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THE NETWORKED PROTESTING CROWDS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
A HISTORIC LOOK AT THE GREEN MOVEMENE IN 2009 IN IRAN

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LA FOULE MANIFESTANTE EN RÉSEAUX DANS LE CONTEXTE GLOBAL
UN REGARD HISTORIQUE SUR LE MOUVEMENT VERT EN IRAN EN 2009

MÉMOIRE
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DEDICATION

To my Mother and Father
Who supported me in every step of the way

To Professor Roman Onufrijchuck
The man who inspired hundreds to think critically
the man who inspire me take on this project
may he rest in peace

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

ICT Information Communication Technologies

NPC Networked Protesting Crowds

NSM New Social Movements

RM Resource Mobilization

SAVAK Sazmaz-e Etela'at va Amniat e Keshvar

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RESUMÉ

Ce mémoire aborde l'émergence du Mouvement Vert en Iran en tant que foule manifestante connectée (Networked Protesting Crowds [traduction libre]). Nous soutenons que la foule manifestante est une forme d'action collective dont les pratiques collectives se produisent dans un *Kairos*, soit un moment opportun. Nous défendons que la foule manifestante, en tant qu'action collective, s'articule dans la sphère politique. En utilisant les technologies d'informations connectées (TIC), la foule manifestante connectée parvient à produire des discours politiques et des réseaux de revendications à l'échelle mondiale. Dans ce mémoire, nous mettons en relation le Mouvement Vert, en tant que foule manifestante connectée, avec l'historique des mouvements sociaux en Iran.

Cette recherche démontre que le discours politique du Mouvement Vert était en effet la suite d'une articulation et d'une re-articulation des discours politiques provenant de la révolution constitutionnelle de 1906. De plus, nous démontrons que les technologies d'information connectées ont toujours joué un rôle important dans la formation du discours politique. À travers l'histoire du pays, nous constatons que les foules manifestantes forment différentes entités propres à leurs discours politiques et à la façon dont elles protestent en tant que collectif. Cela signifie que la foule manifestante du Mouvement Vert, à l'instar de ses prédécesseurs, est en mesure de produire plusieurs discours en utilisant les TIC. Finalement, la foule manifestante s'est formée une identité à partir de pratiques collectives lui permettant de se définir comme tel tout en lui donnant cet *éthos* précis.

Mots clés: la foule manifestante, le mouvement vert, la société en reseaux, les mouvements sociaux, démocratie agonistique, Iran, Kairos

ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at how the Green Movement in Iran emerged as Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC). It argues that a protesting crowd is a form of collective action with particular collective practices that produces itself in a *Kairos* (an opportune moment). We argue that a protesting crowd, as a collective action, articulates and communicates the political in the realm of politics. We further argue that Networked Protesting Crowds are protesting crowds that use Information Communication Technologies (ICT) as tools for communicating the political discourse and producing networks of grievances globally. The protesting crowds of the Green Movement, hence, were political collectives who articulated the political discourse in the politics of the country and globally. By using a historical approach, the thesis brings importance to the context of the Green Movement in relation to the history of social movements in Iran.

The research shows that the political discourse of the Green Movement was indeed a continuation of the articulation and re-articulation of political discourses that were born from the constitutional revolution of 1906. It also shows that through the history of social movements in Iran, the usage of ICTs have always played an important role for articulating the political discourse. Lastly, it demonstrates that through the history of country, protesting crowds formed different identities based on their political discourse and the way they protested as protesting crowds. This meant that protesting crowds of the Green Movement, just like their predecessors, were able to articulate several political discourses by using ICT as tools for communication. Lastly, this protesting crowd was able to form its identity from collective practices that made it recognize itself as a protesting crowd. This in return gave the protesting crowds of the Green Movement its precise ethos.

Key words: Protesting Crowds, Green Movement, Networked Society, Social Movements, Agonistic Democracy, Iran, Kairos

INTRODUCTION

One of the most apparent forms of collective action in any social and/or revolutionary movement is the gathering of crowds in a public space as a collective force. The idea behind this thesis comes because of a necessity seen in understanding the protesting crowd from a communicational perspective. The study of social movements is indeed very vast. What I bring forward in this thesis is a precise focus on the idea of protesting crowds and the impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on protesting crowds as collective actions. This thesis takes a particular case, the Iranian Green Movement in 2009, and seeks to understand the protesting crowds of this movement and the way they formed and articulated their discourses during the post-electoral unrest in the country. The importance of the idea of protesting crowds is that it looks at a particular type of crowds and sees it as an agent that articulates the political discourse. Theoretically, I first look at *kairos* (opportune moments) to argue that protesting crowds produce themselves in an opportune moment. I then look at the articulation of political discourse in the Green Movement and how such articulation by the protesting crowds show that they are political subjects that articulate the political discourse in the politics of the country. I finally argue that the way the protesting crowds construct their identity as well as their collective ethos is through their collective practices and through their political articulation. Methodologically, I look at how political discourses were articulated in the history of the country and how such history has influenced the articulation of discourses of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement. I also look at the particular collective practices of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement and seek to understand the significance of these practices as part of the antagonistic discourse of this protesting crowd. Through the analysis of the protesting crowds online and offline, I show that the Green Movement was able to form Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) in order to make their

movement globally noticed.

For me, the protesting crowds used technology as tools for the benefit of the articulation of discourse. Hence, technology is a tool that is creatively used by protesting crowds as a way to articulate and propagate discourses.

The Global Context of the Green Movement

The history of social movements in modern Iran is of great complexity. Since late 19th century, Iran has faced two major revolutions. The first, the constitutional revolution, occurred in early 1900 and led to the formation of a parliament and a constitution while the second, the Islamic Revolution, happened in 1979 and resulted in the change in the governmental system of Iran from monarchy to Islamic Republic. The aim of this thesis is to understand the protesting crowds of the Iranian Green Movement in 2009. The way by which this thesis answers this question is through historical research and discourse analysis. In order to do so, it first looks at the history of social movements in Iran briefly in order to understand where the discourses of the protesting crowds in Iran in 2009 came from and what the implications of these discourses are in relations to history. In this thesis, we look at three major forces that made up the protesting crowd of the Green Movement: the women, the student, and the reformist movement. The thesis finally looks at several cases where protesting crowds were produced either on the streets or online and used opportune moments to produce themselves through particular collective practices. In this chapter, the thesis lays out its central problem by reviewing the literature on social movement theories and crowd theories and shows the limitations of these theories in explaining the protesting crowds of the Green Movement in Iran. It then poses the central question of the thesis along with its central hypothesis.

The 2009 presidential election in June was indeed a turning point in the history of the country. After the defeat of the reformists in the 2005 election, many reformist groups and social groups (religious and non-religious) "mobilized together and presented two reformist candidates in order to change the socio-political state of the country that was created by Ahmadinejad" (Safa, 2013). Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi were the two hopeful candidates from the reformist movements while Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezai were representing the conservative side of the political spectrum (Anṣārī, 2010). The presence of the two reformist candidates indeed created a momentum for the possibility of change in political, economic, as well as social policies that were implemented during Ahmadinejad's presidency. As Harris (2012) argues, one of the important elements that added to the intensity of the 2009 election was the atmosphere of the country and specifically the city of Tehran during the election campaign. The presence of supporters of both conservative and reformist candidates created momentum in the few weeks before Election Day. Also, the candidate debates that were projected in many parks across the city attracted supporters of both sides of the spectrum in these public spaces:

"After each night's televised debate, small and medium-sized groups, mostly young people, would congregate on Tehran's main streets and square off in raucous yet civil debate. Chanted slogans were colloquially crafted and passed along via cellphone text message or by face-to-face contact" (Harris, 2012, p. 440).

This, in return, started the tensions between the supporters of both sides in the weeks before the election. It also allowed limited freedom of expression in terms of the support for each candidate. On June 8, a pro-Mousavi human chain was formed along Tehran's Valiasr Street while a large rally by the supporters of Ahmadinejad was organized in the Mosalla-ye-Tehran mosque (Harris, 2012). As Harris observed, "it

was the very act of attending these interaction rituals that gave rise to the collective solidarity and emotional effervescence that generated the perception of low participation costs" (Harris, 2012 p. 440)[1].

The voter turnout on the Election Day was between 80-85% and the state declared Ahmadinejad a winner with 64% of the vote (Harris, 2012, p.441). The state was clearly expecting some sort of protest from the reformist side since it started arresting Mousavi and Karroubi strategists within the first two days of the elections (Harris, 2012). However, the presence of large protesting crowds in Tehran and other major cities was something that neither the government, nor the media and commentators outside of the country were expecting (Milani, 2010). Also, the usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as cellphones and social media was something that took the government off guard. In the days that followed, the protests continued and the crackdown on protesters intensified. However, the protesting crowds were able to reach and mobilize many individuals and groups outside of the country in support of the movement. This, in turn, made the Green Movement a global movement and put international pressure on the government of Iran in response to their crackdown of the protest. The Green Movement was not able to succeed in many ways in their demands and was stopped after almost a year. However, the legacy of the movement put several seeds of change in the political dynamic of the country and to the eyes of many observers was the inspiration for the Arab Spring that started right after it (Kurzman, 2012). Many critics became pessimistic at the end of the movement and blamed many factors including the discourse of the movement (Harris, 2012), heavy reliance on the Internet and specifically Twitter (Morozov, 2009), and choice of an

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1   What Harris means by this is that the collective, and almost ritualistic, practices that created the hype before the election helped to create momentum whereby the participants of these practices saw participation in the election as a low-risk practice that may result in great change in their lives in a positive way.

alliance between different discourses (Hossein Ghazian in Zareh, 2010) as some of the reasons why the movement did not succeed. However, the fact remains that the post-election movements became an important part of the country's modern history.

CHAPTER I

PROBLEMATIC

The Green Movement was a social movement in Iran. It consisted of protesting crowds that participated in protestations against the results of the election and other dissatisfactions that were rooted in the present situation in the country. The first problem to look at is to understand the current literature in the study of social movements and where can one situate the Green Movement and its protesting crowds within these frameworks of study. The next sections, hence, aims to define the concept of protesting crowd and find where the concept fits within the current theories on social movements. It finally poses the central question as well as the supporting questions that guide this research.

1.1 Social Movements

The current theoretical frameworks on the study of social movements were created largely in the 1970s by two groups. In the United States, the Resource Mobilization School came as a critique of the limitations of collective behaviour theories explaining social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Meanwhile, in Europe, at around the same time, the New Social Movement theory was developed as a critique of the limitations of Marxist theories in explaining social movements as movements

of class (Buechler, 1995). In what follows, I shall explain each school briefly.

1.1.1 Resource Mobilization

Resource Mobilization theory came to look at when and how actors in a social movement secure the surrounding resources to confront and fight their exclusion from conventional political channels (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 286). The Resource Mobilization theory argues that the political actors in a social movement "adopt strategies to environmental constraints and opportunities on the basis of cost-benefit calculus" (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 292). This idea arose partially from the critique of collective behaviour theory and particularly the emergent norm theory (Smelser, 1964; Turner & Killian, 1957). The emergent norm theory looked at how established structures are questioned through the emergence of new norms that may become new structures. Hence, "In the field of collective behaviour, one such effort involves the assertion that new norms or beliefs 'emerge' in situations where old ones fail or few precedents exist" (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1421). The collective behaviourists argued that individuals, as a collective, follow certain collective behaviour or change to new forms of collective behaviour as new norms emerge. In this sense, the individual in this type of theory is not completely aware of his or her actions since he/she would be persuaded to follow the new emergent norm of the collective behaviour. The resource mobilization theory critiqued this idea by arguing that individuals in a social movement act as rational and calculative actors who have the capacity to mobilize different forms of resources around them (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The school defines social movements as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which presents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1217). It looks at how social movements can be organized and structured through different forms of Resource Mobilization. In this sense, Resource Mobilization looks at the examination of "the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to

control or incorporate movements" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1213). Moreover, for this school of thought, social and political actions are organized and structured processes since "all political action is socially structured and that the resources available to activists are patterned accordingly" (Rootes, 1990, p. 7). Hence, Resource Mobilization looks at social movements in terms of the different resources available (economic, political, social, etc.) and aims at finding a pragmatic solution for the success of a social movement by examining how the mobilization of different available resources will lead to concrete successful outcomes in the social movement. The Resource Mobilization theory has a very economic and pragmatic point of view on social movements in the sense that it "makes the assumption that movement activists are at least as calculatively rational as are more conventional political actors and that they will, accordingly, devise strategies of action which makes best use of the resources they have and which minimize the requirement for resources they do not have" (Rootes, 1990, p.7).

1.1.2 New Social Movements School

Another school of thought that came about around the same time as the Resource Mobilization School was that of the New Social Movements (NSM). Thinkers who have greatly influenced this school are Alain Touraine (1971), Alberto Melucci (1996), and Manuel Castells (2011), to name a few. Born in Europe, the school looks at social movements in relation to the collective identity that a social movement creates. The approach was created because of the inadequacies of Marxism in responding to modern social movements (Buechler, 1995). The movement critiqued the classical Marxist approach on two fronts. First, it critiqued the Marxist theories in presuming that "all politically significant social action will derive from the fundamental economic logic of

capitalist production and that all other social logics are secondary at best in shaping such action" (Buechler, 1995, p. 441). The second critique was of the notion "that the most significant social actors will be defined by class relationships rooted in the process of production and that all other social identities are secondary at best in constituting collective actors"(Buechler, 1995, p. 442). Following the "protests around peace, nuclear energy, local autonomy, homosexuality, and feminism that seemed to be displacing the class-based political mobilization in Western Europe in the 1970's and 1980's" (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 286), the new social movement school put forward two basic observations. First, they directed their attention to the fact that the participants of these movements could no longer be categorized by the class structure to which they belonged since these movements were not class-based (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Second, they saw that the participants were not seeking "to gain political and economic concessions from institutional actors, to further their 'interest' in conventional terms" (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 286). For NSM, hence, the newness of the modern social movements was directly related to the identity of the actors who participated in them. The school looks at how modern social movements "fight against not only the re-appropriation of the material structure of the production, but also the collective control on its development, which translates to the re-appropriation of time, of space, and of relations in the existence of the everyday individual" (Melucci, 1978, p. 48). This means that today's social movements look at reappropriating what is around them in relation to the identity of the participants in the movement. Another important idea introduced in this school is that the structure of new social movements is more decentralized and has a strong expressive dimension (Neveu, 2011). In other words, the new social movements look to "other logics of action based in politics, ideology, and culture as the root of much collective action, and they have looked to other sources of identity such as ethnicity, gender and sexuality as the definers of collective identity"(Buechler, 1995, p. 442). As one can see, the New Social Movements School, at its core, is very identity-based.

There are, therefore, two major perspectives in studying social movements. While one focuses on the resources and capacity of a movement in a pragmatic and economical way, the other gives more of its attention on the importance of identity as a key characteristic of modern social movements. There have been attempts in integrating these two theories in recent years (Farro, 2000; Moghadam, 2012). However, the two schools have kept a certain distance from one another due to disagreements in the understanding of social movements and the method of analyzing them.

1.1.3 Reflection on social movement theories

Both of the theories introduced in previous sections have their strengths and weaknesses as theoretical frameworks for understanding social movements. The New Social Movements (NSM) has been instrumental in pointing out the importance of identity in modern social movements. Through historical analysis and reflection on modern social movements, they have pointed out that pluralistic collectives from different class backgrounds can participate in a movement because they identify with the cause of the movement. This means that social movements are no longer solely class-based movements. For instance, an upper-middle-class person would participate in environmental or feminist movement because of the values of these movements and how s/he identifies with these movements instead of the economic class that s/he is associated with. One of the limitations to the NSM theories is the lack of an explanation as to why a social movement starts. As Canel (1997) argues, "NSM theory offers an incomplete account of the origins of social movements and neglects to identify all the processes that intervene in the passage from 'condition' to 'action'" (p. 35). This critique

has been addressed in later years by authors such as Manuel Castells (2013). In Networks of Outrage and Hope, for example, he takes a particular interest in the relation between how outrage ignites a movement and how, in the process of communication through networks, this outrage turns into connectivity and hope. However, even this explanation is not as articulate as the position of Resource Mobilization (RM) theory and their emphasis on political opportunity as the source that commences a social movement (Canel, 1997). RM sees opportunities as instances that come and go. This means that collective actors play the role of seizing the opportunity and using it as a way to commence a movement. However, the articulation of how this works is problematic since RM theorists see the collective actors as rational subjects that identify these opportunities through "a cost-benefit assessment of likelihood of success, given a movement's evaluation of the possible outcomes of its action and the responses of its adversaries and allies" (Canel, 1997, p.41). This eliminates the element of risk taking and altruism that exists in social movements by associating social actors with rational and calculative individuals who are constantly calculating the cost-benefit of their actions. To this extent, the RM theories propose a limited explanation as to how a social movement is ignited.

Another central aspect in understanding the perspectives of these theories is the idea of continuity. For RM theorists, there was never a new chapter in social movements since social movements are understood from an organizational perspective and the importance of understanding social movements is in understanding the way they mobilize resources and organize against a force. This force is often the State. This means that RM theorists believe in continuity within social movements. For Tilly, for instance, contemporary social action repertoires nowadays are no different from those in the early nineteenth-century in that the forms of actions have stayed unchanged (Canel, 1997, p.43). Actions such as rallies, demonstrations, and strikes are well alive

in this day and age as forms of what Tilly calls contentious politics. This is in contrast to NSM theories that show the discontinuity of social movements and the newness of social movements today by looking at the shift in social movements from movements that were centred on class struggles to movements that are centred on identities of the actors who participate in them. The fact of the matter is that both perspectives have valuable propositions to put forward. The challenge in looking at the question of continuity vs. discontinuity in a country like Iran is that the roots of social movements in the country were neither completely class-based, nor completely identity-based. They were, however, always coalition-based, or, as I would like to see it, network-based. During the constitutional revolution, for instance, a loosely connected network of merchants, guilds elders, ulama (religious leaders), Tulab (religious students), and intelligentsia (mostly secular western educated middle class) came together to articulate a discontent against the absolutist power of the king and proposed the adoption of a constitution for the first time in the country (Abrahamian, 1979). The techniques that these groups used were not very western centric. Acts such as sit-ins in mosques and bazars or wearing white clothes as a sign of the will to die (Abrahamian, 1979) are examples of how the so called 'social action repertoire' that Tilly speaks of is limited to a western-centric collection of social actions.

So how, then, one must reflect on the Green Movement in Iran as a social movement? The challenge with social movement theories is simply the fact that they were developed to analyze western-centric movements. Even though they can be used to understand social movements in other places in the world, they are limited in understanding aspects such as the role of religion in a social movement. Hence, neither NSM nor RM is able to solely answer many of the complexities that rise in a social movement such as that of the Green Movement in Iran. What needs to be addressed in the theoretical framework, hence, is an approach that partially borrows from each of

these schools while adding elements that can explain such complexities as the role that religion played in formulating of the identity of the Green Movement as a social justice movement. What needs not to be forgotten, however, is the fact that the Green Movement was a social movement with particular demands and a specific identity and it was formed, just like the constitutional revolution and the Islamic Revolution, through a loosely linked network of alliances. The next section of the problematic looks at the literature on crowds. It looks at two perspectives on crowd. In doing so, it sets the task of thinking about crowds, and precisely protesting crowds, within the context of social movements.

1.2 Crowds

As cities grew bigger and more populated during the Industrial Revolution, new forms of social structures were starting to be established that were unfamiliar to academics in fields such as sociology and criminology. One of the less understood concepts during this time was the notion of crowds. As an academic subject, this concept was brought into academia during the 19th century, mostly in France and Italy (Rubio, 2010). In France, Hyppolyte Taine (1876) published *Les origines de la France contemporaine*, in which he looked at the influence of gatherings of groups in shaping crowds at critical moments of the French Revolution (Rubio, 2010). For Taine, crowds were dangerous entities because they were irrational and unpredictable. In Italy, criminologist Scopio Sighele looked at the problem of crimes committed by groups of people instead of one person. The challenge, at the time, was to know who was to blame if a group committed a crime. Sighele (1892) proceeded to take on the task of theorizing this concept from a criminologist's perspective. In *La foule criminelle* , he argued that the attitudes of individuals change as they join groups and crowds. For Sighele, humans, just like

animals, have tendencies to adapt their behaviors to that of a group (van Ginneken, 1992, p.78). Moreover, "the larger the number of people expressing a certain emotion, the more intense the feeling would become" (van Ginneken, 1992, p. 79). Sighele suggested that members of a crowd create an emotional bond together to the point where they create a "kind of collective crowd" (van Ginneken, 1992, p. 79). Therefore, when joining a group, individuals in the group can be persuaded through the power of suggestion and be easily manipulated into doing things that they would not normally do in their daily lives (Stewart-Steinberg, 2005). While Sighele vaguely touched upon the concepts of crowds as irrational entities, it was Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde who were able to articulate the framework for what came to be known as 'crowd psychology'. The next section looks at the literature of crowd theories. In doing so, it divides the current understanding of crowds into two categories: crowd theories that look at crowds as irrational entities and those that look at them as rational entities.

1.2.1 Crowds as an Irrational Construct

The three major thinkers that introduced the notion of crowds as irrational entities are Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde, and Sigmund Freud. Le Bon and Tarde were greatly influenced by Taine and Sighele, while Freud took the synthesis of both Tarde and Le Bon and mixed it with psychoanalysis to put forward his theory on crowds.

Known as the father of crowd psychology, Gustav Le Bon is one of the most influential figures in the study of crowds. In his book, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, published first in 1908, he states that he live in the 'Era of Crowds' (Le Bon, 2001, p.8). However, for him, the problem with this idea was that "Civilizations as yet have only

been created and directed by a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. Crowds are only powerful for destruction" (Le Bon, 2001, p. 10). Le Bon's notion of the origin of a crowd is very problematic since he argues that they are "a self-generated being" (Rubio, 2010, p. 5) consisting of "the fusion of individuals in one common sentiment and spirit" (Moscovici, 1985, p. 109). In this way, Le Bon is very close to Sighele in arguing that what "separates crowds from the everyday population is the fact that they come to have a collective mind as soon as they come together as a crowd" (LeBon, 1908, p. 20). This "makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual would feel, think" (Le Bon, 2001, p. 15). As such, for Le Bon, individuals within a crowd reduced their intelligence capacity to that of a crowd since "the mental quality of the individuals composing a crowd must not be brought into consideration. This quality is without importance. From the moment that they form part of a crowd the learned men and the ignoramus are equally incapable of observation" (Le Bon, 2001, p. 24). Therefore, for Le Bon, the crowd follows a herd mentality since, as an entity, it can easily be manipulated. Under four principal characteristics of hypnosis, contagion, suggestion, and leadership, Le Bon presents the pessimistic notion that due to the reduction in their intelligence, individuals in a crowd are hypnotized by the presence of a crowd and their acts can be transferred to one another through acts of contagion and suggestion. Le Bon concludes by arguing that crowds are easily manipulated by a leader since they are in a state where they are vulnerable to any form of manipulation.

Gabriel Tarde was another influential thinker in the field of crowd psychology. Tarde tried to adopt a different perspective from Le Bon in describing the behaviour of crowds. For him, the understanding of human interaction depends heavily on understanding the laws of imitation. This idea was key in Tarde's formulation of his theory of crowds since he argued that crowds form as a result of individuals imitating

the acts of those around them. There is a subtle difference in Tarde's language in contrast with that of Le Bon. For Le Bon, individuals are susceptible to suggestion when they are already in a crowd (Le Bon, 2001). However, for Tarde, individuals are always susceptible to manipulation because they actively imitate those around them. Similar to Le Bon, Tarde believed that crowds could be easily manipulated. On the contrary, for him, there was a difference between artificial and natural crowds. Natural crowds, for Tarde, form organically with the purpose of growing larger because their fundamental goal is to occupy more space (Brighenti, 2010, p.303). A good example of a natural crowd is that of a sports riot. In a sports riot, the crowds are emotionally driven to imitate the acts of those around them and commit acts that they normally would not attempt. The hockey riots in Vancouver, B.C., in 2011 (Lindsay, 2011) are a great example of this type of crowd. The riot started right after the Vancouver Canucks, official hockey team of Vancouver, lost their chance of winning the Stanley Cup by losing the 7th game of the season to the Boston Bruins. What followed, just after the game ended, was a night of mayhem where the crowd looted stores and burned vehicles, continuing until late into the night. What was significant in this example was that the crowd gathered for the purpose of expanding within downtown Vancouver and occupying more space while burning cars and stealing from businesses in different areas of the town. Artificial Crowds, on the other hand, are those that "have absorbed some organizational features in order to last. They have traded space for time" (Brighenti, 2010, p. 303). A good example of this type of crowd is the Military. Artificial crowds are structured, organized, and have a hierarchical formation. Tarde uses this example to argue that the best way to control a crowd is by creating artificial ones in place of natural ones.

The difference between the two types of crowd is rooted in the psychological autonomy of each type of crowd. Natural crowds claim to have a psychological autonomy as a

group while artificial crowds follow a predetermined false consciousness that is pre-ordered for them by some form of structure (Neculau, 2010). Neculau (2010) clarifies this idea in three different distinctions. Natural crowds, as Tarde sees them, are spontaneous and they capture "the empirical reality of a particular kind of large-scale group dynamic with a legitimate claim to psychological autonomy" (Neculau, 2010, p.100). This means that they are not pre-structured and tend to happen unplanned. Because of this, they have a certain psychological autonomy. This is in opposition to artificial crowds that are "reducible to socio-economic conditions and thereby explainable in terms of a system-induced production of false consciousness that normatively underwrites the collective attitudes of the massified individuals" (Neculau, 2010, p.100). There is a problem in understanding the natural vs. artificial crowds because the line that distinguishes these two types of crowds can never be clearly drawn. While one needs to know this as a general knowledge on theories of crowd, the framework is not very useful in analyzing crowds. What we propose, instead, is to look at types of crowds and their particular practices instead of dividing the notion of crowd into two ambiguous categories. This is the reason why we focus on the concept of Networked Protesting Crowds.

