

UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL

POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE SUDANESE DIASPORA
AND THE INFLUENCE OF REGION OF ORIGIN

THESIS

PRESENTED IN PARTIAL REQUIREMENT OF
THE MASTERS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY

STEPHEN BAIRD

APRIL 2013

UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL
Service des bibliothèques

Avertissement

La diffusion de ce mémoire se fait dans le respect des droits de son auteur, qui a signé le formulaire *Autorisation de reproduire et de diffuser un travail de recherche de cycles supérieurs* (SDU-522 – Rév.01-2006). Cette autorisation stipule que «conformément à l'article 11 du Règlement no 8 des études de cycles supérieurs, [l'auteur] concède à l'Université du Québec à Montréal une licence non exclusive d'utilisation et de publication de la totalité ou d'une partie importante de [son] travail de recherche pour des fins pédagogiques et non commerciales. Plus précisément, [l'auteur] autorise l'Université du Québec à Montréal à reproduire, diffuser, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de [son] travail de recherche à des fins non commerciales sur quelque support que ce soit, y compris l'Internet. Cette licence et cette autorisation n'entraînent pas une renonciation de [la] part [de l'auteur] à [ses] droits moraux ni à [ses] droits de propriété intellectuelle. Sauf entente contraire, [l'auteur] conserve la liberté de diffuser et de commercialiser ou non ce travail dont [il] possède un exemplaire.»

UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL

ATTITUDES POLITIQUES DANS LA DIAPOSRA SOUDANAISE
ET L'INFLUENCE DE LA REGION D'ORIGINE

MÉMOIRE

PRÉSENTÉ

COMME EXIGENCE PARTIELLE

DE LA MAÎTRISE EN SCIENCE POLITIQUE

PAR

STEPHEN BAIRD

AVRIL 2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the hard work and expert advice of my supervisor, Tania Gosselin. Her feedback has been exceptionally helpful. I also greatly appreciate my parents' support throughout this Masters programme and in the steps leading to it. A number of friends have also offered perspective, patience, or a helping hand; thank you especially to Emily, Sophie, Marie-Christine, Marie-Pier, Gabrielle, Dave, and Liz. Last but certainly not least, thank you to the twenty people who made time out of their busy lives to participate in the interviews.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|------|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | ii |
| LIST OF TABLES | v |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS | vi |
| RÉSUMÉ | vii |
| ABSTRACT | viii |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER I | |
| OVERVIEW OF THE SUDANESE CONTEXT | 6 |
| 1.1 Pre-colonial and colonial roots of conflicts | 8 |
| 1.2 Post-independence regimes and civil war | 10 |
| 1.3 Recent changes and the current political context | 12 |
| 1.3.1 Radical Islamist rule (1989-1999) | 13 |
| 1.3.2 Changes in the regime and the oil boom | 14 |
| 1.3.3 Relations between the Sudanese government and Western countries .. | 15 |
| 1.4 Peace between North and South and civil wars in today's Sudan | 16 |
| CHAPTER II | |
| LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 21 |
| 2.1 Attitudes towards democracy, regimes, and institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and in Sudan | 22 |
| 2.2 Attitudes towards Western foreign policies and the ICC | 28 |
| 2.3 The political engagement of diasporas and of the Sudanese diaspora | 31 |
| 2.4 Political divides in North Africa and surrounding regions | 34 |
| 2.5 Political divides in Sudan | 36 |
| 2.5.1 Arab/non-Arab politics | 37 |
| 2.5.2 Secularism and religious orders | 40 |
| 2.5.3 Marginalized peripheries | 42 |
| 2.6 Theoretical framework and hypothesis | 44 |
| CHAPTER III | |

| | |
|---|----|
| METHODOLOGY | 50 |
| 3.1 The Sudanese diaspora and the sample | 50 |
| 3.2 The questionnaire | 53 |
| 3.3 Potential biases | 56 |
| CHAPTER IV | |
| RESULTS AND DISCUSSION | 58 |
| 4.1 The role of the GoS in Darfur and in the Nuba Mountains | 58 |
| 4.1.1 Marginalization and the maintenance of dominance | 59 |
| 4.1.2 Genocide | 60 |
| 4.1.3 Politics of Arab identity, "race," and religion | 62 |
| 4.2 Western intervention and UN peacekeeping | 64 |
| 4.3 Democratization | 68 |
| 4.3.1 Levels of repression and tribal politics | 68 |
| 4.3.2 The 2010 election | 71 |
| 4.3.3 Transition to a more democratic or secular regime? | 73 |
| 4.4 Discussion | 77 |
| CONCLUDING REMARKS | 80 |
| APPENDIX A | |
| QUESTIONNAIRE | 82 |
| APPENDIX B | |
| MAP OF SUDAN | 85 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 86 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | | Page |
|-------|---|------|
| 2.1 | Rule by a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections would be "very good" or "good" | 23 |
| 2.2 | Attitudes towards democracy and the role of Islam in North Africa | 26 |
| 2.3 | Comparative measures of trust in and satisfaction with governments and institutions in North Africa | 27 |
| 2.4 | Confidence in NATO in various African Countries. | 29 |

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|------------|--|
| AB1/2 | The Arab Barometer survey, round one or two |
| AOI | The Arab Opinion Index |
| BBC | British Broadcasting Corporation |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| DUP | Democratic Unionist Party |
| GoS | Government of Sudan |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| JEM | Justice and Equality Movement |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| NCP | National Congress Party |
| NIF | National Islamic Front |
| NUP | National Umma Party |
| PCP | Popular Congress Party |
| SPLA/M | Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement |
| SPLM-North | Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North |
| UNAMID | United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur |

RÉSUMÉ

Les attitudes politiques des membres des diasporas ont été peu étudiées à ce jour; ce constat s'applique tout particulièrement à la diaspora soudanaise (connue avant 2011 en tant que diaspora « nord-soudanaise »). Ce mémoire présente un portrait des perceptions de la diaspora soudanaise au Canada en lien avec les conflits armés au Soudan, l'implication du gouvernement soudanais et des pays occidentaux, de même que la démocratisation du pays, réelle et envisagée. Le mémoire analyse également les liens entre la région d'origine des membres de la diaspora et les opinions politiques, posant l'hypothèse que l'affiliation régionale est un point d'ancrage important pour un clivage attitudinal. L'hypothèse est testée grâce à des données d'entrevues recueillies auprès de quinze membres de la diaspora soudanaise au Canada à l'automne 2011 et à l'hiver 2012.

Les résultats confirment que l'origine régionale, définie en termes de territoires marginalisés et non-marginalisés, est associée aux attitudes à l'égard des conflits au Soudan et de certains des acteurs qui y sont impliqués. La plupart de ceux qui proviennent de régions marginalisées croient qu'un génocide a eu lieu au Darfour. Ils sont aussi plus nombreux à soutenir une intervention étrangère au Soudan sous une forme ou une autre en 2011-2012. Ceux qui proviennent de régions non-marginalisées rejettent pour leur part la notion de génocide et sont généralement opposés à une intervention extérieure.

La région d'origine est également liée à la vision du changement politique au Soudan. La majorité des répondants originaires de territoires non-marginalisés invoquent la possibilité d'un soulèvement populaire menant à une transition démocratique; certains mettent l'accent sur le rôle de la société civile soudanaise dans un éventuel changement de régime, par opposition à toute intervention extérieure. Au contraire, les interviewés de régions marginalisées envisagent une intervention étrangère comme un instrument d'un éventuel changement et ne font pas mention de la société civil.

Les opinions recueillies ne sont pas toujours distinctes en fonction de la région d'origine. C'est le cas des perceptions (négatives) à l'égard du rôle du gouvernement du Soudan dans les récents conflits et élections. La nature de l'échantillon colore incontestablement ces perceptions; en effet, la plupart des Soudanais vivant au

Canada s'y sont réfugiés pour fuir la répression; il s'agit également d'individus particulièrement informés et engagés politiquement. En dépit de cette limite, cette étude nous permet de jeter un éclairage inédit sur les attitudes des Soudanais au Canada. Elle montre également qu'il est fructueux de mettre en œuvre le concept de clivage dans un contexte de diaspora, notamment lorsqu'elle est issue d'une immigration récente. Enfin, ses résultats vont dans le sens des études qui remettent en cause l'ethnicité comme principal, voire l'unique facteur pouvant expliquer les attitudes politiques des Africains.

Mots clés : Soudan, diaspora, attitudes politiques, opinions politiques, clivages

ABSTRACT

Political attitudes among diasporas have rarely been studied, much less among the Sudanese diaspora (those referred to as the Northern Sudanese diaspora before 2011). This thesis provides an account of the perspectives of members of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada on the subjects of armed conflicts in Sudan, the roles of the Sudanese government and of Western countries, and issues of democratization. The thesis also analyses the relationship between the regional origins of members of the diaspora and political opinions, posing the hypothesis that regional affiliation is an important element of an attitudinal cleavage. This hypothesis was tested through interviews with fifteen members of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada, in the autumn of 2011 and the winter of 2012.

The results confirm that region of origin, defined as origin in a marginalised or non-marginalised region of Sudan, is related to attitudes regarding conflicts in Sudan and actors involved in these conflicts. Most of those from marginalized regions believe that a genocide took place in Darfur. They were also more likely to support some form of military intervention by Western countries were it to have taken place at the time of the interviews. Those from non-marginalized regions tend to reject the notion of genocide and are generally opposed to Western intervention.

Region of origin also appears to be linked to visions of political change in Sudan. The majority of respondents from non-marginalized regions invoke the possibility of a popular uprising leading to a democratic transition; some speak of the role of Sudanese civil society in an eventual change of regime, often in contrast to ideas of outside intervention. In contrast, those from marginalized regions tend to mention foreign intervention as a way that a significant change could take place, and make no mention of civil society.

The opinions gathered are not all differentiated by region of origin. Commonalities include negative perceptions of the role of the government of Sudan in recent conflicts and in the 2010 elections. The nature of the sample surely colours these perceptions; the majority of Sudanese people living in Canada arrived as refugees fleeing repression. The sample is also made up of individuals who are particularly well informed and politically active. Despite this limitation, this study

allows us to give a rich account of attitudes among the Sudanese diaspora in Canada. It also shows that it is useful to apply the concept of cleavages to a diaspora, notably among one made up of recent migrants. Finally, the results can be situated among studies that call into question the centrality of ethnicity as a principal or unique factor that can explain political attitudes among African populations.

Key words: Sudan, diaspora, political attitudes, political opinions, cleavage

INTRODUCTION

It has been increasingly recognized in recent years, by researchers as well as by diplomats and politicians, that it is important to consider perspectives and expertise coming from diasporas, as they often have important roles in the politics of their home countries. In relation to countries currently or recently in conflict, the involvement of diasporas in civil society, their influence on the foreign policy of certain host-country governments, and their role in armed groups have been examined¹. Examples such as the conflict in Northern Ireland and the anti-apartheid struggle of South Africa illustrate the relevance of understanding the roles of diaspora groups.

There are however few works pertaining to the attitudes and opinions of members of the Sudanese diaspora. This is despite the fact that many political activities have been organized largely from outside the country over the past two decades, due to the repressive political climate and the large portion of the opposition that currently supports armed struggle against the regime. Among these few studies, only one considers the Sudan diaspora in Canada, and provides only very limited data on political attitudes or opinions.

The size of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada is difficult to estimate separately from the South-Sudanese diaspora. Taken together, adult members of these diasporas are primarily first generation migrants who arrived as refugees during the second

1 Nafje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds.), 2002, *New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*, London, Routledge, and H. Smith and P. Stares (eds.), 2007, *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?* Tokyo, United Nations University Press.

Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), especially later in this period². In total, these two diasporas are comprised of at least 15,000 people in Canada³, with other large populations in the USA, the UK, Australia, and countries neighbouring Sudan, especially Egypt in the case of the Sudanese diaspora.

Through 15 in-depth interviews with members of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada, this thesis examines attitudes with regards to political issues in Sudan. Specifically, the research addresses views concerning currently relevant subjects including the question of whether genocide has taken place (or continues to take place) in Darfur or the Nuba Mountains. These conflicts are also more broadly explored through respondents' descriptions of the role that the Government of Sudan (GoS) plays or has played in them. The research also addresses attitudes towards potential forms of Western military intervention in Sudan, particularly with regards to the dramatic early years of the Darfur crisis and the appeals that have been made since that time for interventions such as the establishment of a no-fly zone. Attitudes and opinions are also studied in relation to democratization, including the margin of freedom that appeared in the later half of the 2000s, and the potential for a transition towards a more democratic or more secular regime. Each of these themes is

-
- 2 Numbers published by Citizenship and Immigration Canada show that this population arrived primarily as refugees. For years when such figures were published (1992, 1994, and 1996 to 2001) the number of refugees from Sudan is 77.9% of the number of new permanent residents from Sudan. These same statistics show a rapid growth in the number of new refugees from Sudan, going from 281 in 1993 to 1038 in 2001. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Facts and Figures," Ottawa, Government of Canada, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010.
- 3 According to statistics of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 15,649 new permanent residents in Canada between 1988 and 2008 indicated Sudan to be their country of origin. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *loc. cit.*, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2007 and 2008. According to the 2006 Canadian Census, 12,640 would respond to the question of their origins with "Sudanese" (and 500 others with "Dinka", a primarily Southern Sudanese ethnic identity, and others with only "African" or "Arab"). See Statistics Canada, "Cumulative Profile, 2006 - Large Urban Centres in Canada (table)," *2006 Census of Population*, 48 Census Metropolitan Areas/Census Agglomerations and Census Tracts (database), via E-STAT, [online]. http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=ESat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm (accessed August 12th, 2011).

addressed in relation to the period from 2005 to mid-2011, which began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and ended with the 2011 separation of South Sudan. Because this period saw some major shifts in the political landscape in Sudan, a study of views about conflicts, Western interventionism, and democratization is particularly timely. The recentness of these events also insures that respondents possess sufficient information about the issues at hand and have “meaningful” opinions⁴.

This study develops two aspects: the first, more exploratory one, describes attitudes held by members of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada. The second, more explanatory aspect, tests the hypothesis that these attitudes are linked to respondents' regional affiliation. More precisely, the study hypothesizes that originating from a marginalized or a non-marginalized region of Sudan colours political attitudes, creating a cleavage. Cleavages are persistent divisions among citizens that shape their response to political issues. Most studies that use the notion of cleavages examine voting behaviour in Europe and Western industrialized democracies. However more recent studies have applied the notion to African countries, including non-democratic ones⁵. Socio-demographic characteristics related to ethnicity, region, or language are considered to define the dominant cleavages in most, but not all African contexts⁶.

4 Meaningful opinions are different from the “non-attitudes” that can be found when respondents lack information or otherwise do not have opinions on a given subject. See Philip Converse, 1964, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in *Ideology and Discontent*, David Apter (ed.), New York, Free Press, p. 75-169.

5 See for example Kisangani Ezimet, 1999, “Political Cleavages in a Democratizing Society : The Case of the Congo (Formerly Zaire)”, *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 32, p. 185-228, Shaheen Mozaffar, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich, 2003, “Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies”, in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no 3, p. 379-390, Lisa Blaydes and Drew Linzer, “Losing Muslim Hearts and Minds: Religiosity, Elite Competition, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,” paper presented at the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, April 2009.

6 James Scarritt and Shaheen Mozaffar, 1999, “The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of Democratic Competition in Contemporary Africa,”

There is a considerable literature which analyzes the divisions that are central to Sudanese politics, often in order to explain the root causes or dynamics of armed conflicts. We do not claim that the division between those from marginalized and non-marginalized areas is the sole or dominant division in Sudanese politics; however, the literature indicates that it is among the most prominent. Scholars have documented this division in relation to a history of political and economic marginalization. The under-representation of those from peripheral areas in all post-independence regimes is now well documented, as are patterns through which the current regime has aggravated tensions and conflicts in peripheral regions through the instrumentalization of ethno-tribal politics. The continued patterns and consequences of economic marginalization have also been well documented⁷. Indeed peripheral areas of Sudan, even those that have not been areas of armed conflict, tend to score drastically lower on human development indicators. Such inequalities have been a commonly cited political grievance. While the divide between marginalized and non-marginalized regions of Sudan is well documented, we are unaware of any study that addresses whether political attitudes, in Sudan or in the diaspora, are related to this division.

The first chapter of the thesis provides an overview of Sudanese politics and recent history. The following chapter presents a literature review beginning with political attitudes in Sudan, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, then turning to the limited literature on the political engagements of diasporas and on politics in the Sudanese diaspora. The final section of the literature review provides an overview of scholarship relating to dominant cleavages in Sudan, including the cleavage examined by this thesis between marginalized and non-marginalized regions. The

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 5, no 1, p. 82-117, Daniel Posner, 2005, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Cambridge, Cambridge University press.

7 See especially Alex Cobham. 2006, "Causes of Conflict in Sudan: Testing The Black Book," *European Journal of Development Research*, vol. 17. no.3, p. 465.

theoretical framework and hypothesis are then presented. The methodology and results are presented in separate chapters. The concluding remarks summarize the main findings and suggests ways they may be applied.

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF THE SUDANESE CONTEXT

The Sudanese context is marked by significant differences in economic and social conditions between regions, with particularly difficult conditions in peripheral areas, especially those that were or are currently affected by conflict. For example, a 2009 gross primary school enrolment rate of 93.8% in Khartoum contrasts to rates of less than 40% in some states of Darfur and Eastern Sudan⁸. Rates of moderate or severe malnutrition in children are much higher in some peripheral states (up to 38%) than in some central ones (22-25%)⁹. With the 2011 separation of South Sudan, loss of oil revenues caused the reversal of an earlier trend of rapid economic growth¹⁰. By the end of 2011, inflation had reached 19%, with a projected real GDP negative growth rate for 2012 (-7.3%)¹¹.

8 Rates are as low as 36% in the Eastern Sudanese state of Red Sea and around 40% in South Darfur. See Ministry of Welfare and Social Security National Population Council, 2010, "Sudan Millennium Development Goals Progress Report 2010," Republic of Sudan, p. 24 [online]. Available at <http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/Sudan%20MDGs%20Report%202010.pdf> (accessed August 28th, 2012).

9 Khartoum rates are lower than elsewhere, at 22% chronic malnutrition among children under five in 2006. Four, mostly relatively privileged, central states have rates of 25 or 26%. Four other, mostly peripheral, conflict affected states have rates between 34 and 38%. See Ministry of Welfare and Social Security National Population Council, 2010, *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

10 With the separation of South Sudan, the country lost an estimated 75% of its oil reserves and \$1.7 billion/year in government revenues. See Marina Ottaway and Mai el-Sadany, 2012, "Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, p. 9.

11 See International Monetary Fund, 2012, "Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Mission to Sudan," Press Release No. 12/193, May 29, 2012 [online]. Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12193.htm> (accessed July 12th, 2012).

Unfortunately, little recent or reliable data is available to provide an accurate summary of the ethno-tribal, linguistic, or religious makeup of Sudan, as recent census data does not cover such questions¹². By the time of independence in 1956, Arab identities had been adopted by what seems to have been a narrow majority of Northern Sudanese¹³. Non-Arab populations are located primarily in peripheral regions of Sudan, including large parts of the populations of Darfur, Southern Kordofan (including the Nuba Mountains), Blue Nile, parts of Eastern Sudan, and some of the most northern areas. There is a considerable diversity of languages in Sudan, with Arabic as the *lingua franca* of all regions. Some estimate Sudan to be 70% Arab and 97% Muslim¹⁴, however it is possible that the data underlying such estimates has been manipulated for political purposes¹⁵. Muslim-Christian dynamics and the persistence of some indigenous systems of belief have been prominent in political dynamics in the Nuba Mountains and parts of the Blue Nile, despite the non-Muslim populations of these areas being relatively small.

12 Recent census data does not cover questions of language, ethnic identity, or religion. See Martina Santschi, 2008, "Briefing: Counting New Sudan," *African Affairs*, vol. 107, no. 429, p. 631-640. Such data also seems to be unavailable for most previous (1993 or earlier) censuses. Scholars writing about the ethnic makeup of Sudan tend to quote only the 1956 numbers. See for example M. Daly, 2007, *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 179-180, and Deng, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

13 As is common in other texts, "Northern Sudan" and "Northern Sudanese" will be used to refer to the region that became today's Sudan, and the population of this region. According to the 1955-1956 census, 53.3% of the population of Northern Sudan "reported that they were Arab by language, claimed geneology, and assumed racial identity." See Francis Deng, 1995, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, p. 401.

