses a clear and integrated hierarchical system; it offers formal training to bureaucrats in their domain of expertise and management, and the duties represent the employees' main work; their position is the property of the organization and the employee shall leave it upon retirement (Hodson et al., 2013). Domination of subordinates through hierarchies is an important characteristic of bureaucracies (Courpasson, 2000; Gouldner, 1954; Perrow, 1986; Weber, 1968).

Kafka studies are another interesting branch of bureaucratic research. According to Hodson et al. (2013), the Kafkan bureaucracy is spreading in the private sector, while Weberian bureaucracy would be more prevalent in the public sector. As opposed to Weberian bureaucratic rationality, the Kafkan bureaucracy is characterized by "particularism, chaos, contested goals, abuse of power and a climate of uncertainty and fear" (Hodson et al., 2013: 1252). The argument brought forth is that external goals in private organizations are rarely negotiated; they are driven by profitability. Hence,

rules that hinder the achievement of these goals or create inefficiencies will be skirted or rewritten (Crozier, 1964; Gouldner, 1954; Hodson et al., 2013).

Kafka and Weber are undoubtedly two great influences in the bureaucracy theory who both left their distinct mark. While they look at the same phenomenon from different angles; they both enrich bureaucratic studies (Beck Jørgensen, 2012). Kafka described and caricatured how actors experience bureaucracy as well as its human impacts. Through Jørgensen's analysis of the overlap between Weber and Kafka, we can see that Kafka attempts to portray the bureaucratic phenomenon with the fiction of reality; whilst Weber's focus was primarily on the process of bureaucratization and the bureaucratic organization itself. Thus, there are two main ways to examine the bureaucratic phenomenon: one is by looking at the bureaucratic organization and its characteristics, and the other is by observing the actors involved in it.

Looking at the actors' perspectives, Adler (2012) offered an interesting theoretical review of the Marxist theory by revisiting sociological pillars going from Weber to Gouldner. He postulates that actors are ambivalent about bureaucracy due to its simultaneously enabling and coercive nature. This means that while some working environments can be perceived as coercive by their actors, other organizational settings such as Toyota, can use formalization and standardization positively. Adler concludes that Weber's view and natural system theorists' perspective is based on an important assumption that can lead to misconception. They believe that actors value autonomy over interdependence. This misconception will inevitably lead to conclude that bureaucracy results in feelings of alienation (Adler, 2012).

Nevertheless, if we look at bureaucracy theory from an institutional perspective, Jennings et al. (2005) conducted a quantitative single longitudinal study examining the evolution of a set of legal rules, more specifically, the United States Water Act. This case study was aimed at understanding how legal rules proliferate over time. They found that the complexification process was not as



straightforward as initially imagined since the Water Act was in fact rationalized at certain points in history. Rationalization means that the rule was examined and reviewed to increase its effectiveness. Nevertheless, this rationalization led to the proliferation of other legal rules outside of the Water Act as well as the simplification of some rules within the Act by combining them. Because of case boundaries, proliferation outside of the Water Act was not analyzed. Therefore, it was difficult for researchers to observe proliferation beyond this ruleset. There were major reforms throughout the life of the Act that resulted in the Water Act simplification by transferring segments of laws to other Acts. Case boundaries along with the comparative quantitative nature of the project limited our understanding of rule proliferation.

Even so, Jennings et al. (2005) used punctuated equilibrium theory to explain the periods when social, political, or economic pressure points led to more significant changes in the Water Act. One shortcoming of this prolific study is the lack of a qualitative description of the proliferation phenomenon. This paper opens on a series of hypotheses to demonstrate in a future empirical study, correlations between the frequency of usage of a specific law and the number of revisions that will ensue.

More recently, Beck (2006) explored correlations between organizational size and rule growth to establish causality between size, the number of divisions, and the number of employees with the number of rules (Beck, 2006). This single quantitative case study conducted in Europe demonstrating the growth of rules over time, was the first empirical study that could be associated with a construct of rule proliferation by its concern with the increase in rules as a result of size and organizational complexity. The generalization of this case study is limited, but it is grounded on the strong conceptual foundation that is Weber's, the contingency view, and the neoinstitutional theory. According to Beck (2006), who cited Burr (1998), because the organization will continuously seek increasingly performing structures, it will experience growth in its body of rules

(Beck, 2006). The growth in formal internal rules according to Beck is primarily observed in the sets of rules, this means in terms of the number of pages per rule.

The bureaucracy theory started by looking at rules as attributes of the bureaucratic organization. The recent advancement of the field in defining rules more specifically, however, contributes more importantly to our research project. Beck (2006) refers to internal rules as the mass of rules generated with operational purposes; whereas he refers to general rules as the set of rules organizations create in response to legislation and societal expectations (Beck, 2006). Rule proliferation is pivotal to our research program. Rule proliferation and rule growth have been important aspects of bureaucracy research over the last 15 years. Their quantitative exploration of rule mass growth contingent upon the complexification of the organization inspires the foundation of this thesis. Nevertheless, the highly quantitative nature of the field leaves many hypotheses and questions unanswered. Questions that could be tackled more comprehensively using a processual approach. For instance, bureaucracy scholars took interest in rule proliferation factors but have not yet defined the process by which rules proliferate. The bureaucracy theory embraces a linear approach to rulemaking where institutions influence organizations in their makeover. It does not look into rules leading to the creation of more rules as a cyclical phenomenon. As such, bureaucracy theory is anchored in neoinstitutionalism which examines, among others, the influence of institutions on organizations. However, an important underlying assumption of this theory is an additional cognitive effect in which actors make decisions because they don't see any other alternatives or because of institution-inculcated convictions. In light of my preliminary data collection, this current study does not limit itself to this perspective on decision making.

The bureaucracy theory emerged from sociology and contributed immensely to organizational studies and our understanding of rule proliferation. Hence, it is useful to broaden our scope and

look at other important contributions made by the sociology of organizations to our understanding of rules.

### 1.3.3 The French School of the Sociology of Organizations

Management scholars examine how decisions are made inside organizations, the evolution of organizational forms as well the impact of those actions and decisions on actors and resource allocation. Political studies take interest in complex bureaucracies along with their constraints to demystify their logic and elaborate policies and implement public action (Friedberg, 1997: 37). The sociology of organizations lies at the junction of organization and management theory and political studies, and examines actors' behavior, decision making, and motives; it takes particular interest in the political dimension of organizations. In fact, the sociology of organizations brought important contributions to organization studies. The bureaucracy theory founded by Max Weber, which we discussed earlier, is one of its early contributions and has recently been skillfully applied by scholars such as Beck, Jennings, and Hodson to management studies.

Inspired by Weber, Crozier (1964)'s seminal work was instrumental in defining the sociology of organizations. Crozier's work is one of the pillars of what is currently known as the French School of Sociology of Organizations. He was curious about vicious circles similar to those studied in the red tape theory. Rules are perceived as hindering organizational learning and the creative process (Crozier, 1964; Herdberg et al., 1976). Nevertheless, he suggested that they also reduce arbitrary decision making (Crozier, 1964) as brought forth by Gouldner (1954) in his study of industrial organization. Furthermore, Crozier (1964) refers to rules as resulting from actors meeting, who, in part involuntarily, give rise to a (more or less) deliberate strategy and define the state of their relationships with each other. He claims that the presence of excessive organizational regulation results in a lack of efficiency and initiative since rules cannot possibly anticipate every possible

outcome. Organizational paralysis caused by excessive regulation leads to a minority of actors enjoying more power whether it is outside or inside of the regulatory framework (Crozier, 1964).

Crozier paved the way for two main branches of research to grow. The first one, led by Crozier and Friedberg, was focused on rules as constructed by the strategic behavior of actors. This field is known as strategic actor theory or strategic analysis. The second one, initiated by Jean-Daniel Reynaud, developed a social framework in which regulation, being the ability to generate rules (Reynaud, 2003), is the product of collective action.

First, Crozier and Friedberg (1977) pursued Crozier's work by examining power relations and rule development; they did so by observing strategic games played by actors in organizations (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977). In the strategic actor theory, the actor contributes to the creation and structuration of regulations. They are active players in the system. As such, actors' behavior cannot be determined or explained solely by the system's coherence and objectives, or simply by its environmental constraints as stipulated by early management theorists such as Fayol and Taylor. Therefore, this theory depicts how collective actions are constructed from behaviors and individual interests that seem contradictory and differ from the system's objectives. To do this, they use methodological individualism which is a sociological construct postulating that collective action must be described and explained by the aggregation of individual actions (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977).

Friedberg (1997) advanced strategic actor theory by raising fundamental sociological questions and by attempting to abolish important barriers in conventional sociological research. Fundamentally, Friedberg questioned the assumption separating "actor research" and "systems research" which implies that actors cannot be both individual actors and collective actors. Moreover, he criticized traditional definitions of organizations by questioning actors' relative rationality, as well as organizational borders and their coherence (Friedberg, 1997). In doing so,

this work attempted to marry the study of organizations (systems) with the study of collective action (actors, both individual and collective). By deconstructing the definition of organization, he concluded that any type of collective action is in some regard 'organized'. According to Friedberg, organizations are therefore another degree of organized collective action. In the second part of his 1997 publication on organized collective action<sup>7</sup>, Friedberg zeroed in on the study of rule, games, and power to understand the strategic behavior of actors in which legitimacy plays a central role. Legitimacy is a quality used in sociology to characterize an actor, collective actor, or artifact who commands power, authority, and obedience. Power is described as an uneven and fluctuating resource and a relational construct. In this organized collective action, actors are interdependent, but their reciprocal relationships are asymmetrical. This means that access to resources, information, other actors as well as power is uneven. Their access to objects and artifacts such as rules (these rules which will, in turn, define their problems and guide them in resolving them) is shifting and unequal.

Foudriat (2016) further developed this field by exploring the co-construction of organizational representations (Foudriat, 2016). Social representations are perceptions of social structures that are co-constructed with shared values, ideas, beliefs, and practices (Moscovici, 2001). These representations are generated by organizational learning taking place through constraints faced by actors in the context of their work. These constraints can be the result of rules, interdependence with other actors' tasks, available resources, or perceptions of resources available to complete their tasks. Hence, there can exist as many representations as there are individuals, and the co-construction of these representations is ongoing provided that learning is continuous, and practices are evolving.

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<sup>7</sup> Le Pouvoir et la règle (1997)

The second branch stemming from Crozier's work is Reynaud's social regulation theory (SRT). SRT is the study of the tension between a control regulation and a clandestine regulation (Reynaud, 1988). Regulation is the ability to develop rules. The control regulation is the displayed regulation; this means the set of rules that are perceived as official and by which formal roles are assigned, formal sanctions are specified, and which is usually defined and managed by people holding the most formal power. The clandestine or autonomous regulation is developed by the workers in order to balance the control regulation and ensure the daily functioning of the organization. Contrarily to the control regulation, it does not have a stake in legitimacy (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995); this regulation can be very informal. As such, it is also referred to as internal regulation due to its internal logic legitimacy. Internal logical legitimacy means that it holds informal power. In case of non-abidance to the autonomous regulation sanctions can involve interiorized reprimands and some degree of organized reprimand that is informal. Internal regulation hence entails compromise between one's autonomy and others' (De Terssac, 2003) for the functioning of the collective action.

De Terssac complemented Reynaud's work by contributing to the negotiation between these two regulations. Whether they are in contradiction or not, control (external) and autonomous (internal) regulation; these regulations are more or less distant from each other leaving a space that requires negotiating in some way or other (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995; Terssac, 2012). Therefore, this negotiation does not entail imperfect application of formal regulation but rather distorting or bending its application to accommodate the emergence of diverging interests (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). De Terssac (2012) explains this area of compromise with the paradigm of negotiation. This space and negotiation are necessary as a result of opposing forces of objectivity (control regulation) and subjectivity (autonomous regulation).

Jean-Daniel Reynaud and De Terssac were followed by Benedicte Reynaud who, based on SRT, conducted a qualitative longitudinal case study. Her conclusions contributed to organizational

routines by suggesting that routines clarify and stabilize the incompleteness of rules (Reynaud, 2001).

As described, the sociology of organizations contributes greatly to understanding the construction of regulations as well as actors' roles in the development and proliferation of rules. It harmonizes the understanding of actors, the understanding of collective action as an organization as well as the construction of rules and regulations.

This literature review discussed research addressing rules, rule production and rule proliferation. The next section conducts a critical analysis of literature that is instrumental in refining our understanding of the construct of rule proliferation.

Table 2. Literature Review: Rules as Central Topic of Research

Theory	Authors	Methodology	Unit of analysis	Object of study	Level of rule study	Description
<b>Organizational learning</b>	Zhou, 1993	Quantitative, single longitudinal case study (Stanford rules)	Rule families	Rule changes at the rule family level	Rule definition Rule production	This paper is based on a longitudinal case study that took place at Stanford. Rule changes were assessed from the founding rules 100 years prior. The authors looked at path dependency, attention allocation, governmental intervention, and historical context to address the evolution of organizational rules. Evidence support that rules are path-dependent, sensitive to agenda-setting, adapt to government constraints, and can be institutionalized.
	Schulz, 1998	Quantitative, single longitudinal case study (Stanford rules)	Rule families	Rule changes at the rule family level	Rule definition Rule production Rule proliferation	This study uses population ecology to explore whether rules breed more rules. This is a study of rule production and rule proliferation. The results demonstrate that by increasing the number of rules they increase their ability to cope with a diverse array of problems and the birth rate will lower.
	March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000	Quantitative, single longitudinal case study (Stanford rules)	Rule families	Rule changes at the rule family level	Rule definition Rule production Rule proliferation	Rules are coded from experience. It assumes that more experience leads to more intelligent behavior (problems with evolutionary theory), but preferences change, rules solve problems in a sense, the problem space gets smaller. It postulates that over time, rules experience decreasingly fewer changes.
<b>Bureaucracy theory</b>	Kafka (Hodson et al. 2013)	Fiction of reality	Organizational	Bureaucratic organizations	Rules as an attribute of the bureaucratic organization	Kafka described and caricatured how actors experience bureaucracy as well as its human impacts. Through Jorgensen's analysis of the overlap between Weber and Kafka, we can see that Kafka attempts to portray the bureaucratic phenomenon with fictions of reality. Kafkaian bureaucracy is characterized by "particularism,



						chaos, contested goals, abuse of power and a climate of uncertainty and fear”.
	Weber, 1968	Theoretical	Organizational/rule mass	Bureaucratic organizations	Rules as an attribute of the bureaucratic organization	Weber proposed that rules and the addition of rules as attributes of the bureaucratic organization in its rational form (Weber, 1968).
	Jenning et al. 2005	Quantitative	One set of legal rules (Water Act)	Rules and rule proliferation	Rule definition Rule production Rule proliferation	The authors examine the evolution of a set of legal rules (the U.S. Water Act) over its lifetime and identify macroenvironmental pressures that entice rule proliferation. They define the concept of rule proliferation and use punctuate equilibrium theory to depict major shifts in the Water Act’s life.
	Beck, 2006	Quantitative	Rule mass (one bank)	Rule growth	Rule definition Rule production	Beck explored correlations between organizational size and rule growth to establish causality between size, number of divisions, and number of employees with the number of rules.
<b>Sociology of organizations</b>	Crozier, 1964	Ethnography	Bureaucratic organization	Power, strategic actor and interrelations	Rules as a component of the bureaucratic organization  Rule production	Crozier explores and exposes power relations and dependency caused by human collaboration.
	Crozier & Friedberg, 1977	Grounded theorizing	The actor	Methodological individualism and collective action; zones of uncertainty, areas of discretion, power collective action	Rules as a component of the bureaucratic organization  Rule production	This research indicates that the actor contributes to the creation and structuration of regulations as an active player in the system; behavior cannot be determined or explained solely by the system’s coherence and objectives, or simply by its environmental constraints.
	Reynaud, 1988; 1989; 1995	Literature review, Methodological individualism	Regulation	Collective action, collective project, regulations	Rule as a component of the regulation and the product of actor’s exchanges;	Studies tension between a control regulation, a set of rules that are perceived as official; and a clandestine regulation, is developed to ensure the daily functioning of the organization.

					Rule addition as a quest for further coherence	
	Friedberg, 1997 (first edition 1993)	Methodological individualism	Actor	Power, strategic actor and interrelations	Rules as artifact and resource  Rule production as a source of power and problem solving	This book attempts to marry the study of organizations (systems) with the study of collective action (actors, both individual and collective). He defines the organization as an organized collective action in which actors are interdependent, but their reciprocal relationships are asymmetrical.
	De Terssac, 2003; 2012	Literature review	Regulation	Regulation, negotiation, rule, conflict	Rule as a component of the regulation and the product of actor's exchanges; Rule addition as a quest for further coherence	This research contributes to understanding the negotiation between these two regulations.
	Reynaud, 2001	Longitudinal case study	Organization	Routines, rules, regulations	Rule as an incomplete interdependent artifact that cannot be interpreted without other rules comprised within the set	This research contributes to organizational routines by suggesting that routines clarify and stabilize the incompleteness of rules.
	Foudriat, 2016	Conceptual	Actors	Organizational representation, co-construction	Rules as an artifact in co-construction of organizational representations	This research examines organizational representations. These representations result from learning and constraints faced by actors while completing their work. These constraints can be the result of rules, interdependence with other actors' tasks, available resources, or perceptions of resources available to complete their tasks.


## 1.4 Critical Analysis of Literature

In this section, I conduct a critical analysis of the literature. This analysis contributes to further our understanding of the complex construct of rule proliferation.

The impressive number of research fields that have looked into rules and rule production is remarkable. What's more, the ever-increasing growth in bureaucratic structures has been the subject of social humor, fiction as well as the subject of organizational theory study. It is striking, however, to realize that despite such broad coverage in the literature, limited empirical studies have specifically focused on the subject and that the qualitative process of proliferation has yet to be described and illustrated.

The analysis of the literature resulted in the identification of three important constructs that need to be understood when it comes to the study of rule proliferation: (1) rules, (2) rule production, and (3) rule proliferation. As such and as depicted in Figure 3, these constructs are linked to each other. Construct one is required to understand construct two. Similarly, construct number two is required to understand construct number three. Therefore, to develop a rule proliferation construct, I need to master the construct of (1) rules and (2) rule production, which entails the process of rulemaking, and (3) rule proliferation, which implies that rules multiply in organizations.

Figure 3. Depth of Rule Study



They consist of three depth levels of construct development because rules must be understood before examining rule production. Thus, rules are the foundation. Further, I must understand the production of a rule to develop a rule proliferation construct. Table 3 shows that all fields have looked at rules, but theories that have explored rules indirectly have mostly remained at the rule level. Complex organizations studies and the red tape theory have also looked at rule production. Conversely, those fields of research that have studied rules more directly have reached deeper levels of analysis such as organizational learning, the bureaucracy theory, and the sociology of organizations, and have contributed to understanding rule proliferation.

Table 3. Objects of Rule Study

<b>Object of rule study</b>	<b>Theories</b>	<b>Studied rule indirectly or directly</b>
Rules	<b>Organizational routines</b> Red Tape Theory Complex organizations Organizational learning Bureaucracy theory	<b>Indirectly</b> Indirectly Indirectly Directly Directly
Rule production	<b>Red Tape Theory</b> <b>Complex organizations</b> <b>Sociology of organizations</b> Organizational learning Bureaucracy theory	<b>Indirectly</b> <b>Indirectly</b> <b>Directly</b> Directly Directly
Rule proliferation	<b>Sociology of organizations</b> <b>Bureaucracy theory</b>	<b>Directly</b> <b>Directly</b>

#### 1.4.1 Rules

Rules are an important mechanism of organizational routines. As such, organizational routines scholars are most specifically interested in behavior and hence significantly contributed to our understanding of rules and how they guide organizational routines. Consequently, organizational routines have not contributed to rule production and rule proliferation research.

#### 1.4.2 Rule Production

Complex organizations scholars who are more curious about the organization itself, observed rule production. For a variety of reasons, the creation of rules takes place to manage work relationships among actors, whether it is for managerial motives, for rational decision making, for power and organization of interpersonal relations.

The red tape theory scholars are fascinated with rules, regulations, and inefficiencies in governmental organizations. Hence, they studied rulemaking as a mechanism in the creation of red tape. Only, rules are not the only kind of existing red tape. An empirical case study of a Research & Development firm demonstrates that protocols and other activities can also serve as red tape (Bozeman et al., 1992). On the downside, the red tape theory is limited to public administration and very few scholars within the field. This makes the study of rules and rule-making an understudied field of public administration.

#### 1.4.3 Rule Proliferation


Organizational learning scholars studied rules much more directly and much more closely. A Ph.D. thesis director, March supervised the work of both Schulz and Zhou. Throughout their doctoral work, they undertook the study of rules at Stanford University over a period of 100 years. As shown in Table 2 from the literature review section, this led to important contributions on rules, rule production, and rule proliferation. They demonstrated that rule proliferation raises on a declining rate curve. This means that with a higher number of rules comes a lower birth rate since rules in place will be able to cope with more potential problems. In their collective work of 2000, March, Schulz, and Zhou pooled their rule and rule proliferation knowledge to elaborate on their findings of the Stanford project. The large quantity of data analyzed led to findings of causal relationships between attention allocation, government interventions, path dependency, and rule proliferation. Nevertheless, the quantitative approach prevented an in-depth understanding of the proliferation construct that explains how this process happens and why.

The bureaucracy theory is the oldest field of research that initiated discussions on rules. The construct definition developed for rule proliferation describing rule content complexification, rule changes, and rule additions (Jennings et al., 2005), has been instrumental in shaping this doctoral thesis. Nevertheless, case boundaries applied in empirical testing, as well as quantitative analysis

methods, did not allow to illustrate the process of rule proliferation (Beck, 2006; Jennings et al., 2005). The bureaucracy theory is one of many research branches to emerge from the sociology of organizations as depicted in Figure 4. This figure illustrates the junction and evolution of various fields of research that contributed to the study of rules whether it was directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, subsequent theories of sociology of organizations such as SRT and the strategic actor theory explore rule production and rule addition that is continuous, without addressing the subject of rule proliferation.

This analysis highlights the major contributions made to the study of rules and rule proliferation. Research has addressed rules as artifacts, limits, structures as well as their effectiveness (or lack thereof) in framing and guiding behavior. Rules' perceived lack of effectiveness in a given context can result in overflow, triggering rule changes and tension in the regulation process. Notwithstanding, past research has failed to describe and understand the process of proliferation.

Figure 4. Organization of Literature





Organizational learning's research is specific to rule proliferation. Furthermore, organizational learning publications inventoried were all generated from a university setting, the same empirical setting chosen for this specific thesis. Therefore, it makes the field of organizational learning very important to our project. Nevertheless, the preliminary data gathered during early theorizing partly conflict with the organizational learning theory. Organizational learning postulates that rules are an encapsulation of learning and knowledge; whereas I found that rules may at times be the encapsulation of information that prevents learning and knowledge to be captured.

The bureaucracy theory which in great part inspired this doctoral thesis remains highly appealing as a theoretical framework. Nonetheless, the bureaucracy theory adopts a linear approach to rule proliferation in which complexity and organizational size correlate. Further, it revolves around six main attributes of bureaucratic organizational structure. One of the attributes is impersonality in the application of rules. This specific attribute of the bureaucratic organization is incompatible with key underlying assumptions of this research project positing that rule overflows and human agency lead to interpretation. Provided the descriptive nature of our qualitative project, bureaucracy theory appears too rigid for our purposes. Yet, many variables identified in previous bureaucracy research such as rule mass can be useful in informing our data collection.

Organizational routines contribute to many fields of management and are an extremely active field of research. Yet this model is more concerned with the use of rules and does not sufficiently address rule dynamics in terms of rule proliferation. In order to select the most appropriate theoretical framework, I must address some important research objectives based on current shortcomings:

- 1) The complex process of rule proliferation has not been explored and developed. This means the way rule proliferation unfolds has not been captured in current literature. The quest for

understanding rule proliferation transcends organization studies, sociology, fiction, and practitioner's literature. It is described as a managerial problem because it complexifies organizational processes and decision making. Hence, understanding how rules proliferate can result in developing better solutions for complex organizations.

- 2) More specifically, a one-rule unit of analysis has never been used to fully understand the process of rule proliferation. Because rules, as interconnected in the ecology of rules (March, Schulz and Zhou, 2000), are linked by so many influences, isolating one rule, allows one to zoom in more closely on the process and specific interconnections. By selecting a narrower unit, it makes it easier to zero in on the process.

Interestingly, the sociology of organizations is the only field of research having studied rules directly that has not yet addressed the topic of rule proliferation. It has however addressed the topics of vicious circles and continuous quest for coherence by the addition of rules. Accordingly, by illustrating and theorizing the process of rule proliferation at the organizational level, this doctoral work would contribute to both organization studies and the sociology of organizations. Moreover, the richness of a sociological framework allows one to appreciate very simply the various levels of analysis required for the study: the actor and the collective actors in its various forms (departments, organization, unions, institutional).

## 1.5 Rule Proliferation as a Social Phenomenon

The purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to capture the process of rule proliferation as a supple and spreadable phenomenon. It captures the phenomenon of rule proliferation by investigating the life of one rule from its birth and by analyzing the process by which this rule triggered rule proliferation. Hence the primary research question:

### ***Q1: How do rules proliferate***

I have demonstrated that organizational learning research has empirical shortcomings when it comes to explaining the rule proliferation phenomenon. Furthermore, the bureaucracy theory adopts a linear rule proliferation model as well as underlying assumptions that are constraining for this study. As such, I have mobilized the social regulation theory to refine our understanding of the construct. Moreover, SRT follows Crozier and Friedberg's (1977) strategic actor theory which will be instrumental in understanding the role of the actors in shaping rule proliferation.

The social regulation theory is an adaptable framework that examines tensions between regulations that are undergoing continuous negotiation. I qualify this framework as adaptable for three main reasons. First, its components are easily transferable from one empirical setting to another. Second, its components are malleable to a certain extent. For instance, tensions could be of various kinds. Furthermore, what makes an autonomous or control regulation is defined by a few important characteristics that should be respected, but these regulations are not predefined into rigid categories such as written or unwritten rules or informal or formal rules. Third, contrarily to the bureaucracy theory, it postulates very few underlying assumptions: social regulation emerges from collective action, actors in this collective action are boundedly rational and affective beings, the control and autonomous regulation can be conceptually dissociated, but cannot empirically be disconnected. This means that empirically, the social regulation theory requires the observation of all elements of the framework: actors, regulations, and interactions.

In this framework, tensions and negotiation result in recalibration. Tensions, recalibration, and negotiation between regulations are interesting lenses by which to explore rule proliferation. Further, in this doctoral dissertation, I examine whether proliferation intensity is accentuated by local conditions in different departments, leading into our secondary question:

## ***Q2: How do local conditions accentuate rule proliferation?***

The social regulation theory allows us to observe how autonomous and control regulations take form under different local conditions. Furthermore, following Crozier and Friedberg's tradition and leaning upon the strategic actor theory, we can observe various sub-units through a sociological perspective and assess the influence of actors on rule proliferation.

### **1.6 Conclusion**

Using the social regulation theory and building on important academic contributions made to the study of rules, this Ph.D. thesis adopts a one-rule unit of analysis. Provided the wide array of frameworks available, in the next chapter, I present SRT as my main theoretical framework, and I explain how SRT will be adapted for the study of rule proliferation.

## CHAPTER II

### SOCIAL REGULATION THEORY

#### 2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present the social regulation theory that will be mobilized as a theoretical framework, and I outlay a heuristic framework that illustrates how I use the social regulation theory to study rule proliferation.

#### 2.2 Social Regulation Theory

Reynaud's social regulation theory is grounded in Durkheim's work defining social constraint to action as necessary to social action. Social regulation consists of a set of rules that defines a common project. A collective project, which can be a firm, a social movement, or even the constitution of a state, is characterized by common rules for all actors involved (De Terssac, 2003; J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989) and defines collective interests (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). The meaning of these rules arises from their shared understanding and abidance (J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989). A good example of such collective action is an organization. An enterprise has a set of rules by which its constituents abide; it defines their roles and collective interests. Collective action is characterized by its community of rules that define rules belonging to such group and reprimands for breaching rules of belonging. This collective action is an imperfect system in constant

transformation and this imperfection is caused by the collective actor's continuous quest for further coherence (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995).

The social regulation theory examines regulations that are comprised of sets of rules. The need for rules emerges with the need for coordinating people. They are linked to a project connected to collective action (J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989, 1995). As such, the social regulation theory was in part inspired by previous sociological studies (Crozier, 1964; Crozier & Friedberg, 1977; Friedberg, 1997). Within this theory, three types of regulations interplay: control, autonomous, and effective. The theory explores tension and recalibration between the three regulations.

### 2.2.1 Control Regulation

The control regulation is explicit. Control rules are the most apparent ones and the ones first perceived in an organization. As such, they can be referred to as displayed rules. Different types of literature refer to explicit rules using different terms. Whether they are control, displayed, prescriptive, official, formal, or external rules, they are defined as those that are officially displayed (J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989, 1995). They can be rules of law that are published and which meaning is supported by jurisprudence; management and instruction manuals; standard operating procedures; moral rules and religious beliefs; traditions and customs (Cyert & March, 1963; J.-D. Reynaud, 1989), and so on. The control regulation defines responsibilities for the actors taking part in the collective action, along with the sanctions for breaching the rules. Furthermore, this regulation might include rules on how arguments or conflicts will be settled. Lastly, it is an explicit regulation, provided that it is developed in line with an external institutional logic (commercial, efficiency, legal, etc.) and it will inspire leaders' decision making (De Terssac, 2003; J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). Of course, a regulation's legitimacy and power are directly derived from its source. As such, its perceived legitimacy is externally-sourced and most often embraced by leadership (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995).

### 2.2.2 Autonomous Regulation

Implicit rules also referred to as autonomous, internal, clandestine, parallel, unofficial, dependent, indulgent, are typically experienced after a more in-depth involvement with the organization; this means that they are discovered through social relations. These rules ensure the daily functioning of the organization and contrarily to the control regulation, they do not have a stake in legitimacy (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). They entail reaching compromises between one's autonomy and others' (De Terssac, 2003) for the functioning of the collective action. In sum, their role is to guide internal collaboration, decision making as well as work procedures for them to be effective (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). They are meant to bring back some order to the external-looking regulation (control regulation). As such, this regulation is comprised of a set of rules that is interior-looking and typically based on a different institutional logic (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). Therefore, it has been suggested that leaders who apply the external regulation (control regulation) use a rational logic; whilst the executants who apply the internal regulation (autonomous regulation) use a sentiment-based logic. A rational logic is one where efficacy, coherence, and productivity are prized, whereas a sentiment-based logic is anchored in feelings and affects (J.-D. Reynaud, 1989).

These logics have been said to conflict (Gouldner, 1954), while other researchers suggest that the sentiment-based logic (internal) supports the rational-based one (external) in serving the organization's best interests. Nevertheless, in some instances, there is still a true conflict between displayed rules and autonomous rules – explicit and implicit. For example, an organization might claim that job promotions are based on merit whilst autonomous rules consist of promoting employees based on seniority (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). Whether they are in contradiction, the fact remains that these two regulations are more or less distant from each other leaving a space that requires negotiating in some way or other (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995; Terssac, 2012).

### 2.2.3 Effective Regulation

This system of rules still leaves a considerable negotiation space (De Terssac, 2012) between explicit and implicit; between the external and the internal. This space is where effective regulation lives. Effective rules take many shapes and can lead to joint regulations (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). These joint regulations can then lead to more formalized agreements. Although this process of negotiation can take the shape of formal negotiation, it largely occurs informally (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). Notwithstanding, this regulation is significant since it represents the rules of behaviors that are being enacted at a given time in an organization or social action; hence the name ‘real’ regulation (J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989, 1995). It characterizes an uncertain, moving, and unstable compromise between control (explicit) and autonomous (implicit) rules. The variety of such compromises is important as well as the process by which the compromise is reached. To illustrate a compromise between explicit and implicit, let us take speed limits for instance. Speed limits can be displayed at a maximum of 100 kilometers per hour. However, 115 kilometers per hour might be tolerated during certain periods. The effective rule is therefore not observable data; it is a compromise and is a negotiated space between regulation by authority (external/control) and regulation accepted by users (internal/autonomous) (J.-D. Reynaud, 1989). It is not observable and is learned by the non-application of reprimands for breaching by a certain degree at a given time.

In sum, there exists a divergence between a prescriptive regulation and a real regulation, between explicit and implicit. As aforementioned, informal regulation does not necessarily mean real regulation. Informal regulation is autonomous and emerges from the executant level; whilst the real regulation is the effective regulation that consists of a compromise between prescriptive and informal at any given point in time. This compromise can change depending on the tension between both regulations and circumstances. It involves executants’ judgment (Reynaud, 1995; De Terssac, 2012) and it represents daily internal transactions. Only, the effective regulation represents a methodological challenge; it is difficult to identify and limit. Provided the instability



of social systems and their blurry and fluctuating boundaries, they are in constant fluctuation. As such, observing historical data rather than conducting spontaneous analyses could be preferable (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995).

According to social regulation theory, this negotiation does not entail imperfect application of formal rules but rather distorting or bending their application to accommodate the emergence of diverging interests (Reynaud, 1995). De Terssac (2012) explains this area of compromise by the paradigm of negotiation that is deemed necessary as a result of opposing forces of objectivity (explicit) and subjectivity (implicit). The control regulation (explicit) tends to have a top-down direction; whereas the autonomous regulation (implicit) emerges from the ground up (Reynaud, 1995). Hence, from a strict hierarchical perspective, displayed rules (explicit) tend to own more formal power and legitimacy.

As such, effective rules are a space of negotiation between outside logic legitimacy and internal logic. As a result, and similar to autonomous rules, breaking effective rules might involve interiorized reprimands and some degree of organized reprimand from peers that is informal. Table 4 summarizes key features of control, autonomous and effective rules in terms of the type of constraint – characterized by the application of reprimand – they impose and the source of their legitimacy. These two attributes of regulation appear to be the defining factors in social regulation theory.

Table 4. Summary of Key Distinctions between the Regulations


<b>Rules</b>	<b>Constraint</b>	<b>Legitimacy</b>
Control/External	Serves to settle conflict, organized and institutionalized reprimand	External logic legitimacy
Autonomous/Internal	Interiorized and organized reprimand	Internal logic legitimacy
Effective/Real	Interiorized and organized reprimand	Compromise between internal and external logic

Dynamics of power within regulations usually take two shapes: from within or from without. In sum, some rules are established within a group and there are rules that are applied from the outside by an exterior party. For instance, there could be autonomous rules within a team and control rules applied to the team by its management. The aggregation of these two sets of rules, internal and external, regulates the way work will be carried out in its entirety, leading to the totality principle (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995) and resulting in the system of rules by which the collective action will take its course.

#### 2.2.4 Joint Regulation

Joint regulations (“55egulation conjointe” in French) (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995) are negotiated and more formalized agreements that act as new control regulations. This new control regulation is the negotiated outcome between control and autonomous rules. A collective agreement is a great example of a joint regulation since control rules created by management and autonomous rules put in place by the executant created enough tension to justify the negotiation of a joint regulation that will become a new form of control. Figure 5 depicts the interplay between the regulations giving rise to effective rules that can become formalized in the form of a joint regulation.

Figure 5. Types of Regulation in Social Regulation Theory



This dissertation aims at illustrating the rule proliferation process. The following section outlays how social regulation theory can be mobilized for exploring rule proliferation. To do so, a heuristic framework was developed.

### 2.3 Social Regulation Theory as a Heuristic Framework

This heuristic framework informs the collection and assessment of data. The literature review demonstrates that past studies have not developed and illustrated the process and construct of rule proliferation. Furthermore, the need to account for institutional and macroenvironment influences as described by Jennings et al. (2005), while considering both organization and actors, triggers a significant theoretical reflection for this project. Early theorizing generated by preliminary data

collection conflicts with specific organizational learning findings. Furthermore, the processual nature of this project calls for a framework that is non-linear to better explain the rule proliferation phenomenon. The social regulation theory examines the dynamic process of tension and negotiation between regulations (sets of rules) at the social and institutional levels of analysis (B. Reynaud, 2001; J.-D. Reynaud, 1988; J.-D. Reynaud & Richebé, 2009; Terssac, 2012). Hence, this framework depicts a dynamic process of regulation interplay that will clarify rule proliferation. In addition to accounting for institutional influences, this theory considers both the actor and collective action. Furthermore, Crozier's work and the strategic actor theory influenced SRT. Therefore, strategic actor theory will be instrumental in refining our understanding of how actors, embedded in social and temporal contexts, interpret and apply rules. Moreover, it will help us shed light on how this interaction between actors contributes to the shaping and manipulation of organizational regulations that possibly result in rule proliferation.

## 2.4 From Regulation to Rule Proliferation

Our objective is to mobilize the construct of social regulation to better shape our understanding of rule proliferation at the organizational level. I must therefore shed light on the organizational regulation process.

The social project is at the foundation of the social regulation theory. A social project is characterized by common rules for all actors involved (De Terssac, 2003; J.-D. Reynaud, 1989) and defines collective interests (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). The meaning of these rules arises through their shared understanding and abidance (J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1995). A good example of a social project is an organization. An organization is a collective action bounded by a co-constructed set of rules by which its constituents abide; it defines their roles and collective interests. This collective action is an imperfect system in constant transformation and this imperfection is caused by the

collective actor's continuous quest for further coherence (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). This cumulative process involves rule addition, accumulation, removal, adaptation. It also includes combinations of practices that were developed over different periods that were inspired by different events. This build-up of rules is thought to improve and complement the overall regulatory system. The social regulation theory views the increase in rules as the pursuit of further coherence and precision (J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989, 1995).

The social regulation theory not only considers regulations but also their creation and tensions between them. Tensions between regulations are the source of continuous recalibration is a theoretical abstraction of dynamic processes. This process-oriented approach is very useful to this Ph.D. dissertation provided that it examines regulation interactions, triggering the need for recalibration and rule addition (B. Reynaud, 2001; J.-D. Reynaud, 1988; J.-D. Reynaud & Richebé, 2009; Terssac, 2012). As such, I will develop the concept of rule proliferation by exploring the recalibration process.

## 2.5 Adopting a Social Regulation Theory Perspective on Rule Proliferation

The processual approach adopted by regulation theory is appealing to build upon in order to further develop a rule proliferation construct. However, the level of analysis requires alteration. The social regulation theory has looked at rules as they pertain to institutional and social regulations using a macro level of analysis.

Some organization theory scholars have mobilized social regulation theory in various ways. The social regulation theory has been used in human resource management research as well as in the project-based view of work. Human resource management research is varied and includes research problems such as prescribed and real work to examine transgressions in the workplace (Babeau &

Chanlat, 2008), the relationship between patient and patient care (Havard & Naschberger, 2015), telecommuting (Taskin & Gomez, 2015) and competency management (Havard & Krohmer, 2008). Whereas project-based view work leans upon evolution theory (Brecht & Desreumaux, 2011; Emin & Schieb-Bienfait, 2013); research looking into the divergence between the balance in real and prescribed power or rules remained truer to structuration theory from which the social regulation theory is inspired.

Several empirical works in organization studies have been identified as a benchmark to transfer SRT from an institutional level of analysis to an organizational setting. Reynaud (2001) conducted a case study from 1993 to 2000 that examines rule equilibrium to observe coordination and collaboration in one organization following the implementation of a new convention. Interviews and observation data were collected. She found that organizational routines are a practical, temporary and local problem resolution mechanism to which rules give a theoretical, generic, and abstract answer. Emin and Shieb-Bienfait (2011) conducted an insightful case study (Emin & Schieb-Bienfait, 2011). They adopted the stance of the organization as a collective action organized with regulation (J.-D. Reynaud, 1989). This case study used three types of data: secondary data to get familiar with the organizational context, interview data, and participant observation in working groups. This case demonstrates that the project view of the firm allows conceptualizing the entrepreneurial phenomenon by focusing on the moment when collective action or the entrepreneurial project becomes an organizational project.

Taskin and Gomez (2015) conducted two comparative case studies to illustrate the implementation of a telecommuting work environment in public institutions. While one of the cases they observed failed to implement telecommuting, the other succeeded. To explain what takes place in terms of regulation, Taskin and Gomez articulated a theoretical connection between the social regulation theory and convention theory by addressing the implementation of a new control regulation

overseeing the telecommute practice and as such a reactive autonomous regulation emerging from expectations, conventions, and norms associated with this practice (Taskin & Gomez, 2015).

Eynaud and colleagues conducted a case study which became the object of three publications (Eynaud et al., 2014, 2015, 2016). They studied the case of a social movement that is comprised of many cells that emerge locally and function more or less independently. These cells then adhere to the greater social movement. This social movement is a non-organization since there are no prescribed hierarchy, or control rules to start with. Collective action is therefore inspired by the common mission; how local cells achieve the mission is not imposed by the larger group. These scholars studied the generation of a few control rules based on local community autonomous rules. These control rules were developed with respect to the use of email lists.

Havard and Krohmer (2008) used the social regulation theory as a theoretical framework to observe human resource management practices in an organization. Human resource management consists of the creation of a new control regulation through negotiation among organizational actors. Further, they view competence development as emerging and therefore associated with the autonomous regulation. Havard and Naschberger (2015) mobilized the social regulation theory to analyze relationships and actions between hospital actors by the enactment and development of control and autonomous regulations.

Our project examines the process of a rule evolution from birth, and whether context-specific conditions of a pluralistic organization are more conducive to rule proliferation. As such, the social regulation theory (B. Reynaud, 2001; J.-D. Reynaud, 1988; J.-D. Reynaud & Richebé, 2009; Terssac, 2012) is an adequate framework for this project for two main reasons.

First, its processual and dynamic nature makes it methodologically attractive (Eynaud et al., 2016; Havard & Krohmer, 2008; Havard & Naschberger, 2015; Musca, 2006). As past organizational studies demonstrate, the social regulation theory is a sound framework to observe the process of regulation which means the development of rules. Furthermore, past studies demonstrate the compatibility of the social regulation theory with qualitative longitudinal case studies using multiple units of analysis as well as multiple sources of data. Consequently, even if this project is the first to investigate a single rule and its evolution over time as a case study, a fair level of compatibility between the model and our methodology is anticipated.

Second, it appears to be conceptually appealing. The social regulation framework depicts the recalibration process of control regulations through enactment and adjustment of the autonomous and real regulations. As such, it broadly describes, at a very macro level, the process that I am attempting to understand on a more micro level.

## 2.6 From a Macro-Level Framework to a Micro-Level Application

The selection of the social regulation theory as a theoretical framework, although logical and appealing, is not as easy as it appears. Transferring this theory to the appropriate level of analysis for this study represents a challenge. To ensure the proper transfer of this framework from an institutional level of analysis to an organizational level (one rule) of analysis, I require a four-step process:

1. Define the main elements of the institutional framework:
  - This step entails identifying the key components of the social regulation theory framework.



2. Identify the attributes associated with each element of the institutional framework:

- This step entails identifying the attributes assigned to each of the framework components identified in step 1.

3. Conduct a thorough analysis of each attribute for each regulation:

- This step involves understanding the attributes of each component to be able to describe their specificity.

4. Assess whether each attribute can be assigned to an organizational regulation.

- This step involves a careful analysis of the components along with their attributes to evaluate whether equivalent components and attributes exist at the organizational level.

#### 2.6.1 Define the main elements of the framework

To proceed with the transfer, I first need to define the main elements of the framework. Reynaud outlines and describes four regulations. The three main regulations are control, autonomous, and real (J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989). The joint regulation was also added to the framework in later work (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995).

#### 2.6.2 Identify the attributes associated with each element of the framework

Secondly, I must identify the attributes associated with each of the aforementioned elements. To describe these regulations, Reynaud uses legitimacy, reprimand, and whether it is enforceable by a third party.

Table 5. Social Regulation Theory Attribute Descriptortypeions

<b>Regulation</b>	<b>Reprimand</b>	<b>Legitimacy</b>	<b>Third-Party</b>
Control/External	Serves to settle conflict, organized and institutionalized reprimand	Rational-based (external) logic legitimacy	Third-party can impose a reprimand
Autonomous/Internal	Interiorized and organized reprimand	Sentiment-based (internal) logic legitimacy	
Effective/Real	Interiorized and organized reprimand	Compromise between sentiment-based (internal) and rational-based (external) logic	
Joint regulation	Assessed and imposed by the third party	Compromise between sentiment-based (internal) and rational-based (external) logic	Third-party assesses the situation on behalf of the parties in case of breach

### 2.6.3 Conduct a thorough analysis of each attribute for each regulation

Thirdly, I must conduct a thorough analysis of these attributes for each regulation. In Table 5, I list and describe the attributes associated with each of the elements of the framework. Attributes include whether the regulation's legitimacy is generated externally or internally, whether the reprimand associated with the breach is institutional, formal, or informal, and whether this regulation can be enforced by an outside party. Only then, I can transfer these attributes to

organizational level regulations. For instance, at the social level, the control regulation possesses an external legitimacy coming with the highest levels of reprimand (institutional, formal, and informal). As such, a law is a control regulation with external legitimacy that can be enforced and/or influenced by an outside party.

#### 2.6.4 Assess whether each attribute can be assigned to an organizational regulation.

Fourthly, to make a proper transfer of this concept at the organization level, I need to assess whether these attributes can be assigned to an organizational regulation.

**Control regulation/External regulation:** An organizational regulation with the potential for formal reprimand possessing external legitimacy, governed and inspired by provincial and federal laws could be, a human resources policy. Breach of such policy can result in the highest levels of reprimand, even institutional levels. It has external legitimacy since it is inspired by laws, inspired by similar organizations, as well as inspired by the board of directors. Further, it can require the involvement of outside parties in case of breach or litigation.

**Autonomous regulation/Internal regulation:** The same exercise needs to be conducted for the autonomous, or also named internal regulation, which is characterized by internal legitimacy and proceeds with informal reprimands for breach of the convention. An autonomous regulation allows for daily activities to take place and operationalizes control rules. Such regulation could be, among others, in the protocol for recruiting new personnel. These protocols are learned. Moreover, they could be more or less documented. Failure to follow protocol on the part of a hiring manager could lead to a notification from human resources. With time, failure to follow conventions could even lead to receiving lesser quality service from human resources. This protocol has internal legitimacy provided that it was designed by the people who are responsible to ensure control rule abidance

within the organization and who assist most managers with recruitment. Reprimands are informal as they are not based on legal or external legitimacy.

**Real or effective regulation:** The effective or real regulation is a compromise between both external and internal regulations. This represents the regulation that is actually applied daily. For instance, human resources policy, as a control regulation, might contain rules with regards to access to employment for minorities and anti-discrimination clauses. Recruitment protocols are in place to operationalize organizational activities daily. The real regulation represents the extent of application of both. The real rules, therefore, equate to the tolerance for non-abidance with regards to control rules in a given organization as much as the application of autonomous rules. For instance, in particular instances and unofficially, a company manager might feel that no hire will be accepted by the organization in cases of pregnancy or demonstrative religious artifacts and that if they do, they may receive informal reprimand such as withholding promotions or isolation from important strategic meetings. Yet, according to control regulation, the act of refusing employment to a minority is formally reprehensible. In the case of an autonomous regulation, there are protocols in place for new hires, but some portions might not be applied for temporary hires; this represents the real rule in this situation as it is generally accepted that there should be no informal reprimand to breach protocol in those particular cases. The real regulation represents the compromise the members of the organization make between autonomous rules and control rules and decide what makes sense for them.

**Joint regulation:** A joint regulation is a new control regulation (explicit) that is negotiated within the area between control (explicit) and autonomous (implicit) rules. It can be more or less widespread and more or less constraining, such as collective agreements. Because this set of rules is typically negotiated and formalized between executives and leaders, it could be perceived as more legitimate in the context of formal proceedings than an autonomous regulation. For instance,

union leaders will lean upon collective agreements more so than upon an autonomous work regulation in the context of formal proceedings. Although they are perceived as a compromise, these joint regulations are not a point of equilibrium but rather a point of convergence where some of the interests can meet. This means that they also have their shortcomings. For instance, they cannot account for all points of discord. Further, they leave room on the field for other regulations to develop (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995). These joint regulations tend to keep those issues that are most easily controllable rather than those that are the most critical. Moreover, some rules are by their nature are difficult to constitutionalize. Some situations might be even so challenging as to require temporary deregulation. This is a situation in which both parties agree to distance themselves from the joint regulation and to temporarily function with two parallel regulations instead of forcing a premature agreement (J.-D. Reynaud, 1995).

## 2.7 Heuristic Framework

Throughout this Ph.D. thesis, I look into rule proliferation. In the context of the social regulation theory, the formalization of effective rules leads to more explicit rules, hence the system will recalibrate by adjusting implicit and explicit creating new effective rules and so forth.

In March, Schulz, and Zhou (2000)'s view, unwritten rules are a shared understanding between actors. According to their research, formalization could be derived directly from the set of unwritten rules (implicit). In social regulation theory, this shared understanding comes in the form of autonomous regulation. March et al. (2000) suggest that as group size increases, unwritten rule effectiveness decreases resulting in a higher need for formalization. Hence, as the organization complexifies by size and number of divisions, the less likely are its members to learn informal rules and the intensity of formalization will be higher. In sum, written and formal rule becomes a response to the unwritten rule's dysfunctions. In social regulation theory, control rules are the most

formal set of rules. They are in continuous tension with internal rules. This tension leads to real rules being enacted by actors.

### 2.7.1 Preliminary Framework on the Rule Proliferation Process


Over the last 30 years, organization theory scholars have mobilized the social regulation theory to address the construct of regulation or rule development and the rule enactment phenomenon. As explained in the previous section, attributes of institutional and social regulations can be carefully transferred to an organizational level. By transferring this theoretical framework, I will examine how control rules interact with autonomous rules and generate effective rules at the organizational level. I suggest that this calibration process is central to understanding rule proliferation.

Figure 6 provides a visual representation of my understanding of the rule proliferation process, my understanding of our empirical setting and by the same token, inform our data collection process. It depicts the rule proliferation cycle from the autonomous rules (implicit) to the control rules (explicit). In this heuristic framework:

- i. **Control rules.** Control rules are designed and imposed on actors and exercise and influence the emergence of autonomous rules.
- ii. **Autonomous rules.** These autonomous rules can be more local and guide everyday action and the functioning of the organization. They complement control rules.
- iii. **Effective rules.** Effective rules are the rules that are in fact being enacted and represent a compromise between autonomous rules and control rules. Effective rules are in continuous tension and evolve constantly.

- iv. **Tension.** This tension can result in formally negotiated rules called the joint regulation which becomes a new form of control rules. This tension creates a cyclical effect. This cycle requires a recalibration of the system by an adjustment of autonomous rules and then effective rules that are triggered by new control rules.
- v. **Recalibrated control rules.** New control rules can also be the result of evolving practices in autonomous rules that are adapting to changing realities. These recalibrated regulations instigate tensions in the cycle as shown in Figure 6. For instance, a new joint regulation such as a collective agreement will serve as a control regulation and can also trigger changes in other control regulations.
- vi. **Recalibrated autonomous rules.** These modifications will generate tensions with autonomous rules and create further changes in practices. This process of recalibration is ongoing. Figure 6 demonstrates the process of formalization where the negotiation between autonomous (internal) and control (external) leads to effective rules.
- vii. **Recalibrated effective rules.** Effective rules can result in new control rules triggering a need for the system to recalibrate by adjusting the balance between its set of autonomous and control rules.
- viii. **Tension.** The negotiation between the new autonomous rules and the new control rules will result in new effective rules and so forth.

Figure 6. Rule Proliferation Heuristic Framework



### 2.7.2 Strategic Actor Theory

This project is focused on rule proliferation and as such uses as the main unit of analysis, one organizational rule. Nevertheless, actor dynamics play a significant role in the process by providing opportunities for negotiations, creating tensions, and in turn allowing regulations to recalibrate. Therefore, the strategic actor theory is an important theoretical framework to help us understand behaviors. The strategic actor theory is characterized by three dimensions. First of all, in this view, actors behave in order to improve their action capacity or maneuvering space. Secondly, actors' behavior, although it may not always appear to be clear and coherent, always possesses intrinsic meaning. Thirdly, all human behavior is active (as opposed to passive) as it is in fact the result of choice.

Then, the strategic actor theory is founded on four underlying assumptions. The first one involves that the organization is contingent. This means that the state of the collective action is the result of



actions and events, therefore could have been completely different under other circumstances. The second assumption is that the actor is relatively free. This means that they can follow or not follow social rules. The third assumption indicates that organizational objectives differ from personal objectives. The last assumption is that actors are boundedly-rational agents (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977).

The social regulation theory and the strategic actor theory come from the same large family of research. They both study a similar phenomenon but from a different angle. As strategic actor theory looks at rules as a resource used by actors; social regulation theory explores how regulations are influenced by actors. Social regulation theory borrows from strategic actor theory in order to explain actor behavior. Therefore, they are highly compatible lenses to use in the context of this project. Table 6 represents a preliminary conceptual analysis grid integrating social regulation theory with strategic actor theory.

Table 6. Preliminary Conceptual Analysis Grid

<b>Primary Theoretical Framework: Social Regulation Theory</b>	<b>Secondary Theoretical Framework: Strategic Actor Theory</b>
Control Regulation	Power
Control Rule	Resources
Autonomous Regulation	Conflicts/tensions
Autonomous Rule	Interpretation
Effective Regulation	Ambiguity
Effective Rule	Manipulation
Joint Regulation	Knowledge
Rule Production	
Tension	
Negotiation	
Recalibration	
Power from within	
Power from without	

Given its unique approach to examining ongoing interactions between clandestine and displayed regulations, the social regulation theory offers a unique lens by which to explore rule proliferation. Chapter III describes the research design for this thesis as well as the organizational setting in which this study takes place.

## CHAPTER III


### RESEARCH DESIGN

#### 3.1 Introduction

In this doctoral dissertation, I aim to complement past research on organizational rules by exploring how rules proliferate and which contexts are more likely to intensify the proliferation phenomenon. How, why, and with what consequences does a formal rule come to be reinterpreted over time in a pluralistic organizational setting? As such, I will examine how actors, embedded in social and temporal contexts, interpret, and apply rules, and interact in the shaping and manipulation of organizational regulations.

To achieve the objectives set forth for this dissertation, I opted for a qualitative approach that best describes a complex phenomenon over a long period (Musca, 2006; Fachin & Langley, 2017). As such, I chose a longitudinal embedded case study (Musca, 2006; Yin, 2009). Consequently, Chapter III of this thesis describes the embedded case study used to study how the meta-rule *clause-reserve* proliferates in time, and how this rule evolves in context-specific settings. An embedded case study involves one general case along with multiple sub-units of analysis that are selected for the purpose of comparison as depicted in Figure 7.

Figure. 7 Embedded Case Study Illustration



In an embedded case study, investigations are conducted both at the general case level and at the sub-unit level (Eisenhardt, 1989; Musca, 2006; Yin, 2003, 2009). In this project, the general case consists of one rule at the university level, whereas the sub-units refer to the rule's enactment in various departmental settings. This approach allows comparing rules across different departmental settings to observe the effect of pluralism on rule proliferation and evolution in those different sub-units contingent upon local departmental conditions.

To protect the identity of respondents, departments selected for the study as well as any identifiable information contained in citations have been anonymized. Inspired by the work of Davis and Eisenhardt (2011), I named each department in accordance with a related field of study (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011). This approach was meant to facilitate reading and help readers associate citations with the respective discipline while maintaining anonymity.