The final member of the crowd psychology trio is Sigmund Freud. Freud borrowed greatly from Le Bon and Tarde in establishing his theory on crowds. His perspective, however, uses psychoanalysis to come to conclusions similar to those of Le Bon and Tarde. For Freud, a crowd has within it a collective ego that is separate from each individual that participates in it. Hence, as individuals join a crowd, they give their ego to the crowd in order to become part of the collective ego. However, in doing so, individuals reduce their individuality as they no longer possess their ego. What Freud argues is that crowds are easily manipulated because if someone who plays the role of the leader, or father-figure, replaces the ego-ideal of the crowd, he is able to easily

manipulate the whole crowd (Freud, 1922, p. xi). Hence, for Freud, just as for Le Bon and Tarde, crowds are irrational entities that are susceptible to manipulation by a leader. In a way, behind the 19th and 20th century crowd theories there was a fear of crowds as somewhat of an unknown abstraction (Rokni, 2014) and this fear was dealt with by dismissing crowds as irrational entities.

1.2.2 Crowds as a Rational Construct

After Freud, the interest in crowd psychology morphed into discussions on theories of collective behaviour (Granovetter, 1978; Leach, 1986; Turner & Killian, 1957). Meanwhile, there was a revival of crowd theory with Serge Moscovici's (1985) analysis of the fascist movements in Europe using the theories of Le Bon, Tarde, and Freud in his book *L'âge des foules*. In recent years, a new discourse has emerged, particularly in North America that looks at crowds in a completely different way. In this discourse, the crowd is no longer an irrational entity but a rational one consisting of individuals that make rational choices and who are connected through networked technologies. This discourse circles around two major poles. The first looks at the impact of technology on the mobilization of crowds while the second looks at crowds from an economic perspective. The former is proposed by Howard Rheingold (2005) while the latter is argued by James Surowiecki (2005).

Rheingold, in his book Smart Mobs: *The Next Social Revolution* argues that the greatest success of the Information Communication Technology industry has been the new social practices that it has made possible (Rheingold, 2005). This has been through the new infrastructure that this industry has introduced, which in turn has allowed people

to act together without really knowing one another. Rheingold argues that the next big change in social movements is the appearance of the 'smart mobs'. He defines this concept as a form of mob that "consists of individuals that are capable of acting together without knowing each other" (Rheingold, 2005 p.16). What makes these mobs interesting is their use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to achieve their goals. Rheingold argues that "Smart mobs emerge when communication and computing technologies amplify human talents for cooperation" (Rheingold, n.d.). Using mostly anecdotes, Rheingold talks about how technology and its capacity to intensify and speed up the process of communication have made mob smartness possible. For him, smart mobs can be formed for different reasons. However, what is common in all of them is the use of ICTs as a way to exchange information and form mobs. One can see how this idea is very technology-centred in the sense that most of the credit for this mob formation is given to the structures that the ICTs have been able to provide to the masses, therein reducing the cost of production and information distribution.

Another discourse on crowds comes from an economic perspective. James Surowiecki (2005) is one of the thinkers who pushes forward the idea of thinking of crowds from an economic perspective. He sees an intelligence or wisdom amongst crowds whose members are not aware of the actions of other members and who are guided by self-interest. Surowiecki uses the observation of Francis Galton in 1907 who "pointed out that the average of all the entries in a 'guess the weight of the ox' competition at a country fair was amazingly accurate – beating not only most of the individual guesses but also those of alleged cattle experts" (Ball, 2014). Hence, crowds produce an unconscious wisdom that can be above the intelligent capacity of an individual. For this to happen, four elements must be present. First, there must be a diversity of opinion. This "refers to information and not to socio-demographics (Surowiecki 2004).

It is important that members of a group have different pieces of information so that combining their responses enriches the prediction" (Murr, 2011). The second element is independence. Following the footsteps of Solomon Asch (1955), Surowiecki argues that group-thinking may cloud the judgment of each individual in a crowd (Murr, 2011). So, for a crowd to be wise, the opinions of the individuals should not be influenced by those around them. The third element is decentralization, which refers to the decentralized knowledge of each individual in the crowd (Murr, 2011). The fourth element is aggregation. Aggregation is the idea that through the gathering of all these three elements, the crowd acquires a unique wisdom that surpasses that of an individual. Surowiecki's idea is very economic-centred in that it looks at crowds as an aggregation of egoistic actors that create a transcendent wisdom by the mere fact of putting their individual input in a collective setting. For Surowiecki, collectivity is not very productive. Aggregation of actors that follow their own self-interest is what makes crowds more intelligent than their individual parts.

There are, thus, two major ways of approaching the idea of crowds. The first comes from crowd psychology and sees crowds as irrational entities. For Crowd psychologists like Le Bon and Freud, the individual changes his/her behaviour and becomes part of the psyche or soul of the crowd when he/she participates in it. This is a fairly pessimistic way of looking at crowds because it presumes that the individual has no agency and control over him/herself once he/she is part of the entity. This is also problematic because crowd psychologists never really clarify what type of crowd they address. As we saw earlier, even Tarde's notion of artificial versus natural crowds started to become problematic when this division was seen as unclear. The second way of thinking about crowds looks at it as rational entities. This way of thinking about crowds focuses on the technological or economic arguments. For one side, the accumulation and aggregation of people through the usage of technology create new

kinds of crowds that are smart. This is a very techno-deterministic argument in that it sees technology as a neutral tool that is at the heart of the success of future forms of gatherings and protestations. In other words, the fact that people can act together without knowing one another through the usage of technology creates a new way of being together without really being together. The idea of smart mobs, hence, rises from the notion of technology-based participation. The smartness of the mob is in the way they can achieve collective results only through the usage of ICTs. The other side of the rational way of thinking about crowds is argued through economic theory. Here, we see the argument of Surowiecki (2005) who sees crowds as entities that can become intelligent if and only if each individual in the collective follow their own self-interest without knowing about the opinion and decisions of others around them. It puts forward the notion of cooperation through individualism.

1.2.3 Reflection on crowd theories

The first problem in the literature on crowds is the focus on rationality or irrationality of crowds. What I would like to propose, therefore, is to exit this dilemma by accepting that crowds can be rational or irrational depending on the context and there is no way we can be certain of whether they are completely rational or irrational when we think of them. I would like to also bring forward the idea that depending on the type of crowd that we want to study, the compartmental attitudes of each type is different from another. This is because their collective practices and the way they come together and act together is different. Hence, I wish to point to the problem with both irrational and rational schools of thought on crowds by arguing that "crowds" must be understood as a field of study and not an object of study. Hence, in the field of crowd studies, the

dichotomy of rational vs. irrational is not enough to explain all crowds.

The challenge with crowd theory, from the beginning, is that it is a very generalized theory that includes all forms of crowds under one umbrella. The problem that with this is a very bizarre generalization that looks to explain how all types of crowds would react the same way at all times. For crowd psychologists such as Le Bon, the crowd is an entity that has its own collective consciousness and hence any individual who enters the crowd would reduce their level of consciousness to that of the crowd. It was Tarde who spoke of the distinction between crowd and public for the first time by seeing public as a positive collective entity and crowds as a negative one (McPhail, 1991). Later, Robert Park made a clear distinction between crowds and public by arguing that the difference between that two is that "in the public, interaction takes the form of discussion [...] the crowd does not discuss and hence it does not reflect" (McPhail, 1991, p. 8). Park, and later Blumer, were able to separate a discursive articulation from the crowd by distinguishing crowds from the public. However, they did not to distinguish between different types of crowds. To this extent, they followed the same path as Le Bon and Tarde in generalizing all crowds under one general category. The same goes for thinkers like Serge Tchakhotine (1939) who tried to show how political propaganda during the Nazi regime has been able to condition the masses to commit atrocious acts by using the theory of social conditioning of Pavlov as a theoretical framework. Serge Moscovici (1985) has done the same type of analysis by looking at the theories of Le Bon, Tarde, and Freud to conclude how fascist regimes in Italy and Germany used these theories as the backbone of their strategy to control the masses. Both Moscovici and Tchakhotine assume that crowds lack agency and are easily manipulated by propaganda systems. Hence, crowds can not shape and articulate discourses or identities because they are irrational and prone to manipulation. This is the reason why theories that look at crowds as irrational entities that can be easily

manipulated are not helpful in understanding protesting crowds since they never see protesting crowds as entities with political agency and power.

The same problem is seen with the theoretical framework of Rheinglod (2005) and Surowiecki (2005). They also use the term crowds to address a vague entity that not only includes physical crowds but also looks at crowds and their behaviour online. While in complete opposite spectrum in their analysis, these authors also have a limited perspective on crowds since they look at them as individual entities whose rational behaviour creates an intelligence beyond that of individuals that from them. This sort of rational (in case of Surowiecki) and techno-centric (in case of Rheingold) vision of crowds is problematic since crowds are not really understood as collectives but as an aggregation of selfish individuals that magically contribute to a collectivity that is beyond them. In this spirit, crowds are thought from a very narrow libertarian perspective.

In both rational and irrational ways of thinking about crowds, two important reflections are missing. First of all, it seems that a reflection on identity is missing within the lecture on existing crowd theories. The only reflection on identity goes back to Moscovici and Tchakhotine and the idea that crowds are manipulated and hence their identity is conditioned by something that is beyond their grasp, propaganda machine. This indeed is a weak argument since we see first hand in protests around the world how crowds of protesters from a unique identity that reflects upon their goals and aspirations. Hence, crowds form identities and, more importantly, do so through different collective practices as well as collective articulation of discourses relevant to the situation they are facing. The second reflection is on agency. In both rational and irrational theories on crowds, the reflection on crowds as entities with agency is

missing. One reason why such reflection is not clear in both types of crowd theories is the fact that these theories tend to generalize all forms of crowds into one category. Hence, there may be no difference between a sports riot and a protest against austerity in the eye of these crowd theories.

The importance of thinking about protesting crowds is as followed: protesting crowds are a form of collective action that articulate particular discourses, produce a collective identity and have a particular political agency. For this thesis, hence, I attempt to exit the dichotomy of rational vs. irrational crowd theories because they cannot explain the particularity of a protesting crowd and its importance. I first establish the concept of the protesting crowd. In doing so, I explore the two problems that are not addressed in any of the literature on crowds. The first is the idea that protesting crowds form a certain identity through their collective practices while the second idea is that protesting crowds must be seen as a collective with particular political agency that question a dominant power. In other words, protesting crowds are important political actors in the process of the development and establishment of social movements.

1.3 The Thesis question

The concept of protesting crowds, hence, is the centerpiece of this thesis. In this thesis, we look at a type of crowd in a specific context, the Networked Protesting Crowds of the Green Movement in Iran in 2009. Hence, we seek to understand the way the Green Movement emerged as Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC). This brings us to the central question of the thesis as well as its central hypothesis. The challenge, is to first

and foremost define what a protesting crowd is and show its importance as a collective with political agency within a social movement. I would like to look at three theoretical frameworks in order to do so. First of all, I would like to argue that the protesting crowds of the Green Movement were a collective action that sparked the Green Movement as a social movement. In doing so, I would like to establish the idea that this collective action was able to gain political agency through articulating discourses. For this, I establish a theoretical framework based on the literature proposed by Chantal Mouffe and her idea of pluralistic antagonistic democratic practices. I then use the concept of the "care of the self" by Michel Foucault and argue that one can look at a protesting crowd as a collective entity that constructs its identity through collective articulations and collective practices. Hence, I propose the concept of the "care of the collective" in explaining that protesting crowds and their construction of identity is rooted in the collective practices of this type of crowd and their way of articulating their discourses. In the second volume of D*it et écrit,* Michel Foucault talks about how one shall use his works as tools in an analytical toolbox in order to see how these tools can be used for other reasons. Foucault states the following:

"I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area [...] I would like [my work] to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don't write for an audience, I write for users, not readers" (Foucault in Baker, 2007, p.83)

The notion of the "care of the collective" is indeed using the notion of the "care of the self" as a theoretical tool to look at collective practices in the same way that Foucault saw practices of the self as an analytical tool to understand the *self* and the *subject*. Hence, the notion of the "care of the collective" is a result of my re-appropriation of Foucault's toolbox for understanding a notion that he did not attend to during his life.

Finally, I look at the concept of Kairos, or the opportune moment, by arguing that protesting crowds produce themselves in opportune moments as a form of rhetorical strategy. I use the concept of Kairos in order to distance myself from the idea of political opportunity that was proposed in the literature by RM theorists. This is because I find the economic-centric approach of RM theorists to be limiting in the understanding of the usage of opportune moments. In this thesis I hope to answer this central question through one central hypothesis.

The central question of this thesis is the following:

How did the Green Movement in Iran in 2009 emerged?

This question brings us to our central hypothesis:

The Green Movement in Iran in 2009 emerged as a Networked Protesting Crowd.

What I attempt to find out is how the Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) in Iran allowed the emergence of Green Movement in the country. In order to do so, I aim to lay out a conceptual framework that first conceptualizes what a NPC is and then look at how one can use this conceptual framework to methodologically analyze the case of this particular crowd. The next chapter, thus, establishes the conceptual framework of this thesis.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Metatheory

Methatheory means the theory of theory and is divided between two theoretical perspective of epistemology, and ontology (Miller, 2005, p. 26). Each of these theoretical pillars is important in making a theoretical position within this thesis. This indeed constructs the research paradigm for this thesis. These theoretical paradigms are introduced and justified in this section before introducing the theoretical framework for this thesis.

2.1.1 Ontology

Ontology deals with the question of being. It is a philosophical conception that explores the "science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality" (Guarino & Smith, n.d., p. 155). Roberto Polio argues that "ontology deals with what can be rationally understood, at least partially" (Polio, 2010, p. 1). The reason why ontology is important is that the central question of this thesis is an ontological one since it is looking for the conditions that make possible a crowd. In this matter, this thesis takes the ontological position of Alain Badiou in looking at the concept of being by looking at the concept of Being

alongside Event. In this interpretation, the condition of possibility of a protesting crowd depends not only on what is, but also what disturbs and interrupts what is, the Event. In understanding Badiou's notion of Event (l'évènement), one needs to understand his notion of Being (l'être). For Badiou, the theory of Being contains three theories within it: a theory of multiplicity, a theory of infinity, and a theory of void (Badiou, 2008). Badiou, hence, sees being, or to be, as multiplicity (Meillassoux, 2011). Referring to Cantor and Plato, Badiou makes the argument that ontology is nothing but mathematics since they both share the same three sub-theories of multiplicity, infinity, and void (or zero) (Badiou, 2005, p. 3; Badiou, 2008). He further goes to show that while Being contains multiplicities within itself, it is never the origin of new multiplicities. This is because the basic elements that create the framework of Being, the three theories of multiplicity, infinity, and void, cannot originate new multiplicities. What Badiou means by this is that new multiplicities enter the realm of Being through an Event. Badiou situates Event as something that is supplementary to Being or something that is in the state of Trans Being (trans-être) since it is a form whereby its appearance and disappearance are not separable (Badiou, 2008). Hence, an Event has no objective existence in and of itself since it "emerges along with the subject who recognizes it, or who nominates it as an event" (Dews, 2008). Indeed, Badiou argues that "the situation to-come [the Event] presents everything that the current situation presents, but in addition, it presents a truth. By consequence, it presents innumerable new multiples" (Badiou, 2005, p. 408). Hence, an Event is the source of new ideas and multiplicities in the field of Being.

The position of this thesis is that the understanding of being in and of itself is not enough in understanding the conditions of possibility of the Green Movement in 2009. Instead, these conditions need to be understood through how they entered or re-entered Being through an Event and created new multiplicities in the realm of Being.

2.1.2 Epistemology

Epistemology is the study of what knowledge is. The difference between ontology and epistemology can be understood through the understanding of the concepts that they treat since "ontological concepts are: object, process, event, whole, part, determination, dependency, composition, etc. [while] epistemological concepts are: belief, truth, probability, confirmation, knowledge and all its subsequent modulations (uncertain knowledge, wrong knowledge, etc.)" (Polio, 2010, p.4). Hence, epistemology is the theory of different kinds of knowledge and how they are understood (Polio, 2010). This thesis takes the social constructionist approach with a particular focus on discourse analysis as method as its epistemological approach and methodology respectively. As Vivian Burr (2003) argues, there is no single description of social constructionism. However, there are four key assumptions in the social constructionist approach. The first is that social constructionists take "a critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge" (Burr, 2003, p.2). This approach invites one to "be critical of the idea that our observations of the world unproblematically yield its nature to us" (Burr, 2003, p.3). This is indeed in opposition to positivism that assumes that the nature of the world can be understood through objective observation (Burr, 2003). The second assumption is that our understanding of the world and the way we look at the world "are historically and culturally specific" and relative (Burr, 2003, p.3). The third assumption sees knowledge as something that is sustained by social process. This means that knowledge is constructed through social processes and interactions between people and objects. As Burr argues, "it is through the daily interactions between people in the course of social life that our versions of knowledge become fabricated" (Burr, 2003, p.4). Lastly, constructionists argue that "knowledge and social action go together" since constructions of the world "are bound up with power relations because they have implications for what it is permissible for different people to do, and for how they may

treat others" (Burr, 2003, p.5). This means that there is a relation between power and knowledge whereby "constructions of the world sustain some pattern of social action and exclude others" (Burr, 2003, p.5). Hence, the epistemological stance of this paper is one that sees knowledge as something that is socially constructed and that one can understand an object of study such as the protesting crowd by looking into the discourses that it produces and its relation to the discourses of social movements before it. To this extent, it considers social and historical discourses as key to acquiring knowledge about a phenomenon such as the protesting crowds of the Green Movement in 2009.

This chapter explores the conceptual framework of this thesis and extends the notion of protesting crowds to include the idea of Networked Protesting Crowds. It first looks at establishing the position of protesting crowds within the general context of social movements. It then looks at the practices of the collective and see protesting crowds as a type of collective action who produces its collective identity through collective practices. This protesting crowds recognize themselves and are recognized by others because of their particular collective practices. Following this logic, we argue that the usage of networks or other tools by protesting crowds is part of the innovative ways that they, as collectives, practice their collectivity in creative way.

2.2 A Plight for Democracy

The reason why thousands of people were in the streets in Iran in 2009 was because their last resort to voice their opinion on politics of the country was taken away from

them. The slogan "Where is my vote?" is important because it tells exactly of how many people in the country felt betrayed by seeing that their votes were not heard and were dismissed. This thesis is not about social movements. It is about protesting crowds. What makes protesting crowd relevant as an object of study is their role as an entity with political agency that articulates discourses and demonstrates the grievances of a collective. What makes Iran's Green Movement complicated is that it began as a discursive articulation that showed the desire of a large group of people for change in the system of governance and decision making. However, this is not a sudden realisation in Iran. It has been an historic struggle for social justice and fair representation since constitutional revolution of 1906. Hence, what NSM calls the newness in social movements of post-industrialized societies is not very relevant to the Green Movement since historicity and context become vital pillars of understanding the Green Movement and why Iran faced its biggest social uprising since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The argument by RM about continuity is also not very valid since forms of protestations and mobilization have changed through the history of Iran. This is because the groups that coordinated together in social movements and their forms of coalition have constantly changed throughout the history of the country. Also, the forms of protestation in Iran have changed drastically during the history of the country. What hasn't changed, however, is a plight for democracy. Be it the constitutional revolution, the oil nationalisation movement or the Iranian Revolution, the aim of social movements in Iran has always been about a pluralistic representation of a diverse and complex society.

NSM's focus on identity becomes vital in understanding the Green Movement because there was an identity that was established by the protesting crowds. This identity was articulated through the symbolic usage of a story that was rooted in the Shia'a Islam history, the story of the battle of Imam Hossein and Yazid in Karbala, Iraq. The

importance of this story and the symbolism/discourse used by the protesting crowds in relation to this story shows how the Green Movement used a narrative that has helped shaping the ideological backbone of the post 1979 revolution Iran as a counter-hegemonic narrative against the actions of the government. The Green Movement is a social movement because it is part of a historic struggle for democracy and social justice. What this means, hence, is that what we need as a theoretical framework is not a framework on social movements but a framework on understanding democracy. I would like to hence use the theoretical framework of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (1985) to argue that the Green Movement succeeded in articulating clear discourses to move toward a pluralistic democracy. In this spirit, the protesting crowds of the Green Movement acted as political agents that were concerned with the politics of the country and the way it approached the fundamental democratic right of the nation.

2.2.1 From Deliberative to Agonistic Pluralistic model of Democracy

The challenge of understanding democracy in Iran is that it has never truly existed. Iran's modern history has been an internal struggle between monarchy, theocracy, and secularism and an external struggle with the Western world (England, United States, France, Germany, etc.) as well as the former Soviet Union. The one time Iran saw a brief moment of democracy was indeed crushed by the CIA-led coup d'état against president Mohammad Mosadegh who decided to fight Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now known as British Petroleum) and nationalize the most important natural resource of the country, the oil (Gasiorowski, 2013). This, however, does not have to stop us from thinking about the Green Movement as a social justice movement that is asking to have a voice in the politics of the country. It is hence necessary to reflect on

democratic theory of Chantal Mouffe in explaining some of the tendencies that came out of this movement.

The reason why we can never see democracy in Iran is that there never has been a consensus as to how democracy can be reached in the country. With the Iranian revolution of 1979, a form of democracy was proposed, that of an Islamic Republic. However, this form of democracy also found challenges in positioning itself as a system of reaching consensus. Hence, in thinking democracy in Iran, one needs to have a different notion of democracy that is pluralistic in nature and sees conflict at the heart of its existence. This is the reason why the proposition of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (1985) is a pertinent theoretical tool in understanding the Green Movement and its aspirations.

2.2.2 Deliberative Democracy

Mouffe and Laclau's notion of democracy came as a critique of the proponents of 'deliberative democracy'. The term refers to:

"a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decisions making processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals" (Benhabib in Mouffe, 1999 p.743).

This means that through deliberation and rational discussion, a 'rational consensus' must be reached. Reaching this consensus is based on a procedure that requires impartiality openness, lack of coercion, and unanimity. Combining these values "will

guide the discussion towards generalizable interests to the agreement of all participants and they will produce legitimate outcomes" (Mouffe, 1999, p.747). Deliberative democracy, hence, sees the process of public discussion in rational and inclusive manner as the best way to reach ideal discourses that are inclusive and achieves a consensus between the participants in the public discussion. In other words, "it is possible, thanks to the adequate procedures of deliberation, to reach forms of agreement that would satisfy both rationality (understood as defence of liberal rights) and democratic legitimacy (as represented by popular sovereignty) (Mouffe, 2009, p. 83).

Mouffe proposes a new way of thinking about democracy by critiquing deliberative democracy model from two fronts. The first is the way such models aim to reach certain forms of consensus. Mouffe sees the concept of consensus as problematic. Using Jacque Derrida's work, she argues that deconstruction warns us of how "establishing consensus without exclusion is of fundamental importance for grasping what is at stake in democratic politics" (Critchley & Mouffe, 1996, p. 9). Mouffe sees that thinking of democracy through the lens of consensus brings the dangerous risk of exclusion of voices that have not participated in the reaching of consensus and the undecided voices. Referring to Derrida's work, she argues that "when we accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion, we begin to envisage politics in a different way" (Critchley et al., 1996, p.10). Another critique of deliberative democracy attacks the idea of universalism. In her critique of Habermas, Mouffe argues that Habermas "believes that the emergence of universalist forms of morality and law is the expression of an irreversible collective process of learning, and that to reject this implies a rejection of modernity, undermining the very foundation of democracy's existence" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 9). It is this idea of universalism that makes Mouffe separates herself from deliberative democracy. This is because Mouffe sees that there

is "no longer a role to be played in this project (project of democracy) by the epistemological perspective of the Enlightenment" (Mouffe, 2005, p.10). For this reason, Mouffe proposes the Pluralistic Agonistic model of Democracy.

2.2.3 Agonistic Pluralistic Democracy

The fundamental basis underlying the pluralistic agonistic model of democracy can be found in Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau's book, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. The book proposes to look beyond class since "class is never an a priori formation to the realization of hegemony; any subject position is already caught up in hegemonic relations" (Ballvé, 2011). To this extent, they follow the same critique as the NSM theorists in seeing the limitations of Marxist theories with their focus on class. However, instead of looking at identity formations, Mouffe and Laclau look at two key concepts of 'hegemony' and 'antagonism' to grasp the nature of the political. For them, "the concept of hegemony supposes a theoretical field dominated by the category of articulation" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 93). They continue by defining articulation as "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practices" (Laclau et al., 1985, p.105). Hence articulation is central to the idea of hegemony because it is through articulation that a certain hegemonic order is created and it is also through articulation that hegemonic orders are questioned. Articulation, hence, results in hegemonic orders and conflicts that question hegemonic orders. What articulation produces, in Mouffe and Laclau's view, is the notion of discourse. For them, discourse refers to "the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice" (Laclau et al., 1985. p.105). Unlike Foucault, they reject the distinction between discursive vs. non-discursive practices by arguing the following:

"a) every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction between what is usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totality" (Laclau et al., 1985, 107).

Simply put, discourse includes every object that it constitutes. The moment one gives meaning to something, it becomes part of a discourse. Hence, there is not distinction between discursive and non-discursive objects. Moreover, discourse is a result of practices of articulation. This is important because understanding what is hegemonic and where hegemony is requires one to look at articulation and practices that articulate discourses. This means that articulation is the practice that creates discourses and discourses are central elements that form hegemonic and counter-hegemonic orders.