14 See United Nations Development Programme, "Sudan Overview" [online]. Available at [www.sd.undp.org/sudan overview.htm](http://www.sd.undp.org/sudan%20overview.htm) (accessed August 28th, 2012).

15 See for example Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, 2010, "5th Population and Housing Census in Sudan – An Incomplete Exercise" [online], available at http://southsudaninfo.net/wp-content/uploads/reference_library/reports/5th_population_housing_census_sudan.pdf (accessed August 28th, 2012).

1.1 Pre-colonial and colonial roots of conflicts

Armed conflicts between central and peripheral regions of today's Sudan, as well as the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, have some of their origins in earlier dynamics of slave raiding. These raids were the prerogative of the state in the early Sudanic kingdoms and commonly reached into peripheral regions¹⁶. Under Turko-Egyptian rule, beginning with the invasion of Muhammed Ali in 1820, slave-raiding and slave-owning increased dramatically, with slaves being drawn "very largely from Southern Sudan"¹⁷. This period marked the first time that domestic slavery became "widespread throughout all segments of society in Northern Sudan"¹⁸. Increased slavery intensified social stratification, thus lowering the social status of non-Muslims and people with certain ethno-racial characteristics: not only those from the South, but also from certain peripheral regions of today's Sudan¹⁹.

With the overthrow of Turko-Egyptian rule in 1883, by the forces of a Sudanese religious figure known as the Mahdi, patterns of exploitation between the central state and the hinterlands continued, though slave-raiding and slave-trading started to decline from the later part of Turko-Egyptian rule, through the Mahadist period, and under subsequent British rule²⁰. After the 1898 success of the conquest of most of Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces, British officials worked to establish control and administrative structures through practices of "native administration" (similar to indirect rule) allying themselves with certain tribal and sectarian leaders. This form of rule was later applied in Darfur as well, after it was annexed in 1916. Sudanese

16 See M. Daly, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 22, 25-26, and Douglas Johnston, 2011, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce*, Revised Edition, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, p. 4-5.

17 See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

18 See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

19 See Deng, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

20 See Robert Collins, 2008, *A History of Modern Sudan*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 22-25, 68.

battalions were replenished primarily by conscription, from “areas which coincided with the old slave-raiding zones of the Nuba mountains and Southern Sudan” until the pacification of the South was complete and local recruitment of military forces replaced these battalions in the 1920s²¹.

Egypt's independence in 1922 led to a sharp increase in British concern about nationalism and Arab influence in Sudan. Policies in regions including the South, Darfur, and the Nuba Mountains increasingly encouraged the adoption or preservation of African rather than Arab identities and customs, the use of the English language rather than Arabic (in Southern regions), and to some extent Christianity or traditional belief systems over Islam in the Nuba Mountains and the South²². In addition, restrictions were imposed on the movement of people through most of the South, Darfur, and other areas through the Closed District Ordinance of 1924. The policy aimed to prevent the spread of Islam to Southern areas and the Nuba Mountains and to reduce slave raiding²³. The special status of the South was taken even further through the Southern Policy of 1930 whereby it was stated that the future of the South might ultimately lie with the countries of British East Africa. The ideology by which Arab identities, customs, and even tribes were regarded and treated as “foreign” had a profound impact in Darfur as well, where many Arab tribes were given less land rights and less political representation.

Differential investment in education, infrastructure and economic development widened the gap between central and peripheral areas. Darfur and some other areas of the North were in many ways just as neglected as the South under Anglo-Egyptian rule, a trend that continued after independence²⁴. The lion's share of

21 See Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

22 See Deng, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

23 See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

24 See Daly, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 133-44.

colonial economic investments were made in a part of the Nile valley located in Northern Sudan. In Darfur, colonial policy limited education to the sons of chiefs, and it was very rarely provided beyond the primary level. In pastoral areas, even the sons of "chiefs," a post that was created by the British in many of these areas, were not sent to schools until the 1940s²⁵.

1.2 Post-independence regimes and civil war

In preparations for the 1956 independence of Sudan, Southern Sudan and other peripheral areas were either grossly under-represented or absent from most key negotiations between the British and Sudanese elites. Efforts to create a federal system or special provisions for the South and for other regions were unsuccessful, and in 1958 the first post-independence Constituent Assembly was dissolved in order to prevent it from taking a decision on the question of federalism. Instead, the government handed over power to a military regime under the leadership of Ibrahim Abbud, which implemented an ambitious policy of Arabization and Islamization of the South that resulted, ironically, in increased conversions towards Christianity.

The modest and unplanned beginning of Southern guerrilla warfare against the Sudanese government came with the Torit mutiny of Southern Sudanese soldiers in 1955, only months before Sudan became independent. From 1960 to 1962, a number of senior Southern political figures went into exile and formed the first well-organized political movement in conjunction with the small group of guerrillas that had been in the bush since the Torit mutiny²⁶.

In a popular uprising known as the October Revolution, in 1964, the Abbud regime ceded power to a transitional government that held elections. In the following

25 See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 42, 55.

26 See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 77-80.

five-year period of precarious coalition governments, all dominated by Northerners, the civil war proceeded with growing intensity. Southern Sudanese in the National Assembly continued to press for federalism and the devolution of some powers, often in alliance with marginalized areas of the North, but were repeatedly defeated by Northern-based political parties.

In a 1969 coup, Jafar Nimairi, an army colonel from Northern Sudan, took power and immediately announced that the war in the South would be solved by political rather than military means, eventually signing the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 and bringing about a decade of relative peace. The abrogation of the Addis Abeba agreement by the Nimairi government and the imposition of Sharia law, both in 1983, are the most often cited causes of the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)²⁷ and the return to civil war later that year. The SPLA/M, composed primarily of Southern leadership and troops, always claimed to be fighting for a united, democratic Sudan in which marginalized regions would together form a majority. They consistently denied that they were fighting for an independent South Sudan. They eventually made significant inroads in parts of Northern Sudan; they controlled territory for many years and recruited heavily in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, primarily among non-Arab groups. They also fought in alliance with rebel movements in Eastern Sudan.

Another change of regime came in April 1985, when popular unrest in urban areas of the North led to a military takeover that ended the Nimairi regime. During the subsequent four-year period of coalition governments, three political parties shared power, including the two that had been dominant for decades, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the National Umma Party (NUP), as well as the relatively

27 While some refer to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the political party, as separate from the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the former guerrilla army, both always shared the same top leadership. Like many authors, we will refer to the SPLA/M, as in most cases it is not useful to make a distinction.

new National Islamic Front (NIF), the party of Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood. These parties included few representatives from marginalized areas among their leadership.

The war intensified quickly in the 1980s, particularly following a government decision to arm militias made up primarily of Baqqara youth (from the cattle-herding, seasonally nomadic, Arab tribes living close to and crossing over the North-South boundaries). These militias carried out a long series of extremely brutal attacks on villages in Bahr-el-Ghazal, a neighbouring state of Southern Sudan²⁸. The SPLA/M nonetheless had more military victories than defeats in the 1980s, eventually controlling most areas of the South outside of major towns, including some parts of the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile.

1.3 Recent changes and the current political context

Still having only modest oil revenues, Sudan had become the third most indebted country in the world. After a 1989 IMF deal to inject money into the country, conditional on the elimination of subsidies and the devaluation of the currency, inflation spiralled out of control, as protests and riots shook the cities. At the same time, the GoS indicated significant willingness to negotiate an end to civil war with the SPLA/M, most crucially by repealing significant aspects of Sharia law or limiting its application²⁹. In response, the NIF and a group of army officers staged a coup that installed Omar al-Bashir as president, a post he continues to hold.

1.3.1 Radical Islamist rule (1989-1999)

The NIF consolidated power using far more brutal means than ever before

28 "They would attack a Dinka village at dawn, kill all adult males who could not escape, rape the women, and enslave the children. The village would be burned, the wells stuffed with dead Dinka males, schools and clinics destroyed..." See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

29 See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 84-85

seen in Sudan. Hundreds, if not thousands, of journalists, lawyers, professors, intellectuals and human rights activists were tortured, disappeared, or are known to have been executed. Even relatives of those in the opposition soon faced considerable brutality. In addition, Sharia law was applied in a more fundamentalist fashion whereby public floggings, amputations, and executions became common for the first time. Thousands of women and many others were dismissed from the civil service, police, and judiciary. Political parties, non-government media, and most unions were banned. Large numbers of Sudanese left the country³⁰.

The new regime intensified the war in the South. In front-line areas of the North-South conflict, the ideological fervour of the regime led to even more extreme attempts at Islamization and Arabisation. Ideas of *jihad*, of *mujahadeen* holy warriors, and of the righteousness of killing non-Muslims (and Muslim rebels) received widespread promotion by the regime³¹. The brutality of attacks and their racial and religious dimensions received particular international attention in relation to the Nuba Mountains, where even before al-Bashir seized power, the previous regime had already begun to implement a policy of systematically killing local leaders and any educated Nuba from certain areas³². Whether such crimes and those in other regions constitute genocide has been the subject of debate³³.

Sudan stated its support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War and began actively encouraging armed Islamist extremist groups to spread their revolution throughout the Muslim world by any means necessary. Groups from all different

30 For the events summarized in this paragraph, see Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 192-187.

31 See Sondra Hale, 2001, "Testimonies in Exile: Sudanese Gender Politics." *Northeast African Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 97, and Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 132-133.

32 Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

33 See for example Alex de Waal, 1995, "Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan," London: African Rights [online]. Available at <http://sudanarchive.net> (accessed July 14th, 2010). 348 p., and Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 132

parts of Africa, Arab countries, and Afghanistan, most prominently including al-Qa'ida operatives from a dozen countries, were welcomed to come and go from Sudan as they pleased, were provided resources, and were allowed to set-up training camps. African, Arab and Western countries nearly all became increasingly hostile to the NIF regime and to some extent supportive of the SPLA/M³⁴.

1.3.2 Changes in the regime and the oil boom

The political situation in Sudan changed considerably at the end of the 1990s. A power struggle between al-Bashir and long-time NIF leader Hassan al-Turabi resulted in the reorganization of the NIF into the National Congress Party (NCP) and, in December 1999, the removal of al-Turabi from positions of power and the marginalization of his supporters³⁵. Al-Turabi later formed the Popular Congress Party, an Islamist political formation that rivals the NCP, and has become one of Sudan's most powerful opposition parties. State power became concentrated among a small group described by some as concerned only with the elimination of security threats to the regime and consolidation of their vast political and economic powers³⁶. From this point onwards, the regime has adopted and implemented less Islamist-inspired laws. Some believe that the regime also distanced itself from international terrorist groups³⁷, though multiple Israeli strikes on Sudanese territory seem to suggest otherwise. The civil war continued unabated throughout these shifts.

34 The most notable exception was the post 1991 Ethiopian government, which had come into power by toppling the Mengistu regime using considerable Sudanese government support. Mengistu had frequently used SPLA/M forces against rebel groups. See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 87-90.

35 It is common to refer to al-Turabi as having been even more powerful than al-Bashir himself over a number of years. A number of the regime's Islamist efforts were al-Turabi's initiatives, and when he first came into conflict with al-Bashir, it seemed for some time that he was able to outmanoeuvre al-Bashir and to exert greater influence on the actions of the regime. See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 218-228.

36 See International Crisis Group, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

37 See for example Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

Sudan's economic situation also changed remarkably when in 1999, the oil pipeline was completed from near the North-South boundary to Port Sudan, in the north-east, resulting in an enormous growth in oil revenues³⁸. While new funds were largely spent on arms, and while accusations of widespread corruption are common, the country was nonetheless able to stabilize its economy, to invest in infrastructure, and to pay for imports of electricity, food, and other goods. It seems however that even outside of war-zones, little money reached peripheral regions³⁹ or even most of those in central regions, thus exacerbating tensions. The controversial building of the Merowe dam also added to conflicts.

1.3.3 Relations between the Sudanese government and Western countries

Sudan was once considered an ally of Western governments. The Chadian civil war of the early 1980s is considered by many to have been an internationalized conflict between Libya and the West, with Sudan as a Western ally supporting the Chadian regime⁴⁰. However relations between the Sudanese government and the West worsened from the mid-1980s until the late 1990s, initially in response to the arming of Baqqara militias and the rapprochement between Sudan and countries such as Libya and Iran, and later in reaction to the policies of the NIF regime⁴¹. Significant Sudanese connections to the 1995 assassination attempt on Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak, and subsequent refusal to condemn the attempt or extradite suspects, further worsened the regime's relationships with most foreign governments. A few weeks after the 1998 destruction of US embassies in Nairobi

38 Oil production went from around ten thousand barrels of oil per day in the mid-1990s to 512 thousand barrels per day in 2006. See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 232, 236.

39 Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

40 See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 139-140, and Mahmood Mamdani, 2010, *Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*, New York, Verso Books.

41 See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

and Dar es-Salam by al-Qa'ida, the Americans launched a cruise missile attack that destroyed Sudan's Al-Shifa chemical and pharmaceutical plant⁴².

After the marginalization of al-Turabi and his supporters, relations between Sudan and the West changed considerably. Egypt brokered a rapprochement between Sudan and the USA in 1999, leading to significant cooperation between the Sudanese security apparatus and the CIA⁴³. After 9/11, the American government made considerable efforts to increase security cooperation, though the American Congress soon made it clear that sanctions would only be lifted in response to considerable efforts towards peace between North and South⁴⁴. Later, with an important agreement already signed towards a coming peace between the GoS and SPLA/M, the dramatic early years of the war in Darfur removed the possibility that the USA would lift sanctions. The Americans continued to provide millions in assistance to the SPLA/M⁴⁵.

1.4 Peace between North and South and civil wars in today's Sudan

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the SPLA/M and the GoS led to a six-year interim period in which South Sudan was by almost all measures independent of the North. This interim period had the stated objective of

42 The Americans claimed that the plant was producing a nerve gas, however such evidence was later shown to be dubious at best. Less than a year later, the American government unfroze the assets of the owner of the plant. See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

43 See International Crisis Group, 2011, "Divisions in Sudan's Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country's Stability" [online], p. 12, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/174-divisions-in-sudans-ruling-party-and-the-threat-to-the-countrys-future-stability.aspx> (accessed July 14th, 2010).

44 Only weeks after 9/11, the US lifted the UN travel ban on members of the Sudanese government and Salih Gosh, major-general and head of the National Security Service, was appointed to "expand and coordinate anti-terrorist intelligence with the Americans." In the following year the US Congress passed the Sudan Peace Act, which increased pressure on Sudan, to the displeasure of the NIF. See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 241-242.

45 Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

providing time for the GoS (now with considerable participation by the SPLA/M and opposition parties, but with al-Bashir still in firm control) to make unity attractive before the referendum in the South on the question of separation. In reality, very few substantive reforms occurred. The Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile were only promised "popular consultations" on the question of whether they wished to be part of the North or the South, resulting in no significant change.

Aside from the referendum, key provisions of the CPA included lifting the long-standing state of emergency, 50/50 sharing of oil revenues during the interim period, and the application of Sharia law only in Northern Sudan. The 2010 election was also a result of the CPA, and led to official results whereby very few non-NCP candidates were elected at any level in Northern Sudan, except in the state of Blue Nile and in some parts of the Nuba Mountains. It was marked by boycotts of some of the main opposition parties and was described, among other things, as being "marred by [...] untraceable results that challenged [its] credibility" by election observers⁴⁶. However it was only in relation to Darfur that a monitoring team went so far as to declare that the results "can not be seen as credible"⁴⁷.

Turning to the war in Darfur, it is important to begin with a brief summary of recent history of that region. The abolition of the native administration structures in Darfur in the 1970s came at a time of declining rainfall and considerable desertification. In addition, the Chadian civil war of the early 1980s and the Chad-Libya war of 1986-87 brought not only arms to different groups in Darfur, but also

46 The above quote is from the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) report. The Carter Centre reported similar concerns. See EUEOM, 2010, "Sudan, Final Report: Executive and Legislative Elections, 11-15 April 2010, p. 7 [online]. Available at http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/final-report-eu-eom-sudan-2010_en.pdf (accessed July 25th, 2012), and Carter Center, 2010 "Observing Sudan's 2010 National Elections," Atlanta, The Carter Centre, 2010 [online]. Available at <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-041710.html> (accessed July 25th, 2012).

47 See Carter Centre, 2010, *loc. cit.* p. 4.

militant, pan-Arab mobilization⁴⁸. The two largest conflicts in Darfur since that time have followed similar Arab/non-Arab lines⁴⁹. Severe droughts, ongoing desertification, and the Sudanese government's provision of arms towards Arab groups have further aggravated conflicts⁵⁰. The NIF regime increased favouritism, military support, and impunity for most Arab tribes, particularly after the SPLA/M attempted (unsuccessfully) to gain a foothold in Darfur in 1991⁵¹. Extreme, racist dimensions of the pan-Arab mobilization in Darfur have been fairly common⁵².

Conflict in Darfur reached an unprecedented scale in 2003-2004, when two rebel groups (formed among certain non-Arabs groups) declared their existence and attacked Sudanese military targets. The government organized militias, sent its armed forces, and carried out a massive, scorched-earth campaign⁵³. Though the conflict diminished in intensity in 2005, it continued to result in large-scale displacement and violence until around 2010. Since then, it can be viewed as a series

48 See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 139-141.

49 Namely, the Arab-Fur conflict of 1988-1989 and the war in Darfur from 2003 until 2010. Nonetheless, many Arab and non-Arab groups have refrained from aligning themselves in such ways. The ongoing conflict in Darfur since 2010 is also fairly different, with significant conflicts among Arab groups and among non-Arab groups. See Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana, 2012, "Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and New Players," Geneva, Small Arms Survey [online]. Available at <http://smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-28-Forgotten-Darfur.pdf> (accessed August 28th, 2012).

50 See Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 36-40, 56-70 and Daly, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 263-269.

51 For example, the reform of some structures of government and representation within Darfur in the 1990s, and changes in Darfur's representation in the national government, were perceived by many as favouring Arab tribes over non-Arab ones. See Daly, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 262-264.

52 See Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, 2010, "Appendix K: Arab Congregation (Gathering) and the Ideology of Genocide in Darfur, Sudan," in Salah Hassan and Carina Ray, *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 448-467. See also Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 47-115.

53 An estimated 1.85 million people were systematically displaced during between 2004 and 2006. The number of people who died over the first two years of the conflict is above 100,000 by most credible estimates, with most deaths being attributed to dehydration and disease. See Government Accountability Office, 2006, "Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced," Washington [online]. Available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0724.pdf> (accessed July 12th, 2010).

of interlocking low-intensity conflicts, including considerable fighting among Arab military groups as well as between the government and rebel groups. The large United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has been present since 2007⁵⁴. Most displaced people have yet to return home, due to security concerns, land seizures, and other issues associated with the lack of a political settlement.

The return to war in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile came in 2011, when fighting resumed between the GoS and SPLM-North⁵⁵, whose troops have never been disarmed following the 1983-2005 civil war. The conflict started after NCP incumbent candidate Ahmed Haroun was re-elected for the governorship of South Kordofan (the state that includes the Nuba Mountains). The SPLM-North leadership rejected the results as fraudulent, and violence soon spiralled out of control. The SPLM-North has since joined with the largest rebel groups in Darfur to form the Sudanese Revolutionary Forces (SRF), who call for the overthrow of the current regime. The SRF is thought to receive considerable support from South Sudan⁵⁶. Most of Sudan's largest political parties have now signed a separate agreement, calling for the overthrow of the current regime through a peaceful uprising⁵⁷.

54 It replaced the African Union Mission in Sudan, which began in 2004 and had most of its troops deployed in 2005.

55 The SPLA/M had a fairly centralized leadership structure for decades. However, especially after the January 2011 referendum on the separation of South Sudan, it became clear that the SPLM-North was becoming an autonomous entity, both as a Northern political party and as a sizable military formation.

56 For example anonymous comments attributed to a US official have alleged South Sudanese support for SPLM-North. See *Sudan Tribune*, "South Sudan Kiir 'Apologises' to US Obama for Denying his Support to Sudanese Rebels," 4 August 2012 [online]. Available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-Kiir-apologises-to-US> (accessed August 23rd, 2012).

57 The agreement includes the NUP, the PCP, the Sudanese Communist Party, and a number of smaller political parties. The SPLM-North, now banned as a political party, and the DUP are the only large opposition parties that did not sign the agreement, the later having joined a coalition government with the NCP in late 2011 (a coalition to which the NUP was also invited, but

North-South military confrontations have occurred on some occasions in recent years. Most notably, after months of disputes over the pipeline costs, the Government of South Sudan stopped the flow of Southern oil through Sudan in 2012, a move that cost South Sudan approximated 98% of its total domestic revenues (until a deal was reached in September of the same year)⁵⁸. In April 2012, the Southern Sudanese Armed Forces seized the Heglig oil fields, holding them for ten days and claiming them to be part of South Sudan, despite the SPLA/M having previously accepted a Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling that placed the fields on the Northern side of the border.