Selecting an embedded case study is a strategic and purposeful choice for this research project. An embedded case study consists of examining one general case along with sub-units of analysis. The embedded case study design will allow us to clarify whether there are local conditions more conducive to rule proliferation than others and whether pluralism impacts the difference in proliferation intensity. The need for an embedded case is further driven by the goal to describe the empirical phenomenon as accurately as possible and further supported by the lack of prior instrumentation (Miles & Huberman, 2014). Yet, the embedded case method was selected based on project-specific needs to explore whether context influences rule proliferation intensity.

### 3.1 Case Selection

The general case study selected is the life of one bureaucratic rule in a university setting, namely, the *clause-reserve* rule indicating how teaching load reserves are to be distributed between visiting professors and graduate students before they are allocated to lecturers<sup>8</sup>. Throughout this dissertation, the *clause-reserve* rule is referred to as the meta-rule.

#### **Excerpt of the Meta Rule Reserve Clause**

10.02 A departmental meeting may subtract from the posting a number of course fees which must not exceed, per year and for the University as a whole, eight per cent (8%) of the total course load not allocated to profReynaud's teachers and language teachers when this departmental assembly, before posting, decides to recommend to the University:

- a) the hiring of a person of reputation, because of his exceptional professional experience...
- b) the hiring of a student enrolled in a graduate program at the University or a student, a postdoctoral fellow<sup>9</sup>
- c) the hiring of a university executive;
- d) the hiring of professors of the University to the retirement...

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<sup>8</sup> In the Province of Quebec, the Lecturer title is attributed the course conductors who teach on basis of experience and professional qualifications rather than on the basis of academic qualifications only (Ph.D.). These course conductors typically earned a Master degree in their field and possess a vast professional or technical experience.

<sup>9</sup> In the Province of Quebec, a postdoctoral fellowship can be applied for after graduate studies. PhD students cannot have both status of student and postdoctoral internship. At UQAM university, postdoctoral interns have employee status and receive a salary; they don't have a student status. They are often referred to informally as postdoctoral students.

The chosen case takes place in a pluralistic organization. These are contexts in which disparate goals and interests need to coexist (Denis et al., 2007). Rules and conventions are one of the mechanisms accommodating this cohabitation (Denis et al., 2011).

Professional bureaucracies such as universities are documented as pluralistic (Hardy, 1991; Hardy et al., 1983; Mintzberg et al., 1976). These structures are more specifically characterized by pigeonholing and standardization of skills and training. Pigeonholing consists of isolation of activities and programs leading to a negligible need for coordination across units and departments. Standardization of skills and training for professors, on the other hand, results in increased decision making autonomy in both teaching and research activities. This increased autonomy is referred to as professional judgment from university administrators. Yet this does not necessarily entail autonomy from peers that are in other universities (Hardy et al., 1983).

Hardy (1991) further highlighted the predominance of collegiality derived from the decentralization of power to faculty members based on competence rather than positions (Hardy, 1991). Four subtypes of professional bureaucracies were identified: the collegial, the political, the anarchic, and the rational-analytical. These subtypes are classified based upon decision making style (common interest vs. self-interested), coordination mechanisms (power, norms, or rational analysis), and protocol-type change. Based on this typology, the selected case is a collegial professional bureaucracy.

UQAM<sup>10</sup> encompasses seven faculties hosting 46 departments, schools, and institutes (*Université Du Québec à Montréal*, 2016). As a result, the rule selected, which emerged in 1979, has become increasingly complex over the years, whether it is by the addition of various specificities or by generating context-relevant application rules for all these different departmental settings.

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<sup>10</sup> **UQAM** Université du Québec à Montréal – University of Québec in Montreal

### 3.1.1 Organizational Setting

The empirical setting is a university in Montreal, Quebec; an environmental context recognized for its language and political challenges. A pluralistic organization is characterized by logic multiplicity (scientific, commercial, administrative, educative, etc.); as such offers a fruitful organizational setting to examine diverging applications and interpretations of rules. Throughout previous research, the impact and importance of multiple logics on complexity and rules as well as organizational and human capital challenges resulting from rule proliferation were hypothesized. As such, pluralistic organizations provide a human capital intensive, rule saturated setting with multiple logics. Hence it reflects the pluralistic nature of the organization.

UQAM was founded on a social mandate that remained ingrained in its organizational identity. More specifically, it was created to provide accessible and affordable university education to unprivileged population segments in response to evolving francization needs and increasing requirements for skilled labor in specific competency clusters. Its quick instauration and growth called for a large teaching body that brought on its own set of challenges (*Université Du Québec à Montréal*, 2016).

On April 9, 1969, the Quebec Government founds by decree number 1170 the University of Quebec in Montreal, an institution founded on the law of the University of Quebec adopted in December 1968 at Quebec's National Assembly (*Université Du Québec à Montréal*, 2016). In addition, its creation resulted from the merger of five previous educational institutions, all with distinct ambitions, aspirations, cultures, practices, and union traditions (Corbo, 1994). The adjustment that this merger required, in terms of both culture and practice, has led occasioned violent confrontations and hostile beginnings. From 1969 to 1971 begins the creation of sub-clusters of people and the formation of their identities. During this period, each group gains awareness of their power or lack thereof vis-à-vis others. Despite hostilities, registrations pour in.

In the late 1970s, the hostile negotiations leading to the first collective agreement between the university and lecturers generate a very early version of a rule that will later be called *clause-reserve*.

In the early 1980s research becomes a priority resulting in new faculty recruitment as well as the negotiation of a reserve clause to train future generations of scholars. The second decade is also marked by the signature of the collective agreement of the lecturers, the first convention of lecturers in Quebec, which initiates a period of growth at the levels of the programs and the students. In addition, more graduate programs are emerging (Corbo, 1994). A record 35,000 students are enrolled for 1985 (*Université Du Québec à Montréal*, 2016). As a result of this remarkable growth, the third decade can be remembered by the amendment made to the University of Quebec Act, giving UQAM a special status. This period is characterized by growth management inaugurating new pavilions, laboratories, buildings, institutes. In 1997, UQAM will embark upon the process of facultarization (*Université Du Québec à Montréal*, 2016).

After 2000, UQAM is now established. The institution focuses on the creation of a network of graduates, a more active foundation, galas, the addition of sports teams, and other add-ons reinforcing its position as an imposing higher education institution (*Université Du Québec à Montréal*, 2016).

### 3.1.2 Embedded Case Units' Selection

The second segment, the study, and comparison of embedded case units are crucial to completing the life of the rule in the various sub-contexts of the organization. Preliminary findings suggest key pluralism characteristics to be closely associated with the rule proliferation process and will be closely observed in subsequent data collection and interviews. For instance, the size of the department, the diversity of its expertise, the size of its coordinated courses, the size of its doctoral program as well as the number of its coordinated courses seem to have an influencing role. Equipped with the preliminary information gathered, I collected data for departments accordingly remaining flexible for emerging information.



Although this project is qualitative and adopts a subjective epistemological perspective, it borrows from Eisenhardt (1989) for its rigorous case protocol methodology and case selection approach (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2003). This method was previously adopted in other longitudinal processual embedded case study research (Musca, 2006). Six embedded sub-units of analysis will serve to evaluate rule proliferation intensity. In an embedded case study, sub-units are selected for comparison purposes (Musca, 2006). To compare which sub-unit possesses conditions likely to accentuate rule proliferation, some important departmental differences have been identified. I postulated that pluralistic organizations would experience higher rule proliferation; therefore I selected pluralistic organizations to have a prolific landscape to observe the phenomenon and prolific proliferation cells (university departments).

To select proliferation cells (university departments) that I can compare, they need to have significant differences in their characteristics. These characteristics have been identified as a result of important empirical and theoretical reflection among the research team as well as preliminary data collection. For instance, some departments are larger and more heterogeneous. Heterogeneity leads to disparate goals and interests requiring more organizational slack to operate (Cyert & March, 1963). Others are small and homogeneous. As such, the selection of embedded sub-units will be done according to the following list of criteria:

1. The number of coordinated courses means a course that is taught under the same course identification code by different teachers and is coordinated by one or two professors
  - a. The number of coordinated courses is a criterion that directly relates to the rule selected for the general case. It was found that most *clause-réserve* courses are coordinated courses. Therefore, to be able to compare the effect of the rule, I need to differentiate the number of coordinated courses in the sub-units of analysis.
2. The size of the undergraduate course offering

- a. It was found with a preliminary analysis, that the number of coordinated courses is often a function of the size of the undergraduate course offering. Furthermore, if the size of the undergraduate course offering is large, the number of reserves should be higher in order to reach the 6.5% (university limit of reserve-clause course allocation) quota on the reserve clause. Conversely, it is interesting to look at sub-units of analysis that reach 6.5% very quickly due to the size of their course offering.
3. The size of its Ph.D. program
  - a. Preliminary data indicate that the *clause-reserve* is primarily known for giving Ph.D. students a chance to gain teaching experience and earn some money during their studies. Larger Ph.D. programs should tend to have more demand for access to reserve-clause allocation.
4. Whether their Ph.D. program has an academic career vocation or professional
  - a. Preliminary data suggest that one of the main objectives of clause-reserve is for providing Ph.D. students with teaching experience. Hence, Ph.D. programs that primarily have professional vocation such as Psychology should have less pressure to allocate these reserves.
5. Whether the Ph.D. program offers many alternate and realistic financing sources than teaching
  - a. Preliminary data suggest that another objective of the reserve clause is the financing of Ph.D. students; hence I postulate that Ph.D. programs that offer alternative types of financing should have less pressure on *clause-reserve* allocation.

The embedded case unit selection must be based on possible cross-examination and comparison (Musca, 2006). The six embedded case units selected are Case 1 Organization Studies, Case 2 Business, Case 3 Fine Arts, Case 4 Human Sciences, Case 5 Public Policy, and Case 6 Science.

While cases 1, 2, and 5 are larger departments; cases 3 and 4 are smaller. Case 6 is of moderate size.

### 3.2 Case Protocol

A case protocol was developed to manage this thesis project (Yin, 2003). The following summarizes key elements of the case protocol.

#### Case objective

- (1) Traces the rule's life from 1979 to 2019; taking into account the proliferation of sampled departments; (departments are selected with my directors based on preestablished pluralistic criteria).
- (2) Determines if local conditions and which ones, if any, intensify rule proliferation.

#### Criteria for success

This project aims at making contributions in four specific areas:

First, in rule literature, I aim at developing the rule proliferation construct by using a unique one-rule unit of analysis. This project looks into the life of one rule to observe its evolution and possibly what causes proliferation over time.

Secondly, I wish to shed light on complex decision making processes in rule-intensive settings such as pluralistic organizations. Providing clarity into how to limit decision making complexity by using rules efficiently. Using an embedded case study approach in a pluralistic setting, I examine whether pluralism intensifies rule proliferation.

Thirdly, I hope to bring insights into organizational routine research. I anticipate that an important outcome of this thesis will be to formulate a conclusion with regards to autonomous rules as

organizational routines. Given the present definition of rules as representational artifacts enabling routines and routines-as-theories; this research could significantly contribute to further defining rules within the field of organizational routines.

Fourthly, my preliminary findings conflict with some elements of organizational learning theory. I found that rules don't always represent encapsulation of learning as posited by organizational learning theory. Therefore, I anticipate that this thesis' findings will generate further development in organizational learning. These findings could lead to advancing theory in the field of political decision making since our preliminary data suggests that some rulemaking may take place to divert encapsulation of learning to protect the interests of individuals in a given context at a given time.

### 3.3 Data Collection and Analysis

This project involves a large amount of longitudinal data as well as case data. This section discusses data collection as well as data analysis. However, due to the scope of this research, data, and data collection information specific to each results chapter will be discussed in each respective section for simplicity.

#### 3.3.1 Data collection

Triangulation was ensured with varied data collection strategies. Data collection took place from 2016 to 2020. I have collected 70 documents dating from 1968 to 2019 and conducted 42 interviews. Interviews were conducted with individuals at the administration level of the university, at the union level (union of lecturers), and in six departments across the university. Interviews averaged 57.73 minutes. Respondents include administrators, professors, lecturers, and students. After conducting two interviews with respondents who were present at the university's inception, in the 70s, I collected secondary data from literature and archives to complement the contextual historical background. All collective agreements between the university and lecturers were collected to evaluate each version of the meta-rule. Other organizational documents were collected such as meeting minutes, union communications, reports, and departmental policies.

I aimed for triangulation through multiple sources of data to optimize internal validity. Therefore, I used a mixed data collection approach using fact-finding methods, document analysis, and semi-structured interviews. Using multiple sources of evidence increases construct validity (Yin, 2003). Interviews explored how actors interpret, enact, and experience the meta-rule.

### 3.3.2 Data Analysis

This study has two main research questions: (1) how do rules proliferate in pluralistic organizations?; (2) are local conditions within pluralistic organizations likely to intensify the rule proliferation phenomenon? Furthermore, it has two main levels of study (1) control regulation, and (2) autonomous regulation. Hence, data analysis was conducted in two broad phases.

Phase one, the primary case, aims to understand how the control rule unfolded through time. To achieve this, I used a temporal bracket analysis to examine rule proliferation at the control rule level (Langley, 1999). This process was twofold and iterative. On the one hand, it consisted of identifying key periods of rule proliferation to make sense of it. To inform the temporal bracketing exercise, I used exploratory interviews and secondary data to set the temporal context. On the other hand, I accounted for proliferation within the meta-rule by using a quantification strategy (Langley, 1999). This was achieved by tracking the changes, additions, complexifications in the meta-rule *clause-reserve* at each stage of its renewal from 1978 to 2015; these include articles 10.02 to 10.05 of the lecturers' collective agreement (8.02 to 8.05 in 1978 and 9.02 to 9.05 in 1980). By combining these methods, I identified key temporal periods and identified rule proliferation during each period. Annex A includes comprehensive a data analysis of the five temporal brackets.

Phase two, the analysis of embedded case units, consists of examining how the meta-rule is enacted in six university departments to address rule proliferation at the autonomous regulation level. This allowed me to examine whether are contexts more likely to accentuate rule proliferation. Four key actions were accomplished to answer whether there are context-specific characteristics likely to accentuate rule proliferation. These actions were conducted concurrently and iteratively. First, I was required to understand how rules proliferate at local levels, how autonomous rules emerge,

and what is their nature. The nature of autonomous rules is unknown, hence I used grounded theorizing to better understand their essence (Langley, 1999). Given that I coded for citations referring to elements of autonomous regulation and autonomous rules, I was able to see the emergence of broad types of autonomous rules that were common across departments. Second, I needed to identify whether there were contexts in which rule proliferation was more significant and see if this differential could be attributed to specific characteristics. To achieve this I mobilized a quantification strategy (Langley, 1999) and then conducted a comparative analysis.

Third, I established what role each mechanism of the rule proliferation process played. To better clarify the roles of mechanisms, I conducted a comparative analysis, an analysis of the narrative, and Sankey diagrams to better understand the flow and interrelations of mechanisms. Through this process, I found pervasive mechanisms of rule proliferation that are organizational. These include rule proliferation engines, a rule proliferation vector as well as rule proliferation stimuli. I identified context-specific stimuli that are varying mechanisms that influence rule proliferation locally. The process of comparing contexts within the same organization by using the same meta-rule as the primary case was pivotal for uncovering both pervasive and varying mechanisms of rule proliferation. By examining local enactment of the same rule within the same organizational context, I was able to identify key similarities and differences, as well as types of autonomous rules mobilized to operationalize the meta-rule.

Fourth, I needed to methodologically dissociate the effective regulation from the autonomous regulation. Although it is conceptually simple to dissociate the two concepts, it is empirically difficult because the effective regulation represents a version of the autonomous regulation applied at any given time. It represents its variability. To account for the effective regulation, I used a narrative strategy to trace variability in the application. Annex B includes a comprehensive data analysis of the six embedded case units.

Because data analysis was specific to each research question, and therefore more specific to each chapter of findings, each subsequent chapter of results outlays data analysis strategies pertaining to its specific research question.

Part III includes three chapters of findings. Chapter IV pertains to the findings of control rule proliferation. This involves the analysis of the control regulation evolution using a temporal bracketing strategy. Chapter V discusses mechanisms of rule proliferation and therefore explores rule proliferation at the autonomous level. Chapter VI consolidates all levels of rule proliferation and presents an organizational framework depicting the ongoing recalibration process of rule proliferation.

## PART II



## CHAPTER IV

### RESULTS: CLAUSE-RESERVE PROLIFERATION AT UQAM: HISTORY AND CONTEXT (QR1)

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings on the first research question for this thesis: how does one organizational rule proliferate in a pluralistic organization. This involves the study of rule proliferation at the control level. Understanding how rule proliferation unfolds is essential to developing a unified theoretical framework of rule proliferation and appreciating how rule proliferation truly evolves. Rules that were initially meant to ease decision making processes multiply and complexify, hence rendering decision making intricate and challenging. A finer comprehension of how rule proliferation progresses results in practical decision-making solutions to problems that have mostly been addressed without the support of scientific data.

For this purpose, I have studied the meta-rule *clause-reserve* in a university setting and which appears in UQAM's lecturers' collective agreement. This rule indicates how teaching load reserves are to be distributed between visiting professors and graduate students before they are allocated to lecturers. I investigate the question of rule proliferation by using a longitudinal embedded case study with data ranging from 1968 to 2019. This embedded case study is comprised of one primary case and six embedded case units. The embedded case units represent the enactment of the meta-rule in six departments. A longitudinal approach provides a global outlook on how one rule proliferates from the time of its creation to the contemporary period because it offers temporal and contextual insights on rule creation and ensuing rule production. Furthermore, the variety of data

obtained from secondary data, documents, interviews across different departments, and archives lent varied contextual perspectives on rule proliferation.

Using case study offers hindsight on past and ongoing application, interpretation, and transformation of one organizational rule. This longitudinal approach to an embedded case study (Musca, 2006) supplied valuable data on underlying mechanisms of rule proliferation. Moreover, a case study approach has the additional advantage to investigate the phenomenon of rule proliferation embedded in a specific context (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Langley & Abdallah, 2011; Yin, 2003). As such I observed how organizational life and the enactment of regulation result in rule proliferation.

During this chapter, I describe the type of rule proliferation experienced directly in the meta-rule during five key periods ranging from 1968 to 2019. Doing this, I present a taxonomy of control rule proliferation elements along with the motives associated with rule proliferation elements. This taxonomy emerged as a result of a compilation of rule proliferation elements throughout each period. I identified four types of motives to rule proliferation: modifying freedom of action, increasing understanding, improving efficiency, and adhering to institutional norms. These motives are associated with types of rule proliferation elements. These results are interesting because types of rule changes and additions that modify freedom of action influence organizational slack and impact organizational activity more significantly. I found seven types of control rule changes, four types of control rule additions, and three types of control rule complexifications, which will be detailed during this chapter.

In this chapter, I address rule proliferation elements as a networked system; rule proliferation elements are linked to one another generating a web of interdependent elements. In addition, I discuss the emergence of areas of ambiguity that stimulate rule proliferation. Areas of ambiguity represent uncertainty and challenges in rule application and interpretation. The four main areas of ambiguity identified are: how to qualify experts, how to ensure that actors do not manipulate the hiring process, how to apply the university-wide quota per department, and who should be included

in higher education students qualified to teach courses. For instance, there are ongoing issues regarding the application of the meta-rule pertaining to the university-wide quota established. Within the design of the rule, a percentage was initially identified to limit the application of reserved course loads to privileged groups of people. Because course allocation is conducted within departments and that the quota is measured university-wide, this situation generates ambiguity and uncertainty in rule application.

Past studies have suggested complexity in rule research. For instance, March et al. (2000) portrayed the intricacy of the ecosystem of rules when they undertook the study of an entire organization's regulatory system over 100 years. In contrast, using a single rule for this research has the distinct advantage to focus on elements surrounding the rule such as its interpretation, its ambiguity, its transformation, actors' perception of such rule as well as its enactment. This method, therefore, allows depicting how one rule proliferates in time. Uncovering managerial and organizational challenges of rulemaking and associated motives also results in practical implications for administrators who use rulemaking and policymaking as managerial tools.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I present methodology and data analysis strategies mobilized to make sense of rule proliferation over time. Second, I describe temporal bracket results for each period. In this section, I discuss findings for period 1 which is the meta-rule creation, I address areas of ambiguity emergent from the meta-rule creation, and I describe rule proliferation experienced in each following period. Third, I present the resulting taxonomy of control rule proliferation. Fourth, I discuss the meta-rule and rule proliferation elements as a networked system. Lastly, I review the overall process of rule proliferation at the control regulation level along with its impact on organizational slack.

## 4.2 Methodology

In this section, I explain data collected as well as strategies mobilized to make sense of rule proliferation in time. The first mandate of this doctoral dissertation is to account for the meta-

rule's proliferation in terms of additions, changes, and complexifications as defined by Jennings et al. (2005). To achieve this, I used a temporal bracketing strategy (Langley, 1999). This process was twofold and iterative. On the one hand, it consisted of identifying key periods of rule proliferation to make sense of it. To inform the temporal bracketing exercise, I used exploratory interviews and secondary data to set the temporal context. On the other hand, I accounted for proliferation within the meta-rule by using a quantification strategy (Langley, 1999). This was achieved by tracking the changes, additions, complexifications in the meta-rule *clause-reserve* at each stage of its renewal from 1978 to 2015; these include articles 10.02 to 10.05 of the lecturers' collective agreement (8.02 to 8.05 in 1978 and 9.02 to 9.05 in 1980). By combining these methods, I identified key temporal periods and identified rule proliferation during each period.

The process of identifying and quantifying each proliferation element generated valuable data on areas of ambiguity that appeared recurrent and deserved more exploration. As such, this phenomenon was explored and monitored during interviews. Case interviews were being conducted gradually in six departments over the course of four years. Contents of case interviews enabled to validate main areas of ambiguity identified. To better understand this process, I will first describe the data collected and then the analysis strategies mobilized.

#### 4.2.1 Data Collected

Data collection took place from 2016 to 2020. I have collected 70 documents dating from 1968 to 2019 and conducted 42 interviews. Interviews were conducted with individuals at the administration level of the university, at the union level (union of lecturers), and in six departments across the university. Interviews averaged 57.73 minutes. Respondents include administrators, professors, lecturers, and students. After conducting two interviews with respondents who were present at the university foundation, I collected secondary data from literature and archives to complement the contextual historical background. All collective agreements between the university and lecturers were collected to evaluate each version of the meta-rule. Other organizational documents were collected such as meeting minutes, union communications, reports, and departmental policies. Table 1 summarizes documents and interviews collected per period.

Interviews conducted in the six departments do not pertain to one specific period but were all conducted in period 5.

Table 7. Summary of Documents Collected

		Period 1 2 45	Period 2 4 60	Period 3 6 45	Period 4 4 111	Period 5 3 124	Totals
DocType: Collective agreement	22 684	8	27	22	30	30	117
DocType: Collective bargaining	30 740	6	29	24	30	46	135
DocType: Interview	36 2732	2	2	3	6	40	53
DocType: Reports	2 74				19	1	20
DocType: Secondary Data	5 72	4	6	4	4	3	21
DocType: Union news and infor...	15 270	4	8	9	40	22	83
DocTypes: Rules and policies	10 83				1	16	17
General and Exploratory Intervie...	5 252	19	10	3	4	4	40
Level: Administration	51 1919	19	37	25	32	38	151
Level: University	7 164	24	8	1	20	2	55
<b>Totals</b>		86	127	91	186	202	692

#### 4.2.2 Data Analysis Strategies

The temporal bracketing strategy consists of dividing and analyzing data in terms of different periods to make sense of what took place at different times and how time affected the construct studied. This aims at portraying the general life of the rule, cataloging the main actors of change, examining the intensity of rule proliferation elements observed, and evaluating whether some influences seem more important than others. This exercise necessitated meticulousness given the eclectic nature and amount of data collected. Consequently, to account for rule proliferation and form temporal brackets, two main data analysis strategies were mobilized.

The first one is inspired by the historical method. Although this thesis is not strictly historic, data collection for this first part was greatly inspired by the historical method (Pezet, 2010). Interviews with Cyrille Sardais et Anne Pezet from HEC Montréal provided an adapted approach. Using this method allowed to form initial periods by exploring contextual information, events, and transformation as provided by accounts of respondents and books. Working with historical data

involves numerous challenges. For one, the memory of informants interviewed can be unreliable and their availability is a significant challenge depending on how far in time the project goes. Secondly, information technology was not always so performant, document availability, accessibility, and preservation are difficult and are inconsistent depending on periods, types of documents, and types of organizations. The use of archives for this project was deemed a last resort. Archives can be well preserved, yet some archives are very fruitful for some documents and very lean for others. In regard to these many challenges, thorough data triangulation is essential. Therefore, I followed a step-by-step process.

I first gathered secondary data. This meant gathering writings in the form of books, articles, news clippings produced by people who studied the subject or context, or people who took an interest in the subject around or close to this specific time. Once documents have been gathered and I formed a draft of the context, I required people to fill in blanks, validate some points, understand the unwritten and test some premises. I, therefore, conducted problematization interviews that explored respondents' experiences, validated initial ideas that I would pursue during data collection interviews, and understand elements of history that might be not written. At this point, I had a fair mastery of the subject matter. However, further triangulation was required to validate data given the shortcomings of historic data gathering. As such, I was required to interview informants who were there when and where the phenomenon took place.

Once I concluded exploratory interviews, I pursued case interviews. Five interviews were conducted at the organizational level; this means representatives from the union of lecturers or representatives of the administrations. 36 interviews were conducted in the six departments. Lastly, I used archives to complement and fill important gaps that helped in problematization and answering important questions.

This process allowed me to write the story of each period to have a thorough understanding of the analytical context. While writing the story for each temporal bracket, I constructed a timeline for each period. This helped me gain a deeper understanding of how events unfolded and put into

context rule proliferation elements. These timelines also contributed to adjusting the temporal brackets since I was able to identify marking and transforming events. This iterative process resulted in five periods. Each of these periods was defined by significant events. More importantly, each period starts and concludes on one or a series of important events that contribute to shaping the next period:

1. 1968 to 1979 is defined as the period of the foundation of Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) and ends with the lecturers' collective agreement achieved over an arbitration process.
2. 1980 to 1989 is characterized as a period of institutional growth with 35,000 students in 1985 and ends in 1989 with the restructuration of the University of Quebec law assigning special status to UQAM.
3. 1990 to 1999 is defined as a period of institutional reorganization and decentralization and ends in 1999 with six faculties and one business school.
4. 2000 to 2008 is defined as a period of student uprising with the first wave of red squares and ends in 2008 with a new university governance bill as well as a global financial crisis.
5. 2009 to 2019 was characterized as the peak of the red square uprising in 2012 and budget cuts and ends with a new collective agreement and UQAM's 50 year-celebration.


The second strategy involved a quantification and categorization exercise (Isabella, 1990; Langley, 1999). With this strategy, I cataloged all rule changes, rule additions, and rule complexifications that were applied to the meta-rule. By cataloging all rule proliferation elements, I observed recurring elements in types of elements applied as well as very distinctive types of elements applied. For instance, I observed clear distinctions between additions that increased possibilities in rule application versus additions that decreased possibilities. There were also very clear distinctions between a change in text structure and a change in percentage allowance within the rule itself. By noting these observations, I saw the emergence of a taxonomy. I, therefore, included this level of analysis in my categorization.

This strategy helped to validate and structure temporal brackets identified above in an iterative process. Rule proliferation was accounted for after the publication of the first version of the rule in 1979. Each period was analyzed to understand contextual data relevant to the respective temporal bracket, and each period contains rule changes, additions, and complexifications that were accounted for in the meta-rule. These constructs were classified as follows:

- **Rule change:** a change to an element of the meta-rule, for instance, a change of phrasing.
- **Rule addition:** an element was added to the metarule that increases the scope and volume of the rule, for instance, a new sub-article.
- **Rule complexification:** a new dependency on another article of a regulation or a new condition for application.

Compilations are presented in Appendix A (Tables A1, A2, and A3). Figure 8 presents the results of this quantification per period. It depicts the number of rule changes, additions and complexifications cataloged for each temporal bracket following temporal bracket 1 during which the meta-rule was created. Annex A includes comprehensive a data analysis of the five temporal brackets.

Figure 8. Quantification of Meta-rule Proliferation





During the process of listing, identifying, and categorizing, I found ongoing issues across periods. I further analyzed these issues by considering their historical context. I found that concerns regard four areas. First, it regards the ambiguity of the application of a university-wide percentage in departments. Because of this ambiguity, some departments are perceived to abuse the application of the rule. As a result of this abuse, the union of lecturers pressures the university to reduce this percentage. Second, it regards the accessibility of graduate students and postdoctoral fellows to the provisions of *clause-reserve*. Third, there is ambiguity and concerns pertaining to the manipulation of the course posting process either to use the meta-rule to avoid lecturers or avoid using *clause-reserve* to give students a backdoor entrance into the union of lecturers. Fourth, there is ambiguity regarding how departments qualify experts who were selected to teach under the provisions of *clause-reserve*.

To make sense of the phenomenon observed, I used the construct of ambiguity. Ambiguity can be defined as an expression or situation having more than one meaning or interpretation. Additionally, these multiple interpretations can frequently be conflicting (Pehar, 2001).

Organizational scholars have made important accomplishments in the areas of ambiguity and rulemaking. Cyert and March (1963) suggest that ambiguity of expectations contributes to the development of business policy and results from decisions in processes dominated by unexpected factors and driven by uncertainty. Actors who seek uncertainty avoidance will revise rules when such rules do not allow them to meet goals (Cyert & March, 1963). Crozier (1964) further adds that areas of ambiguity in organizational rules generate frustrations, and discomfort and this can lead to inconsistencies. In the continuity of March and Simon's (1958) uncertainty absorption theory, Crozier discusses how ongoing knowledge asymmetry leads actors to resolve uncertainties by the creation of new rules (Crozier, 1964; March & Simon, 1958). In this case, uncertainties are presented as situations in which one individual or groups of actors lack knowledge or resources to resolve a situation.

In the continuity of Crozier's work in which areas of ambiguity generate frustrations and discomfort, and can lead to inconsistencies, I used contributions from Denis et al. 2011 who described practices of strategic ambiguity in pluralistic organizations. Strategic ambiguity is defined as intentionally universal communication to unify or reconcile diverse needs and promote cohesion (see. Abdallah & Langley, 2014 p.9). Strategic ambiguity is embedded in organizational practices to accommodate plural needs and interests that coexist (Denis et al., 2011). This analysis led to the emergence of four areas of ambiguities.

By tracing the rule proliferation elements within and across periods, I found connections between them. These links exist between rule proliferation elements within each period and across each period. For instance, within the same period, the removal of one article can be linked to other changes and additions. Furthermore, one complexification in one period can lead to a rule addition in another. For example, an addendum to the rule can be created to plan for a committee. The creation of this committee can result in future rule changes and rule additions. To better understand these connections, I took one specific area of ambiguity about the university-wide quota, and I traced connected rule proliferation.





This chapter, therefore, accounts for rule proliferation found in each period, emergent areas of ambiguity, a control rule proliferation taxonomy resulting from categorization, as well as a depiction of the network of connections between rule proliferation elements.

#### 4.3 Proliferation during Time Periods

In this section, I present types of rules proliferation elements uncovered in each period starting with period 1 which represents the period of the meta-rule creation. Figure 9 summarizes five temporal bracket results ranging from 1968 to 2019. It illustrates rule changes, additions, and complexifications in each temporal bracket as organizational slack shrinks. Each change is represented by a triangle. Each addition is represented by a circle. Each complexification is represented by a square. Bold shapes represent rule proliferation elements associated with areas of ambiguity. The figure depicts control regulation (meta-rule) transformation over the 4 periods of

rule proliferation following the period of creation as well as the autonomous regulation transformation. Periods 2 and 5 are productive in the number of rule changes and additions that restrict organizational slack, while periods 3 and 4 experience rule additions that expand organizational slack.

Figure 9. Summary of Temporal Bracketing Analysis

Period 1. 1968-79	Period 2. 1980-89	Period 3. 1990-99	Period 4. 2000-08	Period 5. 2009-19
Foundation of university and union hostility	Institutional growth and reorganization of University of Quebec law	Institutional reorganization and decentralization in faculties	Student uprising (Red Square) and new university governance bill	Peak of Red Square Movement and budget cuts
<b>Control Regulation (CR)</b>				
	CR <sup>1</sup>	CR <sup>2</sup>	CR <sup>3</sup>	CR <sup>4</sup>
	AR <sup>1</sup>	AR <sup>2</sup>	AR <sup>3</sup>	AR <sup>4</sup>
<b>Autonomous Regulation (AR)</b>				
<b>Legend:</b>  Rule change  Rule addition  Rule complexification <b>Bold:</b> relation to initial ambiguity areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 4 restrictive changes, 3 changes in ambiguities</li> <li>• 2 restrictive rule additions</li> <li>• 1 expansive rule addition</li> <li>• 2 outbound restrictions</li> <li>• 6 inbound restrictions</li> <li>• 1 condition</li> <li>• 1 outbound WIP complexifications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 changes</li> <li>• 1 restrictive change</li> <li>• 1 expansive rule addition in relation with ambiguities</li> <li>• 2 outbound restrictions</li> <li>• 1 inbound restrictions</li> <li>• 1 outbound WIP complexifications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 changes</li> <li>• 1 restrictive change</li> <li>• 1 expansive rule addition</li> <li>• 1 outbound restriction</li> <li>• 2 inbound restrictions (1 in relation to ambiguity)</li> <li>• 1 inbound expansion in relation to ambiguities</li> <li>• 1 condition in relation to ambiguity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10 changes, 3 restrictive, 4 related to ambiguity</li> <li>• 2 restrictive rule addition (one in relation to ambiguity)</li> <li>• 1 expansive rule addition</li> <li>• 1 outbound restrictions</li> <li>• 2 inbound restrictions in relation to ambiguities</li> <li>• 1 inbound expansion in relation to ambiguities</li> </ul>

In the following subsections, I describe in further detail each period analyzed.

#### 4.3.1 Period 1 – 1968 to 1979. Foundation of UQAM

The first period is the university foundation and represents the creation of the meta-rule. Following governmental decree 1170, UQAM is founded on April 9, 1969, by merging five educational institutions. These five organizations bring their employees, organizational cultures, and diverging practices into the new organization; some groups are unionized and others not. In the early 70s,

the university's focus is on undergraduate studies to increase accessibility to higher education. In this new organization, lecturers experience challenges in finding their place.

“Lecturers are still not well received. Lecturers reflect an implicit opinion. Lecturers who occupy a position elsewhere are not seen the same way because they are less activist and less politicized.” 77:4<sup>11</sup> (University former high-level administrator)

*New Joint Regulation.* In 1978, lecturers represent more than 55% of the University's teaching staff and they obtain their union accreditation. This results in the creation of a joint regulation between two negotiating parties, the university administration, and lecturers. Although university administration and lecturers are the main parties at the negotiating table, more actors influence this negotiation including department administrations, professors, and students. This joint regulation comprises the first version of the meta-rule “*clause-reserve*”. Several stakes are leading to the creation of this joint regulation: many groups of actors with conflicting interests and varied needs, scarce resources as well as external environmental pressures. These same stakes and main groups of actors remain present with fluctuating intensity throughout the evolution of the rule and regulation from periods 1 to 5.

The first negotiating party is the university administration which accounts for the varying needs and interests of all departments. Furthermore, the university administration is pressured by professors who are actively involved in committee decision making and comprise most university decision makers. Moreover, the university administration must consider its academic mission and strategic goals while balancing resources. Such goals include increasing teaching quality, developing graduate-level programs and research. This means attracting, recruiting, retaining, and financing graduate students across a variety of university programs. Because the university is growing fast and budgetary constraints are strict, access to resources is a challenge. Relying on

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<sup>11</sup> Each citation is identified by two numbers separated by a colon. The first number refers to the document number the quotation originates from while the second number refers to the citation number inside such document. E.g., 77:4 refers to the fourth quotation inside document 77.

lecturers for more than 50% of the course loads has become customary. Even though there is some lobbying to hire more professors and fewer lecturers, financial realities make the meeting of these interests difficult to accommodate. Lecturers have become an important part of the teaching body and are underrepresented in committees and university decision making. The following citations illustrate compromise that takes place in the creation of collective agreements and the bargaining process.

Well, because a collective agreement is an agreement between a boss and his employees. The boss wanted that, not the employees, but you have to compromise, there are clauses that I don't like in the collective agreement for the lecturers, that's not what people on the employee side want, I want to say. 96 :1 (University Administrator)

Dean of Studies and Research finds a way of advocating at the Vice-Provost for Academic Life following pressure from professors to find a solution to a problem of promoting higher education... flexibility in the collective agreement for that our students teach. Then we get an agreement from the academics. We're going to the rector. He agrees to make it a negotiating priority ... to create a reserve clause. We discuss in the direction. The rector asks the Vice-Rector of HR and Vice-Rector of Academics to work on the offer. It's a good idea, now we have to defend it. In the way, you think it's 20%, but at 20% it's impossible to negotiate. How much will it be possible to negotiate? Ex. 12% We come back to the management team. Then we validate with the vice-rector of finance on the monetary side in a more targeted way. Politically, during this time, the rector could call the chairman of the board who would probe the independent members out of the session that this is a human resource rule with an academic mission.76:10 (Former University Administrator)

The union of lecturers is the second negotiating party. The university's constant and fast growth has created a status of nearly full-time lecturers for almost half of this specific teaching body. The other half of lecturers occupy another job and mostly teach in the evening. There is no provision allowing departments some flexibility in assigning guest lecturers, graduate students, or others. As such, departments find ways around regulation to achieve desired results. Professors account for most decision makers in departments. Moreover, lecturers have been experiencing significant organizational frictions with professors resulting from unionization debates since 1971. Agreeing to establish the meta-rule represents a compromise in an intricate bargaining process to gain on something else. Furthermore, it is an attempt to constraint behavior that, otherwise would remain illicit as represented in the following citations.

So the reserve clause in my opinion it must be born from this contradiction. Because before the departments could give course loads to whomever they wanted. So here we can book courses for our students, there is no problem and from the moment the union is born (uh) this is where this specification must be born on the courses we can book, because it is born in this contradiction between (uh) when is the moment when the lecturers will choose theirs or when is the moment when the departments attribute them to whomever they want 97 :1 (Lecturer, Representative of Union of Lecturers)

Other actors' needs are also taken into account but are not the primary negotiating parties. Ph.D. students' needs are considered through the voice of professors. Professors are research directors for graduate students, and they also coordinate new programs at the graduate level. For professors, allowing students to teach is an important facet of training students. Allowing master students, but more importantly, Ph.D. students to teach and gain experience is a common practice in most large universities and is an expected practice for any university desiring to develop a research program. Furthermore, providing financing opportunities is an essential part of retaining students.

It's because we want to train uhh, y'know there are two reasons. One reason for funding is a way of funding our doctoral students, but above all it is also a way of giving them experience, because there is a large proportion of postgraduate and doctoral students. who want to become a professor. So this experience would have been essential. So the "Reserve Clause" gives them a priority that they wouldn't have otherwise. 65:24 (Professor, Department Administration)

*New Meta-Rule Clause-Reserve.* A settlement is reached in 1979 which leads to the creation of the meta-rule *clause reserve*. This settlement results from tough negotiations between the university and lecturers. This negotiation was triggered by tensions between competing needs within the university; actors in a position to compete for resources. Discussions include whether a certain margin should be given to departments for course allocation prior to course attribution to lecturers, if so, what this margin should be, and who should be eligible under which conditions.

The *clause-reserve* is the result of compromise on the part of all parties involved. Hence, the meta-rule is not necessarily satisfactory to all parties; yet it represents the meeting point of competing interests and needs. At this particular point in time, the meta-rule is located at article 8.02 of the collective agreement. This meta-rule can be characterized as a pre-determined organizational slack, as its name "reserve" suggests. This rule captures a slack of 10% of course loads not attributed to professors to allow departments local flexibility in resource allocation.

...shows that it is mainly the students, students, and trainees who benefit from the reserve, which is, is consistent with the spirit of this clause whose main purpose is to enable graduate students to gain teaching experience. 20:40 (Union of lecturers, 2000)

We're going to say 6 or 7 percent of the courses are reserved for the entire university. Now by doing that (uh), the reserve clause is really noble, and all of that, as I said is for training, now it's at the application level, I know it creates a lot of, of, of (uh) problems. Well, one of the first problems there is, being said that it's for all the courses available (uh) there are some departments that are going to take a lot more than others. 63:18 (Lecturer)

#### 4.3.2 Emergent Areas of Ambiguities

The meta-rule design for *clause-reserve* resulted in the emergence of areas of ambiguity. Organizational slack enables local flexibility and results in areas of ambiguity in rule application. These areas of ambiguity further impact the university's organizational slack by increasing local flexibility for rule application. Areas of ambiguity led to the emergence of interpretation and application preoccupations. As a result, the areas of ambiguity generated a broader array of possible behavior and practices throughout the organization and therefore increased variability of rule application. Here are the four main areas of ambiguity identified:

*Area of ambiguity #1: The qualification of experts.* Article 8.02 a) stipulates that the university can hire experts. Expert qualifications and who qualifies them to remain for debate in 2019.

##### **Excerpt from Meta-rule (1978-1979)**

...the appointment of a lecturer of reputation for outstanding contributions to the advancement of scientific, technical, artistic, or literary research and education, as evidenced by publications or productions; 2:17

##### **Ambiguity**

...course in reserve clause was not a person of reputation. According to the Union, therefore, there was a violation of Article 10.02(a) of the collective bargaining agreement. After hearing the evidence, the grievance arbitrator found that the Departmental Assembly did not appear to have given serious consideration to the candidate's file to assess whether she was a person of reputation. On the other hand, the adjudicator confirmed that in order to judge whether a person is of reputation, the person must be in one of two situations: have outstanding professional experience or have made an outstanding contribution to the advancement of research and technical, scientific, artistic or literary education. In this case, the individual in the proviso did not meet either of these criteria. 85:7 (Union of lecturer, 2015)

Well actually the department first of all it's the department that decides that. So they're supposed to have criteria and then they understand what someone of reputation is. I mean someone of reputation is not a doctoral student who has just finished and whom we like and who would be fun to teach. It's someone who is recognized by his peers and who has perhaps been innovative in the field, so he stands out in terms of excellence. So it's different from the reserve clause to encourage a student who's a doctorate student, that's another one, there are several definitions, including (um) a person of reputation. It's someone who has an established reputation in the field by peers who make publications and so on. So at first, we in the department thought that they should not look at this because they gave the reserve clause. When we started to scrutinize, we said yes, and then they-other people-found the person to have an innovative practice, one of them passed, but the others (um) we found that they could not demonstrate that this was a person of reputation. 96:3 (University administrator)

*Area of ambiguity #2: Use of Meta-rule to manipulate the job posting process.* Article 8.05 stipulates that articles 8.02, 8.03, and 8.04 cannot be used to manipulate the job posting process and deliberately limit postings to lecturers. These challenges still transpire in today's narratives and this stipulation still appears in the meta-rule.

#### **Excerpt from Meta-rule (1978-1979)**

8.05 L'application des clauses 8.02, 8.03 et 8.04 ne doit pas être utilisée délibérément comme moyen de limiter l'application des mécanismes d'affichage et de répartition des charges de cours prévus à la convention collective 2:19

#### **Ambiguity**

... who is the holder of the chair and who (uh), already knew me, gave me the challenge, asked me if I wanted to redo the entire course because he was not at all in agreement with the version, not satisfied with the version that had been given by the lecturer for about ten years. He had a lot of complaints from students, so he saw it as an opportunity for someone more specialized to come in and revamp the course. 69:34 (Student)

Well, everyone does that. Yes, with the lecturers' convention, the directors (um) well, it happens and then why, because sometimes the path is too long to get rid of someone who (um) doesn't suit them. Since it's a long and difficult way to put together a file and all that, they look for other rules, they use the rules to get their way. 96:7 (University Administrator)

But the idea is to prevent abuses and that's what they do systematically when they want to block a lecturer for x, y reason, it's often ideological (uh) sometimes, yes it's that there are some who can be temperamental, but often it's ideological. But we will systematically give these courses to students to finally eject them from the pool and (uh) at that point, two years later they are no longer part of the map. So (uh) obviously it's extremely difficult to prove, that's why we need



to have objective mechanisms to prevent these abuses but (uh) that's my experience with (laughs) this regulation 97 :3 (Lecturer)

*Area of ambiguity #3: University-wide 10% quota.* The establishment of a 10% university-wide quota that confuses rule application. Application is departmental and the quota is measured at the university level. Although the quota was lowered to 8% in 1990, and again to 6.5% in 2015; the university-wide quota remains a challenge and will be discussed during the next collective agreement negotiation.

### **Excerpt Meta-rule (1978-1979)**

8.02 A departmental meeting may subtract from the posting a number of course loads not to exceed, on an annual basis and for the university as a whole, ten percent (10%) of the total unallocated faculty course loads when that departmental meeting, prior to the posting... 2:17

### **Ambiguity**

Does the reserve clause have to be applied department by department or is it by the university? So uh...we'll say 10%. Does 10% have to be applied in each department? Which could be problematic for some departments, or on the contrary, it's done on the whole campus, which has other advantages and disadvantages depending on the structure of the department, but... 71:39 (student)

Well, yes, more so, because before, they were more or less monitoring the percentage, but now they've asked us to monitor it. And it's difficult because basically, it's the first one to arrive, our problem is that it's the first one to arrive. But when we see it, we analyze it from session to session, I think we haven't passed it. But when we see a department that gives a lot of provisos we tell them we are restricting them. We don't have a choice because we know that on average everyone should have the right you know to give (uh) I'm just saying that at least one. But when in a department that's made that gives ten, well basically if it comes rather than the others, it would take away the chance for the others to be able to give reserve clauses so that... 96:6 (university administrator)

I think somebody had told me that in one department that they had almost 15%, 20% of the courses that were assigned to... to (uh) the reserve clause. Again because there are some faculties that have less and some faculties that can have more. So it's closely monitored, for example, if the university ever exceeds the percentage, the famous 6-7 that I don't remember, um, that's monitored, that's correct, but as I said there are (um) we end up with faculties (um) or departments that have, that use much more than others, which means that as I said, there are lecturers who end up with sessions of no courses, on the unemployment line. 63:21 (lecturer)

*Area of ambiguity #4: Student registered in advanced studies.* The wording used to qualify students entitled to clause causes ambiguity. In 1986, a committee is put in place to assess course attribution, most specifically in the case of postdoctoral fellows<sup>12</sup>. This ambiguity begins to be clarified in the meta-rule in 1990.

#### **Excerpt Meta-rule (1978-1979)**

8.02 b) the hiring of a student enrolled in an advanced study program at the University.  
2 :17

#### **Excerpt Meta-rule (1990-1993)**

(b) the hiring of a student enrolled in an advanced study program at the University or a postdoctoral fellow.

10.04 The persons referred to in clause 10.02 shall meet the qualification requirements for teaching, shall teach only one course load per year...11:7

#### **Ambiguity**

I think it's ridiculous that ... our ... that ... that we can't offer a maximum number of courses that a student can take as a reserve clause and that's because there's a rule for lecturers. And the second one is the postdoc. The fact that postdocs can't take the reserve clause given their profile and reasons for doing a postdoc. These are the two things that I think are getting in the way. 59:45 (Professor Administrator)

In the case of the rule on post docs and students, the reserve clause there, Ph.D. students, it doesn't say post doc, it says for graduate students. And then (uh) and then (uh) then it was written post doc trainee, but I don't remember, anyway, then the interpretation of the union of that rule who read it there, who didn't have all the experience of where it came from the rule, and then the rest of us either, said, but that's not what it means. But I had people who had been applying it for a long time who couldn't tell me the origin of the rule because they were technicians, they hadn't participated in the negotiations, but they had been there for 25 years and they applied the rule in the same way, yes that. We were told that we had to do it like that because the bosses had discussed something, but today when we reread the rule together, we said it's true we didn't write that, but then they-others were saying but that doesn't mean that we were obliged to make changes to the rule. Why because we had lost the history of why it had been put in place (cough) even I tell you I even called the people who were there at the time to say but explain to me what you wanted

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
<sup>12</sup> **Postdoctoral fellow – Post-doctorant.e:** postdoctoral researcher interning with a professor to complete a research project. In the context of this study, postdoctoral fellows have an employee status at the host university.

to write. I'm telling you because there is a letter of agreement associated with this rule, there is a letter of agreement in relation to the rule and then when you read it you say oh my God it's marked in relation to such and such a case and then we don't even know what it refers to, so it created confusion because the people who put it in place who understood each other at the time are no longer there. 96:9 (University Administrator)

Slack triggered by control rule ambiguities generates a broader array of possible behaviors and practices and therefore increases the variability of rule application.

Ambiguities lead to more slack between the control regulation and the autonomous regulation at local levels. It is in this slack that effective regulation exists, in the disparity between autonomous and control regulations. The effective regulation is the regulation enacted at any given moment and is therefore fluctuating. It represents the variability of applications. Slack giving rise to variability in effective regulation is depicted in Figure 10. As represented in Figure 10, the control rule indicates the university-wide quota for the meta-rule and priority of attribution. The autonomous regulation includes local and organizational processes that allow for this rule to become functional. The effective regulation is the action unfolding because of the meeting of these two regulations. Ambiguity in the control regulation generates more slack for the enactment of the autonomous regulation. As such, a broader variability of application and a wide array of different practices emerge.

Figure 10. Example of Slack Enabling Variability in Rule Application



#### 4.3.3 Period 2 – 1980 to 1989. Period of growth

Celebrating UQAM's 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary, the second period was characterized by the university's growth. Hostilities experienced in the 70s have stopped.

*Rule changes.* Globally, five types of rule changes are experienced. First, changes of clarifications. These changes aim at clarifying elements of the rule that were perceived as requiring further precisions. In the case of the meta-rule 1980 to 1989. A good example of clarification is the one assigning the departmental assembly's role and decision power. In this example, the rule change implies recalibration of the autonomous regulation by clarifying the decision-making entity. This clarification aims at reducing slack in the effective regulation by reducing uncertainty and ambiguity.

The second type of change identified was a direct modification to the meta-rule margin. In these cases, the changes target the university-wide quota and the quota of courses allotted to different groups of individuals. These margin changes modify the application possibilities of the rule.

The third type of change is structural. A structural change is a reorganization of ideas brought about because the rule has evolved, and additions were made. The structural change allows reading the information with more clarity. An example of such change is the reorganization of “*clause-reserve*” and “job posting” as two sub-sections of the larger “course attribution” rule.

The fourth type of change includes rhetorical changes. These changes imply specific modification in phrasing to modify or clarify meaning. In this specific period, the phrase “lecturer of reputation” is changed for “person of reputation”. This rhetorical change, although simple, carries important meaning considering that the title “lecturer” is given to someone who is hired through official channels and covered under the collective agreement of lecturers, whereas a “person of reputation” is a guest invited to teach a course.

The fifth type of rule change is removal. Removals withdraw an article or portion of the article from the meta-rule. In this case, the possibility to hire a company was removed.

*Rule additions.* Throughout this period, three types of rule additions were observed. Rule additions aiming at restricting boundaries of the rule, rule additions aiming at expanding boundaries of the rule, and precisions.

Rule additions that restrict the boundaries are those that limit the possibilities for application. Therefore, they will reduce organizational slack. These additions are added to stop unexpected applications of the rule or to limit abuse. For instance, there is the addition of a stipulation indicating that Ph.D. students who also have lecturer status cannot use the meta-rule instead of the traditional job posting system.

Rule additions that expand boundaries are those that expand the possibilities for application. In this specific example, the possibility of hiring university managers within the university-wide quota was added. This means that the rule adds more possibilities of potential course attribution combinations for departments under the provision of this meta-rule.

Precisions are additions that add more specificity to the rule. In this particular instance, precision is added at the beginning of the rule with regard to course attribution.

*Rule complexifications.* In the 80s, four types of complexifications were observed. First, there are inbound restrictions. Inbound complexifications are dependencies within the rule-text that are contingent on other sections of rule-text. For instance, in 1983 it is stipulated that students and university managers have a limit of 2 courses per semester: and retired professors a maximum of 1 per semester.

Second, there are outbound restrictions. Outbound complexifications are dependencies contingent upon rule text articles but lie outside of the meta-rule. For example, in 1989 there is a letter of agreement attached to the collective agreement extension. This letter refers to the professors' qualifications regarding the application of the meta-rule. Furthermore, in 1983 a stipulation indicates that individuals teaching under the provisions of the meta-rule fall under the collective agreement of lecturers with the exception of article 8 in reference to accumulation of seniority.

Third, there are conditions. Conditions are a requirement that must be met for the application of certain articles of the meta-rule. In this case, it was integrated into the rule that an employee covered under the collective agreement cannot use this meta-rule.

Fourth, there are outbound work-in-progress complexifications. These are outbound contingencies to plan future rule production. For instance, there is in 1986 the creation of a committee aiming to discuss and resolve course attribution issues, most specifically in the case of postdoctoral fellows. Rule proliferation will emerge from the creation of this committee in years to come.

*Areas of ambiguity.* Interestingly, areas of ambiguities that were identified as slack in the effective regulation in 1978 are still present. They include the university-wide quota, the manipulation of the job posting process, the definition of advanced studies, and the qualifications of experts. To address ambiguity:

- a committee put in place in 1989 to attempt clarifying the place of postdoctoral interns in course attribution;
- stricter restrictions are applied to prohibit lecturers from benefiting from the clause and to ensure that individuals benefiting from it only do so once;
- stricter restrictions are established to control teaching activities for graduate students.

As a result, areas of ambiguity remain in period 3 which follows a major restructuring of University of Quebec law giving more autonomy to the University.

#### 4.3.4 Period 3 – 1990 to 1999. Period of institutional organization

For this period, the university experienced important budget compressions resulting in postponed collective agreement negotiations. There are negotiations on whether to organize university administration into faculties. Negotiations concluded in 1997 when 6 faculties and one management school are created.

*Rule changes.* Globally, three types of rule changes were experienced during period 3. First, changes in writing conventions. The meta-rule is now written in both the masculine and feminine forms of the French language. These changes follow other institutional changes in line with cultural and political transformations experienced both at university and in Canada. No associated connection to organizational preoccupations was observed with this type of rule change.

The second type of change involves clarification. A clarification aims at increasing specificity to improve understanding. For example, the professional experience was added as a way to better qualify a person of reputation.

The third type of change is structural change. This structural change is a reorganization of ideas to clarify the decision-making entity for course allocation, as the departmental assembly. The structural change allows reading the information with more clarity as illustrated in the following citations.

1983 “Taking into account the general allocation policy ... on the recommendation of the Studies Committee ... each departmental assembly determines the available charges which are subject to the procedure provided for in this article ....” 6:26 (Collective agreement of lecturers article 10.01)

1990 “The departmental assembly determines the course loads which must be subject to the procedure provided for in this article, taking into account” 11:13 (Collective agreement of lecturers article 10.01)

*Rule additions.* Throughout this period, one rule addition aimed at expanding boundaries of the rule.

Rule additions that expand boundaries are those that broaden the possibilities for application. In this specific example, the possibility of postdoctoral fellows being added within the university-wide quota was added. This means that the rule adds more possibilities of potential course attribution combinations for departments. Interestingly, in 1986 a committee had been established to study this possibility.