This brings us to the importance of antagonism and the idea of Radical Negativity. Through their rejection of universalism, Laclau and Mouffe argue for the necessity to "acknowledge the dimension of the political as the ever-present possibility of antagonism and this requires [...] coming to terms with the lack of a final ground and the undecidability that prevades every order" (Mouffe, 2008). To this extent, every social order consists of hegemonic orders that have been resulted from discourse articulations and these orders are never fixed since they can be challenged through the same process of articulation of discourse. Thinking of democracy as antagonistic, hence, requires one to reject universalism and accept the notion that democracy can never be reached in consensus but in constant conflicts that arrange hegemonic order as well as putting them into question though discourse articulation. This reflection has led Mouffe to continue to work on two concepts. The first is the idea of political vs.

Politics and the second is the notion of pluralism as an alternative to the notion of universalism that has been used by the proponents of deliberative democracy.

As it was said in the previous paragraph, the notion of Radical Negativity shows the constant possibility of antagonism and requires one to come to terms "with the lack of final ground and the decidability that pervades every order" (Wagner, & Mouffe, 2013 p.2). This has led us to the reflection that 1) "any order is always the expression of a particular configuration of power relations" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p.2); 2) hegemonic orders rise from articulation practices and; 3) Every order is "susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices that attempt to disarticulate it in an effort to install another form of hegemony" (Mouffe et. al. 2013, p.2). In The Return of the Political, and The Democratic Paradox, Mouffe continues on this reflection and shows how two notions of The Political/Politics must be seen as an ensemble in order to understand how hegemonic orders are put into question and new hegemonic orders are introduced. The political, for Mouffe, is "the antagonistic dimension which is inherent to all human societies" (Mouffe et. al. 2013, p.2). The importance of the political for Mouffe is that "a project of radical and plural democracy has to come to terms with the dimension of conflict and antagonism within the political and has to accept the consequences of irreducible plurality of values" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 152). Hence, political is a dimension of antagonism that keeps a society pluralistic. The political is rooted in the notion of Radical Negativity in the sense that it is there to question norms and orders and keep active the critical and conflictual aspect of society that must stay alive in order for a pluralistic model of democracy to thrive. The political dimension keeps antagonism alive and allows for challenging hegemonic orders that would otherwise not be challenged. Mouffe argues that political "can take many forms and can emerge in diverse social relations" (Mouffe et al. 2013, p.2). She sees the political as being an important player in the notion of politics. For her, politics is "refers to the

ensemble of practices, discourse and institutions that seeks to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in conditions which are always potentially conflicting, since they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p.2). The political, hence, is an ensemble of choices amongst conflicting alternatives that play a role in influencing politics and hegemonic orders. What the political brings to the table is the understanding of identity as relational by the premise that identity comes out of difference. In another word, political identity, for instance, come out of identifying oneself to a set of discourses in relation to other discourses by acknowledging the difference of one's identity to other identities. Mouffe takes this notion of identity from the work of Jacques Derrida and the notion of 'differance'. She argues that "the affirmation of a difference is a precondition for the existence of any identity [...] (therefore) we can understand why politics, which always deals with collective identities, is about the constitution of a 'we' which requires as its very condition of possibility the demarcation of a 'they'" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p.5).

Mouffe understanding of pluralism comes from the critique of the way this notion is understood in liberal democracies. She comes to show how the liberal democracies see pluralism as a set of diverse perspectives that cannot all be adopted and instead are put together to constitute a harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble (Mouffe et al., 2013). She sees a problem with this notion of harmonious assemblage of perspectives because of how it has to "negate the political in its antagonistic dimension in order to thrive" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p. 3). The negation of the political does not make it disappear since the antagonistic nature of human societies will never disappear. This is the reason why Mouffe proposes the notion of Agonistic Pluralistic Democratic model. This is a model where the notion of conflict is accepted as the reality of human societies. The difference, however, comes in the way subjects are recognized in the democratic conflicts. Antagonistic refers to struggle between enemies while agonistic refers to

struggle between adversaries. This is a very important shift in terminology since within the dynamic of us/them, 'they' should not be seen as "enemies to be destroyed, but as adversaries whose ideas might be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not to be questioned" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p.7). Hence, pluralism accepts the notion of difference. However, it sees the subjects that are in the conflictual relation as adversaries instead of enemies. This, in turn, allows the political to function inside a plural society and becomes an important part of a plural society. What her proposition comes down to is the notion that antagonism still exists within agonistic politics. However, the conflict between different adversaries is "played out under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p.9). To this extent, the agonistic model of democracy accepts the antagonistic dimension of the political and seeks to find ways to establish different ways of including both us/them in the process instead of overcoming their differences by attempting to find a consensus.

2.2.4 Where is Pluralistic Agonistic Democracy in Iran?

This simple answer to this question is: Nowhere. Iran is not a liberal democracy. It is a unique model of governance that was created to integrate Islamic principles of governance with parliamentary model of democracy. Moreover, the subject of this thesis is not really about what democracy in Iran is but how the largest protest movement in the country after the 1979 revolution emerged particularly at the time it emerged. Mouffe admitted to her shortsightedness in using the term 'modern democracy' as the manner of generalizing democratic practices around the world. She makes this clear in her recent book's introduction by stating that "Have I not myself

repeatedly referred to 'modern democracy' to designate the Western model? In truth, I have ceased doing it in recent writings: I now try to avoid speaking of 'modern democracy'" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p.XV). She continues to explain how her judgment on the idea of 'modern democracy' was put into question when she saw the role of Islam in the Arab Spring and how "it would indeed be a fatal mistake to force those countries to adopt the Western model, refusing to recognize the central place of Islam in their culture" (Mouffe et al., 2013, p.XVI). However, she still makes the point that pluralistic model of democracy is the best way to formulate democracy around the world because each culture can make its own pluralistic version of such democratic model. So, one cannot put the lens of 'modern democracy' in thinking about the events that happened in Iran. What one can do, however, is to look at certain theoretical reflections within such theory to reflect upon the Green Movement in Iran and the role of protesting crowds in shaping this movement.

We take two main elements from Mouffe and Laclau's ideas. First, the Green Movement emerged as a social movement with a very simple question, "where is my vote?". This statement is a discourse that emerged through many forms of articulatory practices. As a theoretical framework, hence, we use discourse to not only talk about this slogan, but also other articulatory practices that emerged from the Green Movement as different forms of collective practices. This would include the goals and aspirations of the movement as well as their collective practices. What I am looking for is two things. The first is to see the discourse of the Green Movement as a historical continuation of a plight for an inclusive societal system. The second goes to the mere definition of articulation which includes any practice that modifies an already established identity as a result of articulatory practices. I seek to see for how articulation was made possible and what sort of identity was modified in order to articulate the discourses that were articulated during the Green Movement. In doing so,

I search for how the Green Movement developed its identity through its collective practices. The second element that I use from Mouffe's framework is the idea of political vs. Politics. An important contribution of Mouffe is the role of the political, the antagonistic dimension in human societies that keeps questioning the hegemonic order, in influencing politics. For Mouffe, the political can take many forms. The importance of the political for this thesis is that we position the protesting crowds as a collective action that articulates counter-hegemonic discourses. In the case of Iran, this collective action questioned the legitimacy of an election in ever-present force and with it asked how they are truly represented in the society. Hence, the Protesting Crowd of the Green Movement in Iran, as a collective action, were a form of what Mouffe coins 'the political' who questioned many aspects of the politics in the country during the Green Movement. Studying the protesting crowd as a collective action is pertinent in the case of the Green Movement because it tells the importance of how such form of crowd can be seen as collectives with the capacity to articulate political discourses and affirm the importance of radical negativity when looking at a movement such as the Green Movement.

What is missing from Mouffe's theory is a way to understand how collective identity is formed. In fact, Mouffe has a proposition for understanding political identity. She sees it as something that is "inscribed within an anti-essentialist theoretical framework according to which the social agent is constituted by an ensemble of subject positions that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of difference" (Mouffe, 1992, p.28). Identity of a social agent, for Mouffe, is in a plurality of diverse discourses "among which there is no necessary relation but a constant movement of over-determination and displacement" (Mouffe, 1992, p.28). The reflection of Mouffe on identity is about the way one can think of how a radical democratic "citizens" can be envisaged within the framework of a radical plural democratic society. This does not really help us in

understanding how the protesting crowds of the Green Movement were able to produce a collective identity as a political collective during the post-electoral uprising in 2009.

In what follows, I provide a definition of protesting crowds by arguing that it is a form of collective action that emerges in an opportune moment to articulate particular discourses that shape what Mouffe calls 'the political'. Hence, at its core, a protesting crowd is a political subject. I continue this reflection by showing how the notion of networks can be used to look at Networked Protesting Crowds as a type of protesting crowds that uses networks and networked technologies for expanding the reach of its discourse to a global scale.

2.3 Protesting Crowds

What is a protesting crowd? From the literature that was presented on the two major theories on social movements, I would like to first argue that the these schools are not sufficient independently in explaining the complexities of social movements in today's world, especially with the advent of globalization and the advancement of ICTs. When considering social movements, one must not only consider the ways in which resources are used, but also the identity (or identities) that are formed as a result of a social movement. Mobilization is indeed an important element in understanding the structure of a social movement. However, as Polletta and Jasper (2011) point out, the RM's "emphasis on the how of mobilization over the why of it, their focus on the state as target of action, and their dependence on rationalistic images of individual action left important issues unexamined" (P. 238). This is indeed challenging because the RM school puts aside a great array of characteristics that shape a social movement and its

identity formation and focuses its attention on the actions of the individuals participating in the movement. On the other hand, the NSM School has a greater focus on the construction of identity and social perspective on social movements. For this school, social movements do not always have to be political since they revolve around the established identity of a movement. Moreover, these movements are new because their concerns are no longer solely material but also culturally and socially grounded. The critiques of this school point out that much reasoning behind the "newness" of today's social movements is debatable. As Pichardo (1997) points out, many claims of the newness of social movements prove to be false because such things as movements on the basis of identity has existed before. Moreover, he argues that the new social movements have a biased focus on leftist movements without consideration of right-wing and conservative social movements. Moreover, the discourse of new social movement theories lacks conversation surrounding the organization and mobilization of social movements by putting too much emphasis on identities and identity movements. Lastly, both schools of thought seem to focus on social movements in the western world with little attention to nuances of social movements in other countries that have experienced different social, political, and historical experiences.

The literature surrounding crowds is fairly limited in explaining protesting crowds as a category of study. Crowd theories usually throw all types of crowds into one general category and propose an either/or dichotomy in explaining them. This causes a very fundamental problem since it limits the reader's ability to get a grasp on what exactly these theories are talking about. Moreover, crowd theories seem to downplay the importance of crowds as a form of collective action within social movements. Crowd theories seem to miss the altruistic aspect of crowds by arguing that they are either irrational entities susceptible to manipulation or an aggregation of rational individuals who, by following their self-interest, create a transcendental-like intelligence. To tackle

this problem, I would like to argue that one can look at protesting crowds as a form of collective action, consisting of a collection of collective practices that distinguish them from other forms of crowds. Protesting crowds are particular in that they are collective actions that articulate the political within the sphere of the social.

In this section, I first argue that protesting crowds produce themselves in a *Kairos* (an opportune moment). Therefore, as a collective, protesting crowds use opportune moments to produce themselves and their discourses. I further argue that protesting crowds are political subjects that articulate what Chantal Mouffe terms 'the political' in the sphere of politics. At this point, I move away from Mouffe's notion of understanding identity through difference and argue that identity is formed by protesting crowds through their collective practices. Using Michel Foucault's notion of souci de soi (care of the self), I argue that collectives such as protesting crowds develop notions of collective identity through their collective practices and formulate a collective ethos through such practices. In the same way, protesting crowds recognize themselves as such entities through their collective practices. I finally look at globalization and the idea of networked social movements to introduce the notion of Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) and how such notion is part of the opportunistic usage of tools practices of protesting crowds to articulate their discourses and connect with other networks through the usage of Information Communication Technologies.

2.3.1 Collective Action

Alberto Melucci defines collective action as "a set of social practices (i) involving simultaneously a number of individuals or groups, (ii) exhibiting similar morphological

characteristics in contiguity of time and space, (iii) implying a social field of relationships and (iv) the capacity of people involved of making sense of what they are doing" (Melucci, 1996, p.20). For Melucci, crowd is a form of collective action since it has all the four characteristics that were mentioned in the definition above. Moreover, it "offers individuals (in the crowd) the chance to take part in a collective that remains undefined, that leaves the options open ... the crowd offers an open field in which the individual may project her or his expectations, desires, dreams" (Melucci, 1996, p. 372). For Melucci, then, the crowd is a place where identities form since the crowd, as an entity, leaves options open for different interpretations and identity formation. Lastly, Melucci argues that "crowds can be seen as the most elementary example of a potential collective, and therefore, one in which individuals already interact in the production of meanings and orientation"(Melucci, 1996, p.372). This is an important element to point out. While Melucci, just like many, falls short of specifically addressing protesting crowds, he sees crowds as very rudimentary entities within social movements and as very important forms of collective action. In this thesis, following Melucci, I would like to argue that a protesting crowd is a form of collective action. This leaves two questions unanswered: How do protesting crowds produce themselves? And, how do they form their identity? The next two sections tackle these two questions.

2.3.2 Crowds and Kairos

In Greek mythology, Caerus is the name of the youngest son of Zeus, who represents the spirit of opportunity (theoi Greek Mythology, n.d.). Kairos is commonly used in the tradition of rhetoric as a technique of seizing the moment. One can understand it in relation to Chronos which refers to the chronological way of time. These two concepts

are not really opposed so much as complementary to one another. According to Miller (1994), "Kairos refers not to the specific responsiveness of discourse to situation but to the dynamic relationship between discourse and situation" (Miller, 1994, p. 83). This dynamic relationship is one that comes to life at a precise moment and it is the recognition of the moment and its usage that becomes particularly important as a rhetorical technique. Kairos, hence, "tells us to look for the particular opportunity in a given moment, to find—or construct—an opening in the here and now, in order to achieve something there and then" (Miller, 1994, p. 83). One of the challenges in crowd theory has been the lack of a definition on where crowds come from and how they are formed. This is partially because the analysis of crowds begins once they are already established. In theories that focus on the irrationality of crowds, they are entities that are self-generated (Rubio, 2010, p. 5). Within the theories that see crowds as rational, crowds are produced as inputs of individuals that follow their individualistic interest (Surowiecki, 2005).

What I would like to argue is that protesting crowds produce themselves in an opportune moment. This opportune moment acts as a situation which can be used as a rhetorical argumentation technique against a dominant discourse. There are three advantages to using Kairos as a theoretical framework in explaining how protesting crowds form themselves. First, Kairos is a strategic method in rhetoric. In this sense, usage of the opportune moment by protesting crowds is a strategic move on their part in challenging the dominant discourse. Another important advantage of thinking about Kairos as the way protesting crowds are formed is that it shows the reason behind the creative nature of protesting crowds. As a rhetorical strategy, Kairos brings about the dynamic between situation and discourse. As a situation emerges, creative ways of formulating counter discourses through the use of available materials also emerge. Subsequently, one can imagine new ways of using the different tools protesting crowds

utilize to make their voices heard and reinforce their message. Finally, Kairos responds to the problem of why protesting crowds on the Internet, for instance on social media, can still be considered crowds. Kairos removes the ambiguity that a crowd can only exist in one physical space at a time. Protesting crowds produced in the modern world no longer solely follow time chronologically since their existence as networks have reconfigured them to reproduce themselves in different ways that are not limited to the constraint of time and space. Kairos can be used to explain why crowds in a network can still be considered as crowds. It directs our attention to the opportunistic and creative function of protesting crowds instead of focusing on a definition that is based in space and time.

2.3.3 Care of the Self/Care of the collective

Foucault (1984) introduces the notion of "care of the self" in order to talk about the Ethics of the Subject. In fact, the subject has played a very central role in the development of Foucault's thought. In one of his conferences in the 80s, Foucault states that the goal of his academic career is to understand the creation of the subject. "[My goal] has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1982, p. 777). For Foucault, to understand the subject, one has no choice but to tackle the question of power and how the relations of power create certain subjects. For instance, the use of slogans by a crowd is an act that seeks recognition of its collective discourse as a practice of its collective self. What is central in a protesting crowd is the set of collective practices that separates it from other types of crowds, such as sports crowds

or crowds in a marketplace or bar (Rokni, 2014). One can take the concept of the Ethics of the Subject by Foucault and use it to examine the Ethics of the Collective by looking at how the practices of a collective make it recognizable as a collective. In other words, what one understands as identity formation within a collective comes from the practices of a collective. As a result, a protesting crowd comes to recognize itself as such through practices that are particular to this type of crowd. As Mellucci argues, a crowd is a space where individuals interact to produce meaning. One can argue that these interactions are indeed the collective practices within a crowd and that what they produce is the collective identity of a protesting crowd.

2.4 Globalization and Networked Protesting Crowds

We have established the idea of protesting crowds. In this section, we look at how we can theoretically approach the usage of ICT by protesting crowds and how such technologies impact the collective practices of the protesting crowds.

2.4.1 Globalization and the Networked Social Movements

A great number of theorists have tried to explore the changes that have led to globalization and one of these thinkers is Manuel Castells. He has proposed the concept of Networked Societies and argues that "around the end of the second millennium of the common era a number of major social, technological, economic, and cultural transformations came together to give rise to a new form of society, the network

society" (Castells, 2011, p. xii). For him, the society that we live in now is moving towards networked societies and it is made up of "individuals, businesses and state operating from the local, national and into the international arena"(Castells & Cardoso, 2005, p. xix). These societies are a result of "the emergence of a new technological paradigm, based in information and communication technologies, that took shape in the1970s and diffused unevenly around the world" (Castells, 2005, p. 3). In other words, the network society emerged as a result of a shift toward new forms of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) such as the cell phone, the personal computer, and the Internet. As Castells explains, network society is "a social structure based on networks operated by information and communication technologies based in microelectronics and digital computer networks that generate, process, and distribute information on the basis of the knowledge accumulated in the nodes of the networks (Castells, 2011, p. 7). For this reason, network societies are "knowledge-based" societies. One of the central characteristics of the networked society is its "shift from groups and hierarchies to networks as social and organizational models—looser, flexible arrangements of human affairs" (Benkler, 2006, p. 18). Consequently, a feature of a network society is its organizational structure with loosely affiliated connections between individuals and organizations within a network. Central to all of this is the idea that technology is determined by society in that it is society that "shapes technology according to the needs, values, and interests of people who use the technology" (Castells, 2005).

In his later book, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*, Castells looks at the "nature and perspectives of networked social movements" (Castells, 2013, p. 4). Network, in his book, has a double meaning: "a) the social networks of activists and b) the role of the Internet as global network of computer networks in social movements" (Fuchs, 2012, p. 776). The book is indeed an

exploration of his previous works on social movements (Fuchs, 2012). In the book, Castells argues that because we live in a networked society, our social movements are also spread through "a world wired by the Internet" (Castells, 2013, p.2). To him, social movements can "only form if there are the emotions of hope and outrage and these emotions are communicated to others on a large-scale" (Fuchs, 2012, p. 779). Therefore, for a social movement to occur, the two elements of hope and outrage must be communicated by any means available. In an age of the Internet and social media, these principal tools are used to communicate this message due to their wide accessibility and low cost. Castells puts great emphasis on how technology plays a very central role in the mobilization of recent social movements to the extent that "Internet communication created street protests, which means that without the Internet there would have been no street protests" (Fuchs, 2012, p. 780). He goes through different cases such as the Arab Spring, the M-15 movement in Spain, and Occupy Wall Street and looks at how these movements were largely organized and diffused online and how the physical protests resulted from these online activities.

2.4.2 Networked Protesting Crowd

I would like to base my idea of Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC) partially on Castells' thesis in his latest book while keeping distance from some claims that he has put forward. I would like to first argue that Network, in the term Networked Protesting Crowds, has a similar double meaning to what Castells proposed in his conception of network societies. The first meaning is social. This means that NPC consist of networks of different social groups that come together around a common discourse. This also includes the phenomenon of transnational crowds wherein networks of solidarity are

built physically and online in different places in the world. For instance, during the 2009 Green Movement, there were protesting crowds which gathered in many of the major cities in the world to show solidarity with those who went to the streets of Iran to protest the election results (Burns & Eltham, 2009; Papic & Noonan, 2011). Moreover, these protesting crowds consisted of many individuals, organizations and groups who did not necessarily follow the same discourse. As Valentine Moghadam has argued, "the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of globalization [...] create opportunities and engender grievances that have resulted in a range of forms of collective action on a transnational scale" (Moghadam, 2012, p. 204). Hence, NPC are in nature transnational due to the nature of globalization as a phenomenon that has changed the economic, political and cultural dimensions of the world we live in and they include a multiplicity of interests that come together around a common discourse. The second meaning of network comes from the role of the Internet in creating online networks. Here my views differ with Castells' in that I argue that the NPC use tools available to them in order to produce themselves as a global phenomenon. This is intrinsic to the nature of humans as individual or collective beings with the creative capacity to see potential in tools around them. This does not mean, however, that the nature of protesting crowds has shifted to the extent that their existence depends on networks. On the contrary, I believe that NPC's usage of networked technologies is within the strategic nature of this type of crowds since the different uses of ICTs add to the repertoire of collective practices that already exists amongst protesting crowds. In other words, the use of networked technologies as tools for creating loosely tied networks is what makes protesting crowds to become Networked Protesting Crowds. Benjamin Shepard (2011), in his book *Play, Creativity, and Social Movements*, turns our attention to the role of creativity and play in social movements by taking a historical look at surrealist and situationist movements and linking them to recent forms of social movement that involves play. While this paper has no intention of tackling the subject, I would still like to argue that usage of available tools by NPC is a form of creativity

that comes from making connections between practices of using a technology and finding other ways of using it as a tool for protesting. As such, I would like to maintain that NPC keep many of the collective practices of a protesting crowd and use technology creatively as a tool to articulate their discourse. Subsequently, I would like to add two dimensions to the characteristics of NPC that distinguishes them from protesting crowds. First, NPC transcend space in the sense that they are no longer limited by a national boundary. This is because they can appear in multiple physical places as well as online. Second, they transcend time in the sense that they no longer have to appear together at once. They can appear at different times around the world or they can appear as aggregates of information online.

2.4.3 Networks as opportunities

Protesting crowds are a form of collective action that articulate their discourses within the political dimension of a society. This type of crowd forms itself through Kairos and uses opportune moments along the way to produce counter discourses in creative ways. The dichotomy between whether crowds are rational or irrational is irrelevant when it comes to explaining protesting crowds because these ideas do not really look deep enough into seeing these crowds as forms of collective actions with particular collective practices. Thus, I propose to fundamentally exit this dichotomy by looking at how protesting crowds recognize themselves as such through the process of the care of the collective and how they help in shaping the identity of a social movement through different practices of the collective.

Using this reflection, one can see that networked technologies have provided new ways

for social movements to organize and recognize themselves as collectives. They have been proven to be great tools for the diffusion and engagement, on a globalized level, of protesting crowds. In analyzing NPC, one needs to look at how their collective practices have been able to shape the identity of a social movement in today's world. One needs to also take a look at the way opportune moments were used by this type of crowd in relation to confronting dominant discourse through different creative forms. The mere usage of tools such as the Internet shows how NPC invent creative ways of mobilizing and using the surrounding resources to create counter-discourses. Hence, the usage of Kairos is something that is embedded in the nature of NPC as a form of collective action. Lastly, there should always be a reflection on how discourses are articulated and how they play a role in the relation between the political vs. politics as the NPC articulates these discourses

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Methodology is the way one tries to answer a research question. For the purpose of this thesis, qualitative research is used in order to gather and analyze data necessary to answer the central question of the thesis. The thesis looks at how three social movements of feminist movement, the student movement, and the reform movement were able to come together to form the protesting crowds of the Green Movement in Iran. It looks at how these three movements were able come together by looking at their discourses and their relation to the discourse of the Green Movement. To achieve its goals, the thesis combines two approaches to answer the central question of the thesis. The first approach is historical research while the second approach is discourse analysis. The historical analysis is used to provide the context for the discourse analysis by tracing the roots of the discourses of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement.

3.1 Research Approach

Qualitative research is an approach to research that investigates "complex or sensitive issues that cannot be reduced to a simple, objective, quantitative study" (Creswell in Davis, Powell, & Lachlan, 2013). A qualitative researcher looks at "patterns, symbols, norms, rules, and assumptions in a culture to understand how people create meaning and how these meanings influence what people do and why they do it" (Davis et al., 2013). The reason why this research is considering this approach is because it is answering a complex and open question that cannot be quantified in any sense. It is the

interpretive aspect of the research that is important for this research since the answer to the central question of the thesis requires one to look deeply into the discourse of social movements in Iran and its history. As Bonneville argues, qualitative research allows one to "study [a subjet] in all its complexity and depth" (Bonneville, Grosjean, & Lagacé, 2007, p. 156). This is indeed necessary for this research because the only way to understand the conditions of possibility of a protesting crowd is to have an in-depth look at the socio-political situation in the country and the discourses that lead the Iranian people to go to the streets and protest. This research uses discourse analysis as a qualitative research method in order to analyze the data that is gathered.

3.1.1 Historical research

Historical research, as it is implied in the name, is a research method that searches different historic events in order to find and understand the events of the past or relate them to current events. History is "the written or spoke record, or physical artifact, or interpretation, or study of all that has happened up to the present" (Leslie, 2010, p. 95). Historical approach is objective, subjective, and more importantly constructive. It is objective in that it looks at events in the past and looks through documents that already exist in order to recount what has happened in the past. Historians "tell us what happened in the past and how things changed over time" (Berger, 2014, p. 183). However, this is not completely true because historians look through evidence of the past by looking at factual evidence and interpret them methodologically. In other words, "there is an element of interpretation involved in history based on the selection process" (Berger, 2014, p.183). Hence, the interpretation of a historic event can vary from a historian to another based on the material that they have chosen and the way

they have approached the material in their interpretation.