In summary, Sudan continues to experience armed conflicts between the government and rebel groups in several peripheral regions, linked to some extent to ongoing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan. In addition, Eastern Sudan (part of today's Sudan) has only recently emerged from conflict. In each of these regions, historical tensions regarding the distribution of resources and the political dominance of an elite from a particular part of the North have been exacerbated by the mobilization of government militias mainly among Arab tribes and of the mobilization of rebel groups mainly among non-Arab ones.

declined to participate).

58 South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, 2010 Statistical Yearbook, [online]. Available at <http://ssnbs.org/storage/South%20Sudan%20Statistical%20Yearbook%202011%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed August 29th, 2012).

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political attitudes have been studied primarily in relation to countries that are at least somewhat democratic, where attitudinal data can be linked to voting patterns. In Western democracies, public opinion, often examined in tandem with voting behaviour, has become a subfield of political science in its own right. Works pertaining to political attitudes and behaviour in Africa are less numerous but nonetheless touch on a variety of topics. While rigorous and representative political attitude surveys are considered by many to be impossible in countries of very limited political freedoms⁵⁸, even more so in areas of conflict, comparative survey data has been recently become available for an increasing number of North African countries, beginning with Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt in the early 2000s. In 2012, more extensive data was released, which also included Sudan and Tunisia⁵⁹. The relative paucity and recentness of data about Sudan leads us to discuss academic works related to political attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, the later being often studied as part of the Arab world or the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

58 Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler, 2008, "Attitudes in the Arab World," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 1, p. 434.

59 The World Values Survey has included Algeria, Morocco and Egypt since the early 2000s. The Arab Barometer first round, in 2006, included Algeria and Morocco, and the second round, in 2010, also included Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia. The Arab Opinion Index covered all the above mentioned countries in 2011.

This literature review first presents studies that analyze available survey data pertaining to governments and democracy in the region and in (or about) Sudan. The second section briefly reviews literature on the links between diasporas and the politics of the countries of origin, including questions of opinions and political behaviours of members of these diasporas. The third section looks at dominant patterns in the politics of African countries, especially regional affiliation, ethnicity, and religion. These are the three elements which, according to many scholars, most often explain attitudes and political behaviours on the continent. Fortunately, these factors have been studied in the Sudanese context, which will be described in the final sub-section.

2.1 Attitudes towards democracy, regimes, and institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and in Sudan

Attitudes towards democracy have been a key element of multi-country surveys conducted in Africa. Questions commonly address preferences for different types of regime (including more autocratic options) and attitudes towards particular institutions such as the government, the army, and political parties. Satisfaction with and trust for regimes is also often covered, as are a couple specific events or policies which will be discussed briefly. Of particular significance are the Afrobarometer surveys, which conducted their first round in 1999 in a number of sub-Saharan African countries, and the Arab Barometer surveys which covered two North African countries in 2006, and four in 2010. The Afrobarometer surveys focus on countries that have "recently experienced political and economic reforms"⁶⁰, while the Arab Barometer surveys include some countries with more authoritarian regimes.

60 The Afrobarometer sample countries geographically closest to Sudan are Uganda and Kenya to the South, and Mali and Nigeria to the West. The countries included are those which have "opened up politically and economically in the last couple of decades," though they do include countries with more autocratic regimes such as Zimbabwe and Lesotho. See Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, *op. cit.*

Table 2.1

Rule by a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections would be “very good” or “good” (percentage agreeing)

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| Nigeria | 43% |
| South Africa | 37% |
| Uganda | 31% |
| Tanzania | 29% |
| Zimbabwe | 27% |
| Morocco | 18% |
| Egypt | 8% |

Source: World Values Databank, 2000 and 2001.

“Wide but shallow” popular support for democracy has been observed in sub-Saharan Africa, where almost all (93%) of those interviewed in the first round of the Afrobarometer “reject at least one form of autocracy, that is *either* military rule *or* one-man rule *or* one-party rule” but only 59% reject all three forms. In addition, only 48% reject all three forms and also indicate support for democracy⁶¹. In sub-Saharan Africa, there is particularly strong support for “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections,” which is significantly less popular in the North African countries surveyed, as indicated in Table 1 and complementary data⁶². Support for democracy in sub-Saharan African tends to be stronger among those who are more educated, have higher socio-economic status, or live in urban areas⁶³.

In North Africa and the broader Arab world, some indicators of support for

61 Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 90-91. Emphasis in original.

62 The Arab Barometer surveys asked the same question and similarly found rates below 20% in Algeria and Morocco in the first round, and in Sudan in the second round. See Arab Barometer, *loc. cit.*, and van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 39. Other second round data for North Africa is not yet available in English.

63 Geoffrey Evans and Pauline Rose, 2012, “Understanding Education’s Influence on Support for Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 48, no. 4, p. 498-515.

democracy are quite strong, including majorities in all countries surveyed agreeing that democracy, despite its problems, is better than any other form of government⁶⁴. Similarly, on most other indicators, popular support for democracy and understandings of democracy are about as strong in the Arab world (including North Africa) as in other world regions⁶⁵. There is however some data that indicates lower levels of support for democracy, especially in relation to preference for certain forms of government that substitute elements of Islamic law for elections, or restrict secular political options. For instance, in Algeria, support for “a system governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties” was found to be “very appropriate” or “appropriate” by 42.4% of respondents, compared to 52.6% for a system which in both secular and religious political parties are allowed to compete⁶⁶. It should be noted however that, as Mark Tessler argues, the most significant attitudinal divide in Arab countries is not between those who favour democracy and those who favour other, Islamic-influenced forms of government; rather, is “between those who favour secular democracy and those who favour a political system that is both democratic and Islamic in some meaningful way”⁶⁷. His analysis of the Arab Barometer data shows few generalizable differences in political culture between these secular and

64 Rates surveyed in the World Values Survey indicate nearly unanimous agreement on this point in Egypt and Morocco (98% and 96%), as compared to 88% agreeing or strongly agreeing in Algeria. See World Values Survey Databank, multiple years, *loc. cit.* However, data from the Arab Barometer and the Arab Opinion Index show rates not nearly as high, with values for Morocco of 85% and 68% in these other two sources, and values for Algeria of 69% and 56%. See Arab Barometer, 2006, “Arab Barometer II: Sudan Country Report,” Cairo, Arab Barometer, and Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, “The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index,” Doha, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, p. 39.

65 Fares Braizat, 2010, “What Arabs Think,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 21, no. 4, p. 131-138.

66 The later question was with regards to “a parliamentary system in which nationalist, left wing, right wing, and Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections.” See Arab Barometer, 2006, *op. cit.*

67 See Mark Tessler, 2010, “Religion, Religiosity and the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights from the Arab Barometer Surveys,” *Middle East Law and Governance*, vol. 2, p. 221-252. In this statement, we consider “democratic” to be defined by those polled, in the ways they choose, and not according to any standardized definition.

non-secular groups, whether in civic engagement, political knowledge, or views towards womens rights⁶⁸.

In Sudan, support for democracy is considerable, with a large majority (reported at 74% and 75% in different surveys) agreeing or strongly agreeing that “a democratic system may have its problems, but it’s better than other systems.” This measure of support seems to be similar or even higher than in other North African countries⁶⁹. There is however a sizable minority that believes that “democracy is a system that contradicts the teachings of Islam”⁷⁰. Regarding evaluations of a “system governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties,” or a “system in which nationalist, left wing, right wing, and Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections,” 48.3% find the former appropriate or very appropriate, compared to 60.2% for the later, electoral system⁷¹. On this last indicator and on a few others, it seems that rejection of secularism is slightly stronger in Sudan than in most MENA countries, as indicated by several questions included in Table 2. For instance, in Sudan 66% indicate that they would not accept the attainment of power by a political party that “receives the necessary votes but believes in the separation of religion and state,” which is significantly higher than the MENA average of 41%⁷².

68 This point is made in Tessler, 2010, *loc. cit.* p. 251. Other publications currently available do not seem to contradict this finding.

69 The numbers above are from the second round of the Arab Barometer and the first round of the Arab Opinion Index, respectively. See van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 44, and Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 39. For comparisons between Sudan and other countries, see Table 2.

70 van den Bosch, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 56. On this question, 20.3% agreed and an additional 12.0% strongly agreed. On this question there is no “don’t know” category indicated in the results. Data regarding other countries that would be relevant for comparison is currently available only in Arabic, except for Iraq, where 25.8% either strongly agree or agree. See Michelle Hoffman, 2012, “Arab Barometer II: Iraq Country Report,” Cairo: Arab Barometer, p. 49.

71 van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 46.

72 Conversely, and taking into account the percentages in the don’t know or declined to answer category (5% in Sudan, 14% in the region), the percentages saying they would accept such a party were 29% in Sudan and 45% on average in the MENA countries surveyed, as summarized in

Table 2.2
Attitudes towards democracy and
the role of Islam in North Africa
 (percentages who agree or strongly agree)

| | Sudan | | Egypt | Algeria | | Tuni sia | Morocco | |
|--|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Survey: AB2 2010 | AOI 2011 | AOI 2011 | AB1 2006 | AOI 2011 | AOI 2011 | AB1 2006 | AOI 2011 |
| Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of government. | 74% | 75% | 56% | 69% | 56% | 72% | 85% | 68% |
| Democracy contradicts the teachings of Islam. | 32% | - | - | 24% | - | - | 17% | - |
| Would accept the attainment of power by a political party that receives the necessary number of votes but believes in the separation of religion and state (percentage who would accept) | - | 29% | 56% | - | 38% | 62% | - | 42% |
| Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-political life. | 46% | 31% | 55% | 29% | 44% | 63% | 47% | 35% |
| It is in the country's best interest to separate religion from politics. | - | 25% | 52% | - | 40% | 52% | - | 30% |

Sources: Data presented are from the first and second rounds of the Arab Barometer surveys (AB1 and AB2) as well as from the recently released Arab Opinion Index (AO). For the AB1, see Arab Barometer, 2006, *loc. cit.*; for the AOI, the Arab Centre for Research and Policy, 2012, *loc. cit.*; for the AB2, see van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*

In addition to gauging support for democracy and secularism, the same surveys also evaluate trust for or satisfaction with institutions such as the government and the judiciary. In what was Northern Sudan in 2010 (the territory of today's Sudan), 56% reported trusting the government to a great or medium extent, with 18% reporting trust to a limited extent and 23% reporting absolutely no trust. Very similar proportions were found for the question of trust for public security forces. On the extent of satisfaction with the government on a scale of 1 to 10, results indicate levels of satisfaction similar to other countries in the region, with 28% of

Table 3. See Arab Centre for Research and Policy, 2012, *loc. cit.* p. 43.

respondents in Sudan reporting high rates of satisfaction, with scores of 7-10, 18% giving scores in the 4-6 range, and another 32.0% giving scores of 1-3⁷³. This and two other cross-country comparisons of trust and satisfaction are shown in Table 3.

Table 2.3
Comparative measures of trust in and satisfaction
with governments and institutions in North Africa

| | Sudan | | Egypt | Algeria | | Tuni sia | Morocco | |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | AB2 2010 | AOI 2011 | AOI 2011 | AB1 2006 | AOI 2011 | AOI 2011 | AB1 2006 | AOI 2011 |
| How satisfied you are with the performance of the current government of your country: those reporting high rates of 7-10. | 28% | - | - | 13% | - | - | 25% | - |
| Trust in your country's government: percent reporting a "great deal of trust" or "some trust." | - | 56% | 79% | - | 48% | 47% | - | 18% |
| Trust in "public security (the police)": percentage reporting to a "great" or "medium" extent | 59% | - | - | 49% | - | - | 55% | - |

Sources: For the AOI, see Arab Barometer, 2006, *loc. cit.*; Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, *loc. cit.*; for AB2, see van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*;

In their perceptions of the fairness of the last "parliamentary elections," held in 2010, 43.8% of Sudanese citizens reported believing they were either completely free or fair, or had only minor breaches, 11% reported that they were free or fair with some major breaches, and 29.2% reported that they were not free or fair⁷⁴. Also on a question of freedoms, around half of respondents in Sudan believe that the enforcement of anti-terror laws in Arab countries contributes to a great or medium extent to "violating the public freedoms of citizens," and to "limiting the peaceful activities of the opposition," though a similar proportion believes that enforcing this

73 van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 51.

74 van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 58.

law contributes to “combating terrorism”⁷⁵. In Sudan, favouritism in the state's application of laws is perceived to be a problem by some, with only 21% indicating that the application is “equal to a great extent,” 55% indicating that the state “applies the law among people but favours some groups,” and 17% saying that the application is not at all equal⁷⁶.

2.2 Attitudes towards Western foreign policies and the International Criminal Court

Available multi-country data from sub-Saharan Africa, mainly from international polls, shows relatively favourable attitudes towards the EU, the USA, and even towards American foreign policy in the four sub-Saharan African countries for which this data is available⁷⁷. Near the end of the Bush era, sub-Saharan Africa was the only world region where there were more positive than negative views towards the influence of the USA in the world⁷⁸. More recent studies show a similar

75 The question was as follows: “An anti-terrorism law was issued in some Arab countries, and I would like to know your opinion of this law. To what extent do you think that enforcing this law contributes to...” In Sudan, 52.2% responded that it contributes to “violating the public freedoms of citizens” to a great or medium extent, compared to 56.3% finding that it contributes to “combating terrorism” to a great or medium extent. See *ibid*, p. 59

76 See Arab Centre for Research and Policy, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 59. There are also contrasting attitudes and experiences regarding discrimination, with 36.1% indicating that they are either not at all “being treated equally to other citizens” or are being treated as such only to a limited extent. (This later question is not specific to how people are treated by the government.) See van den Bosch, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 43.

77 For data on favourable attitudes towards US foreign policy, see for example Bruce Stokes, 2010, “Summary of Findings from Pew Global Attitudes Project 2010 Survey of 22 Nations,” Pew Research Centre [online], available at <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/transatlanticProgramme/pdf/pewGlobal.pdf> (accessed August 3rd, 2012). For a summary of recently polling results regarding the five sub-Saharan African countries covered by international polls (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and South Africa), including the BBC Worldwide Service/Globescan polls, the Gallup International Association polls, and the Pew Global Attitudes Polls, see Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, *Public Opinion on Global Issues*, Washington: Council on Foreign Relations.

78 See BBC Worldwide Service / GlobeScan 2008, “Israel and Iran Share Most Negative Ratings in Global Poll.” Available at http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbccntryview/backgrounder.html (accessed August 3rd, 2012).

finding for the region⁷⁹. Confidence in NATO similarly illustrates fairly strong support for Western foreign policy in sub-Saharan African countries, but weaker support in North African countries (see Table 4)⁸⁰. Opinions regarding the ICC seem

Table 4:
Confidence in NATO in various African Countries

| | Country/region | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------|---------|--------------|--------|----------|
| | Algeria | Morocco | South Africa | Uganda | Zimbabwe |
| A great deal | 1.6% | 5.5% | 22.0% | 19.3% | 9.5% |
| Quite a lot | 4.6% | 5.5% | 37.7% | 34.0% | 28.1% |
| Not very much | 25.0% | 18.4% | 24.3% | 25.2% | 36.2% |
| None at all | 68.8% | 70.6% | 15.9% | 21.5% | 26.3% |
| No. of respondents | 1023 | 363 | 2245 | 450 | 280 |

Source: See World Values Survey Databank, 2000, 2001, and 2002, *loc. cit.*

to be similarly differentiated between sub-Saharan and North Africa, with approval for the ICC indictment of Sudanese President al-Bashir at 77% and 71% in Kenya and Nigeria respectively, as compared to 47% in Egypt (as well as 51% in Turkey, and only 25% in the Palestinian Territories)⁸¹.

79 See BBC Worldwide Service / GlobeScan 2011, "Positive Views of Brazil on the Rise in 2011 BBC Country Rating Poll." Available at http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2011_countries/bbc2011_countries_global_rls.pdf (accessed August 3rd, 2012).

80 It should be noted however that this data was gathered among disproportionately urban populations in some countries, as indicated by Michael Bratton, Norris Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 51.

81 In each of these countries, face-to-face surveys were conducted with at least 500 individuals between April and June 2009, in most countries using a national sample except in Egypt where the sample was urban and in Nigeria where the sample was national, but disproportionately urban. See WorldPublicOpinion.org / Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2009, "Muslim and African Nations on Bashir Indictment and Darfur." Available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_Darfur_Jul09_quaire.pdf (accessed August 2nd, 2012).

Citizens in North African countries typically hold negative views towards American foreign policy⁸². Research in Algeria and Jordan has asked specifically about American foreign policy and support for terrorist acts against American targets, and has shown that approval of such acts is disproportionately likely among those “with negative judgements about their own governments and about US foreign policy,” but is unrelated to other factors including judgements about Western culture, religious orientations, or economic conditions in the country⁸³. The correlation between religiosity and views regarding the USA is found in some, but not all studies in the MENA region⁸⁴. Levels of anti-Americanism also seems to be positively associated with the intensity of secular/religious political party competition, which seems to lead elites to promote such sentiments⁸⁵. Age has also been found to have a significant impact on anti-American views, with younger generations in some countries being more likely to have a positive outlook regarding the USA⁸⁶.

A study indicates that public opinion in the MENA region is more favourably inclined towards some Western countries than others. While only 25% and 33% report somewhat or very favourable attitudes towards the USA and the UK, 49%, 49%, and 61% reporting such attitudes towards Canada, Germany, and France, respectively⁸⁷. The United Nations Security Council also enjoys some legitimacy in

82 Shibley Telhami, 2007, “America in Arab Eyes,” *Survival*, vol. 49, no. 1, p. 115-117.

83 Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins, 2007, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51, no. 2, p. 305.

84 See Mark Tessler, 2003, “Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey Research,” *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 4, p. 177-179, and Blaydes and Linzer, 2009, *loc. cit.*

85 Blaydes and Linzer, 2009, *loc. cit.*

86 See Tessler, 2003, *loc. cit.*, p. 180.

87 The question was as follows: “I will read you a list of countries. Please tell me if your overall impression of each is either very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat un-favourable or very unfavourable, or if you are not familiar enough to form a judgement.” See Peter Furia and Russell Lucas, 2006, “Determinants of Arab Public Opinion on Foreign Relations,” *International*

the MENA region, as indicated by widespread support for UN-led military intervention to “prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide” or “to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups”⁸⁸.

In Sudan, there seems to be considerable anti-American sentiment, as indicated by support for the statement that “The United States' interference in the region justifies armed operations against the United States elsewhere,” with which 53.5% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed, especially among those who indicate that they always pray daily⁸⁹. In the Arab Opinion Index survey, 25% of Sudanese respondents believe that the USA is the country “most threatening to [their] personal security,” and 27% believe that the USA threatens “[their] country's security.” Only Israel was perceived as more threatening, with values of 37% and 32%, respectively⁹⁰.

2.3 The political engagement of diasporas and of the Sudanese diaspora

While there is very little data that looks at the political attitudes or opinions in diasporas⁹¹, there is a small body of academic literature concerning their

Studies Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 3 p. 586-87, 594. The margins of error reported for the Zogby country surveys analyzed here ranges from four to six per cent. The surveys were carried out in seven Arab countries including in two in North Africa (Egypt and Morocco).

88 In no country surveyed did less than 61% believe that the UN should have the right to authorize the use of military force in the case of genocide (including Egypt 83%, Turkey 64%, and in Palestinian Territories 78%). “To stop a country from supporting terrorist groups,” no less than 60% in any country agreed. See WorldPublicOpinion.org / Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2006-2008, quoted in Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, *loc. cit.*, p. 22-23.

89 Among those who indicate that they always pray daily, 56% agree with the statement, as compared to 32.8% agreement among those who indicate that they do not always pray daily. Overall, 33.4% either disagree or strongly disagree with this statement, and the other 13.1% either responded that they don't know or declined to answer. See van den Bosch, 2012, *op. cit.* p. 60.