*Rule complexifications.* In the 90s, two types of rule complexifications were observed. First, there were inbound restrictions. Inbound complexifications are dependencies that are contingent upon rule text articles but lie within the meta-rule. This means that this dependency is contingent upon another article of the meta-rule itself. For instance, in 1990 there are specific quotas added for students, university managers, people of reputation, and retired professors were adjusted.

Second, there are outbound contingency complexifications. This means that these complexifications have dependencies or conditions based on rules outside of the meta-rule. For example, in 1990 there is a letter of agreement stipulating how to implement this meta-rule.

*Areas of ambiguity.* Once again, areas of ambiguities that emerged as a result of the meta-rule creation in 1978 are still present. They include the university-wide quota, the manipulation of the job posting process, the definition of advanced studies, and the qualifications of experts.

These areas of ambiguities however triggered changes in the meta-rule such as the addition of postdoctoral fellows as well as the addition of professional experience as a qualification for a



person of reputation. Furthermore, there appears to be a desire to validate the departmental assembly as the key decision-making power when it comes to course attribution.

Professional experience has been included as a characteristic of how to qualify experts. This means that decision-makers have access to more criteria to qualify people of reputations hired for course diffusion. This opens the pool of available candidates for teaching, and it also reduces ambiguity on how to qualify this group of individuals.

Postdoctoral fellows were added to the pool of candidates who can access course loads through the meta-rule. This expands the pool of possible candidates for teaching while the pool of courses remains. In addition, a letter of agreement to study the situation of students who would benefit from teaching experience.

#### 4.3.5 Period 4 – 2000 to 2008. University Governance Policy

Characterized by turmoil and financial challenges, this period is eventful and is central in redefining university governance. Including a global financial crisis as well as student and community strikes in response to the government's rise in tuition fees; the new millennium brings change.

*Rule changes.* Globally, five types of rule changes were experienced during period 4. First, margin changes were observed. Margin changes are changes impacting directly allowances for this meta-rule. By changing course load limits for people of reputation, the organization is directly limiting the margin of action.

The second type of change observed is clarification. In this specific instance, the clarification is associated with the third type of change, removal. The removal of a contradiction in 10.4 stipulating that individuals can only benefit from meta-rule, results in clarification. This clarification, therefore, results directly from the removal of contradicting elements.

The fourth type of change is structural change. By reordering information, decision making authority of the departmental assembly becomes more specific.

The fifth type of change is rhetorical to specify that lecturers are the type of salaried workers the article is targeting.

*Rule additions.* For this period, one type of rule addition that aims at expanding boundaries of the rule is observed. Rule additions that expand the boundaries are those that expand the possibilities for application. In this specific example, language teachers are now integrated into rule application.

*Rule complexifications.* In period 4, three types of rule complexifications were observed. First, there is an inbound dependency added in 2000. This inbound restriction indicates that Ph.D. students cannot exercise their right to this clause beyond six credits. In 2006, two inbound dependencies are added; these inbound restrictions specify new limitations for Ph.D. students and external experts. An outbound dependency is added with letter 301 detailing the application of article 10.04. Furthermore, a condition is added requiring Ph.D. students not to let teaching through *clause-reserve* hinder their educational progress.

Interestingly, areas of ambiguities that emerged from the meta-rule creation in 1978 are still present. They include the university-wide quota, the manipulation of the job posting process, the definition of advanced studies, and the qualifications of experts. These areas of ambiguities however triggered changes in the meta-rule such as changes in the quota, creation of a committee to explore postdoctoral fellows, the addition of postdoctoral fellows as well as the addition of professional experience as a qualification for a person of reputation. Furthermore, there appears to be a desire to validate the departmental assembly as the key decision-making power when it comes to course attribution.

#### 4.3.6 Period 5 – 2009-2019. Red Squares

This period starts with the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of UQAM and ends with its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary. Living the repercussion of the global economic crisis of 2007-2008; tuition raises by the government in 2010 led to the culmination of student and community uprising. By 2012 the Red Square Movement have gained full strength and momentum.

For period 5, a variety of rule changes, rule additions, and rule complexifications are observed. However, complexifications play a significantly bigger role in rule proliferation during this period.

*Rule changes.* Globally, four types of rule changes were experienced during period 5: protocol changes, clarifications, margin changes, and removals. First, there are protocol changes. These are changes made to the rule application protocol. A new technology called ACCENT<sup>13</sup> now enables improved standardization of rule application protocol across the university and is therefore integrated into the meta-rule. It follows that letter 301 detailing implementation protocol becomes obsolete and is removed in 2015.

Second and in 2015, clarification changes are applied by including two acronyms. Third, a margin change is made by reducing the university-wide quota from 8% to 6.5%. Fourth a removal-type change that withdraws a contradiction within the rule text also acts as clarification.

*Rule additions.* Throughout this period, two types of rule addition are observed: one precision article and one institutional article.

Precisions are articles that aim to add specificity to the meta-rule. In this particular case, the authority of the Office of Teaching Staff Services is added. Institutional additions are derived from

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<sup>13</sup> ACCENT : Logiciel de gestion et d'attribution des cours aux chargés de cours – Course allocation software for lecturers

institutional changes such as adding the possibility to benefit from maternity leave for employees covered under the meta-rule.

*Rule complexifications.* In period 5, three types of rule complexifications are observed. First, there is a significant outbound restriction included in 2009 listing all articles of the collective agreement relevant to candidates of “*clause-reserve*”. Second, there are two inbound restrictions included in 2015 detailing requirements for Ph.D. students who want to teach under this meta-rule. This complexification is derived from the removal of teaching equivalency requirements which is removed in 2009. Third, there is a condition included for students who are now required to be monitored by a professor.

*Areas of ambiguity.* Areas of ambiguities that emerged with the creation of the meta-rule are still present. They include the university-wide quota, the manipulation of the job posting process, the definition of advanced studies, and the qualifications of experts. These areas of ambiguities however trigger changes in the meta-rule such as

- changes in the university-wide quota;
- changes in the qualifications and accessibility for graduate students;
- as well as changes in qualifications for external experts.

Equipped with the review of each temporal bracket, the next portion of this chapter details the emergent taxonomy of control rule proliferation. This is a significant building block in understanding how rule proliferation unfolds.

#### 4.4 Taxonomy of Control Rule Proliferation

Throughout this thesis, I found that there was an emergent taxonomy of rule proliferation. This taxonomy is summarized in Table 8. Rule proliferation elements across periods can be groups in motives categories of motives:

1. *Modifying freedom of action (or future freedom of action)*: By modifying the freedom of action, administrators are altering organizational slack and variability for the application of this rule.
  - a. *Rule addition example*: Stipulating those lecturers cannot use the meta-rule to access course loads restricts freedom of action. On the other hand, including university managers increases freedom of action.
  - b. *Rule change example*: For illustration purposes, let us take for example the change in university-wide quota going from 10% to 8% in period 2. This modification restricts freedom of action connects to many other emerging complexifications.
  - c. *Rule complexification example*: By modifying the freedom of action, administrators are transforming slack and possible variability for the application of this rule. For instance, including a condition for retired professors indicating that this group can access a maximum of 10 courses for Fall and Winter semesters for the entire university.
  - d. *Rule complexification example (Modifying future freedom of action)*: For complex issues or those for which an agreement cannot be reached momentarily, committees or working groups are engagement to continue discussions.
2. *Improving the efficiency of rule application*: By specifying application articles and protocols, administrators attempt to reduce the variability of application. This pertains to the effective regulation.
  - a. *Rule change example*: Inclusion of technology such as ACCENT, further contributes to decreasing variability of rule application.
3. *Improving understanding*: Making precisions on roles of actors and committees aims at reducing ambiguity. By changing words, phrases, and by reorganizing text, actors attempt to reach a consensus about common language and understanding in terms of interests and

expectations. Language is essential since it is the basis for rule application once the collective agreement is signed. This type of motive also reduces the variability of application.

- a. *Rule change example:* changing the word “salaried” for “lecturer”
4. *Adhering to institutional norms:* Administrators and union representatives abide by new regulations by adding new articles to the rule or by norms by modifying rule text following new specifications.
  - a. *Rule change example:* Actors transformed rule text to consider feminization of writing conventions.
  - b. *Rule addition example:* Actors added the provision for maternity leave

Table 8. Rule proliferation type with Associated Motive

	Modifying	Increasing	Improving	Adhering to	Modifying
	Freedom of action	Understanding	Efficiency	Institutional Norms	Future freedom of action
<b>Rule changes</b>	Margin Protocol Removal	Clarifications Rhetorical Structural Removal	Protocol Removal	Writing conventions	
<b>Rule additions</b>	Restriction Expansion	Precision		Institutional	
<b>Rule complexifications</b>	Dependencies Conditions				Work-in-progress complexification

Motives are closely associated with types of rule proliferation elements. Rule proliferation elements are applied to meet diverging needs and interests of actors. Therefore, I grouped rule proliferation elements considering (1) motives, (2) whether it was a change, addition, or complexification, and (3) how the rule proliferation element is applied. For instance, a structural

change represents a change in the structure of the rule text whereas a clarification represents a change in phrasing that clarifies the meaning. The following sections detail the emergent taxonomy of control rule proliferation.

#### 4.4.1 Taxonomy of Control Rule changes

All rule changes are illustrated in their respective temporal bracket in Figure A1 of Appendix A. Figure A1 shows how instrumental changes emerging from periods two and five were in shaping the meta-rule.

Over the course of the periods two to five, seven types of rule changes were cataloged (Table A1 of Appendix A illustrates a compilation of rule changes per period):

1. *Margin changes*: Represent changes to the margin of freedom given within the rule. Modifications made to the margin constitute direct organizational slack changes.
2. *Clarifications*: Entail modifications were made to rule content to provide a clearer sense of direction. For instance, clarifications can be relied on to specify decision making power more clearly. Clarifications are indirect changes to organizational slack.
3. *Rhetorical changes*: Entail switching one word or phrase for another set of words or phrases in order to parameter or frame a concept. In those instances, the switch of words is important to convey proper meaning e.g. “switching” salaried for “lecturer”. These changes carry an indirect influence on organizational slack by reducing ambiguity and they contribute to stabilizing the effective regulation by reducing the potential degree of variability in the application.
4. *Structural changes*: Tend to reorganize content to make it more user-friendly and easier to comprehend. Some of these changes are dissociated from organizational slack. Nevertheless, by reducing ambiguity they stabilize the effective regulation by mitigating potential variability.

5. *Protocol changes*: Apply modifications to steps or terms of applications for the rule. They are directly associated with organizational slack by providing a clear framework for application and they appear to stabilize the effective regulation by providing standardized technological tools. This follows findings by D'Adderio (2008) on the use of technology to stabilize routines.
6. *Writing conventions*: Call for rule content modification according to new writing and social norms. These changes are not associated with organizational slack.
7. *Removals*: Entail changes by removal of articles. Removals tend to have joint motives. This means that the removal was associated with another type of change. The motives traced by this study included changes to the protocol, therefore, rendering obsolete past protocol articles, changes to the margin by removing groups of individuals entitled to access the rule, as well as clarifications by removing contradictions.

Although there are many rule changes inventoried during this study, very few of them have significantly marked the organization. The meta-rule was designed leaving four main areas of ambiguity. These four areas were: the qualification of experts, the use of meta-rule to manipulate the job posting process, the university-wide 10% quota, and student registered in advanced studies. As such, prominent changes are those that were driven by areas of ambiguity.

#### *Qualification of experts:*

- There is a change of wording from “hire a lecturer of reputation” to “hire a person of reputation” in period 2
- Addition of professional experience as a qualification for external experts in period 3

#### *University-wide 10% quota :*

- The quota of reserve going from 10% to 8% in period 2
- University-wide percent allowance was reduced from 8% to 6.5% in period 5

#### *Student registered in advanced studies:*



- Student accessibility to the reserve was reduced from one course per semester to one per year in period 2
- Integration of ACCENT software in rule application in period 5
- 10.03 article integrate information protocol through ACCENT in period 5

Rule changes are connected. Taking an example of change that occurred in period 5 allows us to visualize links between rule changes and understand their implications. One of the recent changes consists of integrating technology into the rule. This change involved modifying the terms of rule application so that the rule can be applied by using a software named ACCENT. It therefore, implies removing letter 301 which was an outbound dependency added in period 4. This rule change also involved the subsequent removal of a reference to ACCENT in article 10.02 and the inclusion of ACCENT in two other articles as part of rule instructions. Therefore, to truly understand the implications of rule proliferation, rules must be examined through time and within their networked system.

#### 4.4.2 Taxonomy of Control Rule Additions

Rule additions are illustrated in temporal brackets in Figure A2 of Appendix A. From period two to period five, four types of rule additions were cataloged (Table A2 of Appendix A illustrates a compilation of rule additions per period):

1. *Restrictions*: Represent additions that restrict behavior. Restrictions constitute direct restrictive organizational slack alteration. They have the potential to directly alleviate the effective regulation by removing possibilities.
2. *Expansions*: Represent additions that expand possibilities. Expansion constitutes direct expansive organizational slack alteration that intensifies potential variability in the effective regulation. An example of a rule addition that induced rule proliferation through effective regulation was the inclusion of postdoctoral fellows which was later removed.

3. *Precisions*: Entail additions that aim to specify information such as the role of a decision-making entity. They represent an indirect alteration in slack. They have the potential to indirectly alleviate the effective regulation by removing possibilities.
4. *Institutional*: Entail additions to adhere to institutional norms and laws such as offering maternity leave options to employees. They are a direct alteration to organizational slack.

As observed, there appear to have fewer rule additions than rule changes over time. Furthermore, very few additions were related to areas of ambiguities which make them easier to trace.

*Use of meta-rule to manipulate the job posting process:*

- Lecturers cannot use the meta-rule to access course loads in period 2

*Students registered in advanced studies:*

- Inclusion of postdoctoral fellows with students registered in advanced studies in the period
- Addition of a new requirement for students stipulating that they need to be monitored by a professor in period 5

Rule additions are closely associated to rule changes. For instance, some rule removals lead to the addition of a rule. Hence, the reduction of the meta-rule by removing an article does not always equate to simplification. The removal of articles can also generate proliferation and require adjustment of the autonomous regulation which will be explored in the next chapters. For instance, the removal of the possibility to hire a company under the clause-reserve provision was followed by the addition of the possibility to hire university managers.

#### 4.4.3 Taxonomy of Control Rule Complexifications

Rule complexifications are illustrated in Figure A3 of Appendix A. From period two to period five, three types of rule complexifications were cataloged (Table A3 of Appendix A illustrates a compilation of rule additions per period):

1. *Dependencies*: Dependencies are articles added that are contingent upon other articles of the meta-rules. There are inbound dependencies that are located within the main rule text and there are outbound dependencies that are located outside of the main rule text. These come in the form of addenda. Further, some dependencies are restrictive, and some that are expansive. Dependencies are associated with the organizational slack alteration. Furthermore, they are associated with exacerbating the effective regulation. Dependencies are described in Table 9.

Table 9. Rule Dependencies

	Inbound	Outbound
Restrictive	Inbound restrictions	Outbound restrictions
Expansive	Inbound expansions	Outbound expansions *none were cataloged during the study

2. *Conditions*: Represent terms of application that restrict behavior. Requirements constitute direct restrictive slack changes. Furthermore, they are associated with exacerbating the effective regulation.
3. *Work-in-progress complexifications*: Entail related articles that pertain to the future addition of rules or complexifications e.g., articles defining working groups or committees with the purpose to work on specific rule matters.

Rule additions restricting behavior appear to be less impactful than rule additions aiming to expand. For instance, introducing a new group of individuals such as postdoctoral fellows into the rule appears to have marked the organization more profoundly than the addition of an article adding precision to the process of course attribution at the beginning of the meta-rule. The first one impacts who qualifies under the meta-rule and as a result broadens the umbrella covered by the rule. This significantly recalibrates how the autonomous rule will be enacted. The second rule

addition also entails recalibration of the autonomous regulation but by streamlining the process. Chapter V uncovers autonomous regulation proliferation.

Control rule proliferation, comprised of rule changes, additions and complexifications is a networked system of interrelated elements. This means that rule complexifications are connected to rule additions and changes.

#### 4.5 Rule Proliferation as Networked System

The meta-rule is a networked system and as such, proliferation elements are interconnected. Figure 11 depicts an example of relations between rule proliferation elements over four periods. These rule proliferation elements are linked to one significant change: the university-wide quota decreasing from 10% to 8% in period 2.

We observe in period 2 that the change in university-wide quota is associated with several new quotas imposed on groups of individuals such as students, university managers, and retired professors. These groups are being assigned specific limits under the provision of *clause-reserve*. Specifically, it results in further limitations on allocating courses to Ph.D. students.

there must have been (uh) a calculation back then that that represented in terms of numbers, maybe they did a calculation on the number of doctoral students and then what was given. They probably did the percentage that was given at that time was said we're giving roughly eight percent made that we're going to put eight percent. You know sometimes it's done on this basis (uh) and then there well in negotiation (uh) people claim well there is a decrease in student clientele then there the lecturers said well there are fewer courses means that ... we want you to reduce, you know in return we give you that 96:12 (University administrator)

It can be negotiated anyway, like 6% at UQAM level and no more than 10% per department. 97:36 (Lecturer, Representative Union of lecturer)

That is to say that for me the main one is the collective agreement because that is where we are going to negotiate this kind of quota. 97:56 (Lecturer, Representative, Union of Lecturers)

In period 3, rule proliferation pertaining to graduate students experienced in previous periods leads to the emergence of a committee exploring teaching possibilities for students given the many

restrictions they face. Moreover, there is an organizational contradiction emerging given that graduate students' interests are represented by the Union of lecturers, and lecturers aim at reducing graduate students' access to the meta-rule.

I find that this is regulation manages to create a space so that students have a chance to have an experience without impairing lecturers too much. 97:70 (Lecturer, Representative, Union of Lecturers)

I would pay if he had a problem (uh) they represented me, but I wasn't a member (hesitation) that's one part of that is that (uh). The logic behind the idea of saying that we represent you if there is a union problem, you pay your dues. But you're not a member it's because (uh) you didn't come in through the front door, you entered through the window or the back door. Because (uh) you bypass our collective agreement, that means that our collective agreement, allocates courses according to the score if I have such a score, the department can not say ah well I like the little youngster better. is going out with his doctorate, so I'm going to (uh) give the course to him. 97:40 (Lecturer and former student)

Because we are members of the lecturer's union which is a contradiction but at the same time, in fact, it seems that they do not defend the rights of the "reserve clauses". If tomorrow I switch to the status of lecturer, then I will bring this point to the union. These people they pay, they .. they .. they .. y'know they are part of that union by the way... (67:48) (student)

And that comes directly into play..., it's a conflict of interest for me, it's that the lecturers' union represents both lecturers and students who benefit from the "reserve clause". This means that there is an obvious conflict of interest because the lecturers have an interest in reducing the number of students who obtain these course loads, well, vice versa, so there are fields of force clearly which... as I say to you I do not necessarily master all implications at stake or those resulting from it but... yeah. 68 :50 (student)

In period 4, additional complexifications emerge limiting graduate students' access to the meta-rule. Three complexifications restrict the timeframe by which it can be used, modify the number of courses allowed for graduate students and require that teaching activities do not interfere with studies. These complexifications are challenging given that some departments have become reliant on these resources for financing part of their graduate students. Moreover, there is no change applied to remedy the contradiction in which the Union of Lecturers represents the interests of graduate students who teach under the provision of *clause-reserve*.

Well, she would have a hard time, and then she doesn't want to buy herself out of trouble. For example, the mythical department, in the sense, I don't know which exactly, which is used to using

it almost as scholarships for its students and so on. (Lecturer, Representative, Union of Lecturers) 97:62

you know I don't know if it means lying but you know technically every time you ask for your course load as a lecturer you need the signatures of the teachers who sign, who say, who certify if we can say that no, it does not delay your thesis progress, then in my case well ... 69:65 (student)

it's part of the funding package uhh, as you know we have uhh, a funding program called 'FREDA', you'll excuse me for the acronym, and that funds a doctoral student. 65:29 (Professor, Administrator)

In period 5, complexifications once again concern student status. One of these complexifications entails students who are now required to be supervised by a professor. Furthermore, another change to the university-wide quota is experienced. Pressure is applied on the university administration to decrease the percentage to avoid impairment on lecturers' employment. However, the fact that the quota remains central at the university level and not applied by the department further restricts the rule and does not appear to resolve the entire issue. There are no rule additions directly associated with the change in quota. However, rule changes are closely connected to both rule complexifications and rule ambiguities.

So we have to watch that we do not exceed the percentage, I think we are at, think that before it was 8 percent then we are at six points five, I'm not sure, six point five percent, so we must ensure that at the university level since we are central we see all the reserve clauses, that we do not exceed the number that is allowed to us to give. 96:13 (University Administrator)

there in our collective agreement it's limited, I don't know how much anymore but let's say around 7 or 8% or maybe even 6 decimal point. But it's more the spirit than the letter that matters to me here but that's (uh) contracted at the university level as a whole. As long as there are a few departments that have never used this reserve clause there (uh) well it drops the percentage at the national level. 97:30 (Lecturer, Representative, Union of Lecturers)

Complexifications are connected to rule content as well as tensions between control regulation and autonomous regulation. As a result, many complexifications pertain to areas of ambiguity. All rule proliferation elements do not carry the same importance in terms of impact on organizational life. As such, rule proliferation elements that conveyed the most significance have been associated with the objectives of modifying freedom of action and improving the efficiency of the application. Furthermore, these elements have been associated with areas of rule ambiguity.

Rule elaboration is path-dependent and rule proliferation elements are networked (Zhu & Schulz, 2019). March et al. (2000) discussed rule families comprising categories of control rules (i.e. administrative rules, academic rules) as ecosystems rules. I have found connections between elements of rule proliferation through periods. The meta-rule is a networked system in which elements are interrelated. It follows that elements of proliferation are also connected both during the same period and across periods. As a result, rule proliferation is a path-dependent decision making process. I can now further specify that the meta-rule itself, as well as the control regulation, are networked systems since:

- They are networked elements dependent on one another.
- These networked elements are not evolving continuously as would be the case in the ecosystem but are evolving sporadically.
- The system's elements are passive and not active as required for a self-sustaining ecosystem.

In order to form a self-fulfilling, dynamic, and constantly evolving ecosystem of rules in which components are interdependent; we must examine the entire organizational regulatory system. This means that by mobilizing the three levels of the SRT (J.-D. Reynaud, 1989), we can observe the emergence of an ecosystem. with the following characteristics. The entire organizational regulatory system will be explored in chapters V and VI.

#### 4.6 Understanding the Rule Proliferation Process

This chapter presented a taxonomy of rule proliferation at the control regulation level describing rule proliferation elements as well as motives behind specific elements. Furthermore, it depicted how the meta-rule proliferates over five periods. This proliferation is stimulated by four areas of ambiguity.

Still, all rule proliferation elements do not carry the same importance in terms of impact on organizational life. As such, rule proliferation elements that conveyed the most significance have been associated with the objectives of modifying freedom of action and improving the efficiency of the application. Furthermore, these networked elements have been associated with areas of rule ambiguity. Rule additions restricting behavior appear to be less impactful than rule additions aiming to expand. For instance, introducing a new group of individuals such as postdoctoral fellows into the rule appears to have marked the organization more profoundly than the addition of an article adding precision to the process of course attribution at the beginning of the meta-rule. The first one impacts who qualifies under the meta-rule and as a result broadens the umbrella covered by the rule. This significantly recalibrates how the autonomous rule will be enacted. The second rule addition also entails recalibration of the autonomous regulation but by streamlining the process. The next chapter uncovers autonomous regulation proliferation.

We observed that in Figure 12 that as rules proliferate over each temporal bracket, organizational slack declines. Periods 2 and 5 are productive in the number of rule changes and additions restricting organizational slack. Periods 3 and 4 experienced rule additions that expanded organizational slack. Changes in periods 3 and 4 that were structural, rhetorical, and changes in writing conventions had a lesser impact on organizational change. For instance, lowering the university-wide quota from 10% to 8% is associated with restricting behavior, whereas feminization of text is associated with changes in sociological conventions and less with the rule itself. This writing convention influences slack at institutional levels rather than at the rule level; new regulation on equality of gender led to the creation of new rules and practices within organizations, one of which is the feminization of texts.

The organizational slack designed into this meta-rule to enable local flexibility results in areas of ambiguity in rule application that impact the university's organizational slack. Areas of ambiguity led to the emergence of interpretation and application problems. These areas of ambiguity increased slack for departmental rule application. As a result, the areas of ambiguity generated a




broader array of possible behavior and practices throughout the organization and therefore increased variability of rule application.

Complexifications were connected to rule content as well as tensions between control regulation and autonomous regulation. As a result, many complexifications pertain to areas of ambiguity given that they are key areas of tension between the two regulations. Complexifications modify freedom of action and future freedom of action. Hence, they restrict or expand organizational slack. Period 2 and most particularly period 4 produce several complexifications restricting organizational slack. Only period 4 only carries an expansive complexification.


Some complexifications despite aiming at reducing slack can still increase the variability of application. This variability lives in the effective regulation as illustrated earlier in Figure 7. For instance, a condition was added requiring that the application of the rule for graduate students does not hinder the progress of studies. Our data demonstrate that although some people apply it strictly, it is also challenging to ensure that this condition is met for financial and pedagogical reasons. Moreover, the level of impairment to studies fluctuates across students depending on the type of course, teaching experience, and family situation.

Figure 11. Interconnections between Rule Changes, Additions, and Complexifications



As a result, although they are closely related, it is essential to examine the effective regulation and slack as two distinct rule proliferation mechanisms. As rule changes, additions and complexifications modify freedom of action, the density of the new meta-rule generates more possibilities for variability in each period. Denser and more intricate rule content is therefore enacted with the variability of practices within decreasingly restricted pockets of slack (Figure 9). By restricting organizational slack, there is a restrained decision making area within which this variability is enacted. Moreover, decreased variability of application is not associated with restricted organizational slack. Still, protocol-type rule changes appear to be efficient in reducing variability. It follows D'Adderio (2008)'s contribution regarding the use of technology to stabilize routines.

Figure 12. Effective Regulation's Variability of Application



These results set the foundation for a deeper understanding of rule proliferation as a network of interdependent elements. I have established a portrayal of how one meta-rule proliferates, types of rule proliferation elements encountered, and why these proliferation elements are applied. Hence, we now understand the path dependent nature of rule proliferation as a decision-making process, and how organizational slack stimulates variability of application in effective regulation. Consequently, the next chapter develops a taxonomy of autonomous rules and presents mechanisms of rule proliferation at the autonomous regulation level. This will provide a thorough understanding of the rule proliferation process. Furthermore, it will examine mechanisms that accentuate rule proliferation in local contexts.

## CHAPTER V

### RESULTS: LOOKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN OF DISPLAYED RULE PROLIFERATION (QR2)

#### 5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate the results of rule proliferation at the autonomous regulation level. The first mandate of this thesis is to illustrate the process of rule proliferation in time. This involves rule proliferation at different organizational levels. Therefore, I will address how the meta-rule *clause-reserve* proliferates during its enactment by organizational actors in departments. The second mandate of this doctoral dissertation is to assess whether characteristics specific to local contexts make them prone to accentuate rule proliferation. While the previous chapter provided results pertaining to rule proliferation at the control regulation level; this chapter presents findings pertaining to local environments and rule proliferation at the autonomous regulation level. These results were achieved by using departments' *clause-reserve* enactment as embedded case units.

For this purpose, I have studied *clause-reserve* enactment in six departments of the university. For the purpose of anonymity, I have named them: Organization Studies (Case 1), Business (Case 2), Fine Arts (Case 3), Human Sciences (Case 4), Public Policy (Case 5), and Science (Case 6). I chose these departments for a fair representation of disciplines, size, and course offerings. Course offering representation refers to departments that had important numbers of core courses that are the foundation of academic programs. Furthermore, I selected departments in which the Ph.D.

program is primarily aimed at an academic career and therefore in which Ph.D. students might have a vested interest in gaining teaching experience through the *clause-reserve* provision.

Across these departments, I conducted 36 semi-structured interviews and collected 17 documents such as departmental policies, and departmental communications pertaining to *clause-reserve* whenever these documents were available. Conducting interviews provided an understanding of local actors' rapport and familiarity with the meta-rule. It also allowed me to observe local enactment, challenges, advantages as well as local adaptation. Documents collected showed that local environments have reached varying levels of formality, rigidity, or complexity when it comes to the application of this rule. Additionally, these documents demonstrated the role tools and protocols play as part of the rule proliferation process.

The goal of this embedded case study was to compare the application and evolution of one rule within one organizational setting (Eisenhardt, 1989; Musca, 2006; Yin, 2009). This methodology was very useful in establishing whether context-specific characteristics influenced rule proliferation because each local context examined within this organization uses the same meta-rule. By studying the same rule within the same organization, it provides a better understanding of rule proliferation mechanisms that impact differences across contexts without the added effect of cross-organization differences. Furthermore, the process of identifying varying mechanisms across contexts allowed uncovering pervasive mechanisms of rule proliferation that are common throughout the organization.

During this chapter, I describe autonomous rules and mechanisms of rule proliferation. Most mechanisms observed are pervasive and some are varying mechanisms resulting in differences in the way rules are enacted, evolve, and proliferate. Faced with the complexity of rule proliferation mechanics, I investigated and defined the role of each mechanism. I found that administrative bodies, the autonomous regulation as well as the effective regulation mechanisms are engines because they actively produce rules. I defined the control regulation as a vector of rule proliferation because engines mobilize it for their rule production. I found that there were rule proliferation

stimuli. Stimuli do not produce rules but are organizational properties inducing rule proliferation. Some stimuli are pervasive and therefore organizational. Other stimuli are context-specific and induce a variation in local rule proliferation and enactment.

The primary rule proliferation stimulus is organizational slack which accommodates collegiality and academic freedom which are key to university life and functioning. Academic freedom is a university-specific slack that entitles professors to some margin of action and liberties. These liberties are to some degree, extended to lecturers. These liberties include freedom of thinking, teaching, researching, speech, and behaving.

In addition to more direct mechanisms, there exist indirect influences that make a context auspicious to rule proliferation. These influences are environmental, organizational, or individual. For instance, economic conditions increase or decrease registration levels which, in turn, applies pressure on university resource allocation. This resource-scarce context generates conditions that lead to the negotiation of rules.

Because one of the goals of this dissertation is to examine rule proliferation at the autonomous level, I realized early on how little was known about the nature of autonomous rules. To understand their proliferation, I first needed to understand their nature. This embedded case study grouped autonomous rules into four categories: conventions and norms, alternative practices, tools, and procedurals, as well as local control regulation. Understanding the nature of autonomous rules allowed appreciating how they proliferate locally, and how local proliferation interacts with organizational-level rule proliferation.

After exploring control rule proliferation in the previous chapter, this chapter uncovers autonomous level proliferation by defining the nature of autonomous rules and by describing rule proliferation mechanics. Through this process, I develop a systemic and recursive framework shedding light on rule proliferation. By understanding underlying and implicit mechanisms of rule

proliferation, I lift the curtain on a phenomenon that is understudied. A deeper understanding of underlying mechanisms brings insights regarding rule development and application.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I explain the methodology used for this segment of data analysis. Second, I define the nature of autonomous rules. Third, I describe rule proliferation mechanisms. Fourth I present a recursive and systemic framework of rule proliferation.

## 5.2 Methodology

In this section, I explain data collected as well as strategies mobilized to make sense of rule proliferation mechanisms. The second mandate of this doctoral dissertation is to define whether there are context-specific characteristics likely to accentuate rule proliferation. To achieve this, I used an embedded case study. This embedded case study examines the meta-rule *clause-reserve* as the primary case and the meta-rule enactment in six departments as embedded case units. In this chapter, I focus on the embedded case units. To assess whether there are context-specific properties that are likely to accentuate rule proliferation, I mobilize a comparative strategy to assess departments (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Langley & Abdallah, 2011). I used 36 interviews, and 17 documents including departmental rules, policies, and reports to understand how the meta-rule was enacted locally and appreciate context-specific differences.

Four key actions were accomplished to answer whether there are context-specific characteristics likely to accentuate rule proliferation. These actions were conducted concurrently and iteratively. First, I needed to understand how rules proliferate at local levels, how autonomous rules emerge, and what is their nature. The nature of autonomous rules is unknown, hence I used grounded theorizing to better understand their essence (Langley, 1999). Given that I coded for citations referring to elements of autonomous regulation, I saw the emergence of broad types of autonomous rules that were common across departments. Second, I needed to identify whether there were contexts in which rule proliferation was more significant and see if this differential could be attributed to specific characteristics. To achieve this I mobilized a quantification strategy (Langley,

1999) and then conducted a comparative analysis. Third, I established what role each component of the rule proliferation process played. To better clarify the roles of components, I conducted a comparative analysis, an analysis of the narrative, and Sankey diagrams to better understand the flow and interrelations of components. Fourth, I was required to methodologically dissociate the effective regulation from the autonomous regulation. Although it is conceptually simple to dissociate the two concepts, it is empirically difficult because the effective regulation represents a version of the autonomous regulation applied at any given time. It represents its variability. To account for the effective regulation, I used a narrative strategy to trace variability in the application.

Through this process, I found pervasive mechanisms of rule proliferation that are organizational. These include rule proliferation engines, a rule proliferation vector as well as rule proliferation stimuli. I identified context-specific stimuli that are varying mechanisms influencing rule proliferation locally. Moreover, there exist indirect influences on rule proliferation. The process of comparing contexts within the same organization by using the same meta-rule as the primary case was pivotal for uncovering both pervasive and varying mechanisms of rule proliferation. By examining local enactment of the same rule within the same organizational context, I revealed key similarities and differences, as well as types of autonomous rules mobilized to operationalize the meta-rule. To better understand this process, I will first describe the data collected and then the analysis strategies mobilized.

### 5.2.1 Data collected

Data collection took place from 2016 to 2020. I have collected 17 documents across six departments and conducted 36 semi-structured interviews. Interviews averaged 57.73 minutes. Respondents include administrators, professors, lecturers, and students. Table 10 summarizes documents and interviews collected for each department. During this research, I mobilized data collected from the six general interviews used in the previous chapter as well as other documents collected such as collective agreements.



Table 10. Document Data

	DocType: Interview 36 2732	DocType: Reports 2 74	DocTypes: Rules and policies 10 83	General and Exploratory... 5 252	Totals
Case 1 515	495	2	15		512
Case 2 358	272		18		290
Case 3 186	186				186
Case 4 147	147				147
Case 5 319	307	1	11	7	326
Case 6 255	88				88
Totals	1495	3	44	7	1549

### 5.2.2 Data Analysis

During the process of data analysis, I kept a coding and data analysis journal to trace emergent learning and note early theorization. Data analysis was initiated by writing each case story. Writing the case story and context allowed me to analyze elements that were unique to each case and elements of the autonomous regulation. Case stories ranged from 45 to 185 lines each. These stories allowed me to understand the specific context as well as elements of rule application that were generalized across the organization. Equipped with an understanding of local contexts, I proceeded with advanced data analysis which was conducted in accordance with four main actions: (1) identifying departments with a higher level of rule proliferation; (2) understanding the nature of autonomous rules; (3) identify context-specific characteristics of rule proliferation; (4) understand rule proliferation locally.

*Action 1.* First, I identified departments experiencing higher levels of rule proliferation. To achieve this, I used a quantification strategy in which I evaluated the number of mentions in documents and interviews pertaining to rule proliferation elements (Langley, 1999). Using co-concurrence tables and Sankey diagrams, I established departments experiencing most rule proliferation. Table 11 lists all mentions of *clause-reserve* for each department. The *clause-reserve* code accounts for the number of general mentions. The *clause-reserve* challenge code accounts for mentions of a challenge in relation to the meta-rule. The *clause-reserve* mission code accounts for mentions

specific to narratives of objectives, mission, or goals for the meta-rule. Because this quantification exercise is based on interview information, it represents the number of citations corresponding to each code. Annex B includes a more comprehensive analysis of each embedded case unit.

Table 11. *Clause-Reserve* Mentions per Department

	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4	Case 5	Case 6
	Org Studies Gr=513	Business Gr=358	Fine Arts Gr=186	Human Sciences Gr=147	Public Policy Gr=319	Science Gr=255
<b>Clause-reserve</b> Gr=963	188	136	92	30	187	125
<b>Clause-reserve challenges</b> Gr=279	111	38	11	2	46	46
<b>Clause-reserve mission</b> Gr=137	41	30	11	5	27	16
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>187</b>

Figure A4 of Appendix A illustrates the proportion of rule proliferation per element for each department. In addition, it shows the number of citations for mentions of *clause-reserve*. We observe that Case 1, 2, and 5 experience higher rule proliferation. Still, the illustration demonstrates that the Fine Arts department has experienced more rule additions than rule changes showing that departments with less mature rule proliferation tend to experience more rule additions than rule changes.

*Action 2.* Second, I used grounded theorizing (Langley, 1999), to investigate the nature of autonomous rules. I realized early on that literature did not offer sufficient knowledge of autonomous rules to comprehend what they truly were and therefore understand how they proliferate. Therefore, I set out to define the nature of autonomous rules. This step involved categorizing autonomous rules to define what they were.

Rules, especially at autonomous and effective regulation levels are embedded in social practices. As such, I coded practices and artifacts of socio-material nature to observe the emergence of autonomous and effective regulation (Langley & Abdallah, 2011). Practices and descriptions of rule enactment were coded as “autonomous regulation”, “effective regulation” and/or “application

terms”. This coding exercise accounted for citations in which respondents describe procedures, course of actions, and applications of rules. Citations that described the operationalization of rules were coded as “autonomous regulation”. Citations describing variability in rule application were further coded as “effective regulation”. For example, a citation indicating that individual preferences, choices, or understanding led to differences in enactment was coded in “effective regulation”. Effective regulation refers to the way individuals interpret and individually enact the rule giving rise to variability in autonomous regulation. Citations depicting specific or explicit details on how the rule was expected to be applied were further coded “application terms”. For instance, an application term can be the deadline to be respected to meet rule requirements within the department or the specific order of authorization required. I coded for “control regulation” local elements of the autonomous regulation that were explicitly discussed, negotiated, and voted at the departmental assembly to become formalized. This includes for example departmental policies.

Artifacts and contextual data were coded as “sociomaterial ensemble” to account for tools such as software, procedurals, and lists. Contextual information included data such as project descriptions and stories in which tools and artifacts are used. This coding exercise allowed understanding how tools integrate with rule enactment in local contexts. For example, I accounted for individuals using software to better control rule application and reduce the variability of rule application. Having deeper contextual knowledge was essential to understanding and later theorizing on the contribution of tools and artifacts in the rule proliferation process. This method led to the understanding of clear types of autonomous rules developed and mobilized by actors in all departments. Table A4 of Appendix A describes emergent autonomous rule categories that were developed from this exercise.

*Action 3.* Third, I conducted a comparative analysis of department characteristics using co-concurrence tables and Sankey diagrams. This method allowed me to evaluate the presence and prevalence of context-specific characteristics in different departments. It accounts for the size of the department, the use of clause-reserve, types of courses offered, discipline, administrative

bodies, and resources. During coding, I captured citations pertaining to department size whether it referred to a small size department or large size. I also captured citations that referred to disciplines, the variety of disciplines as well as the types of courses offered in the department. The course offering is an important resource associated with the *clause-reserve* given that the reduction in course offering directly impacts the number of courses available under its provision. By the same token, it was important to understand if there was a distinction in the types of courses allocated under the provision of *clause-reserve* in different departments. As such, with the use of co-concurrence table, I used the code “clause-reserve”, capturing mentions of clause-reserve in each department in concurrence with “autonomous regulation” to uncover local use of *clause-reserve*.

During the interview process, I noticed that resource richness (e.g., grants, number of courses, etc.) appeared to defuse more easily situations of resource negotiations that result in the production of rules. For instance, a department with access to above-average research grants will have research scholarships to finance students and will offer some teaching reliefs for professors; thus, removing pressure on course offerings as the main source of student financing. Conversely, I noticed that departments that were not as well-off in terms of resources seemed to confront situations of resource negotiations that result in the production of rules. Therefore, I analyzed the “resource” code per department in order to shed light on this phenomenon. The “resource” code captures citations in which respondents discuss resources and resource accessibility.

I noticed during analysis that the structure of local administrative bodies influenced the way *clause-reserve* was mobilized and therefore its proliferation. By co-concurrently analyzing “administrative bodies” with each case, I isolated citations referring to committees and decision-making bodies in each department. For instance, in one department the *clause-reserve* may be administered by the department’s administration, while in another department it can be administered through a committee. The nature and the way these administrative structures are organized influence how the rule is mobilized, how often it is used, and how it proliferates.

The diversity of expertise appeared in each case under different conditions. Consequently, I coded to capture the “variety of expertise”. Diversity of expertise emerged in various ways. Some departments host experts from different disciplines who all converge toward the same subject. Other departments host professors with the same discipline, but whose expertise varies per branch or even per tools mobilized. I found that the variety in course offerings that was captured through another code tended to be associated with the variety of disciplines. What’s more, I found that the nature of disciplinary pluralism was associated with context-specific rule proliferation by creating situations auspicious to the negotiation of new rules.

I found that there were varying mechanisms that influence how rules are locally enacted and how they proliferate in each context. Context-specific stimuli are varying mechanisms that influence how rules are locally enacted and how they proliferate in each context. These include rule use, availability of resources, local administrative structures, nature of disciplinary pluralism, and size of the department. For most departments, one of these stimuli plays a more significant role in whether rule proliferation was moderated, was expanded, or was controlled. For instance, a small department with a specific local administrative structure could experience lower rule proliferation despite very important disciplinary pluralism. To fully grasp the extent and essence of rule proliferation in each setting, all elements need to be considered along with their relations to each other. This comparative exercise allowed me to uncover context-specific stimuli of rule proliferation. Figure A5 of Appendix A is a Sankey diagram in which is presented the emergence of context-specific stimuli of rule proliferation.

*Action 4.* In my quest to identify characteristics likely to stimulate rule proliferation in local contexts, I unearthed pervasive mechanisms that suggest overall rule proliferation forces. These mechanisms allowed me to develop a comprehensive understanding of rule proliferation mechanics. Hence, during the process of grounded theorizing, I used Sankey diagrams and visual maps to make sense of rule proliferation mechanisms. Sankey diagrams helped identify connections, the intensity of connections, flows and directions of flows as well as the nature of these connections between rule proliferation mechanisms. We recognized in the previous chapter

that there is an important connection between organizational slack and the effective regulation. This chapter identifies the nature of this connection by understanding the role of both mechanisms in rule proliferation, and by identifying the relative importance of these mechanisms within the scope of rule proliferation mechanics.

I first validated the prevalent mechanisms with a co-concurrence table in which I cross-examined “rule additions”, “rule changes” and “rule complexifications” with main elements of coding: organizational slack, autonomous regulation, effective regulation, control regulation, administrative bodies. These mechanisms were identified as pivotal in my journal of coding and analysis. Then, I needed to shed light on how these mechanisms operated together. I used Sankey diagrams to understand interconnections, intensity, and flow. Key elements of questioning during this period of analysis included whether each mechanism generated new rules and if not, what other role did it play.

Rule proliferation engines were identified as producers of rules. Engines include administrative bodies such as committees and assemblies, the autonomous regulation, and the effective regulation. The “autonomous regulation” code captures citations of local practices and rule enactment, whereas the “effective regulation” code captures elements of variability in practices. “Administrative bodies” refer to committees and assemblies referred to in the context of rulemaking and rule application.

The control regulation was identified as a rule proliferation vector. The “control regulation” code captured elements of regulation that are explicit and formalized such as policy articles. It is characterized as a vector because it does not generate new rules and because it has a passive role in rule proliferation. New rules in the control regulation emerge from administrative bodies. Nevertheless, it is conducive to further rule proliferation because control rules are being applied, interpreted, and adapted at the autonomous regulation level. Rule proliferation at the control level cannot occur without the contribution of administrative bodies and the autonomous regulation that enables organizational activities and allow rules to proliferate.

Stimuli identified do not produce more rules however they generate a context stimulating rule proliferation. The main university stimulus is organizational slack. The “slack” code captures citations pertaining to flexibility and maneuvering capacity in terms of rule application. During data analysis, other stimuli showed association with organizational slack. I realized that each group of actors (professors, lecturers, students, and administrators), had varying levels of organizational knowledge, had varying levels of power, and had varying access to resources. Furthermore, it was clear from specific-context characteristics assessment that resource distribution was uneven across departments. After thorough analysis, I concluded that organizational slack is comprised of other stimuli that accentuate rule proliferation: knowledge asymmetry, power asymmetry, resource distribution, uneven rule abidance, and ambiguity. During coding, I coded for “knowledge” citations that referred to varying levels of rules, procedures, and organizational knowledge. I coded for “power” citations in reference to citations in which the respondent described a position of power, leverage, or use of power. I tracked “resources” which captures citations in which respondents discuss resources and resource accessibility.


Moreover, I noticed that “uneven rule abidance” that is the possibility for individuals to abide or not by rules without consequence was closely associated with organizational slack, power asymmetry, and knowledge asymmetry. I found that individuals who had more knowledge and were in higher power authority had increased leverage not to abide by rules or to find alternate ways without reprimand. Additionally, knowledge asymmetry was closely associated with ambiguity. The “ambiguity” code captured citations in which respondents describe ambiguous, obscure, or uncertain situations.

Figure 13 is a Sankey diagram demonstrating flows and connections between primary elements of rule proliferation mechanics: three rule proliferation engines, one rule proliferation vector, and one main rule proliferation stimulus. Appendix A, Figures A6, A7, and A8 present additional Sankey diagrams that pertain to other rule proliferation stimuli and influences.

There exist indirect influences which are elements that make a context auspicious to rule proliferation. These influences are environmental, organizational, or individual. For instance, economic conditions increase or decrease registration levels which in turn applies pressure on university resource allocation. This resource-scarce context generates conditions that lead to negotiations of rules.

By using the aforementioned methodology, I unveiled rich results. This chapter examines the nature of autonomous rules, and rule proliferation mechanics to reveal an organizational process of rule proliferation.

Figure 13. Sankey Diagram of Pervasive Rule Proliferation Mechanisms





### 5.3 The Nature of Autonomous Rules

During this chapter, I will describe mechanisms of rule proliferation at autonomous levels to understand context-specific characteristics that accentuate the phenomenon. Before proceeding, I must first identify the types of autonomous rules that emerged in the local contexts studied. I identified four types of autonomous rules: conventions and norms, alternative practices, tools, and procedurals as well as local control regulation. These rules vary in their degree of implicitness. For instance, norms and conventions are more implicit and require experiencing department life to observe them more closely, whilst protocols and tools are more explicit and can sometimes be found in documents.

*Conventions and norms.* Conventions are the emergence of generally accepted practices that help operationalize the control regulation, adapt it to local needs, and resolve problems. Because they are often generally accepted practices within a local collectivity and have sometimes been applied in the same way for years, they can be misconstrued as control rules. The following citations portray two examples of generally accepted practices that are not part of the meta-rule. These conventions were developed to assist in the local operationalization of the control rule. For instance, some departments only accept to allocate courses to Ph.D. students within their departments.

bah...) in fact everyone can do it, it is if you open a variable content course... It means that we are asking to... 108: 66 (Administrator)

students can only apply to courses attached to the department where the thesis director is located. In theory that's what they say. 45:93 (Professor)

Norms are the implicit anticipation of behavior that is considered appropriate under a set of circumstances within a local collectivity. Norms can differentiate from one local collectivity to the next. As described in the citation below, in this specific department, it is expected for a professor, to meet with their colleagues' students out of courtesy.

Or she met him like that to be polite, she even attended coordination meetings, but basically ... uh. It didn't interest him. So this first experience I had with a student to teach...., Well, there were zero problems. 45:68 (Professor)

Norms are extremely implicit and are easier to reveal when they are disrupted. For instance, if a departmental actor behaves outside of norms, it is easier to define what the implicit behavioral anticipation would be under a set of circumstances, as described in the following citation.

So she goes like saying, she goes like bringing to light some, some, some mechanisms that are usually hidden by in more formal processes. 111: 6 (Student)... there are several stories between where is she (uh) she still has as I have (uh), she said things that we wanted to tell her not to speak. You know ... the private-public professional aspect, she's having a bit of a hard time there, she mixes things up a bit. 111: 7 (Student)

*Alternative practices.* Alternative practices emerge because actors find an alternate use for the rule, then the original use for which it was intended. These practices are implicit because actors tend to avoid discussing them in official settings since they can be perceived as unethical by some individuals. For instance, there is a practice that emerged over time to use *clause-reserve* to avoid hiring specific lecturers.

It's like with lecturers, if the department gets to a point where they no longer want someone as a lecturer. All they have to do is not put that person's courses on the course list for three sessions and after three sessions, according to the rules and contracts so as not to be a lecturer (er) with advantage of points you are a lecturer...we already had two people eliminated like that and then one of the people got picked up because they didn't have anyone to teach those classes. 107:24 (Lecturer and Student)

... that's a problem ... we have the sixty-two postdoctoral fellows ... who cannot teach courses with us unless we make an exceptional posting withdrawal, but we are not going too much into it. 110: 24 (Professor Administrator)

*Tools and procedurals.* The use of tools, including technology, facilitates and stabilizes the application of the rule to reduce variability in the application. They reduce (they don't eliminate) the flexibility in rule application. Checklists, help sheets, and forms are types of tools that assist in streamlining the application of a rule. They are typically developed by administrators. Professors through the departmental assembly also contribute to developing tools.

he had a document that had been presented to us it was a resolution, no it was not a resolution, it was not yet a resolution we in the assembly often we go there go in two steps 98: 40 (Professor)

Procedurals crystalize protocols, steps, resources, and roles for organizational memory and stability. This allows procedures and rule application to transcend change in employees and stabilizes application across employees.

I organize the work. I created procedurals that I enriched bit by bit. It is constantly evolving. I also have related tasks like taking care of the intranet where information is shared between lecturers, teachers, and staff. 121:3

Tools and procedurals are more explicit because they are discussed, designed, approved, and then communicated for use across the department. They are also an artifact that can be found and physically observed.

*Local control regulation.* The local control regulation emerges to officialize one or a set of conventions and norms. It can contain references to documents, tools, and procedurals. It has the legitimacy to be applied and administered locally. This local control regulation is explicit because it can be found in departmental minutes, official documents, and departmental policies. However, it cannot be transferred to other departments.

Or we voted for a rule so that the introductory courses... the TOPIC1000... as far as possible that this is given neither by lecturers nor by doctoral students so... by professors... 113: 3 (Professor)

there were drafts that were produced by (Director), he asked us to comment on it, he refereed in the executive committee, which is a bit like the committee, it's like a management committee of the department that must have looked at our draft and commented on it. Let's say, we produced a final draft which was then adopted in the departmental assembly which becomes our policy for the allocation of reserve clauses. 45: 190 (Professor)

## 5.4 Mechanisms of Rule Proliferation

The primary purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to describe how one organizational rule proliferates in time. The process of understanding rule proliferation in time, and how proliferation is experienced in six departments uncovered pervasive mechanisms of rule proliferation. The mechanics of rule proliferation is comprised of rule proliferation engines, one rule proliferation

vector, as well as rule proliferation stimuli. This section describes each mechanism and explores how they operate together.

## 5.5 Engines of Rule Proliferation

Rule proliferation engines identified during the study are mechanisms by which rules are produced. There are three engines of rule proliferation. Administrative bodies are the first engine by which rules proliferate. The autonomous regulation is the second and the effective regulation is the third. I like to use the iceberg analogy to illustrate the importance and yet implicit nature of the autonomous regulation as an engine in comparison with the administrative bodies. While the administrative bodies may appear to be the most important engine because it is the one that is most apparent, the autonomous regulation is the engine by which most rule proliferation emerges.

*Administrative bodies.* Administrative bodies are the most explicit engine because it is the most visible and most easily observable in terms of their contribution to rule proliferation. Because of its explicitness, rule proliferation experienced in the control regulation emerges from administrative bodies. The control regulation does not produce rules, but experiences rule proliferation through its enactment at the autonomous regulation level, and by the work of administrative bodies. It is, therefore, conducive to rule proliferation.

Often at the executive committee if we had issues or problems, we had to go towards creating rules with the executive committee, we proposed something to the assembly.... Then the assembly can vote for the rest, 1 The assembly could vote on this rule. 59: 3

No, because we decided, we voted, the teachers voted that we were going to put the procedure in our lesson plan. So from the winter, we will put the news ... 95: 9

*Autonomous regulation.* Interestingly, the autonomous regulation appears to be the most important engine of rule proliferation, but an engine that is implicit and more difficult to observe and decipher. The autonomous regulation emerges to complement the control regulation. It has demonstrated

three main functions: (1) ensuring the operationalization of the control regulation, (2) resolving problems, and (3) adapting to local needs.

It ensures the operationalization of the control regulation by generating conventions and norms and creating tools. These autonomous level rules make it possible for a control rule that was imagined in theory to be transferred to practice. For instance, the *clause-reserve* rule, in theory, requires multiple signatures to be approved. In practice, some issues can be encountered because not all signatures can be acquired at the same moment. This practical issue results in defining who signs first and the person who signs first must rely on informal communication with other signatories to know whether this *clause-reserve* should be approved.

e.g.... it's not just doing the paper, getting everyone to sign, but the work beforehand, informing all the people who are involved.... So all that,... if the professor... if the student wants to give a course, you have to inform the course coordinator,... the program director... by saying here is an interest is it possible...? ... Does the profile of the student seem adequate... 59:31 (Professor Administrator)

The autonomous regulation solves problems resulting from ambiguities and unplanned scenarios. The control regulation does not account for every possible scenario and therefore the autonomous regulation adapts to unplanned circumstances. For instance, the university-wide quota was meant to ensure that a general average of *clause-reserve* was maintained and that there could be some flexibility of application by the department. This quota was not intended for departments to abuse its use and to generate problems for other departments.

I think someone told me that in one department they had almost 15%, 20% of the courses that were awarded to ... under the reserve clause. Again because there are some faculties that have less and others may have more. So that it is closely watched for example, if ever the university exceeds the percentage, the famous 6-7 that I do not remember, ... we end up with faculties or departments which do not have, others which use much more than others... 63:21 (Lecturer)

The autonomous regulation also adjusts the control regulation to the local needs of departments. Disciplinary pluralism leads to teaching and research requirements that are varied. For instance, departments can have specific material needs for teaching (e.g., project-based learning) or for research (labs, concert hall, workshops).

... because a laboratory, me too, we have the students who do experiments, with cells in culture, to test products, well that's okay but it's more at the level, manipulations then 118: 56 (Professor Administrator)

Local problems and ambiguities are resolved by the autonomous regulation. Furthermore, at any given time, it has the potential to be interpreted and enacted differently. This gives rise to the effective regulation: the third rule proliferation engine.

*Effective Regulation.* The most implicit of all engines is the effective regulation. Rule proliferation generated at this level is hidden, implicit, and requires finer analysis to extract insights. It emerges from the autonomous regulation and continuously evolves. It presumes that at any given time there are many possible applications and interpretations of autonomous rules; therefore, is ambiguous and uncertain. The effective regulation cannot easily be dissociated from the autonomous regulation since it is an interpretation and enactment of it. Consequently, the effective regulation accounts for variants of rule application and interpretations.

The highlighted portions of the citations below reflect the variability in rule application experienced in departments. For instance, a convention can intend for a certain type of courses to be taught by specific groups of individuals, however, it may not always be a possibility. This possible variation generates unpredictability in rule application. Or again, specific individuals may not abide by conventions.