There are two main challenges in using historical research methods. The first is the reliability of sources that are used while the second is how the historical data that is gathered is interpreted. In other words, what is said and what is not said. This thesis uses historical research in order to understand the historical context of the Green Movement in Iran. In doing so, it first addresses the two challenges of doing historical research. It then proposes how this research is effectuated for this thesis.

The challenge that must first be addressed in historical research is the verification of data in terms of where the source is coming from and how reliable it can be (Berger, 2014). There are degrees or levels of importance in the quality of information one receives from his/her source (Leslie, 2010). The first type is the primary sources. These include original documents and artifacts that are related to the event that is studied. The secondary sources include scanned or copies of original documents as well as books and articles written by historians or other historical researchers (Leslie, 2010). This thesis uses secondary sources to gather historical data on social movements in Iran including the constitutional revolution as well as the Islamic revolution. These data are gathered from prominent historians in the field. The data that is gathered is verified by comparing the historical data between different authors in order to assure the reliability of the sources as well as historical facts that are presented in each of the cases. Since the reliability of books and articles can be questioned, the practice of comparing several accounts of the same event gives better assurance of the historical reliability of the sources that are being used. Through verification of the same historical accounts amongst different books and articles we verify the veracity of those claims.

The second challenge that must be addressed is that of interpretation and meaning. Historical research requires some form of construction of the data that is collected in order to construct a pattern within the data that is collected (Berger, 2014). As such, one can say that there is a logic behind the construction of a historical work based on the interpretation of the author of the data that he/she has collected. In other words, "facts don't speak for themselves. Someone has to interpret the facts and put them into perspective" (Berger, 2014, p.187). This indeed brings us back to the notion of discourse by Foucault and how one must understand discourse by looking at the relation between knowledge and power. In other words, as authorities in the field of history, historians produce knowledge through constructing the discourse of history. In the same way, our historical research on the roots of the discourses of Green Movement in Iran use previous knowledge in order to construct a new knowledge about the subject. What this means is that the historical analysis that is established in the thesis will not be "the truth" but "a truth" that is interpreted by myself as the author of this paper. Going back to the epistemological position of the paper, this also affirms our position of knowledge as something that is constructed socially and interpreted through different research methods.

3.1.1.1 Data Gathering

The data that is gathered for this analysis comes from articles and books written by historians specialized in the history of modern Iran. While there is a difference in the framing of the history, the historical events that are analyzed by these authors are the same. Hence, to assure reliability of information, the same historical events are compared amongst several authors. This is to assure the credibility as well as the reliability of the data. In terms of interpretation of the data, this thesis looks at the

interpretation of other historians on the subject. The thesis presents its own interpretation of the historical events based on these interpretations for the precise case of the Green Movement in Iran. There are two sets of data gathered in the historical research section. The first set looks at the discourses that were produced during the constitutional revolutions in the country that took place between 1906-1909. This allows us to see how the discourses of the Green Movement are part of a historical context of social movements in Iran. The second focuses on the roots of the three major movements that came together during the Green Movement: the feminist, student and the reformist movement.

In the first part of the historical research, we look at historical data from four major Iranian historians on the constitutional revolution. These include Janet Afary (1994, 1996, 2005, 2009), Ervand Abrahamian (2008, 2009, 1979), Homa Katouzian (1998, 2003, 2008), and Mohammad Taraghi-Tavakoli (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990). Each of these scholars brings a unique perspective on the history of Iran. Janet Afary focuses greatly on the history of feminist movements in Iran. Her framework is useful in understanding the roots of feminism in the country. Ervand Abrahamian and Homa Katouzian are both historians with a focus on the socio-political history of Iran. However, their approaches to this history is fairly different in that Abrahamian still holds a very strong Marxist tradition while Katouzian has a more philosophical approach to the socio-political history of Iran. Mohammad Tavakoli Taraghi has done a great analysis on the evolution of language and imagery during the constitutional revolution and the birth of several discourses during this era. He has also put forward some of the strategies that were involved in introducing and using these discourses during the constitutional revolution. The body of work between these four historians gives me a global perspective of the type of discourses that were produced historically during the constitutional revolution. In addition to these four authors, I refer to Abdul-Hadi Hariri

(1976) and Cyrus Schaghayegh (2001) on the role of ulama and their relationship to modernity during the constitutional revolution. Central to my analysis is the reflection on the constant tension between traditionalism and modernism during this revolution. My analysis from this section focuses on how the discourses that were produced during this period are still alive and embedded in the discourse of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement. To this extent, I would like to see how the tension between traditionalism and modernity has continued in Iran to this day since this period.

The second part of the historical research takes a look at the history of Iranian Revolution and what followed in the period after the revolution. In looking at this history, we examine the development of three major social movements in Iran after the revolution: the feminist, the student, and the reform movement. For the historical data on feminist movement in Iran, we rely on the works of Janet Afary (2009) on the history of sexual politics in modern Iran as well as Nikki Keddie's (1983) work on the place of women in Iran after the 1979 revolution. As a specific case, we look at Zanan magazine and discourse of Islamic Feminism that it introduced. For the historical data on the student movement in Iran, we consult Saeed Paivandi (1998, 2005) and his work on the Islamization of educational system and the creation of Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution in the country and Ali Akbar Mahdi's (1999) study on the history of student movement in Iran after the Islamic Revolution. The two perspectives are complementary to one another since the history of post-revolutionary student movement in Iran commences during the Cultural Revolution where the Iranian government closed all Universities in the country and created the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution in order to assure the accordance of the University curriculums with the Shi'a Islam values. Again, this takes us back to the tension between tradition and modernity and the way these two concepts interact with one another through history. The case that we consult for this historical analysis is the Student Protest of

July 1999 that was sparked after the closure of Salam, a prominent reformist daily newspaper, by the hardliners in Iran. We lastly look at the history of the reform movement in Iran. For this, we look the tension between two philosophical propositions and how the reformist movement evolved from them. The first is that of Dr. Ali Shariati in continuation of the work of Jalal Al-i Ahmad on the concept of Westoxification. Shariati was considered as the ideologue of the Iranian revolution and his ideas on relying on Islam and the Islamic rule as the ideology of the society greatly influenced the revolutionary discourse during the Islamic Revolution (Arjomand, 2002). The second philosopher is Abdolkarim Soroush and he is coined as the ideologue of the reform movement in Iran. I refer to original texts by both authors that are translated in either French or English and use supporting articles from Said Amir Arjomand (2002), Behrouz Ghamari-Tabrizi (2004) and Valla Vakili (1996). As a case, I look at the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and show how this election created a reformist force with a particular discourse in the political sphere of the country. Again, the tension between tradition and modernity is one of the key aspects of this analysis.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Social Movements in Modern Iran

The history of social movements in modern Iran is of great complexity. Since late 19th century, Iran has faced two major revolutions. The first, the constitutional revolution, occurred in early 1900 and led to the formation of a parliament and a constitution while the second occurred in 1979 and resulted in the change in the governmental system of Iran from monarchy to Islamic Republic. The aim of this thesis is to understand the protesting crowds of the Iranian Green Movement in 2009 and see the conditions of possibility of this protesting crowd as a form of collective action. The way by which this thesis answers this question is through discourse analysis. In order to do so, however, one must look at the history of social movements in Iran in order to understand where the discourse of the protesting crowds in Iran in 2009 came from. This puts the Iranian modern history as a continuation of struggle that was really born of a quest for modernity in the late 1800 in Iran. The aim of the first chapter, hence, is to give a context to the Iranian Green Movement by looking at the history of the constitutional revolution and the discourses that were born out of this movement such as Ghanoon (Law), Millat (people), Azadi (freedom), Barabari (equality) (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990). In doing so, the chapter looks at the relation between Mashrutah (constitutionalism) and Mashru'ah (religious law) and traces the fundamental challenges of modern Iranian society that influenced the discourse of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement in 2009.

4.1.1 The constitutional revolution of Iran

The constitutional revolution of Iran is one of the most important events in the history of the country. As Janet Afary puts it, it was "made possible through an initial hybrid coalition of forces which included liberal reformers, members of the ulama, merchants, shopkeepers, students, trade guilds people, workers, and radical members of secret societies who promoted the formation of an assembly of delegates and a constitution" (Afary, 1994). Resulting in the establishment of a parliament and a constitution in the country for the first time in 1906, the constitutional revolution was rooted in the public arena that was created due to the contact with Europe and modernity. The principle goal of the revolution was to establish Ghanoun (law) in the country (Katouzian, 2011). This, however, led to questioning the fundamental structures of power in the country and brought about a new form of power to the Iranian power structures which saw the majlis (parliament) as the representative body of Iranians (Katouzian, 2011).

At its heart, the constitutional revolution was reacting to the traditional understanding of the king as the arbitrary ruler. This reaction was due to many reasons including social injustice, devastating economic situation, a great domination of western world on Iranian affairs, and mistrust in the capability of the Qajar kings to manage the country. Traditionally, the king or the ruler in Iran "was thought to be vicegerent on earth" (Katouzian, 2003, p.234). The idea behind this was that the king or the ruler "was not bound by any written or unwritten rule or tradition and could take decisions up to the utmost of his physical power" (Katouzian, 2003, p.234). This meant that the only factor that really influenced the decision making of a ruler was the fear of rebellion and "the expediencies which were necessary to maintain them in power and authority" (Katouzian, 2002, 234). This also meant that Iran's ruler ruled over the country arbitrarily and could order anything that he felt necessary. This is clear in the writing

of Sir Percy Sykes who observed that the Iranian king had the authority over "the threefold functions of government, legislative, executive, and judicial. He was the pivot upon which turned the entire machinery of public life" (Afary, 1996, p.342). The logic behind this form of legitimacy comes from a concept imbedded in the tradition of kingdom since the Achaemenide empire called *farah-ye izadi* (God's Grace). According to this idea, the king or the ruler, by becoming a ruler, possesses the God's Grace and such possession makes them legitimate and just (Katouzian, 2003, p.236). Simply put, the arbitrary rule was justified by the concept of God's Grace since the ruler "was believed to have received his right to rule as a gift from God" (Katouzian, 2003, p.243). This Grace would have been taken away from the ruler if he "openly claimed divinity, or was systematically unjust towards the people" (Katouzian, 2003, p.243). This would indeed make rebellion and the successful rebel leader would become legitimized as the future king due to the fact that the Grace was bestowed upon him (Katouzian, 2003). As Katouzian argues, the idea of Grace of God was a pre-Islamic myth that was later justified by Muslim theoreticians through the well-known command 'O ye Faithful, obey God, the Prophet and those in authority among you' (Katouzian, 2011, p.758). While for the Shi'a ulama, the authority meant the holy Imams only, "in practice they normally tolerated the existing reality, namely the arbitrary state" (Katouzian, 2011, p.758).

During the Qajar dynasty, the justice system was divided between two sets of law that were practiced by several representatives who "checked the patrimonial powers of the king in some arenas" (Afary, 2005, p.342). The first sets of laws were the urf laws or customary laws (Afary, 2005). The second sets were the Sharia laws that were laws based on the Quranic laws. While the boundaries between the two were ambiguous, in general, the clerics "handled religious and civil matters, and the state handled cases of murder, robbery, and other forms of violence. In commercial disputes, two arbitrators, one for each plaintiff, often resolved conflicts through mediation and negotiation"

(Afary, 2005, p.342). The traditional justice system had four major characteristics. First of all, the meaning of justice was related to maintaining the hierarchy of the four social classes: men of the pen, men of the sword, merchants, and farmers. This meant that the king "had enormous control over the lives of members of the royal court, his ministers, and all public officials" (Afary, 2005, p.343) since he stood at the highest rank of the social hierarchy. The second characteristic of traditional justice was its lack of unanimity. This meant that the interpretation of *Sharia* law (the religious law) differed from one religious scholar to another (Afary, 2005). There was also a difference between the urf law and the sharia law. The use of severe physical punishment was another characteristic of the traditional justice system. "Until the late nineteenth century, if the state found someone guilty of carrying out an insurrection against Islam or the shah, the punishment was brutal and could involve the mass execution of entire communities" (Afary, 2005, 343). This was the case with the Babi movement, for instance. The fourth characteristic was the unequal treatment of minorities and women before the law (Afary, 2005). Hence, there were no unified version of treating a crime and the punishment would depend on the hierarchical status of the accused as well as its gender and race.

In the early 19th century, Iran faced a series of military defeats that lead to the weakening of its economy (Abrahamian, 1979). The two Russo-Iranian wars as well as three Anglo-Iranian wars lead the country to sign two major treaties of Turkamanchai (1827) and Paris (1857) with Russia and England respectively (Abrahamian, 1979). These in turn opened the way for Russia and England to not only take away large parts of lands from Iran, but also to create new trade deals that benefited them significantly by being exempt from paying taxes, tariffs, and road tolls as well as bypassing local laws (Abrahamian, 1979). What this lead to was an exponential growth in trade which changed the Iranian economy through the construction of modern communication systems in the country, industrialization of agriculture, while negatively impacting the

handcraft industry. These, hence, transformed the Iranian economy from a "pre-capitalist economy, with its production for use-value, into a market economy, with its production for sale value" (Abrahamian, 1979, p. 391). These defeats and changes in the economic structure of the country throught the years convinced the king and his concerned ministers to "call for the acquisition of European scientific and technological know-how in order to develop national trade and industries on a competitive basis with Europe" (Bayat, 1991,p.35). The crown prince of the Quajar dynasty at the time, Abbas Mirza, hence, sent several students to England to study modern sciences in 1811 and 1815 respectively (Tavakoli, n.d.). These and other students who were later sent to France were influential in introducing a new language to governmentality in the political discourse of the country. One such students were Mirza Salih-i Shirazi, for instance, whose memoir of his trip to England spoke of the French Revolution and constructed the equivalent terms in Farsi to Parliament (*Mashviratkhaneh*), House of Commons (*Khan ah-'i fail-i ra'aya*), Elections (*intikhabat*) and social revolution (*balva-yi 'ammi*) to name a few (Tavakoli, n.d.). By the time of Naser al-Din Shah in 1848, Iran saw an increasingly vocal circle of reform-minded officials who saw emulation of Europe in development of trade and industry, especially mining and construction of railroads, as a way to regain the former position of the country among the most advanced nations in the world (Bayat, 1991, p. 36). As Katouzian argues, the project of modernization during this time was " about the possession [...] of techniques and institutions which had never been known before, and which gave them such superiority over the Iranians that it looked as if no amount of traditional power and technology might be equal" (Katouzian, 2001, p. 756).

4.1.1.1 The Intelligentsia

On December 28, 1851, Iran's first European-style institution of higher learning, *Dar Al-Funun*, was inaugurated. The main person behind the establishment of this school was Nasir al-Din Shah's first premier, Mirza Mohammad Taqi Khan Farahani, also known as Amir Kabir (Ekhtiar, 2001). Influenced by the Écoles Polytechniques in France, the school admitted around 250 students per year and offered secular sciences including military sciences, medical sciences and, modern languages (Yazdanjoo, 2012). The school was created since Amir Kabir believed that a "disciplined Iranian standing army would not be possible without a single unified body of Iranian officers" (Ekhtiar, 2001, p.153). Hence, the principal goal of the school was to train the next generation of military officers. Alongside of Dar al-Fonun, a translation office was also created and the two organizations were responsible for translation of many European books into Farsi in varying topics such as military subjects, scientific matters, medicine, and Persian literature. The body also translated European works on Western history and the infamous *History of Persia* by John Malcom that lead Iranians to "see their own history through the eyes of nineteenth-century Europeans" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.393). As a place that produced and distributed knowledge in the country, it was impossible for the school to restrict its affairs to military training only. As Ekhtiar (2001) argues, "the mere use of books such as Fenelon's Tilimaque and the History of Napoleon as textbooks in its language classes was bound to open the door to European ideas of every kind, a repercussion unforeseen by the school's founders" (p.154). Other publications such as *The travelogues of Ibrahim Beig* of Zeinol'abedin Maragheh'i and *The history of Persia* by Sir John Malcom can be seen as works of political critic of the decline of Iran (Yazdanjoo, 2012, p.36).

In 1858, a faculty member of the Dar al-Funun, Malkum Khan, with the help of his father Mirza Yaqub, formed a secret society called *faramoushkhaneh* (house of

oblivion) in Dar al-Funun (Algar, 1970). Malkum Khan was an Christian Armenian from Julfa near the city of Isfahan. His father, an English and French teacher in the royal court and an enthusiast of the west, sent Malkum to France on a state scholarship to study engineering (Algar, 1970; Abrahamian, 1979). When he came back from Europe, he joined the faculty of Dar al-Funun and impressed Naser al-Din Shah with "his scientific experiments, converted to Islam (probably to further his public career), and formed a secret society named the Far'amushkhaneh (House of Oblivion) which was modelled on, but not attached to, European Masonic lodges" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.396). Beside the house of oblivion, Malkum Khan also drafted *daftar-i Tanzimat* (Book of Reform) where he proposed several reform proposal including "general warning that the country would soon be engulfed by the foreign powers unless the Shah immediately decreed new laws for reform" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.396). The term Qanun was used to describe these laws and to separate them from the two traditional concepts of justice that was prominent in Iran, the *Sharia* and the *urf*. The *faramoushkhaneh*, hence, played a role as a society that furthered the ideas for the establishment of *Qanun* (law) in the country. For securing its establishment, the society presented itself as a harmless group that diffused scientific knowledge and strengthen the Shah's power (Ekhtiar, 2001). The society was able to attract many graduates and faculty of Dar al-Fonun to it and this, along with the fact that Malkum Khan was liked by Naser al-Din Shah, made the king see it as a scientific society (Algar, 1970). As it became more separate from the court and secretive, it started gaining "support by advocating governmental reform, the rule of law, and the need for a constitution" (Ekhtiar, 2001). The society was shut down for several reasons in 1862 (Algar, 1970). From one side, the rise of *Babism* (a dissident religious fraction of *Shi'a* Islam) some years earlier and their practice of *taquiya* (religiously justified concealment of belief) and their attempt of the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah made the king suspicious of the society as a Babi society (Ekhtiar, 2001). On the other side, the society dissatisfied the *ulama* because, for the *ulama, Qanun* was a European invention that would pollute the country. They also accused *faramoushkhaneh* of having an agenda

of bringing European-style republicanism to the country, something that was not greatly appreciated by the court of *Qajar*. After the closure of the society, Malkum Khan was exiled and the *darftar-i Tanzimat* was shelved (Abrahamian, 1979).

Malkum Khan was part of an ever-growing number of intellectuals who were exposed and influenced by western philosophy specially the French Enlightenment. Usually called *munaver-al fekr* (enlightened thinkers) or intelligentsia, they had the belief that "history was the March of Human Progress" and human progress "was not only desirable but also attainable, provided mankind broke the three chains of royal despotism, clerical dogmatism, and foreign imperialism" (Abrahamian, 1979, 395). These intellectuals were either trained inside Iran in *Dar al-Funun* or in European countries, especially England and France. They were one of the strongest forces that saw "constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism as the three vital means for attaining the establishment of a modern, strong, and developed Iran" (Abrahamian, 1979, 359).

Before and during the constitutional revolution, many newspapers started promoting the ideas behind constitutionalism inside and outside of Iran. These included *Qanun*, *sur-i Israfil*, *Musavat*, and *Iran-e naw* (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990). These papers were influential in introducing very central concepts before and after the constitutional revolution such as the idea of *millat* (People), d*awlat* (state), and *qanun* (Law). In the discourse of the intelligentsia during the revolution, *millat* was re-defined from the Shia Nation *millat-i Shi'ah-yi isna'ashara* (the s*hi'a* nation of twelve Imam) of Iran to *millat-i iran* (nation of Iran) where the idea of nation was no longer limited to religious nation and considered minorities in the country as part of the nation (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990). The discourse of *millat* was also constructed as a pole in opposition to *dawlat* (government) since the government was depicted as *mustabdid* (despotic) and *zalim*

(unjust) and nation was articulated as *muzlem* (oppressed) and *adalatkhwah* (justice seeker) (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990, p.96). Law, hence, was proposed to protect the right of those who live in the land, the nation.

After his exile from Iran, Malkum Khan went to London and started publishing the famous newspaper Q*anun*. While a one-man enterprise, *Qanun* was able to appeal to a broad audience. In fact, the newspaper shaped "the demand for *qanan* into a populist slogan unifying a diverse ensemble of social and ideological forces" (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990, p.94). This can be seen from the first edition of the newspaper:

God has blessed Iran. Unfortunately, His blessing has been negated by the lack of laws. No one in Iran feels secure because no one in Iran is safeguarded by laws. The appointment of governors is carried out without laws. The dismissal of officers is done without laws. The monopolies are sold without any laws. The state finances are squandered without laws. The stomachs of innocent citizens are cut open without laws. Even the servants of God are deported without laws. (Malkum Khan in Abrahamian, 1979, p.398).

Here, Malkum Khan is appealing to a broad audience in denouncing the fact that there was a lack accountability and coherence in the affairs of the country and the sole solution for this was to establish law based on a constitution. Alongside him, Mustasher al-Dawleh, one of his students, wrote an essay called *Yek Kalameh* (One Word) where he "propagated the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen by foregrounding each of its seventeen articles on the Qur'an and hadith" (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990, p.94). People like Malkum and others alsotried to establish a selective remembrance of pre-Islamic Iran in order to create a new national identity that would separate Iran from Islam. As Tavakoli-Taraghi argues, "in the emerging nationalist discourse Islam was defined as the religion of Arabs and the cause of Iran's weakness and decadence" (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990, p.82). To this extent, undesirable costums

were contributed to Islam and Arab while European mannerisms were depicted as originally Iranian (Tavakoli-Taraghi, 1990). This is because in the process towards constitutional revolution, the intelligentsia "found itself, at times, allied with the Shah against the 'ulama'; at times, with the 'ulama' against the Shah; at other times, with the Shah against the imperial powers" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.395).

One can see the importance of education and Dar al-Fonun as one of the spaces for the sharing of the fundamental concepts of the constitutional revolution. While the student movement in Iran evolved later on during the 1979 revolution, the educated from mid-1800 until the constitutional revolution played a great role in the construction of the discourse of the constitutional revolution and the fundamental discourses that seem to reappear within social movements in Iran during the 1979 revolution and the Green Movement of 2009. The intelligentsia were able to put into question the concept of arbitrary rule and bring a way to shift the Grace of God to Grace of Man. In other words, by introducing *millat* in the linguistic discourse of the country, the Grace of God was given from people to the king and the body responsible for assuring this was the *majlis* (parliament). In this manner, the monarch was still a monarch. However, it had to respond to a parliament in decisions affecting the people of Iran. The intelligentsia were able to change the meaning of the term *siyasat* from "punishment, usually execution of fallen state officials" (Katouzian, 2011, p.759) to the process of participation of the millat in the affairs of the country. In other words, they formulated the notion of politics with the nation as its political entity. While the reasoning for constitutionalism within the intelligentsia was nationalism, secularism, and the establishment of a rule of law that would protect the people equally, the ulama joined the constitutional cause for different reasons. What this led to was an internal conflict between the constitutionalists on the one side and the ulama on the other side.

4.1.1.2 Ulama and Bazzar

The intelligentsia came from a class of educated people who majoritarily took position in the bureaucratic systems in the country. They indeed became a new force that introduced ideas about how Iran can move towards a modern society. However, their influence has been overestimated by many such as Tavakoli-Taraghi since what moved people to come to the streets and protest during the constitutional revolution was not only the intelligentsia, but also the bazar population of merchants, traders, craftsman that totalled in hundreds of thousands and the leadership of *ulama* (Abrahamian, 1979, p.413). This was partially due to the fact that the high rate of illiteracy of the country removed much of the *millat* from the discourse of the intelligentsia that was largely circulated through constitutionalist newspapers of the time. The power of the *ulama*, hence, was in their ability to call large congregations of crowds that included the Bazar.

The *ulama's* involvement in politics was largely due to the ever-increasing conviction that "the Qajar Prime Minister and the Shah himself did not fulfill their duties i.e. did not protect Islam and Iran against the alien Europeans" (Schaghayegh, 2001, p. 22). For the most part, the *ulama* were supporters of the Shah and those who were in the constitutionalist camp "had reformist, not revolutionary purposes" (Schaghayegh, 2001, p.22). This can be seen in the discourse of Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai, a prominent pro-constitutionalist voice amongst the *ulama*. Son of the Sayyid Sadigh Tabatabai, one of the members of the *faramoushkhaneh,* he made the demand of "the establishment of a house of justice and an assembly to serve the people's needs" (Hairi, 1976, p.128). According to him, "The removal of these corruptions depends on the foundation of an assembly and the union of the government with the people and the 'ulama'" (Tabatabai quoted in Hariri, 1976, p.129). For him, an assembly of justice was a solution to stop the arbitrary rule of the king and reduce the influence of the west in Iran. The *ulama* were part of an economy that made them powerful and influential at the time. They were supported by the Quajar court through funds to maintain mosques,

traditional schools (madrasa) and other projects proposed by the mujtahids (Poulson, 2002). They also made financial gain from religious taxes and funds supporting religious ceremonies from Iranian population as well as the merchant class (Poulson, 2002). In return, they would support the community by contributing to local projects, supporting merchant enterprises, and help with dispute resolution and other legal affairs. Most importantly, they played a great role in supporting the Quajar legitimacy and maintaining this legitimacy as Islamic. Hence, the religious elite had a great economic as well as political power in the country at the time of Qajar.