90 See Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, *loc. cit.*

91 The definition of diaspora used in this document is as follows: “groups of migrants, refugees and their descendants among whom there is an identity which refers to a homeland elsewhere.” See Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2006, “Diasporas and Conflict Resolution –Part of the Problem or Part

transnational politics. These studies are in part based on the realization that “some migrants maintain strong, enduring ties to their homelands even as they are incorporated into countries of resettlement”⁹². Sending money back to the home country (including to rebel groups) is the best documented political role of diasporas in countries in conflict. Members of diasporas often also have significant roles in peace processes⁹³. In less institutionalized forms, some politically significant processes of reconciliation can also take place among members of the diaspora, outside the country of origin⁹⁴. Diasporas also often have other roles such as compiling and diffusing information⁹⁵, supporting political parties or other actors in the country of origin, or lobbying host governments⁹⁶.

The Sudanese diaspora is quite active in the politics of their home country. As in other diasporas made up primarily of refugees, there is strong opposition to the

of the Solution?” Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, p. 1. Available online at http://www.diiis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf (accessed August 18th, 2011).

- 92 Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind and Steven Vertovec, 2003, “International Perspectives on Transnational Migration: An Introduction,” *International Migration Review*, vol. 37, no 3, p. 565.
- 93 See for example Patricia Ellis and Zafar Khan, “The Kashmiri diaspora: Influences in Kashmir,” in Nadjie Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds.), *New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational communities and the transformation of home*, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 169-187, and W. Zunzer, “Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation,” Berghof Occasional Paper no. 26, Berlin, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004.
- 94 See for example C. Orjuela, 2008, “Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka’s Violent Conflict”, *Global Networks*, vol. 8, no 4, p. 436-452. However, in some cases, forms of nationalism common in certain diasporas can detract from reconciliation attempts and even exacerbate conflicts. See for example Jolle Demmers, 2007, “New Wars and Diasporas: Suggestions for Research and Policy,” *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, vol. 11, p. 1-26.
- 95 Fiona Adamson, 2002, “Mobilizing for the transformation of home: politicized identities and transnational practices,” in Nadjie Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds.), *New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*, London, Routledge, p. 155-168.
- 96 Karpathakis, Anna, 1999, “Home Society Politics and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The case of Greek immigrants in New York City,” *International Migration Review*, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 55-78.

government of the country of origin⁹⁷. Political parties, rebel groups, and civil society organizations are known to draw on the diaspora for considerable participation, leadership, and surely funds as well. Indeed much of the earlier leadership of such groups and parties fled Sudan in response to brutal repression, including the widespread use of arbitrary arrests, torture, extra-judicial executions, and disappearances since the 1989 coup that brought the current regime to power⁹⁸.

From two case studies and from anecdotal evidence, we know that the Sudanese diaspora has been engaged in civil society activities in host countries including Canada⁹⁹. This includes human rights work, advocacy aimed at influencing the Canadian government's role in Sudan, and pressure on a Canadian oil company that was operating in Sudan. The sharing of information about political issues is very popular, particularly through online discussion forums and email lists.

One 2009 study is indicative of some political opinions in the Sudanese and South Sudanese diasporas in Canada. Few significant differences in attitudes were found between Northerners and Southerners. A strong majority of those surveyed (72%) agreed that "the removal of President al-Bashir is essential to achieving peace in Sudan," compared to 16% disagreeing. A majority (60%) agreed that the war in Darfur should be labelled "genocide." Regarding the roles and potential roles of the Canadian government in Sudan, many agreed with Canada sending peacekeepers to Darfur; and 91% agreed with the notion that Canada "has a responsibility to intervene when civilians are threatened by violence in Sudan." However, 38% agreed with the statement that "Canada should not interfere in Sudan's internal conflicts,"

97 See Jolle Demmers, 2002, "Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long-Distance Nationalism, and Delocalization of Conflict Dynamics," *The Public*, vol. 89, no. 1, p. 85-96.

98 The participation of the diaspora in political activities in Sudan has rarely been documented, but has been mentioned in passing by a number of authors and in other anecdotal evidence. See for example Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, 2002, *Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 156-163.

99 *Ibid*, p. 156-163.

while 54% expressed disagreement. Issues of democracy were only briefly addressed, such as the overwhelming support found for the notion that “Sudan must achieve a true separation of religion and politics,” with which 85% agreed and only 12% disagreed¹⁰⁰.

2.4 Political divides in North Africa and surrounding regions

Many studies examining the sources of political opinions and behaviour in Africa are focused on ethnicity, often highlighting the high levels of ethno-political fragmentation¹⁰¹. This fragmentation is related, among other things, to the remarkable ethno-cultural diversity of most African countries, where cross-cutting markers of identity mean that a given individual or group can identify themselves with a number of identities. The divisions that take on political relevance in relation to these identities are often explained by authors with reference to the evolution of the political context, and especially the ethnic favouritism of colonial powers¹⁰². Ethnic political divides are generally considered to be the dominant ones in most African countries¹⁰³. For example, Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes have found that “even with social and attitudinal controls, ethnicity is a significant predictor of party support in most, although not all” of the twelve sub-Saharan African countries

100 This study was based on two survey tools, with a combination of purposive and snow-ball sampling. One was an anonymous, written questionnaire, primarily quantitative in nature, to which 77 responded. These 77 respondents were solicited for additional responses, resulting in in-depth interviews with 15 to 20 of them. See Mosaic Institute, 2009, “Profile of a Community: A ‘smart map’ of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada,” Toronto, Mosaic Institute, p. 54. Available online at <http://www.mosaicinstitute.ca/Publications.html> (accessed August 16th, 2011).

101 Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003, *loc. cit.*, p. 80-83.

102 See for example Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003, *loc. cit.* and Mahmood Mamdani, 2009, *Saviours and Survivors: Dafur, politics and the War on Terror*, New York, Verso Books.

103 Kevin Deegan-Krause, 2006, “New Dimensions of Political Cleavage,” in R. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 15-16, Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999, *loc. cit.*, and Nicholas Cheeseman and Robert Ford, 2007, “Ethnicity as a Political Cleavage,” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 83, Cape Town.

included in their study¹⁰⁴. However it should be noted that divides described as ethnic or tribal by some are often in large part religious, linguistic, geographic, or racial, due to overlapping characteristics¹⁰⁵. For this and other reasons, the impact of ethnicity has been the subject of much debate. As Daniel Young has emphasized, based on a multi-country analysis, the notion that “African voters simply vote for co-ethnics [...] is faulty”¹⁰⁶. There are some countries where ethnic cleavages are not the dominant ones. In Mali, for example, ethnicity has little political salience¹⁰⁷. In Ghana, survey data reveals partisan alignments that are urban-rural, or based on education, occupation, or income level¹⁰⁸.

As in other regions, the institutional structures in African countries are considered to play a major role in the formation of political divisions. For example, the legacy of authoritarian regimes appears to have contributed to the reliance of parties on ethno-political mobilization and the weakness of inter-ethnic coalitions in some African countries¹⁰⁹. The functioning of highly clientelistic patronage systems has also been linked to the importance of ethno-political cleavages. Van de Waal explains that in such systems, the development of a localized support base for a political party – often along ethnic, regional or linguistic lines – is helpful for

104 Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes, 2003, “Does ethnicity determine support for the governing party?,” Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 26, Cape Town, p. iv.

105 Daniel Posner, 2001, “Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa,” Paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy in Africa in Comparative Perspective, Stanford University, 27 April 2001, available online at <http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Posner.htm> (accessed June 27th, 2011).

106 Daniel Young, 2009, “Support You Can Count On? Ethnicity, Partisanship, and Retrospective Voting in Africa,” Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 115, Cape Town, p. 3.

107 Thad Dunning and Lauren Harrison, 2009, “Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali,” Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 107, Cape Town.

108 Staffan Lindberg and Minion Morrison, 2005, “Exploring voter alignments in Africa: core and swing voters in Ghana,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 565–586.

109 Shaheen Mozaffar and James Scarritt, 2005, “The puzzle of African party systems,” *Party Politics*, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 399-421.

accessing patronage networks¹¹⁰.

Divides relating to religion and secularism are also important to consider in countries like Sudan which have powerful Islamist movements and parties. In most North African and Middle Eastern countries, a secular-religious cleavage is generally considered to be among the most important ones, and can be broadly characterized as a divide between Islamist movements and political parties and those which see a more limited or no role for Islam in the political and legal realms¹¹¹. However, distinctions between Islamist and non-Islamist political forces are less clear in some countries, where most major political parties advocate for some role of Islam in politics. In Turkey, other factors such as urban/rural residence and socioeconomic background are related to a dominant political divide between a relatively secularized, urban population and “a more traditional and Islamic 'periphery'”¹¹². In other countries, the most important religious cleavage is not between secular and Islamist political forces, but in relation to sectarian divisions among Muslims¹¹³. Divides between Sunni and Shi'a Islam are most obvious in this regard, but divisions with regards to Salafism or between Sufi orders (*tariqas*) are relevant in countries such as Sudan.

2.5 Political divides in Sudan

While national polling data on attitudes or opinions in Sudan has become available only in 2012, and has not been analyzed in relation to political divisions in

110 Nicolas van de Walle, 2003, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 41, no 2, p. 297-321.

111 Blaydes and Linzer, 2009, *loc. cit.*

112 Paul Kubicek, 2009, “The European Union and Political Cleavages in Turkey,” *Insight Turkey*, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 110.

113 Brian Calfano and Emilie Sahliyah, 2008, “Determining Democracy in the Organization of the Islamic Conference,” *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 89, no 3, p. 751-764.

the country, there is a considerable literature related to the dominant divisions that define Sudanese politics and especially armed conflicts. This literature looks primarily at three divisions: between Arabs and non-Arabs, between Islamists and non-Islamists, and between marginalized and non-marginalized regions.

2.5.1 Arab/non-Arab politics

The importance of the Arab/non-Arab divide in Sudan is acknowledged by many scholars¹¹⁴. The seminal work of Francis Deng is perhaps most often quoted with regards to the nature and importance of the Arab/non-Arab (or “Arab/African”) dynamic in Sudan. Deng explains how non-Arab groups have adopted attitudes that resist not only the idea of an Arab national identity, but also of an ideology whereby they are considered by many to have a lower social status¹¹⁵. Thus one dimension of the Arab/non-Arab cleavage is based on adherence or resistance to an Arab identity. Deng shows how there are remarkable (and illogical) contortions made by both Arab and non-Arab individuals to either justify their “Arabness” or to negate the Arab elements of their culture and genealogy¹¹⁶.

Deng and other authors have noted how the Sudanese political elite has been able to benefit disproportionately from an Arab national identity, mainly due to the varying authenticity of claims to Arabness, largely based on skin-colour or on genealogies pointing to the family of the Prophet¹¹⁷. Abdullahi Osman El-Tom makes a similar argument, outlining how in addition to the factors just mentioned, notions of modernity/backwardness have been used by certain tribes in central regions to

114 See for example Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999, *loc. cit.*, Daly 2007, *op. cit.*, Johston, 2010, *op. cit.*.

115 Francis Mading Deng, 1995, *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, p. 409-420.

116 *Ibid*, p. 400-420.

117 *Ibid*, p. 387-401.

achieve and justify positions of power. El-Tom's argues that the combination of skin colour and notions of modernity are much more powerful than the credible geneological claims of some darker-skinned Arab tribes in peripheral regions¹¹⁸. In such analyses, Sudanese "identification with Arabism is both racial and cultural, with Islam as a central ingredient"¹¹⁹. The overlapping nature of these divisions potentially reinforces their impact on political opinions and behaviour. Such divisions are also reinforced by extreme forms of racial discrimination including Arab supremacist ideologies, though these may be somewhat marginal¹²⁰.

Political dynamics related to Arab/non-Arab divisions have been best documented in relation to the North/South conflict (now of limited usefulness for understanding dynamics within Sudan) and in Darfur, where such divisions have been undeniably prominent since at least the mid- to late-1980s. Conflicts over land rights since that time have often been between nomadic, camel-herding (*Rizayqat*) Arab groups in the North of Darfur and some non-Arab tribes, mainly the Zagawa and several sedentary tribes¹²¹. Some have alternatively described these conflicts as being between sedentary and nomadic populations, or between those tribes that have rights to a *dar*, a particular territory, and those that do not¹²². Therefore in Darfur, the

118 Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, 2006, "Darfur People: Too Black for the Arab-Islamic Project of Sudan - Part I." *Irish Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 5-11.

119 Deng, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 434. The original quote, written long before the separation of South Sudan, is that "Northern Sudanese identification with Arabism is both racial and cultural..." In the current context, his analysis still rings true when applied to the same group, who we would now refer to simply as "Sudanese."

120 See especially Atta El-Battahani, "Ideological Expansionist Movements versus Historical Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: From Actual Homicide to Potential Genocide," in Sarah Hassan and Carina Ray (eds.) *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2010, p. 43-67.

121 See for example de Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op. cit.*, and Dally, 2007, *op. cit.*

122 Mahmood Mamdani has argued in greater detail than other authors that the conflicts in Darfur should be understood mainly as being between tribes with *dars* and those without. However in making this argument, he also explores how ideologies regarding the nature of Arab and non-Arab groups have had a profound impact on the evolution of these conflicts. See Mamdani, 2010, *op.*

Arab/non-Arab cleavage should be regarded as closely related to the struggle between tribes for land rights. The instrumentalization of these conflicts by the Government of Sudan, through their efforts to defeat rebel groups, has transformed and exacerbated these divisions.

There are however reasons to doubt the dominance of the Arab/non-Arab cleavage. First, despite the dominance of Arab tribes in all post-independence governments in Sudan, some Arab tribes, particularly those in peripheral regions, had few economic or political privileges for many decades. In Darfur, for example, many Arab tribes were granted less land rights, less political representation, and less social status than some of the settled, primarily non-Arab populations, from at least colonial times until the 1980s or 1990s¹²³, and have experienced particular precarity since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s¹²⁴.

It should also be noted that in Darfur, while some aspects of Arab/non-Arab divides can be traced back many decades, experts tend to emphasize the very limited political significance of any such divides before the 1980s¹²⁵. Even since the formation of explicitly Arab and non-Arab militarized groups and alliances in the late 1980s and the current regime's use of Arab proxy militias in Darfur after 2003

cit. It should be noted however that some authors have been very critical of Mamdani's description of inter-tribal politics in Darfur. See for example Johnston, Douglas. "Commentary: Mamdani's 'Settlers', 'Natives', and the War on Terror." *African Affairs*, vol. 108, no. 433, p. 655-660.

123 Indeed the word Arab is sometimes used to "indicate a nomadic way of life and an associated inferior social status. (Conversely, nomads look down upon sedentary agriculturalists.)" Ahmed S. Al-Shahi, "Proverbs and Social Values in a Northern Sudanese Village," in Ian Cunnison and Wendy James (eds.), *Essays in Sudan Ethnography*, London, Hurst, 1972, p. 92. Quoted in Deng, 1995, *op. cit.*, 409.

124 Mamdani, 2010, *op. cit.*

125 See especially Sharif Harir, 1994, "Arab Belt" Versus "African Belt": Ethno-Political Conflict in Dar Fur and the Regional Cultural Factors," in *Short-cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan*, Sharif Harir and Terje Tvelt. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, p. 143-184. Erik Neilsen, 2008, "Ethnic Boundaries and conflict in Darfur," *Ethnicities*, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 427-462. Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op. cit.*

(especially until 2006), there are still some significant political events in Darfur that do not align with this cleavage. For example, some Arab groups have remained neutral and some of those that previously fought on the side of the government have since allied themselves with rebel groups¹²⁶. In some other cases, Arab groups have fought with the SPLA/M in other regions. Despite these mitigating factors, the Arab/non-Arab division undoubtedly constitutes an important cleavage in Sudanese politics, though it is not clear from available analysis whether it is the dominant one.

2.5.2 Religious divisions: differences of sect and degree of Islamism

Religious sects and Islamist/secular politics are also part of any thorough discussion of cleavages in Sudan. Before the 1980s, Sudanese politics was largely dominated by the NUP and DUP, and their associated Ansar and Khatmiyya religious sects, ruled by the Mahdi and Mirghani families, respectively¹²⁷. At least until recently, these parties were considered to have large followings, particularly in rural areas, where “allegiance to an order tend[ed] to go hand-in-hand with tribal identity”¹²⁸. This sectarian division has a very powerful influence over Sudanese post-independence politics, but seems to have greatly diminished since the 1989 coup that brought al-Bashir's Islamist regime to power.

Turning to Islamist politics in Sudan, it should be noted that major debates over secularism and the role of Islam in politics date back to 1950s and 1960s efforts to promote Islam (and Arabic) all over Sudan, which fed into Southern fears of

126 See Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op cit.*, especially 257-262. Furthermore, the largest Arab groups in Darfur have generally refrained from engaging with the conflict between government and rebel forces since 2003.

127 The rivalry between the Ansar and Khatamiya sects dates back to the late 1990s. Before independence, there were rival political parties allied with these two religious sects, now the NUP and the DUP. See Collins, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 50-51, 89.

128 John Morton, 1989, “Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea Province, Sudan,” *African Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 350, p. 63.

Northern domination. The growing influence of Islamist political forces, the imposition of Sharia laws, and the subsequent return to North-South war, were all factors that polarized existing tensions and brought issues of secularism and Islamist politics to the forefront of national debates. Since 1999, the Islamist movement has been divided between the ruling NCP and the PCP headed by Hassan al-Turabi. Since then, even supporters of the ruling NCP (not only those suspected of PCP links) have been sidelined by the current regime or have abandoned party structures as power has become increasingly centralized in a small number of security hardliners and members of certain families/tribes¹²⁹.

In addition to Islamist political parties such as the NCP and the PCP, and the rebel JEM in Darfur, the DUP and the NUP are also fairly Islamic-oriented. The later two parties are not generally referred to as Islamist in the Sudanese context – a convention which I follow in this document – however each has published their own kinds of Islamist-influenced manifestos, statements, and electoral material. Their 1986 electoral slogans, respectively calling for an “Islamic Republic” and for an “Islamic Renaissance,” are indicative of the extent to which these parties support a considerable role for Islam in politics and public life¹³⁰. The Sudanese case is thus different from most countries in North Africa and the Middle-East where Islamist political parties have been opposed mainly by secular nationalist ones¹³¹. Political attitude data also makes it clear that large proportions of the public in Sudan favour

129 International Crisis Group 2011, *loc. cit.* With multiple divisions and tumultuous changes in the Islamist movement, tribal/family networks and participation in NCP networks seems to be the most important credentials to benefit from the patronage of the regime in most cases, whether at local, regional, or national levels. However, it should be noted that at sub-national levels, political corruption and patronage can be distributed with limited national control or oversight, by powerful regional power brokers. Even NCP organizations can be marginalized or even attacked by powerful regional actors.

130 Kamal El-Din, “Islam and Islamism in Darfur,” in Alex de Waal (ed.), *War in Darfur: And the Search for Peace*, Harvard Global Justice Initiative, Cambridge, 2007, p. 92-112.

131 Blaydes and Linzer, 2009, *op. cit.*

Islam having a significant role in politics and public life. It seems misleading then to refer to a secular/religious cleavage, as secularism seems to find limited support. There is however an extremely politically salient division regarding how much and in what ways Islam should influence politics, which could be described as a cleavage between Islamists and non-Islamists.

2.5.3 Marginalized peripheries

In academic works on Sudan, the marginalization of peripheral regions is very frequently invoked, at least in passing, and is often described as dating back to the colonial period. All post-independence governments have been criticized as having done little to address development imbalances or to improve the representation of peripheral regions among the political elite¹³². The political marginalization of most regions of Sudan is often argued with reference to the widely-discussed *Black Book*, whose anonymous authors documented the dominance of elites from two states accounting for only 4.7% of (united) Sudan's 2001 population^{133,134}. Individuals from these two states, largely inhabited by the Shaigiya, the Jaaliyin and the Dangala tribes, have made up a strong if not overwhelming majority of ministers in almost all post-independence regimes in Sudan. Other observers similarly claim that even lower level government jobs and much of the economy is dominated to a similar extent by the people of these Northern states, or

132 See for example Mansour Khalid, 2005, *op. cit.*, or Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*

133 Namely Northern State and River Nile. The population figure is attributed to a World Bank publication, cited in Cobham, 2006, *loc. cit.*, p. 465. For an example of a text pre-dating the *Black-Book*, but making a similar argument, see Kasfir, 1990, *loc. cit.*

134 The *Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan* was distributed outside of mosques in major cities, mainly in Khartoum, in 2000. It was denounced on the front pages of government newspapers and quickly banned. It seems to have become well known in Sudan. In relation to the specific claim above, the three tribes made up between 59% and 79% of ministers and presidents in all post-independence regimes except during the second democratic period (1986-1989), when the proportion was 47%. As cited in Cobham, 2005, *loc. cit.*, p. 465.

as others more commonly put it, members of these Riverain tribes¹³⁵. The exclusion of people from peripheral areas has been apparent for a long time, including in pre- and post-independence debates over federalism. More recently, it seems that some hoped that the Islamist movement would be more representative of different regions, but many from Darfur reportedly left the NCP disillusioned by the party's failure to give more influence to those from peripheral regions¹³⁶.