Or we voted for a rule so that the introductory courses... the TOPIC1000... **as far as possible** that this is not given neither by lecturers nor by doctoral students so... by professors... 113: 3 (Professor)

The rule is simple. The university has the right to choose, to appoint, to assign a rule regardless of what there is to do. **The way in which we are going to want to put the rule according to what we are going to have as an objective, that is what we can question, the application.** 70:71


I think that the only thing that, what I heard is that yes publicly finally at the departmental assembly, it was said several times that one could not withdraw from its work plan at the last minute to give it to one of their students that it was a break in collegiality **... and it was**

clearly targeted at the person doing it, but the person kept doing it because they didn't care  
113: 119 ( Professor)

Because there exist an indefinite number of interpretations and rule applications at any given time, the autonomous and effective regulations proliferate indefinitely.

Nevertheless, the continuous adaptation of the autonomous regulation by the inclusion of tools, procedurals, and local control regulation contributes to stabilizing rule application and reducing variability. Whereas rule proliferation at the control rule level increases the potential for variability in effective regulation (as seen in Chapter IV, Figure 12), the autonomous regulation contributes to reducing variability in effective regulation as shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Tools, Procedurals and Local Control Regulation as Moderator of Effective Regulation Variability



### 5.5.1 Organizational Rule Proliferation Stimuli

Rule proliferation engines are exacerbated by stimuli. Some of these stimuli are organizational and therefore pervasive across the university, others are context-specific. This section describes organizational stimuli. The most significant is organizational slack and is associated with power and knowledge asymmetry, uneven rule abundance, resource distribution as well as ambiguity.

*Organizational slack.* Organizational slack exacerbates the variability in the effective regulation by expanding flexibility in rule application. Organizational slack accommodates collegiality and

academic freedom which are key to university life and functioning. Academic freedom is university-specific slack that entitles professors to some margin of action and liberties. These liberties are to some degree extended to lecturers. These liberties include freedom of thinking, teaching, researching, speech, and behaving.

So (uh ...) we are ... certain ... we can have rules that we tried to make as broad as possible because the more precise a rule is the more constraint there is, and therefore (uh ...) in the name certain principles such as academic freedom, we will arrange for there to be no binding rules. 110: 88 (Professor Administrator)

no matter what was written, it could be dealt with, someone says, "Me, I'm being told that the wall is white". You have a rule that says the walls are black, all the walls are black, we know they are black, but if you don't like it that the walls are black, you want them to be white there. So that, you don't try to come out, "Well, I don't interpret it that way." But the rule is very clear there, is that they don't like the rule ... and the problem is, there aren't a lot of people fighting to protect the rules. There is a certain cowardice at university. And it's a lot easier not to fight, and to let people say "well, that's right, look we could interpret it like that." No no no, look, there is no way to interpret it like that. The rules are very clear, it says you can teach according to your doctrine. Your doctrine is your beliefs-communist, uhh liberalist, neo-liberal, libertarianism, whatever you can invent, that's okay. But you don't have the right, for example, not to teach subjects because you don't believe in it. Because it is in the process of bypassing the whole function of the university. Because when we create programs, ask for opinions, refine the program and all its content, not so that after that the professor says: "well, I don't feel like teaching it, is my academic freedom ". It doesn't make sense. 65: 79 (Professor Administrator)

Collegiality is an important principle upon which university administration is based. Respondents refer to this principle with varied perspectives. Self-management amongst departments relies immensely on collegiality to maintain harmony within departments hosting varied experts, each one hired for their expertise and specialized in a particular field. This principle's mission is to ensure that the collective good is considered in a working environment that is designed for individual specialists.

Not that I know of, I think the only thing that, what I heard is that yes publicly) finally in the departmental assembly, it was said several times that we could not withdraw work from our plan last minute to give it to one of those students that it was a break in collegiality that you can't behave like that..., so that, it was said and it was clearly targeted against the person doing it, but the person doing it kept doing it because they didn't care 113: 119 (Professor)

I don't feel like I'm in a college here at UQAM...in a university, I was hired on knowledge or skills (uh) in my field I am recognized as a an expert in FINE ARTS in 20th-century ARTS, so are my colleagues. We all have the expertise, so collegiality is working as a community, I understood that but when we are asked to evaluate ourselves, the evaluation by peers, and then the evaluation by internal committees, it's not so obvious, it's heavy for collegiality for example. At some point, we have to make decisions of authority, so that collegiality has taken the edge a little and then and



collegiality and what is also disturbing in collegiality is the colleagues who will rely on collegiality but to do nothing. Be collegial so take charge of such task, take charge of such task, and then we realize that there are colleagues who no longer do anything or who do not do much for example in community services, that that's a hell of a problem at UQAM.... 98:60 (Professor)

Appendix B Table A6 and A7 provide more data on organizational slack specific to the university environment (Table A6) and other university-wide rule proliferation stimuli (Table A7).

*Knowledge Asymmetry.* Access to administrative bodies allows participants in such commands to access power, visibility, and influence. Uneven accessibility to administrative bodies leads to knowledge asymmetry. Considerable informal knowledge on university life is conveyed through decision making bodies. This information is crucial to reconcile areas of ambiguities between the control and autonomous regulations.

..., But it's a rule that.... it works but in a very uh ... very variable way. It applies, but it applies in a way, but really weird there you know. If you are going to see an assistant, an assistant to the management there she will give you the rule: there is that, that's it, it's written in black and white, but you know very well that it does not work like it. You are going to negotiate with the coordinator or with the department director, well ...) this is different, it is not ...67:38 (Student)

But (uh) I find that in the department here, it's a lot too) there is still a lot of informal. So you know even if it's not, you know like, I still have a closeness with the new director of the third cycle and then (uh) you know I feel like just talking to her with her, we... (uh) maybe I have an influence on how (uh), how we... how she, she will intervene in, you know (uh) with the discussions that we may have. Sometimes I think to myself that I may have contributed a little to her thinking, to what she will transfer to her committees. But after that to say that I have a direct uh uh influence, I will say that I think we have a ... uh, I don't see that I have a huge control but I think I could by more formal means but after that it's still an investment for the students. I don't know if that answers the question.111:12 (Student)

Professors and some administrators are privileged by being the main groups of actors sitting and participating in administrative bodies. A minority of lecturers and students sit as observers and fewer have an active participation role. Groups of actors who are not as actively involved in university decision making bodies find it difficult to reconcile the gap between control and autonomous regulations. One of the main decision-making bodies discussed was the departmental assembly that governs most decision-making processes.

the departmental assembly is the boss at UQAM, they are the bosses, they are the ones who judge and decide. Better to be on their side, if not 122:43 (Lecturer)

Moreover, because the university environment is loosely coupled, lecturers are not in close contact with professors or Ph.D. students, and they have limited contact with some administrators. Therefore, lecturers and students have narrow exposure to decision making. One lecturer sits as an observer in each departmental assembly and their representation is limited in other decision making bodies as well.

... The SCCUQ appoints representatives to departmental assemblies, we receive the names but we never invite them. 95:92 Professor Administrator

Then we managed to do it in relation to) Regulation No. 5 on (uh) representation) the right to vote of lecturers in the program committee. Which is a complete insult. (uh) The lecturers give 60% of the lessons, but have no say in the program in which they are in the majority, they do not have a single vote in a committee or there are five professors sometimes seven. And there is a poor little lecturer all over the gang and there is no right to vote and then it was, ah well there it is because it has to be equal (uh ) teachers, students. Well, we said at that time, you say teachers, students. And then there is a delegate, a representative of the professors who gives way to the lecturers because) (exasperated voice) For forty years! 97:64 (Lecturer)

Furthermore, most departmental decision discussions occur in executive meetings prior to departmental assemblies where only a select group of professors participate.

I'm at the meeting but I uh ...) these proposals are first discussed in the executive committee and I do not attend the executive committee. And in assembly, what came up and then uh ...) was unanimous all the time. Professors receive the project days before 117:22 (Administrator)

Disinformation is another practice observed in administrative bodies that magnifies knowledge asymmetry. Disinformation was observed as an intentional behavior in which actors withhold information from others to maintain control over organizational processes, organizational slack, or regulate the local environment. Withholding of information is made possible in a context where decisions are made by one group of people and only a portion of these discussions are accessible to other groups of actors.

I have a member of the departmental assembly, who does not agree with what is being discussed, she finds that it does not concern the assembly but it concerns her and her program. And this person, she has her cell phone and started recording the departmental assembly. I'm sitting next to her, I can't let that happen. So I took a little piece of paper and my pencil and then I went to see a member of the executive, since the director was chairing, the department director, I said she is recording. And there I went back to my seat. The professor said "are you recording? ". Oh I didn't pay attention. And then the professor who took her cell phone, he started filming her... then he said "Fuck you, you realize what you are doing, you record then that we are in-camera fuck you". This is not possible inh? 95:114 (Administrator)

But honestly, that's one of the things that's the most interesting because you kinda see how it works, especially as a future professor, seeing how it works is very interesting. Like I said, you know the perceptions they have of lecturers, professors they protect themselves. When you have meetings (uh) then I am asked to go out because they have to wash the dirty laundry with the family like they say, no, that's where you finally say they are as tough with each other than with lecturers 63:83 (Lecturer)

Because of knowledge asymmetry, many actors enact rules based on limited information.

But it's a rule that.... it works but in a very uh ... very variable way. It applies, but it applies in a way, but really weird there you know. If you are going to see an assistant, an assistant to the management there she will give you the rule: there is that, that's it, it's written in black and white, but you know very well that it does not work like it. You are going to negotiate with the coordinator or with the department director, well ...) this is different, it is not ...67:38 (Student)

*Power Asymmetry.* In addition to being associated with knowledge asymmetry, administrative bodies are connected to power distribution. Accessing administrative bodies and exerting influence on them is an important form of power. Specific groups of individuals exert more power than others. Furthermore, access to administrative bodies and committees can increase or solidify one's power and enhance one's organizational knowledge.

I believe that the person who will continue to manipulate) to monopolize her desk because I believe that it is not, it is personal, it is a very personality. So I think it's) she was able to do it, she's a woman, she was able to do it because she had her role in the union. But I too was in the union for several years. I didn't do it because she was a very personality more than a role, it's not because she had that power that she did it, it's because she's like that is her very personality. 119: 14 (Lecturer)

This uneven power distribution emerges within the autonomous regulation and nurtures organizational slack by exacerbating discrepancies in knowledge asymmetry and resource distribution. There were different sources of power observed. I observed power as a general construct being exercised during organizational activities. This means mobilizing leverage to achieve objectives.

Being a union member, if there is a union, it doesn't matter if it's you, ..., it can generate more power yes. And at that point, people take over, let's say, certain rights, and then there is no higher body to turn to because we are appealing directly to the union. But that's life eh, that's how it is. 119: 8 (Lecturer)

I observed external and internal power sources. External power comes from a third party. For instance, the Teaching Personnel Services is a source of power outside of the department that can

approve or reject specific decisions about teaching resources. External power is first associated with the control regulation because they are official sources of authority.

This means that on the academic council you have almost as many students as professors, as lecturers. When you arrive at the Studies Commission, you have as many students as professors. This means that a first-year student baccalaureate in philosophy can block a master's program in administration. 75:42 (Professor Administrator)

Third-party power impacts the autonomous and effective regulations because departments adjust to these power sources following their slack and their local needs. These external sources of power are associated with the emergence of alternative practices. In the following example, the emergence of an alternative practice which is to remove lecturers by using Ph.D. students on *clause-reserve* is explained because external powers put in place a time-consuming and intricate official process to lay off lecturers.

Well everyone does that. Yes, with the lecturer collective agreement there, the directors (uh) well it happens and then why, because sometimes the road is too long to get rid of someone who (uh) who does not suit them. As the road is long and difficult to put together a case and all that well they are looking for other rules, they use the rules to come to their end. 96:7 (Administrator)

Internal power is the power to self-regulate and apply regulation at the same organizational level and is more closely connected to autonomous regulation. For instance, the departmental assembly decides to develop a departmental policy, develops it, implements it, applies it, self-regulates and sanctions.

Basically, what he (the other director) was saying, it was me, the students come to me and I have no answer, I tell them the organization studies department chooses like that and that's how it is. As he does, this is how it is. He says, you should do this. He says I have always worked like that in my departments and we can talk, we can not agree and whatnot, but once the rule is voted or decided, even the profs can complain, it's the rule. So he was the one who inspired us to do this. 45: 189 (Professor)

As such, the departmental assembly, which is one of the main decision making entities, is often referred to as 'sovereign' because it self-governs. Departments, through their departmental assembly, possess internal power. They have the power to autoregulate, decide and sanction. This means that within the regulative framework of the university, they exercise exceptional freedom (organizational slack) on operational matters.

Nothing is really planned in the event of non-compliance with this agreement. It only states "Problematic cases will be referred to SCAE for discussion." We had spoken about it in the program committee and the professors seemed to agree on the fact that the FREDA commitment does not have force of law. So if a department or a research chair/professor does not meet their financial commitments, nothing can be done to force them to pay the money. Considering that it is generally the research supervisor who pays the funds, this puts the student in a difficult situation if he has to "demand" from his supervisor the amounts provided. 79: 5 (Professor Administrator)

pre-approved then then it is proposed to the assembly and then it is the assembly that makes the final approval 117: 26 (Administrator)

So, all that is to classify by theme uh ...) so here we have this role as director of seeing the application of the established rules and basically let's say that when we adopt, (uh ...) for each (uh ...) each domain, a procedure so if there are procedures, there are standards to follow. There are standards to follow, criteria and we adopt these criteria (uh ...) by the assembly either after a committee has finally proposed a definition of criteria or simply because it is me who makes a motion for a resolution to the Assembly that we adopt or reject. 110: 5 (Professor Administrator)

*Resource Distribution.* Resource distribution is closely associated with power asymmetry. Groups of actors exercising more power are the ones controlling and allocating resources. Groups of actors (Ph.D. students and lecturers) with less power are the ones competing for resources.

all assemblies at UQAM, when we deal with elements that are specific to professors, we ask the delegate (uh) who represents the lecturers to go out, for example when we talk (uh) about the distribution (uh) services to the community, the distribution of teaching tasks for the coming year, we always ask the lecturers to leave because it is too delicate there, it affects things, it is elements that are sensitive and that would also give information to lecturers who could turn against the department for such and such a thing so you have to be extremely careful I know that it is not easy for lecturers at UQAM and in all the universities but (uh) the professors are the ones who have the task of making the decisions 98:36 (Professor)

*Uneven Rule Abidance.* Power and knowledge asymmetry are linked to rule abidance. As a result of power asymmetry, actors enact rules with different degrees of malleability.

But the least attainable are the professors because we can't be forced to do training this time around. One of the colleagues said, she was very in favor of this policy and she said, who can impose training on me this time, it is on the policy and I am in favor, but the next time it is about what? about the ban on wearing the veil in the institution. I don't want any training because I'm a Muslim believer and I want to wear the veil) so we don't have) we're going to say my intellectual freedom means that we can't impose training on me and it's not entirely wrong, although I am very much in favor of everyone having training on this policy 16, it is very difficult to coerce in the name of academic freedom, intellectual freedom. 113: 126 (Professor)

Power and slack allocated to departmental assemblies influence disciplinary measures or lack thereof. This means that the departmental assembly has the power to apply or not disciplinary measures. This slack in rule abidance allows for manipulation of rules.

It's like a policeman. A policeman won't stop you at 106 km / h on the highway, because he knows your feet aren't accurate, he knows your speedometer isn't accurate. He understands that there is a small descent that made you accelerate from 100 to 106. He is intelligent the policeman, he will not give you tickets at 106. But, he will give it to you at 125. It's judgment too. The rule is there to parameter an activity. 65:56 (Professor Administrator)

Yes, there have already been disagreements in the departmental assembly over the application of rules. For example in relation to the process of hiring professors. The rules were not being followed. These are departmental rules. Everything was stopped, it was chaos. 121: 4 (Administrator)

The departmental assembly's internal power, uneven rule abidance, uneven resource distribution as well as knowledge and power asymmetry nurture organizational slack. These organizational rule proliferation stimuli induce the production of rules by increasing slack in the autonomous regulation, increasing variability in the effective regulation, and by generating asymmetry in the accessibility and administration of administrative bodies.

### 5.5.2 Context-Specific Rule Proliferation Stimuli

Context-specific stimuli are varying mechanisms that tend to result in varied rule proliferation levels across contexts. They include maturity in the use of the rule, availability of resources, nature of disciplinary pluralism, size of the department, and local administrative structures. Mature use of the rule entails a higher level of rule proliferation than early rule use. High availability of resources produces fewer opportunities for negotiation that result in rule proliferation. The nature of disciplinary pluralism in a local context influences rule proliferation because each department requires different levels of slack to accommodate such disciplinary diversity and its specific requirements. Larger departments observed tend to have more volume of courses, more professors, more students, higher use of the rule as well as more occurrences of negotiation that leads to rule proliferation. I will use case examples to illustrate how these variations emerge in local contexts.

### 5.5.3 Local Variations

*Local Administrative Structures.* Because departments enjoy organizational slack and internal power, administrative bodies vary in the way they function depending on actors participating in them and depending on their disciplines. This variation shows in the way the autonomous regulation emerges and rule proliferation unfolds.

uhh well, we made the rules, for example, we changed uuh the uh... conditions of hiring, recruiting ... teachers. So we have.... We wanted uhh to specify in the background the qualifiers acquired for the hiring of teachers. So we tightened up ...Hiring standards. 75:10 (Professor Administrator)

uh That they are clear. In... As at the last departmental assembly, we explained the uh rules of common exams. Previously when a student was sick, he would come to see us here. We looked to see if the ticket was valid and then we set an exam date for it. It was either the next week or early January, let's say for the winter session. Now, this rule no longer applies, all common courses for common exams are managed at school. So the professors kept sending us students when they had medical papers. So there we said in the departmental assembly, here is what is done? All students from now on must apply to the school... 95:4 (Administrator)

... the assembly one can overturn decisions eg program committee and others, the assembly is very strong. Basically, the only ... after that is that the governance committee, I think from memory and above all the board of directors will be able to reverse decisions but the assembly can make very strong decisions. So yes we are looking for consensus, I have realized over the years that even when a few things are a little delicate but if we do not have a majority vote (uh) and I think we are realizing ourselves on the consensus for precisely avoid any problem of overflow or other but I will say there when there are decisions sometimes that are taken and then that do not necessarily suit me, I choose my battles that is to say that sometimes I have to give in by telling myself this decision I'm going to live with, there is no problem and conversely well ...) if there are really some things there that come up against me, then I will say it. In general, colleagues are sensitive to that and then there ... we ... so I must say that there is a kind of logic of respect that has settled in our assemblies, luck (uh) we had a colleague who this moment has development leave which she systematically opposed and systematically always wanted when he had voted on resolutions or other abstain, I found that terrible because I found that it was as always to show that ...not that I find it terrible it's just to always show your individuality... me I do it differently and all that and I thought it was going too far (uh) on the contrary, for sure (uh) you sometimes have to know when you don't agree and whatnot. So I prefer to say it, I prefer to make amendments but in the end, I will always rally to a consensus 98:17 (Professor)

As a result, local administrative structures stimulate or stifle the use of the rule. A unique feature of Fine Arts as compared to other departments analyzed is that its doctoral program is administered faculty-wide. This means that the doctoral program is joint with all other departments of the faculty

except for one department. This is intended to simplify the management of the program by having common core courses before each student specializes. Therefore, there are about 700 hundred courses that are more specialized and offered by departments while there are approximately 20 courses offered at the faculty level.

... it was easier to administratively run the program all grouped like this. So to have common core courses linked to research that are shared but early on, that come together, but that the specialization courses can ... 99: 26 (Administrator)

In the department, we don't have any doctoral students. At the Faculty of Arts.... 102: 52 (Administrator)

therefore very difficult for a student ... to obtain a course load ... I did it, that fall, I accompanied the student, I organized a reserve clause for her because she is a student who has to finish her doctorate without having ever taught so I think we had to do that for her, but on the other hand, I find it limited because she cannot have teaching seniority. 101: 29 (Professor Administrator)

Roughly speaking, I'm trying to recall, we offer seven to eight hundred courses a year at the faculty and then there's something like twenty faculty courses. 99:31 (Administrator)

The local reality that Ph.D. students are administered by the faculty while most courses are administered by departments represents an additional complexity for students to access the provision of *clause-reserve*.

*Use of Rule.* The use of the rule is impacted by the size of the department, the type of local administrative structure, and even the nature of local disciplinary pluralism. In the case of the Fine Arts department, the *clause-reserve* rule is not used often therefore administrators have limited knowledge and experience mobilizing it. It is partly influenced by the fact that most courses are administered by departments while doctoral students, as well as the *clause-reserve*, are administered at the faculty level. This makes the administrative process for applying the rule more intricate than it would be in other faculties. Consequently, there appears to be a lack of knowledge and experience with *clause-reserve*. The department's experience using the rule appeared to have started within the past five years. Early use of the rule coincides with the arrival of an external administrator who had previous knowledge of the rule as well as the nomination of a local professor as Associate Dean. These administrative changes appear to have brought knowledge and know-how to the department.



Because we do little. Very few, so we do not come to know the few details of the rule. The academic regulations, I know it much more than that because I am always in the academic regulations. 99:14 (Administrator)

... really off the top of my head, ... I thought that this idea of a reserve clause was very good. I don't even remember if I was in the executive. I don't think I was in the executive yet ... off memory, winter 20 ... 16, yes winter 2016 maybe ... (Professor)

it happened once so ... for the other clauses reserves what we have ratios to respect er ...) what I know about it this year me I arrived here this year, I do not know all the history it can be refused there for different reasons, but this year everything was accepted. 101: 38 (Professor Administrator)

... I think since this is a faculty course on, my God, I don't know the whole exact procedure there, but I will say it is ... .101: 35 (Professor Administrator)

The more a rule is used the more local actors gain knowledge and experience using it and the more they mobilize it. Still, local rule proliferation only comes with the use of the rule. With more mature rule use comes more tools, procedurals, and local control regulation development. Early rule use is more closely associated with rule additions than rule changes. These rule additions are more prevalently in the form of conventions and norms.

*Size of the departments.* Larger departments have reached a more mature use of the rule and experience higher rule proliferation because their administration experience high levels of activity with a large and diverse group of actors. Figure 15 illustrates comparisons between rule proliferation paths involving two large departments (Organization Studies and Public Policy) and one small department (Fine Arts). As demonstrated, larger departments experience higher levels of rule proliferation because of more use. Case 1 (Organization Studies) was characterized by rule proliferation driven by ambiguity in autonomous regulation. This ambiguity was heightened by the knowledge asymmetry of Ph.D. students who found themselves lost between expectations from the control regulation and obscure departmental conventions. Case 3 (Fine Arts) was characterized by early rule proliferation that was limited because of scarce rule knowledge. This limited rule knowledge was partly due to the unique administrative structure of the doctoral program. Case 5 (Public Policy) was characterized by rule proliferation driven by polarization between disciplines which was exacerbated by people holding key positions in administrative bodies responsible to oversee *clause-reserve*.

As exemplified in Case 1, a large department with many disciplines, a wide group of professors complexifies and intensifies how administrative activities are conducted. It also leads to more opportunities for negotiations that produce rule proliferation.

I think it is maybe because we are bigger because suddenly the calculation of the number of charges is complex 45:88 (Professor)

Yeah, I would tell you that the hick is that we are a department that is almost unique. The sizes of the departments at UQAM will vary...I would say that most of the departments will be around 30, 30-35. ... There is only one department that is bigger than us and that is the Social Science department. And they are one discipline and their structure is different. That is to say that their whole batch of PhDs, the world is together ... The problem I have...it's multidisciplinary and there are a ton of programs...it's not necessarily the rule that has evolved badly, it's that we have grown quite significantly, which means that we stand out a little. UQAM has modified the convention a little bit by saying that now, the departments that have more than 50 professors, can now have an assistant. This has been in place for a year. But the role of the assistant. What is his role, what are his prerogatives, what are his responsibilities? that's not quite there. 59:20 (Professor Administrator)


*Disciplinary Pluralism.* Given the wide variety of expertise, organizational slack also accommodates varied organizational needs and requirements.

... it is the professors who will take this position normally within his department and second what makes the colleagues not wanting again at this time is a different departmental culture; someone will arrive with a more administrative or department-specific conception, the experiences they have had is quite normal. The Fine Arts department in which I work is a department that has specific needs that are very complex. When you're not an art professor or not an artist, you have a lot of difficulty understanding, for example, why you have to buy equipment? Why do we have to maintain equipment? How does the premises work so that when the students practice? See, it's not a department like social, or literature or whatever. These departments will no longer operate on a true university logic, that is to say, premises for teaching, premises for this and that. 98: 8 (Professor)

Disciplinary pluralism in local contexts emerges in various ways and impacts the departmental operations depending on its nature. For instance, departments can be unified by subject matter, meaning everyone in the department is interested in the same subject, yet everyone is studying this subject with a different discipline and therefore a different methodology. Departments can be unified by their disciplines, but individuals can differentiate by their practice or the objects they use. Individuals can be unified or differentiated by being practice or theory-oriented. Departments also differentiate by favoring or requiring specific pedagogical or research settings.

Disciplinary pluralism is shown to be associated with rule proliferation because rules require local adaptation. More importantly, higher disciplinary pluralism is associated with more slack which stimulates rule proliferation.

Figure 15. Examples of Rule Proliferation Paths per Size



... I am more involved precisely in the installation of new rules and also modifications. Something that is important to mention is that as a researcher, I also had to, given my project) my research subject, I had to create a new laboratory with a level of containment that would allow me to work with the virus, with which we wanted to work. So at that time, it is certain that in this component of the research, I indeed had to produce documents and establish operating rules that were specific to the type of research we were doing in this laboratory- the. So, yes there is this component which was quite important as the rules were) because I created the rules. But still there depending on what existed outside... 116: 2 (Professor)

*Availability of Resources.* Resource availability moderates rule proliferation as is seen in Science. Resource richness influences how ambiguities manifest in local contexts. The main resources in departments are research funds, course loads, budget for teaching auxiliary, and correction. Resources are assigned by priority. As a result, the group with the most power, professors, controls how resources are allocated. The second strongest group, lecturers, are allocated what remains. *Clause-reserve* was put in place to create an allowance for each department to grant a specific group of people a few courses before being distributed to lecturers.

Departments with high levels of subsidies to finance research rely less on courses to finance graduate students. This results in fewer opportunities for negotiations leading to rule proliferation.

Probably, because the majority of our faculty here are funded by uh...) federal government agencies uh...) 118:75 (Professor Administrator)

so all the students,... it depends on, where the awards come from because we collect at the end of the term tax-free research awards that are paid out each term. So these scholarships can be paid out of the research funds of the thesis director. They can also come from government grants. For government grants, it's FRQ<sup>14</sup>, SSHRC<sup>15</sup>...things like that that fund students but not automatically. These are grants (...) So the doctoral students who receive a fund, a government scholarship, they receive \$7000 per session, so 21 thousand dollars per year. And this federal grant, it itself gives a limit to the teaching contract that students can take on in parallel. But that's not bad because usually the limit does, it allows us to take a course load per semester. We find ourselves to have had to 21000 plus 5000 not taxable in more frankly for, that goes. On the other hand, the scholarships that are given from the research fund vary according to the labs, the means of the labs, there are labs here that compete with the government, that give scholarships of the style that a government gives is the return of 20 thousand per year. There are others, 20,000 and 25,000, there are others where it's really much lower, it's 15,000, students who are not subsidized by the government who are in a medium-rich laboratory, let's say, are absolutely in precariousness, it's clear 120:38 (Student)

Furthermore, professors with research grants have a greater course load relief. Reducing demand for course loads on the part of professors will increase access to course loads for lecturers.

Yes, so it's a bit of a special course in that it's given in problem-based learning to a cohort of 80 people. So since it's not possible to give, I know you're a little bit familiar with the concept of the app, like you can't give a session of the app to 80 people. So they have to segment, divide the cohort into several groups of 10 to 12 people. So there's not just one lecturer like in a lecture. There are several lecturers. Each one takes care of a class, that's it, each one takes care of a group of 10 people

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<sup>14</sup> **FRQ** : Fonds de recherche du Québec - Quebec Research Funds

<sup>15</sup> **SSHRC** : Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines – Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council

and in the end, there are 8. There can be 8 as there can be 8, 5 and then there are some who take three groups and so on, but that's the idea...120:21 (Student)

Case 6 is richer in resources which provides more flexibility in how they are allocated. This flexibility in resource assignment is important given that it is the meta-rule's premise to share remaining courses between most frequently lecturers and Ph.D. students. Having more resources reduces the pressure in this competition to access courses.

To fully grasp how rules proliferate in departments, local characteristics must be explored considering their interrelationships with each other. Therefore, each characteristic cannot in isolation be determinant of how rules proliferate in a given setting. Table A5 of Appendix A provides a summary of variants observed.

#### 5.5.4 Indirect Rule Proliferation Influences

Rule proliferation influences do not produce rules or stimulate rule production. However, they are considerations that influence contextual settings that will indirectly intensify rule proliferation. For instance, individual emotions and feelings can sway how rules are interpreted and enacted. These emotions trigger situations leading to rule proliferation. Consequently, emotions do not trigger rule proliferation but influence it by creating opportunities for rule proliferation. Three types of influences were observed: organizational, environmental, and individual.

Organizational influences include the evolution of context, evolution of actors within contexts, evolution of knowledge and information, and evolution of interpretations. Environmental influences include macro-environmental forces, isomorphism, competitive forces, and labor pressures. Environmental forces are more directly associated with rule proliferation at the control regulation level which will result in autonomous regulation proliferation. Individual influences include individuality, knowledge asymmetry, and emotions.

### 5.5.5 Organizational Influences

Rule proliferation is a path-dependent construct and as such organizational transformation in time influences rule proliferation. Actors in organizations enact organizational regulations that were developed in past contexts. Given that contexts are continuously changing, the regulation and the way it is enacted evolves. Citations include the evolution of contextual settings and the evolution of actors. The evolution of contextual settings brings new meanings to rules that were thought of under different circumstances. Evolution in actors transforms individuals and perceptual biases. This takes the form of changes in people, sociocultural shifts, and learning.

Actors influence contextual settings in which they operate and bring influences from contexts they come from. Actors come in new contextual settings with limited information on how to apply certain rules; they rely on other actors and experience from other settings to enact the local regulation. Moreover, some local activities can be dependent upon the expertise of actors. Depending on the expertise of Ph.D. students from year to year and the pace at which each student is progressing within their program, some courses in the department might be targeted for the *clause-reserve* more than others. Change of actors can change the array of expertise a department possesses. This change in actor influences rule proliferation.

If we're lucky with someone who trains us like when we arrive. If we are a little less lucky but still lucky, well there are traces, there are procedurals left behind, there are colleagues around who can ... who have done a bit of the same work who can help us, help guide us, if we are not very lucky then we have to find the information on our own. 99:48 (Administrator)

... Then that's kind of what's happening with the new director right now in the program, which is super transparent y'know. 111: 23 (Student)

The rule is that the candidate, if one had experience at UQAM who had more points, then they had the advantage; she had more points, but the other got hired. And she had taken the department to "department tribunal" on two things, ageism, and the issue of not having this class. She made almost five hundred thousand dollars from college and the department said we don't want her anymore, and she was behind the department's programs and this program fell apart and they're looking into rebuilding it but this has not yet happened. 107: 26 (Student and Lecturer)

And about three years ago the department hired, a doctoral student, a professor who had done his master's degree in sales management. It is certain that in the same profile he had taught the course. 70:29 (Lecturer)

### 5.5.6 Environmental Influences

There are three main types of environmental influences on rule proliferation: macro-environmental and isomorphic. Macro-environmental influences include social, political, technological, and economic transformations. Isomorphic influences pertain to influences that are isomorphous or adopt similarity in form between institutions. The following section demonstrates how these influences play a role in rule proliferation.

*Macro-environmental influences.* Jennings et al. 2005 found that rule proliferation is contingent upon macroenvironmental changes. This study supports that there exist environmental influences on rule proliferation, which entail rule changes, rule additions, and rule complexification at the organizational level. Political, social, technological, and economic transformations challenge the control regulation and ways of functioning. Social reality is the backdrop against which regulations emerge and proliferate. Technological transformations bring potential solutions to social transformation and carry the potential for rule proliferation.

Later, parts of the law had to be amended in order to change the status of UQAM and grant university status in order to be able to negotiate agreements with other universities, to be able to grant degrees. A political agreement that is not in the law ends equalization. 77: 7 (Professor Administrator).  
... distance education, well there is strong pressure for the commodification and then globalization of higher education ... 97: 6 (Lecturer)

Because it was, uh, created, uh, 50 years ago in the revolution, now students had rights, then it was created by leftists. 75:45 (Professor)

I think the rules are bound to change anyway because it's mandatory because society changes. So the individuals who populate the university are also changing and I think that from an administrative point of view, they are faced daily with new data, new problems that sometimes mean that we have no possibility other than to change the rules. 100:39 (Student)

(uh) I don't think he understood either, to fully understand UQAM is in a difficult situation financially, the budgetary rules did not favor it, that's all ok, favors other universities. In the budgetary rules, we are still in the process of favoring certain universities or others and UQAM is in the network, but we favor regional universities and not UQAM. This means that we always try and it is still the case today and in this case the lecturers well, we are, we are the ones who are cut off when there are cuts ok. 122: 12 (Lecturers)

*Isomorphic Influences.* During the present study, normative and competitive isomorphism were the main type of isomorphic change observed. One coercive isomorphic influence was noted. Normative influences observed describe a phenomenon by which a similar rule or practice is used across institutions to allow Ph.D. students to gain teaching experience.

I'm going to start broader (uh), because I myself am a university student, I am a doctoral student at Sherbrooke University. (Uh) generally, yes I'm doing (uh) a doctorate and generally, I know that each university has its own rules for the reserve clause. Uh, it all depends a little on what is done with it, at the level of, of, of ... it is agreed at the level of the collective agreement for lecturers (uh). 63:16 (Lecturer)

Competitive isomorphic influences observed are triggered by two main pressures. The first and main one is the pressure of the university and departments to be competitive in recruiting students. This entails having quality programs, quality teaching, funding opportunities, and teaching opportunities for Ph.D. students.

In fact, we have no structural funding for (er) our students and so of course it's also a big problem compared to) at the University of Montreal which is our big competitor at the doctorate who has structural funding for their doctoral students. It's that we, our students, well we have very few 113: 38 (Professor)

The second one involved the competitiveness of graduates, most particularly Ph.D. graduates in the marketplace in a scarce academic job market.

a lot of psychological stress compared to other students of not knowing if, they are able to teach or not teach uh if they are going to be able to have a job after, a professor job or not, since there is no (uh) seniority, not that they don't have seniority, but they have no ...), but that they haven't had the experience. uh (...) it can also bring a lot of stress because yes, we have to go through all the EQE processes I don't think that the EQE would be so problematic but it is the seniority lists 69: 75 (Student)

One coercive isomorphic influence was observed, and no mimetic influence was noted. The coercive influence was noted in the context of inter-university programs in which the institution is dependent on other institutions with more resources.

Well in the sense that you feel like we are small too. We are rather in a situation where we always have the impression of being the ones who have to apologize for being in the joint program 45:30 (Professor)



### 5.5.7 Individual Influences

Individual influences include emotions, individual knowledge asymmetry, and individuality.

*Emotions.* I observed that emotions impact rule interpretation and rulemaking. Emotions observed came in many forms: uncertainty and anxiety, perception of unfairness, and frustration. Although these emotions don't generate new rules, they influence rule proliferation by triggering situations that will require negotiation of new rules.

so me at the beginning yes I saw it as with ...the extension, I planned to do it with extensions (uh), but I admit that you know in the program committee the discussions we had it's true that we shouldn't do that, I did it myself, to plan a bit, then after that, there were psychological problems, periods that I have my psychological health, it was not so well, that delayed it, so now I have no choice but to use my extensions; It's not true that I'm going to give up now and then it would be the worst thing that could happen if ever my extension request is denied. I mean I probably have a job waiting for me at Laval University as long as I have (uh), my thesis is finished, (uh), but I have anxiety disorders, so it creates a lot of anxiety to apply for an extension because to hear about it I was not on the last program committee, since I moved to Rimouski but (uh), I had the impression that it was headed, maybe toward tightening the noose a bit. We may have given extensions, requests for absences a little too easily. 69:16 (Student)

Uncertainty and anxiety in the face of uncertain situations influence the way the rule is received by groups of actors with less information and less control over the way resources are allocated.

But we fought for it to be more (uh), that we put more scholarship even if it means reducing the amount per person, but it was really a chasm between those who have this scholarship and those who have no scholarship at all and who have the uncertainty of whether they be able to come out of the doctorate with no debt or a reasonable debt 69: 5 (Student)

It happens, it depends, it's if there is a session that has a lot of students, sometimes fewer students, it is very difficult, it adds a bit of uncertainty. (Uh) I will say it's even more glaring at the moment since last year, since the demographic decline of UQAM. There are fewer and fewer students, there are classes that have been canceled (uh) There is a.... I don't have the numbers with me there but a large percentage of classes have been canceled. So if you look at the number of courses, the professors will keep the same number of courses and the pie has shrunk. So, what makes them-others end up with a large percentage of courses available. The reserve clause remains the same and so that's why a lot of lecturers at the end find themselves cut off from courses. But being said that they are cut off why, but the clause reserves the students have priority in the choice of the

remaining courses. So there are a lot of people who see it like that to say but then I lost my job, I am not working the next session I am unemployed (uh) and then I look, because there are six, seven students teaching. So there is a bit of this problem on this end with the rule of the reserve clause e 63:25 (Lecturer)

Perception of unfairness emerges differently for different groups of actors. This feeling of unfairness is frequently accompanied by feelings of powerlessness and frustration. For instance, students perceive that paying lecturer union fees while not getting seniority or full representation is unfair. Or again, having limited access to course loads or financing is unjust. Lecturers feel that it is unfair that more than 50% of courses are taught by their group, while they are underrepresented in decision-making bodies. Or still, they believe it is unjust that they cannot plan their work ahead of time because job postings are uncertain. They believe it is unfair that students with no experience deliver subpar quality teaching while having priority in class selection.

Maybe not the first one, but it could be one of the dominoes that would have a bit of a butterfly effect. I think that removing the reserve clause will not only create a lot of problems, whether financial or stress-related, but I think that it will create a lot of psychological stress for students who don't know if they are capable of teaching or not, whether they will be able to get a job afterward as a teacher or not, given that they don't have seniority, they don't have seniority but they don't have experience. ...), but they don't have uh experience. uh (...) it can also bring a lot of stress because if we have to go through all the EQE processes I don't think the EQEs would be so much of a problem but it's the seniority lists 69:75 (Student)

It's rewarding and then they're in the wrong place. It's not... It still comes with the loss of the image of UQAM because me, if my university. I did my master's degree, my doctorate, I did my post-doc in Abitibi at UQAC, I did my baccalaureate at the University of Montreal. I really like the atmosphere at UQAM, I really like UQAM. Then it pains me to see that, sometimes I hear things that are very mean, they laugh, about efficiency at UQAM, then I know that we have good profs and everything, but there is a system which sometimes means that we do not end up with people precisely at the level of... it is a frustration for the lecturers. 119: 83 (Lecturer)

*Individual Knowledge Asymmetry.* Individuals appear uninformed or ill-informed about rules organizational rules. Organizational regulations appear heavy and complex. A few people have a broad and superficial knowledge of organizational regulation. Another few people have very deep knowledge of some organizational rules.

in fact, the problem is not the norms, it is the processes. The processes are so heavy .... in a university like this. As because of this pseudo-democracy where everything must be filtered by committees. It

starts with the department, or the program, it goes to the governance committee, we go to the Academic Council, we go to the Studies Commission, (corrects itself) to the Sub-Commission for studies, the Studies Commission, the Board of Directors. And at every place, eeh, except in the departments, there is congestion with students 75:48 (Professor Administrator)

Because we do little. Very few, so we do not come to know the few details of the rule. The academic regulations, I know it much more than that because I am always in the academic regulations. 99:14 (Administrator)

Should the reserve clause be applied department by department or is it for the university? So uh... let's say 10%. Should 10% be applied in each of the departments? This could be problematic for certain departments or on the contrary, it is done on the whole campus; This has other advantages, other disadvantages also depending on the structure of the department but ... 71:39 (Student)

Knowledge asymmetry is not only a rule proliferation stimulus, but it also differentiates how individuals behave and interact with rules. Knowledge and knowledge acquisition are variable and uneven. There are three dimensions associated with knowledge asymmetry and rule proliferation: (1) learning style, (2) experience, and (3) local narratives. Learning style has been shown to play an important role in creating knowledge asymmetry. Rule learning seems to take place in these three ways and this interchangeably.

The first way observed is reading and gathering information on a specific rule only when required. This means that when a specific need, problem, or event occurs, it might bring the concurrent need to learn about a rule that allows, prevents, or bounds certain courses of action.

I've been at UQAM for 5 years and I must have known this story for 3 years. The first time I was brought to be concerned by the reserve clause, it was when a course that I usually gave, I no longer wanted to give it because I had another course in the year and suddenly, I was interested in whether I could give it away to someone else. And especially then me in my specific case, I was annoyed because I knew I had lecturers who were priority which came to the point that gives them access to the course. So, we have to ask them when the lesson is not given, but hey... 45: 61 (Professor)

well ...) among all the years of experience that I have had either as a student or as a representative for all program committees and as president to defend my student associations ... I don't think I have ever read a collective agreement or a regulation...from start to finish. I think each time I really searched for the section I needed... section 8.3.1, but I will start by reading 8.3.1, then if I understand correctly with the article as such, well ... I will close the book, or I will stop reading and then I will go away. If I don't understand, this is where I'll go read before and after to contextualize the rule and try to understand it a little better. But that means for 8.3.1, I may have read 8...; section 8, but I wouldn't have been reading up and down, I wouldn't have been reading (uh) the entire rulebook. Done on the reserve clause, I went to read the student section, but I skipped the passage on the other types of reserve clauses because it did not concern me. 69: 99 - 69: 100 (Student)

The second way observed is through inference from past experiences of their own or of others. In these cases, actors rely on past experiences with similar rules in other departments or organizations. This generates a form of isomorphism between departments and institutions.

No that's it. That's it. As in the strategy department, she said to me "how do I know that someone is going to take the reserve clause?". Well, I said, I send it to the Ph.D. Program, the Ph.D. Program sends it to the students of the BUSINESS option. You could do the same. 95:53 (Administrator)

The third way observed is through organizational narratives. People learn from their peers about rules without reading official references. This comes with sets of advantages and drawbacks. For instance, it allows peers to have smooth transitions over time when new actors come in and out of their teams and it is more likely that the team's interpretation better responds to local needs. But it also transfers any assumptions that might have been made in the past. This may lead to a larger gap between autonomous regulation and control regulation over a long period.

Really, me ... yes the proof of this rule, it is clear that it is the interpretation, I have not even read the article 10-2, in fact, I do not know what says the real truth about the reserve clause, I have never read it. Maybe that can be far from what the paragraph says compared to all the blah blah that we make about it here and all the discussions that we have here that may have nothing to do with what is done in law or sociology. 113: 93-113-94 (Professor)

I'm trying to see the posting of, all the professors choose. Someone came to see me for a reserve clause. What do I do? Well, I said, well look at the collective agreement, you can look at what's being done before you get there. You know, every department works differently. But it is with experience that you know who ... 95:61 (administrator)

The experience acquired differentiates individual knowledge. From an organizational standpoint, knowledge asymmetry is associated with power distribution. Roles that people occupy in the organization, as well as their presence, absence, or authority in decision-making bodies, generate marked differences in knowledge transmission and acquisition. Again, from an organizational standpoint, rule information is transmitted through departmental narratives.

Individual experience is also associated with knowledge asymmetry. A good number of people interviewed are uninformed or ill-informed about rules in general. A minority of people

interviewed have a broad yet superficial knowledge of organizational regulations. Others have learned in detail the depths of specific rules that are required for their jobs.

Because we do few. Very few, so we do not come to know the few details of the rule. The academic regulation, I know them much more than that because I am always in the academic regulation. 99:14 (Administrator)

Not at all. I haven't been executive secretary long enough to dive into it, to understand everything about administrative bodies 109: 7 administrator

People are careful. That is to say that when we appoint when we are going to elect a department director, for example, we are going to elect a person who is quite experienced. There is like an unspoken rule that you are not going to send a young teacher there to do that 75:36 (Professor Administrator)

So you cannot establish a rule without knowing the other rules that exist. 94: 5 (Professor)

Rule information is conveyed through departmental narratives. Propagation of information is mainly conducted at autonomous levels. Although there are formal ways of communicating rules; most people learn them by working with other people within the organization. Because many actors learn through word of mouth, errors, twists, and past interpretations come with this learning. Thus, sometimes false information (misinformation) is being transmitted.

Oh no I haven't even read it (eh). I don't know it's to allow hiring people (uh) with no experience who otherwise might not (uh) might not have a first teaching experience 97:42 (Lecturer)

Really, me ... yes the proof of this rule there, it is clear that it is the interpretation, I have not even read it, this article 10-2, in fact, I do not know what it says the real truth about the reserve clause, I have never read it. 113: 93 (Professor)

These three knowledge asymmetry dimensions generate variability in the effective regulation.

*Individuality.* Regardless of the learning style adopted, every actor interprets the information gathered per their individuality. Individuals are unique and have unique ways to look at specific sets of circumstances according to their values, experience, education, attitudes, and so on. The variability in interpretation influences rule proliferation for three reasons. First, it leads to debates on boundaries and regulations. These debates result in discussion on how rules can be further clarified to avoid future confusion. These clarifications complexify the control regulation. Second,

it leads to variability in rule application between actors and across local contexts, therefore, creating inequities or the perception of inequities. These situations trigger opportunities for proliferation at the control regulation level. Third, it allows for easier rule manipulation because this misuse of the rule can be camouflaged within the acceptable variability in applications.

## 5.6 Lifting the Curtain on Rule Proliferation Mechanics

The purpose of this chapter was to define the nature of autonomous rules and rule proliferation mechanisms to assess whether there are context-specific characteristics likely to accentuate rule proliferation. In the previous sections, I identified the nature of autonomous rules: conventions and norms, alternative practices, tools, and procedurals, as well as local control regulation. Then I described in fine detail, each component of the rule proliferation mechanics. The purpose of this last section is to understand how mechanisms operate to produce systemic and recursive rule proliferation as portrayed in Figure 16.

Rule proliferation engines were identified as producers of rules. Engines include administrative bodies such as committees and assemblies, the autonomous regulation, and the effective regulation. The autonomous and the effective regulation are implicit engines of proliferation, while administrative bodies were identified as an explicit engine of rule proliferation. Still, administrative bodies are operated by the autonomous regulation that enables organizational activities and allows control rule proliferation. For instance, in Case 2 (Business) it is a norm not to invite the lecturer representative to attend the departmental assembly's monthly meeting despite the control regulation in place. Moreover, because the autonomous regulation is necessary to operate administrative bodies, it produces control rule proliferation.

The autonomous regulation was identified as the main engine of rule proliferation. It is in continuous interaction with the control regulation. This continuous interaction results in the emergence of autonomous rules that operationalize, adapt, and solve problems with the control regulation enactment, and therefore generates rule proliferation at the autonomous level. For

example, Case 5 (Public Policy) has established a convention by which “TOPIC1000” courses which include all basic core courses, should always be taught by professors, and never be allocated under the provisions of *clause-reserve*.


The effective regulation is in continuous interaction with the autonomous regulation. It represents the version of the autonomous regulation enacted at any given time. Thus, its variability generates ongoing micro rule proliferation by continuously transforming the autonomous regulation. For instance, a convention emerging out of Case 5 (Public Policy) indicating that all “TOPIC1000” should be taught by professors varies in applications. In some semesters, it is not possible to have enough professors to assure all course loads. Furthermore, some professors have assigned these courses to Ph.D. students. This variability in applications led to a formalization of the convention in the form of a departmental policy.

The control regulation was identified as a rule proliferation vector because it does not generate new rules. Control level proliferation emerges from administrative bodies who hold the official role of adding and changing rules control rules. Control level proliferation generated by administrative bodies recalibrates the control regulation with new rules, changed rules, or complexifications. This control level proliferation triggers autonomous level proliferation since the autonomous regulation must now adapt to a recalibrated control regulation. For example, the removal of postdoctoral fellows in the meta-rule (control rule change) resulted in the removal of articles in departmental policies (autonomous rule proliferation) and the emergence of an alternative practice (autonomous rule proliferation) in order to allocate courses to this group of actors.

Rule proliferation stimuli identified do not produce rules, however, they generate a context that stimulates rule proliferation engines. The main organizational stimulus is organizational slack which accommodates collegiality and academic freedom. Collegiality and academic freedom are key to university life. Organizational slack is comprised of other stimuli that accentuate rule proliferation: knowledge asymmetry, power asymmetry, resource distribution, uneven rule

abundance, and ambiguity. There also exist context-specific characteristics that induce or moderate rule proliferation in local settings. Rule proliferation, in turn, transforms these stimuli. For instance, a control rule change such as a reduction in the university-wide percentage restricts slack. Conversely, a control rule change that clarifies the decision-making power of the departmental assembly restricts organizational slack by clarifying the decision-making entity, but it expands organizational slack by increasing power asymmetry. Rule proliferation can also impact context-specific characteristics such as the use of the rule and access to resources.

Figure 16. Mechanics of Rule Proliferation



In light of this analysis, there exist pervasive rule proliferation mechanics that prevail and result in systemic and recursive rule proliferation. Some local characteristics stimulate or moderate these mechanisms generating variants in proliferation and how rules are applied from one setting to the next. The next chapter discusses findings and consolidates control and autonomous proliferation learnings into a theoretical rule proliferation framework.



## CHAPTER VI

### RESULTS: THE PROCESS OF RULE PROLIFERATION

#### 6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to consolidate findings and depict the organizational process of rule proliferation. This dissertation aimed at answering two research questions. The first examines how one organizational rule proliferates in time within the context of a pluralistic organization. This first question required the observation of one organizational rule's transformation in its context. Consequently, chapter IV presented a taxonomy of control rule proliferation. Some proliferation elements such as clarifications tend to reduce slack and others can expand slack by increasing possibilities for rule application. I found that areas of ambiguity emerging from the meta-rule generated rule proliferation. Furthermore, we observed that ambiguity induced variability in the effective regulation triggering rule proliferation. I found that restricting or expanding slack has associated effects on effective regulation that play an important role in organizational life and on negotiation between control and autonomous regulations. Each rule proliferation element conveys the potential of increasing variability of the effective regulation. Hence, as organizational slack tends to restrict in time, variability in the effective regulation increases.

The second question of this doctoral dissertation examines rule proliferation mechanisms to assess whether there are contexts likely to accentuate rule proliferation. It called for a comparison of settings to identify whether context-specific characteristics of local environments can accentuate rule proliferation. I found in chapter V that there were pervasive mechanisms and varying mechanisms. Pervasive mechanisms include rule proliferation engines, one rule proliferation

vector, and organizational stimuli. Varying mechanisms consist of context-specific stimuli. I also observed indirect influences of rule proliferation (individual, organizational and environmental) that make a context auspicious to rule proliferation.

This section consolidates findings by looking at the rule proliferation phenomenon as an ongoing recalibration process of organizational rule proliferation. Throughout this dissertation, I defined five levels of rule proliferation that unfold in the control and autonomous regulations. Each rule proliferation level results in areas of ambiguity generating the potential for further rule proliferation at the control and autonomous regulations. The process of continuous negotiation between control and autonomous regulations attempts to resolve ambiguities. Hence, emerging from these areas of ambiguities are periods of recalibration of the organizational regulatory system. For example, by applying modifications to the control regulation, the autonomous regulation must adapt locally, find new solutions and generate new ways to be made operational. Furthermore, given the variety of contexts, some rule proliferation remains local and therefore has local reach, other rule proliferation is organizational and has organizational reach.

To do this, I organized this chapter as follows. I first describe each rule proliferation level. Then, I explain the ongoing recalibration of the organizational regulatory system emerging from areas of ambiguities. Lastly, I depict how rule proliferation unfolds continuously. This model of rule proliferation is derived from the ongoing recalibration of the organizational regulatory system.

## 6.2 Rule Proliferation Levels

During this thesis, I have addressed rule proliferation in the control regulation (chapter IV) and at the autonomous level (chapter V). In this section, I capture rule proliferation observed at each regulation level and explain each level. Table 12 summarizes each level. Each rule proliferation level generates ambiguities susceptible to result in further rule proliferation. These ambiguities can exist at both levels: control and autonomous. Moreover, they can trigger proliferation at both levels. This proliferation therefore can have local reach and organizational reach.

### 6.3 Level Zero – Creation of the joint regulation and initiation control regulation proliferation

Rule proliferation level zero (RPL0) corresponds to the creation of the regulation and the meta-rule *clause-reserve*. The creation of a joint regulation in 1978 has repercussions on rule proliferation. This joint regulation augments the organization's control regulation since there is a new set of control rules created. This implies that practices must adapt to new regulatory conditions. As such, autonomous regulation emerges to enable its operationalization, to adapt to local needs, and to resolve problems.

These first negotiations began on August 10, 1978, with the submission of a draft collective agreement. They were long and difficult. The lecturers had to deal with two parties. The employer, UQAM, tried to limit its concessions as much as possible, while the SPUQ sought to reduce the proportion of teaching assigned to lecturers. 26:49

Table 12. Rule Proliferation Levels

Regulation Level	Rule proliferation Level	Description	Rule proliferation level after recalibration	Description
Control Regulation				
Control Regulation	RPL0	Creation of joint regulation that acts as control regulation	RPL0'	Modifications to control regulation
Control Rule	RPL1	Rule proliferation at control level	RPL1'	Rule proliferation at control level
Autonomous Regulation				
Rule proliferation at autonomous level	RPL2	Conventions and norms	RPL2'	Conventions and norms
	RPL3	Alternative practices	RPL3'	Alternative practices
	RPL4	Tools and procedurals	RPL4'	Tools and procedurals
	RPL5_0	Local control regulation	RPL5'	Local control regulation
Local control regulation proliferation	RPL5_1	Local control regulation (rule addition)	RPL5_1'	Local control regulation (rule addition)
	RPL5_2	Local control regulation (rule change)	RPL5_2'	Local control regulation (rule change)
	RPL5_3	Local control regulation (rule complexification)	RPL5_3'	Local control regulation (rule complexification)

RPL0' accounts for recalibration experienced and therefore modifications applied to the initial control regulation in the second version. For instance, the version of 1980 contains 25 sections which are two more than the original. We have observed four main areas of ambiguities triggered by the creation of the meta-rule. For instance, one area of regarded students registered in advanced studies. For instance, postdoctoral fellows were not included in the meta-rule until 1990, leaving ambiguous their place in the university's teaching body.

8.02 (b) the engagement of a student enrolled in an advanced study program at the university. 2:17 (document)

### 6.3.1 Level One – Rule Proliferation at Control Level

Rule proliferation level one (RPL1) considers rule proliferation experienced directly in the meta-rule. For instance, the inclusion in 1990 of postdoctoral fellows in the meta-rule or the change in university-wide quota in 2019.

e.g., 1990-1993 the hiring a, of a student enrolled in an advanced studies program at the University or of an intern, a postdoctoral fellow.

rather than that there was an eight percent that was there and then (um) the lecturers themselves didn't like it, the reserve clause, so they asked to reduce it...we honestly would have liked to leave it at eight, and then why it was at eight I have no idea, there must have been a calculation at the time on what it represented in terms of numbers... You know, sometimes it's done on that basis and then during the negotiations, people claim that there's a decrease in the number of students and then the lecturers say that there are fewer charges, so that... we want you to decrease, you know, in return we give you this. But we want you to decrease, so it's really, it's really, and then we took away the post-docs at that point, so we said to ourselves that if we took away the post-docs, maybe it wouldn't have so much impact on the six point five. 96:12

The addition of postdoctoral fellows in 1990 expands the pool of possible candidates for teaching while the number of courses remains approximately stable. In addition, a letter of agreement is added to the control regulation. This letter aims at investigating ambiguities regarding the situation of students who would benefit from teaching.