The merchant class rose in power at the beginning of the establishment of the Qajar dynasty because of a commercial expansion that was a result of the "consolidation of the state power under the [...] Qajar dynasty" (Moaddel, 1992, p. 453). In 1870s and 1880s, the Quajar government mostly abstained from the affairs of the *tujjar* and, in return, they did not participate in any form of anti-state protests (Schaghayegh, 2001). However, in the late 1880s, due to the shift from a pre-capitalist to a market economy, many of Iran's merchants faced an increasing pressure from foreign economies (Schaghayegh, 2001). This also meant that the merchants were slowly losing their grip on the local market as well to the extent that "towards the end of the nineteenth-century, it was completely dominated by the Russian and British" (Schaghayegh, 2001, p.24). The *tujjar* and merchants were also angered because their loss of control over the economy of the country was largely due to failed modernization attempt by the *shah* that lead to the dependency of the economy of the country on European countries. This included a taxation system that favoured foreigners over local merchants. Some of these taxation systems were also put due to the loss of Iran to English and Russian army. The result of Turkmanchai treaty, for instance, was a fixed custom pay of 5% on foreign trade which gave "foreigners an economic advantage because the Iranian merchants had to pay higher taxes" (Moaddel, 1992, p. 456).

4.1.1.3 The Tobacco Revolt

In 1891, Nasir al-Din Shah sold a 50-year monopoly of production, distribution, and exportation of Tobacco to Major Talbot of England (Abrahamian, 1979). This lead to major protests that started from Shiraz, the Tobacco region in Iran and spread nationally, thanks to the usage of the telegraph, to other major cities in Iran such as Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Qazvin, and Isfahan to name a few (Abrahamian, 1979). The revolt started in April of 1891 when the bazar in Shiraz was shut down as a way of protesting the treaty. This lead to the closure of other bazars in the country and a general strike by the tujjar. Following this was a religious *fatwa* against the use of tobacco in the country. The *fatwa* lead to a nation-wide boycott that received support from variety of groups. As Janet Afary (1996) argues, the opposition at the tobacco concession came from four main directions: 1) the merchants and small traders who found their economy threatened 2) the members of *ulama* with "close financial or family connections to the merchants or a vested interest in the production of tobacco on vaqf lands under their control" (p.32) 3) reformist and liberal-minded politicians such as Amin Al-Dawlah 4) the Russian government who "bribed some members of the *ulama* and encouraged them to join the opposition to the British concession. The revolt was indeed ignited by the merchants since they were able to frame the concession by showing how "Muslim interest was in conflict with the non-Muslim" (Moaddel, 1992, p.459). However, it was also supported by the intelligentsia because they saw that turning to *ulama* was the only solution to mobilize people for political action and clear a broad-based nationalist movement (Afary, 1996). As Nikki Keddi argues:

"The creation of alliance between the ulama leaders and the reformers was a tactic begun by Sayyed Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, achieving its first success in the tobacco movement, and carried on through the Iranian [constitutional] revolution. Advanced reformers were willing to put their own liberal, freethinking, or heretical notions into the background in order to achieve an active alliance with ulama leaders against the government. Afghani and others recognized that only the ulama were powerful and influential enough to lead a successful mass movement; in the absence of wide-spread demand for modernization, the use of religious language and

appeals was necessary to move the masses." (Keddie in Afary, 1996, p.28)

Afghani was able to strategically position the *ulama*, specifically Mirza Hassan Shirazi who was the leading cleric of the time, to support the tobacco revolt. With phrases such as "do not allow the Pharao to destroy religion" and "death to this monarch", in a letter that he wrote to Mirza Hassan Shirazi, he was able to mobilize the *ulama* "simultaneously flattering and threatening them, reminding them of their exalted position as guardians of the faith and yet dependent on the masses following and goodwill, promising a greater share in political process and even political authority should they join the cause and support the dissent" (Bayat, 1991, p.24). The importance of Afghani was his proposition of Pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism believed in uniting the Islamic world against the colonial occupation of Muslim land. Indeed, his plight for such idea at the time of the tobacco revolt in Iran came to be very effective in uniting all the different fractions around a unified discourse.

The tobacco revolt was unique in three ways. First of all, it demonstrated the possibility for local revolts to "spread to general rebellions" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.73), making the tobacco revolt a precursor to the constitutional revolution (Abrahamian, 1983). Secondly, it allowed for a collection of different groups with different ideas to create a network that opposed the threat of the west to the economy of the country. It indeed showed the intertwined relationship between the merchants and the religious elite and the power of using Islamic discourse as a way to frame an economic issue. Finally, and this is something that has not been clearly articulated by historians of the constitutional revolution in detail, it showed the importance of technology, especially printing press and telegram (Abrahamian, 1983), as forces that helped propagating the articulation of a local revolt into general rebellion.

We can clearly use the theoretical frameworks that we have established to look at the tobacco revolt. The revolt started with a dissatisfaction. Between all sorts of

concessions that Naser Al-Din Shah gave to the Europeans, this concession was not as grand as the other ones. However, it was something that could be used as an opportune moment given the economic and social status of the country. Indeed, the tobacco revolt started in a *kairos,* an opportune moment, to articulate a political discourse. However, this political discourse had to be coated within a religious discourse in order to be legitimized. Within this discourse, one sees the dissatisfaction towards the influence of the West on the economy of the country. However, the Russians, who also profited from large concessions from Iran, also used the tobacco revolt as a *kairos* to advance their influence on Iran by instigating hatred against the British. This shows that *kairos* can be used as a strategy of dominance as much as it can be used as a strategy of protest. Hence, we see the idea of articulation of discourses, the political, and using one hegemonic order to question another hegemonic order within the tobacco revolt. In addition, the analysis of the collective practices are also important. The closure of the *bazar* and a collective will to do so as an act of solidarity is important. The *bazar* used the collective practice of closure as a way to unify itself and recognize itself as a force that can influence the politics of the country. More importantly, the collective will to ban the consumption of tobacco because of the *fatwa* is an example of how the collective practice shaped the identity of the protesters as a Muslim collective who opposed the dominance of non-Muslims in their everyday affairs. Lastly, the impact of the printing press and the telegraph cannot be missed in the tobacco revolt. As it was mentioned above, the telegraph was used as a tool to communicate the events that started in the Shiraz *bazar* to other regions of the country. Therefore, it played an important role in spreading the news about the protests in other parts of the country and propagating the *fatwa* across the country. The telegraph was used as a tool in a creative way that had a function of serving the cause of the revolt.

4.1.1.4 Mobilization and revolution

This thesis can in no way capture the complexity of the constitutional revolution. For this, I will briefly explain some of the key elements of the event and the results that it gave. The first important event was the assassination of Nasser al-Din Shah by one of Sayyed Afghani's followers in 1886 and his replacement by Muzafar al-Din Shah (Abrahamian, 1979, p.400). The new king, seeing the result of his predecessor's policies, sought to reverse many policies of Naser al-Din Shah (Abrahamian, 1979). He relaxed censorship in the country and "lifted the ban on travel, appointed Malkum Khan ambassador in Rome, opened the Schools of Agriculture and Political Science, and, most important of all, permitted the formation of commercial, cultural, and educational associations" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.400). This lead to the establishment of first stock market (Sherkat-i Islami) as well as many influential publishing circles and anjumans (Societies). In Tabriz, the Tabriz circle started the publication of *Ganji-Funun* (treasury of knowledge) while in Tehran the influential *Anjuman-i Ma-arif* (Society of Learning) was formed. The latter was responsible for the establishment of *Ketabkhane-i Melli* (National Library) by gathering and collecting books from its members (Abrahamian, 1979). While the hope of Muzafar al-Din Shah was to satisfy the opposition by allowing more liberty of association, the exact opposite effect took place. Many semi-secret societies such as *Anjuman-i Makhfi* (Secret Society) *Markaz-i Gheybi* (The Secret Centre), *Hizb-i Ijtima'yun-i Amiyun* (Social Democratic Party) *Jama-i Adamiat* (Society of Humanity) and *Komite-i Inqilabi* (Revolutionary Committee) were formed (Abrahamian, 1979). Each of these societies had their own separate agenda. The Secret Society was formed by members of *ulama* and merchants, the Secret Centre and Social Democratic Party were allied with social democrats in Baku that were influenced by the revolutionary socialism of Russian Marxism, and the Society of Humanity, formed by a follower of Malkum Khan, followed Liberal humanism of August Comte and John Stuart Mill (Abrahamian, 1979). The

Revolutionary Committee was influential in effectuating radical change. The committee consisted of 57 members that "reflected the sociological composition of the intelligentsia" (Abrahamian, 1979, p.403).

The 57 included 15 civil servants, 8 educators, 4 translators, 1 doctor, 14 clergymen (all of whom had studied modern subjects), 1 tribal chief, 3 merchants, and 4 craftsmen. All were acquainted with Western civilization through either the Dar al-Funun, the study of European languages, the reading of recent translations, or the influence of Malkum Khan (Abrahamian, 1979, p.403)

Hence, what started as a strategy to make peace with the opposition suddenly became a *kairos* for the opposition to mobilize against the shah and demand for a liberal model of democracy with the parliament as its institution and a constitution as its pillar. While all the groups knew that there needs to be a change, their idea of the kind of change they were looking for played a great role in the outcomes of the constitutional revolution and, to an extent, the modern history of the country.

The second important event came from a breakout in *bazar* of Tehran. In December 1905, governor of Tehran bastinadoed two sugar merchants for not complying with the demand of the governor for reducing the price of sugar (Afary, 1996). This lead to months long protests that lead to a large *bast* (sit-in) of over two thousand people in the Shah Abd-al-Azim Shrine. The demand of the protesters were 1) dismissal of Naus from his post 2) dismissal of the governor Alah al Dawleh 3) establishment of a house of justice. This lead Muzaffar al-Din Shah to issue a "statement calling for the formation of a 'house of justice that would incorporate the ruling of the Shari 'at" (Afary, 1996, p.52).

At this point, the constitutionalists saw an opportunity to push the idea of *majlis*

(parliament) forward through a series of *shabnameh* (secret leaflets) in Tehran (Keddie, 2003) warning the ulama that "if they abandon the public cause no one would support them when the government turned against [them]*"* (Afary, 1996, p.53). They articulated two demands:

"1) A house of justice would be an institution resembling a court of appeal, where petitions were sent and grievances were addressed, whereas a consultative *majlis* would be a parliament along European lines, with delegates representing the provinces and the capital, and would be a legislative body 2) The formation of a *majlis* required the writing of a constitution" (Afary, 1996, 53)

The efforts by the supporters of constitutionalism continued in different forms of protests such as general strikes, *basts* (sit-ins) and peaceful protests led Muzafar al-Din Shah to sign the "royal proclamation that called for the formation of a National Consultative Majles and the writing of a constitution" (Afary, 2005, p. 344). Within the first six months of the establishment of National Assembly, over 30 Societies started appearing, many from minority groups such as Society of Jews and Society of Armenians (Abrahamian, 1979). During the same time, the number of papers and journals published in Iran jumped from 6 to over 100 publications (Abrahamian, 1979). This lead to the influence of many voices that otherwise could not articulate their vision of how a society based on a constitution and a parliament would look like. The National Assembly opened in October 1906 and began to draft a constitution that would safeguard the role of the parliament. The document that came to be know as the Fundamental Laws gave National Assembly extensive power as:

"the representative of the whole People [with the] the right in all questions to propose any measure that it regards as conducive to the well-being of the Government and the People [and the] final determination over all laws, decrees, budgets, treaties, loans, monopolies, and concessions. It was to hold sessions lasting two years, during which period its members could not be arrested without the permission of the assembly" (Abrahamian, 1983, p. 88)

The fundamental laws were ratified by Muzafar al-Din Shah five days before he died

(Abrahamian, 1979). The shah's successor, Muhammad Ali Shah, came to power and quickly showed his opposition to the parliamentary system. He refused to sign the completed document that formulated the role of the National Assembly known as the Supplementary Fundamental Laws. This included two sections including a "bill of rights" guaranteeing every citizen "equality before the law, protection of life, property, and honor, safeguards from arbitrary arrest, and freedom to publish newspapers and to organize associations". It also gave additional power to the legislature to "appoint, investigate, and dismiss premiers, ministers, and cabinets, to judge ministers for "delinquencies," and to approve annually all military expenditures" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.89). Muhammad Ali Shah argued that he cannot accept these laws because as a "good Muslim he could accept the Islamic term mashru' (lawful) but not the alien concept mashrut (constitutional)" and showed enthusiasm to the German constitution that would allow him to appoint all ministers while enjoying "real as well as nominal command over the armed forces" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.91).

The ratification of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws threatened the opponents of the majlis including conservative *ulama* who saw Islam being threatened by two elements in the Bill: 1) the Bill of Rights for all citizen where all citizens are treated equally. 2) the power of the *majlis* to pass laws. One of the elected members of the assembly, *Shekh Fazllolah Nuri,* was able to add a clause to the supplementary law where all "parliamentary legislation had to pass the ratification of a committee of five mujtaheds of the highest rank" (Arjomand, 1981, p.178). He continued his dissatisfaction to the constitution arguing that the equal rights of all nationalities and religions as well as the freedom of press were contrary to *shari'a* laws (Arjomand, 1981). He saw the Bill of Rights as a threat because he believed that *Muslims* are not equal to *non-Muslims*. As well, women and men should not be treated equally because it is against the *shari'a* law. His opposition to the majlis gained him support with the royalists as well as traditionalist *ulama* who saw that Islam was being threatened by a

Western ideological system. Nuri sought the help of mujtahids from the city of Najaf (most high-ranking *shia'* clerics lived in Najaf) and was able to produce three telegram from three different high-ranking *mujtahids* "demanding the inclusion in (the Supplement to) the Fundamental Law of a Clause concerning the heretics and the execution of divine commandment" (Arjomand, 1981 p.180). Hence, Nuri proposed the qualification of *mashru'a* (Islamic law) to be added to *mashrut'a* (constitutionalism) coining the term "mashruta-ye mashru- 'a" or "Islamic constitutionalism" (Arjomand, 1981, p.180). Nuri indeed articulated a vision of constitutionalism that gave birth to a very fundamental conflict between traditionalists and modernists until today. The conflict between constitutionalists and royalists/traditionalist *ulama* escalated when Muhammad Ali Shah closed the parliament and resisted the constitutionalists. As a result, a civil war broke out between the constitutionalists and royalists between 1908-1909 in many cities in the country (Abrahamian, 1979). The war ended when the constitutionalists took over Tehran, overthrew the Shah and replaced him with his son, Ali Shah, and executed many anti-constitutionalists including Nouri.

4.1.1.5 Where are women? The roots of feminism in Iran

Women participated greatly in the constitutional revolution. As Afary (1996) argues in her book *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution 1906-1911*, the "roots of modern Iranian feminism were firmly planted during that early turn of the century revolution" (p.178). Afary later explores this role in her book *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran* (2009) where she details the shift in the notions of sexuality in Iran as modernism started to change the perception of the society on concepts like marriage, homosexuality, health,specifically sexual health, as a result of new notions of sexuality that were introduced at this time. During the constitutional revolution, intellectual women started

questioning male dominated leadership of the constitutional movement and critiqued conservative wings of the *ulama,* such as Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri, who "issued a religious edict *fatwa* against girls' schools" (Afary, 1996, p.178). At the same time, several progressive male intellectuals supported women's rights during this period. Again, the importance of printing press becomes vital in the articulation of discourse in support of women's rights in many newspapers including *sur-i Israfil (1907-1908) Habl al-Matin (1907-1909), Musavat (1907-1908) and Iran-i Naw (1909-1911)* (Afary, 1996).

During the constitutional revolution, several societies were formed for women. Some of these include *Anjuman-i Azadi-yi Zanan* (The Anjuman for the Freedom of Women), *Ittihadiay-yi Ghaibi-yi Nisvan* (The secret Union of Women), and *Anjuman-e Nisvan* (Women's Society) (Afary, 1996, p.184). Some of these societies were established to help with the welfare of women by funding schools, hospitals, and orphanages while others had political agendas to make the cause for representation of women in the public sphere more prominent. The Anjuman of Women's letter, for instance, was "discussed during the First Majlis, which briefly looked up the issue of recognizing women's councils" (Afary, 1996, p.184). Amongst issues that women's societies concentrated on was education. They argued that the reason why Iranian society is not advanced is because its women, who are responsible with educating their child, are not educated (Afary, 1996). Hence, establishment of girls' schools and adult school for women became an important task of many of these Anjumans.

Women were also critical of polygamy, homosexuality, and arranged marriage in their discourse before and during the revolution. Taj al-Saltaneh, the daughter of Nasir al-Din Shah and member of the *Anjoman i Nisvan* (Women's Society), saw the lack of courtship between boys and girls before marriage and the need for love within the

institution of marriage as the main reasons why men would seek other wives, temporary wives, or boys as company (Afary, 2009). According to Afary (2009), Taj "became one of the first Iranian women to call for romantic love within marriage" (p.134). Taj's articulations about marriage were also reflected in major newspapers in the country. For example, *Mullah Nasreddin,* an Azari-language satirical newspaper that advocated a progressive reading of Islamic texts, "challenged the conservative social and political practices of the of orthodox clerics"(Afary, 2009, p.135) by publishing humoristic pieces that criticised polygamy and homosexuality and promoted heteronormative marriages.

4.1.1.6 Concluding remarks

The constitutional revolution in Iran was an Event. This Event did not happen in one day but through several years as a result of the introduction of modernism and modern concepts in the country. The Event brought new multiplicities with it into the state of Being of the society and hence resulted in new ways of discourse articulation. It would not be wrong to assume that the constitutional revolution was the first time in the modern history of Iran where the political entered politics in the country in a profound way. It did so by questioning the hegemonic discourse of the Shah's legitimacy coming from the Grace of God and shifting this power into the hands of a body that was represented by the people of Iran. While the revolution ended with the constitutionalists executing the leaders of the traditionalist camp, it was the *ulama* that were able to rally the crowd against the Shah and for the institution of the first *majlis.* In a very complex and bizzare way, constitutional revolution saw a form of antagonistic pluralism that Mouffe and Laclau speak of.

The constitutional revolution had another aspect as well which is sporadically talked about in history books but never really analyzed in dept. This is the formation of networked opposition through the usage of communication technologies. The printing presses played a large role in articulating the discourse of the opposition and created the spaces for antagonism during the constitutional revolution. Besides the printing press, the telegraph played an important role in spreading the news about the unrests in the country and spreading the regional unrest nationally. This was seen in how the usages of telegraph during the Tobacco Revolt lead to the spread of revolt from the *bazar* of Shiraz to other parts of the country. Hence, constitutional revolution is greatly indebted to the usage of ICTs in creating Network Social Movements.

The forms of protestations during this period are also an important point of discussion. The practice of *bast* (religious sit-ins), for instance, shows the way protesting crowds formulated a nationalistic identity against the concession by using a practice that identified them as religious and oppositional at the same time. The collective practice of *bast* shaped the identity of the protesting crowds of the Tobacco Revolt as a crowd that is religious and concerned with the threat of the West to its property. One can see, hence, how *bast* is a form of collective action that results from a collective care. During the *basts,* many people joined the *ulama* in the protestation while others took care of them by bringing food and supplies to them. Hence, the collective practice resulted in practices of caring for the collective and forming a collective identity against the Shah. Also, by stopping the consumption of tobacco across the country, the collective recognized themselves as a protesting crowd through the shared practice of following the *fatwa* that banned the consumption of tobacco. In other words, in every step of the way, the collective practices of protesters made them realize a collective ethos and made them identify themselves as protesting crowds.

4.1.2 Modernity on steroids: from Reza Shah to Mohammad Reza Shah

In 1909, the British, realizing an opportunity in the instability of the country caused by the civil war and discovering oil in the southwest of the country, founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now known as British Petroleum) (Keddi, 2003, p.72). Five years later, in 1914, the World War I broke out. While Iran declared its neutrality, the geographic position of the country made it valuable to both sides. The Germans took to appease Iranians by promoting the anti-British and anti-Russian sentiment while the Russians and the British decided to become allies by splitting the country into two regions with the North controlled by the Russians and the south by the British (Keddi, 2003). The war ended in 1919 but the effects devastated Iran economically and politically. Many of the war battles started being held in Iran, especially the Northern Region, destabilizing the regions. Regional conflicts, such as that of Mirza Kuchak Khan, with nationalist and/or Marxist tendencies started appearing in many parts of the country. At the same time, the first unions in the country formed in 1918 and were instrumental in many successful strikes (Keddi, 2003). Between 1919-1925, the government of Iran tried to win back the heart of the Iranians but the conflicts and changes that resulted from war and regional conflicts did not allow this to happen. In 1921, Reza Khan, a self-made commander of the Cossak Brigade, staged a military coup and convinced the Shah that the only way the dynasty would survive would be to make him the commander of the army. In 1923, the majlis terminated the Qajar dynasty and by 1925 Reza Khan, as the prime minister of the country, was able to gain the support of "an overwhelming majority of the assembly [who] voted to bestow the throne upon the Pahlavi family" (Abrahamian, 1981, p.135).

Reza Shah was an influential character in the history of the country. Between 1926-1941, he made many crucial changes to the country. He started all of this by securing his power and control over the country through the creation a new unified army,

strengthening government bureaucracy, and gaining of support from the court patronage (Abrahamian, 1983). "For the first time since the Safavids, the state was able to control society through extensive instruments of administration, regulation, and domination" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.136). Having such power and influence over the country now, he embarked on major social, cultural, and economic changes. First, he established three sets of codes: the Commercial Code (1925), the Criminal Code (1926) and the Civil Code (1928). Based mostly on the French model of laws, these codes came to reduce the power of the *ulama* economically and socially since many of these matters were handled by the *ulama* at the time (Keddi, 2003, p.89). These codes were able to unify different forms of punishment across the country. Second, he embarked into great infrastructure projects such as major dams and the Trans-Iranian Railroad project (Abrahamian, 1981). Reza Shah also made major educational reforms by unifying the school curriculums based on the French curriculum and shift 4% of the parliamentary budget on education reform (Keddi, 2003, p.91). Again, this move reduced the power of *ulama* since their religious schools (*madrasa)* were no longer the only option for education (Keddi, 2003). Some of the seeds that the women's movement planted during the constitutional revolution came to bear fruit during this time as well since many girls and women were able to attend schools and get educated in secular schools. Higher education was also reformed with the establishment of the first civilian university in the country in 1934, Tehran University (Abrahamian, 1983, p.145). Just like the Dar al-Fonun in the late 19th century, the Tehran University created the next generation of intelligentsia that were becoming more and more familiar with the western sciences. The number of enrolled students in the university jumped from 600 in 1934 to 3300 in 1941, for instance. The changes in governmental and educational system also led to a new class of society. These were educated bureaucrats that held governmental jobs and were part of a new middle class in the society. By implementing these changes, Reza Shah became more and more unpopular amongst the *ulama* and traditionalists who saw his reforms as threat to Islam and Islamic *shari'a* law. In 1936, Reza Shah passed a law that banned the *hijab* and forced all women to unveil (Girgis,

1996). While he faced many criticisms especially from the traditionalist side, he was able to suppress the opposition and implement the project. The project lead the *ulama* to mistrust Reza Shah even more and this mistrust continued until the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

While Reza Shah was able to modernize the country in a fast pace, he also started to become pessimistic of the capability of the parliament and those around him. He also started mistrusting the British and the Russians and sided more with the Germans in his modernization projects especially in the south of Iran (Abrahamian, 1979). In 1939, the World War II broke out and the Germans invaded parts of the Soviet Union (Keddi, 2003, p.105). While the Germans wanted to use Iran as a base to attack the Soviets, the Allies saw the country as the most strategic route to transfer supplies to fight the Germans on the Russian side (Keddi, 2003). This lead the British and the Russians to attack Iran from North and South respectively, abdicating the Shah in September 1941, replacing him with his son Muhammad Reza and forming an alliance between Great Britain, Russia and Iran in January 1942. Hence, another chapter in modern history of Iran came to an end.

4.1.2.1 The Reign of Mohammad Reza Shah

The period between 1941-1979 can be divided into two separate periods. The first, between 1941-1953, saw a rise in nationalist sentiments and ended with the second proto-democratic movement after the constitutional revolution with the nationalisation of oil and the 1953 coup d'état that overthrew the democratically elected Mohammad Mosadegh (Khosrokhavar, 2012). The second, between 1953-1979, saw a series of developments that resulted in major social changes including urbanisation, land reforms, and greater rights for women and minorities. The same period also saw the

rise in anti-shah and anti-western sentiments and resulted in the coalition between the left and the traditionalists against *shah* and the west. The period ended with the infamous 1979 Iranian Revolution and the establishment of the current system of governance in the country. In this section, I will explore the oil nationalisation period. I will explore the second period concluding with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 further in the thesis.

4.1.2.2 Nationalism in Iran and nationalization of oil (1941-1953)

Reza Shah, during his reign, started a project of dynastic nationalism by using the symbolism of pre-Islamic Iran. One of his orders was to "use 'Iran' in order to establish a particular historical narrative which would connect the modern state to its Aryan past" (Ansari, 2007, p. 103). The new nationalist movement that rose in the 1940's and 50's sought to make the nation of Iran and Iranian as an inclusive and pluralistic notion that evoked unity amongst all different ethnic backgrounds in the country (Ansari, 2007). The 1940's and 50's also was a period of competing political fractions (Ansari, 2007). The strongest political fraction, however, came from two major parties: Tudeh Party (Part of Masses) and Iran Party. The Tudeh Party was formed in 1941. It divided the society into two major classes of "those who own the main means of production; and those who have no significant amounts of property" and aimed to "mobilize the workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals, traders, and craftsmen of Iran" (Tudeh Party's firs program in Abrahamian, 2008, p.108). Tudeh was not the first communist party in the country but was the first to unite Marxist sentiments amongst the masses across the country. By 1945-46, Tudeh party had "six parliamentary seats in addition to that of Isfahan. It had three cabinet ministries: education, health, and trade" and claimed to have 50,000 members and 10,000 affiliate members (Abrahamian, 2008, p.108). It's newspaper, *Rahbar (Leader),* "boasted a record-breaking circulation of

more than 100,000 – triple that of the semi-official Ettela'at" (Abrahamian, 2008, p.108). The Iran Party was also formed in 1941 out of an Engineering Association by Mehdi Bazargan with members from professional associations such as lawyers, doctors and professors and campaigned "on behalf of the highly respected Dr. Mossadeq as well as their own party leaders" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.189).