The economic marginalization of most peripheral areas is even better documented than their political exclusion. The *Black Book* claims that the dominance of individuals from Northern states is also reflected in skewed government expenditures. A scholarly analysis of the *Black Book* similarly indicates that Khartoum and Northern and River Nile states (which include a fifth of the country's inhabitants) enjoy higher government subsidies, much higher per capita development expenditure, and score almost twice as high as the West or East on some human development indicators¹³⁷. Similarly, scholars studying Darfur have underlined how the widely discussed paucity of economic or social development efforts in the South was mirrored in Darfur, both during the colonial era and long afterwards¹³⁸. The economic marginalization of people from certain regions of Sudan (and of certain groups within these regions) has been furthered by significant land expropriations in some areas, including on the territories of nomadic Beja people of Eastern Sudan¹³⁹.

135 The idea of Riverain tribes, Riverain Sudan (as a region) and similar usages of the term have become common in political analyses of the situation in Sudan. For the dominance of Riverain tribes in government, among the civil service, and in the economy see International Crisis Group, 2011, *loc. cit.*, and Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 16-17.

136 See for example Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 102-108.

137 For example, as of 2002, the West (Darfur and Kordofan) had a 38% rate of literacy and 44% gross primary enrolment, compared to 72% and 82% respectively, in Northern and River Nile states. See Cobham, 2006, *loc. cit.*, p. 475.

138 See Daly, 2007, *op. cit.*, especially p. 224-225, 239-242.

139 Johnston 2011, *op. cit.*, 130-139.

Analyses of marginalization are coherent with the overall patterns of armed conflicts in Sudan, as all major marginalized regions of Sudan have been involved in conflicts with the GoS. Rebel movement manifestos and political declarations have often made explicit reference to the marginalization of peripheral regions¹⁴⁰. Recent political events point to the continued prominence of the divide between marginalized and non-marginalized areas. For instance, a well known 2005 paper presented to the economic committee of the NCP by an ex-Minister of Finance and National Economy of the current regime argued for government economic efforts to be concentrated almost exclusively in the central “Dongola-Sennar plus Kordofan axis,” an area which excludes large parts of today's Sudan including Darfur and Eastern Sudan¹⁴¹. Riverain dominance has been maintained, especially through the current regime's extensive use of tribal affiliation to ensure its hold on power. For example, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) has become a powerful organ, with personnel recruited mainly from the Riverain tribes. In addition, the Jaaliyin top elite have reportedly created a military force from among members of their tribe, under the direct command of al-Bashir¹⁴². Riverain tribes are also known to dominate various economic sectors through corruption and nepotism¹⁴³.

2.6 Theoretical framework and hypothesis

This study of attitudes towards armed conflicts, the roles of Western

140 One partial exception is the “Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): Proposal for Peace in Sudan in General and Darfur in Particular,” published in Hassan and Ray, 2010, *op. cit.* p. 378-380. This declaration places a considerable emphasis on the distribution of political power and public wealth, but does not refer to marginalization as such.

141 Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hamdi, “The Future of Investment During the Interim Period: What Investment and Where in the Country?” Khartoum, quoted in El-Din, 2007, *loc. cit.*, p. 103.

142 International Crisis Group, 2011, *loc. cit.*, p. 10, 14.

143 *Ibid*, p. 18-19.

countries, and democratization in Sudan between 2005 and mid-2011 is in part exploratory, and in part explanatory. The exploratory component documents attitudes in the Sudanese diaspora, a population whose political attitudes and roles have rarely been studied. The theoretical framework and hypothesis refer to the explanatory component of the thesis, whereby the concept of cleavages is employed to identify and better understand the linkages between a socio-demographic characteristic and political attitudes.

The concept of cleavages is used to identify one or several particularly dominant divisions that shape political attitudes, behaviours, and institutions in a given population, often on the basis of a socio-demographic difference such as class or ethno-regional identity. Lipset and Rokkan's classic study identified class-based, urban/rural, religious/secular, and centre/periphery cleavages. According to these authors, cleavages that first defined political arenas in Western European countries "froze", as reflected in the stability of political institutions and electoral behaviours from the 1920s well into the 1960s¹⁴⁴. More recent studies have identified cleavages in many other countries, in different world regions. For example, Blaydes and Lintzer argue that "in large parts of the Islamic world, the substance of political debate surrounds a secular-religious issue cleavage." While most cleavages have been identified in relation to socio-demographic variables similar to those identified by Lipset and Rokkan, some argue that there are cleavages based on factors such as gender¹⁴⁵ or differences between materialist and post-materialist values¹⁴⁶.

144 Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1967, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments, An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, Seymour Lipset et Stein Rokkan (eds.), New York, The Free Press, p. 1-64.

145 C. Brooks, P. Nieuwbeerta, and J. Manza, 2006, "Cleavage-Based Voting Behavior in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence from Six Postwar Democracies," *Social Science Research*, vol. 35, p. 88-128.

146 Ronald Inglehart, 1990, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Definitions of cleavages have been the subject of much debate in political science. Deegan-Krause has identified the most common elements in academic conceptualizations of cleavages: socio-demographic/structural differences (most notably differences of ethnic origin, urban/rural residence, class, religion, or language), differences of attitudes (based in more fundamental values or beliefs), and finally differences of political institutions, especially political parties. A number of scholars who sought to further specify the model outlined by Lipset and Rokkan have argued that the notion of cleavage entails having all three elements¹⁴⁷. However, many others refer to cleavages when describing divisions manifested by the alignment of only two elements¹⁴⁸.

Our analysis is focused on a division that brings together a structural factor and attitudes¹⁴⁹. To avoid getting entangled in definitional debates, cleavages are defined in a general way in this thesis, as divisions that are politically significant and deeply rooted in a given population¹⁵⁰. The terms “cleavages”, “divisions” and “divides” are therefore used interchangeably. Specifically, the cleavage examined in this analysis brings together the following elements: region of origin (marginalized or non-marginalized region) and attitudes related to conflicts, Western intervention, and democracy. Potential institutional elements of the cleavage studied are beyond the scope of this research, in part because institutions in Sudan are currently unstable, given recent changes including continuing conflicts in certain areas, the severe repression of political activities, and the fluid nature of political alliances

147 Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair are among the most prominent proponents of this point of view. See Stefano Bartolini, and Peter Mair, 1990, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stability of European Electorates, 1885-1985*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

148 Deegan-Krause, 2006, *loc. cit.*

149 This is a combination of elements that Deegan-Krause would refer to as a “position divide.” See *ibid.*

150 This definition is similar to the “general” definition of cleavages proposed by Oddbjorn Knutsen and Elinor Scarborough in their 1996 chapter “Cleavage Politics,” in Jan W. Van Deth and Elinor Scarborough (eds.) *The Impact of Values*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 495.

between rebel groups and political parties. Formal political institutions in the Sudanese diaspora itself are too limited to be included in a cleavage analysis.

Lipset and Rokkan's seminal work on cleavages is primarily based on support for political parties in Europe in the 20th century. In this context, the national, regional, religious, and ethnic markers of citizens have been relatively stable, despite some changes of borders due to wars. However in African contexts, authors tend to accentuate changes in cleavages over time¹⁵¹. For some authors such as Daniel Posner, the socio-demographic factors that anchor many cleavages undergo gradual changes, including identification with a region of origin, a tribe, or an ethnicity¹⁵². For example, Naomi Chazan makes the following observation in the Ghanaian context:

Sometimes ethnic solidarity was expressed in cultural and linguistic terms. At other times ethnicity was presented in regional or geographic terms. At still other points, ethnicity was manifested in local-communal – traditional, political, or kin – terms... All possible ethnic-political presentations, either separately or in conjunction, could be brought to bear on the political situation depending on particular conditions¹⁵³.

Other authors similarly point out how individuals identify themselves differently depending on whether the individual or institution that they are interacting with shares one or more of their potential identity-markers¹⁵⁴. Taking an example from Darfur, “community leaders for whom the term ‘African’ would have been alien even

151 See for example Posner, 2001, *loc. cit.*, and 2005, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 10-17, and Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003, *loc. cit.*

152 Posner, 2005, *loc. cit.*, p. 10-17.

153 It should be noted that Naomi Chazan's analysis quoted above does not use the concept of cleavages; however it is nonetheless suggestive of the complexity of some ethno-political cleavages, and of how the political use of identity markers changes over time. See Naomi Chazan, “Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 97, p. 461-85. This quote was used to make a similar point in Posner, 2001, *loc. cit.*, p. 1.

154 Posner, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

a decade ago, now readily identify themselves as such when dealing with international interlocutors”¹⁵⁵. Also, anthropologists have documented how some Fur farmers in Darfur would “become Baggara” over time, adopting Arabic and other socio-cultural traits of this neighbouring tribe¹⁵⁶. Thus, through a complex series of different interactions and events, various socio-demographic factors can emerge as very politically salient.

We chose to focus on regional affiliation instead of ethnicity in part due to the relative fluidity of ethnicity and tribal affiliations in Sudan, as well because of works that question the centrality of ethnicity in defining political views in Africa. This focus should not be understood as rejection of the impact of ethnicity or other factors such as religion. Indeed, as in many countries, regional, ethnic, tribal, linguistic and other markers of identity in Sudan overlap to some extent. Regional affiliation is also a less sensitive characteristic than ethnicity in the Sudanese context¹⁵⁷.

Regional affiliation is closely related to geographical difference, a contemporary label for the structural element behind the urban/rural cleavage outlined by Lipset and Rokkan¹⁵⁸. We further adapt it to the object of our study by differentiating between marginalized and non-marginalized regions. This designation also recalls the centre/periphery cleavage laid out by Lipset and Rokkan, namely a cleavage between “the central nation-building culture” of a given country and “ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces

155 de Waal, 2005, *loc. cit.*, p. 197.

156 de Waal, 2005, *loc. cit.*, p. 194.

157 The first respondents interviewed were asked whether they would identify themselves in ethnic or tribal terms; however several declined to do so and the question was dropped. Ethnic or tribal affiliations, even the most general ones, therefore could not be verified without information from third parties that would violate the anonymity and go contrary to the wishes of some respondents.

158 See Deegan-Krause, 2009, *loc. cit.*.

and the peripheries”¹⁵⁹. However, the notion of a cleavage between marginalized and non-marginalized Sudanese regions is different in an important way. Regional marginalization emphasizes the political and economic exclusion of peripheral regions without necessarily making reference to distinct ethnic, tribal, or linguistic characteristics. It should therefore not be confused with the Arab/non-Arab divide outlined in the literature review¹⁶⁰.

Finally, because the Sudanese diaspora in Canada is largely composed of people who came from Sudan relatively recently, expectations derived from the literature about Sudanese politics and context are relevant. We therefore hypothesize that *distinct political attitudes in the Sudanese diaspora with regards to current conflicts in Sudan, Western intervention, and democratization are related to origins in a marginalized or non-marginalized region of Sudan.*

We consider that marginalized regions in Sudan include Darfur (the states of Northern, Southern, and Western Darfur), Western and Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Eastern Sudan (Gedaref, Kassala, and Red Sea states). Significant areas of other states, perhaps especially Northern Kordofan, could also be considered to be economically and politically marginalized. However, specifying parts of states is complex and unnecessary for the purposes of this study. Similarly, around the national capital, there is a large population that can also be described as economically and politically marginalized, but will not be considered a marginalized “region” in our analysis.

159 See Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, *loc. cit.*, p. 14.

160 This is despite the fact that in our sample, the distribution of respondents along the Arab/non-Arab divide is likely very similar to (though not the same as) their distribution according to marginalized or non-marginalized region.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifteen members of the Sudanese diaspora. This chapter begins by describing the Sudanese diaspora in Canada, then presents the recruitment method and the interviewees themselves. The questionnaire is then presented, along with a discussion of the attitudes that were studied. The final section explains biases related to my identity or affiliations that may have affected the results.

3.1 The Sudanese diaspora and the sample

In Canada, around a quarter of the more than 15,000¹⁶¹ members of the Sudanese or South Sudanese diasporas live in Toronto, another quarter live elsewhere in South-Western Ontario and around a fifth live in Calgary. Around 700-900 or more members of these diasporas are estimated to live in each of Edmonton, Vancouver and Winnipeg¹⁶². Average levels of educational attainment are considerably higher than most refugee populations in Canada, with a quarter of this population having completed a post-secondary degree or diploma¹⁶³. Most of those who arrived as

161 For more detailed numbers and estimates, see the introduction.

162 Statistics Canada, 2006, *loc. cit.* It should be noted that in Edmonton it seems that the combined population of these diasporas is “dominated by Southerners” and that “the majority” of those in Calgary are from South Sudan. See Mosaic 2009, *loc. cit.* p. 21.

163 The for Sudanese refugee educational attainment is from a 2006 Canadian Census data product purchased by the Mosaic Institute and not publicly available. See Mosaic 2009, *loc. cit.* p. 32.

refugees are known to face considerable challenges. Lack of sufficient income (mainly due to limited employment options), housing difficulties, and discrimination are commonly cited problems¹⁶⁴. For some, language proficiency is an additional challenge. In a 2004 study of recent, Sudanese refugees in South-Western Ontario, lack of English proficiency was mentioned as a barrier to gaining employment by 27% of men and 65% of women¹⁶⁵.

Fifteen in-depth interviewees were conducted with members of the Sudanese diaspora. Due to the limited size of the diasporas and their being spread over a considerable number of cities, a snow-balling approach was used to identify respondents willing to be interviewed. The initial goal was to speak with a balanced number of Northerners and Southerners, however given significant challenges involved with recruitment, this could not be achieved¹⁶⁶. This thesis focuses exclusively on the attitudes of members of the Sudanese diaspora: those whose origins are within the current borders of Sudan. As per terminology that seems fairly widely accepted in these communities, at least since the independence of South Sudan, I use the term “Sudanese” as a category that is exclusive from “South Sudanese.” Occasionally, when referring to periods before the independence of

Among all refugees in Canada from non-European source countries, only 6.3% of those who arrived between 1980 and 2001 held a bachelors degree or higher by the time of data collection. See de Voretz, Don, Sergiy Pivnenko and Morton Beiser. “The Economic Experiences of Refugees in Canada.” Discussion paper no. 1088. Bonn: Insitute of the Study of Labour, 31 p.

164 Data on employment profiles, housing, discrimination, and other problems can be found in Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “The study of Sudanese settlement in Ontario – Final report,” CIC Settlement Directorate, 2004. The employment profile whereby most new Sudanese and South Sudanese refugees have been limited to poorly paying jobs is corroborated by other studies such as Patrick Kandi Keyero, “When remittances become their tears: Canada's exclusionary immigration policy towards African immigrants robs Sudanese immigrants of the very money they need for settlement,” M.A. Thesis, Toronto, Ryerson University, 2007. See also Mosaic Institute, 2009, *loc. cit.*

165 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2004, *loc. cit.* p. 18.

166 Only five interviews with members of the South Sudanese diaspora could be completed. All references to the sample in this document refer only to the 15 members of the Sudanese diaspora.

South Sudan in 2011, I refer to “Northern Sudanese” or “Northerners” to refer to those who identify their origins within the current borders of Sudan.

I had some contacts in the Sudanese and to a lesser extent, Southern Sudanese diasporas prior to beginning the thesis due to having been an employee, and later a volunteer, of the Darfur/Sudan Peace Network for two and a half years (2007-2010)¹⁶⁷. Interviews began more than a year later. Five interviewees were already contacts of mine. The ten other respondents were identified through these initial contacts.

Seven of the fifteen respondents lived mainly in non-marginalized regions of Sudan (Khartoum and parts of the Nile Valley) and did not profess any affiliation with any other region. The other eight identified themselves with regions that are widely considered to be marginalized. Three of these respondents grew up in Darfur, one in western Kordofan, and another simply identified with the “Western” part of Sudan. Two respondents identified themselves with the Nuba Mountains. One respondent identified with a particular ethnic group in Eastern Sudan. Respondents’ region of origin was identified through a combination of questions. All respondents were asked in which parts of Sudan they lived. Many respondents were also asked whether they identify with a particular region of Sudan. Some respondents were also (or instead) asked whether they would be comfortable identifying themselves with a particular ethnic or tribal group, but this question was dropped because a considerable number of respondents preferred not to identify themselves in this way.

The sample is made up of 12 men and 3 women. This imbalance was unintended, but perhaps unsurprising given that there seems to be an over-representation of men among those Sudanese in the diaspora who are involved in political activities. The sample is mostly made up of people who left Sudan as adults

¹⁶⁷ The nature of the organization and potential biases relating to my affiliations are discussed in section 3.4.

and who are now in their thirties or older (only two respondents are younger, in their early-to-mid 20s, having left Sudan as children). Similar to the overall Sudanese diaspora, most respondents (12 of 15) came to Canada as refugees. Nine of the fifteen have lived in North America for over ten years, four between five and ten years, and one arrived less than five years ago. Many respondents have now spent most of their adult lives in North America. The interviews did not examine economic status, however anecdotal evidence suggests that the respondents tend to be disproportionately among the more economically privileged members of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada.

Most respondents are politically active, presumably much more than the norm in the Sudanese diaspora. Since coming to Canada, 11 of the 15 have been active in one or more associations, groups, or non-governmental organizations that have political goals; and a number of them have had leadership roles. Among the remaining four, at least two have been involved in other political activities. Seven of the fifteen have participated in a Sudanese political party since leaving Sudan, though in two of these cases that participation was described as being brief or as still feeling part of the community of a political party.

Respondents have a high rate of consumption of news media from Sudan. Eleven of fifteen check news from Sudan daily or almost daily and only two indicated that they do not check news sources regularly. Eight of 15 said that they check three or more sources regularly. They mainly consult online newspapers and websites with discussion forums, and a few watch satellite TV channels from Sudan. The two respondents who are in their early-to-mid 20s indicated that they see a lot of interesting content through Facebook.

3.2 The questionnaire

Semi-structured interviews were conducted using the questionnaire that can

be found in Annexe 1. At times, I asked follow-up questions other than those systematically used in order to clarify certain points or to better understand a given subject. The questionnaire was tested with the first four respondents. The subsequent modifications mostly consisted of removing some questions, making minor modifications to the wording of some others, and re-ordering. Little relevant data is missing from those first four interviews or from other ones¹⁶⁸.

Two interviews were done with pairs of respondents, one of which was a couple, the others being friends who requested that the interview be done together¹⁶⁹. The average interview time was approximately 63 minutes per respondent. The shortest interview lasted 40 minutes. Four of the interviews were considerably longer than the others (significantly more than one hour). Eight of the interviews were done in person, at the respondents' homes or in cafes. The other seven were done by phone or by Skype. I used a voice recorder except with three respondent who preferred that I take notes by hand. All interviews were transcribed. All respondents will be referred to using pseudonyms. Only male names are used, in order to ensure the anonymity of the three female respondents. The choice of pseudonym does not imply any characteristic of the respondents, whether in terms of their region of origin,

168 The final question, perhaps the most exploratory one, was omitted from interviews with three respondents due to time constraints. This was the question of whether "anything about living outside of Sudan [had] changed [their] views about political issues in Sudan?" Also, in one case, a respondent had a lower level of English-language skills and the interview was slower than usual. This respondent's answers were still quite clear and detailed, however in order to gather the most relevant data within the available time, this respondent was not asked 3 of the 12 questions about his attitudes, as he had already given responses which had to a considerable extent answered two of these three questions.

169 In the case of the couple, it was not known before the interview was about to begin that both would participate. In the case of the two friends, it did not seem appropriate to refuse to do the interview together, given the circumstances. The pair interviews resulted in some ambiguities, since it was difficult to note when and to what degree a respondent seemed to be in agreement with a point that the other was expressing. This was particularly challenging in the pair interview done through a Skype audio call. Fortunately, in both the pair interviews, respondents were very generous with their time and each individual responded at length to the large majority of questions.

ethnic affiliation or otherwise.