RPL1' accounts for recalibration and represents further modifications applied to the meta-rule in 1980.

### 6.3.2 Level Two – Emergence of Conventions and Norms

Rule proliferation level two (RPL2) considers rule proliferation at autonomous levels. First levels of autonomous rules are initiated by conventions and norms that allow to operationalize the control regulation and adapt to local needs. For instance, when postdoctoral fellows were added to the collective agreement in 1990, one of the conventions was to treat them as Ph.D. students.

In the case of the rule on post-docs and students, the reserve clause there, the doctoral students, it is not written post-doc, it is written for graduate students... then it was written post-doc trainee... then the interpretation of the union of this rule that read it who did not have all the experience of where it came from the rule, then us neither, said, but that is not what it means... But I had people who had been applying it for a long time who couldn't tell me the origin of the rule because they were technicians, they hadn't participated in the negotiations, but... they had been there for 25 years and they applied the same rule 96:9

This convention of treating postdoctoral fellows as Ph.D. students created ambiguity for new actors arriving in the organization and trying to apply the meta-rule since postdoctoral fellows have employee status.

...the postdoc students it's more complicated...question of the students, the work of the students, the CNSST<sup>16</sup>, because it was students ok of certain status, but postdoc you have another status so there it's following an arbitration we said stop playing on words it's either the employees, or students but you can't have two statuses at the same time. ...I know that it was frustration in certain faculties in science among others but () object of negotiation but that is from the beginning, it is questions 122:39

RPL2' accounts for recalibration and represents transformations in conventions and norms.

### 6.3.3 Level Three – Emergence of Alternative Practices

Rule proliferation level 3 pertains to the emergence of alternative practices. For instance, postdoctoral fellows were removed from the 2019 collective agreement which led to departments to search for new ways to bypass this removal.

These are things that have passed in (the....) we don't have that, the administration hasn't seen and so that poses a problem because basically, we have the sixty-two post-docs who are excellent but

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<sup>16</sup> CNESST : Commission des normes, de l'équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail – Committee on Standards, Equity, Health and Safety at Work

who can't teach courses with us unless we do an exceptional posting withdrawal but (uh...) we don't go in there too much. 110:24

Using alternate ways to allocate courses transforms local course allocation processes and routines.

This uncertainty in processes leaves areas of ambiguity.

a lot of people in the department who are somewhat critical of feudal practices... older men... who manipulated the rules... there is a changing generation, people who are retiring... we created a procedural... 113: 64

Michèle Nevert also mentioned that she had met with members of the SCCUQ Executive Committee to discuss the consequences of the signing of their last collective agreement on issues related to the work of professors, in particular, the current impossibility of subtracting courses from the posting for the postdoctoral researcher. 93:7 (document)

I think it's ridiculous... the fact that postdocs can't take advantage of the reserve clause given their profile and reasons for doing a postdoc. 59:45

RPL3' accounts for recalibration and represents transformations in alternative practices.

#### 6.3.4 Level Four - Emergence of Procedurals and Tools

Rule proliferation level four (RPL4) involves the emergence of procedurals and tools. For instance, the Fine Arts department is developing procedurals to stabilize rule the application for new personnel.

There's not really, one of the things that I'm... I need to work on actually right now for some of the administrative tasks, to try to put in place more internal procedures. That will look less at the more general side for example the use of software, but more at the particularity of the faculty in the way we do things for new uh... to help new people coming in. 99:55 (Administrator)

Tools and procedurals observed tend to stabilize rule application and reduce variability. Yet, there are instances, where procedurals and tools are not sufficient to stabilize rule application. For instance, the Public Policy department puts in place a procedural to avoid rule manipulation.

a lot of people in the department who are somewhat critical of feudal practices... older men... who manipulated the rules... there is a changing generation, people who are retiring... we created a procedural... 113:64

Lack of abidance toward this procedural generates ambiguity which triggers the need for a local control regulation (RPL5).

RPL4' accounts for recalibration and represents transformations in tools and procedurals.

### 6.3.5 Level Five – Emergence of Local Control Regulation

Rule proliferation level five (RPL5) involves the emergence of a formalized regulation at the autonomous level. Because the local control regulation is formalized, this type of autonomous rule can experience the rule proliferation in the same forms as an organizational control regulation: changes additions, and complexifications. For instance, the removal of postdoctoral fellows from the meta-rule in 2019 led to the transformation of a local control regulation that included them. Departments must exclude this group from their practices when applying *clause-reserve*.

e.g., REMOVAL OF POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWS IN DEPARTMENTAL POLICY:

2016: Reservation clauses are granted on a priority basis to students enrolled in the administration program or to postdoctoral fellows interested in.... 44:29

2019: Reservation clauses are granted on a priority basis to students enrolled in the administration program interested in....82:1

Departments face ambiguity dealing with the exclusion of postdoctoral fellows in their local practices because one of the key reasons to pursue a postdoctoral fellowship is to develop research and gain teaching experience.

Uh...) what we regret about... that, that clause there can't apply... doesn't apply to postdoctoral students. 110:23

RPL5' accounts for recalibration and represents transformations in the local control regulation.

### 6.3.6 Areas of Ambiguities

Each rule proliferation level generates areas of ambiguity, and each area of ambiguity carries the potential of rule proliferation at autonomous and control levels. An example of such an ambiguous situation is the removal of postdoctoral fellows from *clause-reserve*. Uneven application of *clause-*



*reserve* across the university generates ambiguity at the control regulation level. Lecturers pressure the university to reduce the percentage allowance in *clause-reserve* in order to reduce abuse. This brings university administration to ponder which groups to prioritize between postdoctoral fellows and Ph.D. students. Although both groups are precarious and can benefit from teaching experience; postdoctoral fellows have a salary and have an employee status while Ph.D. students don't have institutional financing. This skews the university administration's decision to favor Ph.D. students over postdoctoral fellows.

In fact, since doctoral students are people who want to ... apply for teaching positions, ... it will help them except ... if we had to choose, well, we had to choose between doc students and postdoctoral fellows, we preferred ... to encourage students, because we know that they don't have,... always research grants (uh) it's people who have more precarious situations in monetary terms, they have rent and so on, the doc positions well if they come here, in general, it's who have a grant or who have a prof's salary... 96:8

Areas of ambiguity, therefore, trigger a recalibration in which all regulations require rebalancing. For instance, a recalibration implies that conventions and norms transform, local control regulation requires rethinking, actors reflect on new alternative practices and tools and procedurals evolve. In the example of the removal of postdoctoral fellows, this recalibration results in the removal of postdoctoral fellows from *clause-reserve* departmental policies, the transformation of conventions, and the emergence of alternative practices for postdoctoral fellows to teach under other provisions than *clause-reserve*.

#### 6.4 Recalibration: A Rule Proliferation Process

A recalibration represents the rebalancing of the entire organizational regulatory system. This means that by applying modifications to the control regulation, the autonomous regulation must adapt locally, find new solutions and generate new ways to be made operational. Recalibration of the organizational regulatory system emerges from ambiguities in rule application. This results in an ongoing and intricate interplay between the autonomous and control regulations. For instance, uneven rule abundance when it comes to the meta-rule results in the emergence of alternative practices. The emergence of these alternative practices gives rise to organization-wide concerns. These concerns include the fact that some departments make abusive use of the meta-rule. These

organization-wide concerns, in turn, lead to modification of the meta-rule. These modifications to the meta-rule trigger a recalibration of the autonomous regulation.

The ongoing interplay between autonomous and control regulations was observed by the enactment of rules by actors. The variability in understanding and rule enactment generates areas of ambiguity that require renegotiation of the control regulation. These areas of ambiguities are either associated with (1) context-specific discrepancies between the displayed control regulation and the autonomous regulation (e.g., why one student is chosen instead of another when another better qualifies as per departmental criteria); (2) organizational concerns between groups of actors (e.g., lecturers pressure university administration to reduce the university-wide quota to maximize resources for lecturers and resolve local issues). As such, recalibration can have a local reach or an organizational reach.

*Reach of Recalibration.* Recalibration can have a local reach on rule proliferation when local ambiguities are context-specific. Recalibration can gain an organizational reach if ambiguities become university-wide concerns. Let us take for example the local control regulation established by Case 5 indication that *clause-reserve* courses should be more varied and “TOPIC1000” courses should be avoided. In this specific example, this local control regulation has local repercussions because those courses and needs are specific to the department. In the case of a department allocating almost 30% of courses in *clause-reserve*, this concern triggers recalibration at the organizational level because the quota is university-wide.

The identity of the group of actors (e.g., students, lecturers, professors) who are experiencing concern further influences whether an area of ambiguity will have local or organizational reach. If a group of actors is (1) powerful, (2) is involved in administrative bodies, or (3) if university functioning depends largely on this group for daily activities; there will be more opportunities for the ambiguity to be brought forth in university-wide discussions for problem-solving. For instance, the union of lecturers as a group exerts more power than individual lecturers. Furthermore, the university requires them for the daily functioning of operations. Lecturers teach more than 50% of

courses and the union transcends departments and disciplines. Nevertheless, lecturers are not active in administrative bodies. Ph.D. students have multiple roles: students, researchers, and employees. For their role as correction auxiliary, they are represented by the union of student-employees (SETUE)<sup>17</sup> and as Ph.D. students, they are represented by several associations depending on disciplines. Therefore, their negotiating power is fragmented by associations, unions, and by discipline. The university is much more dependent on lecturers for daily operations than on Ph.D. students for teaching courses. Although Ph.D. students teaching courses might have long-term strategic implications for attracting, training, and retaining students; short-term implications of ill-treating lecturers are damaging in the short term. Furthermore, in the case of *clause-reserve*, the negotiating body representing students under *clause-reserve* is the union of lecturers. Therefore, the same group who is trying to limit their teaching access is the group representing them leaving students with weaker negotiating power.

## 6.5 Rule Proliferation Process

Rule proliferation emerges from the ongoing negotiation between autonomous and control regulation causing a need for recalibration of the meta-rule. Figure 17 describes the organizational rule proliferation process in which the autonomous and control regulations interplay by fostering areas of ambiguities that require resolving. Control regulation proliferation results in a need to adjust and adapt the autonomous regulation. For instance, it calls upon departments to change procedurals and routines, or to find alternatives to challenges created by the revised control regulation. This proliferation is triggered by ambiguities generated at both autonomous and control levels. An example of an alternative solution is the Public Policy department which is now using

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
<sup>17</sup> SETUE : Syndicat des étudiants et étudiantes employé.e.s de l'UQAM - Union of employed students of UQAM

exceptional posting withdrawal to allocate courses to their postdoctoral fellows now excluded from the meta-rule.

In this continuous negotiation between autonomous and control regulations:

- the control regulation is a vector of rule proliferation because it does not generate rules but triggers the emerge of rules
- the autonomous regulation continuously proliferates by operationalizing the control regulation, resolving problems, adapting to local needs, and generating proliferation at the control level through administrative bodies
- the effective regulation proliferates by interpreting and enacting regulation with variability.

Figure 17. Rule Proliferation Process



As such the ongoing recalibration of the regulatory system resulting from evolving areas of ambiguities in the control and autonomous regulation triggers a continuous process of rule proliferation. This ongoing process of recalibration occurs through the continuous negotiation between the autonomous and control regulations. Part four discusses findings and presents theoretical contributions of this thesis and concludes on leads for future research and practical implications.

Part II demonstrated findings of how one rule proliferates in a pluralistic organization and to context-specific characteristics accentuating rule proliferation. Chapter IV described results pertaining to control rule proliferation over five periods. This resulted in the emergence of a control rule proliferation taxonomy. Chapter V showed results relating to the autonomous regulation. This entailed the understanding of autonomous rules as well as understanding how mechanisms of rule proliferation work in a systemic and recursive framework. Chapter VI demonstrated each level of rule proliferation encompassing both control and autonomous levels. This was conducted to consolidate learnings into one ongoing recalibration process of organizational rule proliferation.

Part III explores theoretical contributions, discusses results, and concludes on implications for management and the future of research.

## PART III

## CHAPTER VII

### DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

#### 7.1 Introduction

I started this Ph.D. dissertation with the observation that research conducted on rule proliferation was incomplete because: (1) many contributions on rules and rule proliferation were collateral, meaning that rules and rule proliferation were not the focus of the project; and (2) and, the majority of the research conducted thus far was quantitative thus leaving questions unanswered, most specifically as to how the process of rule proliferation unfolds and whether there are local contexts likely to accentuate rule proliferation.

Consequently, I set out to answer two questions. The first one explored how one organizational rule proliferates in time. Using a temporal bracketing strategy, I defined five periods of proliferation. By examining elements of rule proliferation across these periods, a taxonomy of control rule proliferation elements emerged. Moreover, I found those rule proliferation elements that have the most impact on organizational life (the organizational slack and the effective regulation) are associated with areas of ambiguities emergent from the meta-rule.

The second question explored whether there are contexts more auspicious to rule proliferation. By comparing six departments, I found pervasive mechanisms that operate rule proliferation across the organization, and I uncovered varying mechanisms which are context-specific. Pervasive mechanisms include rule proliferation engines, organizational stimuli, and one rule proliferation vector. Context-specific stimuli include the size of the department, resource availability, the use of the rule, local administrative structures, and the nature of local disciplinary pluralism. In

addition, I found that there exist indirect influences of rule proliferation. These influences generate more opportunities for rule proliferation.

During this dissertation, I identified the relationships between mechanisms of rule proliferation, and I defined six levels of rule proliferation encompassing control and autonomous levels. This process is recursive and systemic. By identifying and describing the relationship between each mechanism and exploring rule proliferation at the control and autonomous levels, I delineated how the process of ongoing recalibration generates rule proliferation within an organizational setting. This process illuminates underlying mechanisms that are understudied and misunderstood and that have often been addressed in literature as a vicious circle (Crozier, 1964; Crozier & Friedberg, 1977).

Part III concludes this thesis by discussing results, examining theoretical contributions, and concluding with implications for practice and the future of research. In this chapter, I present a discussion of results in which synthesize my findings in regard to the two research questions. Then I produce theoretical contributions.

## 7.2 Discussion of Results

In this section, I discuss the results concerning the two main research questions identified for this doctoral dissertation: (1) describing how one organizational rule proliferates in a pluralistic setting, and (2) identifying whether there are context-specific characteristics that are likely to accentuate rule proliferation.

Throughout this thesis, I defined a control rule proliferation taxonomy and defined four types of autonomous rules. This led to the identification of six levels of rule proliferation. Two of these levels take place at the control regulation level, while four of them take place at the autonomous levels. Each level constantly evolves and transforms at each period of recalibration producing rule proliferation. Rule proliferation produces new areas of ambiguity or leaves unresolved (partly or



completely) past areas of ambiguity. Furthermore, I defined rule proliferation mechanisms that uncovered rule proliferation engines, one rule proliferation vector, and rule proliferation stimuli. This entailed the understanding of autonomous rules as well as understanding how mechanisms of rule proliferation work in a systemic and recursive framework.

During this section, I discuss the six levels of rule proliferation. While doing so, I will contextualize the role of the control and autonomous levels in the rule proliferation process to address the two research questions. First, I discuss the control regulation levels. Second, I address the autonomous regulation levels. Third, I consolidate by looking at the interplay of regulations as an organizational process. This section is followed by theoretical contributions.

### 7.2.1 Control Regulation Levels

During this thesis, I developed a taxonomy of rule proliferation at the control regulation level describing rule proliferation elements as well as motives behind specific elements. In the taxonomy, the most significant elements are associated with the objectives of modifying freedom of action and improving the efficiency of the application. Rule additions restricting behavior appear to be less impactful than rule additions aiming to expand. Complexifications modify freedom of action and future freedom of action. Hence, they restrict or expand organizational slack. Nevertheless, despite aiming at reducing slack, complexifications can still increase the variability of application.

This taxonomy revealed two levels of rule proliferation at the control regulation level: RPL0 and RPL1. RPL0 represents the regulation creation. This regulation is a set of rules, and those rules can be changed, and rules can be added or complexified. Every time this regulation is modified by removing or adding sections, it becomes a recalibrated control regulation that triggers the autonomous regulation to adapt locally, find new solutions and generate new ways to be made operational.

The control regulation is a vector of rule proliferation. Rule proliferation in the control regulation is produced by the administrative bodies. Administrative bodies are enabled by the autonomous

regulation that animates how these committees and groups operate. Both the administrative bodies and the autonomous regulation, combined with the effective regulation were identified as engines of rule proliferation. Although the control regulation is explicit, given that it is displayed, it is a passive vector of rule proliferation because it does not produce new rules. Yet the scope of the control regulation, and the number and the nature of rules comprised within its bounds, impact how administrative bodies produce new rules, change rules, and complexify rules.

RPL1 represents the creation of a new rule within the regulation. This new rule contains articles, definitions, explanations, guidelines, or text. Rule complexifications are connected to rule content as well as tensions between control regulation and autonomous regulation. As a result, many complexifications pertain to areas of ambiguity given that they feature key areas of tension between the two regulations.

Control rule proliferation triggers a recalibration of the autonomous regulation. A recalibration represents the rebalancing of the entire organizational regulatory system. Recalibration of the organizational regulatory system emerges from ambiguities in rule application. This results in an ongoing and intricate interplay between the autonomous and control regulations. Because the control rule is a networked system of interconnected proliferation elements, this recalibration entails the rebalancing of all regulations (control, autonomous and effective). For instance, a recalibration implies that other parts of the control regulation be adjusted, conventions and norms transform, local control regulation requires rethinking, actors reflect on new alternative practices and tools and procedurals evolve.

Recalibration can have a local reach on rule proliferation when local ambiguities are context-specific. However, recalibration can gain an organizational reach if ambiguities become university-wide concerns. The identity of the group of actors who are experiencing concern resulting from the ambiguity also influences whether an area of ambiguity will have local or organizational reach. This depends on the group of actors' power, involvement in administrative bodies, and the university's dependence on this group of actors for daily activities.

In light of the first research question, I have observed that one organizational rule proliferates once it is created. It proliferates by generating rule changes, rule additions, and rule complexifications directly at the control rule level. This proliferation is driven by administrative bodies and by the autonomous regulation. The control regulation can further be influenced by changes to the regulation itself. Each proliferation element and level carry the potential for ambiguity that requires resolving. Control rule proliferation triggers a recalibration of the organizational regulatory system. This recalibration generates autonomous rule proliferation.

By providing a detailed account of the process by which one rule proliferates and the taxonomy of organizational rule proliferation, I enrich the literature on bureaucracy theory and organizational learning. Bureaucracy theory has defined the concept of rule proliferation by formulating the constructs of rule change, rule addition, and rule complexification (Jennings et al., 2005). This detailed account allows us to understand the variety of rule proliferation as well as their motives. These findings also add to the organizational learning literature (March et al., 2000) by demonstrating a networked system of control rule elements through different periods. Moreover, these rules emerge as a compromise achieved at a given time between competing interests and needs; they do not reflect optimal organizational knowledge at the time of rule addition. Theoretical contributions are elaborately developed in the following section.

These findings are very important for professionals in their quest to improve decision making processes. Understanding rule proliferation as a continuous process of resolving ambiguity through rulemaking can lead decision-makers to question the viability of using rules as management tools in some instances. Moreover, the taxonomy informs decision-makers of the different types of rule proliferation elements and the importance of identifying the motives before designing a rule. Professionals can better appreciate temporal contexts in which rules are designed and evaluate their relevance periodically. Furthermore, considering that rules are not perfect encapsulation of knowledge or perfect decision tools, but rather compromises achieved through negotiation can result in a more profound appreciation of the imperfect and ephemeral nature of rules along with the need to complement the control regulation with performing autonomous rulemaking.

Still, control regulation proliferation is only one portion of the rule proliferation process. To gain a better understanding of the recalibration process on the autonomous regulation, I will discuss rule proliferation at the autonomous levels.

### 7.2.2 Autonomous Regulation Levels

One of the key findings of this thesis is the autonomous regulation as a primary engine of rule proliferation. It follows that four levels of rule proliferation identified exist at the autonomous level.

RPL2 represents the first levels of autonomous rules that are initiated by conventions and norms that allow to operationalize the control regulation and adapt to local needs. RPL3 pertains to the emergence of alternative practices. RPL4 represents the development of procedurals and tools. Lastly, RPL5 involves the creation of local control regulation. This last level possesses similar properties as observed in control rule proliferation since it is often perceived as more formal and legitimate than other types of autonomous rules. At this last autonomous rule level, we can observe rule changes, rule additions, and rule complexifications as seen at the control rule level because the explicitness and tangibility of the rule are higher.

The autonomous regulation operationalizes the control regulation, resolves problems, and adapts the control regulation to the local needs. Because of the unlimited number of interpretations and possible application variants, the autonomous regulation can be enacted in a slightly different manner at any given time. The effective (real) regulation represents the regulation enacted at any given moment. Therefore, although the effective regulation is a compromise between the intended theoretical motive of the control regulation and the practical purpose of the autonomous regulation, empirically, the effective regulation appears as variations of the autonomous regulation. Consequently, both the autonomous and the effective regulations are implicit since they can only be learned by experiencing organizational life. By continuously generating variability in autonomous rule enactment, the effective regulation triggers autonomous rule proliferation. It produces rule proliferation by creating a wider variety of practices and by enticing actors in local contexts to produce new rules intended to stabilize rule enactment.

In light of the first research question, I have observed that one organizational rule proliferates by the ongoing need to adapt to local needs, find solutions, and be made operational in local contexts. This process generates a variety of rule enactment possibilities. By the same token, actors in local contexts produce rules that are structuring (e.g., procedurals and tools, and local control regulations) and stabilizing rule enactment.

By providing a detailed framework of rule proliferation mechanics and identifying the types of autonomous rules enacted, I enhance the literature on neoinstitutional theory and organizational routines. Neoinstitutional theory suggests that an ongoing increase in rule mass results from institutional pressures and isomorphism (Beck, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Although this account is partly true according to this dissertation findings, I found that most proliferation results from the autonomous regulation. Moreover, the identification of four categories of autonomous rules strengthens literature on organizational routines. Tools and procedurals as well as the local control regulation are more explicit than conventions and norms and alternative practices. Tools are essential to the enactment of rules and are a key phase in the formalization of autonomous rules. Theoretical contributions are elaborately developed in the following section.

These findings are significant for professionals aiming to improve governance, efficiency, and decision making. Shedding light on mechanisms allows decision-makers and organizational actors to better understand the organizational mechanisms at work in rulemaking and decision making. Professionals are therefore better equipped to identify underlying mechanisms that are sources of problems in rule application and rule proliferation. Appreciating the ongoing process of rule proliferation and its underlying organizational mechanisms makes professionals more adept at designing tools to organize work and to improve decision making processes.

Still, the ongoing process of rule proliferation remains an organizational phenomenon that can be fully grasped only by looking at the interplay of regulations at both control and autonomous levels.

### 7.2.3 The Organizational Process of Rule Proliferation

Although rule proliferation levels are found at the control and autonomous levels, organizational rule proliferation is a process by which the autonomous and control regulations interplay by fostering areas of ambiguities that require resolving. Rule proliferation emerges from the ongoing negotiation between autonomous and control regulation causing a need for recalibration of the meta-rule. Control regulation proliferation results in a need to adjust and adapt the autonomous regulation. Consequently, regulations must be observed as one interconnected system to generate valuable insights.

In the process of rule proliferation, there are organizational mechanisms that stimulate engines. Among them are pervasive rule proliferation mechanisms that prevail and result in systemic and recursive rule proliferation. The main organizational stimulus is organizational slack which accommodates collegiality and academic freedom. Organizational slack is comprised of other stimuli that accentuate rule proliferation: knowledge asymmetry, power asymmetry, resource distribution, uneven rule abundance, and ambiguity.

Areas of ambiguity contribute significantly to the proliferation of the meta-rule observed. Areas of ambiguity represent uncertainty and challenges in rule application and interpretation. Each rule proliferation level generates areas of ambiguity, and each area of ambiguity carries. Each rule proliferation level generates ambiguities susceptible to result in further rule proliferation. These ambiguities can exist at both levels: control and autonomous. Moreover, they can trigger proliferation at both levels. This proliferation therefore can have local reach and organizational reach.

There also exist context-specific mechanisms that stimulate or moderate local rule proliferation, hence generating variants in proliferation and how rules are applied from one setting to the next. To fully grasp how rules proliferate in departments, local characteristics must be explored considering their interrelationships with each other. Therefore, each property cannot in isolation be determinant of how rules proliferate in a given setting. The use of the rule in each department, their administrative structure, the nature of disciplinary pluralism, the size of the department as well as the availability of resources, are context-specific stimuli that help determine whether a context is likely to experience higher levels of rule proliferation. These stimuli are continuously being transformed by rule proliferation whether they are context-specific or organizational.

In light of the second research question, context-specific stimuli of rule proliferation such as the use of the rule in each department, their administrative structure, the nature of disciplinary pluralism, the size of the department as well as the availability of resources stimulate or moderate rule proliferation locally. Still, there are pervasive organizational stimuli that can be more prevalent in one context than another. For instance, a context might be more prone to have uneven rule abundance because of its administrative structures or power distribution, or it may be experiencing more organizational slack resulting from its size. Furthermore, the reach of rule proliferation recalibration further describes how rules evolve and proliferate differently from one context to another by defining levels of concern (context-specific or organizational) for areas of ambiguities.

By providing a detailed framework of rule proliferation mechanics, I enhanced the literature on the social regulation theory. This thesis's findings can only be generated through the mobilization of the social regulation theory, and this entails observing the ongoing negotiation between regulations. This ongoing negotiation nourishes rule proliferation. In addition, the effective regulation has been presented in the literature as an ongoing compromise between the control and autonomous regulations (De Terssac, 2003; J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989). I found that, empirically, this negotiated compromise is more closely associated with the autonomous regulation given that it is an enactment of this regulation.

Moreover, by exploring mechanisms of rule proliferation in a pluralistic organization, I also enriched the literature on pluralistic organizations. I enhanced this literature by portraying how rules serve as mechanisms of cohabitation, by enriching areas of ambiguity observed in pluralistic organizations, by providing rich insights on the nature of disciplinary pluralism, by describing the enactment of diffuse power characterizing pluralistic organizations, and by specifying how resources influence decision making in pluralistic organizations. Theoretical contributions are elaborately developed in the following section.

Learning about enhanced governance and managerial practices is crucial for university administrators and decision-makers in pluralistic organizations. The nature of universities as self-governed organizations makes them a particularly complex type of organization. Administrators must appreciate the influence (both positive and negative) of collegiality and academic freedom on managerial practices. Furthermore, decision making by committee and their uneven composition influence rule enactment, and more importantly have an incidence over uneven rule abundance. In addition, power asymmetry is strongly associated with the nurturing of asymmetry of organizational knowledge. Lastly, administrators must consider the allocation of resources as well as the effect of disciplinary pluralism on rule enactment and local decision making.

#### 7.2.4 Synthesis of Discussion

In this section, I discussed the results pertaining to the two main research questions identified for this doctoral dissertation: (1) describing how one organizational rule proliferates in a pluralistic setting, and (2) identifying whether there are context-specific characteristics that are likely to accentuate rule proliferation.

To answer the first question, I have defined the process of organizational rule proliferation. To achieve this, I developed a taxonomy of control rule proliferation and identified the types of autonomous rules enacted. Furthermore, I defined rule proliferation mechanisms that uncovered rule proliferation engines, one rule proliferation vector, and rule proliferation stimuli. This entailed



the understanding of autonomous rules as well as understanding how mechanisms of rule proliferation work in a systemic and recursive framework.

As a result, rule proliferation is a systemic and recursive process by which the autonomous and control regulations interplay by fostering areas of ambiguities that require resolving. This process is comprised of six levels of rule proliferation encompassing both the control and the autonomous levels. Two of these levels exist at the control regulation level, while four of them exist at the autonomous levels. Each level constantly evolves and transforms at each period of recalibration producing rule proliferation. This rule proliferation produces new areas of ambiguity or leaves unresolved (partly or completely) past areas of ambiguity.

By uncovering mechanisms of rule proliferation, I answered the second question set forth for the thesis by identifying context-specific characteristics likely to accentuate rule proliferation. I found that a set of elements influence local rule proliferation such as the use of the rule, the size of the department, the nature of disciplinary pluralism, the local administrative structures as well as the availability of resources. I noticed that the mere presence of one of these elements is not a fair indication of how rules could proliferate in the local context; these characteristics require to be observed as interconnected elements that can influence each other. For instance, a large department experiences more opportunities to use the rule as a smaller department. Furthermore, administrative structures in a small department differ from those in larger departments.

The following section positions the results of this thesis within the scope of current literature and presents theoretical contributions.


### 7.3 Theoretical Contributions

Throughout this work, I used Jennings et al. (2005)'s definition of rule proliferation (rule content complexification, rule changes, and rule additions) to illustrate the phenomenon in rich detail and understand how it unfolds through time. This study, therefore, contributes to four areas of literature

as illustrated by Figure 18: rule proliferation, pluralism, sociology of organizations, theory of organizations, and social regulation theory.

During this section, I position this thesis' findings within the landscape of current literature, and I develop theoretical contributions. The section is organized as follows. First, I review contributions that are specific to rule proliferation discussions. By doing this, I discuss contributions made to bureaucracy theory, neoinstitutional theory, organizational learning, and organizational routines. Second, I explore contributions made to the social regulation theory and I address the benefits and shortcomings of this theory as a theoretical framework. Third, I examine contributions made to the study of pluralism and pluralistic organizations. Fourth, I conclude with a short synthesis of contributions.

Figure 18. Contributions to Rule Proliferation Discussions



### 7.3.1 Rule Proliferation

Rules and rule proliferation were explored by scholars from diverse domains of research. Rule proliferation findings specific to this thesis contribute most specifically to four discussions: (1) **organizational learning**, (2) **organizational routines**, (3) **neoinstitutional theory**, and (4) **bureaucracy theory**. The latter three theories emerged from the sociology of organizations. Hence, because the theory of organizations is a subset of the sociology of organizations, rule proliferation contributions made to neoinstitutional theory, organizational routines, and bureaucracy theory advance to both domains.

*Bureaucracy Theory.* This dissertation contributes to bureaucracy theory because it provides a detailed account of the process by which a rule proliferates and its implications, it provides a taxonomy of organizational rule proliferation, a framework of rule proliferation mechanics, and it identifies contextual characteristics that are likely to accentuate rule proliferation. Bureaucratic rules are one of the key characteristics of the bureaucratic organization (Weber, 1968). More recently, Beck (2006) and Jennings et al. (2005) contributed to understanding rule growth and rule proliferation measures (Beck, 2006; Jennings et al., 2005). More specifically, Jennings et al. (2005) defined rule proliferation as the accumulation of rule changes, rule additions, and rule complexifications. Beck (2006) further found that the growth of internal formal rules is primarily observed in the increase of pages per rule rather than simply the number of rules. This appears to be in line with rule additions, rule changes, and the rule complexifications observed during this study that increase the scope and density of the rule.

To complement this research, I developed a taxonomy of control rule proliferation that helps understand the types of control rule proliferation elements as well as associated motives. Rule changes can have multiple motives such as modifying freedom of action, increasing understanding, improving efficiency, and adhering to institutional norms. They are experienced more frequently than rule additions which have more specific motives: modifying freedom of action, increasing understanding, and adhering to institutional norms. Still, rule changes are connected to rule additions within periods and across periods. Table 13 presents a summary of rule proliferation types with associated motives.

Table 13. Rule proliferation type with Associated Motive

	Modifying	Increasing	Improving	Adhering to	Modifying
	Freedom of action	Understanding	Efficiency	Institutional Norms	Future freedom of action
<b>Rule changes</b>	Margin Protocol Removal	Clarifications Rhetorical Structural Removal	Protocol Removal	Writing conventions	
<b>Rule additions</b>	Restriction Expansion	Precision		Institutional	
<b>Rule complexifications</b>	Dependencies Conditions				Work-in-progress complexification

Complexifications are connected to rule content as well as tensions between control regulation and autonomous regulation. As a result, many complexifications pertain to areas of ambiguity.

Nevertheless, not all changes, additions, or complexifications carry the same importance in terms of impact on organizational life. As such, rule proliferation elements that conveyed the most significance have been associated with the objectives of modifying freedom of action and improving the efficiency of the application. Furthermore, these elements have been associated with areas of rule ambiguity.

*Neoinstitutional Theory.* The continuous growth of rules in complex organizations and rule proliferation was suggested to be largely the result of institutional changes (Jennings et al., 2005; Schulz, 1998). Rules have been primarily studied by their control regulation, while this study sheds light on rule proliferation mechanisms at the autonomous level. Most importantly, it demonstrates that the autonomous regulation is the greatest rule proliferation engine. Most proliferation emerges from the operationalization of the control regulation by the autonomous regulation. The effective

regulation emerges from the autonomous regulation granted that at any given time many possible applications and interpretations are possible giving rise to variability in the application.

I have observed an institutional influence on rule proliferation in the form of environmental influences. For example, law changes and economic downturns influence the target class size and as such the number of courses made available for allocation. Environmental influences also take into account isomorphism which was observed during this study. Normative, coercive, and competitive isomorphism are present (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983).

Other influences indirectly drive rule proliferation such as organizational and individual. These influences provide contextual opportunities for rule proliferation. For example, emotions generating departmental conflicts can result in negotiation for rule changes. Yet, these influences can be described as indirect forces infusing organizational life and providing a setting for rule negotiation.

This study, therefore, shows that rule proliferation is primarily generated in clandestine regulations. It follows that only studying control rules misleads the observer in understanding the phenomenon in its entirety. Neoinstitutional theory suggests that rule proliferation is a result of institutional pressures and isomorphism (Jenning et al. 2005, Beck, 2006, Meyer 1979, Fennel 1980). Although institutional influences on rule proliferation were observed, they are not the primary influence. Rule proliferation results from organizational mechanisms; findings that were not identified in detail by previous studies that focused on the control regulation. In light of this analysis, rule proliferation appears to emerge mostly from the ongoing negotiation between autonomous and control regulation causing a need for recalibration of the meta-rule. This supports Bozeman, Reed & Scott, 1992, findings that red tape (administrative formalities) is intensified in personnel-related areas.

*Organizational Learning.* I found that rule complexifications are connected to rule additions and changes. Moreover, rule changes are interconnected with each other as well as across periods.

Hence, rule proliferation is a path-dependent decision making process, and rule proliferation elements are networked (Zhu & Schulz, 2019).

March et al. (2000) discussed rule families comprising categories of control rules (i.e., administrative rules, academic rules) as ecosystems of rules. I have found connections between elements of rule proliferation through periods. The meta-rule is a networked system in which elements are interrelated. It follows that elements of proliferation are also connected both during the same period and across periods.

I can now further specify that the meta-rule itself, as well as the control regulation, are networked systems as opposed to an ecosystem, since:

- They are networked elements dependent on one another.
- These networked elements are not evolving continuously as would be the case in an ecosystem but are evolving sporadically.
- The system's elements are passive and not active as required for a self-sustaining ecosystem.

I can now further specify that rule families and control regulations alone cannot be ecosystems, since they are not active in producing other rules, they are not continuously evolving, and they are not self-sustaining. The emergence of a self-sustaining, active, interdependent ecosystem of rules emerges with the control regulation's interdependence with the autonomous regulation combined with the effective regulation. Hence, the ecosystem of rules comprises three levels of regulation (J.-D. Reynaud, 1989) to be active and self-sustaining: control, autonomous and effective.

Furthermore, this study weakens organizational learning's rule definition as an encapsulation of knowledge. Organizational learning's premise is that rules are coded from experience and assumes that more experience leads to more intelligent behavior (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000). In light of this study, this definition appears incomplete. Control rules in a complex organization appear to emerge as a compromise achieved at a given time between competing interests and needs; they do

not reflect optimal organizational knowledge at the time of rule addition. Some control rules are negotiated to appease tensions rather than to fix a problem; as such they are a compromise and not a solution to a problem. Furthermore, autonomous rules, although they convey some organizational knowledge, do not always capture, and carry this knowledge. For instance, some alternative practices remain extremely implicit to stay outside of official channels, and intrinsically they are broadly unknown. Nevertheless, my findings support Zhou (1993)'s claim that rules are path-dependent, sensitive to agenda-setting, adapt to government constraints, and can be institutionalized.

*Organizational Routines.* Research on organizational routines has been instrumental in refining rule definitions. Over time questions have been raised as to whether rules were routines, or whether protocols were rules. Distinguishing between these constructs is challenging conceptually, methodologically, and empirically. The current study informs the field of organizational routines in better understanding distinctions between routines, rules, and protocols by looking at autonomous rules.

A prevalent view in organizational routines research is that rules are artifacts streamlining routines (D'Adderio, 2008; Feldman, 2015). As such, rules were presented as 'routine-in-theory' (Feldman, 2015). We saw that the development of procedurals serving as protocols is a type of autonomous rule stabilizing rule application. Consequently, forms of autonomous rules such as procedurals and protocols are both rules in clandestine form, and routines.

In a different view, Reynaud (2001) researched rules with an evolutionary lens and found that routines served as a complement to rules' incompleteness. Still, I have observed that the entire autonomous regulation, including routines but not routines exclusively, complements the control regulation by making it functional.

D'Adderio (2008) examined rules and other artifacts in the enactment of routines and found that technology integration can result in more efficient routine performance. The examination of the autonomous regulation revealed the fact that integration of technology and tools might generate more efficient routine performance, but also result in more stable rule application.

I found that the autonomous regulation has four broad categories of rules: conventions and norms, alternative practices, tools and procedurals, and local control regulation. Tools and procedurals as well as the local control regulation are more explicit than conventions and norms and alternative practices. Tools are vital to the enactment of rules and are a key phase in the formalization of autonomous rules.

Tools and procedurals help actors in departments gain stability in rule application and transfer procedures from one individual to the next. The presence of tools and documentation leads actors to assign more importance to autonomous rules.

### 7.3.2 Social Regulation Theory

Mobilizing the social regulation theory as a theoretical framework was fruitful. One of the key findings of this thesis is that the autonomous regulation is the primary engine of rule proliferation. I further defined the types of autonomous rules observed. Taskin & Gomez (2015) found that a reactive autonomous regulation emerged from expectations, conventions, and norms (Taskin & Gomez, 2015). I found that conventions and norms are part of the autonomous regulation. Moreover, I found other types of autonomous rules such as alternative practices, tools, and procedural as well as local control regulation.

Moreover, the ongoing negotiation between the control and autonomous regulation nourishes rule proliferation. Control rule proliferation is generated through administrative bodies.

Furthermore, as hypothesized by Jennings et al. (2005), higher rule usage appears to lead to more rule proliferation. I found that departments that used the rule more experienced higher levels of proliferation. A rule that is not being mobilized is less likely to proliferate as much. Mature rule use involves the evolution of norms and conventions, more tools, procedurals as well as local control regulations. Early use entails the emergence of conventions and norms, generally followed by alternative practices.



The effective regulation (or real regulation) has been presented in the literature as an ongoing compromise negotiated between the control and autonomous regulations. This means that the effective regulation becomes the regulation enacted at any given time (De Terssac, 2003; J.-D. Reynaud, 1988, 1989). Hence, there can exist as many representations as there are individuals, and the co-construction of these representations given the variety of constraints (e.g., rules, interdependence with other actors' tasks, available resources, or perceptions of resources available to complete their tasks), and this co-construction is ongoing since learning is continuous, and practices are evolving (Foudriat, 2016). Even if the effective regulation is a negotiated compromise between the autonomous and control regulations, I found that, empirically, this negotiated compromise is more closely associated with the autonomous regulation given that it is an enactment of this regulation.

There were several benefits and shortcomings of using the social regulation theory. The next two sections present the implications of using social regulation theory as a theoretical framework.

*Benefits.* All the above contributions are a direct result of mobilizing social regulation theory as a theoretical framework. This framework allowed us to unearth significant clandestine rule proliferation engines: the autonomous regulation and the effective regulation. In literature, clandestine rules are frequently referred to as informal rules, and both their nature and scope are misunderstood. Observing the phenomenon from a new angle sheds light on these clandestine (or informal) rules, how they emerge, collide and interplay with the control regulation. In addition, it generated an initial typology of autonomous rules.

Using this framework allowed seeing that administrative bodies are the displayed engine of proliferation, but not the primary one. We have observed that even though the control regulation (or formal rules) is more broadly studied and displayed than the autonomous regulation, it plays a more passive role in rule proliferation. Since the autonomous regulation operationalizes the control regulation, it plays a more active role in rule proliferation. Using this framework, therefore, allowed clarifying what is an ecosystem of rules.

In addition, using the sociology of organization was compatible with the empirical setting observed. Friedberg (1997) claims that, in organized collective action, actors are interdependent, but their reciprocal relationships are asymmetrical. This means that access to resources, information, other actors as well as power is uneven. Their access to objects and artifacts such as rules (these rules which will, in turn, define their problems and guide them in resolving them) is shifting and unequal (Friedberg, 1997). I complement this research by developing a framework of rule proliferation mechanisms. This framework describes the main rule proliferation engines (autonomous regulation, effective regulation, and administrative bodies) and main rule proliferation stimuli (organizational slack, knowledge asymmetry, power asymmetry, uneven resource distribution, ambiguity, and uneven rule abundance). Therefore, it solidifies the constructs of uneven fluctuating power and knowledge in organizations brought forth by Friedberg (1997).

Friedberg (1997) suggests that rule production is a source of power and problem-solving. He defines the organization as an organized collective action in which actors are interdependent with reciprocal but asymmetrical relationships. Foudriat (2016) suggests that rules are artifacts in the co-construction of organizational representations. Nevertheless, I found that forms of autonomous rules can be artifacts and routines.

As a result of this research, it is possible to reframe the former rule's perspective. The definition proposed is based on a collective action in which actors are interdependent with reciprocal but asymmetrical relationships (Friedberg, 1997). In this collective action, rules emerge from compromises of diverging needs and interests, as a co-construction of social parameters framing and guiding behavior.

*Shortcomings.* The social regulation theory works under a few underlying assumptions: social regulation emerges from collective action, actors in this collective action are boundedly rational and affective beings, the control and autonomous regulation can be conceptually dissociated, but cannot empirically be disconnected. This means that empirically, the social regulation theory requires the observation of all elements of the framework: actors, regulations, and interactions.

Although conceptually, the effective and autonomous regulation can more easily be dissociated; empirically the effective regulation is part of the autonomous regulation and is more difficult to isolate. The effective regulation represents the regulation that is applied at any given time. Therefore empirically, it is not only a compromise between the autonomous and control regulation at any given point in time as originally suggested in literature; in the field, but it is also the autonomous regulation presenting itself in a variety of shapes. As a result, it presents a considerable methodological challenge to analyze the effective regulation because it cannot be isolated from the autonomous regulation to which it belongs. Tackling the challenge more finely could represent a fruitful lead for future research.

### 7.3.3 Pluralistic Organizations

Pluralistic organizations are fertile grounds for the study of decision making and the proliferation of rules because heavy rules of control govern decision making processes. Furthermore, they host actors with divergent perspectives cohabit and collaborate. The literature suggests that rules serve as a mechanism allowing various groups to coexist peacefully. Pluralistic organizations are characterized by their acceptance of higher levels of ambiguity to accommodate a variety of needs and interests. Consequently, a sub-question of this thesis was whether pluralism impacts the difference in proliferation intensity.

This dissertation advances the conversation on pluralism and pluralistic organizations further, by (1) examining rules as mechanisms of cohabitation, (2) by enriching areas of ambiguity observed in pluralistic organizations, (3) by providing rich findings on the nature of disciplinary pluralism, (4) by further describing the enactment of diffuse power characterizing pluralistic organizations, and (5) by specifying how resources influence decision making in pluralistic organizations.

*Rules as mechanisms of cohabitation.* Rules not only allow the cohabitation of actors with diverging needs and interests, but they also proliferate in the presence of important organizational slack which is essential to university functioning. I have observed that control rule proliferation tends to expand the potential for variability in the effective regulation. The control regulation tends to be negotiated by very few people on behalf of many with competing interests and needs (Denis

et al., 2007, 2011). The negotiated outcome is therefore an imperfect compromise that can be unsatisfactory and interpreted differently in various settings. Because of this reality, control rules are designed to leave to malleability for local adaptation.

*Areas of ambiguity.* Strategic ambiguity was formulated and mobilized to describe a decision making phenomenon experienced in the context of indecision (Denis et al., 2011). It is defined as intentionally universal communication to unify or reconcile diverse needs and promote cohesion, and it is embedded in organizational practices to accommodate plural needs and interests that coexist (Denis et al., 2011; Abdallah & Langley, 2014). Cyert and March (1963) suggested that ambiguity of expectations contributes to the development of business policy and results from decisions in processes dominated by unexpected factors and driven by uncertainty. Actors who seek uncertainty avoidance will revise rules when such rules do not allow them to meet goals (Cyert & March, 1963). Crozier (1964) further adds that areas of ambiguity in organizational rules generate frustrations, and discomfort leading to inconsistencies. He suggests that knowledge asymmetry leads actors to resolve uncertainties by the creation of new rules. In this case, uncertainties are presented as situations in which one individual or groups of actors lack knowledge or resources to resolve a situation. In this thesis, we found areas of ambiguity to be associated with rule proliferation (Crozier, 1964; March & Simon, 1958). I used this construct to understand how areas of ambiguity in rule application generated rule proliferation by triggering an ongoing need for recalibration. This analysis led to the emergence of four areas of ambiguities in the meta-rule. I also defined ambiguity as a rule proliferation stimulus associated with organizational slack. Consequently, knowledge asymmetry (linked to uncertainty avoidance) is indeed a powerful rule proliferation stimulus, still the resolution of areas of ambiguity having multiple conflicting interpretations is pivotal to the rule proliferation process.

*Disciplinary pluralism.* Although many forms of pluralism were observed during this study (political, religious, cultural, disciplinary), disciplinary pluralism is the most prevalent and plays an important role in rule proliferation. Significant organizational slack is required to accommodate the great diversity of expertise and needs. For instance, departments can be unified by subject

matter, meaning everyone in the department is interested in the same subject, yet everyone is studying this subject with a different discipline and therefore a different methodology. Departments can be unified by their disciplines, but individuals can differentiate by their practice or the objects they use. Individuals can be unified or differentiated by being practice or theory-oriented. Departments also differentiate by favoring or requiring specific pedagogical or research settings.

This dissertation advances the importance of disciplinary pluralism in university and its impact on rule proliferation.

*Diffuse power.* Diffuse power characterizes pluralistic organizations that are governed by committee decision making processes (Denis et al., 2011). I found that access to administrative bodies privileges accessibility to information, decision making positions, power, and influence. Ph.D. students and lecturers represent a minority in administrative bodies and therefore often sit as observers limiting organizational knowledge and decision making opportunities. Consequently, this doctoral work complements past research by demonstrating how diffuse power nurtures knowledge and power asymmetry in pluralistic organizations and nourishes rule proliferation.

*Resources.* Denis et al. (2011) found that the promise of uncertain resource allocation impacted decision making process in a pluralistic setting (Denis et al., 2011). Uncertainty in resource allocation creates ambiguity in decision making. This dissertation revealed that uneven resource distribution stimulates local rule proliferation. Availability of resources in wealthier departments in which there is less competition for those resources generates fewer opportunities for rule proliferation.

#### 7.4 Synthesis of Contributions

This doctoral work explores many rule definitions. It further suggests the influence of pluralism on rule proliferation. Organizational learning defines rules as an encapsulation of knowledge,

routines perceive them as representational artifacts enabling routines and routines-as-theories, whereas bureaucracy theory describes them as limits to individuals' decision making. Friedberg (1997)'s perspective is that rules emerge from compromises of diverging needs and interests, as a co-construction of social parameters framing and guiding behavior. Each of these characterizations partly describes rules as they indeed contain and convey asymmetrical organizational knowledge, they are organizational representations guiding collective action, and they influence decision making by limiting and expanding freedom of action. I found that although rules do convey traces of organizational knowledge, rules are imperfect contextual representations of negotiated interests at a given time. Rules are imperfect given that they are a negotiated compromise between actors with diverging interests, embedded in a temporal and organizational context.

In light of this information, our contributions position our rule definition in line with the strategic actor theory perspective (Friedberg, 1997). Rules have been found to emerge from competing needs and diverging interests more than optimal organizational knowledge. The following chapter is a discussion that reflects on the results of this dissertation.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCERNS AND REFLECTIONS ON DISSERTATION RESULTS

#### 8.1 Introduction

The object of this thesis was to understand how rule proliferation unfolds and identify whether there are context-specific characteristics likely to accentuate rule proliferation. We understand the path-dependent nature of rule proliferation as a decision-making process and that rule proliferation elements are connected between them and across periods. We observed five rule proliferation levels encompassing the control and regulation levels. Rules are imperfect given that they are a negotiated compromise between actors with diverging interests, embedded in a given temporal and organizational context. Interestingly, most of the rule proliferation is generated organizationally through the enactment of the control regulation by the autonomous regulation. The variability in autonomous regulation is represented by the effective regulation.

There exist pervasive rule proliferation mechanisms that prevail and result in a systemic and recursive rule proliferation framework. Organizational slack is the key organizational stimulus that induces three rule proliferation engines: administrative bodies, the autonomous regulation, and the effective regulation. Moreover, two types of slack are specific to a university setting: academic freedom and collegiality. Some local characteristics stimulate or moderate these mechanisms generating variants in proliferation and how rules are applied from one setting to the next.

The use of a longitudinal embedded case study allowed to capture two different types of rule proliferation intensity. One type of intensity captured was temporal and the other type was

contextual. Periods 2 and 5 are productive in the number of rule changes and additions that restrict organizational slack, while periods 3 and 4 experience rule additions that expand organizational slack. Moreover, we know that Case 1, 2, and 5 experienced higher rule proliferation. Still, Case 3 has experienced more rule additions than rule changes showing that departments with less mature rule proliferation tend to experience more rule additions than rule changes. This shows that as rule use mature proliferation increases in density as described by Schulz (1998). This is interesting because it triggers a reflection on the importance of context both temporal and organizational for future research on rule proliferation.

The mobilization of the social regulation theory as a theoretical framework resulted in rich and surprising findings. I not only uncovered mechanisms of rule proliferation across control and autonomous levels, but I also learned about rules as historical artifacts, ethics, and the roles of actors in rule enactment. In addition, I revealed thought-provoking contradictions of university administration that could nourish future research on academia.

#### 8.1.1 Rules as a historical artifact

First, I learned that rules are artifacts that convey historical contextual data. Although rules do convey traces of organizational knowledge, they are imperfect contextual representations of negotiated interests at a given time. Their imperfect nature conveys ambiguity and requires continuous negotiation between the autonomous and control regulations. Therefore, these areas of ambiguity nourish the process of rule proliferation.

In time, rules can appear disconnected from their context because they were developed in other temporal circumstances. But they can also seem disconnected because the historical context in which they were negotiated must be known and appreciated to understand their initial intent. For instance, many actors who had been enacting *clause-reserve* for decades knew implicitly the spirit in which this meta-rule was initially negotiated because they were present at the time of negotiations. When new actors with no historical knowledge joined the organization within the



last decade, their interpretation of the rule differed from that initially intended. Actors, therefore, had to rethink and renegotiate their current understanding of the rule in a new temporal context.

The evolution of actors and their perspectives can influence the way they perceive the evolution of these rules as well as their legitimacy. For instance, a provision for maternity leave was added in the 1990s. Of course, if we look at this addition from a contemporary perspective, it appears logical and undebatable. Still, if we glance at it from initial temporal context, it teaches us about the social context at the time. Another example is the presence of lecturers on committees and in departmental assemblies in the contemporary period, which although it is still unevenly accepted across departments, is now part of the control regulation. By looking at how the place of lecturers evolved in university, we can see that this negotiated rule is an incredible advancement in inclusion. Therefore, some ideas that are perceived as normal nowadays, were perceived as arguable a few decades ago. Conversely, it is possible that a few decades into the future, we find some of our current rules questionable or even inconceivable. I found rules as a historical artifact to be a fascinating sociological lens to studying evolving perceptions and practices.

#### 8.1.2 Ethics in rule enactment

Second, I also learned about ethics in rule enactment. My journey showed me that there is an actual difference between “doing things by the book” and “doing things right”. Two main issues arose from this observation. The first one relates to the variability in behavior and the second one relates to the integrity of behavior. In terms of the variability in behavior, organizational slack in a university provides a wide maneuvering space to “do things by the book” in your own way. Given the variability in rule enactment, there are many versions of “by-the-book”. For instance, two Ph.D. students from different departments require to find their own right way to apply and conform to the *clause-reserve* rule in their specific units and with their specific thesis director. There is no one way to enact the meta-rule.

In terms of the integrity of behavior, the emergence of alternative practices has shown that one rule can be acceptable for one group of actors while being perceived morally questionable by other

groups of actors. For instance, some professors have used the *clause-reserve* rule to prevent lecturers from accessing specific courses. This practice is sufficiently common for Teaching Personnel Services to be aware of it, but implicit enough that it is very difficult to detect. It is sufficiently common for some respondents from three departments to have discussed it, but implicit enough that respondents present unease discussing it. It is a practice that is perceived unethical by lecturers because professors are using a shortcut to bypass the formal performance evaluation system and take away from lecturers' livelihood. This practice is not communicated openly because it could be considered ethically questionable and generate grievances if known. Other similar practices include not inviting elected lecturer representatives to departmental assembly or asking them to step out for portions of the assembly.

In addition to alternative practices, many respondents shared perceptions that there appear to be certain types of people who inherently behave as though rules are only for others, there are types of people who behave as though rules can sometimes be bent for the right reasons, and there are types of people who will not try to bypass any type of rules. It follows what Crozier (1964) described as organizational paralysis caused by excessive regulation which led a minority of actors enjoying more power whether it is outside or inside of the regulatory framework (Crozier, 1964). Accordingly, uneven rule abidance is an important stimulus of rule proliferation during this study.

Because slack is important in a university setting, it leaves room for uneven rule application and abidance. This showed to have both advantages and disadvantages. For instance, someone can attempt to manipulate a rule for what they consider a rightful cause. Conversely, slack can also be used for a wrongful cause. Sometimes the line between rightful and wrongful is difficult to determine. For instance, the director in charge of administering *clause-reserve* for Case 5 decided, upon reception of Ph. D. students' applications, to stop the hiring process, change the rule, and then restart the process. This decision appeared unfair to the applicants because they did everything "by the book" and submitted their applications in time. But this process also seemed fair to other students who, semester after semester, could not apply because of what they perceived was an unfair course offering for *clause-reserve* that consistently favored the same Ph.D. students. This

line of questioning can be the subject of future research and possibly bring fruitful insight in terms of ethical decisions in rule enactment.