Mossadeq's contribution to the history of Iran is indeed of great importance. He saw the influence of the British and Russians and the concessions given to them as something that needed to be stopped. In 1949, Mossadeq formed the National Front. He purposefully avoided the name Party because he "insisted that Iran was suited more for a loose coalition of organizations with a general goal than for a structured political party with disciplined members and elaborate programs" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.253). The National Front included plurality as one of its core principles and brought together the traditional middle class and the intelligentsia to form the organization together (Abrahamian, 1983). The traditionalists were more religious and had ties with the *ulama* and *bazar* while the latter was secular. In the 1950's the National Front shifted its attention from domestic to external affairs. This was through an opposition to the revision of the 1933 agreement with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. At the same time, Mossadeq was able to acquire the support of the Tudeh party, a party that had great power and capability for staging large scale protests due to its success in establishing and uniting many Trades Unions across the country. In 1951, Mossadeq became the prime minister and was able to convince the parliament to nationalize the oil industry (Abrahamian, 1983). In response, the British decided to fight the matter in International Court of Justice at The Hague and lost to Mosadeq in the court. In the next two years, Mossadeq tried to fend off economic pressure resulting from the worldwide embargo that the British imposed on Iran on the purchase of Iranian Oil. In 1953, seeing that the Mosadeq government is weakened, the British and the American government joined forces with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and staged a coup d'état against Mossadeq and overthrew his government (Gasiorowski, 2013). This event marked the first period

of shah's rein.

4.1.2.3 Women's right movement in the period

Probably the two biggest achievements in this era for women were in education and cultural practices. With the public education project, Reza Shah aimed to "integrate women, ethnic minorities, Sunni Muslims, and non-Muslims into the state" (Afar, 2009, p.145). By 1933, for instance, around 45,000 girls were attending 870 girls schools across the country (Afary, 2009). However, Reza Shah also started controlling the activities of women during the same era. For instance, he dismantled the activities of the Patriotic Women's League and replaced it with the government controlled *Kanun-e Banuan* (Ladies' Centre) (Afary, 2009). The organization called for reform in "marriage, divorce, inheritance laws, equal wages for equal work, greater political rights for women, greater emphasis on women's education, and especially unveiling" (Afary, 2009, p. 151). Interestingly, the Civil and Penal codes that Reza Shah introduced excluded the family law and all matters regarding marriage, divorce and appointment of trustees and guardians rested under the control of the clerics (Afary, 2009). As it was mentioned before, the unveiling laws were some of the most dramatic initiatives that aimed to create what Afary, using Foucault's notion, calls the "making of modern, docile bodies" (Afary, 2009, p. 155). Culturally, women participated more in public activities. At this time, cinema became an important instrument in learning and emulating the western mannerism. This in turn contributed to the discourse of normative heterosexuality amongst the middle class. Cinema also became the instrument to teach western courtship and theatres became spaces of intimacy for boys and girls who "found the darkness and safety of the movie houses conducive to the charged moments of privacy, intimacy, and eroticism" (Afary, 2009, p. 159). Lastly, the role of women and topics concerning women's issues became more prominent at

this time in the literary circle. The era saw the rise of Parvin E'tesamie, an acclaimed female poet, as well as novels critiquing the exploitation of women and the pain and trauma associated with modern marriage (Afary, 2009). Overall, while many issues around women's rights did not get addressed during this era, a Pandora's Box opened where speaking publicly about these issues, especially through literature, became more common.

4.1.2.4 Concluding remarks

Several key elements relating to the thesis must be addressed at this point. First of all, on top of printing press and telegraph, which were the tools of articulation and organization during the constitutional revolution, another technology was added to this list, the radio. During 1940s, the Soviet government supported the Tudeh Party in establishing several radio stations. The result of this was that the party could reach a large area of the country through a dissemination tool "which required no literacy, allowed immediate reception of political news and propaganda, and was dependent upon no one" (Ansari, 2007. p.101). This meant that large population of illiterate people in villages showed interest in politics and became political. The second element was the role of protesting crowds as collective action to question the decisions of the Shah and articulate their political discourse. As it was articulated by the royalist newspaper *Itila'at* (Information) "Mossadeq constantly resorted to street demonstrations to pressure the opposition and thereby, 'bring parliament under his influence" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.267). We can also see this in Jamal Emami's discourse in the Majlis regarding what he coined "street politics":

"Statecraft has degenerated into street politics. It appears that this country has nothing better to do than hold street meetings. We now have meetings here, there, and everywhere. Meetings for this, that, and every occasion, Meetings for university students, high school students, seven-

year-olds, even six-year-olds. I am sick and tired of street meetings. Is our premier a statesman or a mob leader? What type of premier says 'I will speak to the people' every time he is faced with a political question?" (Emami in Abrahamian, 1983, p. 267)

While during the constitutional revolution the major forms of collective action were *bast* (religious sit-ins) and closure of the *bazar*, the events in late 1940's and early 1950's in Iran primarily resulted from a form of protestations that was more common in the Occident. This was because of the power of Tudeh Party to organize large scale strikes and form large protesting crowds in the streets. While protesting crowds existed during the constitutional revolution, the occidental form became the most prominent form of protestation during nationalization crisis. Moreover, due to the advent of radio, the political discourse was able to travel wirelessly to areas where it would not normally reach before and this lead to an increase in articulation of the political in politics of the country at the time. Unfortunately, the Iranian historians that I have studied have not really focused on the impact of communication technologies as a force in creating networked political oppositions during this era and I do not have enough information to make a conclusive observation. However, the fact of the matter remains that communication technologies helped in expanding the network of the opposition in the country. Lastly, the idea of collective identity came to play a great role in this period. Facing the collective memory of Reza Shah's version of nationalism, the oil nationalization movement came to establish an identity of Iranian Nationalism that was inclusive and pluralistic. The west was no longer only a threat to Islam, as it was formulated during the constitutional revolution. It was a threat to the nation of Iran in its plurality of religions and ethnicities. Hence, the ethos of the collective that came from the collective practices of the crowd in this era, formulated a secular and nationalistic identity that sought to modernize the nation of Iran without a direct dependence to the west.

4.1.3 Islamic Revolution (1977-1979)

During the nationalization crisis, Mohammad Reza Shah fled the country (Abrahamian, 1979). With the help of the West, he came back to the country and continued in the footsteps of his father by starting, "full speed the drive to expand the three pillars that held up his state: the military, the bureaucracy, and the court patronage system" (Abrahamian, 2008, p.123). He increased the military budget and established a secret service organization that would stop future military coups called SAVAK with the help of the FBI and Israeli Mossad in 1957 (Abrahamian, 2008, p.126). He also increased the number of ministries from twelve to twenty and indirectly financed quasi-governmental institutions such as the Central Bank, National Iranian Radio and Television Organization, National Iranian Oil Company, and National Film Company (Abrahamian, 2008, p.126). Lastly, he used the wealth of the dynasty to found a foundation that included not only lands and estates but also over 207 companies active in "mining, construction, automobile manufacturing, metal works, agribusinesses, food processing, banking, insurance, and tourism (casinos, cabarets, and grand hotels)" called the Pahlavi Foundation (Abrahamian, 2008, p.127). He was successful in implementing these and much more changes because of the sudden increase in the price of oil due to the Israel-Arab War of 1947 (Abrahamian, 2008).

Seeing that his popularity was not improving amongst the majority of the population in the country, the Shah staged what I would like to call a public relations stunt that backfired at him and cost him his throne. He introduced a set of reforms and staged a referendum to legitimize these changes as a 'revolution' (Abrahamian, 1983). The event came to be known as the "White Revolution. These reforms included: "1) nationalization of forests, 2) sale of state factories to private entrepreneurs 3) profit-sharing for industrial workers 4) extension of the vote to women, and 5) establishment of the rural literacy corps" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.424). The official results of the referendum stated that 99.9% of the voters said yes to the referendum question. In June

1963, however, Ayatollah Rouholah Khomeini staged a protest in the month of Muharram against the Shah's so called "White Revolution" that became the dress rehearsal for the Iranian Revolution (Abrahamian, 1983). The upheaval of June 1963 started on June 3rd when Khomeini gave a speech that defined the ideological framework of the revolution. In it, he compared the Shah of Iran to the Bani Umayyad family and the actions of his police force against political activists to the battle of Karbala, an important event that saw the army of the grandson of Mohammad, Hossein Ibn-i Ali, get brutally defeated and murdered by the military of Yazid, an army general of the Bani Umayyad caliph. Khomeini started the speech with following declaration:

"It is now the afternoon of *Ashura* ...Sometimes when I reflect upon the events of *Ashura,* a question occurs to me: If the Bani Umayyad and the regime of Yazid ibn Mu'awiya were at war with Husayn, then why did they commit such savage and inhuman crimes against defenseless women and innocent children on the day of *Ashura?* What were the women and infants guilty of? It seems to me that their concern was far more basic, they did not wish the Bani Hashim to exist; the Bani Umayyad were hostile toward the Bani Hashim as a whole and their goal was to root out this goodly tree.[1]

The same idea prevailed in Iran. What business did they [the Shah regime] have with our sixteen and seventeen-year-old youngsters? What had the Sayyid aged no more than sixteen or seventeen years done against the Shah? [2] What had he done to upset the government? What had he done to upset the tyrannical regime? One is led to conclude that it is towards underlying principles that they are hostile rather than children. They do not wish these principles to exist, nor do they wish any of us to exist; the young and the old alike." (Khomeini, 1963)

The articulation that Khomeini used in this discourse was not new. It was born of the discourse of constitutional revolution where "the political space was divided into the two antagonist camps of people (millat) and state (dawlat). Dawlat was depicted as despotic (mustabidd) and unjust (zalim), and millat as oppressed (mazlum) and justice-seeking ('adalatkhwah)" (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990, p.96). The difference this time, however, was that Khomeini was able to rearticulate this discourse in a narrative that connects the most important historic event in *Shi'a* Islam to the relation between the people of Iran and the Shah. Instead of focusing on the concerns of the rest of the *ulama* relating to the land reforms and women's rights, Khomeini "denounced the regime for

living off corruption, rigging elections, violating the constitutional laws, stifling the press and the political parties, destroying the independence of the university, neglecting the economic needs of merchants, workers, and peasants, [and] undermining the country's Islamic beliefs" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.425). The upheaval in June lasted three days and was ruthlessly oppressed leaving hundreds of people dead (Ansari, 2007).

4.1.3.1 Dr. Ali Shariati, the ideologue of the revolution

After Mossadeq was overthrown, the Shah, with the help of its new organization, SAVAK, cracked down on many of the major parties that formed opposition to the Shah. Of these groups, the Tudeh Party was repressed significantly by the police and later by SAVAK (Abrahamian, 1983). By 1970s, the Tudeh was no longer a threat to the establishment. The second group, National Front, was also suppressed by the regime to the extent that by 1965, it broke into two rivals of the Second and Third National Front respectively, working mostly outside of Iran through the publication of newspapers (Abrahamian, 1983). Some of the members of the National Front also formed a new organization called *Hezb-i Azadi* (Liberation Movement). These were mostly educated young professionals and technocrats who sought to synthesize Islam and Western Sciences together (Abrahamian, 1983). They would become the strong force in establishing the ideology behind the Islamic Revolution. Beside these three groups, the clerical opposition came mostly from Ayatollah Khomeini. Last but not least, two major guerrilla organizations also took part in the opposition movement that lead to the Iranian Revolution. The first, *Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran* (The Organization of the Iranian Peoples' Guerrilla Freedom Fighters) was a Marxist group that saw the "victories of Castro, Giap, and Mao, as well as the newborn confidence of the Latin American guerrillas" as examples of the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare in overthrowing the Shah (Abrahamian, 1983, p.488). The second was

Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (The Organization of the Iranian Peoples' Freedom Fighters) that has its origins from the religious wing of the National Front and saw that "Iran was dominated by Imperialism, especially American imperialism, that the White Revolution had transformed Iran from a feudal society to a bourgeois one heavily dependent on Western capitalism [and] the only way to shatter this atmosphere of terror was through heroic acts of violence" (Abrahamian, 1983, p. 492).

While all these groups held their positions strongly, they all saw Imperialism and the influence of the West as a problem and the solution was either in socialist, traditionalism or both. It was in this spirit that the work of Ali Shariati influenced many religious as well as Marxists to join forces against the Shah. In the 1940s, Ahmad Fardid, a philosophy professor at Tehran University, coined the term *Westoxification*. In the 60s, Jalal Al-Ahmad, a member of Tudeh Party, wrote a book by the same title, which "played the founding role in the effort to articulate a local, Islamic modernity as a blueprint for revolutionary social change in Iran" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p. 418). The term, referring to "the aggregate of events in the life, culture, civilization, and modes of thought of a people having no supporting tradition, no historical continuity, no gradient of transformation" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p.418), was used by Al-Ahmad as a Heideggerian critique of the nihilism that western modernity has brought to Iran in the form of consumerism and obsession with technology. He argued that "from a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same [in their] dreary technological frenzy [and] unrestricted organization of the average man [...] all of these 'isms' and ideologies are roads leading to the sublime realm of mechanization" (Al-Ahmad in Mirsepassi, 2006, p.422). He saw that the only way to exit "mechanosis", "the compound of nihilism and technological frenzy that grew indigenously within the West and extended itself like a plague to the world as a whole", as the 'disease' that has plagued Iran is "the subordination of technology to the power of authentic traditional Iranian culture" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p.423). What Al-Ahmad did, more or less, was to take the critique of technology by Heidegger and rearticulated it in the context of

consumerism and obsession with the west in the Iranian society at the time.

Al-Ahmad's work captured the minds of intelligentsia during the 1960s. During the 1970s, however, Dr. Ali Shariati's re-articulation of Al-Ahmad's work came to articulate *Shi'a* Islam as a modern revolutionary Ideology. Shariati was educated in France and was greatly influenced by revolutionary movement in Algeria and the works of Martin Heidegger, Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre. He "promoted the notion of Islamic ideology in his search for a reinvigorated collective conscience through the reform of Islam" (Arjomand, 2002, 720). More importantly, he painted the *Shi'a* Islam as "a revolutionary ideology that permeates all spheres of life, especially politics, and inspires true believers to fight against all forms of oppression, exploitation, and social injustice" (Abrahamian, 1983, p.466). Shariati's appeal came in his capacity to "split Shi'a Islam into a subterranean authentic tradition, which is called on to overthrow the tyrannical injustice of any powers that be, as well as to oppose the dominant yet inauthentic strain of the tradition that lingers in the mire of passivity and conservatism" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p.427). By doing so, he sough to give another narrative to Islam that was an alternative to that of Marxist-Leninist in its articulation. According to Abrahamian, Shariati argued that Islam and specifically *Shi'a* Islam was a revolutionary idea against despotism and for the greater good of people:

"The prophet Mohammad had been sent to establish not just a new religion but a dynamic society in permanent revolution moving towards a classless utopia. Imam Ali had opposed the early Caliphs not just because they had usurped authority but because they had beyrayed the true mission by compromising with the powers-that-be. Imam Hussein had died in Karbala not just because of predestined fate but because of the burning desire to keep alive the true content of Islam." (Abrahamian, 2008, p.144)

He hence established *Shi'a* Islam as an alternative to the Marxist-Leninist Movement in Iran (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004) by describing Imam Hossein as an early day Che Guevara and "Zaynab –Hussein's sister – as an exemplary woman who kept alive the revolutionary message" (Abrahamian, 2008, p.145). Shariati also criticized many of

the *ulama* in their passiveness and apolitical attitude to politics. He saw *Shi'a* Islam as politically active and redefined/rearticulated many of the meanings of terms used in the *Shi'a* literature.

He transformed ummat (community) into dynamic society in permanent revolution; towhid (monotheism) into social solidarity; imamat (rule of the imam) into charismatic leadership; jihad (crusade) into liberation struggle; mojahed (crusader) into revolutionary fighter; shahid (martyr) into revolutionary hero; momen (pious) into genuine fighter; kafer (unbeliever) into passive observer; sherk (idol worship) into political submission; entezar (expectation of the Messiah) into expectation of the revolution; tafsir (scriptural commentary) into the skill of extracting radical meaning from sacred texts; and, perhaps most significant of all, mostazafen (the meek) into the oppressed masses – as in the wretched of the earth. He also transformed the Cain–Abel fable into a metaphor for the class struggle; and the Karbala paradigm into a morality lesson on revolutionary self-sacrifice (Abrahamian, 2008, p.145).

So, just like constitutional revolution where new terms started surfacing as a result of articulations, the Iranian Revolution saw the introduction of a new vocabulary. Shariati was able to capture the educated middle class of Iran and specially "Iranian youth, to underprivileged university students, to those from the traditional middle classes, and to educate young women from traditional backgrounds" (Mirsepassi, 2006, p.427). He was also able to capture the imagination of Marxist-Leninists.

Shariati's speeches were mostly recorded on cassette tapes and were copied and distributed to the public. One sees again the role of technology as a tool for articulation of the political and the use of technology as a creative way to mobilize and disseminate information. However, the impact of his ideas on the revolutionary generation came from a different medium, Television. In 1973, the Iranian government charged two young Marxist-Leninists, Khosrow Golsorkhi (his last name means red rose, a revolutionary symbol) and Keramatolah Daneshian, with a plot to kidnap the crown prince and televised the trial live on TV (Dabashi, 2011). The trial became a public spectacle where "people of capital were transfixed watching the wide face, handsome demeanour, and heavily moustached lip of the young poet and journalist" (Dabashi, 2010, p.73). The discourse of Golsorkhi publicized the Islamic Ideology of Shariati in

the words of a secular, Marxist-Leninist:

"Verily! Life is [naught but] conviction and struggle!' I began my statement with a passage by Master Hossein, the great martyr of the Middle Eastern masses. [Thought] I am a Marxist-Leninist, for the first time I found social justice in Islamic Ideology and then became a socialist. In this court I do not [intend to] haggle for my life and living. I am but an insignificant drop in the great... in the great suffering of the revolutionary Iranian masses" (Golsorkhi in Dabashi, 2010, p.74)
.

In essence, Golsorkhi was able to connect two ideas of Marxist-Leninist social justice with the notion of martyrdom of Islamic Ideology for the revolutionary cause of the Iranian masses. Golsorkhi was found guilty and executed by the regime. However, his articulation of mixing Islam and Marxism was one of many that gave rise to the support of the left for Khomeini and his leadership during the Iranian Revolution. The two ideas of westoxification and Islam as a revolutionary ideology came to play a crucial part of the Iranian revolutionary and post-revolutionary discourse. Between 1977-1979, many mass protests started to appear around the country. The Iranian Revolution became a globalized spectacle when many of the strikes around the country were televised in the global media and this in turn "generated solidarity among different groups of strikers, especially among oil workers, railway workers, copper, coal and steel workers, electrical workers, and white-collar employees" (Rasler, 1996, p.146). During the same time, many new forms of collective practices by protesting crowds started forming including the infamous shouting of *Allah-o-Akbar Khomeini Rahbar* (God is Great, Khomeini is our leader) from the rooftops at night (Mottahedeh, 2015). In 1979, Iran's last king escaped the country. Immediately after, a referendum was called by Khomeini where the majority of the population voted to establish what is now known as the Islamic Republic system of governance (Abrahamian, 2008).

4.1.3.2 Concluding Remarks

The shift in the articulation of discourse from 1953 onwards was from nationalistic to pluralistic. The pluralism, as we showed, came from the left and the intelligentsia as well as the traditionalist and the *ulama*. These articulations were transformed by the works of Jalal Al-Ahmad and Shariati in two ways. The first was a critique of Western Imperialism that resonated with the Marxists. This critique was indeed a continuation of constitutional revolution's plight for independence from Western influence as well as West's threat to Islam. Westoxification, in a way, was the continuation of this thought with the difference that instead of using Quran and religious texts, Al-Ahmad used Heidegger's critique of modernity against modernism and the West itself. The Shah's era saw a great increase in the influence of the West in the country. It also saw a rise in consumerism and Al-Ahmad's work was a reaction to this materialism without historicity and authenticity. What Shariati did was to take Al-Ahmad's argument to a new level by making Islam a revolutionary ideology and the solution to the disease of Westoxification. Shariati's formulation of the cause of the protesting crowd of the Iranian Revolution as a *Shi'a* Islamic cause gave Khomeini a platform to hammer the Shah by framing the Iranian revolution as an Islamic one with the symbolism of the battle of Karbala as the major platform for the cause. Khomeini's strategy is not something new since Seiyyd Jamal Al-Din Afghani used a similar logic to promote his idea of Pan-Islamism during the constitutional revolution and support the *ulama* in rallying the crowds during the Tobacco Revolution.

What we can see, hence, is that many of the articulations of the constitutional revolution came to be articulated and re-articulated during the Islamic Revolution. The innovation of the Islamic Revolution was the usage of the *Shi'a* narrative of the battle of Karbala in uniting the traditionalists and the leftists for the cause of overthrowing the king. Khomeini, by putting himself in the role of Hussain and portraying Shah as Yazid, used the narrative to formulate the collective practices of the protesting crowds within the

framework of *Shi'a* Islamic practices such as *Tazi'ye* (Afary & Anderson, 2004, p. 36). After the revolution, Khomeini's discourse of the battle of Ashura and the value of martyrdom for the cause of the Islamic Revolution became the hegemonic framework of his government. He was able to rally millions of Iranians to join the Iran-Iraq war with the same discourse and used it as a framework to silence any opposition to the government. In the next section, I will briefly talk about Iran after the 1979 revolution by talking about the emergence of three main social movements before the Green Movement.

4.1.4 Post revolution Iran

Four important changes happened in Iran after the revolution. The first was the unification of religion and state under one authority. The second was the Cultural Revolution and the revision of all scholar curriculums in the country. The third was the disciplination of the bodies, especially for women, and a push for legitimization of the hegemonic power of the state through the myth of Karbala. The fourth was the rise of the reform movement and a move towards civil society and Islamic Democracy.

4.1.4.1 Governance in Iran and the State

Following the revolution, the Islamic Republic system of governance was installed in the country with Khomeini as its supreme leader. This meant "the transfer of all power – theological and political – to the highest religious authority, the marja-e taqlid (source of imitation), or, as the concept became known in revolutionary parlance, the velayat-e faqih (guardianship of jurisconsult)" (Menashri, 2001, p. 13). Following a popular referendum in 1979, 99% of the electorate in the country, over twenty million, voted

for the Islamic Republic as a form of governance. From this, a new constitution was written that replaced the constitution of 1906 that was a hybrid product between "divine rights and the rights of man; between theocracy and democracy; between vox dei and vox populi; and between clerical authority and popular sovereignty" (Abrahamian, 2008, p.165). Under the constitution, "the 12-man Council of Guardians (*shura-ye negahban*), comprising of six clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists chosen by the Majlis with his approval, is charged with reviewing laws passed by the Majlis to determine whether they are in conformity with Islam and compatible with Iranian constitution" (Menashri, 2001, p.14). The people of Iran vote for two major bodies. The first is the leader of the Executive Branch, who becomes the president every four years, while the second is the members of Majlis who are responsible with passing laws. All the members who run for office in the executive and legislative branch of the government must be verified by the Guardian Council and approved by the Supreme Leader to do so (Menashri, 2001).

With such fundamental changes in the constitution and form of governance in the country, the soul of the conflict and civil war in Iran during the constitutional revolution came to life. In essence, the dream of Nouri to have a Mashruteh-y *Mashru'a* (Religious Constitutional) form of constitution was transformed into an institutionalized government that formed a constitution with Shari'a at its foundation. In such manner, another change in the articulation of the Grace of God was born in the sense that the Supreme Leader came to be the authority to judge this Grace according to his knowledge of Shari'a. The fight to transfer the Grace of God directly to the hands of the people during the constitutional revolution was hence rearticulated by adding the Supreme Leader that assures its execution according to the laws of *Shari'a*.

4.1.4.2 Cultural Revolution and the new student movement

While the first change in the new government in Iran was the establishment of power, the second was the control over knowledge. After the Nationalization crisis, the student movement in Universities started flourishing due to a crackdown on political parties at the time (Mahdi, 1999). This in turn expanded to a large and diverse group of student associations that were active before and during the 1979 revolution. After the revolution and the election of Banisadr as president, the student associations continued their activities and as Mahdi (1999) clearly points out, "Being young, active, energetic, and mostly influenced by the secular groups [...] were a major obstacle in the way of consolidation of power" (p.8). After months of struggle between the leftist student associations and the government, the revolutionary council ordered Universities closed on June 5, 1980 (Mahdi, 1999). Following the closure, Ayatollah Khomeini established the *Shoraaye Enghelab-e Farhangi* (The Council for Cultural Revolution) on June 12 of the same year (Mahdi, 1999). For the next two years, a project of Islamization of knowledge took place in the country where all programs of the Universities in the country were verified by the council to follow the values of Islam and the Islamic Revolution (Mahdi, 1999).

When the Universities opened in 1982, "they were purged of leftists, nationalists, secular, and opposition students and faculties. Female students were barred from studying certain disciplines like agriculture, engineer and the law" (Mahdi, 1999, p.9). At the same time, new Islamic associations were formed and quotas were established for the admission of members of *Basij* (Mobilization Force), *Passdaran* (Military), and high-ranking governmental officials (Mahdi, 1999). In the light of these changes, many Islamic associations were established as the arm of the state. Many organizations started shaping in the 1970's and 1980's and many of them supported the government.