The questionnaire examined respondents attitudes regarding three themes: the roles of the Government of Sudan in current armed conflicts, the roles of Western governments, and the democratization attempted through the CPA. To understand attitudes regarding the GoS' role in current armed conflicts, I asked respondents to describe "what goals the government of Sudan seems to be pursuing" in the conflicts in Darfur and the Nuba mountains. Respondents' descriptions of the goals of the GoS address, among other things, the issue of whether the GoS intended or intends to commit crimes or genocide or other crimes against humanity. I asked respondents who did not spontaneously mention such terms whether they "believe[d] that the word genocide is accurate" in relation to the early years of the Darfur conflict ("and why or why not?"). Attitudes with regards to the GoS' role in the Blue Nile or Abyei conflicts were not examined, mostly in order to keep the interviews to a reasonable length.

To understand attitudes regarding the roles of Western governments, I asked about support for UN peacekeepers in Darfur, about the debate around potential Western military intervention in the early years of the Darfur conflict, and whether during the interim period of the CPA, pressure from Western governments could have been more effective in increasing the extent of freedoms or human rights in Sudan.

Issues of democratization are examined mainly in terms of levels of repression of political and non-political activities since 2005, the extent of unfair practices leading up to and during the 2010 election, and the boycott of the presidential election by the most powerful opposition party (and some other parties). I also asked whether respondents "believe there is any possibility that in the next ten years there could be a secular and democratically elected government in Sudan," and whether it is "possible that democratization could happen in some kind of gradual

and peaceful way.” While these questions are speculative, they provided some opening to explore issues of democratization with respondents who felt that there have been little to no changes in recent years¹⁷⁰. Respondents were also asked about how often they check news from Sudan and how many sources they consult, in order to ascertain whether this is related to the political attitudes studied.

3.3 Potential biases

As already noted, I knew five of the respondents prior to beginning this research project and the other ten were referred through these initial contacts and subsequent ones. This recruitment method may have introduced a bias because people are likely to refer me to people they know well, and presumably tend to share some attitudes with those individuals. While there was nonetheless quite a diversity of attitudes among my initial contacts and other respondents, almost all of them are opponents of the current regime in Sudan¹⁷¹. However, even without the potential biases described in this section, one would expect a high proportion of opponents of the regime for two reasons. First, the diaspora is primarily made up of refugees who left since the current regime came to power. (The regime produced a massive outflow of refugees, especially through the brutal persecution of perceived opponents and their families.) Second, the regime appears to be fairly unpopular within Sudan, as indicated by the polls described in the literature review and by other sources¹⁷².

170 Among other things, this last question can provide some indication of the extent to which respondents believe that the above-mentioned issues are relevant to achieving an eventual democratization. It is also an open-ended question that prompts respondents to name other factors that they perceive to be important. The question of whether pressure from Western governments could have been more effective in increasing the extent of freedoms or human rights also has some bearing on the same theme of whether marginal changes in civil liberties are perceived as being relevant.

171 Based on their responses, all but one respondent can quite easily be identified as opponents of the current regime. Even this one other respondent was fairly critical of the regime on most issues addressed and gave responses that were mostly unexceptional.

172 For example, historian Robert Collins has described the current government as the “most

I already had contacts in the Sudanese community due to my past work with the Darfur/Sudan Peace Network. I was an employee, later a volunteer, and throughout this time one of the main contact people of this organization, for around two and a half years (2007-2010). The nature of this organization¹⁷³ and its positions on various issues shaped the kinds of contacts I made with members of the Sudanese community and can thus be considered as another potential source of bias. However, my involvement in issues of human rights in Sudan seems to have been very helpful in convincing some people to share their views with me. This potential bias should thus be viewed in relation to my being given additional trust and access to information by some. During the consent procedure, I mentioned to respondents my previous role in this organization and explained that my role as a researcher is completely separate from any past involvement.

It also bears acknowledging that biases might be introduced by my being from outside of the community and being of a certain socio-cultural and religious background. One possible effect of these differences is that I may be perceived as being influenced by certain types of ideas, assumptions and misconceptions that are common in the West. For example, there is a lot of contested, misleading or even completely erroneous information in public discourse with regards to ethno-tribal or Islamist politics (in general and in relation to Sudan). That said, this effect is likely to have been reduced by my knowledge of the situation in Sudan, my history of involvement in these issues, and through the questionnaire.

unpopular regime in the history of independent Sudan.” See *Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan: Essays on the Sudan, Southern Sudan and Darfur, 1962 – 2004*, Los Angeles, Tsehai Publishers, 2005, p. 149-170. Some describe the support of the NCP by their allies as being limited and highly dependent on patronage. See for example International Crisis Group, 2011, *loc cit.*, p. 17-21.

173 The organization, which no longer exists, advocated initially for increased Canadian commitments to address the situation in Darfur: peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, diplomatic efforts, and support for the International Criminal Court. As of mid-2009, the organization also advocated around issues affecting other regions of Sudan.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Respondents' lengthy responses provide a unique data set from which to describe the nature of political attitudes in the diaspora with regards to recent political issues. In addition to describing these attitudes, we use this data to test whether there is a cleavage of attitudes between those from marginalized and non-marginalized regions of Sudan, as evaluated in the discussion. This chapter is organized into four sections, the first three of which deal with attitudes regarding the role of the GoS in the Darfur and Nuba Mountains conflicts, the role of Western governments in Sudan, and issues of democratization. The fourth and final section of this chapter briefly describes factors other than respondents' region or origin that were evaluated to see if they might explain patterns in the data.

4.1 The role of the GoS in the Darfur and in the Nuba Mountains

Respondents were asked how they would describe the goals that the Government of Sudan seems to be pursuing in the recent conflicts in Darfur and in the Nuba Mountains. Respondents responded by describing goals and other aspects of the GoS' role, including its motivations and actions in these conflicts. Respondents were nearly universal in their condemnation of the role of the GoS. However their descriptions of this role varied considerably. The issues most commonly addressed by respondents were the GoS' maintenance of the political and economic marginalization

of peripheral areas and its instrumentalization of ethno-tribal politics. Respondents also offered a variety of perspectives on whether it is accurate to describe the early years of the Darfur conflict as a genocide.

4.1.1 Marginalization and the maintenance of dominance

The most common theme in respondents' descriptions of the role of the GoS in the Darfur and Nuba Mountains conflicts was that it seeks to maintain a situation in which these regions are politically and economically marginalized. Most respondents communicate this idea or a very similar one¹⁷⁴. The frequency and emphasis on this type of explanation suggests that it is perceived as one of the best ways to explain these conflicts by those in the diaspora. For instance, Issam explains, referring to the GoS' efforts to address conflicts by military means, that the Nuba Mountains returned to conflict in 2011 because "the only option that [the leadership of the GoS] had is to control the country; and to control the country by doing what they did and what they are doing in Darfur. These are the same issues of social injustice and of marginalization." Ibrahim suggested that the GoS wants to make an example of Darfur: "[the GoS] doesn't want other places in Sudan to go down the same path that Darfur went down, to ask for what Darfur people ask for, which is their share in wealth and their share in authority." Similarly, Khamis indicates that the GoS seeks to simply maintain its control over the centre: "I don't think [the GoS has] any goal, but if there is one thing they try to assure is just to keep a buffer zone. That this war should not infiltrate into the centre. Either in the Nuba Mountains or in Darfur... As long as they're fighting there, we don't care. It's not the war itself, it's now to keep the centre." Khamis went on to tie this notion of keeping the centre to the regime's concentration of economic development activities in central areas.

¹⁷⁴ Four respondents talk explicitly about "marginalization", "marginalized areas" or the dominance of the "centre." Five give various other descriptions of how the GoS seeks to maintain an unequal distribution of wealth and power.

Some respondents mentioned marginalization in reference to historical roots of these conflicts, suggesting that these historical factors influence the GoS' current intentions and actions. For example, Sulayman explains that “the Riverain areas have to maintain their dominance. [...] In 2003 when the problem erupted [in Darfur], they saw that if they don't crush these movements, they might eventually end up having to share wealth and power and that kind of thing.” Makki similarly suggests that “neglect is the cause of the various conflicts. [...] Historically, certain groups dominate. At the time of independence they had money and education. After independence they didn't focus on marginalized areas – they focused on Khartoum and central Sudan.”

4.1.2 Genocide

There has been a prominent debate around whether genocide took place in Darfur, mainly in relation to the events of 2003 and 2004, but also sometimes in relation to events from 2005 onwards. There is a much less visible debate over whether genocide is taking place in the Nuba Mountains since 2011: this term was common among respondents. Before being prompted to address the notion of genocide, five respondents made such allegations, three of which were in relation to the situation in the Nuba Mountains. For example, Adam stated that “it's a genocide. They're using chemical weapons. They're using Antonovs [bombers]. They're using bombs against civilian people. They're making them starve. There is no right to basic human life in [the Nuba Mountains]”¹⁷⁵. When asked whether the notion of genocide is accurate to describe the conflict in Darfur, eight responded in the affirmative (including the five who had spoken of genocide without prompting). For example,

¹⁷⁵ There appears to be only a small number of journalistic accounts that allege the use of chemical weapons. See for example Mike Pflanz, “Sudan bombing civilians and executing rebel soldiers says leaked UN report,” *The Telegraph*, London, 17 July 2011, accessed 25 July 2012 from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/8643842/Sudan-bombing-civilians-and-executing-rebel-soldiers-says-leaked-UN-report.html>

Gamal says “I think it's accurate because if the government supports certain ethnic groups against others, I don't know how you can describe that other than genocide.”

Respondents' allegations of genocide were almost all qualified in significant ways. For example, Sulayman indicated that the GoS has perpetrated genocide, and later describes its goal as follows:

“The goal is three things: number one, that people will be on the run, away from the centre of where they can have a response, away from fertile areas to be occupied; number two, that they will change the demography of the area; number three, they will use the divide and conquer tactics to keep people fighting with each other”¹⁷⁶.

While this explanation is coherent with the respondent's allegation of genocide, it summarizes the goals of the GoS in a way that appears not necessarily genocidal. Absent from all but two of the eight respondents' descriptions of genocide is the notion of attempts to destroy or target a specific group other than “opponents” or “rebels.” For example, Adam explains that “[the GoS] would like [civilians] either to leave [rebel controlled] areas and come to the government, or they will kill them.” This contrasts with broader debates around genocide, referred to by two respondents¹⁷⁷, in which there is the notion of acts that intend to destroy a group defined by a criterion that is normally ethnic, religious, or racial. Some respondents explain that while it is opponents of the regime who are being targeted, there are nonetheless ethnic dimensions to the attacks. Ibrahim explains that “in my perspective, this grouping is just pro and against the government. And it happens that

176 The type of “demographic change” being referred to was contextualized by Sulayman in terms of government efforts to weaken and displace the Fur and their giving passports to people from neighbouring countries. “They get people, [according to] UN reports, from Niger, Mali, Chad and they give them Sudanese passports. Some of them have been absorbed in the border guards.”

177 For example, Yassin refers to “the definition of genocide in international law.” It is likely that Yassin and other respondents' are aware of common references to the Convention definition and similar definitions of genocidal crimes being acts “with the purpose of destroying” a group “in whole or in part” Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948.

most people who are against the government are *Zurqa*¹⁷⁸, and most people who are for the government are Arab. So it is a genocide, but with qualifications.”

In contrast, almost half of respondents expressed significant reservations about the term genocide, and three of them clearly and categorically refuted its appropriateness. Among them, only Faisal called into question the scale of crimes committed in Darfur, stating that “the international community blew things really out of proportion. I don’t believe that there were 300 000 or 500 000 killed.” Other respondents acknowledge something to the effect that “great evils” took place (Abdella) or that “I’m sure that a lot of crimes have been committed” (Issam), but call into question the appropriateness of the term based on whether it is believable that groups were targeted because of ethnic or tribal affiliations. For example, Salih responded by saying that he “[doesn’t] think that when [the GoS] sits down to strategize and to make a plan, [that they] plan to cleanse this tribe and that tribe.”

4.1.3 Politics of Arab identity, “race,” and religion

The large majority of respondents commented on dynamics related to the roles of Arab and non-Arab groups, as well as religion and sometimes “race.” Conflicts in Darfur and the Nuba mountains have often been described among academics along Arab/non-Arab lines, or in terms of inter-religious dynamics in the Nuba Mountains¹⁷⁹. All but two respondents mentioned the above factors in one way or another when discussing the role of the GoS in these conflicts.

178 The term *Zurqa*, or *Zuruq* is “a locally used name for the non-Arabized population of Darfur derived from the Sudanese Arabic word for Black,” and sometimes carrying a derogatory connotation. See Salah Hassan and Carina Ray “Critical Reading Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan,” in Salah Hassan and Carina Ray (eds.), *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009, p. 19.

179 As discussed in Chapter I, the Nuba Mountains has a sizable minority of Christians and other non-Muslims. The religious diversity of the region was at times used overtly by the GoS to justify brutal war-time strategies during the second Sudanese civil war. See Johnston, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

Most respondents suggested that the GoS divides people according to any criteria that might strengthen their position or weaken their opponents. Favouritism towards certain groups, whether presented in terms of “racial” or religious dynamics, tribal politics, or Arab identities were usually explained as being instrumentalized by the GoS. A fairly typical explanation, offered by Eissa, was that “if they're not using race, they use religion [...] They use whatever they can. They divide and divide and divide.” Another respondent similarly explains that “they kind of tried to separate people in that region into thinking that some of them are pro-South and others are pro-North; and have the conflicts occur within the Nuba Mountains people itself, rather than its true nature which is actually the Northern government trying to gain more control over that territory” (Abdella).

A minority of respondents indicated that the GoS consistently favours certain groups.

“The government is dividing people by Arab or African descent. This regime believes only in power – destroying opposition in all its forms. This hasn't worked, using all measures to crush any opposition by force [...] They are also trying to convince certain groups to join the government by giving them money and offering them things.” (Makki)

Some allegations of ethno-tribal favouritism of the GoS are made in relation to Darfur, where the GoS has taken significant measures to increase the military and political power of some, if not most Arab tribes, since at least the late 1990s¹⁸⁰. Some such policies were explicitly mentioned by three respondents, two of whom (both from Darfur, Sulayman and Khamis) refer to attempts to “change the demography” of the region by giving citizenship to Arab immigrants from countries in the region. Sulayman situated this goal of the GoS among two others: displacement and the creation of divisions. Khamis explained that the GoS sees non-Arab tribes in various regions as creating troubles for them, and “just wants to dominate those areas.”

¹⁸⁰ See the Chapter 1 of this document and Flint and DeWaal, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 33-70.

A sizable minority indicated that certain religious, ethnic, or “racial” factors are important to consider in relation to the Nuba Mountains. For example, Faisal stated that

“there is a historical aspect [by which] the Christian missionaries were more successful in converting the Nubas to Christianity than the Muslim missionaries were. Even those who were converted to Muslim sects, they were then converted to Christianity. So there are legacy prejudices”¹⁸¹.

Addressing a similar topic, Badawi mentioned a speech by President al-Bashir (since the independence of South Sudan) in which he said that thereafter Sudan would be a fully Arabic and Islamic country, and that there would be no more speakers of languages other than Arabic¹⁸².

4.2 Western intervention and UN peacekeeping

Respondents were asked whether Western military intervention would have been justified in Darfur or in the Nuba Mountains, and whether the UNAMID peacekeeping mission has been effective and appropriate. For most respondents, attitudes towards Western intervention vary considerably depending on the conflict, the time period, and the type of intervention. The large majority criticize Western intervention, mainly with regards to the motivations behind Western foreign policies and their effects. Cooperation between Western and Sudanese security and intelligence agencies is also a concern for some. The UNAMID peacekeeping mission is much less controversial, though its effectiveness is doubted by many.

181 Contrary to what this response suggests, there is a large Muslim population in parts of the Nuba Mountains. See Johnston 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 131-134.

182 The 2011 speech by Al-Bashir that Badawi refers to could unfortunately not be located. See however Peter Moszynski, “Fears grow for minorities in North Sudan if South votes to secede,” *The Guardian*, London, 8 January 2011, accessed 25 July 2012 from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/08/south-sudan-referendum-bashir-sharia-law>

In relation to Darfur, respondents were asked whether Western military intervention would have been justified in the early, most intense years of the conflict. While there are divided attitudes towards many elements of Western military interventionism, it was remarkably common for respondents to agree that an intervention would have been justified in the early years of the Darfur conflict. Only three respondents rejected all forms of Western military intervention in this case¹⁸³.

Four of the respondents who indicated that some form of intervention would have been justified nonetheless expressed major reservations. Adam suggests that only a no-fly zone would have been justified. Another respondent, Faisal, indicated that intervention would have been justified but that a “serious threat” or some “limited” intervention would have been the right way to proceed. Another respondent, Salih, criticized those who call for a no-fly zone:

In my opinion, when you are in big trouble and you don't really know what you can do and you don't really have a way out – I guess what I'm trying to say – and I'm trying to be fair to everyone, I think there is a kind of desperation in asking the Western governments to come and help us out.

Later in his interview, when asked whether intervention would have been justified in the early years of the Darfur conflict, Salih said the following: “...umm...Yes, it [would have been] right. Whether it's realistic or feasible I'm not really sure, right. But definitely I think that could have saved a lot of lives.”

The large majority of respondents who said that some form of intervention would have been justified in the Darfur context were also asked whether such an intervention would be justified where it to occur at the time of the interview, whether in relation to the Nuba Mountains or Darfur. On this question, attitudes are much more divided, with only seven respondents indicating that such an intervention

183 UN-mandated peacekeeping was consistently described as separate from (rather than as a type of) Western military intervention.

would be justified. The type of intervention that would be justifiable also changed for some respondents. For example, Sulayman responded as follows.

Still we need a no-fly zone [in Darfur], because they are still bombarding. Now also in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile they also want a no-fly zone. The way there could be an intervention [as] in 2003 [in Darfur], I don't think that would be valid anymore, but the no-fly zone is still valid.

A few respondents indicated that a military intervention was necessary in order to bring about a change of regime in Sudan¹⁸⁴:

I do advocate for a more peaceful transition or revolution, but we just don't see that change in Sudan, we continue to see the failure of peaceful movements and peaceful transition. Maybe outside military intervention would be the only way to really see an effect against the NCP. I wouldn't want that to happen but I guess, I think it's the only way that the NCP would be affected, by an outside military intervention. (Abdella)

Respondents voiced a variety of concerns about Western military intervention, often pointing to the Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as disastrous examples¹⁸⁵. Some explained that positive changes cannot result from outside interventions, two of whom indicated that any Western intervention in Sudan would rally people around the current regime. Faisal suggested that “exogenous change is impossible in Sudan the same way it was impossible in Iraq and it is impossible in Afghanistan; and people are starting to realize this.”

The most commonly expressed type of reservation regarding Western military intervention was with regards to the motivations of Western foreign policies. Mostly respondents indicated that there is little or no genuine concern for human rights, democracy, or even crimes against humanity in Sudan. Even some who are fairly

¹⁸⁴It should be noted that two of these three respondents nonetheless expressed opposition to Western military intervention in most forms or contexts.

¹⁸⁵It is unclear whether respondents view Western military interventions primarily in terms of US-led interventions. The examples mentioned by respondents could all be described as such: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

favourable to the idea of Western military intervention hold such perspectives. For example, Sulayman explained that:

I do believe that intervention was necessary. The intervention I have in mind is not like what happened in Iraq but something based on [the UN principle of] right to protect. Use that to make clear if a government is killing its own people, then the international community can intervene to create a safe haven for those people. The Sudan issue or Darfur issue is not an issue for people. The Darfur people are Muslims and are Black, and so the world ignores this.

Other respondents express Western interest (or lack thereof) mainly in terms of oil, as indicated by Makki: “[Western countries] said they intervened in Libya to protect civilians, but there was not even a fraction of the danger to civilians as [in] certain conflicts in Sudan. But it’s because there are billions in oil, which Darfur or Nuba Mountains don’t have.”

A number of respondents (n=5) pointed to the West’s collaboration with the Sudanese security apparatus as a major point of concern and reason why Western governments have not put greater pressure on the GoS. As Sulayman explains, “The priority of the USA is security, fighting terror. I don’t know what information Sudan is giving them, but this seems to play a huge role. Obama knows what is going on, but there is no will, because they’re concerned about national security.” More broadly, it was often simply a lack of political will of Western governments that was invoked to explain their inaction:

“I think always since 2003, the Western countries [in relation] to [the Darfur] conflict and to [other] conflicts in Sudan, including human rights in Sudan, they were not up to the level, and I think it lacks the political will. And that it why the [GoS] does not take the threats and things seriously, because they know they will not do it. Because they do not have the political will to do anything on the ground. (Ibrahim)

Aside from questions of Western military intervention, respondents were also asked what they think of Western support for the UNAMID peacekeeping mission in

Darfur. None of the respondents expressed opposition to the mission, though two respondents expressed concerns regarding sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers or corruption within the international force. Some respondents doubted the effectiveness of the mission, indicating for example that Western support should have been greater. Three respondents, all from Darfur, went so far as to say that the peacekeepers have been “useless,” “not effective at all” or are “not doing anything.”