#### 8.1.3 The roles of actors in rule enactment

Third, this thesis also provided insights into the roles of actors in rule enactment. Different groups of actors adopt different roles. This is a fascinating, yet not surprising, observation in the context of a pluralistic organization. In departments, there appear to be gatekeepers of slack. These actors attempt to protect individual and departmental slack in order to maintain maneuvering space in rule enactment and decision making. Nevertheless, there are gatekeepers of constancy who attempt to instill a sense of stability and certainty. These actors tend to design procedurals and tools to guide other actors in applying rules in the same manner and the same order. Consequently, as the rule use reaches more maturity, the rule application will be less variable. Still, this variability greatly depends on the interplay between the gatekeepers of the slack and the gatekeepers of constancy.

#### 8.1.4 Contradictions of academic administration

Fourth, I unearthed two contradictions of academic administration: knowledge and inclusiveness. The contradiction of knowledge considers universities as knowledge-based organizations whose primary mission is the advancement and transmission of knowledge. The contradiction exists in how significant knowledge asymmetry is experienced and nurtured within the university context. Experts in knowledge advancement and transmission often rely on unverified data and departmental narratives for rule enactment and decision making.

The contradiction of inclusiveness considers universities as pluralistic organizations characterized by diffuse power and committee decision making. This structure is meant to foster equity and democracy so that the wide variety of individuals encompassing all departments have a voice and are represented in administrative bodies. This system, however, results in many groups of actors perceiving injustices and feeling excluded. Some professors have limited control over administrative issues and negotiation of the collective agreement. Nevertheless, they need to abide

by these agreements that are negotiated on their behalf. Lecturers are underrepresented in administrative bodies. Their precarious status leaves some of them feeling sentiments of uncertainty, anxiety, unappreciated, and sometimes unmotivated. Experienced lecturers feel cheated that some of their courses, their livelihood is being taken away with no prior notice, and attributed to individuals with little competence (Ph.D. students). Furthermore, it has been informally known that some professors have used this rule to eliminate lecturers without due process.

Ph.D. students feel their own form of unfairness and they are typically underfinanced. They feel that no one informs them of their possibilities; they move forward blindly and, they have a perception that rules are applied asymmetrically. Moreover, Ph.D. students who become lecturers under *clause-reserve* are represented by the union of lecturers which appears to them as a conflict of interests.

In addition to developing two research questions, this thesis exposes areas of interest for future research. In conclusion, I will summarize the dissertation's main achievements, and present managerial implications and implications for the future of research.

## CONCLUSION

This dissertation's objectives were twofold. It was first to understand and describe how rule proliferation unfolds in a pluralistic organization. It was also to assess whether characteristics specific to contexts accentuate rule proliferation. As such, contributions pertain primarily to the understanding of rule proliferation by developing a taxonomy and the comprehension of rule proliferation mechanisms. Moreover, these contributions were made possible by mobilizing the social regulation theory as a theoretical framework that gives a unique outlook at clandestine rulemaking. Investigating rule proliferation at the autonomous level is crucial to recognizing the phenomenon's full scope. Furthermore, using a pluralistic organization as an empirical setting informed on organizational slack which is an important stimulus of rule proliferation necessary to accommodate disciplinary pluralism.

Rules proliferation was suggested to result from institutional pressures and isomorphism (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Jennings et al., 2005; Schulz, 1998). We observed that environmental influences are only indirect influences making a context auspicious to rule proliferation. Moreover, rules were suggested by organizational learning scholars (Schulz, Zhou, and March, 2000) to be an encapsulation of organizational knowledge. We have seen through this case that rules can also hinder organizational learning. This means that a rule designed with an intended purpose to resolve organizational tensions between groups of actors is a tool that can appease these tensions and will require adjustment; it is not an optimal solution that captures adequate organizational knowledge, it is a compromise. Original tensions remain and with time, organizational learning gained during the original period will fade due to the failure to capture optimal information. Consequently, the continuous resolution of areas of ambiguities results in the ongoing recalibration process of organizational rule proliferation.

The first case objective was to trace the rule's life from its inception to 2019. The second case objective was to determine whether there existed local conditions that intensify rule proliferation. The third objective was to develop the construct of rule proliferation by understanding how it unfolds through time by identifying causes and its evolution. Fourth, this study aimed at guiding on how to use rules efficiently for decision making. Consequently, and based on the success criteria identified for this study, this dissertation exceeds case objectives.

## 9.1 Implications of the Future of Research

Future research on rule proliferation, pluralistic settings, or academic environment is appealing. The autonomous regulation as a main engine of regulation was a fascinating discovery of this thesis and deserves further investigation. Furthermore, it would be important to methodologically revisit the isolation of the effective regulation from the autonomous regulation. Other interesting leads for the future include ethical and immoral rules. It was interesting to see an emergent pattern of alternative practices. I find fascinating the acceptance of questionable practices as an autonomous rule and the subject deserves further studying.

From a neoinstitutionalism point of view, I found that there are forms of isomorphism influencing rule proliferation. University financing is a particular challenge brought up throughout this study. Consequently, the prospect of exploring coercive isomorphism concerning public university financing is appealing. In addition to the above, exploring the contradictions of university administration about knowledge and inclusiveness are interesting leads for future research.

Hardy (1991) highlighted the predominance of collegiality derived from the decentralization of power to faculty members based on competence rather than positions (Hardy, 1991). Four subtypes of professional bureaucracies were identified: the collegial, the political, the anarchic, and the rational-analytical. Based on this study and the case examined, I found that the collegial type requires the mobilization of uneven and fluctuating power (political forces) to a high degree, therefore I find challenging to empirically dissociate the political and collegial subtypes.

Accordingly, future research in university settings should explore collegiality and power mobilization.

This study was confronted with many definitions and perceptions of pluralism across university settings. Types of pluralism encountered during interviews include religious, cultural, political, and disciplinary. A deeper investigation into disciplinary pluralism in universities and other pluralistic organizations would shed light on how the phenomenon evolves within pluralistic organizations.

## 9.2 Managerial Implications

Important practical and managerial implications derive from this doctoral work. Management practitioners should retain that most rule proliferation emerges from the autonomous regulation, therefore the application and adaption of the control regulation. It is therefore important to use tools and procedurals whenever possible. D'Adderio (2008) had found that in fact technology played a role in stabilizing the enactment of routines. The use of technology in rule application therefore could be favored.

Management practitioners should question the motives behind rule change, addition, or complexification to assess the potential impact on the organization and evaluate whether it is in fact, rulemaking is the right approach. We observed over the course of the study very few rule removal. Management should ask whether rule removal could be beneficial if this rule removal is connected to other rules, and if this removal will involve further proliferation. I have found that practitioners must be informed about the potential influence of slack, but more importantly how rule proliferation can exacerbate or alleviate potential variability in the effective regulation. This analysis will enable administrators to use elements of rule proliferation more cautiously. For instance, outbound complexifications appear to lead to the emergence of more complexification. Moreover, it is important to identify areas of ambiguity more carefully in order to address them

more directly and more accurately. This may assist negotiating party when identifying underlying issues rather than organizational problems arising from such issues.

In conclusion, the study of rule proliferation and the contributions of this dissertation have important implications for the way we administer organizations and what we expect from our organizations. It shows clear distinctions between doing things right and doing things by the book. Actors in organizations must rethink the quality of regulations in order to optimize management practices.

We observed that using common knowledge and unverified information can result in unintentional rule proliferation. Breaking this complexification pattern by shedding light on this phenomenon and elucidating the rule proliferation process is an important step in reducing rule proliferation, enhancing rulemaking, and improving organizational decision making.



## APPENDIX A

### ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES

## 10.1 Tables

Table A1. Compilation of Rule Changes per Period

RULE CHANGES	Margin	Protocol	Clarification	Rhetorical	Structural	Writing convention	Removals
<b>Period 2 (1980-1989)</b>							
The quota of reserve from 10% to 8%	X						
The option of hiring a company was removed	X						X
Student accessibility to the reserve was reduced from one course per semester to one per year	X						
The meta rule now expanded into a greater section divided into an intro of course attribution					x		
The meta-rule assigns decision power to departmental assembly;			X				
There is a structure change in the meta-rule which now brings course posting under a different sub-topic and the meta-rule “reserve-clause” under another sub-topic;					x		
There is a change of wording from “hire a lecturer of reputation” to “hire a person of reputation”				x			
<b>Period 3 (1990-1999)</b>							
Feminization of rule text						x	
10.01 assigns decision power more directly on departmental assembly			X				
Addition of professional experience as a qualification for external experts			X				
<b>Period 4 (2000-2008)</b>							
Order change in article 10.4					x		
Phrasing change from « salaried » to « lecturer » in 10.5				x			
Contradiction in 10.4 stipulating that individuals can only benefit from meta-rule once is removed			X				X
Change in course load limit for external experts (2 per semester)	X						
Change in course load limit for students (1 per year for master students; 2 per year for doctoral students and postdocs)	X						
<b>Period 5 (2009-2019)</b>							
Integration of ACCENT software in rule application		X					

Removal of outbound dependency indicating that lecturers teaching under the meta-rule are to abide by all collective agreement except, article 8			x				X
10.03 article integrate information protocol through ACCENT		x					
ACCENT was removed from article 10.02							X
University-wide percent allowance was reduced from 8% to 6.5%	X						
Teaching equivalence requirements (EQE) were removed for students and external experts	X						X
Removal of reference to letter 301		X					X
Addition of acronym SETUE			X				
Addition of acronym AFPC <sup>18</sup>			X				
Removal of postdoctoral fellows	X						X

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<sup>18</sup> **AFPC** : Alliance de la fonction publique du Canada – Public Service Alliance of Canada

Table A2. Compilation of Rule Additions per Period

<b>RULE ADDITIONS</b>	Restriction	Precision	Expansion	Institutional
<b>Period 2 (1980-1989)</b>				
Lecturer cannot use the meta-rule to access course loads	x			
Added precision at the beginning of course attribution meta-rule		x		
Added the possibility to hire university managers			x	
<b>Period 3 (1990-1999)</b>				
Inclusion of post doctoral fellows with students registered in advanced studies			x	
<b>Period 4 (2000-2008)</b>				
Language teachers are integrated with professors' collective agreement;			x	
<b>Period 5 (2009-2019)</b>				
Increased power from without (teaching staff service)		x		
Addition of maternity leave for people under clause-réserve				x

Table A3. Compilation of Rule Complexifications per Period

RULE COMPLEXIFICATIONS	Dependencies			Conditions	Work-in-progress
	Outbound restriction	Inbound restriction	Inbound expansion	Conditions	Outbound WIP
<b>Period 2 (1980-1989)</b>					
Letter of agreement 2 is signed with regards to the meta-rule to define qualifications of retired professors	x				
Added a dependency stating that people using this meta-rule must abide by collective agreement except for article 8 which is for earning points of seniority.	x				
Added a dependency stating that students and university managers have a limit 2 courses per semester; and retired professors a maximum of 1 per semester		x			
Added application terms that relies on course posting that indicates that posting must start 75 days notice prior to beginning of semester		x			
Added a dependency indicating that people hired under 9.02 can only be hired once then they fall under the collective agreement		x			
Added a contingency in the form of an additional 4% specific to university managers and people of reputation		x			
Added a condition for retired professors indicating that this group can access a maximum of 10 courses for Fall and Winter semesters for all university		x			
Added a contingency that people of reputation, university managers and retired profs cannot exceed 4%;		x			
Added a condition that an employee under the lecturers' collective agreement cannot benefit from the meta-rule				x	
There was a committee created to discuss course attribution and specifically, course attribution for postdoctoral fellows.					x
<b>Period 3 (1990-1999)</b>					
New contingences capping number of courses per semester per type of individuals		x			
Letter of agreement on the formation of a committee exploring teaching possibilities for students					x
<b>Period 4 (2000-2008)</b>					
Letter 301 on application of article 10. 04	x				
Addition of new student contingences : a cap of 6 years for doctoral students and 4 years for master students		x			
Change to hiring cap for external experts to three times maximum		x			
Doctoral students can now give two courses per year, with some exceptions, without exceeding 6 credits			x		
Addition of the condition stipulating that teaching does not hinder progress of studies				x	
<b>Period 5 (2009-2019)</b>					
Addition of a new requirement for student stipulating that they need to be monitored by a professor				x	

Article indicating that lecturers teaching under the meta-rule are to abide by a list of articles in the collective agreement	x				
Be enrolled in the 2nd cycle and have successfully completed four (4) terms of his program if he is hired to teach a course for which the qualification requirement for teaching is the master's		x			
Be enrolled in the third (3rd) cycle and have completed one (1) trimester, if she is hired to teach a course for which the qualification requirement for teaching is a doctorate or doctoral education		x			

Table A4. Emergent Categories of Autonomous Rules

Autonomous Regulation	First order codes	Examples of citations	Aggregated Concepts
	<b>Effective Regulation</b> (Variability)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Absolutely, let's say that in the idea that the professor for 10 years always orders the same course and always gave it during the 10 years to his lecturer) to his student, who became a lecturer ah, if we limit the fact that students can only teach one course during their doctorate, well this is no longer possible. 113:19 (Case 5)</li> <li>...To take the rule after, the regulation after I am ready to do it but (uh) with freedom of interpretation (laughs). You are in the presence of a man (uh) who (uh) I am not gaga but I am rebellious and to be able to push limits of rebellion, I will interpret freely. 107:4 (Case 4)</li> <li>At the same time, there are students who are there without knowing that they are interested, so it is not easy for them to go around. Sometimes they send emails and stuff, but they don't really know how to go about applying, and basically, it's kind of obscure. 45:67 (Case 1)</li> </ul>	Alternative Practices
	<b>Autonomous Rules</b> (Implicit)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>...but what I've seen is that the students who need it have become lecturers. 102:56 ... But (Director)... she was the research director of a student who later became a lecturer. I think it also helps when you're a doctoral student research director. Since you already know his research, you know how the person works, you try to encourage him to persevere... 102:58 (Case 3)</li> <li>On the other hand, as a lecturer, well obviously some departments, not all (uh) but some departments abuse it, and in our collective agreement it's limited, I don't know how much but let's say around 7 or 8% or maybe even 6 comma something. But it's more the spirit than the letter that matters to me here, but that's (uh) agreed upon at the entire university level. 97:30 (Case 5)</li> </ul>	Conventions and Norms
	<b>Application Terms</b> Details on how operationalize	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>And another time, she let the dates go, because the dates that students can choose the reserve clause courses is like four days from 8 to 8:22.45:77 (Case 1)</li> <li>In this case it was more at the level of interpretation, not so much of the rule itself because the academic regulation is written in a rather general way. So it wasn't so much the rule, but the application policy that was changed. 99:43 (Case 3)</li> <li>Yes, I'll leave it with you. We ask the doctoral student, in fact the doctoral student, to complete the form with the signature of his or her thesis director, the signature of the program director, the course coordinator and finally the department chair. But I'll print one out for you. 95:21 (Case 2)</li> </ul>	
	<b>Sociomaterial Ensemble</b> Artefacts and contextual data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I organize the work. I have created a set of procedures that I am adding to little by little. It's constantly evolving. I also have related tasks such as taking care of the intranet where information is shared between lecturers, professors and staff. 121:13 (Case 3)</li> <li>It's pretty informal... I think it's.... Honestly, it's more the paper itself, for me it's just the finality, but there's the negotiation, there's the discussion to be had with those people to make sure that the teaching of that course is done in an appropriate way. As I know, it's more common sense to say I'm going to go talk to these people to see if there's an interest to see if it's possible before finalizing it with a... with a document. 59:32 (Case 1)</li> <li>Well... there were rules, it depends, there are procedures like reserve clauses, it's adopted at the assembly after the other procedures () for students who are entitled to (), it's little things like that 66:2 (Case 1)</li> </ul>	Tools and Procedurals
	<b>Control Regulation</b> Rules and policies formalized at departmental assembly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In fact, it's a possibility for doctoral students to have a teaching experience...in a reserve clause and then it's a uh..., in fact it's a... it's a set of rules and then included in a departmental policy. In fact, you have no influence whatsoever. In fact you expect others to decide for you and then uh.... for example the fact that...uh... when you want to apply for your EQEs, well...) all the years that you have taught as a reserve clause are not recognized. 67:17 (Case 1)</li> <li>... Or we voted for a rule so that the introductory courses... the TOPIC1000... as far as possible that this is not given neither by lecturers nor by doctoral students so... by professors... 113:3 (Case 5)</li> </ul>	Local Control Regulation

Table A5. Summary of Context-Specific Stimuli

Local Context Stimuli	Cases	Local Characteristics	Rule Proliferation Level	Evidence
Use of rule	Org Studies; Business; Public Policy	High use	High proliferation	Large departments with many actors, disciplines, and courses, and many opportunities for negotiations resulting in rule proliferation.
	Science	Moderate use	Moderate proliferation	Moderately large department with many actors, expertise and courses, and some opportunities for negotiations resulting in rule proliferation.
	Fine Arts; Human Sciences	Limited use	Low proliferation	Small department with fewer actors and fewer opportunities for negotiations resulting in rule proliferation.
Local Administrative structure	Fine Arts	Centralized Doctoral Administration	Low proliferation	Centralized doctoral administration that limits rule knowledge dissemination and rule application.
	Public Policy	Program committee in charge of rule application	High proliferation	Department with typical administration; the doctoral program committee oversees the application process for <i>clause-reserve</i> .
	Org Studies; Business;	Typical departmental administration	High proliferation	Department with typical administration in which the departmental assembly and executive committee oversees the application process for <i>clause-reserve</i> .
	Science	Typical departmental administration	Moderate proliferation	Department with typical administration in which the departmental assembly and executive committee oversees the application process for <i>clause-reserve</i> .
	Human Sciences	Typical departmental administration	Low proliferation	Department with typical administration in which the departmental assembly and executive committee oversees the application process for <i>clause-reserve</i> .
Size of department	Org Studies; Business; Public Policy	Large	High proliferation	Large departments with many actors, disciplines, and courses, and many opportunities for negotiations resulting in rule proliferation.
	Science	Moderately large	Moderate proliferation	Moderately large department with many actors, expertise and courses, and some opportunities for negotiations resulting in rule proliferation.
	Fine Arts; Human Sciences	Small	Low proliferation	Small department with fewer actors and fewer opportunities for negotiations resulting in rule proliferation.
Nature of disciplinary pluralism	Science	Unified by discipline; a wide array of practices, tools, and expertise	Moderate proliferation	High disciplinary pluralism with specific material requirements.
	Fine Arts	Unified by discipline; a wide array of	Low proliferation	High disciplinary pluralism with specific material requirements.

		practices, tools, and expertise		
	Org Studies	Unified by field; a wide array of disciplines and epistemologies	High proliferation	High disciplinary pluralism within the context of a large department; diverging interests and needs collide resulting in more frequent occurrences of rule proliferation.
	Human Sciences	Unified by subject matter; a wide array of fields; disciplines; expertise and methodologies	Low proliferation	High disciplinary pluralism requires delicate and tactful departmental communication and management. Department possesses a history of conflict related to disciplinary pluralism; current actors appear to wish to avoid repeating history by accommodating and respecting these differences. The small department size appears to appease management challenges.
	Business	Unified by field; a limited array of expertise	High proliferation	Disciplinary pluralism does not generate sufficient evidence to indicate an influence on rule proliferation.
	Public Policy	Unified by field; polarity between disciplines within the department	High proliferation	Tensions between disciplines and uneven resource allocation between disciplines result in more occurrences for rule proliferation.
Availability of resources	Science	High resource availability	Moderate proliferation	High resource availability moderates opportunities for negotiation resulting in rule proliferation.
	Public Policy	Unevenly distributed available resources	High proliferation	Resources are unevenly distributed depending on research groups.
	Fine Arts	Unevenly distributed available resources	Low proliferation	Lecturers compete for resources.
	Org Studies, Business	Competition for resources	High proliferation	Lecturers and students compete for resources.
	Human Sciences	Competition for resources	Low proliferation	Lecturers and students compete for resources.



## 10.2 Figures

Figure A1. Rule Changes over Five Periods




Figure A2. Rule Additions over Five Periods




Figure A3. Rule Complexifications over Five Periods

Period 1. 1968-79	Period 2. 1980-89	Period 3. 1990-99	Period 4. 2000-08	Period 5. 2009-19
<b>Control Regulation (CR)</b>				
<div><div><div><div><div>Legend:</div><div>△ Rule change</div><div>○ Rule addition</div><div>□ Rule complexification</div></div><div><b>Bold:</b> relation to initial ambiguity areas</div></div></div><div>Slack</div></div>	<div><div>□</div><div>• Application terms: course posting indicates that posting must start 75 days notice before semester</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Dependency: people hired under 9.02 can only be hired once then they fall under the collective agreement</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Dependency to another article stipulating that an additional 4% specific to university managers and people of reputation</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Condition that an employee under the lecturers' collective agreement cannot benefit from the meta-rule</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Dependency: people hired under 9.02 can only be hired once then they fall under the collective agreement</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Condition : retired professors indicating that this group can access a maximum of 10 courses for Fall and Winter semesters</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Dependency indicating that people of reputation, university managers, retired profs cannot exceed 4%;</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Dependency: students and university managers have a limit 2 courses per semester; and retired professors a maximum of 1 per semester</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Dependency: people using this meta-rule must abide by collective agreement except for article 8 which is for earning points of seniority</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Committee created to discuss course attribution and specifically, course attribution for post-doctoral interns.</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Letter of agreement 2 is signed with regards to the meta-rule to define qualifications of retired professors</div></div>	<div><div>□</div><div>• New contingences capping number of courses per semester per type of individuals</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Letter of agreement on the formation of a committee exploring teaching possibilities for students</div></div>	<div><div>□</div><div>• Letter 301 on application of article 10. 04</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Addition of new student dependency : a cap of 6 years for doctoral students and 4 years for master students</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Addition of the condition stipulating that teaching does not hinder progress of studies</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Doctoral students can now give two courses per year, with some exceptions, without exceeding 6 credits</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Change to hiring cap for external experts to three times maximum</div></div>	<div><div>□</div><div>• Addition of a new requirement for student stipulating that they need to be monitored by a professor</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Be enrolled in the 2nd cycle and have successfully completed four (4) terms of his program if he is hired to teach a course for which the qualification requirement for teaching is the master's</div></div> <div><div>□</div><div>• Be enrolled in the third (3rd) cycle and have completed one (1) trimester, if she is hired to teach a course for which the qualification requirement for teaching is a doctorate or doctoral education</div></div>
<b>Autonomous Regulation (AR)</b>				

Figure A4. Rule Proliferation per Department




Figure A5. Sankey Diagrams of Context-Specific Mechanisms




Figure A6. Sankey Diagram of Rule Proliferation Mechanics illustrating Organizational Stimuli





Figure A7. Diagram of Rule Proliferation Mechanics with Focus on Influences



## APPENDIX B

### COMPLEMENTARY CITATION TABLES

#### 11.1 Citation Tables

Table A6. Organizational Slack

<b>Organizational Slack</b>
<p>So (uh ...) we are ... certain ... we can have rules that we tried to make as broad as possible because the more precise a rule is the more constraint there is, and therefore (uh ...) in the name certain principles such as academic freedom, we will arrange for there to be no binding rules. 110:88 (Professor Administrator)</p>
<p>It's like a policeman. A policeman won't stop you at 106 km / h on the highway, because he knows your feet aren't accurate, he knows your speedometer isn't accurate. He understands that there is a small descent that made you accelerate from 100 to 106. He is an intelligent policeman, he will not give you tickets at 106. But, he will give it to you at 125. It's judgment too. The rule is there to parameter an activity. 65:56 (Professor Administrator)</p>
<p>no matter what was written, it could be dealt with, someone says, "Me, I'm being told that the wall is white". You have a rule that says the walls are black, all the walls are black, we know they are black, but if you don't like it that the walls are black, you want them to be white there. So that, you don't try to come out, "Well, I don't interpret it that way." But the rule is very clear there, is that the don't like the rule ... and the problem is, there aren't a lot of people fighting to protect the rules. There is certain cowardice at university. And it's a lot easier not to fight, and to let people say "well, that's right, look we could interpret it like that." No no no, look, there is no way to interpret it like that. The rules are very clear, it says you can teach according to your doctrine. Your doctrine is your beliefs-communist, uhh liberalist, neo-liberal, libertarianism, whatever you can invent, that's okay. But you don't have the right, for example, not to teach subjects because you don't believe in it. Because it is in the process of bypassing the whole</p>



function of the university. Because when we create programs, ask for opinions, refine the program and all its content, not so that after that the professor says: "well, I don't feel like teaching it, is my academic freedom ". It doesn't make sense. 65: 79 (Professor Administrator)

### **Collegiality**

I don't feel like I'm in a college at UQAM, I don't feel like I'm in a college, in a university, I was hired based on knowledge or skills (um) in my field I'm recognized as an expert in 20th century FINE ART, my colleagues are as well. We all have expertise, so collegiality is working as a community, that I understood, but when we are asked to evaluate each other, peer evaluation and then evaluation by internal committees, it's not easy, collegiality is heavy, for example. At some point, we have to make authoritative decisions, so collegiality takes a backseat and collegiality and what is also disturbing in collegiality is that colleagues will rely on collegiality but to do nothing. either collegial so take charge of this task or that task and then we realize that there are colleagues who do not do anything or who do not do much, for example, in the service to the community, this is quite a problem at UQAM. I'm experiencing it here in the department, we've been through a lot and at one point we decided to make decisions and then we decided that in the distribution of committees, for example, we were in favor of imposing committees on certain professors who didn't have enough. 98:60 (Professor)

It's at five-year evaluation that we're going to blame them, but that's where I tell you that collegiality can have some pretty serious limits, right? So I like this term, I also find it beautiful in theory, but in practice, it doesn't always apply to this famous collegiality, so that's where I find that at UQAM there are some words that are a little bit out of place, there are words that we find like that and then that... we have to question it more and then we have to, we see that in writing it's very idealized... especially in the collective agreement, but after that in the application it's much more complex, we're in a situation that's much more demanding, so; that's an example, and then it touches the regulations in the background because the regulations mean that we, the professors, have to (uh) obviously (uh) give the tasks, right? We have to assign the tasks ourselves. Sorry, I meant to say allocate. So we have to divide the tasks ourselves, both teaching and community service. 98:64 (Professor)

No, apart from the (uh) I think a big problem in the department is that this is the (uh) the history of why it's such a big deal why people are a little, a little sensitive about this rule is because one of our colleagues who's retired now, for years was taking his course out at the very last moment. As I told you, so that it was his student who gave it by going through the withdrawal of posting, and then this person became a lecturer and had the EQEs on this course that he gave as a doctoral student. And that, that was really) we felt that it was really an attack on collegiality insofar as the professor knew full well that he never gave his full load because he had a Chair, a deferment, and nanana, every year he put in this X course, and every year he discharged himself a few days before the beginning of the session to give it to his student and that created a lot of, uh resentment on the part of other colleagues who would have liked to give that course. 113:60 (Professor)

Not that I know of, I think the only thing that, what I heard was that yes publicly) well at the departmental meeting, it was said several times that you couldn't take it out of your syllabus at the last minute to give it to one of these students that it was a breach of collegiality that you can't behave like that na na na na na na, so that was said and it was clearly targeted against the person who was doing it, but the person who was doing it continued to do it because they didn't care 113:119 (Professor)

I think ultimately you have to work not just for yourself, you have to work for the university, you have to believe in what you are doing, when you are a member of an organization you have to believe in that organization. But if this organization has made a choice to bring someone else, it's up to me to respect it, and if I ever get angry, I won't participate, if I get angry, I'm excluded from the collegiality. And I chose to be in the collegiality with him. Because he took some of my course notes, I participated in the development of the intra exam, the final exam, the course outline. So instead of having something imposed on me, a course for example, well, I contributed to doing it, and then I was able to do what I've been doing all along, let's say for a decade, and then to be able to pass it like that. I've been a winner in the end more than...70:86 (Lecturer)

### **Academic Freedom**

But the least reachable are the professors because we can't be forced to do a training this time. One of the colleagues said, he was very much in favor of politics and he said who can force me to do a training this time it's about a policy and I'm in favor of it, but the next time it's about the ban on wearing the veil in the institution. I don't want any training because I'm a Muslim believer and I want to wear the veil) so we don't have) we'll say my intellectual freedom means that we can't impose training on me and he's not entirely wrong, even if I'm very much in favor of everyone having training in politics 16, it's very difficult to force in the name of academic freedom, intellectual freedom. 113:126 (Professor)

no matter what would be written, it could be dealt with, someone says, "I'm being told the wall is white. You have a regulation that says the walls are black, all the walls are black, we know that they are black, but you if you do not know your business that the walls are black, you want that there they are white. So you don't try to say, "well, I don't interpret it like that". But the rule is very clear, it's that the rule is not your business...and the problem is that there are not many people who fight to protect the rule. There's certain cowardice at the university. And it's much easier to not do the fight, and let people say "well that's true, look it could be interpreted that way. No, no, no, keep, there's no interpretation like that. The regulation is very clear, it says you can teach according to your doctrine. Your doctrine is your beliefs-communist, uhh liberal, neo-liberal, libertarian, whatever you can come up with, there's no problem. But you don't have the right, for example, not to teach subjects because you don't believe in them. Because it's curing the whole function of the university. Because when you create programs, when you ask for advice, when you perfect the program and all its content, not so that afterward the professor says: "well, I don't feel like teaching it, it's my academic freedom". That doesn't make sense. 65:79 (Professor Administrator)

... So sometimes students who have work to hand in on Sunday morning ... on Monday morning, sorry, on Sunday evening, they write to me and I tell them it's my students, and then I know that it's last minute and that maybe I shouldn't answer them, but I'm not capable of not doing it. I say to myself that it's my responsibility and so on, and you know, I understand them, they're also caught up with their reality and all that, they're going through all kinds of things, so the 35-hour week is a regulation that (laughs) is the very example of a regulation (laughs). On the other hand, we have a beautiful freedom, so that's also part of... 98:71 (Professor)

your academic freedom is very clear, very very clear. And it's made people, yes maybe it's you and it's us, say: "well, doctrine, it can include what I want to teach or not". No, what I want to teach or not is not a doctrine. A doctrine is a belief, a religion. 65:77 (Professor)

Well, yes, it's that... well, do the rules have a field of application there? There are rules and there are rules that clash with each other and there are rules about academic freedom with principles that therefore... some of them take precedence, but there are cases, for example, of laws, labour laws... there are disciplinary sanctions that are applied at UQAM 68:92 (Student and Professor)

So (um...) we are... certain... we can have rules that we were looking for before as broad as possible because the more precise a rule is, the more constraint there is, and so (um...) in the name of certain principles such as academic freedom, we'll manage so that there are no restrictive rules. 110:88 (Professor Administrator)

at UQAM, especially. At the ESG, too, for the most part. People define academic freedom as they see fit. 65:44 (Professor Administrator)

### **Slack for disciplinary pluralism**

well...) because already in the collective agreement it is written normally that it is the professors of a department who will take this position normally within his department and secondly what makes that the colleagues would not want again at this moment, it is a different departmental culture; somebody will arrive with a more administrative conception or more specific to his department, the experiences that he knew what is completely normal. The FINE ARTS department in which I work is a department with specific needs that are very complex. When you are not a FINE ART professor or a ARTIST, it is very difficult to understand, for example, why you have to buy EQUIPMENT? Why do we have to maintain EQUIPMENT? How does the space work so that when students practice, you see, it's not a department like social, or literature or others. These departments will function more on a true university logic, that is to say, premises for teaching, premises for this for that. 98:8 (Professor)

Yes, it's for a type of course around creation in the school environment, on the connection between FINE ART education and environmental education; with a place inside for creativity activities in the school environment. And I have a specificity which is, which is... so I make a lot of creations in school in my field which is FINE ART. But I try to integrate improvisation practices through creation. So it is a rather particular field for which the future professors are

very nervous. In fact they don't know how to do this type of activity. So to have a certain type of reasoning, of questioning, so that's why he makes me intervene. 100:18 (Student)

because a laboratory, I too, we have students who do experiments, with cells in culture, to test products, well that's correct but it's more at the level of manipulations and then 118:56 (Professor Administrator)

Learning courses not a problem in SCIENCE. 119:32 (Lecturer)

we go to the fact but when I hear pluralism but when I hear rather in the middle as multicultural 106:33 (Professor)

but, with pluralism generally one speaks rather of religious pluralism, of pluralism on the cultural level 106:127 (Professor)

Yes, it's good because the reason why I asked this question, I made my career in terms of my research and everything on pesticides in the agri-food sector, and then I was on committees of the general audit and all that. And that's a field, that's my field of work, it's a field where there is really plurality in the decisions and policies. To see the money, the economy, we see it now, we are in a pandemic and it is the economy that leads. So there are precisely many fields where we feel that finally, it is the same game, these same games, that we can see inside an institution like UQAM, we find them a little bit everywhere in politics. 119:69 (Lecturer)

There's that and then there's also, for example, the Department of Human Sciences it's a department where people (um) go to extremely different places, that is to say, they will have extremely different influences. There's going to be a professor who's going to be, who's going to be an Arab world specialist, another professor who's going to be, who's going to be interested in Indian issues, Nepal, things like that. (Uh) here even though, I was going to say even though even the methodology may seem, ... the methodology used, no the methodologies are different as well but, even though, there's one and the same department (uh) you have to actually find a common language. 104:14 (Student)

It's not the same personalities, depending on... My daughter did her Bachelor of Music degree and she said, well violinists don't have the same temperament as percussionists. The percussionists are knock knock, the violinists are (gestures to sweep gently). It's kind of the same, it depends on the career you've decided on and your point of interest, it makes different personalities. So it's certain that in departments where the career is ultimately can become a little more aggressive or let's say domination but competition can be important. At that point, it's certain that someone who chooses that path for his or her career will have the personality that goes with it. 119:66 (Lecturer)

So I think it's just to make the administrative life of the program easier. The programs that are a little bit bigger, a little bit more separated in literature or in art history have their own doctorate, so it's really for the practical side 99:27 (Administrator)

But at the moment, I must admit that I am part of committees, through my evolution as a professor, I see that I am more involved in the installation of new rules and also modifications. One thing that is important to mention is that as a researcher, I also had to, given my project) my research subject, I had to create a new laboratory with a level of containment that would allow me to work with the virus, which we wanted to work with. So at that time, it's certain that in this component of the research, I had to produce documents and establish operating rules that were specific to the type of research we were doing in that laboratory. So, yes, there is this component that was quite important that the rules were) because I created rules. But again, it was based on what existed outside. I don't know if that's okay with you... 116:2 (Professor)

However, she had a bit of a feeling that it was becoming the general reserve and that you could give it away from any way you wanted at any time. Because we're not a homogeneous department, it was like sometimes I have students, I have an ORG STUDIES, you give it to SUBJECT X students. 45:170 (Professor)

There's that, and then there's also, for example, the department of HUMAN SCIENCES, it's a department where people go to extremely different places, that is to say, they will have extremely different influences. There's going to be a professor who's going to be, who's going to be an Arab world specialist, another professor who's going to be, who's going to be interested in Indian issues, Nepal, things like that. (Uh) here even though, I was going to say even though even the methodology may seem, ... the methodology used, no the methodologies are different as well but, even though, there's one and the same department (uh) you have to actually find a common language. 104:14 (Student)

So I think it's just to make the administrative life of the program easier. The programs that are a little bit bigger, a little bit more separate in literature or art history have their own doctorate so it's really for the convenience 99:27 (Administrator)

I think it's really relevant that she wants to question it. And then it's really the way she's going to do it, you know, or she's decided to, but that's, that's what I see as another problem, is that, if she wants to change it like that she has to tell us as students. Then that's kind of what's happening with the new director right now of the program, which is super transparent you know. So she's telling us (laughs), she's going to come and tell us (laughs) you know, me you know she told my friends and all that, well yeah but it's always the same people who apply because of the list so (uh) I have to reopen it, I'm going to put others on it, when she could have done that, I think she has, you know, I mean, an authority, she's the director of the program, she could have done that) I'm making an observation, I'm going to give the two guys the opportunity to give them the course but I'm going to decide with my, my... they're other professors too, I'm going to talk to them about it and then we're going to reopen it, it's not going to be against it, you know), it's not going to encroach on the two who applied in time. But we're going to offer it to others, you

know, too, but what she's doing by saying, you know, by saying (laughs) a little bit to everyone like that, so it's sure that it's going to come to people who are like, well, I met the deadlines and everything. 111:23 (Student)

I don't know how things are going to work out, we're waiting, we're waiting for things to happen, but I have no idea, at some point we're going to adapt, we're going to know, already that in the department, as it's not a department with a lot of (ummh...) it's.... .uh... it's a department where there are several disciplines, we have professors who are... who have a background in engineering, others in economics, others in administration, etc. And then others in technology. And then others in technology. So it's... in computer science and everything, it's people in information systems, it's people who are already working together and they were having a hard time getting them together. So there's going to be a whole separation, umm...) bo listen, is it a separation by discipline, I have no idea but there eh...) 67:5 (Student)

Table A7. Other Organizational Stimuli

### **Power Asymmetry**

#### **Professor Administrators**

... The SCCUQ appoints representatives to the departmental assemblies, we receive the names but we never invite them. 95:92

That means that on the Academic Council you have almost as many students as professors, and then lecturers. When you get to the Studies Committee, you have as many as you have professors. That means that a first-year undergraduate student in philosophy can block a master's program in administration. 75:42 (Professor Administrator)

#### **Professors**

...I find that in the department I don't know the opinion of the lecturers at all, I don't know the lecturers personally. And I...) they are not at all even rep), even if there is the lecturers' representative at the departmental assembly, I never) he is silent all the time, I never have the opinion of the lecturers, I don't know at all how they position themselves, what they want, what they don't want, what their strategies are, I don't have the sound of the bell at all uh. It's as if there were two worlds, the professors, even though we teach the same courses, well, I find that there is very little dialogue with the lecturers. 113:33 (Professor)

... we always ask the lecturer to leave because it is too delicate ... these are elements that are sensitive and that would also give information to the lecturers who could turn against the department for such and such a thing. you have to be extremely careful I know that it is not easy for the lecturers at UQAM and in all the universities but the professors are those who have the

task of making the decisions and others and the lecturers are really assigned in the function of teaching tasks so it's finally I don't want to get into all the debates there between lecturers and professors but I am sure that I will always defend the structure of professor, ... so it is those who are paid and who have the functions to do in general all the work and lecturers, I do not like to always use this word, there but it is a little precarious situation and then it makes me smile ...who puts lecturers in a situation that is not obvious 98:36 (Professor)

### **Lecturers**

the departmental assembly is the bosses at UQAM, they are the ones who judge and decide. It's better to be on their side if not 122:43 (Lecturer)

Yes, and then between the two, there's the department, the department which at UQAM is a (um) sort of... two-headed entity, um, because it has one leg in the administration and the other leg in the SPUQ convention. And so the professors. Because the departmental assembly is made up of 100% professors (um) who therefore manage their department in a sovereign manner, the administration can't do much else in this regard, so it's only to supervise that, but nothing more. 97:37 (Lecturer)

Then we managed to do it in relation to) Regulation No. 5 on (uh) representation) the voting rights of lecturers in the program committee. Which is a total insult. (uh) Lecturers teach 60% of the courses, but they have no say in the program in which they are the majority, they don't have a single vote in a committee where there are five professors sometimes seven. And there's one poor little lecturer on the whole gang and he doesn't have a vote and then it was, ah well, that's because it has to be parity (um) professors, students. So we said at that time, you say professors, students. And then there is a delegate, a representative of the professors who gives up his place to the lecturers because) (exasperated voice) For forty years! 97:64 (Lecturer)

In fact, being a member of the union, if there is a union, it doesn't matter if it's you, what's-his-name, it can generate more power yes. And at that point, people take over certain rights, let's say, and there is no higher authority to which you can turn because we appeal directly to the union. But that's life, that's the way it is. 119:8 (Lecturer)

I think the person who's going to keep manipulating) hogging his office because I think it's not, it's personal, it's very personal. So I think it's) she was able to do it, she's a woman, she was able to do it because she had her role in the union. But I was also in the union for several years. I didn't do it because it was a very personal thing rather than a role, it's not because she had that power that she did it, it's because she's like that, she's a very personal thing. 119:14 (Lecturer)

In the department ... apart from being a professor, which is not my case, we do not have enough possibilities, I think, of participating in bodies to evaluate the existing rules and then modify them ... 114:1 (Lecturer)

### **Administrators**

I am at the assembly but I uh...) these proposals are first discussed in executive committee and I don't attend the executive committee. And in the assembly, what came up and then uh...) it's always passed unanimously. The professors receive the project days before 117:22 (Administrator)

I have a member of the departmental assembly who does not agree with what is being discussed. And this person has his cell phone and has started to record the departmental assembly. I'm sitting next to her, I can't let that happen. So I took a little paper and my pencil and I went to a member of the executive because the director was presiding, the department director, I said she is recording. And then I went back and sat down. The professor said, "Are you recording? Oh, I didn't pay attention. And then the professor who took his cell phone, he started filming her... then he said Fuck you, do you realize what you're doing, you're recording while we're in camera fuck you. This is not possible inh 95:114 (Administrator)

Yes, I think that the application can change, can evolve even without a change of personnel or individual with whom we interact, sometimes it's good, interpretations in the institution that can change, other times it's good the consensual application can be wrong or judged wrong by a third party for example. At the academic level, we do the ombudsman at the university. There are practices that have changed because of the Ombudsman's recommendation decisions following cases that were, in short, judged that the application of the rule that was made, was not adequate. 99:41 (Administrator)

### **Students**

..., but it's a rule that .... it works but in a very uh... very variable way. It is applied, but it is applied in a way that is really strange, you know. If you go to see an assistant, a management assistant, she'll tell you the rule: this is it, this is it, it's written in black and white, but you know very well that it doesn't work like that. You're going to negotiate with the coordinator or with the department head, well...) that's different, it's not... 67:38 (Student)

and this... but what remains unclear is the way, because this percentage cannot be applied directly in the departments. Let's say, I forgot the figures, but let's say it was 8%... but it's not 8% ORG STUDIES, 8% at SOCIAL STUDIES 8% at..., it's in the whole UQAM. So the calculation is very complex, first of all. So it can be used as an argument. We have reached our... whereas in the end it... Also, the fact that the coordination has the last word, so a doctoral student doesn't have much power to defend himself in the case where, for example, we meet a course coordination that refuses us the reserve clause, generally that's where it ends. So, you could refer to your research directorate, for example, who could support your request. Already when you go to the coordination, your director agrees that you teach this course, but after that, beyond this informal influence that your director could have, if it's no, it ends there. There's no recourse. 68:22 (Student and Professor)

Oh my God, my role... I think that (hesitation), yes... I don't know, I feel quite disconnected, if you like, from this capacity to change how things work and everything because it's a big



machine. But I think that when, when there are means, like for example the programs, that I could get more involved and try to influence a rule. But I think it's a lot of investment. You know, I still see it as an investment in terms of what (uh) the possibilities are that it actually changes. 111 :1 (Student)

.... I couldn't tell you all the details of the rule, I know you have to... get a series of signatures. We are at the mercy of coordination, that is to say, that... even if it is to encourage that we finance doctoral students, that there are union rules .. reserve clauses granted or not granted in such a perfectly arbitrary way.... 68:20 (Student)

### **Knowledge Asymmetry**

#### **Professor Administrators**

... The SCCUQ appoints representatives to departmental assemblies, we receive the names but we never invite them. 95:92 Professor Administrator

... I think since this is a faculty course on, my God, I don't know the whole exact procedure there, but I will say it is ... .101: 35 (Professor Administrator)

#### **Professors**

But I think we are still quite informal at UQAM, we can do a lot of things, well me, but a lot of people who say that ah but me at UQAM there are a lot of rules, but ultimately there is the culture of informality which is very present. 113:96 (Professor)

... we always ask the lecturer to leave because it is too delicate ... these are elements that are sensitive and that would also give information to the lecturers who could turn against the department for such and such a thing. you have to be extremely careful I know that it is not easy for the lecturers at UQAM and in all the universities but the professors are those who have the task of making the decisions and others and the lecturers are really assigned in the function of teaching tasks so it's finally I don't want to get into all the debates there between lecturers and professors but I am sure that I will always defend the structure of professor, ... so it is those who are paid and who have the functions to do in general all the work and lecturers, I do not like to always use this word, there but it is a little precarious situation and then it makes me smile ...who puts lecturers in a situation that is not obvious 98:36 (Professor)

I've seen (uh) three scenarios in general. The first scenario that I saw is in the executive we will address a problem and there we will try to solve it by taking some lines of thought or some solutions and there we will present them to the assembly and there in assembly we are going to exchange, we are going to discuss so that I would say that it is the first scenario that I saw it is the scenario perhaps the most frequent.98:88 (Professor)

... they are older professors...they are mostly men who know the institution very well, who know the rules very well. 113:45 (Professor)

**Administrators**

I'm at the meeting but I uh ...) these proposals are first discussed in the executive committee, and I do not attend the executive committee. And in assembly, what came up and then uh ...) was unanimous all the time. Professors receive the project days before 117:22 (Administrator)

I have a member of the departmental assembly who does not agree with what is being discussed. And this person has his cell phone and has started to record the departmental assembly. I'm sitting next to her, I can't let that happen. So I took a little paper and my pencil and I went to a member of the executive because the director was presiding, the department director, I said she is recording. And then I went back and sat down. The professor said, "Are you recording? Oh I didn't pay attention. And then the professor who took his cell phone, he started filming her... then he said Fuck you, do you realize what you're doing, you're recording while we're in camera fuck you. This is not possible inh 95:114 (Administrator)

**Lecturers**

But honestly, that's one of the things that's most interesting because you get to see a little bit of how it works, especially as a future professor, seeing how it works is very interesting. Like I said, you know, lecturer the perceptions that we have to say ah the professors, they protect themselves. When you have meetings, and then I'm asked to leave because they have to wash their dirty laundry in the family, as they say, no, that's when you say that in the end, they are just as hard on each other as they are on the lecturers who give the courses. 63:83 (Lecturer)

**Students**

..., But it's a rule that.... it works but in a very uh ... very variable way. It applies, but it applies in a way, but really weird there you know. If you are going to see an assistant, an assistant to the management there she will give you the rule: there is that, that's it, it's written in black and white, but you know very well that it does not work like it. You are going to negotiate with the coordinator or with the department director, well ...) this is different, it is not ...67:38 (Student)

But (uh) I find that in the department here, it's a lot too) there is still a lot of informal. So you know even if it's not, you know like, I still have a closeness with the new director of the third cycle and then (uh) you know I feel like just talking to her with her, we... (uh) maybe I have an influence on how (uh), how we... how she, she will intervene in, you know (uh) with the discussions that we may have. Sometimes I think to myself that I may have contributed a little to her thinking, to what she will transfer to her committees. But after that to say that I have a direct uh uh influence, I will say that I think we have a ... uh, I don't see that I have a huge control but I think I could by more formal means but after that it's still an investment for the students. I don't know if that answers the question.111:12 (Student)

So she'll like say, she'll like bring to light some, some, some mechanisms that usually are hidden by (laughs) (uh) in the more formal processes. And she'll like put them, she'll say, well yes but we decided that, but yes but it's all the time like that in the committees and all that. And then there after that if it reveals a little of the, of the (uh) power struggles that has within the

committees and all that. Then they are like brought to light so there it awakens frustrations against that person then 111 :6 (Student)

I had no prior information, we are told that ... the department is going to be split in two, uh ...) how? in what circumstance? I have no idea, I have no information. I don't know if it's a rule or administrative rearrangement or ... 67: 4 (Student)

### **Resource Distribution**

... And so that creates a fight and it takes away a bit of the jobs of the lecturers. So we find ourselves in a situation where we have two groups (uh) who have uh... both want to work... 63:19 (Lecturer)

Here there is a whole management of the ARTISTIC device, and its management is very important. We have multifunctional rooms for example our large room downstairs which is called the CLASSROOM\_NUMBER we have classes like me I'm giving tonight, a class, a class in this room, but tomorrow there is a DIFFUSION, so every devices must be loaded, anyway, there are attendees and appearances so there is a whole departmental logic that makes us... a small place of diffusion.... we are both in an academic environment and a place of dissemination because students often have to play, often have to practice and so on, so that creates situations of management and administration that are different from others... 98: 9 (Professor)

... it turns out that we have people who are also at the doctorate who are lecturers through the lecturer system so that this will not happen .... the offer which was in summer is much more limited than in the fall or in winter, which meant that by having given an introductory course to someone who in the clause reserves I just had nothing else ... 114: 31 (Lecturer)

### **Uneven Rule Abidance**

#### **Professor Administrators**

It's like a policeman. A policeman won't stop you at 106 km / h on the highway, because he knows your feet aren't accurate, he knows your speedometer isn't accurate. He understands that there is a small descent which made you accelerate from 100 to 106. He is intelligent the policeman, he will not give you tickets at 106. But, he will give it to you at 125. It's judgment too. The rule is there to parameter an activity. 65:56 (Professor Administrator)

#### **Professors**

...it was perfect this example of the regulation, so most of my colleagues have a very objective reading of this regulation, and then they say to themselves, what is important is what I do in terms of the amount of work and all that, I'm going to go beyond that and then I'm going to make sure that the machine works. Except that colleagues who do maybe 25 hours, 30 hours a week, we know that there are some, there are even some who do 20 hours a week and then when the five-year evaluation comes, it comes out and then they are given a reprimand saying unsatisfactory evaluation and then nothing happens in the structures there ... it's all nonsense, it's all going around in circles (uh) there's no one who really has... I don't know of any professors

who have really lost their jobs because of this, at least I don't know any, so... and that's the problem when I tell you that there are some who have a very, very, very individualistic vision, but above all, in the light of their personal interests, of these regulations, as there is no authority above them that will, as in a company, reprimand them. ...) they will say to themselves, well, my colleagues will accept in the name of collegiality or my colleagues will accept because they say that they too will be evaluated and then it goes round in circles and that's where we don't move forward with certain people and unfortunately after that, we put human resources to work and we try to move things forward it's long, it costs time, it's wasted energy, it creates negative feelings, it's not great, we've experienced it here in the department 98:72 (Professor)

And in total, the creation of a rule does not solve the case itself from which it started. Since this case will finally be solved by circumventing in part the problem. But in total we still have the production of a rule. But the purpose of the rule is simply that everyone believes that there is a way of functioning, that it can be imposed on everyone. 45:205 (Professor)

Right here in the Fine Arts department, we are twelve professors and we have about 60 lecturers, which is normal because we have several families of EQUIPMENTS. A professor cannot be at the same time an EXPERT AT EQUIPMENT1, EQUIPMENT2, and then good fact that we are several small families of lecturers for different EQUIPMENTS and it is quite correct like that, except that it always creates concussions when you hire a new professor who will take the place or sometimes courses given to a lecturer, then the lecturer does not understand and he comes to see us and we explain, we explain to him listen to you are paid to give a course, We hired you on this basis, we respect your work and everything, but the university ensures that normally we have to hire professors who will have three components to their tasks and who will also contribute administratively to research and other and who will take these courses. 98:38 (Professor)

### **Administrators**

Yes, there have already been disagreements in the departmental assembly over the application of rules. For example in relation to the process of hiring professors. The rules were not being followed. These are departmental rules. Everything was stopped, it was chaos. 121: 4 (Professor)

### **Lecturers**

there was a course that was placed (uh) and (uh) there was a lecturer who wanted to take that course but who was not liked by the others there was someone who took the course, normally who did not take, precisely, to avoid that the one, the first lecturer took the position. It's the use of the rules for the purpose of making someone else feel bad. (uh) So that unfortunately (it's, it's, a big unfortunately it's things that happen that. 63:51 (Lecturer)

So it's at that level that it's decided and so we can't make a universal rule on that because it really depends on the type of department, the type of relationship there is between the department and the lecturers, so it's not that all departments abuse it or that all the administration committees do. Let's see, what is it? The ) yeah, the management committee that would abuse this clause

but unfortunately I saw that some were abusing it and vice versa, it's interesting because there were challenges and there were departments that said well we don't want to have any more trouble with the lecturers' union so we apply the rule correctly. So, it just goes to show that sometimes, if you assert your rights, you can get respect 97:51 (Lecturer)

### **Students**

... as it is a department ... where there are several disciplines that exist, we have professors ... who have a background in THEME 1, others in THEME2, others in THEME 3 etc. And then others in THEME4. So it's... in THEME 4.1 and all, it's people in... these are people already working together and they were having a hard time getting together....) 67: 5 (Student)

... These five courses, well, these are subjects that are not mine, well, that are not everyone's subjects either, therefore, it is normal that they are the same who apply because after that, the subjects, there are a lot of people working in several... different fields. 111:17 (Student)

### **Ambiguity**

#### **Professors**

So that's basically what makes the status of the student when he's in the reserve clause and in the doc a bit of a hybrid 45:52 (Professor)

#### **Administrators**

It must depend on the reading comprehension, () communication or () it's rare because it's not very clear the convention, you can't interpret it 66:34 (Administrator)

#### **Lecturers**

That's it, if ever (laughs) these formal mechanisms exist I'm not even aware of them, so I would tend to think they don't exist. 114:29 (Lecturer)

### **Students**

Uh...I kind of feel like the rules are kind of always fuzzy and you always have to look for them. I think that's kind of the...what's often said, we're not taught enough during our doctorate, how we have to deal with course loads. I think it's...for me it's been...I had to dig around to find the rules that handled everything, the ways of assigning points, stuff like that. And it was much more my epistemic community that helped me with that than the institutions themselves. 112:3 (Student)

in the first instance. I've got a subject that's quite, well, it's not true, but I'm in the field of emotion and I'm in the field of positive emotions specifically. In the context of BUSINESS, there are two professors that I have identified in the joint program who are directly in the subject and I am really unlucky but both of them can't in the winter session really. It's clear, it's the cross, there is a barrier, we have to try to understand, already find another professor who had a common subject but also understand, can all professors be on the committee or it's just certain professors? What is this famous research accreditation that is supposedly the rule for selecting a professor to be on the committee? I'm not sure if it applies to all universities. In short, can the young professor who is an assistant at McGill be allowed to be on my committee or not? So I'm already

in and finding a clear answer is not obvious and basically if you don't call someone 71:3 (Student)

Table A8. Other Influences: Organizational

### Evolution of context

#### Professors

As far as I remember it has always existed but, I guess not, wait a minute...what had on it...the "reserve clause"...well, it was a way to help finance doctoral students, and since we didn't have any grants to do so, it was a way to provide them with a small salary 62:37 (Professor)

#### Administrators

Well (laughter) if we get into that, we're not done (laughter), it depends so much on the case, on the case law, I consult the lawyers for that. 96:18 (Administrator)

Well... ) reprimands are going to be as a consequence of the convention if you don't respect an article of the convention, what consequences can have it's not me who decides, it's the union with the teaching personnel service, it's beyond a recurrence, it's the first time, it was a professor, it was an old professor because in the past he had the right to do that, and then he didn't know what could happen, what could happen, okay, he could have a lesser sanction, it's immense, it's something I couldn't even get involved in because it's by me, it's by my own authority, all that could happen in that case is that if I witness, () something; if now a lecturer comes to see me, I was going to file a grievance, go to such and such a class () Well. ...) I have no choice but to call the professor personnel department to see if you have received a grievance, if not, you will have one, that's the most I can do, it hasn't happened to me here, but it could happen 66:46 (Administrator)

#### Lecturers

I remember the first text that I wrote and sent to the board of directors before I was there, it was (um) with the GSS, the GSS wanted to take more space. And it was the whole issue of decentralization of the faculties already that the () at the time wanted to decentralize (uh) certain functions and that was one of the issues within the faculties. In fact, during all those years, the decentralization of the faculties in order to make UQAM like the other universities was one of the issues from '87 until today. 122:6 (Lecturer)