The 1990's in Iran saw many changes in the country. The most important of these wasthe rise of the reform movement and the election of Mohammad Khatami. In 1994, before the election of Mohammad Khatami, a student organization called the Tabarzadi Group published an article making allegations against the then president Hashemi Rafsanjani's family and their associations (Mahdi, 1990). This was one of the first times after the cultural revolution where an Islamic student association critiqued a high ranking official in the government. The 1990s saw the rise in the baby boomers that were born before and during the 1980-88 war in Iran. This high birth rate gave rise to the number of students in universities from 117,000 at the beginning of the 1980s to 1,150,000 before the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997 (Mahdi, 1999). At the same time, for the first time in the history, presence of women Iranian higher education drastically increased to the extent that by 1999, the number female students surpassed the number of admitted male students "by a figure of about 20,000" (Mahdi, 1999, p.14). All these changes lead to a great participation of the student associations during the election of Mohammad Khatami, the first reform president after the 1979 revolution.

The election of President Khatami was a turning point as it was the result of the coalition of several forces in the country including "disenchanted and angry masses of youth and women, politically isolated and angry supporters of Islamic left [...] and a large segment of the public variably dissatisfied with the policies of the Islamic Republic" (Mahdi, 1999). The election also led to the rebirth of the student movement and parallel organizations outside of the University that "took on a life of their own and became major players in the events of July 1999" (Mahdi, 1999, p.15). The activities of students and the violent response to these activities including a series of unsolved murders of several important political activists in the country. In July 1999, the Majlis approval of a tough new press law a day after *Salam,* a newspaper run by the reformist cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi-Khoeiniha, published "a letter by Said Emami, the intelligent officer who had mastermind the serial murders (of several

reformist intellects)" resulting in its closure (Mahdi, 1999, p.18). On July 8, 1999, some 200 students staged a peaceful protest demanding for more freedom of the press and the reopening of the *Salam* newspaper. Later in the evening, at 3:30AM, an organized force of 400 plainclothes men broke into the dormitories of *Kooye Daneshgah* and "ransacked student rooms, and assaulted students indiscriminately" (Mahdi, 1999, p.19). The events, known as *Vaghe-ye Kooyeh Daneshgah* escalated into major protests in the streets of Tehran and by July 12, the government put a ban on all protests (Mahdi, 1999). What followed was a struggle between the students and government forces that ended with blame games and arrest of many students as well as closed door trials. The events of *Kooye Daneshgah* left a bad taste in the mouth of not only students but also ordinary Iranians who sympathized with the students. After these events, the student movement continued and the crackdown on these movements also continued from the government's side. This was until the students reorganized their force and came to play a major part in the Green Movement in 2009.

4.1.4.3 Women in post revolution

The role of women after the revolution also greatly changed. Before the Iranian Revolution, the major player as women's advocacy group was the Women's Organization of Iran (IWO) (Afary, 2009). Its biggest success, amongst many, included the changes in Family Law that allowed women to have equal rights in the matters of marriage, divorce and child custody (Afary, 2009). Continuing in the line with other women's organizations during the Constitutional Revolution as well as the reign of Reza Shah, IWO set up centres for literacy and vocational training as well as legal counselling on marriage, divorce and inheritance (Afary, 2009). Changes in the fabric of the society lead many women to leave their families in rural areas and move to urban centres to go to University and work (Afary, 2009). This also led to a fear from

modernity amongst rural families who saw their children go to cities to later not come back home (Afary, 2009). Religious intellectuals such as Al-Ahmad and Shariati articulated these fears. Al-Ahmad saw consumerism and its impact on the purity of women. Al-Ahmad criticized the "eroticized female bodies" by stating the following:

"In fact, what have we done? We have only given women the right to show off [their bodies] in society [...] In other words, we have pushed women, who are the guardians of tradition, family, ancestry, our very blood, into adopting loose manners of behaviour" (Al-Ahmad in Afary, 2009, p.240)

Shariati also proposed a vision of "modern woman" by arguing that "her embrace of modernity was not to interfere with her responsibility as a wife or mother, nor with her commitment to authentic Islam" (Afary, 2009, p.241). Using symbolisms from the *Shi'a* Islam's history, he spoke of Fatimah, the youngest daughter of Muhammad, the wife of Ali and mother of Hossein, as the ultimate role model with "her total devotion to her father, her unconditional support for her husband, her never-ending love and care for her sons, and her sacrifices for Islam" (Afary, 2009, p.242). Shariati, by doing this, made the archetype of the model of Islamic woman who participated in the political by the mere act of being a traditional woman. Shariati's discourse indeed became the backbone of the archetype of women that the Islamic government came to promote. During the revolution, many unveiled women started wearing the *hijab* during protests as a protestation symbol (Afary, 2009). Many leftist women saw the *hijab* as a sign of resisting consumerism and westoxification. The symbolism of the war of Karbala that united the Iranian women used the strongest symbol of Islam as a tool for protest.

Immediately after the revolution, a long and harsh process of the disciplining of bodies started. A series of specific measures particularly targeted at the urban women happened immediately after the revolution. These included the abrogation of the Family Protection Law, prohibition of women from serving in the military or as a judge, limitation of women from working in many professions, and a project of re-veiling took

place (Afary, 2009). After March 7th speech of Ayatollah Khomeini who declared that he requires all female government employees to wear the *hijab* (veil). The next day, and for the next five days, demonstrations in Tehran lead to the "last largest feminist demonstration" in the country on March 12 (Afary, 2009, 273). Ironically, many of the leftist leaning organizations, including the Fadayeeon, refused to support the women's rights movement seeing it as a secondary problem that would divide the unity of the revolution (Afary, 2009). By echoing the regime's charges, "major leftist organizations like Fadayeen and the Mojahedeen labelled the women's rights activists as *'agent provocateurs'* whose purpose was to derail the revolution" (Moghissi in Afary, 2009, p. 274).

By 1983, women were stripped of many of their rights through the reinstatement of laws that limited their power in marriage, divorce, and child custody as well as defining them as second-class citizens. *Hijab* became compulsory and women were banned from many activities including sporting events and a ban on singing and dancing in public (Afary, 2009). While these restrictions were in place, Khomeini also encouraged women to become active citizens by following the footsteps of women such as "Fatimah, the prophet's daughter and mother of Hossein, and her daughter Zainab, who bravely embraced the death of her brother Hossein in the desert of Karbala" (Afary, 2009, p.297). The war of 1980-88 saw an increase in the usage of the narrative of Karbala through immortalizing and honouring those who died in the war by naming streets, hospital, and schools after them and installing memorial *shrines* in corners of streets (Afary, 2009). The mothers and widows of the war veterans also got preferential legal, educational, and employment training treatment from the government. What this did was to bring a large workforce of women in many governmental positions and increase the number of women who went to universities (Afary, 2009). However, women faced and still face discriminatory laws and institutional segregation in regards to employment in the country.

Just like women activists in other periods of the Iranian modern history, women saw education as the solution to entering the social space. The late 1980's and 1990's saw a rise in the proportion of literate women especially those from rural areas. Before the revolution, many girls from traditional families were not allowed to go to school because of the fear of corruption of the Islamic values in these places (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p. 8). After the Islamization of schools, "not only in the rural areas, but also in many urban conservative families, girls were sent to school by their parents who become confident about the Islamic value of the educational system" (Khosrokhava, 2013, p.9). While the textbooks in universities have "ascribed different roles to women and men, [...] teaching science and related topics and introducing social sciences and other topics have opened up new visas for women, in particular, discussing, arguing, debating, and contesting the views of authority figures" (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p.8). This indeed has led to an attitude amongst women to share the same worldview as men and challenge "the Islamic Republic in its claims to maintain the disparity between men and women in the name of Islam" (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p.9) and denounce the restrictions put on women to join the workforce in many fields in the country in many ways.

The 1990s gave rise to the so-called Islamist Feminist movement in Iran. The decade saw an increase in the publication of magazines that were dedicated to women's issues. Some of these publications such as *Payam-e Hajar* (Hajar's Message), *Payam-e Zanan* (Women's Message) and *Neda* (Voice), committed to the state while "they claimed more rights for Islamist women within the state" (Afary, 2009, 316). Others, such as *Zan-e Ruz* (Today's Woman), *Khanevadeh* (Family), and *Rah-e Zendegi* (Way of Life) published articles on pressing social and legal issues such as divorce and child custody. The decade saw a number of journals that defined themselves as *feminist* such as *Zanan* (Women), H*oquq-e Zan* (Women's Rights) and *Jens-e Dovvom* (Second Sex) (Afary, 2009). Again, the printing press, as a communication technology, came to play an important role in shaping the political and introducing the political discourse in the

politics of Iran. Of importance for discussion in this thesis is the *Zanan* magazine and its influence in shaping the feminist movement in post-revolution Iran.

Zanan was the first independent journal after the Iranian Revolution that dealt with women's issues specifically (Eftekhari, 2003). It came to life from a suggestion by prominent religious intellectuals, particularly Abdolkarim Soroush, to Shahla Sherkat, the only prominent intellectual woman in the religious intellectual circles at the time, "out of political calculations than concerned with women's issues per se" (Eftekhari, 2003, p.16). The religious intellectual circle "believed that if their general project of rationalizing and modernizing religion was successful, the problems of women, along with many other social problems, would be solved" (Eftekhari, 2003, p.16). However, Sherkat saw women's issues as specific and set three objectives that would enhance the position of women in legal, social cultural, and political arena. These objectives were: 1) religious discussions; 2) feminist discussions; and 3) social discussions (Eftekhari, 2003, p. 18). The religious discussions started with interpretation and re-articulation of Islamic Jurisprudence and continued towards philosophical and theological discussions on women's issues (Eftekhari, 2003). The feminist discussions aimed at debunking the negative perception of feminism as something that "has always been equated with 'Westoxication', social permissiveness, violence against women by men, and homosexuality" and move towards seeing feminism as "a scientific, social, and philosophical phenomenon that must be seriously studied by intellectuals and elites" (Eftekhari, 2003, p.19). Lastly, Zanan dealt with social issues as well by looking at "Iranian women's contemporary reality" by bringing together "many male and female experts to talk about what they consider to be most important issues for women in Iran" (Eftekhari, 2003, p.20). The magazine published reports on women's prisons, women beggars and runaway girls as well as reporting on successful women in the private sector such as lawyers, publishers, painters, and filmmakers (Eftekhari, 2003).

Zanan was successful in developing a new feminist interpretation of *Shi'a* Islamic

doctrine and introducing the political discourse of women in the politics of the country. In doing so, it articulated the political in the sphere of politics of Iran. It was also successful in bringing a pluralistic voice to women's issues in Iran by articulating the discourses of religious intellectuals as well as voices from activists in NGOs and the private sector. In doing so, it aimed to treat women's issues as a pluralistic issue that impacts the society as a whole. Just like Mustasher al-Dawleh who saw the use of Quran as an important tool for legitimizing the French Declaration of the Rights of Man during the constitutional revolution, *Zanan* was able to "de-legitimize the authenticity of some of the most blatantly sexist statements and provided alternative readings of orthodoxies", by emphasizing, "Qur'anic verses and narratives that suggested a more egalitarian treatment of women and reinterpreted those that seemed to call for restrictions on women" (Afary, 2009, p.318). This indeed shows the articulation of political discourse in politics in Iran.

4.1.4.4 Reform movement

I will not focus much on the reform movement because much of the information that is related to this movement was provided in the previous two sections. The reform movement officially started after the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. However, it came from "a silent ideological revolution" during the 1990s (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p.12). At the heart of this ideological movement was a rejection of the interpretation of Islam that was developed by Jalal Al-Ahmad and Shariati during the 1960's and 1970's. It instead looked at "a new interpretation of Islam that rejected tenets of Islamic radicalism and opposed autocracy in the name of Islamic pluralism" (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p.12). This was indeed the beginning of what is now called 'religious intellectuals' whom Abdokarim Soroush is an important part of.

Soroush is a theologian philosopher who became part of the Cultural Revolution Council in revising the University courses during the Cultural Revolution (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004). He graduated from Tehran University in 1969 and moved to London where he studied history and philosophy at Chelsea College in London (Gharami-Tabrizi, 2004). There, he was influenced by Carl Popper's philosophy and wrote a body of work critiquing the Marxism's historical determinism by echoing the "assertion that at the core of Marxist 'scientific philosophy' lies an irrepressible urge toward 'holistic utopian engineering'"(Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004, p.514). Soroush continued his philosophical work where he critiqued Shariati's notion of Islam as Ideology by arguing for "'de-ideologization' of Islam through a distinction between religion and religious knowledge" (Gamari-Tabrizi, 2004, p.514). He makes this argument by stating that "Based on the conviction that no understanding of Islam is ever complete or final, he dismisses any attempts to formulate an official Islamic political ideology" (Vakili, 1996, p.3). Vakili (1996) outlines the arguments of Soroush as followed:

1) No understanding of Islam is ever complete or final. 2) No religious government should rule on the basis of an official Islamic political ideology. 3) Human rights are the fundamental political criterion, and democracy is the only form of government that can both protect human rights and preserve a proper role for religion in politics.4) Institutional links between the clerical establishment and the government in religious states must be severed, in order to protect the integrity of religion and clerics alike. 5) Iranian and Western cultures are not mutually opposed, but require continuous dialogue and constructive interaction. (Vakili, 1996, p.1)

Referring to the theoretical framework of Mouffe and Laclau, we can see that Soroush argues that religion must be part of *the politics* and not *the political*. In other words "unlike Shariati, for Soroush, the religiosity of the state is not defined by a canonized rendition put forward by a Muslim polity. The state is religious and democratic insofar as it reflects and realizes the general values and goals of the society" (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004, p.517). This indeed critiques one of the centrepieces of the Islamic Revolution, the concept of Supreme Leader, because Sorush "distinguishes religion, 'as intended by God', from the temporal human knowledge of it (religious knowledge or *Shari'a*)"

(Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2004, p.515). Hence, for Soroush, religious knowledge is no longer absolute and its interpretations hence are not absolute. As Ghamari-Tabrizi (2004) puts it "Soroush introduced an epistemological pluralism in the context of which any absolute truth-claim was suspect. In this light, he rebuked the foundation of the revivalist (reformist or revolutionary) project of reconciling what was eternal with what was ephemeral, what is text and what is context" (p.516).

Soruosh's ideas come to play a great role in the formulation of the discourse of President Khatami's 1997 election. The success of Khatami was in his discourse for change and his address to the youth generation or "children of revolution" (Menashri, 2001). These were children who were born right after the revolution during the baby boom of the 1980s and were called that name because they were the first generation of children after the revolution. Khatami translated two ideas from Soroush in his political discourse: civil society and Islamic Democracy (Ansar, 2007. P.319). Khatami was able to articulate these ideas by "identifying 'civil society' (*jame'eh-ye madani*) with what Khatami called the 'golden age of the prophet', i.e., his community in the town of Medina (*medinat al-nabi*) being ruled by democratic ideals after his exodus from Mecca" (Khosrokhava, 2013, p.16). In a way, Khatami's comparison made possible "the demand for limited forms of political pluralism within the theocratic regime" (Khosrokhavar, 2013, p.16). Khatami advocated for "social liberalization, political tolerance, greater rights for women, and the rule of law" (Menashri, 2001, p.82). He also focused on national interests instead of ideological re-articulation and chose "the great nation of Iran has a great Islamic and national heritage" as a platform (Menashri, 2001,p.83). The establishment, seeing that Khatami was a low-profile clergy, did not see him as a threat to the conservative candidate of the time, Nateq Nouri. He hence was able to get the approval of the Guardian Council and became an official candidate. The reformist press, mostly consisting of Soroush and intellectual circle, and the student associations backed the campaign of Khatami and mobilized on his behalf (Ansari, 2007). The women's rights advocates and a large population of women who

were looking for reform saw that he would be able to adopt a "more liberal stance on gender relations" and overwhelmingly supported him during his election (Afary, 2009). To the surprise of many, 29 Million from the 33 Million eligible voters participated in the election and 20 Million amongst those voters voted for Khatami (Afary, 2009, p.328). Khatami faced great opposition from the conservatives during his presidency. He was able to execute some policies to provide more opportunities for cultural expression and political criticism (Afary, 2009). However, he also faced repression in every step of the way because the police and legal system remained under control of the Supreme Leader (Afary, 2009). A great example of the lack of control over the military and the police was explained above during the *Kooye-Danshgah* incident in 1999 where student dormitories were attacked and many students were arrested and killed during the protests at the time. This being said, the election of Khatami trickled something that never stopped until its reappearance during the June 2009 elections that brought with it the Green Movement.

4.1.4.5 Concluding remarks

During the 1980s, the Islamic government in Iran used two main ideas to create a hegemonic state. The first was Al-Ahmad's *Westoxification* and the idea that the west has within itself a disease that would pollute the authenticity of the Iranian people through its logic of consumerist modernity. What this lead to was a return to the *Shi'a* Islam values and Shariati's notion of Islam as ideology. Shariati was able to convince the left in his conviction that Islam, at its heart, is a socialist project that goes beyond materialism and promises authenticity and value to a society. The Islamic government saw Westoxification as a threat to the values of Islam and immediately started a project of disciplining the body that had the veiling law as its centrepiece. The government also intruded in the way people, men and women, dressed and acted in the public. In

essence, the 1980s saw the re-articulation of the term Westoxification as a hegemonic power that legitimized forced disciplination of the body. During the 1990s, the three major forces started to articulate several counter-hegemonic discourses. The Cultural Revolution of 1980-1982 saw a complete eradication of oppositional voices. However, many new organizations that formed started shifting their attitudes towards the government and its policies during the 1990s. This developed a great mobilization force that lead to the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. This also led to the first major student protest in 1999, with the incident of the *Kooye Daneshgah*. The 1990s also saw a rise of the Islamic Feminist movement in the country with the rise in the number of educated women during the 1980's and 1990's and an opposition to institutional discrimination during the same period. Of importance, as we saw, was the *Zanan* magazine and its aim to push for the issues of women exclusively instead of mixing it with the new Islamic Intellectual circle. We saw that women also contributed greatly in the election of Khatami in 1997. Lastly, the 1990s saw the rise of a new group of intellectuals who started critiquing the two ideological roots of the Islamic Revolution, namely Shariati's Islam as Ideology. By doing so, they pushed for a distinction between Islam as religion versus Islamic knowledge *Shari'a* and argued that Islamic knowledge is not absolute but interpretive. This was articulated by Soroush amongst others and led to the articulation of a discourse around civil society and Islamic Democracy with the rule of law as its central pillar during the 1997 election campaign of Khatami.

CHAPTER V

THE GREEN MOVEMENT

Khatami, during his presidency 1997-2004, tried to implement many reforms in the country. While he could not influence the policies in TV and Radio, he did bring about changes in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (Farhi, 2004). Hence, the period saw a rise in the number of newspapers and journals. However, in the same period, "more than a hundred newspapers were closed down, and the state targeted political dissidents, journalists, and even some reform politicians" (Afary, 2009, p.350). This was due to the reaction of the conservatives to the policies proposed by Khatami and the reformists. The Iranian people, seeing that all their avenues of communications were blocked, used another avenue for communication and articulation of discourses, the internet. Two factors are important to mention at this point. First, as it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the literacy rate in the country rose dramatically. Between 1979 and 2003, the literacy rate jumped from 59% to 77.1% (Rahimi, 2003). Also, the so-called "children of revolution" came to dominate the demography of the country. By 2005, 70% of the 68 million population of the country were under the age of 30 (Cohen, 2006). The recipe is simple, you produce a country full of youth that did not experience the trauma of its revolution and barely remember its war, you take all forms of expression away from them and, meanwhile, introduce a tool called the internet in the middle of them where they can express themselves anonymously. The results, as it would be expected, was a boom in the usage of the internet as a tool for expression in not only political, but also social and cultural discourse. As Rahimi (2003) argues, the internet "opened a new domestic arena of contestation, accommodating numerous dissident groups online" (p.107). From 2001-2009, the number of Internet users in Iran increased from 200,000 to 25,000,000 and

the considerable growth in educational level of the country lead many youth to use the internet as a tool in their everyday life (Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010).

In 2004, the Guardian Council disqualified many of the reformist candidates. At the same time, many of the disillusioned voters who saw this decided not to vote. Hence, "the decision of nearly 20 million disillusioned pro-reformist voters to boycott the election, voting fraud engineered by the office of the Supreme Leader, and the zeal with which the Basij got out the vote certainly helped bring Ahmadinejad to power" (Afary, 2009, p.331). The Ahmadinejad's election in 2005 was a setback to the movement that started in 1990s. Ahmadinejad came into power with an appeal to the working class voters and was able to beat Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a high-ranking cleric and the president of Iran during the 1980s, to become the first non-cleric president of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Hassan, 2007). He "drew on a populist policy which explicitly aimed to support poor people and systematically disregarded middle class demands in social, economic and political arenas" (Sohrabi-Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010). Besides the economic challenges, many of his policies played against the idea of civil society and left no place for the opposition in the country (Sohrabi-Haghighat et al. , 2010). The 2009 election, hence, came out of a desire for a return to the 1997's promise of the establishment of a civil society and an Islamic Democracy with the reformist camp, student organizations and women's organizations coming together to support the two reformist candidates: Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karoubi.

In what follows, I bring forward the key elements of my theoretical framework and show how the Green Movement emerged as a Networked Protesting Crowd (NPC). In doing so, I make reference to other instances in history to show how this movement is a continuation in the history of social movements in the country.

5.1 Event and Kairos

Badiou's notion of Event speaks of how an event is a trans-being that enters the realm of being to introduce new multiplicities in Being. To this extent, the Event changes Being by modifying it through the introduction of new multiplicities. The constitutional revolution of 1906 in Iran was indeed that Event. It forever questioned the legitimacy of the King and new concepts such as parliament, people, law, and constitution to the state of Being of Iran as a country. Through the articulation and re-articulation of new discourses, the discourses that were introduced during this era were articulated and re-articulated through the history of the country. To this extent, the Event of the constitutional revolution and its discourses appeared and reappeared in the Being of Iran as it introduced new multiplicities (discourse formations) through the history of the country. To this extent, the Green Movement is not far off from another re-emergence of what started as the Event of the constitutional revolution. Hence, ontologically, the Green Movement was an Event. However, it was an Event in a chain of Events that emerged and re-emerged through the history of modern social movements in the country.

This brings us to the second concept, *Kairos*. Using of opportune moments as a way to gather protesting crowds to articulate counter-hegemonic discourses is fairly evident in the history of modern Iran. During the tobacco revolt, we saw how the protesting crowds emerged when they became aware of the tobacco concession. While there were many concessions before and after the tobacco revolt, the opportune moment and the mobilisation of not only the *bazar* of Shiraz but also other places in the country shows how the concession was used as an opportune moment by a pluralistic force in the country to articulate the dissatisfaction of the country with its state of politics. *Kairos* is not just usage of opportune moment, but also a moment to articulate a counter-argument at the right moment and the events of the tobacco revolt clearly demonstrate

that. Furthermore, the usage of opportune moment by the *ulama* and the *bazar* to articulate their desire for a house of justice came after the unrest in bazar of Tehran when two sugar merchants were bastinadoed in public. The event may have seemed insignificant. However, the chain of events that came from the articulation of a political discourse after this event again shows how seeing an opportune moment to articulate their desires formed protesting crowds. The result of such a small event was years of conflict that led to the establishment of the first parliament, first constitution and a civil war in the country. We can also see the usage of opportune moment during 1950s and the nationalization of oil in the country. Mossadeq intelligently saw the potential of using every opportune moment to call for protests and general strikes during this time to push for what resulted as the nationalization of the oil in the country. Last but not least, during the Islamic Revolution, as we saw, Khomeini gathered the crowds in 1963 after the so-called 'White Revolution' of the Shah by using the event as an opportune moment to articulate what became the backbone of his discourse, the comparison of the struggle of people of Iran to the battle of Karbala. We can also see this idea after the revolution with the protests during the International Women's Day who used the day to articulate their disagreement with the discourse of Khomeini a day before the protests. Lastly, the 1999 student protests after the closure of the *Salaam* newspaper is another great example that shows how university students formed protesting crowds to articulate their demand for the reopening of the newspaper. What we see, hence, is that there is coherence in the history of Iran's social movements in the use opportune moments to form protesting crowds to articulate political discourses.

The Green Movement was no different. Immediately after the election, many Iranians, believing that the election was rigged, started coming to the streets and using the result of the election as a *Kairos* to articulate the political discourse that their democratic right to vote must be respected. The election results were an opportune moment because it concerned a broad base of people from different backgrounds. The use of the event was

indeed a strategic move by the people to show the pluralistic opposition to the action of the government. The government, hence, could no longer blame the protests on one group since the protesting crowds consisted of a large pluralistic force. Several examples can be used to complement this argument.

5.1.1 The Epic of Dirt and Dust

After the elections, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad organized a rally to celebrate his victory (Tait, 2009). During a speech, in response to the violence of the police in arresting and killing protesters in the Green Movement, he declared "The nation's huge river would not leave any opportunity for the expression of dirt and dust" (Tait, 2009). As a result, on June 17th, a large crowd of protesters came to the street holding a massive sign by calling the event *Hamaseye Khaso-Khashak* (Epic of the Dirt and Dust). The event was reported in the first page of the Iranian reformist newspaper *Etemad-e Meli* with a picture of the banner on the front page (Tait, 2009). What this shows is that the protesting crowds used the articulation of "dirt and dust" and turned into a language that is used in the *Shahnameh* (The Persian book of mythology) to explain the struggle between Good wins against Evil. In this case, the Good is the dirt and dust and the evil is the one who called the people in the streets as dirt and dust. In this way, the protesting crowds used the day after the public speech of Ahmadinejad as an opportune moment to come together as a protesting crowd and frame their collective action as an epic conflict between good and evil.