4.3 Democratization

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) resulted in some significant shifts in the political landscape. It has been linked to a reduction in repression, and led to the first multi-party election in more than two decades. Respondents were asked to consider elements linked to democratization, such as changes in levels of repression, the fairness of the 2010 election, and changes in the GoS' use of tribal politics. They were also asked whether they saw any potential for a change towards a democratic and secular government, and whether such a change could occur in a gradual or peaceful fashion. This revealed some of respondents' beliefs regarding the conditions necessary to achieve democratization in Sudan.

4.3.1 Levels of repression and tribal politics

There is disagreement over whether there was any substantive decrease in repression around the time of the CPA. Half of the respondents indicated that there was a certain margin or space of freedom that appeared around 2005, at least in Khartoum, particularly with regards to freedom of expression and the inclusion of some political parties that had operated mainly from neighbouring countries for a number of years. Numerous respondents gave examples of changes that were part of this margin of freedom. For example, Eissa explains:

The opposition parties were not [parties to the CPA] so it didn't affect them.

The gov't didn't honour its agreement with the political parties. To be true though, before CPA, many people could not go back. We could not go back to Sudan. There was no margin of freedom. [After the CPA] politicians also went back to Sudan, and the newspapers started to open here and there. But the election came and that struggle changed this margin of freedom. This margin did not go that far. Yes, you can talk on public transportation or whatever, but even if you are a big guy, you can still get killed or tortured.

Several respondents (n=6) indicated that there was an increase in freedom of expression and association. According to some, there was also a reduction in the frequency of torture, arrests or beatings carried out by the security services: "They can kill someone in Port Sudan or Darfur, but not a prof in Khartoum as they used to" (Ali). Yet respondents also mentioned cases of beatings, torture and killings which occurred during the same period.

[A person I know] was engaged in the women's civil society movement. She was beaten two – three times. [Another person I know] went back to Sudan and was beaten by the police because he was holding an American passport. He did nothing actually. Still there is repression, still there is a ban on some papers, still people cannot make their activities in a normal way. Still you feel like there is someone behind you. People start to speak, like at a gathering, a feast, when they bury someone, they speak their mind. I'm listening, but it is not safe. [Adam]

Several respondents mentioned that repression increased again leading up to and following the 2010 election and the separation of South Sudan¹⁸⁶. The election in South Kordofan (the region that includes the Nuba Mountains), held a year later¹⁸⁷, then precipitated a return to conflict between the GoS and SPLM-North, which

186 This increased repression has been widely reported and documented elsewhere. See for example International Crisis Group, "Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan," March 30th, 2010 [online], available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan.aspx> (accessed 25 June 2012).

187 The election was delayed in this region due to the disagreement between the NCP and SPLA/M over results of the 2008 census and over the boundaries of certain constituencies. See Muhammad Osman, 2011, "FACTBOX: South Kordofan elections," *Sudan Tribune*, 10 April 2011 [online], available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/Background-briefing-South-Kordofan,38531> (accessed 30 September 2012).

further heightened the security concerns of the GoS. Approaching and following the separation of South Sudan, inflammatory rhetoric of the GoS against minority groups and in favour of an Arab and Islamic identity for Sudan seems to have been coupled with an increase in repression. As one respondent noted, “they think now everyone in the North is a Muslim, so they think they can enforce their political agenda. And they start with the women's movement, harassing them [about the] Islamic dress code”¹⁸⁸.

Eight respondents denied that any reduction in repression had taken place around 2005, and three of them claimed that things have only gotten worse since that time. When asked about the return of political parties, one such respondent explained that the GoS simply wanted to neutralize those political forces – mainly the two most historically prominent political parties of what was Northern Sudan, the DUP and NUP.

Some respondents indicated that tribal politics are becoming more prominent. “[Those] still living [in Sudan] kind of feel that the country went back 100 years” (Salih). Given the myriad of military alliances between the GoS and various tribal groups, Khamis describes things particularly pessimistically:

I believe there will be no country in 10 years. There will be no Sudan. The country will disintegrate, no matter what. Just like Somalia, it's not going to continue like this. You could have them sitting there and having control over Khartoum, and have the government carry the name of Sudan. But in reality there will be no country [...] When everyone has arms, and even the government is not using the military to fight them, you loose sight of a national identity. Even now, I don't see a nation. I see a bunch of people running by the name of a country, giving people weapons to protect them.

Three other respondents also mention the possibility that the country could “break

¹⁸⁸ Women in Sudan have been defying the regime's laws about dress codes for many years. The current regime decreed years ago that all women must cover their faces when in public. See Hale, 2001, *loc. cit.* Most women do not abide by such rules, and this is generally tolerated. However, there have been cases where it has led to repression. For example, a journalist was beaten under the pretext that she was wearing pants.

apart” (Sulayman and Eissa) or that they are unsure whether “it can stay one country with the same borders” (Gamal). Sulayman explains these changes particularly in terms of the 2001 split between Sudanese President al-Bashir's and Hassan al-Turabi's factions of the ruling party:

Those who remained in power no longer trusted that the military would be loyal to al-Bashir instead of Turabi, so they had to resort to tribal support. Now it is whether you are loyal to a tribe that you can get something. With applications for jobs, they ask what is your tribe. Even at the airport they ask: “What is your tribe?” So it became such that everything is based on tribe.

The Darfur conflict seems also to have further contributed to a dynamic of discrimination. Two respondents alleged that some are persecuted based largely on their being from Darfur¹⁸⁹. While Darfuris have long been underrepresented in the country’s institutions, along with those from other marginalized regions, this type of persecution is unprecedented given that until 2003, there had been very little armed resistance by Darfuris against the government.

4.3.2 The 2010 election

All respondents except one described the 2010 election as being affected by extensive unfair practices on the part of the current regime. Most (n=10) went so far as to dismiss the election completely, saying that it was “completely rigged,” “almost like a joke,” or that it “cannot be described as free or fair in any way”. Others point to extensive corruption, vote buying, and fraud. For example, one respondent mentioned that he knows of a rural area in which a credible opposition candidate (who had at least some known support) did not receive a single vote, according to the official results.

Several respondents pointed out that “the West” or “the Americans” should

189 See International Crisis Group, 2010, *loc. cit.*

not have accepted the 2010 election results. Some objected specifically to the actions of the Carter Center elections monitoring team¹⁹⁰. Adam explains that the election

has been secured by the Carter Centre. The Americans approved it [in order] to approve the separation of the South. They close their eyes on this one, and ask to please leave the [2011] referendum [on the separation of the South] to go smoothly. It's a deal. Everyone knows that. It's a deal between the Americans and the Sudanese government itself.

Eissa similarly summarizes the Western response to the elections as follows: “Forget about Darfur. Forget about the Nuba Mountains. Forget about Blue Nile. Let the South secede first. The West is playing this game time after time.”

Despite respondents' almost universal dismissal of election results, eight respondents still thought that the SPLM should not have withdrawn its candidate for president, Yassir Arman¹⁹¹. As Sulayman explained, if Arman had not been withdrawn, the NCP “still could have rigged it, but maybe like in the Nuba Mountains case it would be more contested, and the whole world would be concerned with the CPA at stake.” A few respondents attributed the boycott to the SPLM's focus on the upcoming secession vote in South Sudan. “I think it's a big mistake. I think Yassir as a member of SPLM couldn't understand the real political game on this front. It was a game played by the separatist people inside the SPLM against the people who are calling for the unity” (Adam). Other respondents

190 In addition to the Carter Center's report, respondents may be referring to Jimmy Carter's widely discussed comment to a reporter, after two days of polling, that there was “no evidence of fraud so far as [he] kn[e]w.” See Sudan Tribune, “Carter election observer mission says no evidence of fraud in Sudan poll,” 13 April 2010, [online] <http://www.sudantribune.com/Carter-election-observer-mission,34753> (accessed August 3rd, 2012), and Carter Center, 2010, *loc. cit.*

191 Yassir Arman was the 2010 election SPLM candidate for President of Sudan. Arman, as a respected SPLM figure, a Northerner, and a Muslim, was perceived by many to be a good candidate, especially for getting votes in the North. The SPLM was and continues to be headed by Salva Kiir, who ran successfully for President of what was then Southern Sudan and is now independent South Sudan. Arman was withdrawn as presidential candidate during campaigning. The SPLM continued to contest all positions in Southern Sudan and ran many candidates in the North, for positions of governor, members of the National Assembly, etc. NCP candidates were declared the winners of almost all seats in the North other than for governor of Blue Nile.

similarly expressed dismay or at least disagreement with the SPLM's focus on secession, which in their view detracted from potential political change in the North. Salih explains that

“[with regards to] the democratic and progressive movements in the country, the nomination of Yassir Arman and all that I think to a large degree succeeded in mobilizing a lot of people. It's just that the SPLM decided to withdraw him from the election had a negative impact... In my opinion the SPLM, at that time, maybe they had made up their mind about separation, so they didn't really care that much about the election.”

Three more interviewees explicitly linked the withdrawal to a deal between the SPLA/M and the NCP, whereby the regime agreed to make secession easier in exchange for the withdrawal of Arman.

4.3.3 Transition to a more democratic or secular regime?

Respondents' speculations about the potential political change in Sudan in years to come were complex and included inter-connected themes such as whether a popular uprising was possible, the nature of political parties, and the strength of Islamist and secular forces in Sudan. Speculations also related to the sensitive topic of armed movements, a subject that I did not address in interviews questions¹⁹².

As seen in the previous subsection, respondents expressed considerable scepticism about the impact or relevance of the most obvious attempts at liberalization or democratization in recent years. In their forward-looking comments, there is even less mention of a gradual change. Rather, some respondents explained that the current regime “won't allow anyone else to become powerful enough to compete democratically” (Makki), or won't “go out without a fight, unfortunately” (Abdella). Respondents mostly talked about popular uprisings, rebel groups, or

¹⁹² This can be a sensitive topic mainly because in some diasporas, it is common to send money to rebel movements in the country of origin.

outside military interventions as the only ways that the current alignment of political forces could change in a major way. Only two respondents indicated that a transition could happen through a “revolt from within” whereby political forces close to the centre of power would come to some agreement to shift power to parties such as the DUP or NUP. One factor that was conspicuously absent from respondents' forward-looking remarks was the notion that a significant change in the alignment of political forces could occur as the result of a negotiated agreement between the NCP and opposition political parties (or rebel groups). No one suggested that such a settlement could potentially lead to democratization or a change of regime.

The most common suggestion (n=7) of how the regime could leave power was through a popular uprising, due to the difficult situation in the cities (high inflation, widespread unemployment, etc.). “People in all the cities are very upset and the situation is explosive. Graduates are not working, there are no jobs, inflation is so high. How is it going to go?” (Eissa). Other respondents mentioned military spending, rural famine, and even

“the problem with expression [and the] right of organization. That whenever someone express their opinion they are arrested and tortured. Still people are tortured. Still people are imprisoned. So all of these are the right conditions for uprising to happen.” (Ibrahim).

Several (n=4) mentioned the role of civil society or grassroots groups, generally placing a strong emphasis on the importance of such groups in any attempted democratization. For example, Issam stated that for democratization to occur,

it needs a lot of efforts in terms of the work seriously to organize people, organize being active in the trade unions, being active in the civil society organizations and try to really address the concerns of the people. This is not only the concerns of the role of the politicians and the opposition but also the role of the people from the communities itself, you know, those grassroots people.

Some believed that political parties could also have a positive role to play in

the event of a transition.

“[The regime] has changed society, really. The country that we know has changed totally. Re-education might take a generation... People remember their old political allegiances though, so political parties could come back potentially. They could come back and fill the vacuum [in the event of a transition]. [The long-time leaders of the Umma and DUP parties] are alive. I think there will be something there. They didn't torture people in jail, at least. They could make a come-back.” [Ali]

Four other respondents also revealed that they have positive views towards (at least certain) political parties (out of the twelve respondents who mention the role of political parties). For example, alluding to the role of the diaspora, Yassin mentioned that “there are different reasons that [Sudan] is still behind [other countries], but we still have hope. Not only hope but different people are working now outside the country in different political parties and movements.” In contrast, others displayed negative attitudes towards political parties, particularly expressing doubts about commitments to secularism. These later respondents and some others expressed concerns about the DUP and NUP adopting an Islamist discourse or being increasingly unwilling to show support for secularism. Three respondents expressed clearly that these two parties are “part of the problem” or even “the other side of the same coin” (referring to the current NCP regime).

When asked about the possibility of a secular government in Sudan, respondents emphasized how difficult this would be to achieve. Two respondents noted that outside of war zones, the strongest opponent of the regime is perhaps the (Islamist) PCP, associated with Hassan al-Turabi, who was considered to be more powerful than al-Bashir himself until they came into conflict in 1996-1999¹⁹³. Furthermore, the strongest military force in Darfur, JEM, is considered to be an

193 Collins 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 194-228.

Islamic group, and is thought to have links with al-Turabi¹⁹⁴. It has already been noted that Islamist discourse has also had a considerable influence on the DUP and NUP, as well as on many people in Sudan. Some political leaders talk about the need for a 'civil state' rather than a 'secular' one; and the most powerful current alliance of rebel groups, the SRF, avoided referring to secularism or to Sharia law in its founding declaration, apparently as result of a compromise with JEM¹⁹⁵. Salih noted that "in the minds of the people [in Sudan], it's almost like a taboo" to oppose Sharia law. Similarly, Faisal explains there is a fear of "giving your enemy the chance to name you as un-Muslim or a bad Muslim."

194 It is known that JEM's late leader Khalil Ibrahim was at least somewhat close to Hassan al-Turabi before Bashir removed al-Turabi from power. While Ibrahim later ardently denied ongoing links to al-Turabi, many believe that there are ongoing links between JEM and the PCP. See Flint and de Waal, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

195 The founding declaration of the SRF, apparently delayed because of disagreements over the role of Islam in a post-revolutionary state, summed up the aims of the SRF as including "equal citizenship [and] liberty" but without making any more direct mention of secularism or freedom of religion. See Jared Ferrie, "Sudanese Darfur Rebel Group Joins Anti-Government Alliance," Bloomberg Businessweek, November 14, 2011, accessed June 26th from <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-14/sudanese-darfur-rebel-group-joins-anti-government-alliance.html>

4.4 Discussion

A number of the attitudes described above are related to whether respondents are from a marginalized or non-marginalized region of Sudan¹⁹⁶. The association between region of origin and attitudes is particularly clear in relation to questions of genocide and of Western intervention. Among those who said that the term genocide is accurate in relation to at least one of the conflicts in Sudan, seven of nine were from marginalized regions. In contrast, the large majority of those from non-marginalized regions either cast doubts on whether groups have been targeted based on a tribal, ethnic, or racial basis, or offered descriptions of the conflicts that did not mention genocide or a comparable term.

Those from non-marginalized regions, in addition to less frequently believing that genocide took place¹⁹⁷, were also less supportive of Western interventions. While there was a strong majority who agreed that at least some limited form of intervention would have been justified in the early years of the Darfur conflict, even the range of opinions on this case is indicative of a divide. Among those who either opposed all forms of intervention or who expressed major reservations about what kinds of intervention would be justifiable in this case, five of seven were from non-marginalized regions. A similar pattern emerged with respect to whether an intervention would have been justified at the time of the interview, in order to stop the violence in the Nuba Mountains and Darfur. Among the seven who thought it

196 While other factors were also analyzed, only region of origin merits discussion. Age and number of years spent in North America were not found to be relevant. Some patterns in the data seem potentially related to lack of involvement in political activities and low levels of news media consumption; however only four respondents fit this criteria. This number is too small to warrant further discussion, especially since only three of these four have a considerable number of attitudes in common. Similarly, gender differences could not be evaluated because there are only three women in the sample.

197 During the pilot interviews, the question of whether the term genocide is accurate was not asked. The two respondents from non-marginalized areas did not use the term, and were not prompted to explain whether they believed the term to be appropriate.

would be justified, five were from marginalized regions. Unsurprisingly, there was also a difference in the extent to which respondents expressed criticisms of Western countries' policies towards Sudan (and towards Libya, Iraq, or Afghanistan), whereby some of the strongest criticisms were voiced by those from non-marginalized regions; this was however a difference of degree rather than of kind, as criticisms of Western government motivations or policies towards Sudan were common, even among respondents who were relatively favourable to Western interventions.

There was agreement among respondents that the GoS is seeking to maintain a situation in which peripheral areas are politically and economically marginalized, and that this is a driver of current conflicts. Respondents also shared similar levels of pessimism about the likelihood of democratization in the years to come, and a strong majority agreed that the regime "won't go out without a fight" (Abdella). Yet, the regional divide emerges again when the issue of regime change was addressed. The potential avenues towards a democratic transition mentioned by respondents were Western intervention, a coup, the overthrow of the government by rebel movements, or some form of largely or entirely unarmed, popular uprising due to difficult economic conditions in urban areas. The likelihood of a popular uprising was raised by seven respondents, five of whom are from non-marginalized regions of Sudan. Four of those who mentioned the possibility of an uprising also mentioned the role of civil society, sometimes in reference to the work that would be needed to achieve an uprising or other transition. These later four were all from non-marginalized areas.

The attitudes associated with region of origin were also connected to one another in an additional way. Almost all of those who talked about a potential uprising were among those who are least favourable to Western intervention. Issam, having already mentioned the possibility of a popular uprising, expressed his opposition to the idea of intervention in the early years of the Darfur conflict in the following way. "No, I don't believe that is a good idea at all. Any intervention will

not be for the sake of the people. [...] Changing the government of the North of Sudan has to be the role of the people themselves. Not an intervention.”

There were opinions that do not appear to be related to whether respondents are from marginalized or non-marginalized regions. For example, opposition to the government of Sudan was extremely common, and attitudes towards the GoS' role in recent conflicts were very negative. There was also wide agreement that the 2010 election was rigged. There were also some differences that do not align with region of origin. Ethno-tribal dimensions of conflicts were described in a variety of ways, most notably giving diverging explanations of whether such factors are important aspects of the GoS' goals in these conflicts. Respondents' views of whether repression had decreased around 2005 were also divided a way that appear unrelated to region of origin. Notwithstanding these later opinions, the pattern discussed in this section lends considerable support to the hypothesis that differences of political attitudes in the Sudanese diaspora with regards to current conflicts in Sudan, Western intervention, and democratization are associated with origins in a marginalized or non-marginalized region of Sudan. Significant differences of opinion on these subjects are associated with both region of origin and with one another.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This thesis had two objectives. The first was to explore the perceptions of members of the Sudanese diaspora in Canada (formerly referred to as northerners) with respect to current conflicts in Sudan and some of the main actors involved in them, namely the GoS and the “West”, as well as with respect to related issues of democratization. Fifteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with respondents from several cities in Ontario and Quebec, in late 2011 and early 2012. The interviews with members of this little known diaspora revealed complex views of politics in Sudan, particularly in relation to the period which began with the signing of the 2005 CPA and ending with the separation of South Sudan in 2011. After presenting the views of respondents, the thesis proceeded to analyze their relationship to a socio-demographic characteristic: origins in marginalized or non-marginalized regions. While this is certainly not the only significant political divide in Sudan, many works underline its importance. It also overlaps with other politically significant factors such as ethnicity and tribal identity.

The results provide some support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between differences of political attitudes in the Sudanese diaspora and origins in a marginalized or non-marginalized region of Sudan. Indeed a number of trends are quite pronounced in this sample. Those from marginalized regions of Sudan believe that genocide has taken place and that Western intervention would have been justified in both 2003 and late 2011. Most of those from non-marginalized regions of Sudan reject the label of genocide, are opposed to Western intervention of most kinds and in most cases other than the early years of the Darfur conflict. Those from non-

marginalized regions tend to indicate that a popular uprising could lead to a transition in Sudan (which is mentioned by few of those from non-marginalized regions). They are also more likely to mention the role of civil society in any potential transition.

That said, there was still considerable agreement on certain topics, including that some form of limited Western intervention would have been justified in the early years of the Darfur conflict. Respondents also agree that the regime will do almost anything to maintain itself and keep most of the country economically and politically marginalized. The fact that the expected divide was not apparent with these issues is most likely due to the nature of the sample. Indeed, the Sudanese diaspora in Canada is largely composed of individuals who fled repression.