#### Students

So people sometimes thought that it was a rule, that it had to be done like that and then when I started asking the question, then looking for it, people said I don't know why we do that, we've been doing that since 1970. Yes, but it's not written anywhere, it's not written in my collective

agreement what I have to do, why I do it, so we looked in the regulations, in the policies, well....(euh) they said, don't do it anymore, well, we stopped doing it. Well, that's why there are rules that are sometimes written down, but there are also rules, or practices that are more practices that we give ourselves than (um) that don't really exist, so we don't ask ourselves the question you give it to the professors and then after that (um) you go to the lecturers, well, you have a lot of students in the graduate program that you want to allow them to acquire teaching skills because we know that people who have a doctorate, well, often their profile is to become a university professor, researcher, etc. And so it was to be able to give them the opportunity to acquire teaching skills. And so it was to be able to allow these students to develop teaching skills, to obtain financing to continue their studies, to have a job that would allow them to (um) in fact, because often they can get scholarships and grants, but sometimes that's not enough because they're at an age where they have a family to support, sometimes, etc. 67:32 (Student)

### **Evolution of actors**

#### **Lecturers**

For years, I had courses that I didn't have access to because there was one professor in particular who gave reserve clauses to all his students in a field that I could have taught. I had courses that paid less but I was still accumulating, but these people, as they are at the master's or doctorate level, eventually leave UQAM to go into the job market. But there, I don't say to myself, well he's going to finish his doctorate or she's going to finish her master's, but there, he's not replacing another reserve clause, then another reserve clause. 119:21 (Lecturer)

In one of the situations, it was that the guy had more interests in other areas, geographic, demographic, etc., and the department didn't see a need for a reserve clause. And the department didn't see a need and the reason he's back is because, with the new movements in the sciences of HUMAN SCIENCES, demography and geography have become very important. And we have no one to teach it. And in the other one, the woman had applied to become a professor (uh) and it was denied. The rule is that the candidate, if there was experience at UQAM who had more points had the advantage; she had more points, the other was hired. And she had taken the department to court on two things, ageism, and the issue of not having this course. She made almost five hundred thousand dollars from the university and the department said we don't want it anymore, and she was behind the department programs and that program fell apart and they are looking to be able to rebuild it but it hasn't happened yet. 107:26 (Student and lecturer)

And about three years ago the department hired a doctoral student, a professor who had done his master's degree in sales management. It's certain that in the same profile he had taught the course. He contacted me to find out how things were done because at the same time he became the course coordinator. So in my way of working I had two choices. Either to stand up and say no, I'm not giving you anything, or to collaborate with him. What I chose to do was to collaborate with him. Because that's all I knew, I talked in front of my course notes, books, what he could do, the person he was reporting to I knew, the context. I was a person who more accompanied than challenged. There were two other lecturers, whom I knew, them for having met them, who challenged him more than accompanied him. 70:29 (Lecturer)

(uh) well initially it was supposed to be sent by the coordination, it was not ready in the meantime. We changed coordinators and it was sent back (um) recently. So it was my coordinator who sent it (uh) on behalf of the department. 63:6 (Lecturer)

### **Students**

...then that's kind of what's happening with the new program director right now, which is super transparent you know. She's telling us (laughs), she's going to come and tell us (laughs), you know, me, you know, she told my friends and all that, well, yes, but it's always the same people who apply because of the list, so (um) I have to reopen it, I'm going to put others on it, whereas she could have done that, and then say, you know, I think she still has, you know, I mean, an authority, it's the director of the program, she could have done)..111:23 (Student)

No, other than the (uh) I think a big problem in the department is that that's the (uh) the history of why it's such a big deal why people are a little, a little sensitive about this rule is because one of our colleagues who's retired now, for years was taking his class out at the very last moment. 113:60

### **Administrators**

If you're lucky with someone who gives you a course like when you arrive. If you're a little less lucky but still lucky, well there are traces, there are proceduralists who are left, there are colleagues in the area who can... who have done some of the same work who can help us, refer us if you're not lucky well then you have to find the information by yourself. 99:48 (Administrator)

It's such a big machine, the university you never know how it's going to end. It's, except that I'm a one-to-one guy. So I have contracts that are a little bit advanced. I know who to call. If she doesn't answer I go around but if she does I call the front desk. I'll wait half an hour to tell me the name of her replacement. 102:77 (Administrator)

Uh...) There's a lot of turnovers here at the university whether it's in the departments or the services and what has caused the directors to change say every four years, the administrative assistant. Well, she may stay in the chair for say three or four years, and then another one comes in, so the other one is either going to be a lot more strict on certain things versus the old one that was there, or it may be the director or the principal as well, so that's why sometimes it's... the rules are different all over the place so... 109:26 (Administrator)

Yes, yes. I did at least... my God five six places before I got here there, I was management, recruiting, psych... anyway before I got to the faculty even here, so this is maybe the seventh or eighth one I've done here. 109:21 (Administrator)

### **Professor Administrators**

1982 Claude Pichette seeks reappointment - committee includes UQ President and two people from UQAM. 77:16 (Professor Administrator - retired)



Also, the older members have retired. Quite quickly we start to see new people 77:1 (Professor Administrator - retired)

### **Professors**

Umhum, I don't know either, it's sure that it was born in the context of union negotiations, but after that... 68:34 (Professor)

Table A9. Other Influences: Environmental

### **Macro Environmental Influences**

#### **Professor Administrator**

Later on, parts of the law had to be amended to change the status of UQAM and to grant it university status in order to be able to negotiate agreements with other universities, to be able to grant its diplomas. A political agreement that is not in the law puts an end to equalization. This is beneficial to all faculty. Another factor to explain the search for another size over others. Never again has the head office had the upper hand in choosing the rector. 77:7 (Administrator Professor - retired)

At the end of the '60s, there are 3 visions for UQ. Ministry officials see a multi-campus network and want to establish standards to control the others (e.g. state universities). The militant left (Marxist): sees it as a revolutionary instrument of society, a lever of transformation (professors). May 1968 in France to look at, a utopian vision: a community of professors/students with library. There was a committee to select the professors 77:12 (Professor Administrator -retired)

#### **Professor**

Because it was, uh, created, uh, 50 years ago in the revolution, then the students had rights, then it was created by leftists. UQAM was created by leftists where everyone is nice. Everyone wants a kind operation and wants the success of the planet... Not gendered, in bicycle, (pause) on the social welfare. 75:45 (Professor)

#### **Lecturer**

...let's take a not even fictitious example, distance education, well there are strong pressures for the commodification and globalization of (uh) higher education. (Uh) So there are economic interests that want to get their hands on higher education and there is union resistance. But if the administration wants to (uh), wants to get around these resistances, well, it creates new non-democratic bodies, it appoints people it knows will agree with it, and then it creates a pseudo consultation 97:6 (Lecturer)

in 2012 (uh) there was the student conflict, among other things, so it was quite different. (Uh) I was not yet at UQAM in 2012, I had, I saw how things were going at UQAM. Any authoritarianism in front of the students UQAM was not the pi it was at UDM it was, it couldn't or the police would come in or the lecturers were stuck between the students and the obligation to teach (). The conditions were absolutely for (uh) how can I say that correct, (uh) but there month I lived this situation there in 2015 when there was a student conflict and there UQAM I and I think it was with the government that was in the background imposed on UQAM a vision that was completely different from anything that has been doesn't do the past in front of the students in front. So it was 2015 was very difficult it was a different way of dealing with student conflicts and (uh) in my case personally I found that absolutely unacceptable. And we (uh) that means that it was the lecturers who were obliged to teach and then he had students in certain departments where he already had the SGs from other faculties and there they were confronting each other it was unacceptable conditions for the professors and there UQAM did not listen to us at all 122:9 (Lecturer)

The data was not a department and I could make analyses and try in any case to ask questions. And the () at that time () understood that (uh) to receive me in my office in his office then I could ask him all the questions then at the council I kept just one or two relevant questions () with () it was not very transparent it was (uh) I think he did not understand either, to understand well UQAM is in a difficult situation financially the budgetary rules did not favor it's all ok, favors other universities. In the budgetary rules we are always favoring certain universities or others and UQAM is in the network, but we favor the universities in the regions and not UQAM. So they always try () and this is still the case today and in this case the lecturers well) we are, we are the ones who are cut when there are cuts ok. It's always the lecturers and that's not () we don't understand well yes we are precarious and that the first to jump are the lecturers. And on top of that they are despised because they are not permanent. So there are all sorts of things, but all that to tell you that the budgetary rules have been, they've been quite complicated, among other things, with () to try to corrupt 122:12 (Lecturer)

### **Student**

I think the rules are going to change anyway because it's mandatory because society changes. So the individuals who populate the university also change and I think that from an administrative point of view, every day they are confronted with new data, new problems which mean that sometimes there is no other possibility than to make the rules evolve. 100:39 (Student)

### **Documents**

In total, the combined effects of the increase in the target average and the decrease in student enrolment (by 11.8% between 1993-94 and 1997-98) resulted in a 24.5% loss of course load for our members, with the number of course loads carried by lecturers falling from 4,158 to 3,140. 20:30- 20:31 (Document)

### **Isomorphic Influences**

#### **Normative Isomorphism**

In other universities, we can give course loads to doctoral students. So, we ask to make arrangements with the collective agreement for lecturers. 76:4 (Professor Administrator)

I taught at the University of Montreal, I was a researcher at Harvard for two years, I also spent a little time at other universities, and in general, the reserve clause was systematic, 98:29 (Professor)

Yes, it was very strict, I mean, I had been trained to work in this type of laboratory in Quebec City, at the CHUL, and they also had a protocol. So, we really) were inspired by what existed in that protocol, we were also inspired by another level 3 containment laboratory that exists at the IRCM. So it's not very far. The IRCM is a clinical research institute in Montreal. 116:6 (Professor)

I'm going to start in a broader way (uh) because I myself am a university student, I'm a doctoral student at the University of Sherbrooke. (Uh) generally speaking, yes I'm doing (uh) a Ph.D., and generally speaking, I know that each university has its own rules about the reserve clause. Uh, it depends a little bit on what's done with it that in terms of the... it's contracted in terms of the lecturers' collective agreement (uh). 63:16 (Lecturer)

I don't see it as much here as at other universities, more so at the Université du Québec en Outaouais. In a regular way, it's a way of proceeding. It's a lot like that 70:22 (Lecturer)

When it's not true that it's a political decision, but if we don't oppose this first political decision, we are obliged to look for sources of funding elsewhere. And so that's their mandate, to look for sources of funding elsewhere. 97:20 (Lecturer)

we find the same, the same, the same, the same dynamics. You know, there's a lot of that, and I have friends who are in other universities like Sherbrooke, umm, and it's different, for example, at HEC it's different. It's quite different because the rules are very clear. And the rules are so clear and everything is... 67:46 (Student)

yes I think that the reserve clause, it exists everywhere after the rules, the applications can be different from one institution to another. 71:14 (Student)

### **Competitive Isomorphism**

Already we have difficulty recruiting doctoral students, I think that...95:70 (administrator)  
but it's not how I'm going to say it anymore, it's the competition, it's the competition to get the students, you have to remember the context 122:87 (Lecturer - retired)

With the growth of the population and the war veterans have to train. The new universities have 3 orientations: to fill the needs of clientele that traditionally have not had access to universities; to explore new fields of knowledge; to compete with the established universities. 77:9 (Professor Administrator - retired)

I mean, we don't have structural funding for (um) our students and so of course that's also a big problem compared to) at the University of Montreal which is our big competitor at the doctorate who have structural funding for their doctoral students. It's that we have very few students 113:38 (Professor)

Well the consequence is that people who do research are less interested in coming here to the university. First, for the future, to know that if they do research they will be able to apply it, to teach. The 2nd, in addition to the grants that students can have at the doctorate, if they don't have course loads they are going to have less compared to what they have to do. 70:47 (Lecturer)

yes absolutely, uhh we would achieve more of the two objectives identified and there are other consequences. So, less funding for our Ph.D.s. There would obviously be uhh less opportunity for them to have teaching experience, there would also be a decrease in the attractiveness of our programs as a result. It's an advantage uhh for our doctoral programs to have a "Reserve Clause" ...for the, because both of these are very laudable uhh goals, very desired by the students. 65:33 (Professor Administrator)

He thought it was better to focus on the thesis... uh...) with no regard to my financial needs to know... but also need for professionalization. 68:27 (Student)

In the 80's we were trying to develop graduate study and research. It was an institutional priority. Expansion of 2-3rd cycle studies 76:3 (Administrator Professor)

a lot of psychological stress in relation to the students not knowing if they are capable of teaching or not teaching, uh if they are going to be able to have a job afterward as a professor or not, given that there is no (uh) seniority, not that they have no seniority but that they have not ben. ...), but that they don't have uh experience. uh (...) it can also bring a lot of stress because if we have to go through all the EQE processes, I don't think that the EQEs would be so problematic, but it's the seniority lists 69:75 (Student)

that's the practice, well you're asking another question it's creating a lot of doc students so you're creating another problem () we don't have a career for () that's the big frustration for lecturers you think you're going to become a professor but it's not true.122:26 (Lecturer -retired)

### **Coercive Isomorphism**

And the problem is that the joint program and the sort of collective agreement but overall it leaves a lot of freedom to each institution. You have a few principles, like recruitment conditions, but overall it's pretty vague,.... 45:23 ....Ben in the sense that you have the impression that we are small too. We're in a situation where we always feel like we're the ones who have to apologize for being in the spouse, so overall when you listen to what other people are doing, you get the impression that they're having a party, they're taking margins, they're interpreting things in a really cool way. The rules, they would like to put 15 courses when there are only 7

normally. Good, let's do it. But we're always closer. So that's the weakling complex I think. Always closer to the rules. 45:238 (Professor)

### **Labor Influences**

In total, the combined effects of the increase in the target average and the decrease in student enrolment (by 11.8% between 1993-94 and 1997-98) have resulted in a loss of course loads for our members of 24.5%, with the number of course loads carried by lecturers falling from 4,158 to 3,140. 20:30- 20:31 (Document)

Every time a new group of workers tries to unionize, the whole arsenal of delaying procedures is brought out. Among the lot, the non-recognition of the character of a salaried employee is a good example. Lecturers have experienced this 25:2 (Document)

The renewal of the collective agreement in 1987 was marked by a seven-week strike. It was a different kind of strike, one that broke with certain traditional union practices in a context of generalized demobilization of union forces. A special law, particularly repressive, will end this strike. 26:1 (Document)

The Acting Vice-President, Academic Life, presented the Notice of Enrolment, as attached. She recalled that this file had been placed on the desk at the November meeting of the Studies Committee, when commissioners had noted several indelicate wordings, particularly with regard to course instructors. It was therefore necessary to revise the text, without intervening in the process. 86:2 (Document)

Since they were already employed elsewhere, it was a small compensation to come and expose their expertise. But given that it costs much less to have a lecturer than a professor, we began to (um) develop a lot until we reached the point where 60% of the courses were given by lecturers. And there, therefore, this body of employment that had no union representation will unionize and therefore 97:1 (Lecturer)

Let's take an example that's not even fictitious: distance education. Well, there are strong pressures for the commodification and globalization of (um) higher education. (Uh) So there are economic interests that want to get their hands on higher education and there is union resistance. But if the administration wants to (uh), wants to get around these resistances, well, it creates new non-democratic bodies, it appoints people it knows will agree with it, and then it creates a pseudo consultation 97:6 (Lecturer)

when it's not true it's a political decision, but if we don't oppose this first political decision there and obviously there, we are obliged to look for sources of financing elsewhere. And so that's their mandate, to look for sources of funding elsewhere. 97:20 (Lecturer)

that's it, there are no answers, you don't have the information (uh) you had to do, you had to work with other people when you have to go through the newspapers to get answers you already

have when the conflict is publicized in the media that means that there are problems 122:13  
(Lecturer -retired)

Table A10. Other Influences: Individual

**Emotions**

Lack of authority, it's a lack of decision making and authority, when there are) we see when she has decisions to make that are difficult or we see sometimes, I have the impression that she really goes by feeling, by, I don't like, I don't like to fall into big categories like saying she goes by emotions, there I don't like that kind of thing it's too reductive, But sometimes she has difficulty saying yes or no, which means that we move forward on certain things that are not the right things, and then that takes us backward, and then other things that should be taken up, that leaves us in suspense, that goes round in circles, and then it doesn't move forward. 98:82 (Professor)

I was, I was blue, I wrote I was blue. I told him, listen. I didn't go to the meeting; I said I was going to be there, it's not a problem for me to cross a picket line here, here in the Fine Arts Department everyone is there, and we're working anyway. I said, it's going to be like a yo-yo, I can't make a decision, yes I'm going, yes I'm not going, yes I'm going, yes I'm not going. I wrote and said no, I won't be there. The place of the meeting! in a restaurant... there were about three of them when there were supposed to be seven, and then there were minutes with decisions taken. I was flabbergasted and I don't think she did it in bad faith, it's because she wanted to make decisions outside, it's just that she was... 98:84 (Professor)

It's very stressful because it has an impact on my immediate family budget, it's a course load, it's my job. 114:25 (Lecturer)

Then on top of that, the person probably thought that his objective was his master's work and not the priority, it's a bit humiliating. And probably, I've already had students who were unhappy since the first time I taught, it's not pleasant. So when we got expelled, she couldn't teach anymore, she was expelled from that class. It's putting a student in a situation, where he's probably going to lose time on his graduate studies, if he wants to perform, otherwise he doesn't perform. It lowers the quality of the teaching and then it frustrates the person, maybe even delaying if they want to try to perform. They're going to delay their work, so I think it's not... 119:28 (Lecturer)

Well, I think because basically, we are super emotional beings and then emotional. I mean, there's not... the problem with rules is that they're too much thought from rationalities... that don't take into account these emotions and then the affects that surround them. I think that this is a big problem of the scientific world, which has not wanted to accept that there is no Cartesian division there. 112:75 (Student)

ah yes, we would have felt, we would have felt animosity afterward, there is a very personal relationship that can bias things in this pavilion because there are really not many of us. We tend to become very quickly 120:24 (Student)

### **Individual Knowledge Asymmetry (Learning and experience)**

the feeling that has colleagues who are a little different from these policies I'll show to be good... more 106:16 (Professor)

Really, I... yes, the proof of this rule is clearly the interpretation, I haven't even read article 10-2, in fact, I don't know what the real truth is about the reserve clause, I've never read it. 113:85 (Professor)

... they are older professors...they are mostly men who know the institution very well, who know the rules very well. 113: 45 (Professor)

it's sure to pass. Somebody who didn't have experience could propose it. Then it would come back to her face. (laughs) 75:35 (Professor)

Oh It's different readings, different understandings, it's limited knowledge of certain facets of the issue, not overall knowledge. Because the more global knowledge the person has, the more his interpretation can change. Someone who has never directed a thesis, someone who has never done a thesis cannot imagine what it is like for a student to do a thesis, for a student to do a thesis. It's a slow, complicated process that requires involvement, that requires time. So for someone who can't imagine that, it's a problem. On the other side also, someone who can't imagine what a BUSINESS TOPIC1 AND TOPIC 2 course is like that requires experience, it's not just coming in and giving definitions and concepts, no. It's animating, animating with examples.... can also thinking that it's just a math class where you're doing demonstrations and it stops there. So, that's where...the lack of overall knowledge of the problem. 94:44 (Professor)

I think that (uh) I think that the fact that there is a great lack of knowledge of the regulations; I think that when a new program comes along, it's rare that (uh) that your first instinct is going to be (uh) ah I'm going to go read all the regulations. Ah I'm a new master's student, I've never been to graduate school, I'll go to UQAM and I'll read from the first page to the last page (um) the graduate school regulations. I have the impression that often, as a student, I don't know if you can say that to call it that as an employee; I think that as an employee (uh) I think I would already have more maturity to say ok I'm going to go read the whole collective agreement, I'm going to annotate it () and be able to know at least what it's about. Whereas as a student, well...) it's when I need to that I'll go read the section I need. 69:98 (Student)

### **Individuality**

(why) it's because they have divergent interests 106:49 (Professor)

that had without a doubt I think, and my feeling is that the conception of the young, younger professors is more collegial and more collective, in any case, that's my feeling, eh, than that of the person who was before, it's more (uh... Uh...) I'm doing my own research, and when we're no longer in the department, and her director, uh...) she works a lot, we're more collective, we try to do things together 106:113 (Professor)

and that's the inequalities that, then there aren't... the rules in relation to that .... You know, there were some who wanted it to be much more... there were students who went to the program committee and who wanted... they demanded too many things, I think. But, you know, I think that just to have rules about, we have to know so much before when, what is our jury, what is the date. And then what date our oral, and then between... the time between, you know I mean, the types of questions also you had to write to get sample questions, it's often... it gives) I realized that my friends had had, they had received sample questions sent by the program director. And then that me and my friends, my girlfriends that we're doing the doctorate and then the exam had to write to ask for it, you know (silence) so that there you're like uh, it's clearly because there's a more friendly relationship with them I sent them back their sample question but it should be automatic it's like sending it's that there we're privileging the same people there it's crazy. 111:103 (Student)

Self-interest is very present and in self-interest, it is the question of economy if it pays, if it is profitable, if it will promote other projects, we will do it. If it costs us, there are certain sacrifices that we are not ready to make and it's a pity, but that's how it is. There is the question of racism, sexism, forms of intolerance and we are not going to accept everyone on the same level, we are not going to, and for that, we are going to put them where they belong, how do you do that? Just don't give me an inch. 107:66 (Lecturer and student)

all these relationships between when it's a woman who does it and when it's a man, let's just put the decisions that we) that I just said, I'm sure that if it had been a man, you know the same personality as the director, like a man who would have decided to change I'm sure that he would have been angry but that it wouldn't have been the same interaction, you know he wouldn't have been as, I don't know who it looks like, you know it looks like since she's a woman it's even easier to go and criticize everything like how she's) how she's not) like she doesn't fit the mold and everything you know. You know a man you're going to say oh yeah he's a bit... he's special and all that, and she's going to be like she's crazy. But I'm exaggerating here, there's no, say that but it's like really stereotypes.... 111:89

The power relationships. Yes, the power relationships because ... ffff, because, well you know, I also think that sometimes (laughs) human beings have a tendency to want to break the rules themselves (laughs). I feel like rules are so often restrictive because they set parameters where you can't get out. Sometimes they'll serve to guide you but sometimes they'll also constrain your actions, your creativity, your... But I think that, why people are going to apply them differently well there are clearly power relationships, there is the relationship of the person, did the professor and the student talk to each other? Did one of the professors who is on the committee



talk to one of the students who applied? Did they? You know they have a lot of things going on in the departments, daily contact in the hallways, et cetera, it's all things that are outside of the written rule but they happen, they happen. 112:72 (Student)

## ANNEX A

### COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF PERIODS 2 TO 5

#### 12.1 Period 1 – 1968 to 1979. Foundation of UQAM

The first period is the foundation. Following governmental decree 1170, UQAM was founded on April 9, 1969, by merging five education institutions. These five organizations brought their employees, organizational cultures and diverging practices into the new organization; some groups were unionized and others not. In early 70s, the university's focus was on undergraduate studies to increase accessibility to higher education.

For the first ten years, University of Quebec developed centralization policies. UQAM staff felt apart from decision making and victim of budget re-equalization; hence relationships were tensed, and rules were heavy. Over this period, professors went on strike for four months. Because of hostility, there were rumors of closing UQAM.

“In the 1970s, there was an increase in registrations, but hiring did not follow. People continue to work.” 77:3 (University former high-level administration)

In 1971, lecturers were intended to become a subunit of the professors' union. This became a source of argument amongst professors. Some professors refused to have them join given that lecturers don't have the same qualifications or role.


“Lecturers are still not well received. Lecturers reflect an implicit opinion. Lecturers who occupy a position elsewhere are not seen the same way because they are less activist and less politicized.”  
77:4 (University former high-level administrator)

It took five more years of debate and conflict until a subgroup of lecturers after seeing the unionization of all other groups of UQAM employees, decide to form their own union.

- 1971, Foundation of SEUQAM union of employees
- 1971-1972, creation of ACUQAM’s managers’ association
- 1976, Foundation of AGEUQAM union of students

In 1978, lecturers represented more than 55% of the University’s teaching staff and they succeeded in obtaining their union accreditation. This long battle is still imprinted in the union narrative. Figure AX1 illustrates the timeline of period 1.

Figure AX1. Period 1 – Foundation of UQAM



### 12.1.1 The negotiation of a joint regulation between university administration and lecturers

This first period led to the creation of a joint regulation between two negotiating parties, the university administration, and lecturers. Although university administration and lecturers are the main parties at the negotiating table, more actors influence this negotiation including department administrations, professors, and students. In this joint regulation appears the first version of the meta-rule “*clause-reserve*”. Several stakes are leading to the creation of this joint regulation: many groups of actors with conflicting interests and varied needs, scarce resources as well as external environmental pressures. These same stakes and main groups of actors remain present with fluctuating intensity throughout the evolution of the rule and regulation from periods 1 to 5.

The first negotiating party is the university administration. The university administration accounts for the needs of all departments each varying needs and interests. Furthermore, the university administration is pressured by professors who are actively involved in committee decision making and comprise most university decision makers. Moreover, the university administration must consider its academic mission and strategic goals while balancing resources. Such goals include increasing teaching quality, developing graduate-level programs and research.

The union of lecturers is the second negotiating party. The university’s constant and fast growth created a status of nearly full-time lecturers for almost 50% of lecturers. The other half of lecturers occupy another job and mostly teach at night. Organizational frictions had been experienced between lecturers and professors from 1971 to 1976 regarding unionization. Then lecturers negotiated their collective agreement that reached an arbitration process against the university. A settlement was reached in 1979. Table AA1 illustrates narratives from two different standpoints.

Table AX1 – Administration’s and Lecturer’s Perspective at First Negotiation

## ADMINISTRATION

This decentralized structure, largely self-managed, UQAM owes it largely to the activism of its unions and particularly the Syndicat des Professeurs de l'Université du Québec à Montréal (SPUQ). The great strike of 1976 is in UQAM's memory the real moment of the founding of the self-managed UQAM.

91:8 (Press)

Well, because a collective agreement is an agreement between a boss and his employees. The boss wanted that, not the employees, but you have to compromise, there are clauses that I don't like in the collective agreement for the lecturers, that's not what people on the employee side want, I want to say.

96 :1 (University Administrator)

It was the first negotiation against the labor code; there is an impasse, so it went to arbitration

(Former University Administrator)

## LECTURERS

In 1975, the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa had the National Assembly vote for the Charter of human rights and freedoms. The Charter is a fundamental law that prevails over any other law or regulation within the legislative competence of Quebec. ... and freedom of association.

25: 1 (Lecturers' Union)

Every time a new group of workers tries to organize, the whole arsenal of delaying proceedings is brought out. Among the lot, the non-recognition of the character of the employee looks good. The instructors, lecturers ... SCCUQ<sup>19</sup> have succeeded in gaining recognition despite this argument widely invoked by the employers.

25:2 (Lecturers' Union)

Over the past three decades, the relationship between the University and the lecturers has changed greatly. Not recognized as a group of employees, instructors and lecturers have become, in a way, partners linked to the functioning of the University. In other universities, you can give course loads to doctoral students. So we are asking to come to terms with the collective agreement for lecturers.

26:5 (Lecturers' Union)

Since the beginning, the SCCUQ has put all its energy to have the lecturers recognized.

26:8 (Lecturers' Union)

We can see how far we have come since the meeting in a brasserie on Sainte-Catherine Street when six people decided to embark on the adventure of organizing a group of precarious education workers. It was at UQAM. It was in 1976.

26:9 (Lecturers' Union)

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<sup>19</sup> SCCUQ : Syndicat des chargées de cours et chargés de cours de l'UQAM – UQAM's Lecturers' Union


that is to say that forty years ago, when was born,... the union of lecturers (uh), a lecturer in fact was nothing before,... he was a lawyer or a retired professor who gave lessons ... gave him a contract ... a third of what a professor costs (hesitating). Since they were already employed elsewhere it was a small compensation to come and present his expertise. But since it costs a lot less for a lecturer than a professor, we started to (uh) develop a lot until we managed to get 60% of the courses to be given by lecturers. . And there, therefore, this body of employment which had no union representation will unionize and therefore....97:1 (Lecturer, Representative of Union of Lecturers)

### 12.1.2 The creation of meta-rule *clause-reserve*

The meta-rule *clause-reserve* results from tough negotiation between the university and lecturers. This negotiation was triggered by tensions between competing needs within the university. During this negotiation, actors competed for resources. These actors including the two primary negotiating parties are portrayed in Figure AX2.

- This negotiation includes whether a certain margin should be given to departments for course allocation prior to course attribution to lecturers;
- Establish the margin's proportion, who is eligible, and under which conditions.

Figure AX2. Actors involved in the creation of meta-rule *clause-reserve*



One of the actors represented is the university administration. The university considers the needs of a wide diversity of departments with varying needs and interests. Moreover, professors who have committees lobby to maintain control over course allocation. Moreover, the university requires to consider its academic mission and strategic goals while balancing resources. Such goals include increasing teaching quality, developing graduate-level programs and research. This means attracting, recruiting, retaining, and financing graduate students across a variety of university programs. Because the university is growing fast and budgetary constraints are strict, access to resources is a challenge. Relying on lecturers for more than 50% of the course load has become customary. Even though there is some lobbying to hire more professors and fewer lecturers, financial realities make the meeting of these interests difficult to accommodate. Lecturers have become an important part of the teaching body and are underrepresented in committees and university decision making. Table AX2 lists narratives describing the implications of negotiating the first collective agreement from an administration's standpoint, and why a *clause-réserve* was a key part of the bargaining process.

Table AX2. Negotiation of the first collective agreement - Administration's Perspective

ADMINISTRATION – UNIVERSITY LEVEL
<p>It was the desire of part of the faculty and administrators (vice-rectorate for academic life, vice-rectorate for research) for the development of studies... It was debated for a long time. 76:7 (Former University Administrator)</p> <p>In other universities you can give course loads to doctoral students. So we ask to come to terms with the collective agreement for lecturers 76 :4 (Former University Administrator)</p> <p>Well, because a collective agreement is an agreement between a boss and his employees. The boss did wanted that, not the employees, but you have to compromise, there are clauses that I don't like in the collective agreement for the lecturers, that's not what people on the employee side want, I want to say. 96 :1 (University Administrator)</p> <p>Dean of Studies and Research finds a way of advocating at the Vice-Provost for Academic Life following pressure from professors to find a solution to a problem of promoting higher education... flexibility in the collective agreement for that our students teach. Then we get an agreement from the academics. We're going</p>

to the rector. He agrees to make it a negotiating priority ... to create a reserve clause. We discuss in the direction. The rector asks the Vice-Rector of HR and Vice-Rector of Academics to work on the offer. It's a good idea, now we have to defend it. In the way, you think it's 20%, but at 20% it's impossible to negotiate. How much will it be possible to negotiate? Ex. 12% We come back to the management team.

Then we validate with the vice-rector of finance on the monetary side in a more targeted way. Politically, during this time, the rector could call the chairman of the board who would probe the independent members out of the session that this is a human resource rule with an academic mission.76:10 (Former University Administrator)

The union of lecturers is the second negotiating party. The university's constant and fast growth created the status of nearly full-time lecturers for nearly half of this particular teaching body. The other half occupy another job and mostly teach at night. Lecturers are disadvantaged by the meta-rule *clause-reserve*. Yet if there is no provision allowing departments some flexibility in assigning guest lecturers, graduate students, or others, departments will find ways around regulation in order to achieve desired results. Professors account for the majority of decision makers in departments. Agreeing to have this rule represents a compromise in a negotiation to negotiate on something else and attempt to constraint behavior that otherwise would remain illicit. Table AX3 captures citations from the lecturers' points of view regarding the negotiation.

Table AX3. Negotiation of the first collective agreement - Lecturers' Perspective

LECTURERS
<p><b>Meta-rule creation</b></p> <p>(uh) those are the two sides of a coin as they say. There is a certain, there is a side of the coin which says, the lecturers would be happy because it allows to stabilize the jobs and there is the other side of the coin, but it is that it does not give not the opportunity for (uh) Ph.D.s to teach to see if they like the job too. (Uh) So it's, y'know, it's a rule I don't want to judge too much, to try to find a balance between these two 63:32 (Lecturer)</p> <p>So the reserve clause in my opinion it must be born from this contradiction. Because before the departments could give course loads to whomever they wanted. So here we can book courses for our students, there is no problem and from the moment the union is born (uh) this is where this specification must be born on the courses we can book, because it is born in this contradiction between (uh) when is the moment when the lecturers will choose theirs or when is the moment when the departments attribute them to whomever they want 97:1 (Lecturer, Representative of Union of Lecturers)</p>



<p>Because it's to go beyond the convention of lecturers that we are creating this thing. Before we didn't have to go over anything, it was the department the director who decided who was going to give (uh) the course loads, but it is not by hypothesis, it is not 97:39 (Lecturer, Representative of Union of Lecturers)</p>
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Other actors' needs are also taken into account but are not the primary negotiating parties. Students' needs are considered through the voice of professors. Professors are research directors for graduate students and they also coordinate new programs at the graduate level. For professors, allowing students to teach is an important facet of training students. Allowing master students, but more importantly, Ph.D. students to teach and gain experience is a common practice in most large universities and is an expected practice for any university desiring to develop and research program. Furthermore, providing financing opportunities is an essential part of retaining students. Table AX4 captures citations from other stakeholders' points of view regarding the negotiation.

Table AX4. Negotiation of first collective agreement – Other stakeholders' perspective

PROFESSORS, DEPARTEMENTS AND STUDENTS
<p><b>Meta-rule creation</b></p> <p>There are several interested, a certain number of professors are lobbying. 76 :3 (Former University Administrator)</p> <p>It was the desire of part of the faculty and administrators (vice-provost for academic life, vice-provost e for research) for the development of studies ... It was debated for a long time. 76 :7 (Former University Administrator)</p> <p>It's hard to say, but I can say it was more of the big master's and doctoral programs. 76 :8 (Former University Administrator)</p> <p>It's because we want to train uhh, y'know there are two reasons. One reason for funding is a way of funding our doctoral students, but above all it is also a way of giving them experience, because there is a large proportion of postgraduate and doctoral students. who want to become a professor. So this experience would have been essential. So the "Reserve Clause" gives them a priority that they wouldn't have otherwise. 65:24 (Professor, Department Administration)</p>

### 12.1.3 The birth of the meta-rule “*clause-réserve*”

The *clause-reserve* is the result of compromise on the part of all parties involved. Hence, the meta-rule is not necessarily satisfactory to all parties; yet it represents the meeting point of competing interests and needs. This compromise was born as a university-wide control rule within a joint regulation negotiated between university administration and the union of lecturers. This first negotiation took place prior to the first arbitration sentence, hence before 1978. At this particular point in time, the meta-rule is located at article 8.02 of the collective agreement. This meta-rule can be characterized as a pre-determined organizational slack, as its name “reserve” suggests. This rule captures a slack of 10% of course loads not attributed to professors in order to allow departments local flexibility in resource allocation. Table AX5 lists citations exemplifying the meta-rule *clause-reserve* as pre-determined organizational slack.

Table AX5. Meta-rule *clause-reserve* as pre-determined organizational slack

#### **Professors**

“Well... I know technically that allowing students to access course loads once the teachers have filled their charge that normally gives them a right of priority over these charges before the lecturers. So after everyone ... everyone beyond the aspects of how it works after everyone interprets his role differently.” (45:35) (Professor)

Its mission, I would tell you, is to ... give a little experience to doctoral students who want to become university professor. So giving them experience as a professor is one of the things. The second thing is to offer them funding during their studies. 59:29 (Professor)

‘I believe that there are strong issues related to the fact that it was important to fund students and also to give them a way to start teaching.’ (45:41) (Professor)

#### **Lecturers**

Oh no I haven't even read it (eh). I don't know it's to allow hiring people (uh) with no experience who otherwise might not (uh) might not have had a first-class experience 97:42 (Lecturer, Representative, Union of Lecturers)

...shows that it is mainly the students, students and trainees who benefit from the reservation, which is, is consistent with the spirit of this clause whose main purpose is to enable graduate students to gain teaching experience. 20:40 (Union of lecturers, 2000)

We're going to say 6 or 7 percent of the courses are reserved for the entire university. Now by doing that (uh), the reserve clause is really noble, and all of that, like I said is for training, now it's at the application level, I know it creates a lot of, of, of (uh) problems. Well, one of the first problems there is, being said that it's for all the courses available (uh) there are some departments that are going to take a lot more than others. 63:18 (Lecturer)

There is the mission of ensuring an income, but there is also the teaching. Because people are going to have to teach. When people do a doctorate, facilitating research, give a course, it's part of the job. 70 :28 (Lecturer)

### **Department Administration**

Well ...) the reserve clause is all there in the agreement it is 5% of the complete UQAM which allows the reserve clause since only we cannot. In fact research in the agreement ()... in each trimester it is two clauses per year, per doctoral student therefore () these are rules that are already agreed, we, our policy is () that demand is higher than we can offer, it's to be able to eliminate some with constraints 66 :10 (Professor, Department Administration)

### **Students**

she let me know that she has no room and it's been a long time since... she couldn't bring someone else in because in fact she has a percentage, it is again lecturers 67 :34 (Student)

The organizational slack designed into this rule to enable local flexibility results in areas of ambiguity in rule application that impact the university's organizational slack. Areas of ambiguity led to the emergence of interpretation and application problems. These areas of ambiguity increased slack for departmental rule application. As a result, the areas of ambiguity generated a broader array of possible behavior and practices throughout the organization and therefore increased variability of rule application.

*Area of ambiguity #1: The qualification of experts.* Article 8.02 a) stipulates that the university can hire experts. Expert qualifications and who qualifies them, remain for debate in 2019. Table AX6

*Area of ambiguity #2: Use of Meta-rule to manipulate the job posting process.* Article 8.05 stipulates that articles 8.02, 8.03, and 8.04 cannot be used to manipulate the job posting process and deliberately limit postings to lecturers. These challenges still transpire in today's narratives and this stipulation still appears in the meta-rule. Table AX7

*Area of ambiguity #3: University-wide 10% quota.* The establishment of a 10% university-wide quota causes confusion in the application. Application is determined by each department, and the quota is measured at the university level. Although the quota was lowered to 8% in 1990, and again to 6.5% in 2015; the university-wide quota remains a challenge and will be discussed during the next collective agreement negotiation. Table AX8

*Area of ambiguity #4: Student registered in advanced studies.* The wording used to qualify students entitled to clause causes ambiguity. In 1986, a committee is put in place to assess course attribution, most specifically in the case of postdoctoral fellows<sup>20</sup>. This ambiguity begins to be clarified in the meta-rule in 1990. Table AX9

Table AX6 – Area of Ambiguity on Qualification of Experts

QUALIFICATION OF EXPERTS
<b>Meta-rule (1978-1979)</b>
a) the hiring of a lecturer of reputation because of his outstanding contribution to the advancement of scientific, technical, artistic or literary research and education, as evidenced by publications or productions; 2:17
<b>Slack triggered by ambiguity</b>
...course in reserve clause was not a person of reputation. According to the Union, this was a violation of Article 10.02(a) of the collective bargaining agreement. After hearing the evidence, the grievance arbitrator found that the Departmental Assembly did not appear to have given serious consideration to the applicant's record to assess whether she was a person of reputation. On the other hand, the adjudicator confirmed that in order to judge whether a person is of reputation, the person must be in one of two

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<sup>20</sup> **Postdoctoral fellow – Post-doctorant.e:** postdoctoral researcher interning with a professor to complete a research project. In the context of this study, postdoctoral fellows have an employee status at the host university.

situations: have outstanding professional experience or have made an outstanding contribution to the advancement of technical, scientific, artistic, or literary research and education. In this case, the individual in the proviso did not meet either of these criteria. 85:7 (Union of lecturer, 2015)

Well actually the department first of all, it's the department that decides that. So they're supposed to have criteria and then they understand what someone of reputation is. I mean someone of reputation is not a doctoral student who has just finished and whom we like and who would be fun to teach. It's someone who is recognized by his peers and who has perhaps been innovative in the field, so he stands out in terms of excellence. So it's different from the reserve clause to encourage a student who is a doctorate student, that's another one, there are several definitions including (um) a person of reputation. It's someone who has an established reputation in the field by peers who makes publications and so on. So at first we in the department thought that they should not look at this because they gave the reserve clause. When we started to scrutinize, we said yes, and then they-other people-found the person to have an innovative practice, and one of them passed, but the others (um,) we found that they could not demonstrate that this was a person of reputation. 96:3 (University administrator)

...well it's always a question of the intention of the people. You know we said earlier (uh), somebody can say I understand what the reputation clause is but (uh) they feel like it's not really enforced you know (uh) nobody's watching that. So they decide to maybe be a little bit lax in (uh) enforcing it by saying well (uh) we don't look at that we never had a grievance. We've done it before and no one has ever told us anything, so we're going to keep doing it like that 96:4 (University administrator)

we've lost a lot of teachers and we don't have the expertise, we don't have a reputation that means we won't be able to bring in guest teachers or things like that 71:28 (Student)

In science too, there are a lot of visiting professors, things like that, we'll put all that in the reserve clause, which means that the lecturers often find themselves stuck. 71:30 (Student)

Table AX7 - Area of Ambiguity on Manipulation of the Job Posting Process

MANIPULATION OF THE JOB POSTING PROCESS
<b>Meta-rule (1978-1979)</b>
8.05 The application of clauses 8.02, 8.03 and 8.04 shall not be used deliberately as a means of limiting the application of the posting and course load allocation mechanisms of the Collective Agreement; 2:19
<b>Slack triggered by ambiguity</b>
... who is the holder of the chair and who (uh), already knew me, gave me the challenge, asked me if I wanted to redo the entire course because he was not at all in agreement with the version, not satisfied with the version that had been given by the lecturer for about ten years, (He had a lot of complaints from students, so he saw it as an opportunity for someone more specialized to come in and revamp the course. 69:34 (Student)

Well, everyone does that. Yes, with the lecturers' convention, the directors (um) well, it happens and then why, because sometimes the path is too long to get rid of someone who (um) doesn't suit them. Since it's a long and difficult way to put together a file and all that, they look for other rules, they use the rules to get their way. 96:7 (University administrator)

But the idea is to prevent abuses and that's what they do systematically when they want to block a lecturer for x, y reason, it's often ideological (uh) sometimes, yes it's that there are some who can be temperamental, but often it's ideological. But we will systematically give these courses to students to finally eject them from the pool and (uh) at that point, two years later they are no longer part of the map. So (uh) obviously it's extremely difficult to prove, that's why we need to have objective mechanisms to prevent these abuses but (uh) that's my experience with (laughs) this regulation 97 :3 (Lecturer)

And among the people in charge there is a lot of precariousness, there are many who only give one or two charges per year. And so when it happens to these lecturers, I have one who has just been ejected from the pool because he is no longer part of the lecturers' union because he hasn't given his courses for over two years. Well, it's the combined effect, we hired a professor who was teaching the two courses that he had always taught and the few courses that he could have taught, well, they were given to the doctoral students of this professor who was hired in his place (laughter). 97:45 (Lecturer)

Because let's suppose that once you don't have access to your course in the summer, it's okay if the following year they don't do it again (um) either the same student or another one. At that point, it's more viable, because at that point we're eliminating a course load for a lecturer 97:47 (Lecturer)

Otherwise, in PUBLIC POLICY, it's mostly the other case of saying such and such a lecturer, we don't like him, we want to neutralize him, so we're going to try to find students to give that course (laughter) it's pathetic but that's how it is, it's... 97:49 (Lecturer)

Table AX8 - Area of Ambiguity on the University-Wide Quota

UNIVERSITY-WIDE 10% QUOTA
<b>Meta-rule (1978-1979)</b>
8.02 A departmental assembly may subtract from the posting a number of course loads not to exceed, on an annual basis and for the university as a whole, ten percent (10%) of the total unallocated faculty course loads when such departmental meeting, prior to the posting.... 2:17
<b>Slack triggered by ambiguity</b>
Does the reserve clause have to be applied on a department-by-department basis or is it by university? So uh...we'll say 10%. Does 10% have to be applied in each department? Which could be problematic for some departments or, on the contrary, it's done on the whole campus, which has other advantages and disadvantages depending on the structure of the department, but... 71:39 (Student)
Well, yes, more so, because before, they were more or less monitoring the percentage, but now they've asked us to monitor it. And it's difficult because basically it's the first one to arrive, our problem is that

it's the first one to arrive. But when we see, we analyze it from session to session, I think we haven't passed it. But when we see a department that gives a lot of provisos we tell them we are restricting them. We don't have a choice because we know that on average everyone should have the right you know to give (uh) I'm just saying that at least one. But when in a department that's made that gives ten, well basically if he comes rather than the others, he would take away the chance for the others to be able to give reserve clauses so that... 96:6 (University administrator)

I think somebody had told me that in one department that they had almost 15%, 20% of the courses that were assigned to... to (uh) the reserve clause. Again because there are some faculties that have less and some faculties can have more. So it's closely monitored, for example, if the university ever exceeds the percentage, the famous 6-7 that I don't remember, um, that's monitored, that's correct, but as I said there are (um) we end up with faculties (um) or departments that have, that use much more than others, which means that as I said, there are lecturers who end up with sessions of no courses, on the dole. 63:21 (Lecturer)

From the moment that there are some departments that have never used this reserve clause there (uh) well it lowers the percentage at the national level. So there are departments that get up to 30% of their courses from this. 97:31 (Lecturer)

Yeah well) the example that (uh) I give of the 30% but just and less how do you say that of two or third hand (laughs) it's not a direct testimony. Well, the friend in question who was excluded is... he's part of it, but if not, it's precisely those cases with people who are... well, the 30% where there is really abuse. 97:48 (Lecturer)

So if we take the example of the 30%, it's an interpretation that falls within the framework of the law because the rule was poorly defined, poorly negotiated or we didn't manage to negotiate it more precisely than that. And so it is interpreted that way, but that does not go in the spirit of the rule, because the limitation of the number of, of reserve clauses is precisely to prevent their abuse. And in this case, it means that there are too many of them and that there are no more (um) so that's the reason why (um) there are misinterpretations or divergent interpretations, because of divergent interests. And it's the same ones that were there in the first place. 97:74 (Lecturer)

Table AX9 - Area of Ambiguity on Students Registered in Advanced Studies

STUDENTS REGISTERED IN ADVANCED STUDIES
<p><b>Meta-rule (1978-1979)</b></p> <p>8.02 (b) the hiring of a student enrolled in an advanced study program at the university. 2 :17</p> <p><b>Meta-rule (1990-1993)</b></p> <p>(b) the hiring of a student enrolled in an advanced studies program at the University or a post-doctoral fellow.</p>

10.04 Persons referred to in clause 10.02 shall meet the qualification requirements for teaching, shall teach only one course load per year...

### **Slack triggered by ambiguity**

While the doctoral student, even if he doesn't answer because I don't think he is obliged to answer the EQEs, if there is no doctorate, then we don't give them, we don't make them teach doc courses there. But if, for example, it's a master's course and then he (uh) has a doctorate (uh) there's no doctorate, well, we let him teach the course because in principle the reserve clauses give the students, the professor must supervise. 96:8 (University administrator)

In the case of the rule on post-docs and students, the reserve clause there, the doctoral students, it's not written post-doc, it's marked for graduate students. And then (uh) and then (uh) then it was written post doc trainee, but I don't remember, anyway, then the interpretation of the union of that rule who read it there, who didn't have all the experience of where it came from the rule, and then the rest of us either, said, but that's not what it means. But I had people who had been applying it for a long time who couldn't tell me the origin of the rule because they were technicians, they hadn't participated in the negotiations, but they had been there for 25 years and they applied the rule in the same way, yes that. We were told that we had to do it like that because the bosses had discussed something, but today when we reread the rule together, we said it's true we didn't write that, but then they-others were saying but that doesn't mean that we were obliged to make changes to the rule. Why because we had lost the history of why it had been put in place (cough) even I tell you I even called the people who were there at the time to say but explain to me what you wanted to write. I'm telling you because there is a letter of agreement associated with this rule, there is a letter of agreement with respect to the rule and then when you read it you say oh my God it's marked with respect to such and such a case and then we don't even know what it refers to, so it created confusion because the people who put it in place who understood each other at the time are no longer there. 96:9 (University administrator)

I think it's ridiculous that... our... that... that you can't offer a maximum number of courses that a student can take as a reserve clause and that's because there's a rule for lecturers. And the second one is the postdoc. The fact that postdocs can't take the reserve clause given their profile and reasons for doing a postdoc. These are the two things that I think are getting in the way. 59:45 (Professor administrator)

(uh) yes it's that we were giving it to graduate students I think we weren't just doing the Ph.D. I think the reserve clauses we were giving to people who had masters and Ph.D. and then I'm not sure, uh interns post doc. And then when we reread the rule we said yes, but it was) you're not even allowed to give to people who are at... who have the master's degree, it seems to me that it's just post-graduate and then why did you add (uh) I don't know if post-docs weren't in there or in any case. So that (uh) makes it like there was an unspoken expectation on both sides that wasn't necessarily written down there maybe that wasn't written down or worded so that it was super clear there. But the people and the parties had agreed and we had never had a grievance on that and then suddenly everyone changed, the union party said well no, it's not good, I'm giving you a grievance, whereas we said, well let's see, we said well it's you, we ?) it's true that we do something as it should be. Then the person who applies it says no, no we have always applied it like that. But it's true that when we read it, it could be confusing and then the interpretation was not clear, the rule was not clear. 96:11 (University administrator)



## 12.2 Period 2 – 1980 to 1989. Period of growth

Celebrating UQAM's 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary, the second period was characterized by the university's growth. Hostilities experienced in the 70s have stopped.

In addition, the older ones have retired. Quite quickly we start to see new people. After 10 years the shuffling was somewhat done 77 :1 (Former high-level university administrator)

As a result, the university went through its first and second university financing campaigns. The significant increase in enrolment, with a high of 35, 000 students in 1985, required an adjustment in how the university functioned. During this period, it experiences an increased reliance upon lecturers for course delivery.

Professors take advantage of the conflict to discuss the impact of the policy on hiring lecturers on the working conditions, the study conditions of students, and the working conditions of regular professors. They are negotiating a job opening clause to gradually reduce the percentage of courses given by lecturers. Under this clause, the University is expected to open 383 faculty positions within five years, ie by the end of 1982. The University does not apply the clause. 26:10 (Union of lecturers)

Moreover, there is an enhanced sense of belonging as people can rally beyond the institution's successes. This growth leads to several inaugurations for new programs and new buildings. Lecturers aspire to have a greater role within the university and better recognition for their participation. Despite their relative importance in course delivery (more than 50% of courses), they face precarity of employment. They aspire to access a clause (gateway clause) that would entitle them to bridge to professor status contingent upon some criteria.

The negotiation of the second collective agreement for the union of lecturers took place in Spring 1980 and discussed the role of lecturers, double employment, and participation in decision making bodies.

At this point, the university was intensifying its research mission and therefore expanding its graduate program offering. By 1985, the university now counts 12 Ph.D. programs, 31 masters et 5 graduate diplomas, and 122 undergrad programs.

“in the 80s we were trying to develop higher education and research. It was an institutional priority. Expansion of masters and doctoral level programs... there is an important need to finance students over the course of their studies. Many put pressures, among which professors. In other universities, we can give course loads to Ph.D. students. So people were asking us to deal with the lecturers’ collective agreement” 76:3 (Former high-level university administrator)

“On the admissions side - age and work experience set students apart from other universities. So we had to have a full-time offer - part-time and evenings and weekends as well. Before it was only full-time. It was necessary to have programs in new fields: communication, sexology, arts, theater, and to do research on new themes” 77:2 (Former high-level university administrator)

This growth stage is concluded by a modification to the Law on the University of Quebec that appeared to be inevitable to some considering the size and expansion experienced by UQAM over the last two decades.


The next day, the government put an end to the strike by resorting to a special law, Law 48, which will force the return to work of those in charge. The law orders the resumption of classes from 8 a.m. on May 11. It renews the elements of the old agreement until December 31, 1988, and fixes the rates of pay for a course load according to the parameters of the public sector, without taking into account the principle put forward by the Union, i.e. "For work of equal value, equal pay". 26:12 (Union of lecturers)

It was later necessary to amend parts of the law in order to change the status of UQAM and grant university status in order to negotiate agreements with other universities, to be able to give diplomas. A political agreement that is not in the law puts an end to equalization. This is beneficial for all faculty. Another factor to explain the search for other sizes compared to others. Never again has the head office had the upper hand in the choice of the president. 77:7 (Former high-level university administrator)

This change to the law not only brings many changes for the university but also implies changes in status for lecturers.

The 80s period is also marked by a seven-week strike by professors, recuperation as an institutional preoccupation, and the 1987 adoption of gender equality and access to employment policy.

Figure AX3. Period 2 – Period of institutional growth



### 12.2.1 Evolution of the meta-rule

The important growth experienced by the university over the course of this decade resulted in many organizational transformations.

it's hard to say, but I can say it was more of the big masters and doctoral programs 76:80 (Former high-level university administrator)

There were people from the administration (academic vice-rectorate, or whatever it was called at the time) who asked for a relaxation of the collective agreement in order to have financial leverage 76 :5 (Former high-level university administrator)

In 1980, the lecturers' new collective agreement expands by two articles, going from 23 to 25 sections, one of which details union representation articles. As a result, the meta-rule moves to clause 9.02 and remains part of the job posting meta-rule. It represents the second collective agreement and discusses subjects such as the role of lecturers, double employment, and participation in decision making bodies.

With the signing of the third collective agreement in 1983, the collective agreement expands to a total of 30 sections. Among the additions, the double employment status condition status moves, the meta-rule to 10.02; it remains part of the job posting meta-rule.

In 1986, 1986 a letter of agreement was signed to extend the collective agreement until 1989. Moreover, in line with the negotiation of UQAM's new status in 1989, 1989, important new definitions appear in collective agreements that will grant more power to departmental assembly in accordance with SPUQ definitions. Table AX10 details meta-rule changes, additions, and complexifications that occurred over the course of Period 2.

Table AX10. Rule proliferation during period 2

<b>Control rule changes</b>
1980 The quota of reserve from 10% to 8% The option of hiring a company was removed Student accessibility to the reserve was reduced from one course per semester to one per year
1983 The meta-rule now expanded into a greater section divided into an intro of course attribution The meta-rule assigns decision power to departmental assembly; There is a structure change in the meta-rule which now brings course posting under a different sub-topic and the meta-rule "reserve-clause" under another sub-topic; There is a change of wording from "hire a lecturer of reputation" to "hire a person of reputation"
<b>Control rule additions</b>
1980 A lecturer cannot use the meta-rule to access course loads Added the possibility to hire university managers
1983 Added precision at the beginning of course attribution meta-rule
<b>Rule complexifications</b>
1980 Added application terms that relies on course posting that indicates that posting must start 75 days notice prior to beginning of semester Added a dependency to another article stipulating that an additional 4% specific to university managers and people of reputation Added a condition that an employee under the lecturers' collective agreement cannot benefit from the meta-rule Added a dependency on another article stating that people hired under 9.02 can only be hired once then they fall under the collective agreement
1983 Added a condition for retired professors indicating that this group can access a maximum of 10 courses for Fall and Winter semesters for all university Added a dependency on another article indicating that people of reputation, university managers, and retired profs cannot exceed 4%; Added a dependency on another article stating that students and university managers have a limit 2 courses per semester, and retired professors a maximum of 1 per semester

Added a dependency on another article stipulating that people using this meta-rule must abide by collective agreement except for article 8 which is for earning points of seniority.