5.1.2 Neda and the Voice

Seven days after the first protest in the country, two videos emerged where it showed a woman getting shot in the head and die in from of the camera (Delphine, 2009). The video showed the moments after she was shot and continued until she bled to death (Youtube, 2009). The gruesome video immediately became a trending topic on Twitter after its viewing by millions on YouTube (Vincent, 2009). For Green Movement Neda became the image of the repressed voice in the country. The name Neda in Farsi means 'voice'. Hence, the connection between the slogan "where is my vote?" and the murder of an innocent woman called "Voice" provided an opportunity for the protesting crowds to use the moment as a *kairos* to produce themselves and articulate their discourse. Neda's incident was greatly used amongst the protesting crowds outside of Iran. In Paris, for example, a group of protesting crowds gathered in front of Eiffel Tower holding the picture of Neda Agha-Soltan in front of their face and a large banner in the back reading "we are all one Neda, we are all one Voice" (Figure 5.1). Protesting crowds in other cities in the world used the picture of Neda as the symbol of repression of the government of Iran (Figure 5.2) and the slogan "I am Neda" became one of the major slogans of the protesting crowds of the Green Movement around the globe (Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.1 Protesting crowds holding the sign " we are all one Neda, we are all one Voice" (Jackson, 2012)

Figure 5.2 A vigil with the photo of Neda at the center of the table in Dubai (Fathi, 2009)

Figure 5.3 A woman holding the sign reading "I am Neda" in a protest in New York (DailyMail, 2009)

5.1.3 Majid Tavakoli, the veiled man

Since 1953, the 7th of December is known as "Student Day" in Iran (Sahimi, 2009). For this event, the students in different universities organize rallies and general assemblies to commemorate the three students that died by the government of Reza Shah on the 5th of December of 1953 during a protest against the visit of President Nixon to Iran (Sahimi, 2009). On December 7th of 2009, Majid Tavakoli, an Iranian student activist, gave a controversial speech at the Amir Kabir University in Tehran where he criticized the Iranian regime because of their violence towards student activists (Tavakoli, 2010).

After the speech, Majid was arrested by the police and was incarcerated at Evin prison (a notorious prison that houses political prisoners in the country) (BBC, 2009). The next day, Fars News, a semi-official news agency close to the government of Iran, published a photo of Majid Tavakoli wearing woman's headscarf or *hijab* (Fars News Agency, 2010). The news quickly travelled in the social media and a social media campaign called "We are all Majid" started where Iranian men took selfies of themselves wearing the head scarf (*hijab)* (Mackay, 2009). The campaign continued for some days and many important Iranian figures like Hamid Dabashi participated by wearing the *hijab* and taking selfies of themselves (Figure 4). In this instant, the protesting crowds were only online and they did not expand their presence outside of the internet. This produced an online protesting crowd with the same tendency to use the opportune moment for producing a political discourse whereby the intimidation tactics of the government were put into question. This is an example of how a globalized network of protesting crowds used the story of Majid Tavakoli as a *kairos* to produce themselves as a collective political force to critique the move from the government to intimidate its dissident.

5.2 Protesting Crowds as The Political

As we saw, discourse, for Mouffe and Laclau, is what is said and what is not said. Therefore, it includes textual practices as well as non-textual ones. Articulation of discourse is probably one of the key parts of this thesis. As we saw, in the modern history of Iran, many discourses were articulated and these discourses were at times complementary while at other times contradictory. Tavakoli-Taraghi (1990), in his analysis of the linguistic aspects of the constitutional revolution, clearly explains the importance of discourse articulation in formulations of the demands of the

revolutionaries during this era. Nationalism during the 1950s had its own form of discourse articulation with independence from the West as its central pillar. We can also see that the feminist movement in Iran was able to establish itself through different forms of articulation that started during the constitutional revolution and continues now with Islamic Feminism as its new articulation of discourse. We have shown through the history of Iran that the articulation of discourse has played a great role in bringing together protesting crowds. What is of importance is not only the discourses that were articulated but also the way they were articulated. Hence, I look at some of the political discourses that the protesting crowds of the Green Movement articulated during the Green Movement. I then look at how the protesting crowds of the Green Movement used technology as tools of organize global grievances, mobilize the movement, and turn the Green Movement into a mediatized spectacle.

5.2.1 Articulations of the political

What makes a protesting crowd different from other forms of crowd are two characteristics: 1) their set of collective practices that are unique to this form of crowd; 2) their emergence as political agents who articulate political discourse in the realm of politics.

The protesting crowd, during the movement, started by formulating their discourse around the demanding for their vote. However, as the movement continued, other political discourses came forward. At every stage, the protesting crowds used an opportune moment to articulate certain discourse. For instance, on September 18, during the annual Qods rally, where the regime organizes a rally in support of Palestine, the protesting crowd of the Green Movement joined the rally with the slogan "No Gaza,

No Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran" (Davinci Code, 2009). In another video from the same time, one sees the protesting crowd who have integrated themselves in the pro-Palestinian rally, shouting "Death to Russia" and "Death to Palestine" when the caller is asking them to shout "Death to America". This indeed brought another dimension to the movement because the protesting crowds entered the realm of international politics by criticizing the politics of Iran in the region and internationally. This can also be seen in other periods of the country. During constitutional revolution, the protesting crowds criticized the influence of the west in the affairs of the country. The nationalization crisis of 1953 and the 1979 revolution also formulated discourses around the politics of the country in relation to international influence. However, this time around, the protesting crowds of the Green Movement criticized the government of its influence on the region and support for other countries in the region.

One of the most interesting formulations of the political discourse in 2009 post-election movement was the use of the subject as a slogan. What I mean by this is that many of the slogans were either about a specific person i.e. "Neda" "Majid" or about how the "I" is central in the slogan. Some of these examples include: "Where is my vote?"; "I am Neda"; "I am Majid"; " dust and dirt is you, the enemy of the soil is you" (shahram257, 2009), and "I will take back your vote, my martyred brother". These are some of the examples that show a sort of individualist discourse in the collective discourse of the protesting crowds during the Green Movement.

During the Green Movement, there were many political articulations that were formed through the usage of symbolism and re-appropriation of many collective practices that were used during the Iranian Revolution. In a sense, the protesting crowds of the Green Movement used the collective practices and symbolism of the 1979 revolution to re-create the Green Movement as a struggle for justice. First of all, the color green, as I have said previously, is the symbolic color of the battle of Ashura. Hence, the re-

appropriation of the color by the movement was to identify the movement with the *Shi'a* Islam's symbol of the struggle for justice. On top of that, the name of the leader of the movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is also the name of the grandson of Mohammad who was killed during the battle of Ashura. Therefore, just like Khomeini, who compared the struggle between the Shah and the people of Iran to the battle of Ashura, the protesting crowd of the Green Movement used this symbolism to do the same with the Iranian regime. In doing so, they used the strongest hegemonic discourse that was used to justify the Iranian government's authority as the counter-hegemonic discourse for a social justice movement in the country. In this way, the true followers of Hossein became the followers of Mir-Hossin. The protesting crowds used many symbolic chants and slogans to make this connection. They for instance chanted two of the songs from the Iranian Revolution during the protests. These chants were sung inside and outside of Iran. The first, *Yar-e Dabestani* (My High-School Friend) is the glorification of the revolutionary student that fight the Shah while *Sar-Oomad Zemestoon* (The Winter is Over) is the song symbolizing end to repression and a new beginning. They also chanted *Allah-o Akbar* from their rooftops at nights during the Green Movement (Kheshti, 2015). This was a very common practice during the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Mottahedeh, 2015).

In short, protesting crowds are political actors since they are collective actions that articulates the political discourse in the realm of politics. The Green Movement did exactly that through not only the collective practices of writing and chanting slogans but also through the usage of symbolism and symbolic collective practices. In doing so, they were able to articulate their grievances and establish an identity as a movement. This is why I would like to argue that the Green Movement was a social justice movement because it came about as a coalition of multiple social movements that already existed and whose main concern was the question of democracy and social justice in the country. The Green Movement was violently shut down after the Ashura

protest of 27th of December 2009. On the day, many protesters, wearing black and green, both symbolic colors of the day of Ashura, took to the streets and marched from Imam Hossein Square to Freedom Square on the Revolution street (Time Magazine, 2009). The protesters during this day saw the most violent response from the police and the *basij* where 5 people were killed including the nephew of Mir Hossein Mousavi (Time Magazine, 2009). The event led to the house arrest of both leaders of the movement and their wives (Offiler, 2013). The sheer symbolism of this event is very important since the movement was seemingly crushed by the state. However, what came out of this was a clear articulation of the Green Movement as a social justice movement, the Green Movement manifesto. The manifesto (Soroush, Kadivar, Mohajerani, Ganji, & Bazargan, 2010), written and signed by many of the founders of reform movement including Abdolkarim Soroush, articulated the demands of the Green Movement in 10 separate sections. These demands included the resignation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the releasing of all political prisoners, free means of mass communication, recognition of all lawful political groups, independence of universities, independence of judiciary by electing its head, and electing all the officials who must become responsive to criticism, and limiting the number of the terms that they can be elected (this last one is directed at the Supreme Leader indirectly) (Soroush et al., 2010). The manifesto, hence, was able to capture the desires of Green Movement and show that the movement is not a post-electoral turmoil but a social justice movement.

5.2.2 Technology, networks and the political

One of the points that Mouffe is unclear about in her works is the question of how the political is articulated. What this brings us to is the importance of Information

Communication Technologies (ICTs) as tools that can be used for articulating, propagating, and sharing political discourses. This also means that ICTs, through the sharing of political discourse, are important tools for forming and maintaining networks of dissent. What is different with the Internet is its multi-directional capacity and its reach whereby all its users can participate in the network while coming from different parts of the globe. Thus, what becomes a media spectacle (Kellner, 2003) on the internet is not only seen by a globalized audience but also shared and commented on by that audience. What I would like to argue here is that the usage of the ICTs by protesting crowds of the Green Movement was part of a historic culture of creative usage of technology as tools for protestation in the country that dates back to the tobacco revolt of 1891. Hence, the principle of creative usage has never changed. What has changed is the type of technology and its capabilities.

As we saw, during the tobacco revolt, the telegraph was an important instrument to spread the revolt to other parts of the country. Later, during the constitutional revolution, both the telegraph as well as the printing press came to play a crucial role in not only shaping the political discourse and articulating counter-hegemonic discourses, but also as tools to inform the public of news of the day. Taking the theoretical framework of Harold Innis (1949), we see how the telegraph was able to shorten the time and space by reducing the time that it would take to transfer information. This as a result was able to mobilize the tobacco revolt from a small regional protest to a national revolt that showed the capacity of the people to defy the power of the king. Constitutional revolution also profited from communication technologies to mobilize pluralistic resistance movements across the country and articulate the political discourse in the realm of politics in the country. The 1950s, as we saw, brought another important technology, radio, to the forefront of protest movements in the country. The radio, with its capacity to wirelessly reach large regions of the country, was able to mobilize people in the rural areas of the country and

propagate the political discourse of mostly Marxist political parties at the time. Again, communication technologies played a crucial role in not only mobilization but also propagation of political discourse in the country. The era also saw another technology for articulating political discourse, the cinema. Cinema, as we saw, was not really a tool for mobilization but more of a tool for expression. It played an important role in shaping the discourse around sexual desire in the country. All this to say that communication technologies, during the nationalization crisis, played an important role in articulating political discourses and forming networks. The Islamic Revolution also saw the usage of communication technologies as tools for mobilization and forming networks. But most importantly, the era saw the first usage of communication technologies as tools for turning a revolutionary struggle into a televisual spectacle. This is because "Iran was the world's first televised revolution, and its passion and brutality was brought into people's living room in 'living colors'" (Fair, 2004). However, the revolution also saw a return to more authentic network creations since many of the communication tools were controlled and managed by the state. We saw a return to the usage of mosques as places for gathering and networking and a heavy reliance on printing press and cassette tapes as tools for articulating political discourse amongst revolutionaries.

What I have shown here is that the usage of networks as tools for protestation, mobilization, and political articulation did not just start in June 2009 after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The lack of perspective of many analysts in seeing the creative usage of ICTs as a very common collective practice in the history of social movements in the country indeed made them jump on the band wagon of calling the Green Movement a "Twitter Revolution". What is important is that Iranians were using mobile phones and the Internet since the 1990s in the country and because of the existence of a large population of educated youth who knew how these technologies work and how they can be used to propagate news, the usage of ICTs during the Green

Movement was bound to happen. As a society with one of the highest number of bloggers per capita in the world (Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010), Iran was more than ready to turn these events into a media spectacle and make the Green Movement a globalized movement. The success of the 1979 revolution in painting the Shah as a tyrant through making the revolution a televised spectacle left a collective memory amongst the protesting crowds of the Green Movement who saw that the only way they can make their plight for social justice and civil rights relevant in the globe was to use the technologies of reaching the globe as tools for mediating the events in Iran and sharing it with the world so that the globe becomes the judge of what is happening on the streets of Tehran. The government of Iran tried very hard to curtail this effect by for example cutting the cellphone networks and text messaging services just after the announcement of the results of the election and banning international journalists from leaving their hotel and reporting from the streets. However, the government was caught off guard when the news got out through the usage of Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube. The ICTs were used by protesting crowds to create networks of solidarity around the world, to make a spectacle of the violence on the streets of Iran and share it with the world, and to organize global grievances by calling the Iranian diaspora to form their protesting crowds in their countries of residence. The ICTs, therefore, should be seen as tools that played an important part during the Green Movement. In essence, they helped shape the Networked Protesting Crowds of the Green Movement. However, one must not give all the credit to ICTs since, as we saw in this thesis, what made the Green Movement was the formation of movements that were given rise to in the 1990s with the rise of reformists, students, and women's rights movements.

To summarize, networks are not new. As Castells himself said, networks should be treated with a double meaning. The first is a social meaning while the second includes the role of ICTs in shaping what he terms "Networked Societies". Following the same logic, we saw that networks in Iran were always social and consisted of a coalition of

forces that came together to articulate counter-hegemonic discourses. The Green Movement was also a social network at its core. They consisted of multiple groups and coalitions who came together to articulate several counter-hegemonic discourses and form an identity as a movement for social justice. The Green Movement also was a network because of its usage of the internet as a tool to articulate its political discourse and organize global grievances. While this is important, looking at Green Movement as solely a product of the ICTs networks is shallow since this movement is a continuation of social movements and collective practices that started a hundred years ago with the constitutional revolution. Therefore, one must see the usage of technology as a creative way to articulate the political and organize grievances. Technology is not a means to an end, it is a tool that is used in conjunction with other collective practices of a protesting crowds such as the one during the Green Movement.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section, the conclusion, will provide the definition of a Networked Protesting Crowds and answer the central question of the thesis. I will then sumerize the main chapters of this thesis including the theoretical framework, the methodology, and the two chapters on analysis. The second section, the discussion, examines the main findings of the thesis. At this point, It will also show the relevance of this thesis in the field of communication. This section concludes with making a broader observation about the state of the Iranian society by arguing that Iran is in the midst of a Quiet Revolution (Revolution Tranquille) just like Quebec was during the 1960s and this Quiet Revolution is slowly shifting Iran in profound ways. Through this, it shows the potential research that can be conducted in the near future.

6.1 Conclusion

Going back to our theoretical framework, we can now clearly define a protesting crowd and Networked Protesting Crowds:

1) A protesting crowd is a form of collective action that produces itself in a *kairos* and acts as the articulator of the political discourse in the realm of politics.2) A Networked Protesting Crowd (NPC) is a protesting crowd that expand its reach of articulating its discourse by establishing globalized networks through the usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).

As for our central question, we can now argue that the Green Movement emerged as NPCs and these NPCs were able to communicate and articulate their political discourse in the realm of politics with the help of the usage of Information Communication Technologies. The NPCs of the Green Movement were part of a bigger picture that reflected the struggles in the history of the social movements in the country.

The idea of looking at a protesting crowd was born of an interest in learning about the study of crowds, specifically crowd psychology, during my bachelor's degree in a course given by Professor Roman Onufrijchuk. What started as an interest became a two-year-long quest to articulate the notion of protesting crowds and distinguishing it as a collective that articulates the political in the realm of politics. During 2009, I became involved in the Green Movement protests in Vancouver and it became clear to me that if I am writing a thesis, it will be on the subject. Hence, I do have a bias towards this subject since, as an Iranian living outside of the country, I personally participated in the crowds who gathered every day to show support for the protesters in the country.

This thesis has its limitations in the fact that I could not visit Iran for conducting this research. Hence, I could not interview people who had experienced the Green Movement first handedly and who lived through the events. This limitation was resolved by focusing on the theoretical side of the notion of protesting crowds. Another limitation to this thesis was the fact that I could not really choose one theory and apply it to the case of the Green Movement. For one, as I showed in my thesis, there is no notion of protesting crowds. There are categories that include protesting crowd as one act of contestation (Collective action or contentious politics). Hence, I was left alone for the most part to come up with a theoretical framework that can explain this idea clearly. Another limitation to my thesis was the fact that I was not working on an occidental problem. Therefore, I was not really able to fully use theoretical frameworks

that I studied on social movements and democratic theories. This was when the notion of "tools in a toolbox" of Foucault came handy because I was able to assemble several pieces of different theories to form a conceptual framework.

I started working on the thesis by reading the literature on crowd theory as well as social movement theory. It was not long before I noticed a gap in the literature. On one side, crowd theories categorized all types of crowds under one category and saw them as either rational entities or irrational entities. Moreover, they did not really explain in a clear way as to how crowds emerge. On the other side, social movement theorists also generalized all forms of political action into categories. For RM theorists, these were termed contentious politics (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996) while for NSM theorists they were referred to as collective action (Melluci, 1996). Moreover, I saw limitations in both theories. With RM theories, I saw a limitation in the realm of expression and identity formation because of their focus on rational choice and mobilization of resources as the framework of thinking about social movements. I did find their idea of historical continuity important as something that I can reflect upon. With NSM theories, I found the idea of a shift towards identity movements from class movements useful. However, unlike the Occident, the social movements in Iran have always centred on identity. Hence, what I decided to take from both of these theories was to search the formation of identity and political discourse in the history of modern Iran's social movements. I could not use one school precisely because they were both right and wrong when it came to the case of Iran.

I took the historical approach as methodology because of two reasons. My thesis was a theoretical thesis and historical analysis would give me a unique perspective in how my theoretical framework can pass the test of time. This means that by looking at history, I was able to sample different instances in the history of social movements in the country and see if the conceptual framework that I established can be applied to

different eras in the history of Iran. I also wanted to show that the only way that one can understand the Green Movement as a social movement and its protesting crowds as articulators of the political discourse of this movement is to look at this movement in relation to the history of social movements in the country. This is because unlike many social movements in the occidental world, Iran's social movements have always been the continuation of previous social struggles. Therefore, I could not isolate Green Movement in order to search for the answer to my central question.

The theoretical framework of this thesis included several elements. It first formulated protesting crowds as a form of collective action that produces themselves in an opportune moment (*Kairos*). It then continued to argue that protesting crowds, as a collective action, articulate the political discourse in the realm of politics. This idea indeed became the theoretical piece that showed the relevance of protesting crowds in communication studies. In other words, protesting crowds are articulators, and hence, communicators of the political discourse in the realm of politics. Lastly, by using the idea of Networks in its social and technological sense, I have argued that the protesting crowds of the Green Movement were a Networked Protesting Crowds (NPC). From a social perspective, protesting crowds come together as coalitions of different groups around a common discourse. Hence, there is an established social network that already exists amongst protesting crowds. The technological aspect of the protesting crowds showed that through the usage of network technology, especially the internet, protesting crowds remove two very important dimensions of time and space since they are able to appear simultaneously in different parts of the world at different times. Hence, by using networked technologies, protesting crowds are able to always be present and participate in organization and articulation of political discourses. Lastly, I spoke of the idea of *care of the collective* and argued that protesting crowds, as a collective, recognise themselves as such through several practices that identifies them as protesting crowds. This also meant that through collective practices, protesting

crowds form an ethos through practices of care.

I used historical analysis as a methodology to show that the Green Movement is a continuation of a historical struggle for a civil society that began with the constitutional revolution of 1906. Hence, in order for one to understand why the Iranians used the Green as a symbol of their movement or why the term "where is my vote?" was so important to them, one needs to revisit modern history of the country in order to find the answers as to the root causes of the struggle of Green Movement. The historical section detailed the five main eras of the Iranian modern history. The tobacco revolt and the constitutional revolution, the reign of Reza Shah and his replacement during the WWII by the British and the Russians, the Nationalisation of oil and the crisis that followed, the Islamic Revolution, and the Green Movement. In each section, I have purposely attended to the history of women's movement separately because I found that this history needed a specific attention. This is because as a patriarchal society, women's issues have mostly been put on the sidelines so that other issues can be dealt with at first. The two most dramatic events in the history of women in Iran came from institutionally disciplining the women's body through unveiling (during Reza Shah) and re-veiling (after the Islamic Revolution). Hence, as one of the three movements that gave rise to the protesting crowds of the Green Movement, I tried to give a special importance to the history of a movement that at many times is pushed to the sidelines.

6.2 Discussion

The Islamic revolution saw the emergence of a new form of protesting crowd. One that not only articulated discourses but also used the opportunity of being televised as a way to reach a globalized audience. This era saw a very complex articulation of the political

in the sphere of politics that lead to the formulation of Westoxification. By doing so, the protesting crowds were able to create a collective identity as the army of Hossein who is fighting the army of the Shah. With this, the collective identity became an Islamic civil liberties movement that saw the west as a barrier to its liberty. What came from the Islamic revolution was a system of governance that used the narrative of Hossein and the fear of westoxification to create new docile bodies. This was done by literally taking control of power and knowledge and systematically, and violently, imposing many codes of conduct in the public space.

All this to say that the Green Movement carried with it a baggage of frustration from not only economics but also a failed process of disciplination that worked with both forces of power and knowledge to create docile bodies. It also came from a long history of the struggle for social justice and independence from the west that was rooted in 1906 and was re-articulated in 1953 and 1979. The Green Movement did not happen overnight. It happened as a coalition of three major social movements that already existed in the country and were mobilizing their forces to get people to vote. These three movements were: The student movement, the women's rights movement, and the reform movement.

As I demonstrated in three clear examples, the protesting crowds seized every opportunity to gather as a force and articulate their discourses. Moreover, the protesting crowds of the Green Movement used technology constantly to articulate their political discourses globally and engage the global public in the events that were happening on the ground through the usage of Youtube, Facebook, and Twitter. They were also able to create a global spectacle of the Green Movement in Iran with the footage that they captured and the news that they shared. This crowd was a NPC in two ways. For one, they had social ties with the Iranian diaspora around the world. Hence, when the news of the post-electoral unrest broke, many Iranians outside of Iran organized their own

gatherings and protests in solidarity with the Iranians in Iran. Secondly, they used networked technologies to communicate their message and mobilize globally. This was done by recording videos of protests on the street and posting them online as well as constantly updating several twitter feeds to inform the global public of what is happening in the country. The Internet was one of the many tools that the protesting crowds of the Green Movement used to produce themselves as communicators of the Green Movement.

The Iranian protesting crowds, through their collective practices, recognized themselves as a political force. From their practices offline such as marching on the streets and chanting slogans and songs collectively, to their practices online such as posting videos and twitting the events as they happen, they were able to form an identity that made them recognize themselves as protesting crowds of the Green Movement. The usage of the Green color, as the re-appropriation of the symbol of the battle of Karbala, was also very important in shaping the identity of the Green Movement. What all these collective practices brought was a sort of ethos of the collective. This ethos was formulated through the narrative of Karbala as the collective used the symbolism of this narrative to characterize themselves as the collective who are fighting for their right. Thus, the Iranians, during the 2009 Green Movement were able to create a unique character, an ethos, through their collective practices as Networked Protesting Crowds.

The relevance of this thesis as an academic piece in the discipline of communication lies in the idea that understanding a social movement requires the understanding of how discourses are specifically produced by collectivities through certain historical conjunctures. This means that, on the one hand, one needs to identify the discourses that are articulated by a movement and, on the other hand, the way in which these discourses are produced and diffused. To tackle the first challenge, one must understand discourse in a historic context. this is why understanding the slogan "where

is my vote?" required me to take a journey into the historical articulation of political discourse since the constitutional revolution in iran in order to show how this slogan is connected to the struggles of popular movements in iran since the institution of the first constitution in the country. To face the second challenge, one must look at collective practices of a social movement in order to understand how discourses are articulated and difused. The usage of technology as a tool for protestation is a form of collective practice. Studying NPCs as a research subject allows one to focus on these collective practices by focusing on a particular group. This in return reduces the ambiguity of theoretical frameworks such as contentious politics and collective action and forces the researcher to look at concrete examples.

During the 1960s, Quebec went through a quiet revolution whereby the society shifted from a predominantly religious society to a secular one. A centrepiece of this change was a shift in the culture of the society through different means of communications. Many important artists came to express the Quebec identity and produce cultural works that expressed this identity. As history shows me, the first step in every shift in the Iranian society has started with the articulation of discourse. This is why I would like to argue that Iran, since the 1990s, has started its own quiet revolution. This is a revolution where the practice of disciplining the body has been challenged through every day cultural practices of young Iranians who no longer see the docile body as an option. It is the revolution where the works of art are challenging the social and the political inside and outside of the country. It is a revolution where new articulations of Islamic discourse are questioning the fundaments of the Islamic ideology by articulating new discourses that are more inclusive and pluralistic. Above all, it is a revolution where expressing the self and communicating about it to others has become the most important way of challenging the system. Communication and the usage of communication tools are central to the continuation of this quiet revolution. The Green Movement was a burst within this quiet revolution. As we saw, the usage of ICTs

became a very important part of the Green Movement. This was because the ICTs were already being used by the Iranian youth before the Green Movement. The protesting crowds in Iran already had the knowledge of using these tools and all they did was to apply it as a protesting tool during this period. While the Green Movement was violently crushed, this quiet revolution continued. The avenue that I would like to open from writing this thesis is for communication scholars to look at this quiet revolution from a communicational perspective. Indeed, a great body of work has already been established that looks at the cultural changes in Iran from many perspectives. However, by seeing these changes as a quiet revolution, one may be able to get a better insight as to how these shifts are changing the society and the everyday lives of the Iranian people.

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