As is often the case, our conclusions are limited in part by the size of the sample and the exploratory nature of the research. Furthermore, our questions addressed the specificities of the Sudanese situation, which makes the results more difficult to compare with those of studies pertaining to attitudes towards Western intervention and democracy in more general terms. However, the results suggest that a regional cleavage is likely to shape diaspora's attitudes pertaining to conflicts in Sudan and elsewhere in the world.

It is noteworthy that this appears to be the first study to analyse cleavages among political attitudes in this particular diaspora. For the broader study of political attitudes, this study shows that the notion of cleavage can be useful for understanding the politics of diasporas. The results can also be applied to non-academic contexts. For those who draw on expertise from the Sudanese diaspora, as well as for those who engage with members of the diaspora on efforts such as peace processes, the results provide some exploratory and explanatory data from which to better understand political attitudes. Those who support political activities by members of the diaspora can use the evidence and conclusions in a similar way.

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

Initial questions about the respondent:

1. For how many years of your life did you live in Sudan or in South Sudan?
 - a) In what parts of Sudan or South Sudan have you lived?
 - b) [Only asked in cases that it was not already known.] With what region of Sudan would you identify yourself?
2. When did you arrive in Canada and did you arrive as a refugee or through another process?
3. How often have you travelled to Sudan?
4. How often, on average, do you speak by phone with people in Sudan? And how often do you send emails to people in Sudan?

Democratization

5. To what extent did the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have an effect on the level of repression by police and the security forces against members of opposition political parties and other people engaged in political activities in the North?
6. Do you perceive the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as having had any effect on other areas of human rights in the North such as freedom from discrimination, freedom of cultural and religious practices, or people's ability to get justice from the courts?
7. How would you describe the election of the President of Sudan and of Members of the National Assembly in April 2010? To what extent were there unfair practices leading up to or during this election?
 - a) Do you believe that it was a good decision by the SPLM to boycott the election for President of Sudan (by withdrawing Yasir Arman as a candidate before the

election)?

8. At the state level and at the local level within Northern Sudan, were the elections of April 2010 any more or less free or fair when compared to the election of members of the National Assembly?
9. Do you believe that there is any possibility that in the next 10 years there could be a secular and democratically elected government in (Northern) Sudan?
 - a) Is it possible that democratization could happen in some kind of gradual and peaceful way?
10. Since 2005, do you perceive there to have been any change in the representation of ethnic and tribal groups that have historically been under-represented within the civil service or among the leadership of political parties?
11. Some people have indicated that there should have been more pressure from Western governments during the transition period on the issue of freedoms and human rights within Northern Sudan. Do you believe that this kind of pressure from Western governments can be effective in increasing the extent of freedoms?

Conflicts

12. How would you describe the goals that the Government of Sudan seems to be pursuing in the Nuba Mountains since May [of 2011]?
13. How would you describe the goals that the Government of Sudan seems to be pursuing in Darfur since 2003?
 - a) [Follow-up question for when the notion of genocide is not mentioned in the answer to the above question] Some people have described the early years of the Darfur conflict as genocide. Do you believe that the word genocide is accurate and why or why not?
14. Do you believe it is possible that Darfur or any other region could become an independent country?

Western governments' roles in Sudan

15. What do you think of the support of Western governments for the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur? [If clarification is needed: "Has Western support for UN peacekeeping been an effective and appropriate way for Western countries to respond to the situation?"]
16. Do you believe that Western countries should have intervened militarily in Darfur in the first two or three years of this conflict?

- a) [Follow-up question for those who answer affirmatively to the question above]
Do you believe that there should be some kind of military intervention by Western governments at the current time, in Darfur or in other regions?

Final questions about the respondent

17. How often do you read newspapers or watch television news from Sudan or South Sudan?

- a) How many different sources of news do you check regularly?

18. Have you participated in any Sudanese political party since you've been in the diaspora? I'm not asking that you tell me which one.

19. Do you participate in Sudanese politics in other ways such as voting, sharing information about political issues or being part of any association?

20. In order to understand and describe the perspectives of people in the diaspora, I am told that it could be relevant to be aware of the ethnic or tribal background of people who I interview. I understand that this can be a sensitive question, so it's really up to you to decide if you would feel comfortable indicating what ethnic or tribal group you would identify with?

21. Is there anything about living outside of Sudan that has changed your views about political issues in Sudan?

APPENDIX B

MAP OF SUDAN



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abusharaf, Rogaia Mustafa. 2002. *Wanderings : Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 193 p.
- Adamson, Fiona. 2002. "Mobilizing for the Transformation of Home: Politicized Identities and Transnational Practices." In *New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*. Nafje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds.), p. 169-187. London: Routledge, 246 p.
- Al-Ali, Nafje and Khalid Koser (eds.). 2002. *New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*. London: Routledge, 264 p.
- Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies. 2012. "The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index." Doha: Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 87 p.
- Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stability of European Electorates, 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BBC Worldwide Service / GlobeScan. 2008. "Israel and Iran Share Most Negative Ratings in Global Poll" [online]. http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcntryview/background.html (accessed August 3rd, 2012).
- BBC Worldwide Service / GlobeScan. 2011. "Positive Views of Brazil on the Rise in 2011 BBC Country Rating Poll" [online]. http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2011_countries/bbc2011_countries_global_rls.pdf (accessed August 3rd, 2012).
- Blaydes, Lisa and Drew Linzer. 2009. "Losing Muslim Hearts and Minds: Religiosity, Elite Competition, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World." Paper presented at the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, April 2009.

- Braizat, Fares. 2010. "What Arabs Think." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 21, no. 4, p. 131-138.
- Bratton, Michael and Mwangi Kimenyi. 2008. "Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective." Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 95, Cape Town, 22p.
- Bratton, Michael and Norris Mattes. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 488 p.
- Brooks, Clem, Paul Nieuwbeerta, and Jeff Manza. 2006. "Cleavage-Based Voting Behavior in Cross-National Perspective: Evidence from Six Postwar Democracies." *Social Science Research*, vol. 35, p. 88-128.
- Calfano, Brian and Emilie Sahliyeh. 2008. "Determining Democracy in the Organization of the Islamic Conference." *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 89, no. 3, p. 751-764.
- Carter Centre. 2010. "Observing Sudan's 2010 National Elections." Atlanta: The Carter Centre [online]. <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-041710.html> (accessed July 25th, 2012), 190 p.
- Chazan, Naomi. 2001. "Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana." *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 97, p. 461-485.
- Cheeseman, Nicholas and Robert Ford. 2007. "Ethnicity as a Political Cleavage." Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 83, Cape Town, 37 p.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. "Facts and Figures." Ottawa: Government of Canada.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 2005. "The Study of Sudanese Settlement in Ontario – Final report." Ottawa: CIC Settlement Directorate, 78 p.
- Cobham, Alex. 2006. "Causes of Conflict in Sudan: Testing The Black Book." *European Journal of Development Research*, vol. 17, no. 3, p. 462-480.
- Collins, Robert. 2005. *Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan: Essays on the Sudan, Southern Sudan and Darfur, 1962 – 2004*. Los Angeles: Tsehail Publishers, 408 p.

- Collins, Robert. 2008. *A History of Modern Sudan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 331 p.
- Converse, Philip. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*. David Apter (ed.), New York, Free Press, p. 75-169.
- Council on Foreign Relations. 2012. *Public Opinion on Global Issues*. Washington: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Daly, M. 2007. *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 368 p.
- Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre. 2010. "5th Population and Housing Census in Sudan – An Incomplete Exercise." 43 p. [online]. Available at http://southsudaninfo.net/wp-content/uploads/reference_library/reports/5th_population_housing_census_sudan.pdf (accessed August 28th, 2012).
- de Voretz, Don, Sergiy Pivnenko and Morton Beiser. "The Economic Experiences of Refugees in Canada." Discussion paper no. 1088. Bonn: Insitute of the Study of Labour, 31 p.
- de Waal, Alex. 2005. "Who are the Darfurians." *African Affairs*, vol. 104, no. 415, p. 181-205.
- de Waal, Alex and Yanes Ajawin. 1995. *Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan*. London: African Rights, 348 p. [online]. Available at <http://sudanarchive.net> (accessed July 14th, 2010).
- Deegan-Krause, Kevin. 2007. "New Dimensions of Political Cleavage." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*, Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1312 p.
- Demmers, J. 2007. "New Wars and Diasporas: Suggestions for Research and Policy." *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, vol. 11, p. 1-26.
- Deng, Francis Mading. 1995. *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 577 p.
- Desai, Raj M., Anders Olofsgard and Tarik M. Yousef. 2008. "Poverty, Exclusion, and Dissent: Support for Regimes in Developing Countries." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, August

28 – 31, Boston, 31 p.

- Dunning, Thad and Lauren Harrison. 2009. "Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali." Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 107, Cape Town, 26 p.
- El-Battahani, Atta. 2010. "Ideological Expansionist Movements versus Historical Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: From Actual Homicide to Potential Genocide." In *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader*, Sarah Hassan and Carina Ray (eds.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 43-67.
- El-Din, Kamal. 2007. "Islam and Islamism in Darfur." In *War in Darfur: And the Search for Peace*, Alex de Waal (ed.). Cambridge: Harvard Global Justice Initiative, p. 92-112.
- El-Tom, Abdullahi Osman. 2006. "Darfur People: Too Black for the Arab-Islamic Project of Sudan - Part I." *Irish Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 5-11.
- El-Tom, Abdullahi Osman. 2010. "Appendix K: Arab Congregation (Gathering) and the Ideology of Genocide in Darfur, Sudan." In *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader*, Sarah Hassan and Carina Ray (eds.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 448-467
- Ellis, Patricia and Zafar Khan. 2002. "The Kashmiri Diaspora: Influences in Kashmir." In *New Approaches to Migration?: Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*, Nadjé Al-Ali and Khalid Koser (eds.). London: Routledge, p. 169-187.
- Enyedi, Zoltst. 2005. "The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation." *European Journal of Policy Research*, no. 44, p. 697-720.
- Erdmann, Gero. 2007. "Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation: An African Case: Zambia." Hamberg: German Institute of Global Studies Working Paper no. 45.
- European Union Election Observation Mission. "Sudan, Final Report: Executive and Legislative Elections, 11-15 April 2010" [online]. http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/final-report-eu-eom-sudan-2010_en.pdf (accessed July 25th, 2012), 175 p.

- Ezimet, Kisangani. 1999. "Political Cleavages in a Democratizing Society: The Case of the Congo (Formerly Zaire)." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 32, p. 185-228.
- Furia, Peter and Russell Lucas. 2006. "Determinants of Arab Public Opinion on Foreign Relations." *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 3, p. 585-605.
- Government Accountability Office. 2006. "Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced." Washington, 71 p. [online]. Available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0724.pdf> (accessed July 12th, 2010).
- Gramizzi, Claudio and Jérôme Tubiana. 2012. "Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and New Players." Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 119 p. [online]. Available at <http://smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-28-Forgotten-Darfur.pdf> (accessed August 28th, 2012).
- Hale, Sondra. 2001. "Testimonies in Exile: Sudanese Gender Politics." *Northeast African Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 83-128.
- Harir, Sharif. 1994. "Arab Belt" Versus "African Belt": Ethno-Political Conflict in Dar Fur and the Regional Cultural Factors." In *Short-cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan*, Sharif Harir and Terje Tvelt. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, p. 143-184.
- Hassan, Salah and Carina Ray. "Critical Reading Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan." In *Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan*. Salah Hassan and Carina Ray (eds.). p. 15-33. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 528 p.
- Hazama, Yasushi, 2009. "Social Cleavages and Electoral Support in Turkey – Toward Convergence?" *Developing Economies*, vol. 41, no. 3, p. 362-387.
- Hoffman, Michelle. 2012. "Arab Barometer II: Iraq Country Report." Cairo: Arab Barometer, 53 p.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 504 p.
- International Crisis Group. 2010. "Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan" [online]. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/>

regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan.aspx (accessed June 25th, 2012), 24 p.

International Crisis Group. 2011. "Divisions in Sudan's Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country's Stability." [online]. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/174-divisions-in-sudans-ruling-party-and-the-threat-to-the-countrys-future-stability.aspx> (accessed July 14th, 2010), 42 p.

International Monetary Fund, "Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Mission to Sudan," Press Release No. 12/193, May 29th, 2012 [online], <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12193.htm> (accessed July 12th, 2012).

International Organization for Migration. 2010. "Southern Sudan Referendum (2011) Out of Country Registration and Voting (OCV) Frequently Asked Questions" [online]. <http://www.iom.pl/Shared%20Documents/20101104%20OCV%20CO%20Call%20Centre%20FAQs%20en%20%282%29.pdf> (accessed 12 august 2011), 8 p.

Jamal, Amaney and Mark Tessler. 2008. "Attitudes in the Arab World." *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 19, no. 1, p. 97-110.

Johnston, Douglas. 2009. "Commentary: Mamdani's 'Settlers', 'Natives', and the War on Terror." *African Affairs*, vol. 108, no. 433, p. 655-660.

Johnston, Douglas. 2011. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce*. Revised Edition, Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 236 p.

Karpathakis, Anna. 1999. "Home Society Politics and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The Case of Greek Immigrants in New York City." *International Migration Review*, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 55-78.

Levitt, Peggy, Josh DeWind and Steven Vertovec. 2003. "International Perspectives on Transnational Migration: An Introduction." *International Migration Review*, vol. 37, no 3, p. 565-575.

Lindberg, Staffan and Minion Morrison. 2005. "Exploring Voter Alignments in Africa: Core and Swing Voters in Ghana." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 565-586.

Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and

Voter Alignments, An Introduction,” in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, Seymore Lipset et Stein Rokkan (eds.). New York: The Free Press, p. 1-64.

Keyero, Patrick Kandi. 2007. “When Remittances Become their Tears: Canada's Exclusionary Immigration Policy Towards African Immigrants Robs Sudanese Immigrants of the Very Money they Need for Settlement.” Major research paper submitted as partial requirement for the degree of Masters of Arts. Toronto: Ryerson University, 74 p.

Knutsen, Oddbjorn and Elinor Scarborough. 1996. “Cleavage Politics.” In *The Impact of Values*, Jan W. Van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 492-524.

Kubicek, Paul. 2009. “The European Union and Political Cleavages in Turkey.” *Insight Turkey*, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 109-126.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2009. *Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror*. New York: Verso Books, 416 p.

Ministry of Welfare and Social Security National Population Council, 2010, “Sudan Millennium Development Goals Progress Report 2010,” Republic of Sudan, 75 p. [online]. Available at <http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/Sudan%20MDGs%20Report%202010.pdf> (accessed August 28th, 2012).

Morton, John. 1989. “Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea Province, Sudan.” *African Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 350, p. 63-76.

Mosaic Institute. 2009. “Profile of a Community: A 'Smart Map' of the Sudanese Diaspora in Canada.” Toronto: Mosaic Institute [online]. <http://www.mosaicinstitute.ca/Publications.html> (accessed August 12th, 2011), 62 p.

Moszyncki, Peter. 2012. “Fears Grow for Minorities in North Sudan if South Votes to Secede.” *The Guardian*, London, 8 January 2011 [online]. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/08/south-sudan-referendum-bashir-sharia-law> (accessed July 25th, 2012).

Mozaffar, Shaheen and James Scarritt. 2005. “The puzzle of African party systems.” *Party Politics*, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 399-421.

- Mozaffar, Shaheen, James Scarritt and Glen Galaich. 2003. "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies." *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no 3, p. 379-390.
- Neilsen, Erik. 2008. "Ethnic Boundaries and conflict in Darfur." *Ethnicities*, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 427-462.
- Norris, Pippa and Mona Lena Krook. 2009. "One of Us: Multilevel Models Examining the Impact of Descriptive Representation on Civic Engagement." Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Papers Series RWP09-030, 29 p.
- Norris, Pippa and Robert Mattes. 2003. "Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?," Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 26, Cape Town, 22 p.
- Orjuela, Camilla. 2008, "Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka's Violent Conflict." *Global Networks*, vol. 8, no 4, p. 436-452.
- Osman, Muhammad. 2011. "Factbox: South Kordofan Elections." *Sudan Tribune*, 10 April 2011 [online]. Available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/Background-briefing-South-Kordofan,38531> (accessed September 30th, 2012).
- Ostergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2006. "Diasporas and Conflict Resolution – Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?" Danish Institute for International Studies Brief, 15 p. [online]. Available at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Briefs2006/%F8stergaard-nielsen_diaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf (accessed August 18th, 2011).
- Ottaway, Marina and Mai el-Sadany. 2012. "Sudan: From conflict to conflict." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [online]. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sudan_conflict.pdf (accessed August 28th, 2012).
- Pflanz, Mike. 2011. "Sudan Bombing Civilians and Executing Rebel Soldiers Says Leaked UN report." *The Telegraph*. London, 17 July 2011 [online] <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/8643842/Sudan-bombing-civilians-and-executing-rebel-soldiers-says-leaked-UN-report.html> (accessed July 25th, 2012).
- Posner, Daniel. 2001. "Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa." Paper

prepared for the Workshop on Democracy in Africa in Comparative Perspective, Stanford University, April 27th, 36 p. [online]. Available at <http://democracy.stanford.edu/Seminar/Posner.htm> (accessed June 27th, 2011).

- Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 337 p.
- Santschi, Martina. 2008. "Briefing: Counting New Sudan." *African Affairs*, vol. 107, no. 429, p. 631–640.
- Scarritt, James and Shaheen Mozaffar. 1999. "The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of Democratic Competition in Contemporary Africa." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 5, no 1, p. 82-117.
- Shafiq, Najeeb. 2010. "Do Education and Income Affect Support for Democracy in Muslim Countries? Evidence from the Pew Global Attitudes Project." *Economics of Education Review*, vol. 29, no. 3, p. 461-469.
- Shandy, Dianna. 2007. *Nuer-American Passages*. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 224 p.
- Smith, H. and P. Stares (eds.). 2007. *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers?* Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 331 p.
- South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics. 2011. *2010 Statistical Yearbook*. 113 p. [online]. Available at <http://ssnbs.org/storage/South%20Sudan%20Statistical%20Yearbook%202011%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed August 29th, 2012).
- Statistics Canada. 2006. "Cumulative Profile, 2006 - Large Urban Centres in Canada (table)." *2006 Census of Population*, 48 Census Metropolitan Areas/Census Agglomerations and Census Tracts (database), via E-STAT [online]. http://estat.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-win/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&EST-Fi=EStat\English\SC_RR-eng.htm (accessed August 9th, 2011).
- Stokes, Bruce. 2010. "Summary of Findings from Pew Global Attitudes Project 2010 Survey of 22 Nations." Pew Research Centre, 7 p. [online]. Available at <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/transatlanticProgramme/pdf/pewGlobal.pdf> (accessed August 3rd, 2012).
- Sudan Tribune. 2012. "South Sudan Kiir 'Apologises' to US Obama for Denying his

- Support to Sudanese Rebels." August 4th, 2012 [online]. Available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-Kiir-apologises-to-US> (accessed August 23rd, 2012).
- Telhami, Shibley. 2007. "America in Arab Eyes." *Survival*, vol. 49, no. 1, p. 107–122.
- Tessler, Mark. 2003. "Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey Research." *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 4, p. 175–181.
- Tessler, Mark. 2010. "Religion, Religiosity and the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights from the Arab Barometer Surveys." *Middle East Law and Governance*, vol. 2, p. 221-252.
- Tessler, Mark and Michael Robbins. 2007. "What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts against the United States?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51, no. 2, p. 305-328.
- United Nations Development Programme. "Sudan Overview." [online]. Available at [www.sd.undp.org/sudan overview.htm](http://www.sd.undp.org/sudan%20overview.htm) (accessed August 28th, 2012).
- van de Walle, Nicolas. 2003. "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 41, no 2, p. 297-321.
- van den Boasch. 2012. "Arab Barometer II: Sudan Country Report." Cairo: Arab Barometer, 60 p. [online]. Available at <http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/sudanreportABII.pdf> (accessed August 3rd, 2012).
- WorldPublicOpinion.org / Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 2009. "Muslim and African Nations on Bashir Indictment and Darfur," 4 p. [online]. Available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_Darfur_Jul09_quaire.pdf (accessed August 2nd, 2012).
- World Values Survey Databank. Multiple years. World Values Survey Association, [online]. Available at <http://www.wvsevsvdb.com/wvs/WVSanalyzeStudy.jsp> (accessed August 2nd, 2012).
- Zunzer, Wolfram. 2004. "Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation." Berghof Occasional Paper no. 26. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 54 p.