1986

There was a committee created to discuss course attribution and specifically, course attribution for postdoctoral fellows.

1989

Letter of agreement 2 is signed with regards to the meta-rule to define qualifications of retired professors

### 12.3 Period 3 – 1990 to 1999. Period of Institutional Organization

Throughout this period, the university experienced important budget compressions resulting in postponed collective agreement negotiations.

1995 was a period of budget cuts. But I was less involved since during this period I was a professor and no longer part of the administration... 76:11 (Former high-level university administrator)

This government interference also results in restrictions on working conditions. Subject to budget cuts, UQAM is experiencing constraints that force its administrators to review its mandate. 26:15 (Union of lecturers)

In total, the combined effects of the increase in the target average and the decrease in student registrations (by 11.8% between 1993-1994 and 1997-1998) resulted in a loss of course loads of 24.5% for our members, the number of course loads assumed by lecturers going from 4,158 to 3,140. 20:30 (Union of lecturers)

Negotiations for the renewal of the agreement began in March 1995, a few months before the end of the latter. The members vote on the main principles at the General Assembly on March 16. They opt for the search for a solution to the financial crisis while maintaining three objectives: quality of education, solidarity, and work-sharing. 26:4 (Union of lecturers)

From 1993 to 1996, the collective agreement was extended twice mainly to meet the requirements of laws extending collective agreements in the public sector. However, the 1996-2000 agreement, accepted in the context of major budget cuts and in the face of the threat of a possible repetition of the 1982 salary cuts, pushed integration further by associating it with the notion of "enlargement of the task". in complementarity (and not in replacement!...) of the tasks assumed by the teaching staff. 26:16 (union of lecturers)

Coping and managing the significant growth experienced during the 80s; the 90s represent a period of an institutional organization where institutional isomorphism is observed. UQAM shifts into a

standardized higher-level education structure as is commonly seen in Canada. For instance, the year 1990 welcomes the Foundation of the Institute of Environmental Sciences and the Institute for feminist studies as well as recognition of lecturers in university life.


When the strike ended, a decisive period began for the UQAM lecturers. It will be marked by two parallel steps: greater institutional recognition and the renewal of collective agreements. First, the lecturers will obtain greater institutional recognition 26:13 (Union of lecturers)

Over the course of this decade, there are negotiations on whether to organize university administration into faculties. Negotiations concluded in 1997 when 6 faculties and one management school are created.

Moreover, in 1992, the University grants its first honorary doctorate and pavilions are inaugurated.

Figure AX4 illustrates period 3's timeline.

Figure AX4. Period 3 – Period of institutional organization



### 12.3.1 Evolution of the meta-rule

The last period ended with important modifications to the law of the University of Quebec, some important impacts are observed at the regulation level delegating more power and autonomy to the University due to its size and growth. These changes have implications on lecturers' place and recognition within the institution.

At UQAM, the long strike, its settlement by law, and the debates surrounding the Opinion of the Council of Universities had called into question the place and role of lecturers in the institution. Even if the strike ended with a special law, the balance of power, the solidarities created and the heated discussions ultimately played a positive role 26 :3 (Union of lecturers)

Over the past three decades, the relationship between the University and the lecturers has changed greatly. Not recognized as a group of employees, instructors and lecturers have become, in a way, partners linked to the functioning of the University. 26:5 (Union of lecturers)

In 1988, the government used a law forcing extensions of collective agreements in the public sector to force a return in class. The 1990's collective agreement is thus the first collective agreement since 1983. The new collective agreement now contains 36 sections as compared to 30 in 1983.

In 1990, postdoctoral fellows are added to the pool of eligible candidates to clause-reserve. This rule emerges from the complexification experienced during the last period. Meanwhile, the university-wide quota remains. Furthermore, we see the addition of the feminine form in the written rule.

In this collective agreement, another outbound work-in-progress complexification was experienced. This complexification also pertains to a zone of ambiguity. It took the form of a letter of agreement calling for the formation of a committee to discuss teaching possibilities for students.

After this new collective agreement was signed in 1990, it was extended twice more. Once with a 1994 letter of agreement and once more in 1995. In 1996, another collective agreement was negotiated to add the 37<sup>th</sup> section. This 5<sup>th</sup> collective agreement was valid until 2000.



Upon the renewal of the collective agreement in 1996, no noticeable changes, additions, or complexifications were made to the meta-rule. Nevertheless, the inclusion of language teachers in 1999, in the union of professors will involve a series of modifications in four sections of the meta-rule for the next collective agreement.

Table AX11 details meta-rule changes, additions, and complexifications that occurred throughout Period 3.

Table AX11. Rule proliferation during period 3

<b>Control rule changes</b>
1990 Feminization of rule text; 10.01 assigns decision power more directly to departmental assembly Addition of professional experience as a qualification for external experts
<b>Control rule additions</b>
1990 Inclusion of postdoctoral fellows with students registered in advanced studies
<b>Rule complexifications</b>
1990 New contingences capping number of courses per semester per type of individuals Letter of agreement on the formation of a committee exploring teaching possibilities for students

#### 12.4 Period 4 – 2000 to 2008. University Governance Policy

Characterized by turmoil and financial challenges, this period is eventful and is central in redefining university governance. Including a global financial crisis as well as student and community strikes in response to the government's rise in tuition fees; the new millennium brings change.

Lecturers make a big stride starting with negotiating a new collective agreement. This negotiation included a special request to fund the *clause-reserve* with a fee equivalent to 1% of teaching staff salary. This request was denied in negotiation.

In 2005, however, student turmoil was initiated by an isolated sociology group at UQAM and is quickly generalized throughout the province. Coinciding with UQAM's governance scandal on "Îlot Voyageur" in which top university administrators became entangled in and mismanaged a commercial real estate project resulting in dire financial circumstances for the university; province-wide tuition raises exacerbated public opinion that Quebec universities were poorly administered and changes were in order.


2006 was a year of financial problems with the science campus and "*ilot voyageur*" 76:12 (Former High-Level University Administrator)

And there have also been changes to the balance of power within the Board and "Ilot voyageur" made it even worse, but it's so incredible what happened around the scandal of the "Ilot voyageur" (uh) the only ones who opposed it were the unions and student associations. And from there (uh), they concluded that there was a governance problem and that we must have more external executives to UQAM, while these external executives who did not look at what Minister Roch Denis was proposing or something like that, the Minister what am I saying? Rector Roch Denis, so at the time (uh) the only ones who really did their job as responsible administrators and looked at documents and said it's not) we must refuse this PPP (uh) 97:17 (Lecturer, Representative, Union of lecturers)

This paved the way for the 'Red Square' movement protesting against Bill 32 on university governance, against tuition raises, and promoting access to higher education.

The 2007-2008 global financial crisis aggravated a situation that was already politically charged. Nevertheless, the rise in unemployment led people back to school. Figure AX5 illustrates key moments of period 4.

Figure AX5. Period 4 – University Governance Policy



#### 12.4.1 Evolution of the meta-rule

In 2000, the lecturers' collective agreement goes down from 37 sections to 35 sections. It is the first time that the joint regulation experiences a decrease in the number of sections over the course of its lifetime. It will grow back to 36 sections with the 2003 and 2006 versions of the collective agreement.

The last collective agreement negotiated by the professor's stakeholder group integrated a subunit for language teachers. This important change to their collective agreement resulted in several changes in the regulation and the meta-rule. This change implies that each time professors are mentioned in the meta-rule, language teachers are also added. However, this change triggers more important implications than solely rewording. The number of courses allocated through "clause-

reserve” was calculated based on the number of courses taught by professors. This change, therefore, implies a change in course allocation calculation to include courses taught by language teachers. Moreover, it also means that retired language teachers have access to the clause to teach in the same way retired professors do.

Article 10.4 now lists several conditions for the different groups of individuals targeted by the meta-rule. In 2000, there is a change in the order in which these conditions are listed. It was again changed and reordered in 2006. Nevertheless, a contradiction in 10.4 indicating that individuals using this clause could use it only once, was removed. It was contradicting other rule text outlining the number of courses allowed per person, therefore implying that individuals could use it more than once. There are also changes in the limit of courses allowed for students and for external experts. Furthermore, we observe an additional change that allows using external experts under Clause-reserve up to three times.

In article 10.5 there is a switch from the word “salaried” to “lecturer” referring to workers who abide by the lecturers’ collective agreement. This change allows specifying that this phrase specifically targets active lecturers under the collective agreement and differentiates them from other university workers who could potentially be eligible to access the meta-rule.

In 2006, we observe the inclusion of important limitations of rule application for students. A maximum of four years is added for master students and six years for Ph.D. students. There is also the addition of a condition that teaching should not hinder the normal progress of studies which is left to individual interpretation.

The parties declare that the teaching activities assumed by students by the application this clause shall not constitute a barrier to academic journey of the student and the student.” 28:2 (Clause-Reserve, 2006-2008)

you know I don't know if it means lying but you know technically every time you ask for your course load, lecturer you need the signatures of the professors who sign, who say, who certify if we can say that, no it does not delay your progress of thesis, then in my case well ...) I do not know to what extent my research director and well ...) John Smith in this case who was my, my, my

teaching resource person was aware or not that obviously my thesis was slowed down. It would be a lie to say that it was not slowed down. 69:65 (Student)

Furthermore, there is the addition of an important complexification. Letter of agreement 301 was drafted to assist in the application of article 10.04.

Table AX12 details meta-rule changes, additions, and complexifications that occurred over the course of Period 4.

Table AX12. Rule Proliferation during period 4

<b>Control rule changes</b>
2000 Order change in article 10.4; Phrasing change from « salaried » to « lecturer » in 10.5
2006 Contradiction in 10.4 stipulating that individuals can only benefit from meta-rule once is removed Change in course load limit for students (1 per year for master students; 2 per year for doctoral students and postdocs) Change in course load limit for external experts (2 per semester)
<b>Control rule additions</b>
2000 Language teachers are integrated with professors' collective agreement;
<b>Rule complexifications</b>
2000 Doctoral students can now give two courses per year, with some exceptions, without exceeding 6 credits
2006 Letter 301 on the application of article 10. 04 Addition of the condition stipulating that teaching does not hinder the progress of studies Addition of new student dependency: a cap of 6 years for doctoral students and 4 years for master students Change to hiring cap for external experts to three times maximum

## 12.5 Period 5 – 2009-2019. Red Squares


This period starts with the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of UQAM and ends with its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary.

Living the repercussion of the global economic crisis of 2007-2008; tuition raises by the government in 2010 led to the culmination of student and community uprising. By 2012 the Red Square Movement have gained full strength and momentum.

This led to solidified negotiations for various bargaining groups such as the union of lecturers. The five-day strike of 2016 is the first one since 1987.

In 2015 and 2016 UQAM's business school has become one of the largest business schools in Canada in its number of students. Its size and contribution to the economic viability of the university bring about the subject of increased financial autonomy from the rest of the institution. Figure AX6 illustrates key moments of period 5.

Figure AX6. Period 5 – Red Square



### 12.5.1 Evolution of the meta-rule

The collective agreement expands from 36 sections in 2006 to 38 sections in 2009 and 2012. It will grow to 43 sections in 2015.

In 2009, ACCENT is introduced in the rule as the primary vehicle for postings and communicating between union and university. There is an addition to represent how maternity leave should be treated for Reserve-clause candidates. Furthermore, there are many additions to clarify which articles of the collective agreement apply to *clause-reserve* candidates. Prior to 2009, the rule stipulated that the entirety of the collective agreement applied except for article 8. This addition is major and complexifies the application of the rule.

The 2009 collective agreement integrates the ACCENT software in the application of the rule. ACCENT is software used by university and department administrators in course allocation management. This integration of ACCENT will have further implications in 2012. In 2012 ACCENT is introduced in 10.03 as the vehicle by which to inform lecturers of course offerings and selections. As such it is removed from 10.02.

Although 2012 does not bring too many transformations to the meta-rule, the 2015 version brings many changes. Authorization from the service teaching staff is now formally required for reserved course allocations. There are also modifications made to the students' condition for teaching under the reserve. For instance, teaching equivalence requirements (EQE) are no longer required for students and for external experts. Furthermore, reference to letter 301 for the application of the meta-rule was removed as a result of ACCENT's integration in the application in 2009.



The most significant change is a reduction of the percentage allowance of reserved courses under the clause that went from 8% of courses allocated to professors and language teachers to 6.5%.

Over the course of this period, three of the departments observed during the study out of six developed their own local policy on how to implement the meta-rule. Table AX13 details meta-rule changes, additions, and complexifications that occurred throughout period 5.

Table AX13. Rule proliferation during period 5

<b>Control rule changes</b>
<p>2009</p> <p>Integration of ACCENT software in rule application</p> <p>Removal of outbound contingency indicating that lecturers teaching under the meta-rule are to abide by all collective agreement except, article 8</p> <p>2012</p> <p>10.03 article integrate information protocol through ACCENT</p> <p>ACCENT was removed from article 10.02</p> <p>2015</p> <p>University-wide percent allowance was reduced from 8% to 6.5%</p> <p>Teaching equivalence requirements (EQE) were removed for students and external experts</p> <p>Removal of reference to letter 301</p> <p>Addition of acronym SETUE</p> <p>Addition of acronym AFPC</p> <p>Removal of postdoctoral fellows</p>
<b>Control rule additions</b>
<p>2009</p> <p>Addition of maternity leave</p> <p>2015</p> <p>Addition of a new authorization requirement from teaching staff service</p> <p>Addition of a new requirement for student stipulating that they need to be monitored by a professor</p>
<b>Rule complexifications</b>
<p>2009</p> <p>Addition of outbound dependency indicating that lecturers teaching under the meta-rule are to abide by a list of articles in the collective agreement (Définition (article 1), Langue de travail : clause 2.05, Libertés politiques et universitaires et non-discrimination : clauses 5.01 et 5.02, Cotisation syndicale : clause 6.03, Réserve : clauses 10.02 à 10.05, Engagement : clauses 11.01 à 11.04, Annulation : clause 12.01, Tâche (article 13), Procédure de règlement de griefs et d'arbitrage (article 19), pour les dispositions de la convention qui s'appliquent à ces personnes, Traitement : clauses 20.01 et 20.03, Vacances (article 21), Congé de maladie, lésions professionnelles et santé et sécurité, au travail pour le trimestre où la personne a obtenu une charge,</p>

de cours et tombe en invalidité (article 23), Versement du traitement (article 24), Divers : clauses 25.01, 25.04 et 25.05, Droits d'auteur, d'auteur (article 26).

2015

Être inscrit au 2<sup>ème</sup> cycle et avoir complété avec succès quatre (4) trimestres de son programme si elle, il est engagé pour donner un cours dont l'exigence de qualification pour l'enseignement est la maîtrise

Être inscrit au troisième (3<sup>e</sup>) cycle et avoir complété un (1) trimestre, si elle, il est engagé pour donner un cours dont l'exigence de qualification pour l'enseignement est le doctorat ou une scolarité de doctorat


## ANNEX B

### EMBEDDED CASES UNITS ANALYSIS (DEPARTMENT 1 TO 6)

#### 13.1 Case 1: Organization Studies

Figure AX7 summarizes data gathered for Case 1.

Figure AX7. Case 1 Summary



Although some courses may require computer labs and some research labs may be technical, Organizations Studies mostly rely on traditional classroom settings. This department is characterized by its large size (Table AX14) and the diversity of expertise coexisting under the same administration (Table AX15). For the sake of this case study, the multiple disciplines such as THEME1, THEME2, and THEME 3.

As a result of this variety in expertise, course offerings in Organization Studies tremendously diversified. What's more, some of the courses are highly technical in nature. As a result, there is a great number of courses offered. Yet, because of the broad variety of disciplines, course offering is limited within the scope of each subject matter.

Courses such as THEME101 appear to be the ideal course to start as a professor since it is perceived as the introduction to THEME1, THEME2, and THEME3 topics (Table AX16). However, it is challenging for students to access the meta-rule provision for THEME101. There is therefore a large course bank for this course, but very few courses available for Ph.D. students to teach. This results in poor resource availability for students.

There is a distinctive autonomous regulation operating at the department level that is only discernable through close examination. For instance, the understanding that students are required to only apply to departments to which their thesis director belongs has become part of autonomous regulation. It has become generally accepted as a local rule and ensures the functionality of the application. The local departmental application process which requires lobbying and negotiating with different professors has become part of the process and expected behavior.

Table AX14. Citations illustrating the size of the department

Size of the department
<p>Yeah, I would tell you that the hick is that we are a department that is almost unique. The sizes of the departments at UQAM will vary...I would say that most of the departments will be around 30, 30-35. ... There is only one department that is bigger than us and that is the Social Science department. And they are one discipline and their structure is different. That is to say that their whole batch of PhDs, the world is together ... The problem I have with our department, in other words, it's multidisciplinary and there are a ton of programs, which means that to manage all that, it's not the same structure. So it's... I would say that... I would say that it's not necessarily the rule that has evolved badly, it's that we have grown quite significantly, which means that we stand out a little. UQAM has modified the convention a little bit by saying that now, the departments that have more than 50 professors, can now have an assistant. This has been in place for a year. But the role of the assistant. What is his role, what are his prerogatives, what are his responsibilities? It's all that... it's all that side that is not. It's all that... it's all that side that's not... that needs to be defined. and that's not quite there. 59:20 (Professor Administrator)</p> <p>for example the department when I came in in 2001, we were 28 professors, we're up to 64. So a lot of development. And now, at 64, it's almost impossible to think that we're going to develop and so on... 59:12 (Professor Administrator)</p> <p>Yeah, I think it's maybe because we're bigger, because it's complicated to calculate the number of loads 45:88 (Professor)</p> <p>If you ask a course like mine that has sixty groups, there's a better chance that she's going to ask for a group that's a style... a course that's taught by two people... we're not going to take someone away from you to give it to you, that's part of it, but... 68:44 (Student)</p> <p>It comes, it definitely comes from... it comes from, for example recently I learned that there's going to be a split in the Organization Studies department. Uhh...I didn't have any prior information, we were told that...the department is going to be split in two, uh...) how? under what circumstances? I have no idea, I have no information. I don't know if it's an administrative rule or rearrangement or... 67:4 (Student)</p>

Table AX15. Citations illustrating expertise diversity and disciplinary pluralism

<b>Diversity and disciplinary pluralism</b>
<p>Beginning with the fact that as we have a department with many different disciplines, sometimes some production management students or information systems apply thinking to be able to give THEME101. 45:170 (Professor)</p>
<p>The thing is, we do. We have so many different disciplines that. So that's part of the reason for producing a rule. 45:168 (Professor)</p>
<p>The problem I have with our department in other words it's multi-disciplinary and the programs are a ton of them, so in order to manage all that, it's not the same structure. So it's... I would say that... I would say that it's not necessarily the rule that has evolved badly, it's that we have grown quite significantly, which means that we stand out a bit. UQAM has modified the convention a little bit by saying that now, the departments that have more than 50 professors, can now have an assistant. This has been in place for a year. But the role of the assistant. What is his role, what are his prerogatives, what are his responsibilities? It's all that... it's all that side that is not. It's all that side that's not, that needs to be defined and that's not quite there. 59:20 (Professor Administrator)</p>
<p>I don't know how things are going to work out, we're waiting, we're waiting for things to happen, but I have no idea, at some point we're going to adapt, we're going to know, already that in the department, as it's not a department that much (ummh...) it's.... .uh.... it's a department where there are several disciplines, we have professors who are... who have a background in THEME 2, others in THEME 1.1, others in THEME 1000, etc. And then others in THEME 1.2. And then others in THEME 3. So it's... in THEME 2.1.1 and all, it's people in THEME 2 studies, it's people who are already working together and they had difficulty to be together. So there's going to be a whole separation, uhm...) bo listen, is it a separation by discipline, I have no idea but there eh...) 67:5 (Student)</p>



Table AX16. Citations illustrating types of courses typically assigned under  
*clause-reserve*

<b>Types of courses</b>
<p>Yeah, I think that maybe it's because we're bigger, because the calculation of the number of loads is complex, that we have .... There are some departments that have one big coordinated course that students can go to and teach. We have several. So they are quite technical, but we have courses THEME 1, THEME2, or THEME 3 45:85 (Professor)</p>
<p>Yes, but I would tell you that right now the reserve clauses are going to teach basic courses at the baccalaureate. So you can count them on one hand right now. A core course in THEME2, a core course in THEME 3, a core course in... so that's where I would tell you that most of the reserve clauses are going to go to core courses where there's already a pre-determined content. So it's much easier for those students to take those courses. Otherwise, developing a course and all that becomes complicated. So often, it's reserve courses that are reserved for... courses that already have 40 or 50 group courses per year. So the professor's role is not as predominant as a master's course that is given one slot per year where it is difficult for someone who is starting out. 59:34 (Professor Administrator)</p>
<p>Actually it was Jim and Lynn who put the book together for the THEME201 course, the book is so complex (sarcasm). I created courses to make sure I didn't have to teach it anymore. 61:7 (Professor)</p>
<p>An internship activity can be in any field, a PEI<sup>21</sup> is students from any program, so there are a dozen courses, so there are academic competitions especially in the School of Business. Because it brings together people from different programs, from different departments - the the teachers can come from any department. And so, I act a little bit like the administrative assistant if you will, well not in the technical, it's the administrative assistant that does it but, the vice dean delegates to me it's kind of</p>

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<sup>21</sup> PEI Programme d'études internationales – ISP International Studies Program

that task there - to find professors for our ESG<sup>22</sup> courses, I have to know these rules because I've already assigned someone to the "reserve clause" and I've also had to understand - (laughs) 62: 16 (Administration)

Yeah well...) the THEME400, it's the first time I taught it this summer it was really interesting. And then as ... in fact, it takes a lot of ... effort so I'll come back as I don't have time, so I'll come back to teach THEME201 which is more ... simple than the London. The problem is that the THEME2.2 actually takes less effort, it's my field, but uhh... it brings me a lot of stress, I'm in front of people you know I'm almost the same age and people who are much older, more experienced, so I don't want to get into trouble with the doc, so I'll come back with THEME2 because I ... I have a lot more control over that. 67:16 (Student)

The first time... but now I have a story... I was in human resources at the beginning. I had another research direction, so this is the first experience and it's in THEME 5 and not in THEME 1. To tell you the truth, you see, I have...my first reserve clause course was in THEME5200, so uh... 68:25 (Student)

but I don't think we have enough doctorates to go beyond that maximum. At the very least, I don't know, I don't have the impression, I've never heard that it caused a problem there. Maybe it happens, but I don't know. But I can't say for sure that you want to give a specific course, which would be the best course you'd like to give according to your research, your field of research, yeah, I think it's maybe because we're bigger because the calculation of the number of loads is complex, that we have .... There are some departments that have only one big coordinated course that students can go to and teach. We have several. So they are quite technical, but we have courses in information systems, like logistics, or management, there are several big ones. 62:25 (Administrator)

The department's rule use is mature. It has developed conventions, procedurals, tools and a local control regulation making rule application more rigid. Associated rule

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<sup>22</sup> ESG École des sciences de la gestion – ESG Business School

proliferation is high. The ambiguity between displayed control regulation and applied autonomous regulation appears to drive most rule application unevenness (Table AX17).


Table AX17. Citations illustrating areas of ambiguity between control and autonomous regulations

<b>The ambiguity between control and autonomous regulations</b>
<p>... it comes from, for example recently I learned that there is going to be a split in the Organization Studies department. Uhh...I didn't have any prior information, we're told that...the department is going to be split in two, uh...) how? under what circumstances? I have no idea, I have no information. I don't know if it's an administrative rule or reorganization or... 67:4 (Student)</p>
<p>After the impact, the impact is really very different uhh from the staff, so us as a lecturer and then us even worse (Laughter) as a Ph.D. student in reserve clause uh.... ) not much... not much... let's see... not much power on that, but I'm still active in the department because I do uh... I'm going to put... I'm going to try to be there to really not... how to say, to make my voice heard because I'm always going to be involved, it takes a lot of time I'm going to be involved 67:7 (Student)</p>
<p>a teaching experience...in a reserve clause and then after that it's a uh..., in fact, it's a... it's a set of rules and then included in a departmental policy. In fact, you have no influence whatsoever. In fact, you expect others to decide for you and then uh.... for example, the fact that...uh... when you want to apply for your EQEs, well...) all the years that you have taught as a reserve clause are not recognized. 67:17 (Student)</p> <p>Well... yeah, I mean afterward, if you're not considered, if you're out of the program, you can... that is... yeah, I'm saying that... I had to know them, I don't remember by heart all the details, but I remember for example that in certain contexts that I hadn't foreseen, for example, I was on leave of absence, I couldn't teach, so things of examples like that. Now I couldn't... I couldn't list all the details of the rule, I know that you have to, you have to get a series of signatures. We are at the mercy of the coordination, that is to say, that... even if it is encouraged that we fund doctoral students, that there are union rules, in reality, I am not necessarily talking about my personal experience, but I have heard cases... reserve clauses granted or not granted in a perfectly arbitrary way. That's it... 68:20 (Student)</p>

## 13.2 Case 2: Business

Figure AX8 summarizes data gathered for Case 2.

Figure AX8. Case 2 Summary



Although some courses may require computer labs and some research labs may be technical in nature, the Business Department mostly relies on traditional classroom settings. It belongs to the same faculty as the Organizational Studies Department. The Business Department is large but smaller than Organization Studies. Expertise within

the department is more homogeneous because this department was once part of a bigger shell containing three disciplines that were later divided into three departments. Nevertheless, its subject matter entails cross-collaboration with numerous other departments to develop and deliver cross-competency courses (Table AX18).

In this department, the meta-rule was actively mobilized as part of a financing plan. The use of the rule does not appear as ambiguous as was the case in the Organizational Studies Department. The Business department is experienced and appears to be agile in mobilizing rules (Table AX19). Students, lecturers, and professors appear knowledgeable about the meta-rule.

There is a distinctive autonomous regulation operating at the department level that is possible to learn by examining more closely. For instance, the understanding that students are required to only apply to departments to which their thesis director belongs has become part of autonomous regulation. The local departmental application process requires lobbying and negotiating with different professors.

Table AX18. Citations illustrating types of courses and cross-departmental collaborations

<b>Types of courses and cross-departmental collaboration</b>
It was divided into three parts, (uh), the part of the department is a scholarship, the department BUSINESS and me is the research chair in INVESTMENT (another department) uh it's a work contract. And in it, it's also included the reserve clauses, (uh), which were guaranteed to me. So I knew that over four years I was going to have a minimum of 60,000, but it could be more than that, so it's a lot of money, but it was given to one student per session, so... ..often it's master's courses, so it's rarer that we're going to give, that the department is going to feel comfortable giving a

master's course to a doctoral student, unless that person has five, six, ten years, I don't know, several years of experience in the industry. But someone like me, for example, who really did the master's degree directly... followed by a doctorate immediately after the master's degree, I was told that it would be surprising to be given a master's course, especially an MBA course. 69:83 (student)

A THEME3 course 70:26 (Lecturer)

A general interest course in which you have more application, basic course, for example, you have the basic THEME, 3300 70:63 (Lecturer)

An internship activity can be in any field, an *PEI* is students from any program, so there are about a dozen courses, so there are academic competitions especially specific to *ESG*. Because it brings together people from different programs, from different departments - the professors can come from any department. And so, I act a little bit like the administrative assistant if you will, well not in the technical, it's the administrative assistant that does it but, the vice dean delegates to me it's kind of that task there - to find professors for our *ESG* courses, I have to know these rules because I've already assigned someone to the "reserve clause" and I've also had to understand - (laughs) 62: 16 (Administration)

So that, uh...when you choose a reserve clause for a basic course, for more or less theoretical courses, the problem doesn't arise. For much more technical courses, uh...it's a problem and it creates debates within the department...and with colleagues where some see that the experience side is not good or another course also comes to mind as well: retail. 94:37 (Professor)

Yes, well, he has to... he'll say yes. Often it's the basic course THEME101 or the course THEME 201 that the student has already corrected several times. So, we know that she's able to teach it, and then for the...for the first time, we're doing paper evaluations instead of doing them online for the students. Yes 95:29 (Administrator)

The department's rule use is mature. It has developed conventions, procedurals, tools, and local control regulation, making rule application more rigid. What's more, this department's direction has advised other departments on how to develop a local control regulation. Associated rule proliferation is moderately high. The ability to mobilize

bureaucratic rules results from important organizational slack leaving some flexibility in application.

Table AX19. Citations illustrating the ability to mobilize bureaucratic rules

<b>Mobilization of <i>clause-reserve</i> and bureaucratic rules</b>
<p>... At the time it was Director (also see Organization Studies #45:189) who was the director uh so they told me that I had been selected and (uh), it's not a grant. They really call it funding because you have to work for it. So it's in three parts uh, for the first part it's the department, yeah the department of doctoral administration that gives a scholarship, (uh), in total it's 60 000 dollars over 4 years, so they gave I think it's ten or twelve thousand dollars, uh the department you're attached to, to which you're attached, so I'm in BUSINESS (uh), they gave a third too. You either needed a research chair or a research director who agreed to give you another third. It was divided into three parts, (uh), the part of the department is a scholarship, the BUSINESS department and me is the research chair in INVESTMENT (other department) uh it's a work contract. And in that, it's also included the reserve clauses, (uh), which were guaranteed to me. So I knew that over four years I was going to have a minimum of 60,000, but it could be more than that, so it's a lot of money, but it was given to one student per session, roughly. 69:4 (student)</p> <p>The university has the right, the department has the right to support... support someone who is a Ph.D. to be able to assign them a course load to provide an income. 70:19 (Lecturer)</p> <p>Well, when they put out the posting of the courses, they will mention the courses that are reserved either for professors or for students or for people who are within the university for the doctorate. 70:23 (Lecturer)</p> <p>here, I just get the emails asking if we want to give the courses? You have to register on such and such a date to be able to benefit from the reserve clause, but I never pursued it because it doesn't suit me. 71:23 No, as I have a job, you know, on my side at the university, I don't need to look for a job here through UQAM, so I... 71:27 (Student)</p>



it is effective because it allows us to prioritize doctoral students who are trained to become professors over the lecturers, so its contribution is very clear: it allows future professors to gain teaching experience. Well, the lecturers who are there to give courses, not necessarily to be professors, if we didn't have this rule, these people would find themselves at the back of the line and might not have the chance to teach. This clause is very correct and very effective. 75:2 (Professor Administrator)

Uhh...I didn't get any prior information, we're told that...the department is going to be split in two, uh...) how? under what circumstances? I have no idea, I have no information. I don't know if it's a rule or an administrative reorganization or... 67:4 (Student)


I was the department chair and I had to... uh... approve. I was one of the signatories on that document approving the actual charge, the granting of the reserve clause. 94:17 (Professor)

From the department and then afterwards I prepare the resolution and I have it voted on in the departmental assembly 95:23 (Administrator)

### 13.3 Case 3: Fine Arts

Figure AX9 summarizes data gathered for Case 3.

Figure AX9. Case 3 Summary




The Fine Arts Department is highly dependent upon physical resources as well as specific classroom layout and specific physical settings. In this department, experts are typically interested in the same subject and study the same discipline, however, they use different tools, practices, and methods. Furthermore, there is an important

distinction between practical expertise and teaching versus theoretical expertise and teaching. Some experts possess only a theoretical background while some have both theoretical and practical expertise. There is a high reliance upon lecturers to fulfill the need to cover a wide array of different practices.

A unique feature of Fine Arts as compared to other departments analyzed is that its doctoral program is faculty-wide. This means that the doctoral program is joint with all other departments of the faculty except for one department. Moreover, most courses are administered by departments, this results in a more complicated rule application and resource availability as illustrated in Figure AX10.

Figure AX10. Centralized Ph.D. Administration



There appears to be a lack of knowledge and experience with Clause-r  serve. This rule is not used very often therefore administrators do not gain much experience mobilizing it as shown in Table 7. The development of the autonomous regulation is therefore still limited and its early stages. As such, we observe the emergence of new conventions and some procedurals that are still new and evolving.


Table AX20. Citations illustrating lack of knowledge with meta-rule

<b>Lack of knowledge with the meta-rule</b>
Because we don't do much of it. Very little, so little the details of the rule we don't come to know it. I know the academic rules much more than that because I am always in the academic rules. 99:14 (Administrator)
I can't tell you because I'm not the one they approach. They would go and see, it's either they would have a good contact, it would be more a student who is doing research with one of the professors, or they go and get their strength, both together. It's with the professor who would make an approach. 102:49 (Administrator)
It seems to me that... and I'm really going by memory, that's the kind of project that maybe, I thought it was really good by the way this idea of a reserve clause I can't even remember if I was in the executive. I don't think I was in the executive yet, I think it was when we had, we were still under the chief executive officer but at the end of his term there like... from memory, winter 20... 16, yes winter 2016 maybe so from what I remember is that, yes winter 2016, whatever, what I remember is that he had a document that had been presented to us it was a resolution, no it wasn't a resolution, it wasn't yet a resolution we people at the meeting often we're going to go in two stages 98: 40 (Professor)
Well...) it happened once, so () for that time, for the other reserve clauses what we have to respect, uh...) what I know about it (uh), this year () I arrived here () that year, I don't know all the history, it can be refused there for different reasons, but this year everything was accepted. 101:38 (Professor Administrator)

## 13.4 Case 4: Human Sciences

Figure AX11 summarizes data gathered for Case 4.

Figure AX11. Case 4 Summary



Although some courses may require computers, some research labs, and equipment, the Human Sciences department is largely reliant on traditional classroom settings. Furthermore, it is characterized by its small size (Table AX21).

The coexistence of expertise within this small department is fascinating. Although experts are unified by their subject of interest, their disciplines and methodologies differ (Table AX22). This brings many different perspectives and ontologies cohabitating within the same small department. Human Sciences has a history of conflict within its ranks. However, over the last few years, new professors came in and other professors retired, thus evacuating part of the conflicts (Table AX23). Nonetheless, this conflictual past seems to remain part of a history that none wants to relive.

Some conflicts were also experienced between lecturers and professors with clause-reserve. There is a perception that the rule could have been used in past instances to indirectly let go of specific lecturers.

It's like with lecturers... if the department gets to a point where they no longer want someone as a lecturer. All they have to do is not put that person's courses on the course list for three sessions and after three sessions, according to the rules and contracts so as not to be a lecturer (er) with the advantage of points you are a lecturer...we already had two people eliminated like that and then one of the people got picked up because they didn't have anyone to teach those classes. 107:24

The variety of disciplines also results in a wide variety of courses (Table AX24). However, given the small size of the department and the number of students, not all courses are offered each semester.

Knowledge about Clause-reserve is uneven within the administration. Still, the presence of an autonomous regulation was observed in the form of one convention and one alternate practice. Slack appears to be very important, therefore there appears to be flexibility in application.

bah...) en fait tout le monde peut le faire ce sont si on ouvre un compte à contenu variable, un cours risque. Ça veut dire qu'on demande de... 108 :66 (Administrator)

Ils n'ont qu'à ne pas mettre les cours de cette personne sur la liste des cours pour trois sessions et au bout de trois sessions, selon les règles et les contrats pour ne plus chargé de cours (euh) avec avantage de points vous êtes chargé de cours, mais en attendant si on vous a appelé pour ça. Et on a déjà eu deux personnes éliminées comme ça et ensuite une des personnes a été repris parce qu'il n'avait personne pour pouvoir enseigner ces cours-là 107 :24 (Lecturer and student)

Table AX21. Size of the department

<b>Size of department</b>
see it's smaller size it's smaller (laughs...) so 106:22 (Professor)
no not many students, this is a small department. There's not, there's what, about twenty Ph.D. students...) 108:47 (Administrator)
No, we are small 109:2 (Administrator)

Table AX22. Diversity of expertise

<b>Diversity of expertise</b>
There's that and then there's also, for example, the Human Sciences, it's a department where people (uh) go to extremely different places, that is to say, they'll have extremely different influences. There's going to be a professor who's going to be, who's going to be an Arab world specialist, another professor who's going to be, who's going to be interested in Indian issues, Nepal, things like that. (Uh) here, even if, I was going to say if even the methodology may seem, ... the methodology used,

no the methodologies are different too but, even if, there is one and the same department (uh) we have to find in fact a common language. And this common language is not self-evident, especially when you come from a discipline with such different fields of research. That I can still imagine in and even for example in a department like (uh) a department in psychology, in (uh) in dynamic psychology for example we have a discipline which is quite clear for example and then there we have common references which is not necessarily the case in the science of TOPIC, you see. 104:11 (Student)

no, it's really particular to the HUMAN SCIENCES because in fact uh...) in fact we say the science of TOPIC but then we speak of DISCIPLINE in fact it's from you see (uh uh) it's me I made a formation human study, socio-human, geography, uh...) NAME1 to and not NAME1 there is an SPECIALIST1, NAME2 is a SPECIALIST2, there is a SPECIALIST3, there is a SPECIALIST4, there is a SPECIALIST5, there is an SPECIALIST6, so who is more of a literary scholar, it's really uh...) 106:26 (Professor)

Table AX23. History of intra-department conflicts

<b>History of intra-department conflicts</b>
<p>because there were barbarians, tensions, there were wars between people, between perspectives within the department I don't know if it was related to organizational rules or it was more related to scientific or epistemological perspectives but otherwise I never attended uh...) 106: 37 (Professor)</p> <p>In one of the situations was that the guy had more interests in other areas, geographic, demographic, and so on. And the department didn't see a need and the reason he's back is because with the new movements in the HUMAN SCIENCES, demographic and geographic have become very important. And we have no one to teach it. And in the other one the woman had applied to become a professor (uh) and it was denied. The rule is that the candidate, if there was experience at UQAM who had more points had the advantage; she had more points, the other was hired. And she had taken the department to court on two things, ageism, and the issue of not having this course. She made almost five hundred thousand dollars from the university and the department said we don't want it anymore, and she was behind the department's</p>



programs and that program fell apart and they're looking to be able to rebuild it but it hasn't happened yet. 107:26 (Lecturer and student)

I think it's not a bad thing, uh...) I think that, but in any case, when I arrived, I was told that there were really wars and even the fact that my position was not filled was filled very late, uh...) it's because, uh...) the, uh...) there were clans and people did not agree on the profile that should be given to the past. 106:114 (Professor)

But we had a guy here in the department who was working on his doc, death and grief and a woman who was working on her masters, death, and grief and at one point he had submitted his proposal for his thesis and a third, it was this woman's paper, without acknowledging that it came from her. And she has no way to prove it. And one day we were together, we were having coffee and NAME1 left, he was there when we were talking and I said I'll ask a question. How does it feel for you satisfying or not satisfying to have given a thesis proposal that is not yours? He knew exactly what I was talking about. He wasn't going to try) He knew exactly. And since then he went to see the director who is my director, we are good friends to tell him this part is not mine it's NAME1's I stole her work, I'm going to redo it. Plain dealing. 107:75 (Lecturer and student)

Table AX24. Types of courses


Types of courses
<p>But here because of the size of the department, the envelope is large, but the number of courses that are drawn from the envelope to offer is small. 107:33 (Lecturer and student) bah...) actually anyone can do this are if you open a variable content account, a course risk. It means that we ask to... 108:66 (Administrator)</p> <p>It's (uh) a form of power trip and the victims are the lecturers that we want to eliminate and the students that need those courses to be able to complete the program. 107:25 (Lecturer and student)</p>

yes for some courses.... well...) the issue is that the teaching to these future professors there are different candidates. the pedagogy is different. They were asking for more hours... no it's more by bulk it's a teaching. It's for future, future professors .... in primary and secondary. So that's different, they ask for more time then.... but they can ask for monitors, monitors to help them in the courses 108:7 - 108:14 (Administrator)

### 13.5 Case 5: Public Policy

Figure AX12 summarizes data gathered for Case 5.

Figure AX12. Case 5 Summary



Although some courses may require computers, some research labs, and equipment, the Public Policy department is largely reliant on traditional classroom settings. Furthermore, this department is moderately large and is a field that has traditionally been male-dominated (Table AX25). Polarities are cohabitating within this department. This polarity opposes experts in male-dominated subjects and a smaller group of experts in female-dominated subjects. The reconciliation between these two groups proves to be challenging at times and results in a conflict-ridden environment (Table AX26).

There are other subjects of research coexisting within the department, but they mostly emerge from one research discipline. Different methodologies can be promoted depending on the group to which one belongs. Because of this polarity between groups, it has been traditional to offer male-dominated courses in the context of clause-reserve, therefore limiting access to courses to other students (Table AX27). The department, therefore, experienced a change in their autonomous regulation to address this issue.

This department is largely male-dominated. Yet there are joint programs with women groups in other departments. Feminist studies are for the most part female students supervised by female professors. This group is very tightly knit. The director of the department is a man belonging to one group and the director of the Ph.D. program is a woman belonging to the other group. This composition appears to generate some frictions and tensions.

There was the creation of a protocol of application. In this protocol of application there exist formal selection criteria (control rules). Yet, there are informal selection criteria that seem to carry more weight. These informal criteria remain ambiguous to students.

Norms are emerging within groups. For instance, the female group of students has an implicit understanding that everyone should get a chance to teach and should therefore communicate before applying and not apply on someone else's course. What seemed to have constructed that implicit understanding is cohesiveness, common values, epistemology and practices, appreciation of others, sense of belonging, lack of negative feedback when embracing this approach, and positive appreciation from peers (minority group).

Organizational slack is driving rule application flexibility. There appear to be a procedural by which the department chooses which courses will be offered in the context of clause-reserve. This provides the department with the flexibility to adapt its offering.

And then (um) it's for the summer and the summer in public policy, there are not many courses offered, you know. And now, well, the two of them applied and well, I know that the program director had said well, let's see, it's still the same two, you know, who are applying. And that's why I say that sometimes, I say to myself) I know that I influenced her thinking on that because she talked to me about it, well I said that yes, it's true that there are always (um) it's true that it's always the same types of courses that are offered, so I'm never going to apply in the summer. Because the courses, these five courses, well, they're not my subjects, well, they're not everyone's subjects either, so, you know, it's normal that the same people apply because after that, the subjects, there are lots of people who work in several (um), in several different fields 111:17 (Student)

Table AX25. Field perceived as male-dominated

<b>Male-dominated field</b>
<p>(laughs) but I'm in a male environment because I'm in a research chair that's just men, but in the PUBLIC POLICY department there are still a lot of women, you know, in feminist studies for example. But it's that it's and) then even in the NAME Chair which is on the TOPIC, but the (uh) remains that there is still a tendency or is there going to be) it's going to be the) a lot of men who are going to, who are going to have the confidence to apply and then send in their applications and then (uh) say well I'm going to teach a course, you know we see it. There are fewer women, you know it's like... that's kind of the director's point too, is to say, we're going to open you know we're going to) because there that's what I was saying, I said it's for sure that with courses like that there are pers) there are no women who's going to apply. I mean it's...(laughs) these are courses that (uh) it's in fields that are more occupied by men, but, uh, yeah that's it... 111:41 (Student)</p> <p>Yeah I think it's a practice that people, I think people who, the professors who have a lot of well it's also probably experience, it's older professors (uh) well for the time</p>

being, here it's mostly men who know the institution very well, who know the rules very well. And who may already have, already, management positions, so compared to me, they know the institution and the rules of UQAM much better than I do and they can handle them. 113:45 (Professor)

Well, the institution is thought by, I'll be direct, by white heterosexual men who thought of the university as a place of truth, so you know when you know there is not just one truth. 112:59 (Student)

Table AX26. History of frictions

**History of frictions**

... But this director, I find that there is a good aspect to this, she is (euh) she has a rather (euh) strong personality and then she lacks a little...a...a... she says a lot of things (laughs) if you want without thinking sometimes of the professional aspect and everything, she...(euh). So she'll like say, she'll like bring to light some, some, some mechanisms that usually are hidden by (laughs) (uh) in the more formal processes. And she will like put them, she will say, well yes but we decided that, but yes but it's all the time like that in the committees and all that. And then there after that if it reveals a little of the, of the (uh) power struggles that has within the committees and all that. And then there are like brought to light so there it awakens frustrations against that person... 111:6 (Student)

uh with uh with my friend, my colleague (uh) where did she, (uh) where did she target him directly by saying the goal is to break down inequality. But she's targeting him like, well I'm going to favor other people. You know I'm going to (uh) because you're not the one who's favored (laughter) but then it becomes like more personal instead of criticizing the system for example, but then it's just, he's the...it's like the perfect example of the system, if you will so she targeted him repeatedly 111:7 (Student)

And (uh) there, my friend (laughter) colleague was really upset that we would dare to suggest a professor that his advisor didn't get along with and who would probably,

I mean when you get to the end of your, of your thesis defense (uh) you don't want a uh 111:9 (Student)

So there's a frustration and (uh) my director went directly to the department chair (uh) to say well let's see what's up, you know everything, and there well there, the bickering because the program director) because the department chair (versus program director), she was angry that we were going over her, you know, instead of going to her directly like we go directly to the department chair. She was upset 111:10 (Student)

And then we got to (uh) the course load (laughs) so at (uh) or did my colleague want to re-file an (uh) wanted to because he already taught a course last year, so he wanted to teach another course this summer. The same course in the fact that he gave, a year and a half ago. And there's him and another friend of ours who's in the same office who's also a white male, who's confident and you know (hesitation). 111:11 (Student)

It's true that if we had a rule in doctoral training that says that teaching is valued more, that would (um) support it (um) and that would support it much more. And I was trying to think how to allow, to diminish a little bit this increased competition between lecturers and doctoral students as well. It would actually be to get out of the precariousness, to allow some stability to the lecturers. Who all in all are really mistreated in the u) Anyway. 113:74 (Professor)

No doubt yes I'm thinking of the former professor who systematically gave his course to his student, hence the fact that the director was super stressed that I was doing it too, the fact that yes there are really conflicts of decades of people who don't talk to each other. So there's in the department, people who don't talk to other people who don't say hello, who don't say good morning and I think there's not that it's) there's not one person isolated. It's gangs. 113:118 (Professor)

As a lecturer, I myself have already had) it was at the beginning perhaps when I was teaching, but I have already had requests for EQEs for introductory courses refused on the pretext that introductory courses required more general knowledge and that the department favoured professors to teach them. So I) it is sure that it is not written anywhere except on an answer of several years ago, but I always kept that in mind by observing that afterward when the courses are withdrawn from the posting it is mainly courses that I was told as a lecturer you can't give, it takes a professor with

more experience. The reserve clause is used to give course loads to people who, by definition, don't have that experience, at least not within the framework of the UQAM university. 114:30 (Lecturer)

(hesitation) what has already happened in my department, in any case, is that professors take a course, so that one will not go to the bank of... of what the lecturers can give in a session. Once we've made our choices and we've responded positively to everything we do, they withdraw from the course at the last minute, so what happens is that it won't go on complementary posting because as a professor they have access to the department's management, and they can propose someone they know at short notice to replace them, including their doctoral students. I know that it has already happened that way, and then it was included in the reserve clause, but it wasn't really... at least that's how it was expressed in the words... 114:48 (Lecturer)



Table AX27. Type of courses

Type of courses
<p>And then (um) it's for the summer and the summer in public policy, there are not many courses offered, you know. And now, well, the two of them applied and well, I know that the program director had said well, let's see, it's still the same two, you know, who are applying. And that's why I say that sometimes, I say to myself) I know that I influenced her thinking on that because she talked to me about it, well I said that yes, it's true that there are always (um) it's true that it's always the same types of courses that are offered, so I'm never going to apply in the summer. Because the courses, these five courses, well, they're not my subjects, well, they're not everyone's subjects either, so, you know, it's normal that the same people apply because after that, the subjects, there are lots of people who work in several (um), in several different fields 111 :17 (Student)</p>
<p>For the real lecturers (uh)then not the...uh. I think it's like disconnected. I don't know, you know in the sense that there's from what I understand, there's a bank of courses that are really going to be taught by the professors or lecturers, the ones that are in the bank. And then they're going to decide some that are going to be for doctoral students removed from the display. But one doesn't overlap with the other. Because you know, in PUBLIC POLICY (laughs) there are courses (laughs) there are basic courses but there are also a lot of advanced courses, it's like, it depends on the (uh) you know, for example, I have (uh) the (uh) there's really a list of courses that are subtracted from the posting. But you know if there's a doctoral student who applies to give it, well it's going to be given, but I don't think the others are going to be given at that time. There are like courses that are given automatically by lecturers or professors. 111:20 (Student)</p>
<p>Oh yeah maybe a convention but more, I think more it's like, you know we know that, ah! such a course but let's say, I'll just give an example, I have a friend of mine who's working on anti-feminism. If the course on anti-feminism opens, well, you know, she's clearly going to apply. I'm going to say to myself, well it's sure that she's the one who's more, like... you know I could give it, but I know that she's, even more, uh she's even more capable than I am to do it. So you know. I don't see why I would apply if I know that she's really the one who's... but, you know, that's in my community of friends, I'm talking about 3-4 people here, it's not... 112:27 (Student)</p>

So it's for the (accents that it's a group of courses) THEME1000 it's not just one course, there are several courses that start with, yeah that's it, the introductory courses, the idea is student retention. So that's the kind of rules that we're trying to adopt in order to deal with the drop in enrolment, so, in the face of the problems that the university is experiencing with the drop in enrolment, at all levels, so that's an idea so that enrolments) retention and enrolment of students because the evaluations show that students prefer to have professors who teach rather than lecturers (cough) or, or students. 113:5 (Professor)

But the vast, vast majority, at least in my department, the withdrawals on the posting are on introductory courses, those are courses that are the lowest siglage, or they're TOPIC, TOPIC1000 and something or the required courses in particular pathways that are by nature general courses. As a lecturer, I myself have already had) it was at the beginning perhaps when I was teaching, but I have already had requests for EQEs that I had done on introductory courses refused on the pretext that introductory courses required more general knowledge and that the department favored professors to give them. So I) it is sure that it is not written anywhere except on an answer of several years ago, but I always kept that in mind by observing that afterward when the courses are withdrawn from the posting it is mainly courses that I was told as a lecturer you can't give, it takes a professor with more experience. The reserve clause is used to give course loads to people who, by definition, don't have this experience, at least not within the framework of the UQAM university. 114:30 (Lecturer)

I would say one, maybe three, because we were talking about the summer. I don't know if it's going to be possible for the summer, but I know that the issue at stake at the last departmental meeting was the TOPIC1000, 1600, which was for the two students with the one who had already given courses and it was for the summer. And the whole issue is going to be, but in the summer we have a lot less course offerings so, well there you go, I think it's two, on average. 113:36 (Professor)


Oh I'll admit I don't know. Oh no, I think it was done pretty quickly, you know, I think it was, I would say, a week. You know, she probably did) because I think it came true when it happened, I think she went: Ah, why is it still the same two, and then she did, but that's why I thought it was really a reflection ... adequate there, it's true there. You know, because I told her, well yes, but (laughs) it's the same courses all the time (laughs) it's sure that it's always the same. Then it's there, you know look, here it's the *TOPIC* Chair, so the summer course is *TOPIC* and then there are three, four courses that are more basic courses and then there are the courses) because

they're courses given by teachers but you know and then in the summer there are fewer people who also apply because they're courses that are condensed, you know it's a more condensed session, so it's two courses per week. The load is greater, you know. So it's definitely going to be two guys who are confident, who are doing these courses, plus...at least there's a lot of them. And it's the same types of courses that are there every summer. And it's there, it's just because she realized it when she did it, why it's the same two who apply? She does well there it's because it's the same courses that are offered all the time. And I was there, but yes, I would never apply in the summer, but I mean, it's the same courses all the time, I don't even look at it, I think, because I know it won't be courses that are (um) interesting. 111:21 (Student)

### 13.6 Case 6: Science

Figure AX13 summarizes data gathered for Case 6.

Figure AX13. Case 6 Summary



The department of Sciences is characterized by above-average access to resources. According to information received by respondents, this department is one of the most generously research-endowed throughout the university. This results in course relief for professors, providing more teaching opportunities to others such as lecturers and Ph.D. students. This also generates research scholarships for students.

Probably, because the majority of our faculty here are funded by uh...) federal government agencies uh...) 118:75

so all the students, it's not the same because there's, it depends on, where the awards come from because we collect at the end of the term tax-free research

awards that are paid out each term. So these scholarships can be paid out of the research funds of the thesis director. They can also come from government grants. For government grants, it's FRQ, SSHRC...things like that that fund students but not automatically. These are grants that are given on the basis of excellence also and the ranking of the students in relation to several criteria related to merit, publications etc. So the doctoral students who receive a fund, a government scholarship, they receive \$7,000 per session, so 21 thousand dollars per year. And this federal grant, it itself gives a limit to the teaching contract that students can take on in parallel. But that's not bad because generally the limit does, it allows us to take a course load per semester. We find ourselves to have had to 21000 plus 5000 not taxable in more frankly for, that goes. On the other hand, the scholarships that are given from the research fund vary according to the labs, the means of the labs, there are labs here that compete with the government, that give scholarships of the style that a government gives is the return of 20 thousand per year. There are others, 20,000 and 25,000, there are others where it's really much lower, it's 15,000, students who are not subsidized by the government who are in a medium-rich laboratory, let's say, are absolutely in precariousness, it's clear 120:38 (Student)

... But in general it's over twenty thousand that we give to doctoral students then uh...) it's fifteen thousand to masters something at the end of additional income. 118: 14 (Professor Administrator)

Materiality appears to play big importance which relates to the high need for resources. This science department requires labs with special requirements as well as specific classroom settings. Consequently, the physical environment is extremely important.

... DISCIPLINE1, DISCIPLINE2 are also used. ...in the lab the best you can get, they're doing lab experiments.... Human laboratories are solutions and then products circulate. ... (116:57) Professor)

The importance of adequate physical environmental setting is associated with very specific types of courses. Many courses in this department follow a project-based approach. This results in having very small yet many groups of the same course

requiring many teaching resources. This increases the reliance on lecturers for the department. Because of the scientific nature of this department, many lecturers are trained researchers with PhDs and postdoctoral fellows.

The reliance on a specific physical environment and the scientific context also brought forth characteristics that are resembling high-reliability organizations. For some laboratory work at different levels that is required in science, the department adopts a very rigid rule application.

For example, we worked with a laboratory that allowed us to work with SCIENTIFIC MATTER. So, at that time, we had to have very specific decontamination rules for the equipment used in that laboratory. We had what we call an autoclave with two doors. So we had very specific rules for decontaminating the equipment, but also, for example, when we entered the laboratory from outside, we had to follow a very specific protocol and then put on the various elements of what we call protective equipment; blues, gloves, the hat. 116:4 (Professor)

Nevertheless, other types of rule applications can be somewhat flexible as is perceived in other departments because of organizational slack and variability in application.

Then it was a strategy in the past where a professor would give a course, actually it was worse than the reserve clauses. The professor takes a course himself knowing that he's going to drop it and give it to a student. 119:51 (Lecturer)

By account of respondents, the scientific nature of its department renders the department more forgiving with internal conflicts than what is seen elsewhere.

Even the professors in the department, it is certain that in SCIENCE, it is perhaps the department that I would say the “softest”, we are not people in general, the students are people who like birds, they listen to documentaries on squirrels. They are not very competitive people. It's special SCIENTISTS. 119:67 (Lecturer)

High availability of resources moderates opportunities for interests and needs to compete, and consequently moderates rule proliferation. Therefore, even though Science experiences a mature use of the rule, moderately high rule proliferation was observed.

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